Last month, it was my great honor to be invited to be a keynote speaker at Lincoln Network’s Reboot 2018 “Innovation Under Threat” conference. Zach Graves interviewed me for 30 minutes about a wide range of topics, including: innovation arbitrage, evasive entrepreneurialism, technopanics, the pacing problem, permissionless innovation, technological civil disobedience, existential risk, soft law and more. They’ve now posted the full event video and you can watch it down below.

Written with Christopher Koopman and Brent Skorup (originally published on Medium on 4/10/17)

Innovation isn’t just about the latest gee-whiz gizmos and gadgets. That’s all nice, but something far more profound is at stake: Innovation is the single most important determinant of long-term human well-being. There exists widespread consensus among historians, economists, political scientists and other scholars that technological innovation is the linchpin of expanded economic growth, opportunity, choice, mobility, and human flourishing more generally. It is the ongoing search for new and better ways of doing things that drives human learning and prosperity in every sense — economic, social, and cultural.

The United States is uniquely positioned to lead the world into the next era of global technological advancement and wealth creation. That’s why we and our colleagues at the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University devote so much time and energy to defending the importance of innovation and countering threats to it. Unfortunately, those threats continue to multiply as fast as new technologies emerge.

Indeed, it isn’t easy keeping on top of all of these issues and threats because the only constant in the world of innovation policy — the study of technological change and its impact on social, economic, and political systems — is constant change. You go to sleep one night thinking you’ve got the world figured out, only to awake the next morning to see that another tectonic shift has reshaped the landscape.

In the industrial era, it was hard enough mapping the contours of this field of academic study. This task has grown far more challenging. Computing and Internet-enabled innovations have fundamentally reshaped society and have also helped spawn other technological revolutions in diverse fields such as: robotics, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, big data, the Sharing Economy, 3D printing, virtual reality, aviation, advanced medical technology, blockchain and Bitcoin, and the so-called the Internet of Things.

The short-term social and economic disruptions caused by these and other new technologies often lead to backlashes and even occasional “techno-panics.” When those panics bubble over into the political arena, the risk is that misguided regulatory policies will short-circuit opportunities for creators and entrepreneurs to pursue life-enriching innovations.

At the Mercatus Center, where we study these and other topics, our goal is to bring greater focus to these emerging technologies and the many different facets of innovation policy surrounding them. How we accomplish these goals is as challenging as it is exciting. As more and more industries and business are affected by these emerging technologies, the decisions that policymakers make about them will have profound effects on large parts of our economy and society.

Specifically, as we place ourselves at the forefront of these debates, our aim is to:

• Explore how innovation policy affects economic growth and mobility, consumer welfare, and global competitive advantage;
• Identify barriers to entrepreneurial endeavors and devise a roadmap for how to remove them;
• Push back against technopanics and overly-broad theories of “technological harm” that could limit innovation opportunities and greater consumer choice; and
• Confront the legal and ethical concerns surrounding emerging technologies and craft constructive solutions to those problems to avoid solutions of the top-down, “command-and-control” variety.

Overall, our vision is simple: Permissionless innovation must become the norm rather than the exception. This means innovation and innovators are protected against efforts to preemptively control ongoing trial-and-error experimentation. We should let creative minds and empowered entrepreneurs experiment with new and better ways of doing things. It also means that the future if public policy should be rooted in fact-based analysis and not shaped by outlandish fears of hypothetical worst-case scenarios.

Going forward, you will continue to see Mercatus producing research applying permissionless innovation across a host of areas. You can also expect us to begin pursuing big questions about the future.

What if we could reduce the number of deaths on US roadways from 96 people per day to zero? What if we could double life expectancy? Triple it? Wouldn’t it be nice if we could travel from New York to London in three hours? New York to Los Angeles in 2.5 hours? What if we welcomed automation instead of fearing its effects on the workforce? What if we could remove the technical and political barriers keeping us from going to Mars and then beyond it? And so on.

We pose these questions not merely because they are intellectually interesting and important, but also because we hope to make the case for embracing the future with a sense of wonder and optimism about how technological advancement can radically improve human well-being in both the short- and long-run.

It isn’t enough to simply point out where innovators and entrepreneurs are being hindered. It isn’t enough to simply tell people that the future will be bright. We must explain, in real terms, how hindering innovation opportunities undermines our collective ability to constantly improve the human condition.

And because there is a symbiotic relationship between freedom and progress, we must defend our collective ability as a society to achieve very concrete, widely-shared advances in well-being through a general freedom to experiment with new technologies and better ways of doing things.

That is our vision for the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center and we hope it is one that the public and public policymakers will embrace going forward.

“The quickest way to find out who your enemies are is to try doing something new.” Thus begins Innovation and Its Enemies, an ambitious new book by Calestous Juma that will go down as one of the decade’s most important works on innovation policy.

Juma, who is affiliated with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has written a book that is rich in history and insights about the social and economic forces and factors that have, again and again, lead various groups and individuals to oppose technological change. Juma’s extensive research documents how “technological controversies often arise from tensions between the need to innovate and the pressure to maintain continuity, social order, and stability” (p. 5) and how this tension is “one of today’s biggest policy challenges.” (p. 8)

What Juma does better than any other technology policy scholar to date is that he identifies how these tensions develop out of deep-seated psychological biases that eventually come to affect attitudes about innovations among individuals, groups, corporations, and governments. “Public perceptions about the benefits and risks of new technologies cannot be fully understood without paying attention to intuitive aspects of human psychology,” he correctly observes. (p. 24)

Opposition to Change: It’s All in Your Head

Juma documents, for example, how “status quo bias,” loss aversion, and other psychological tendencies tend to encourage resistance to technological change. [Note: I discussed these and other “root-cause” explanations of opposition to technological change in Chapter 2 of my book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, as well as in my 2012 law review article on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.”]  Juma notes, for example, that “society is most likely to oppose a new technology if it perceives that the risks are likely to occur in the short run and the benefits will only accrue in the long run.” (p. 5) Moreover, “much of the concern is driven by perception of loss, not necessarily by concrete evidence of loss.” (p. 11)

Juma’s approach to innovation policy studies is strongly influenced by the path-breaking work of Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who long ago documented how entrepreneurial activity and the “perennial gales of creative destruction” were the prime forces that spurred innovation and propelled society forward. But Schumpeter was also one of the first scholars to realize that psychological fears about such turbulent change was what ultimately lead to much of the short-term opposition to new technologies that, in due time, we eventually come to see as life-enriching or even life-essential innovations.  Juma uses Schumpeter’s insight as the launching point for his exploration and he successfully verifies it using meticulously-detailed case studies.

Case Study-Driven Analysis

My favorite case study in the book discusses how the dairy industry fought the creation and spread of margarine (excuse the pun!). I had no idea how ugly that situation got, but Juma provides all the gory details in what I consider one of the very best crony capitalist case studies ever penned.

In particular, in a subsection of that chapter entitled “The Laws against Margarine,” he provides a litany of examples of how effective the dairy industry was in convincing lawmakers to enact ridiculous anti-consumer regulations to stop margarine, even though the product offered the public a much-needed, and much more affordable, substitute for traditional butter. At one point, the daily industry successfully lobbied five states to adopt rules mandating that any imitation butter product had to be dyed pink! Other states enacted labelling laws that required butter substitutes to come in ominous-looking black packaging. Again, all this was done at the request of the incumbent dairy industry and the National Dairy Council, which would resort to almost any sort of deceptive tactic to keep a cheaper competing product out of the hands of consumers.

And so it goes in chapter after chapter of Juma’s book. The amount of detail in each of these unique case studies is absolutely stunning, but they nonetheless remain highly readable accounts of sectoral protectionism, special interest rent-seeking, and regulatory capture. In this way, Juma is plowing some familiar ground already covered by other economic historians and political scientists, such as Joel Mokyr and Mancur Olson, both of whom are mentioned in the book, as well as a long line of public choice scholars who are, somewhat surprisingly, not discussed in the text. Nonetheless, Juma’s approach is still fresh, unique, and highly informative. In fact, I don’t think I’ve ever seen so many distinct and highly detailed case studies assembled in one place by a single scholar.  What Juma has done here is truly impressive.

Related Innovation Policy Paradigms

Beyond Schumpeter’s clear influence, Juma’s approach to studying innovation policy also shares a great deal in common with two other unmentioned innovation policy scholars, Virginia Postrel and Robert D. Atkinson.

Postrel’s 1998 book, The Future and Its Enemies, contrasted the conflicting worldviews of “dynamism” and “stasis” and showed how the tensions between these two visions would affect the course of human affairs. She made the case for embracing dynamism — “a world of constant creation, discovery, and competition” — over the “regulated, engineered world” of the stasis mentality. Similarly, in his 2004 book, The Past and Future of America’s Economy, Atkinson documented how “American history is rife with resistance to change,” and in recounting some of the heated battles over previous technological revolutions he showed how two camps were always evident: “preservationists” and “modernizers.”

When Juma repeatedly recounts the fight between “innovation and incumbency” in his case studies, he is essentially describing the same paradigmatic divide that Postrel and Atkinson highlight in their works when they discuss “dynamist” vs. “stasis” tensions and the “modernizers” vs. “preservationists” battles that we have seen throughout history. [Note: In my 2014 essay on, “Thinking about Innovation Policy Debates: 4 Related Paradigms,” I discussed Postrel and Atkinson’s books and other approaches to understanding tech policy divisions and then related them to the paradigms I contrast in my work: the so-called “precautionary principle” vs. “permissionless Innovation” mindsets.]

Finally, Juma’s book could also be compared to another freshly released book, The Politics of Innovation, by Mark Zachary Taylor. Taylor’s book is also essential reading on this lamentable history of industrial protectionism and the resulting political opposition to change we have seen over time. [Note: Brent Skorup and provided many other high-tech cronyist case studies like these in our 2013 law review article, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.”]

To counter the prevalence of special interest influence and poor policymaking more generally, Juma stresses the need for evidence-based analysis and a corresponding rejection of fear-mongering and deceptive tactics by public officials and activist groups. He’s particularly concerned with “the use of demonization and false analogies to amplify the perception of risks associated with a new product.”

Accordingly, he would like to see improved educational and risk communication efforts aimed at better informing the public about risk trade-offs and the many potential future benefits of emerging technologies. “Learning how to communicate to the general public is an important aspect of reducing distrust [in new technologies],” Juma argues. (p. 312)

On the Pacing Problem

But Juma never really adequately squares that recommendation with another point he makes throughout the text about how “the pace of technological innovation is discernibly fast,” (p. 5) and how it is accelerating in an exponential fashion. “The implications of exponential growth will continue to elude political leaders if they persist in operating with linear worldviews.” (p. 14) But if it is indeed the case that things are moving that fast, then are we not potentially doomed to live in never-ending cycles of technopanics and misinformation campaigns about new technologies no matter how much education we try to do?

Regardless, Juma’s argument about the speed of modern technological change is quite valid and shared by many other scholars. He is essentially making the same case that Larry Downes did in his excellent 2009 book, The Laws of Disruption: Harnessing the New Forces That Govern Life and Business in the Digital Age. Downes argued that lawmaking in the information age is inexorably governed by the “law of disruption” or the fact that “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”  This law, Downes said, is “a simple but unavoidable principle of modern life,” and it will have profound implications for the way businesses, government, and culture evolve going forward.  “As the gap between the old world and the new gets wider,” he argued, “conflicts between social, economic, political, and legal systems” will intensify and “nothing can stop the chaos that will follow.”

Again, Juma makes that same point repeatedly throughout the chapters of his book. This is also a restatement of the so-called “pacing problem,” as it is called in the field of the philosophy of technology. I discussed the pacing problem at length in my recent review of Wendell Wallach’s important new book, A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control. Wallach nicely defined the pacing problem as “the gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.” “There has always been a pacing problem,” he noted but, like Juma, Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to “govern” using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms.

New Approaches to Technological Governance Needed

Both Wallach in A Dangerous Master and Juma in Innovation and Its Enemies struggle with how to solve this problem. Wallach advocates “soft law” mechanisms or even informal “Governance Coordinating Committees,” which would oversee the development of new technology policies and advise existing governmental institutions. Juma is somewhat ambiguous regarding potential solutions, but he does stress the general need for a flexible approach to policy, as he notes on pg. 252:

It is important to make clear distinctions between hazards and risks. It is necessary to find a legal framework for addressing hazards. But such a framework should not take the form of rigid laws whose adoption needs to be guided by evidence of harm. More flexible standards that allow continuous assessment of emerging safety issues related to a new product are another way to address hazards. This approach would allow for evidence-based regulation.

Beyond that Juma wants to see “entrepreneurialism exercised in the public arena” (p. 282) and calls for “decisive leaders to champion the application of new technologies.” (p. 283) He argues such leadership is needed to ensure that life-enriching technologies are not derailed by opponents of change.

On the other hand, Juma sees a broader role for policymakers in helping to counter some of the potential side effects associated with many emerging technologies. He highlights three primary areas of concern. First, he suggests political leaders might need to find ways “to help balance the benefits and risks of automation” due to the rapid rise of robotics and artificial intelligence. Second, he notes that synthetic biology and gene-editing will give rise to many thorny issues that require policymakers to balance “potentially extraordinary benefits and the risk of catastrophic consequences.” (p. 284)  Finally, he points out that medicine and healthcare are set to be radically transformed by emerging technologies, but they are also threatened by archaic policies and practices in many countries.

In each case, Juma hopes that “decisive,” “adaptive” and “flexible” leaders will steer a sensible policy course with an eye toward limiting “the spread of political unrest and resentment toward technological innovation.” (p. 284)  That’s a noble goal, but Juma remains a bit vague on the steps needed to accomplish that balancing act without tipping public policy in favor a full-blown precautionary principle-based regime for new technologies. Juma clearly wants to avoid that result, but it remains unclear how or where he would draw clear lines in the sand to prevent it from occurring while at the same time achieving “decisive leadership” aimed at balancing potential risks and benefits.

Similarly, his repeated calls in the closing chapter for “inclusive innovation” efforts and strategies sounds sensible in theory, but Juma speaks in abstract generalities about what the term means and doesn’t provide a clear vision for how that would translate into concrete actions that would not end up giving vested interests a veto over new forms of technological innovation that they disfavor.

Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained

Generally speaking, however, Juma wants this balance struck in favor of greater openness to change and an ongoing freedom to experiment with new technological capabilities. As he notes in his concluding chapter:

The biggest risk that society faces by adopting approaches that suppress innovation is that they amplify the activities of those who want to preserve the status quo by silencing those arguing for a more open future. […] Keeping the future open and experimenting in an inclusive and transparent way is more rewarding that imposing the dictum of old patterns. (pgs. 289, 316)

In that regard, the thing I liked most about Innovation and Its Enemies is the way throughout the text that Juma stressed the symbiotic relationship between risk-taking and progress. One of the ways he does so is by kicking off every chapter with a fun quote on that theme from some notable figure. He includes gems like these:

• “Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome.” – Samuel Johnson
• “Only those will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go.” – T.S. Eliot
• “If you risk nothing, then you risk everything.” – Geena Davis
• “Test fast, fail fast, adjust fast.” – Tom Peters

Of course, I was bound to enjoy his repeated discussion of this theme because that was the central thesis of my latest book, in which I made the argument that, “if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon such fears—then many best-case scenarios will never come about.” Or more simply, as the old saying goes: “nothing ventured, nothing gained.”

On Pastoral Myths

I also liked the way that Juma used his case studies to remind us how “the topics may have changed, but the tactics have not.” (p. 143) For example, much of the fear-mongering and deceptive tactics we have seen through the years are based on “pastoral ideals,” i.e., appeals to nature, farm life, old traditions, of just the proverbial “good old days,” whenever those supposedly were! “Demonizing innovation is often associated with campaigns to romanticize past products and practices,” Juma notes. “Opponents of innovation hark back to traditions as if traditions themselves were not inventions at some point in the past.” (p. 309)  So very true!

That was especially the case in battles over new farming methods and technologies, when opponents of change were frequently “championing a moral cause to preserve a way of life,” as Juma discusses in several chapters. (p. 129) New products or methods of production were repeatedly but wrongly characterized as dangerous simply because they were not supposedly “natural” or “traditional” enough in character.

Of course, if all farming and other work was to remain frozen in some past “natural” state, we’d all still be hunters and gathers struggling to find the next meal to put in our bellies. Or, if we were all still on the farms of the “good old days,” then we’d still be stuck using an ox and plow in the name of preserving the “traditional” ways of doing things.

Humanity has made amazing strides—including being able to feed more people more easily and cheaply than ever before—precisely because we broke with those old, “natural” traditions. Alas, many vested interests and even quite a few academics today still employ these same pastoral appeals and myths to oppose new forms of technological change. Juma’s case studies powerfully illustrate why that dynamic continues to be a driving force in innovation policy debates and how it has delayed the diffusion of many important new goods and services throughout history. When the opponents of change rest their case on pastoral myths and nostalgic arguments about the good old days we should remind them that the good old days weren’t really that great after all.

Conclusion

In closing, Innovation and Its Enemies earns my highest recommendation. Even though 2016 is only half done as I write this, Professor Juma’s book is probably already a shoo-in as my choice for best innovation policy book of the year. And I am certain that it will also go down as one of the decade’s most important innovation policy books. Buy the book now and read every word of it. It is well worth your time.

Additional material related to Juma’s book:

• Calestous Juma’s website at the Harvard Kennedy School
• Official book page for Innovation and Its Enemies
• Concise summary of the book from AAAS: “Why important innovations stall; understanding obstacles to change is key to future”
• Steven Overly, “Humans once opposed coffee and refrigeration. Here’s why we often hate new stuff,” Washington Post, July 21, 2016.
• Matt Ridley’s review of the book for The Times of London.

Other Related Books

In addition to the books that I already mentioned throughout this review, readers who find Juma’s book and the issues he discusses in it of interest should also consider reading these other books on innovation policy, technological governance, and regulatory capture.  Although many of them are more squarely focused on the information technology sector or other emerging technology fields, they all relate to the general subject matter and approach found throughout Juma’s book. [NOTE: Links, where provided, are to my reviews of these books.]

• The Inevitable: Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future, by Kevin Kelly (2016)
• Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies, Gary E. Marchant, Kenneth W. Abbott & Braden Allenby (eds.), (2013)
• Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom ,by Rebecca MacKinnon (2012)
• Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance, by Milton Mueller (2010)
• The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, by Tim Wu (2010)
• The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves, by Matt Ridley (2010)
• Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness After the Digital Explosion, by Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis (2008)
• Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies — and What It Means to Be Human, by Joel Garreau (2005)
• The Creation of Media, by Paul Starr (2005)
• Ruling the Waves: Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth from the Compass to the Internet, by Debora Spar (2004)
• Questioning Technology, by Andrew Feenberg (1999)
• Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy, by Carl Mitcham (1994)
• Technologies of Freedom: On Free Speech in an Electronic Age, by Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983)

Last December, it was my pleasure to take part in a great event, “The Disruptive Competition Policy Forum,” sponsored by Project DisCo (or The Disruptive Competition Project). It featured several excellent panels and keynotes and they’ve just posted the video of the panel I was on here and I have embedded it below. In my remarks, I discussed:

• benefit-cost analysis in digital privacy debates (building on this law review article);
• the contrast between Europe and America’s approach to data & privacy issues (referencing this testimony of mine);
• the problem of “technopanics” in information policy debates (building on this law review article);
• the difficulty of information control efforts in various tech policy debates (which I wrote about in this law review article and these two blog posts: 1, 2);
• the possibility of less-restrictive approaches to privacy & security concerns (which I have written about here as well in those other law review articles);
• the rise of the Internet of Things and the unique challenges it creates (see this and this as well as my new book); and,
• the possibility of a splintering of the Internet or the rise of “federated Internets.”

The panel was expertly moderated by Ross Schulman, Public Policy & Regulatory Counsel for CCIA, and also included remarks from John Boswell, SVP & Chief Legal Officer at SAS, and Josh Galper, Chief Policy Officer and General Counsel of Personal, Inc. (By the way, you should check out some of the cool things Personal is doing in this space to help consumers. Very innovative stuff.) The video lasts one hour. Here it is:

[Note: I later adapted this essay into a short book, which you can download for free here.]

Let’s talk about “permissionless innovation.” We all believe in it, right? Or do we? What does it really mean? How far are we willing to take it? What are its consequences? What is its opposite? How should we balance them?

What got me thinking about these questions was a recent essay over at The Umlaut by my Mercatus Center colleague Eli Dourado entitled, “‘Permissionless Innovation’ Offline as Well as On.” He opened by describing the notion of permissionless innovation as follows:

In Internet policy circles, one is frequently lectured about the wonders of “permissionless innovation,” that the Internet is a global platform on which college dropouts can try new, unorthodox methods without the need to secure authorization from anyone, and that this freedom to experiment has resulted in the flourishing of innovative online services that we have observed over the last decade.

Eli goes on to ask, “why it is that permissionless innovation should be restricted to the Internet. Can’t we have this kind of dynamism in the real world as well?”

That’s a great question, but let’s ponder an even more fundamental one: Does anyone really believe in the ideal of “permissionless innovation”? Is there anyone out there who makes a consistent case for permissionless innovation across the technological landscape, or is it the case that a fair degree of selective morality is at work here? That is, people love the idea of “permissionless innovation” until they find reasons to hate it — namely, when it somehow conflicts with certain values they hold dear.

I’ve written about this here before when referencing the selective morality we often see at work in debates over online safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. [See my essays: “When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed;” “Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead,” and “And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars.“] In those essays, I’ve noted how ironic it is that the same crowd that preaches about how essential permissionless innovation is when it comes to overly-restrictive copyright laws are often among the first to advocate “permissioned” regulations for online data collection and advertising practices. I also noted how many conservatives who demand permissionless innovation on the economic / infrastructure front are quick to call for preemptive content controls to restrict objectionable online content, and a handful of them want “permissioned” cybersecurity rules.

Of course, it’s not really all that surprising that people wouldn’t hold true to the ideal of “permissionless innovation” across the board because at some theoretical point almost every technology has a use scenario that someone — perhaps many of us — would want to see restricted. How do we know when it makes sense to impose some restrictions on innovation to make it more “permissioned”?

The Range of Options

I spend a lot of time thinking about that question these days. The sheer volume and diversity of interesting innovations that surround us today — or that are just on the horizon — are forcing us to struggle both individually and collectively with our tolerance for unabated innovation. Here are just a few of the issues I’m thinking of (many of which I am currently writing about) where these questions come up constantly:

• Online data aggregation / targeted advertising
• Commercial drones
• 3D printing
• Facial recognition & biometrics
• Wearable computing
• Geolocation / Geotagging / RFID
• Robotics
• Nanotechnology

When thinking about innovation in these spaces, it is useful to consider a range of theoretical responses to new technological risks. I developed such a model in my new Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology article on, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” In that piece,  I identify four general responses and place them along a “risk response continuum”:

1. Prohibition: Prohibition attempts to eliminate potential risk through suppression of technology, product or service bans, information controls, or outright censorship.
2. Anticipatory Regulation: Anticipatory regulation controls potential risk through preemptive, precautionary safeguards, including administrative regulation, government ownership or licensing controls, or restrictive defaults. Anticipatory regulation can lead to prohibition, although that tends to be rare, at least in the United States.
3. Resiliency: Resiliency addresses risk through education, awareness building, transparency and labeling, and empowerment steps and tools.
4. Adaptation: Adaptation involves learning to live with risk through trial-and-error experimentation, experience, coping mechanisms, and social norms. Adaptation strategies often begin with, or evolve out of, resiliency-based efforts.

While these risk-response strategies could also describe the possible range of responses that individuals or families might employ to cope with technological change, generally speaking, I am here using this framework to consider the theoretical responses by society at large or governments. That allows us to bring three general policy concepts into the discussion:

1. “Permissionless Innovation“: Complete freedom to experiment and innovate.
2. “Permissioned Innovation“: General freedom to experiment and innovate, but with possibility that innovation might later be restricted in some fashion.
3. “The Precautionary Principle“: New innovations are discouraged or even disallowed until their developers can prove that they won’t cause any harms.

Here’s how I put all these concepts together in one image:

This gives us a framework to consider responses to various technological developments we are struggling with today. But how do we decide which response makes the most sense for any given technology? The answer will come down to a complicated (and often quite contentious) cost-benefit analysis that weighs the theoretical harms of technological innovation alongside the many potential benefits of ongoing experimentation.

The Case for Permissionless Innovation or an “Anti-Precautionary Principle”

I believe a strong case can be made that permissionless innovation should be our default position in public policy deliberations about technological change. Here’s how I put it in the conclusion of my “Technopanics” article:

Resiliency and adaption strategies are generally superior to more restrictive approaches because they leave more breathing room for continuous learning and innovation through trial-and-error experimentation. Even when that experimentation may involve risk and the chance of mistake or failure, the result of such experimentation is wisdom and progress. As Friedrich August Hayek concisely wrote, “Humiliating to human pride as it may be, we must recognize that the advance and even preservation of civilization are dependent upon a maximum of opportunity for accidents to happen.”

I believe this is the more sensible default position toward technological innovation because the opposite default — a technological Precautionary Principle — essentially holds the “anything new is guilty until proven innocent,” as journalist Ronald Bailey has noted in critiquing the notion. When the law mandates “play it safe” as the default policy toward technological progress, progress is far less likely to occur at all. Social learning and adaptation become less likely, perhaps even impossible, under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

Therefore, the default policy disposition toward innovation should be an ” anti-Precautionary Principle.” Paul Ohm outlined that concept in his 2008 article, “The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online.” Ohm, who recently joined the Federal Trade Commission as a Senior Policy Advisor, began his essay by noting that “Fear of the powerful computer user, the ‘Superuser,’ dominates debates about online conflict,” but that this superuser is generally “a mythical figure” concocted by those who are typically quick to set forth worst-case scenarios about the impact of digital technology on society. Fear of the “superuser” and hypothetical worst-case scenarios prompts policy action, since as Ohm notes: “Policymakers, fearful of his power, too often overreact by passing overbroad, ambiguous laws intended to ensnare the Superuser but which are instead used against inculpable, ordinary users.” “This response is unwarranted,” Ohm argues “because the Superuser is often a marginal figure whose power has been greatly exaggerated.” (at 1327).

Ohm correctly notes that Precautionary Principle policies are often the result. He prefers the “anti-Precautionary Principle” instead, which he summarized as follows: “when a conflict involves ordinary users in the main and Superusers only at the margins, the harms resulting from regulating the few cannot be justified.” (at 1394) In other words, policy should not be shaped by hypothetical fears and worst-case “boogeyman” scenarios. He elaborates as follows:

Even if Congress adopts the Anti-Precautionary Principle and begins to demand better empirical evidence, it may conclude that the Superuser threat outweighs the harm from regulating. I am not arguing that Superusers should never be regulated or pursued. But given the checkered history of the search for Superusers — the overbroad laws that have ensnared non-Superuser innocents; the amount of money, time, and effort that could have been used to find many more non-Superuser criminals; and the spotty record of law enforcement successes — the hunt for the Superuser should be narrowed and restricted. Policymakers seeking to regulate the Superuser can adopt a few strategies to narrowly target Superusers and minimally impact ordinary users. The chief evil of past efforts to regulate the Superuser has been the inexorable broadening of laws to cover metaphor-busting, impossible-to-predict future acts. To avoid the overbreadth trap, legislators should instead extend elements narrowly, focusing on that which separates the Superuser from the rest of us: his power over technology. They should, for example, write tightly constrained new elements that single out the use of power, or even, the use of unusual power. (at 1396-7)

To summarize, the Anti-Precautionary Principle generally holds that:

1. society is better off when innovation is not preemptively restricted;
2. accusations of harm and calls for policy responses should not be premised on worst-case scenarios;  and,
3. remedies to actual harms should be narrowly tailored so that beneficial uses of technology are not derailed.

Alternatives to Precaution / Permissioning

I don’t necessarily believe that the “anti-Precautionary Principle” or the norm of “permissionless innovation” should hold in every case.  Neither does Ohm. In fact, in his recent work on privacy and online data collection, Ohm betrays his own rule. He does so too casually, I think, and falls prey to the very “Superuser” boogeyman fears he lamented earlier.

For example, in his latest law review article on “Branding Privacy,” Ohm argues that “Change can be deeply unsettling. Human beings prefer predictability and stability, and abrupt change upsets those desires. . . . Rapid change causes harm by disrupting settled expectations” (at 924). His particular concern is the way that corporate privacy policies continue to evolve and generally in the direction of allowing more and more sharing of personal information. Ohm believes that this is a significant enough concern that, at a minimum, companies should be required to assign a new name to any service or product if a material change was made to its information-handling policies and procedures.  For example, if Facebook or Google wanted to make a major change to their services in the direction of greater information sharing, they have to change their names (at least for a time) to something like Facebook Public or Google Public.

Before joining the FTC, Ohm also authored a panicky piece for the Harvard Business Review that outlined a worst-case scenario “database of ruin” that will link our every past transgression and most intimate secret. This fear led him to argue that:

We need to slow things down, to give our institutions, individuals, and processes the time they need to find new and better solutions. The only way we will buy this time is if companies learn to say, “no” to some of the privacy-invading innovations they’re pursuing. Executives should require those who work for them to justify new invasions of privacy against a heavy burden, weighing them against not only the financial upside, but also against the potential costs to individuals, society, and the firm’s reputation.

Applying the Model to Online Safety & Digital Privacy

I’d argue that this “bottom-up” model of coping with technological change is already at work in many areas of modern society. In my “Technopanics” paper, I note that this pretty much the approach we’ve adopted for online safety concerns, at least here in the United States. Very little innovation (or content) is prohibited or even permissioned today. Instead, we rely on other mechanisms: User education and empowerment, informal household media rules, social pressure, societal norms, and so on. [I’ve documented this in greater detail in this booklet.]

Fifteen years ago, there were many policymakers and policy activists who advocated a very different approach: indecency rules for the Net, mandatory filtering schemes, mandatory age verification, and so on. But that prohibitionary and permission-based approach lost out to the resiliency and adaptation paradigm. As a result, innovation and freedom speech continues relatively unabated.  That doesn’t mean everything is sunshine and roses. The Web is full of filth, and hateful things are said every second of the day across digital networks. But we are finding other ways to deal with those problems — not always perfectly, but well enough to get by and allow innovation and speech to continue. When serious harms can be identified — such as persistent online bullying or predation of youth — targeted legal remedies have been utilized.

In two forthcoming law review articles (for the  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy and the George Mason Law Review), I apply this same framework to concerns about commercial data collection and digital privacy. I conclude the Harvard essay by noting that:

Many of the thorniest social problems citizens encounter in the information age will be better addressed through efforts that are bottom-up, evolutionary, education-based, empowerment-focused, and resiliency-centered. That framework is the best approach to address personal privacy protection. Evolving social and market norms will also play a role as citizens incorporate new technologies into their lives and business practices. What may seem like a privacy-invasive practice or technology one year might be considered an essential information resource the next. Public policy should embrace—or at least not unnecessarily disrupt—the highly dynamic nature of the modern digital economy.

Two additional factors shape my conclusion that this framework makes as much sense for privacy as it does for online child safety concerns. First, the effectiveness of law and regulation on this front is limited by the normative considerations. The inherent subjectivity of privacy as a personal and societal value is one reason why expanded regulation is not sensible. As with online safety, we have a rather formidable “eye of the beholder” problem at work here. What we need, therefore, are diverse solutions for a diverse citizenry, not one-size-fits-all top-down regulatory solutions that seek to apply to values of the few on the many.  Second, enforcement challenges must be taken into consideration. Most of the problems policymakers and average individuals face when it comes to controlling the flow of private information online are similar to the challenges they face when trying to control the free flow of digitalized bits in other information policy contexts, such as online safety, cybersecurity, and digital copyright. It will be increasingly difficult and costly to enforce top-down regulatory regimes (assuming we can even agree to common privacy standards), therefore, alternative approaches to privacy protection should be considered.

Of course, some alleged privacy harms involve highly sensitive forms of personal information and can do serious harm to person or property. Our legal regime has evolved to handle those harms. We have targeted legal remedies for health and financial privacy violations, for example, and state torts to fill other gaps. Meanwhile, the FTC has broad discretion under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to pursue “unfair and deceptive practices,” including those that implicate privacy. These remedies are more “bottom-up” in character in that they leave sufficient breathing room for ongoing experimentation and innovation but allow individuals to pursue remedies for egregious harms that can be proven.

Applying the Model Elsewhere

We can apply this model more broadly. Let’s pick an issue that’s been in the news recently: concerns about Google Glass and fears about “wearable computing” more generally, which Jerry Brito wrote about earlier today. Google Glass hasn’t even hit the market yet, but the privacy paranoia has already kicked into high gear. Andrew Keen argues that “Google Glass opens an entirely new front in the digital war against privacy” and that “It is the sort of radical transformation that may actually end up completely destroying our individual privacy in the digital 21st century.” His remedy: “I would make data privacy its default feature. Nobody else sees the data I see unless I explicitly say so. Not advertisers, nor the government, and certainly not those engineers of the human soul at the Googleplex. No, Google Glass must be opaque. For my eyes only.”

There’s even more fear and loathing to be found in this piece by Mark Hurst entitled, “The Google Glass feature no one is talking about.” That feature would be Glass’s ability to record massive amounts of video and audio in both public and private spaces. In reality, plenty of people are talking about that feature and wringing the hands about its implications for our collective privacy. Also see, for example, Gary Marshall’s essay, “Google Glass: Say Goodbye to Your Privacy.”

But Google Glass is just the beginning. For another example of a wearable computing technology that is bound to raise concern once it goes mainstream, check out the Memoto Lifelogging Camera. Here’s the description from the website:

The Memoto camera is a tiny camera and GPS that you clip on and wear. It’s an entirely new kind of digital camera with no controls. Instead, it automatically takes photos as you go. The Memoto app then seamlessly and effortlessly organizes them for you. . . . As long as you wear the camera, it is constantly taking pictures. It takes two geotagged photos a minute with recorded orientation so that the app can show them upright no matter how you are wearing the camera. . . . The camera and the app work together to give you pictures of every single moment of your life, complete with information on when you took it and where you were. This means that you can revisit any moment of your past.

Of course, that means you will also be able to revisit many moments from the lives of others who may have been around you while your Memoto Camera was logging your life. So, what are we going to do about Google Glass, Memoto, and wearable computing? Well, for now I hope that our answer is: nothing. This technology is not even out of the cradle yet and we have no idea how it will be put to use by most people. I certainly understand some of the privacy paranoia and worst-case scenarios that some people are circulating these days. As someone who deeply values their own privacy, and as the father of two digital natives who are already begging for more and more digital gadgets, I’ve already thought about a wide variety of worse-case scenarios for me and my kids.

But we’ve been here before. In my Harvard essay, I go back and track privacy panics from the rise of the camera and public photography in the late 1800s all the way down to Gmail in the mid-2000s and note that societal attitudes quickly adjusted to these initially unsettling technologies. That doesn’t mean that all the concerns raised by those technologies disappeared. A century after Warren and Brandeis railed against the camera and called for controls on public photography, many people are still complaining about what people can do with the devices. And although 425 million people now use Gmail and love the free service it provides, some vociferous privacy advocates are still concerned about how it might affect our privacy. And the same is true of a great many other technologies.

But here’s the key question: Are we not better off because we have allowed these technologies to develop in a relatively unfettered fashion? Would we have been better off imposing a Precautionary Principle on cameras and Gmail right out of the gates and then only allowing innovation once some techno-philosopher kings told us that all was safe? I would hope that the costs associated with such restrictions would be obvious. And I would hope that we might exercise similar policy restraint when it comes to new technologies, including Google Glass, Memoto, and other forms of wearable computing. After all, there are a a great many benefits that will come from such technologies and it is likely that many (perhaps most) of us will come to view these tools as an indispensable part of our lives despite the privacy fears of some academics and activists. As Brito notes in his essay on the topic, “in the long run, the public will get the technology it wants, despite the perennial squeamishness of some intellectuals.”

How will we learn to cope? Well, I already have a speech prepared for my kids about the proper use of such technologies that will build on the same sort of “responsible use” talk I have with them about all their other digital gadgets and the online services they love. It won’t be an easy talk because part of it will involve the inevitable chat about responsible use in very personal situations, including times when they may be involved in moments of intimacy with others. But this is the sort of uncomfortable talk we need to be having at the individual level, the family level, and the societal level. How can social norms and smart etiquette help us teach our children and each other responsible use of these new technologies? Such a dialogue is essential since, no matter how much we might hope for these new technologies and the problems they raise might just go away, they won’t.

In those cases where serious harms can be demonstrated — for example “peeping Toms” who use wearable computing to surreptitiously film unsuspecting victims — we can use targeted remedies already on the books to go after them. And I suspect that private contracts might play a stronger role here in the future as a remedy. Many organizations (corporations, restaurants, retail establishments, etc) will want nothing to do with wearable computing on their premises. I can imagine that they may be on the front line of finding creative contractual solutions to curb the use of such technologies.

Embracing Permissionless Innovation While Rejecting “The Borg Complex”

One final point. It is essential that advocates of the “anti-Precautionary Principle” and the ideal of “permissionless innovation” avoid falling prey to what philosopher Michael Sacasas refers to as “the Borg Complex“:

A Borg Complex is exhibited by writers and pundits who explicitly assert or implicitly assume that resistance to technology is futile. The name is derived from the Borg, a cybernetic alien race in the Star Trek universe that announces to their victims some variation of the following: “We will add your biological and technological distinctiveness to our own. Resistance is futile.”

Indeed, too often in digital policy texts and speeches these days, we hear pollyannish writers adopting a cavalier attitude about the impact of technological change on individuals and society. Some extreme technological optimists are highly deterministic about technology as an unstoppable force and its potential to transform man and society for the better. Such rigid technological determinism and wild-eyed varieties of cyber-utopianism should be rejected. For example, as I noted in my review of Kevin Kelly’s What Technology Wants, “Much of what Kelly sputters in the opening and closing sections of the book sounds like quasi-religious kookiness by a High Lord of the Noosphere” and that “at times, Kelly even seems to be longing for humanity’s assimilation into the machine or The Matrix.”

I discussed this problem in more detail in my chapter on “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 1,” which appeared in the book, The Next Digital Decade. I noted that technological optimists need to appreciate that, as Neil Postman argued, there are some moral dimensions to technological progress that deserve attention. Not all changes will have positive consequences for society. Those of us who espouse the benefits of permissionless innovation as the default rule must simultaneously be mature enough to understand and address the downsides of digital life without casually dismissing the critics.  A “just-get-over-it” attitude toward the challenges sometimes posed by technological change is never wise. In fact, it is downright insulting.

For example, when I am confronted with frustrated fellow parents who are irate about some of the objectionable content their kids sometimes discover online, I never say, “Well, just get over it!” Likewise, when I am debating advocates of increased privacy regulation who are troubled by data aggregation or targeted advertising, I listen to their concerns and try to offer constructive alternatives to their regulatory impulses. I also ask them to think through to consequences of prohibiting innovation and to realize that not everyone shares their same values when it comes to privacy. In other words, I do not dismiss their concerns, no matter how subjective, about the impact of technological change on their lives or the lives of their children. But I do ask them to be careful about imposing their value judgments on everyone else, especially by force of law. I am not harping at them about how “Resistance is futile,” but I am often explaining to them why a certain amount of societal and individual adaptation will be necessary and that building coping mechanisms and strategies will be absolutely essential. I also share tips about the tools and strategies they can tap to help protect their privacy and specifically how it is easier (and cheaper) than ever to find and use ad preference managers, private browsing tools, advertising blocking technologies, cookie-blockers, web script blockers, Do Not Track tools, and reputation protection services. This is all part of the resiliency and adaptation paradigm.

Conclusion

In closing, it should be clear by now that I am fairly bullish about humanity’s ability to adapt to technological change; even radical change. Such change can be messy, uncomfortable, and unsettling, but the amazing thing to me is how we humans have again and again and again found ways to assimilate new tools into our lives and marched boldly forward. On occasion, we may need to slow down that process a bit when it can be demonstrated that the harms associated with technological change are unambiguous and extreme in character. But I think a powerful case can be made that, more often than not, we can and do find ways to effectively adapt to most forms of change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms. We should continue to allow progress through trial-and-error experimentation — in other words, through permissionless innovation — so that we can enjoy the many benefits that accrue from this process, including the benefits of learning from the mistakes that we will sometimes along the way.

In their paper, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” my Mercatus Center colleagues Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins warned of the dangers of “threat inflation” in cybersecurity policy debates. In early 2011, Mercatus also published a paper by Sean Lawson, an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, entitled “Beyond Cyber Doom” that documented how fear-based tactics and cyber-doom scenarios and rhetoric increasingly were on display in cybersecurity policy debates.  Finally, in my recent Mercatus Center working paper, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” I extended their threat inflation analysis and developed a comprehensive framework offering additional examples of, and explanations for, threat inflation in technology policy debates.

These papers make it clear that a sort of hysteria has developed around cyberwar and cybersecurity issues. Frequent allusions are made in cybersecurity debates to the potential for a “Digital Pearl Harbor,” a “cyber cold war,” a “cyber Katrina,” or even a “cyber 9/11.” These analogies are made even though these historical incidents resulted in death and destruction of a sort not comparable to attacks on digital networks. Others refer to “cyber bombs” even though no one can be “bombed” with binary code. And new examples of such inflationary rhetoric seem to emerge each day. For example, today’s NPR’s Morning Edition program featured a segment by Tom Gjelten entitled, “Cybersecurity Bill: Vital Need Or Just More Rules?” that included the comments of Michael McConnell, a former director of National Intelligence, Here’s what McConnell said about cyberwar at the 6:30 mark of the show:

“this threat is so intrusive, it’s so serious, it could literally suck the life’s blood out of this country, and if we don’t address it, it’s going to be a severe impact and so I think we have no choice but to address it and some of that process will be regulatory.”

Wow, who knew the blood could literally be drained from our bodies by cyberattacks! Have the Chinese or Iranians developed a cyber-superweapon that can reach through our screens and suck the life right out of us? (Like a cross between Videodrome and Halloween III: Season of the Witch!)

I’m being silly, of course. And some might dismiss such rhetorical flourishes or even defend them in the name of “doing whatever it takes” to raise awareness about an important concern. But these fear-based tactics are dangerous. As Brito and Watkins note, “when a threat is inflated, the marketplace of ideas on which a democracy relies to make sound judgments—in particular, the media and popular debate—can become overwhelmed by fallacious information.” In my paper, I argue that technopanics and threat inflation can have many troubling ramifications. They can:

1. Foster animosities and suspicions among the citizenry;
2. Create distrust of many institutions, especially the press;
3. Often divert attention from actual, far more serious risks; and,
4. Lead to calls for information control.

But we shouldn’t expect such rhetorically tactics to subside any time soon. After all, bombastic predictions of an impending cyber-apocalypse are nothing new, especially because they are such an effective way to grab attention, headlines, and funding.

Back in January 1996, the conservative Weekly Standard magazine ran a truly over-the-top cover story by Charles J. Dunlap entitled “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007.” (The actual cover appears above and the whole outlandish article is worth reading for its comedic value if noting else.) It included a dramatic Tom Clancy-esque cover illustration of the U.S. Capitol building smoldering in flames after an apparent cyber-attack of some sort.  Of course, there was no High-Tech War of 2007. But talk is cheap and there are few downsides to using such alarmist tactics. Pessimistic critics who use threat inflation to advance their causes are rarely held accountable when their panicky predictions fail to come to pass. As journalist Matt Ridley correctly observes, “Pessimism has always been big box office.”  Bad news sells, and there are always plenty of buyers.

It’s a shame rational debate is increasing impossible in this and other Internet policy arenas.

[UPDATE: 2/14/2013: As noted here, this paper was published by the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology in their Winter 2013 edition. Please refer to that post for more details and cite this final version of the paper going forward.]

I’m pleased to report that the Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my huge new white paper, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” I’ve been working on this paper for a long time and look forward to finding it a home in a law journal some time soon.  Here’s the summary of this 80-page paper:

Fear is an extremely powerful motivating force, especially in public policy debates where it is used in an attempt to sway opinion or bolster the case for action. Often, this action involves preemptive regulation based on false assumptions and evidence. Such fears are frequently on display in the Internet policy arena and take the form of full-blown “technopanic,” or real-world manifestations of this illogical fear. While it’s true that cyberspace has its fair share of troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society. This paper considers the structure of fear appeal arguments in technology policy debates and then outlines how those arguments can be deconstructed and refuted in both cultural and economic contexts. Several examples of fear appeal arguments are offered with a particular focus on online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. The  various  factors  contributing  to  “fear  cycles”  in these policy areas are documented. To the extent that these concerns are valid, they are best addressed by ongoing societal learning, experimentation, resiliency, and coping strategies rather than by regulation. If steps must be taken to address these concerns, education and empowerment-based solutions represent superior approaches to dealing with them compared to a precautionary principle approach, which would limit beneficial learning opportunities and retard technological progress.

The complete paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader.

Technopanics and Threat Inflation [Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center]

What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation? [pdf]

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point No. 16.19

Anyone who has spent time following debates about speech and privacy regulation comes to recognize the striking parallels between these two policy arenas. In this paper we will highlight the common rhetoric, proposals, and tactics that unite these regulatory movements. Moreover, we will argue that, at root, what often animates calls for regulation of both speech and privacy are two remarkably elitist beliefs:

1. People are too ignorant (or simply too busy) to be trusted to make wise decisions for themselves (or their children); and/or,
2. All or most people share essentially the same values or concerns and, therefore, “community standards” should trump household (or individual) standards.

While our use of the term “elitism” may unduly offend some understandably sensitive to populist demagoguery, our aim here is not to launch a broadside against elitism as Time magazine culture critic William H. Henry once defined it: “The willingness to assert unyieldingly that one idea, contribution or attainment is better than another.”^[1] Rather, our aim here is to critique that elitism which rises to the level of political condescension and legal sanction. We attack not so much the beliefs of some leaders, activists, or intellectuals that they have a better idea of what it in the public’s best interest than the public itself does, but rather the imposition of those beliefs through coercive, top-down mandates.

That sort of elitism—elitism enforced by law—is often the objective of speech and privacy regulatory advocates. Our goal is to identify the common themes that unite these regulatory movements, explain why such political elitism is unwarranted, and make it clear how it threatens individual liberty as well as the future of free and open Internet. As an alternative to this elitist vision, we advocate an empowerment agenda: fostering an environment in which users have the tools and information they need to make decisions for themselves and their families.

I. The Elitism of Speech Regulation

First, consider how those two elitist beliefs identified above are on display when lawmakers or regulatory advocates make efforts to control speech or content.^[2] Calls to regulate free speech are often premised on the belief that something must be done to “protect The Children.”^[3] Personal and parental responsibility ^[4] are regarded as inadequate safeguards ^[5] since some parents will inevitably fall down on the job by not adequately shielding their children’s eyes and ears from potentially objectionable (or supposedly harmful) speech. Therefore, government must regulate content that is indecent, profane, excessively violent, and so on. The definition of those things is then left to unelected bureaucrats and judges to make on our behalf.

But it’s not just about “The Children.” Some regulatory advocates believe that even the choices made by consenting adults must be disregarded because some people fail to understand the supposedly destructive nature of the speech they are consuming. Government must act to protect people from making what some regulatory advocates regard as destructive or even immoral choices that could bring harm to them or their loved ones.

In sum, regulatory advocates are essentially saying that people cannot be trusted or left to their own devices and, therefore, government must intervene and establish a baseline “community standard” on behalf of the entire citizenry to tell them what‘s best for them.^[6] Even if those citizens have tools and information at their disposal to make sensible decisions about objectionable content, that’s not good enough because they might not do the job properly. Government must do it for them!

II. The Elitism of Privacy Regulation

This same mentality motivates calls for privacy regulations. Those who call for government interventions to “protect privacy” often claim that people too willingly surrender personal information about themselves and that they don’t understand the adverse consequences of those actions.^[7] Alternatively, regulatory advocates claim that advertising and marketing efforts are inherently “manipulative” and that people do not realize they are being duped into surrendering personal information or into buying products or services they supposedly don’t need.^[8] Of course, those regulatory advocates rarely pause to explain to us how it is that they were not also duped and manipulated by the same things—again revealing their deeply-rooted elitism! (As discussed below, this makes it clear how the psychological phenomenon of “third-person effect hypothesis” is driving much of this debate.)

“Protecting The Children” is also used as a rhetorical cover for regulation here, but not as often in debates over speech controls.^[9] Instead, regulatory advocates mostly focus on adults who are presumed not to know what is in their own best interest—necessitating paternalistic government intervention on their behalf.

III. Intellectual Schizophrenia on Both the Left & Right

What is particularly interesting about all this is the way these two issues expose a sort of intellectual schizophrenia at work on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum. Left-leaning policymakers and intellectuals typically decry censorship efforts (except where “commercial speech,” “hate speech” and “bias” are at issue), but are quick to rally around proposals to layer privacy regulations on the Internet. The opposite is often true of many on the Right of the political spectrum: They typically declare privacy regulations to be paternalistic and antithetical to free enterprise (or perhaps just erosive of efforts to legislate morality),^[10] but in the next breath advocate controls on content they find objectionable.

Few on either side stop to consider the relationship between speech and privacy. In fact, they are but two sides of the same coin. After all, what is your “right to privacy” but a right to stop me from observing you and speaking about you?^[11] “Protecting privacy,” therefore, typically means restricting speech rights in the process. Advocates of privacy regulation often insist that the use, processing and collection of information are “conduct” unprotected by the First Amendment, but in fact, the First Amendment broadly protects the gathering and distribution of information as part of the process of communication (“speech”).^[12] Similarly, attempts to “clean up” speech or “protect The Children,” often require regulations that would betray the privacy of adults by expanding the role of government, and impose serious burdens on businesses and markets—such as age verification mandates ^[13] or extensive data retention requirements.^[14]

IV. Common Tactics & Regulatory Mechanisms

The two movements also share common political tactics and regulatory approaches. Privacy advocates generally favor “opt-in” mandates as the federal “baseline standard” for any website collecting information about users, especially their browsing habits (regardless of whether the information is “personally identifiable”). In other words, the law would create a property right in such “personal information” (ironically, many advocates of this approach criticize or reject intellectual property.) In a similar vein, many advocates of speech controls push for mandatory parental control tools or restrictive default settings.^[15] That is, if government won’t censor speech outright, regulatory advocates want lawmakers to at least (1) require that media, computing and communications devices be shipped to market with parental controls embedded or included (as proposed in Australia and with China’s “Green Dam” filter),^[16] and possibly, (2) that such controls be defaulted to their most restrictive position—forcing users to opt-out of the controls later if they want to consume media rated above a certain threshold.

More sophisticated advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation will likely argue that their paternalism is less elitist or intrusive because they merely want to “nudge” the public into making “better” decisions. Economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein (director of President Obama’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, responsible for analyzing most new federal regulations) popularized this approach with their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Based on behavioral economics studies, they argue that both government and private actors must inevitably make decisions about “choice architecture” and that, by setting defaults, incentives and rules smartly, “choice architects” can and should improve decision-making without blocking, fencing-off or significantly burdening choices.^[17]

In this regard, Sunstein and Thaler’s approach parallels the work of Lawrence Lessig, one of the most influential Internet policy thinkers. Lessig has argued that the “architecture” of “code” (how software is written) “regulates” all online activities and requires government oversight and intervention to keep in check. Otherwise, he warned ominously a decade ago, “Left to itself, cyberspace will become a perfect tool of control.”^[18] Lessig’s hyper-pessimistic predictions have proven unwarranted, however. Far from fostering a world of “perfect control,” code and cyberspace have proven remarkably difficult to regulate, but nonetheless has generally benefited consumers and citizens without centralized direction.^[19] Still, Lessig, Sunstein, and others of this ilk persist in their advocacy of “nudges” of many varieties to impose their will on cyberspace through mandates from above.

But while it might be possible to define “better decisions” and argue that poor choice architecture leads people to choose things they clearly don’t want in contexts like investment decisions and mortgages, how can elites know what other people really want in highly subjective contexts like privacy and speech? Should they rely on opinion polls—the highly subjective results of which depend heavily on “choice architecture” of question-crafting—to guess what the right default should be?^[20] Was the Chinese proposal to mandate deployment of “Green Dam” just a harmless “nudge” because users weren’t barred from uninstalling the filtering software that must accompany their computers (i.e., “opting-out”)? The problem becomes even more difficult where trade-offs among competing values are inevitable. For example, data collection about Internet users raises privacy concerns for some but benefits all, creating more funding for “free” content (i.e., speech) and services users prefer by making more valuable the advertising that supports online publishers. In short, regulations of speech and privacy are likely to be pure paternalism, even when billed as “libertarian paternalism as Thaler and Sunstein label their approach.^[21]

What might be called “regulatory blackmail” is also a time-honored tradition among both advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation. When censorship advocates have previously been impeded by the First Amendment, they have worked behind the scenes with lawmakers or regulatory agencies to use indirect pressure and strong-arming tactics to extract “voluntary concessions” from companies or others.^[22] For example, in 2004, the FCC strong-armed radio giant Clear Channel into agreeing to a “voluntary” consent decree that involved taking Howard Stern off the air.^[23] Similarly, in 2008, XM and Sirius Satellite Radio finally agreed to set aside 4% of their system capacity for use by politically favored racial minorities (a kind of speech control) as a “voluntary condition” of their merger—after the FCC had sat on their application for nearly 16 months.^[24] This race-based preference would have been unconstitutional if the FCC had imposed it directly.^[25] While the FTC has been far less prone to such abuse and actually plays a key role in holding companies to their promises, its current Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, has hung the “regulatory sword of Damocles” over the heads of the online advertising industry, threatening them with a “day of reckoning” if he doesn’t get what he wants from industry self-regulatory efforts.”^[26] The sword could actually fall if the FTC turns self-regulation into the European model of “co-regulation,” where the government steers and industry simply rows.^[27]

V. The Crisis Mentality that Drives Regulation

Speech and privacy regulatory advocates share another trait in common: an affinity for the use of a crisis mentality as a method of spurring political action. In his 1995 book The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy, political philosopher and economist Thomas Sowell formulated a model that he argued drives ideological crusades to expand government power over our lives and economy. “The great ideological crusades of the twentieth-century intellectuals have ranged across the most disparate fields,” noted Sowell. But what they all had in common, he argued, was “their moral exaltation of the anointed above others, who are to have their different views nullified and superseded by the views of the anointed, imposed via the power of government.”^[28] These government-expanding crusades shared several key elements, which Sowell identified as follows:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society, a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many, in response to the prescient conclusions of the few.
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes.

We see this model at work on a daily basis today with our government’s various efforts to reshape our economy, but the model is equally applicable to debates over speech controls and privacy regulation. In particular, the various “technopanics”^[29] we have witnessed in recent years fit this model. For example, consider how this model plays out in the debate over online social networking:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [online sexual predators], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [such as mandatory online age verification ^[30] or the Deleting Online Predators Act ^[31]] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [must stop kids and adults from being online together on same sites], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [some state Attorneys General].^[32]
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [child safety researchers and others are told that their research is meaningless or offbase].^[33]

We also see this model in play in other debates, such as efforts to regulate “excessively violent” video games and television programming.^[34] And consider how this model plays out on the privacy front:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [amorphous privacy violations], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [“baseline federal privacy regulation”] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [anyone who shares information online], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [a handful of privacy advocacy groups].
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [any suggestion that privacy concerns are being overblown and that most information-sharing is socially beneficial is dismissed out-of-hand].

Worse yet, regulatory intervention in these cases simply begets more and more intervention to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions.^[35] Thus, the “crisis” cycle never ends.

VI. Third-Person Effect Hypothesis as an Explanation

Something more profound than simple political elitism seems to be at work here, however. A phenomenon psychologists refer to as the “third-person effect hypothesis” can explain many calls for government intervention, especially in the media world.^[36] Simply stated, speech and privacy critics sometimes seem to only see and hear in media or communications what they want to see and hear—or what they don’t want to see or hear. When they encounter perspectives or preferences that are at odds with their own, they are more likely to be concerned about the impact of those things on others throughout society and come to believe that government must “do something” to correct those perspectives. Many people desire regulation because they think it will be good for others, not necessarily for themselves. The regulation they desire has a very specific purpose in mind: “re-tilting” speech or market behavior in their desired direction.

The third-person effect hypothesis was first formulated by W. Phillips Davison in a seminal 1983 article:

In its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves.^[37]

Davison used this hypothesis to explain how media critics on both the Left and Right seemed to simultaneously find “bias” in the same content or reports when they couldn’t possibly both be correct. In reality, their own personal preferences were biasing their ability to fairly evaluate that content. Davison’s article prompted further research by many other psychologists, social scientists, and public opinion experts to test just how powerful this phenomenon was in explaining calls for censorship and other social phenomena.^[38] In these studies, third-person effect has been shown to be the primary explanation for why many people fear—or even want to ban—various types of speech or expression, including news,^[39] misogynistic rap lyrics,^[40] television violence,^[41] video games,^[42] and pornography.^[43] In each case, the subjects surveyed expressed strong misgivings about allowing others to see or hear too much of the speech or expression in question, but greatly discounted the impact of that speech on themselves. Such studies thus reveal the strong paternalistic instinct behind proposals to regulate speech. As Davison notes:

Insofar as faith and morals are concerned… it is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having been adversely affected by the information whose dissemination is to be prohibited. Even the censor’s friends are usually safe from the pollution. It is the general public that must be protected. Or else, it is youthful members of the general public, or those with impressionable minds.^[44]

It’s easy to see how this same phenomenon is at work in debates about privacy. Regulatory advocates imagine their preferences are “correct” (right for everyone) and that the masses are being duped by external forces beyond their control or comprehension, even though the advocates themselves are somehow immune from the brain-washing and privy to some higher truth that the hoi polloi simply cannot fathom. Again, this is Sowell’s “Vision of the Anointed” at work.

Consider the flare-up in 2004 over the introduction of Gmail, Google’s free email service. At a time when Yahoo! mail (then as now the leading webmail provider) offered customers less than 10 megabytes of email storage, Gmail offered an astounding gigabyte of storage that would grow over time (now over 7 GB). Rather than charging some users for more storage or special features, Google paid for the service by showing advertisements next to each email “contextually” targeted to keywords in that email—a far more profitable form of advertising than “dumb banner” ads previously used by other webmail providers.^[45] Self-appointed (or, to extend Sowell’s framework, “self-anointed”) privacy advocates howled that Google was going to “read users’ email,” and led a crusade to ban such algorithmic contextual targeting.^[46] Thierer responded to these critics by pointing out that the service was purely voluntary and noted:

you don’t speak for me and a lot of other people in this world who will be more than happy to cut this deal with Google. So do us a favor and don’t ask the government to shut down a service just because you don’t like it. Privacy is a subjective condition and your value preferences are not representative of everyone else’s values in our diverse nation. Stop trying to coercively force your values and choices on others. We can decide these things on our own, thank you very much.^[47]

Interestingly, however, the frenzy of hysterical indignation about Gmail was followed by a collective cyber-yawn: Users increasingly understood that algorithms, not humans, were doing the “reading” and that, if they didn’t like it, they didn’t have to use it. Today, nearly 150 million of people around the world use Gmail, and it has a steadily growing share of the webmail market. Even though cyber-consumers have embraced the service, some privacy advocates persist in their effort to shut down Gmail. They appear determined to stop at nothing to impose their will on others—the essence of political elitism—even if that means cutting off free email service for 150 million people!^[48]

A similar debate has played out more recently regarding targeted online advertising in general. Advertising on search engines is, much like Gmail, targeted “contextually” based on search terms entered by users and most advertising on other websites is based on the nature of content on a site or page. But certain data is collected about users as they browse to make that advertising more effective—by measuring its performance, reducing fraud, preventing over-exposure, etc. Some privacy advocates have insisted that industry self-regulation of such practices (even if enforced by the FTC) is inadequate and have called for preemptive regulation. They are even more offended by “behavioral advertising” which allows publishers whose content would have little value as the basis for contextually targeting advertising on their own sites to compete for more highly valued advertising by showing ads to users based on other sites they’ve visited. In both cases, data collection can increase the funding available to publishers to produce more of the content and services preferred by users, thus conferring an enormous indirect benefit on users, but also directly benefits users by increasing the relevance of the advertising they see.^[49] For some of the more extreme advocates of privacy regulation, however, there are no trade-offs, only absolutist “solutions:” To them, privacy is so obviously desirable that they feel at ease in deciding what’s best for everyone else. Such absolutists often respond with righteous indignation and conspiratorial fulmination when challenged to identify the harm against which they’re protecting consumers, while disdainfully dismissing all talk of the benefits of online advertising as self-serving industry propaganda.^[50]

VII. The Principled Alternative: Trust People & Empower Them

There is an alternative to this elitist mentality: freedom and personal responsibility. Individuals should be permitted to live a life of their own, even if they sometimes make mistakes or choices that are at odds with what elites think is best for them. ^[51]

Of course, the world isn’t perfect. In an ideal world, adults would be fully empowered to tailor speech and privacy decisions to their own values and preferences. Specifically, in an ideal world, adults (and parents) would have (1) the information necessary to make informed decisions and (2) the tools and methods necessary to act upon that information. Importantly, those tools and methods would give them the ability to not only block the things they don’t like—objectionable content, annoying ads or the collection of data about them—while also finding the things they want.

Achieving that ideal is likely impossible, but the good news is that we are moving closer to it with each passing day. Citizens have more tools and methods at their disposal than ever before which enable them to make decisions for themselves and their families. And this is true for both parental controls ^[52] and privacy controls.^[53]

Of course, some speech and privacy elitists will argue that we can’t trust empowerment tools ( e.g., filters, rating systems, or other controls) that are created by companies or other affected parties. But rather than trying to enhance those tools and educate users about how to use them, these elitists skip right past user empowerment and channel their energies into regulations that would impose a top-down, one-size-fits all standard on all adults and families—or even into trying to craft the perfect “nudge” that will help users make what elites believe to be the “right” decisions. Of course, these tools can, and should, be improved. Those groups worried about speech/content and privacy issues should focus on how we might drive such protections from the bottom-up by empowering individuals instead of government bureaucrats. The goal in both cases should be a “let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom” approach, which offers diverse tools and strategies for our diverse citizenry.^[54] We need not accept “one-size-fits” all approaches, whether they be regulatory mandates or “nudges,” based on the presumption that elites know best.

Finally, it is vital not to lose sight of what’s ultimately at stake here. If regulatory approaches trump the empowerment agenda we have described, the future of a free and open Internet—indeed, as technology converges, the future of all media—is at risk.^[55] By imposing technological solutions from the top-down that can never keep pace with technological change, regulation necessarily forecloses freedom and innovation.^[56] By contrast, individual empowerment allows innovation to flourish. The better approach across the board is education, not regulation.^[57] Empowerment, not elitism, is the path forward. The digital elite should be leading this effort by developing and promoting technologies of empowerment, not crafting regulatory mandates to force their will upon us.^[58]

#

Adam Thierer is a Senior Fellow with The Progress & Freedom Foundation and the director of its Center for Digital Media Freedom. Berin Szoka  is a Senior Fellow with PFF and the Director of PFF’s Center for Internet Freedom.

[1] . William A. Henry, In Defense of Elitism (1995) at 2-3.

[2] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Congress, Content Regulation, and Child Protection: The Expanding Legislative Agenda, Progress Snapshot 4.4, Feb. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.4childprotection.html. Like American courts, we use the term “speech” as a broad catch-all for communications, including both actual speaking as well as other forms of transmitting, as well as receiving, information (“content”).

[3] . See generally Adam Thierer, Don’t Scapegoat Media, USA Today, Dec. 4, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.24scapegoatmedia.html; Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the Children, “Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (2001); Karen Sternheimer, It’s Not the Media: The Truth about Pop Culture’s Influence on Children (2003); Karen Sternheimer, Kids These Days: Facts and Fictions about Today’s Youth (2006).

[4] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, FCC Violence Report Concludes that Parenting Doesn’t Work, PFF Blog, Apr. 26, 2007, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2007/04/fcc_violence_re.html.

[5] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sen. Rockefeller Gives Up on Parenting at Senate Violence Hearing, PFF Blog, June 26, 2007, blog.pff.org/archives/2007/06/sen_rockefeller_1.html.

[6] . Adam Thierer, Conservatives, Porn, and “Community Standards,” The Technology Liberation Front, March 2, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/02/conservatives-porn-and-community-standards.

[7] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate, Progress Snapshot 4.19, Sept. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.19onlinetargeting.html.

[8] . Jeff Chester, for decades the great gadfly of American advertising, has decried “the system … developed to track each and every one of us and our behavior for one-on-one marketing efforts” as “manipulative, intrusive and un-democratic.” Wendy Melillo, Q&A: Chester Writes the Book on Privacy, Dec. 11, 2007, www.gfem.org/node/227. For instance, Chester and other leading “privacy advocates” ridicule the idea of smart phones as a “liberating technology” and insist that,

Despite the glowing words about customization and personalized service, what marketers and advertisers are increasingly offering consumers is merely the illusion of free choice. Mobile operators offer their various options and services, not on an individual basis, but preconfigured according to segmented demographic profiles.

Center for Digital Democracy and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Complaint and Request for Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Mobile Marketing Practices, Jan. 13, 2009 (emphasis original), www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCmobile_complaint0109.pdf. See generally Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?, Progress on Point 16.2, Feb. 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.2targetonlinead.pdf.

[9] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Privacy, Age Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, Progress on Point 16.11, May 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.11-COPPA-and-age-verification.pdf.

[10] . The Supreme Court has used a “right to privacy” to strike down laws against the use of contraception by married couples, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[11] . Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (2000), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop7.15freedomofspeech.pdf.

[12] . See , Amicus Brief for Association Of National Advertisers, Cato Institute, Coalition For Healthcare Communication, Pacific Legal Foundation And The Progress & Freedom Foundation In Support Of Appellants, IMS Health v. Sorrell, No. 09-1913-cv(L), 09-2056-cv(CON) (2nd Cir. 2009), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/071309-Brief-Amici-Curiae-ANA-et-al-Second-Circuit-(09-1913-cv).pdf.

[13] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Social Networking and Age Verification: Many Hard Questions; No Easy Solutions, Progress on Point No. 14.5, March 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ pops/pop14.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf; www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.5ageverification.pdfAdam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Statement Regarding the Internet Safety Technical Task Force’s Final Report to the Attorneys General, Jan. 14, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/090114ISTTFthiererclosingstatement.pdf; Nancy Willard, Why Age and Identity Verification Will Not Work—And is a Really Bad Idea, Jan. 26, 2009, www.csriu.org/PDFs/digitalidnot.pdf; Jeff Schmidt, Online Child Safety: A Security Professional’s Take, The Guardian, Spring 2007, www.jschmidt.org/AgeVerification/Gardian_JSchmidt.pdf.

[14] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Mandatory Data Retention: How Much is Appropriate, PFF Blog, June 26, 2006, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2006/06/mandatory_data.html

[15] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Perils of Mandatory Parental Controls and Restrictive Defaults, Progress on Point 14.4, Apr. 11, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15.4defaultdanger.pdf.

[16] . Adam Thierer, China’s Green Dam Filter and the Threat of Rising Global Censorship, PFF Blog, June 17, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/06/chinas_green_dam_filter_and_threat_of_rising_globa.html

[17] . They define choice architecture as follows: “A structure designed by a choice architect(s) to improve the quality of decisions made by homo sapiens. Often invisible, choice architecture is the specific user-friendly shape of an organization’s policy or physical building when homo sapiens come into contact with it. Examples of choice architecture include a voter ballot, a procedure for handling well-meaning people who forget a deadline, or a skyscraper.” Nudge Glossary of Terms, www.nudges.org/glossary.cfm.

[18] . Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) at 6.

[19] . See Adam Thierer, Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of “Perfect Control,” Cato Unbound, May 2009, www.cato-unbound.org/2009/05/08/adam-thierer/code-pessimism-and-the-illusion-of-perfect-control

[20] . See Solveig Singleton & Jim Harper, With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us, 2001, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299930.

[21] . As Cato Institute scholar Will Wilkinson has argued, the book’s “agreeably banal doctrine of choice-preserving helpfulness” blurs the lines between paternalism and libertarianism, and thus “the thrust of the conceptual renovation behind the term libertarian paternalism is to empower, not limit, political elites.” Why Opting Out Is No “Third Way,” Reason, October 2008, www.reason.com/news/show/128916.html. See also Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sunstein’s “Libertarian Paternalism” is Really Just Paternalism, PFF Blog, April 7, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/04/sunsteins_liber.html.

[22] . See Robert Corn-Revere, “’Voluntary’ Self-Regulation and the Triumph of Euphemism,” in Rationales & Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic Media (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., 1997), at 183-208.

[23] . Telecom Policy Report, Commission Settles Indecency Charges, But At What Cost?, June 30, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_25_2/ai_n6091525.

[24] . See Adam Thierer, XM-Sirius, Regulatory Blackmail, and Diversity, June 17, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/06/xmsirius_regula.html.

[25] . See Comments of W. Kenneth Ferree on Implementation of Sirius-XM Merger Condition, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, MB Docket No. 07-57, March 30, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/033009siriusXMconditionfiling.pdf.

[26] . See Szoka & Adam Thierer, supra note 8 at 3.

[27] . See id. at 2.

[28] . Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (1995) at 5.

[29] . Alice Marwick, To Catch a Predator? The MySpace Moral Panic, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 6-2, June 2008, www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2152/1966; Wade Roush, The Moral Panic over Social Networking Sites, Technology Review, Aug. 7, 2006, www.technologyreview.com/communications/17266; Anne Collier, Why Techopanics are Bad, Net Family News, April 23, 2009, www.netfamilynews.org/2009/04/why-technopanics-are-bad.html; Adam Thierer, Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics,’ Inside ALEC, July 2009, at 16-17, www.alec.org/am/pdf/Inside_July09.pdf; Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Technopanics and the Great Social Networking Scare, PFF Blog, June 10, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/07/10/technopanics-and-the-great-social-networking-scare.

[30] . Supra note 13.

[31] . In the 109th Congress, former Rep. Michael Fitzpatrick (R-PA) introduced the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on social networking sites in public schools and libraries. DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a lopsided 410-15 vote, but failed to pass the Senate. The measure was reintroduced just a few weeks into the 110th Congress by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the ranking minority member and former chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. It was section 2 of a bill that Sen. Stevens sponsored titled the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act” (S. 49), but was later removed from the bill. See Declan McCullagh, Chat Rooms Could Face Expulsion, CNet News.com, July 28, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6099414.html?part=rss&tag=6099414&subj=news.

[32] . See Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, MySpace Receives More Pressure to Limit Children’s Access to Site, Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2006, online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115102268445288250-YRxkt0rTsyyf1QiQf2EPBYSf7iU_20070624.html; Susan Haigh, Conn. Bill Would Force MySpace Age Check, Yahoo News.com, March 7, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17502005.

[33] . See, e.g., Letter of Henry McMaster, Attorney General, South Carolina to Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and Attorney General Roy Cooper Regarding Internet Safety Task Force (“ISTTF”) Report, January 14, 2009, www.scag.gov/newsroom/pdf/2009/internetsafetyreport.pdf

[34] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Games and “Moral Panic,” PFF Blog, Jan. 23, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/01/video_games_and_moral_panic.html ; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Fact and Fiction in the Debate over Video Game Regulation, Progress Snapshot 13.7, March 2006, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.7videogames.pdf.

[35] . “All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.” Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, at 858 (3rd ed. 1963) (1949).

[36] . See generally Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 119-123, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf (Explaining how the third-person effect serves as a powerful explanation for the heated backlash that followed an FCC effort to moderately liberalize media ownership rules in 2003-04).

[37] . W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 Public Opinion Quarterly 1, Spring 1983, at 3.

[38] . For the best overview of third-person effect research, see Douglas M. McLeod, Benjamin H. Detenber, and William P. Eveland., Jr., Behind the Third-Person Effect: Differentiating Perceptual Processes for Self and Other, 51 Journal of Communication, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2001, at 678-695.

[39] . Vincent Price, David H. Tewksbury & Li-Ning Huang, Third-person Effects of News Coverage: Orientations Toward Media, Journalism & Mass Communications Quarterly, Vol. 74, at 525-540.

[40] . Douglas M. McLeod, William P. Eveland & Amy I. Nathanson, Support for Censorship of Violent and Misogynic Rap Lyrics: And Analysis of the Third-Person Effect, Communications Research, Vol. 24, 1997, at 153-174.

[41] . Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber, For the Good of Others: Censorship and the Third-Person Effect, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 8, 1996, at 163-186.

[42] . James D. Ivory, Addictive, But Not For Me: The Third-Person Effect and Electronic Game Players’ Views Toward the Medium’s Potential for Dependency and Addiction, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Aug. 2002.

[43] . Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The Third-person Perception and Support for Censorship of Pornography, Journal of Communication, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1995, at 27-38

[44] . Supra note 37 at 14. Along these lines, a December 2004 Washington Post article documented the process by which the Parents Television Council, a vociferous censorship advocacy group, screens various television programming. One of the PTC screeners interviewed for the story talked about the societal dangers of various broadcast and cable programs she rates, but then also noted how much she personally enjoys HBO’s “The Sopranos” and “Sex and the City,” as well as ABC’s “Desperate Housewives.” Apparently, in her opinion, what’s good for the goose is not good for the gander! See Bob Thompson, Fighting Indecency, One Bleep at a Time, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2004, at C1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49907-2004Dec8.html.

[45] . See Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price at 112-118 (2009).

[46] . See Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Beth Givens, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Pam Dixon, World Privacy Forum, to California Attorney General Lockyer, May 3, 2004, http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/agltr5.3.04.html.

[47] . See email from Adam Thierer to Declan McCullaugh on Politech Email discussion group, April 30, 2004, http://lists.jammed.com/politech/2004/04/0083.html (emphasis added).

[48] . See Complaint and Request for Injunction of the Electronic Privacy Information Center against Google, Inc., March 17, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf; see also Ryan Radia, Should the FTC Shut Down Gmail and Google Docs Because of an Already-Fixed Bug?, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 18, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/18/should-the-ftc-shut-down-gmail-and-google-docs-because-of-an-already-fixed-bug/.

[49] . See Berin Szoka & Mark Adams, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Benefits of Online Advertising & the Costs of Regulation, PFF Working Paper, forthcoming.

[50] . Anti-advertising crusader Jeff Chester often resorts to questioning the motives of those who question whether his regulatory prescriptions would actually benefit consumers, see, e.g., http://techliberation.com/2009/06/17/behavioral-advertising-industry-practices-hearing-some-issues-that-need-to-be-discussed/#comment-11698840. See generally Jeff Chester, Digital Destiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy (2007).

[51] . “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1859, 1986) at 72.

[52] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection, Special Report, Version 4.0, Summer 2009, www.pff.org/parentalcontrols.

[53] . Adam Thierer, Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Privacy Solutions, PFF Blog, Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/privacy_solutions.

[54] . Comments of Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, In the Matter of Implementation of the Child Save Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming; MB Docket No. 09-26, April 16, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/041509-%5bFCC-FILING%5d-Adam-Thierer-PFF-re-FCC-Child-Safe-Viewing-Act-NOI-(MB-09-26).pdf.

[55] . See Adam Thierer, FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age, Engage, Feb. 20, 2009, www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090216_ThiererEngage101.pdf

[56] . “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.” Friedrich von Hayek, “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in The Essence of Hayek, (Hoover Inst., 1984), at 276.

[57] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Two Sensible, Education-Based Legislative Approaches to Online Child safety, Progress Snapshot 3.10, Sept. 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2007/ps3.10safetyeducationbills.pdf.

[58] . See, e.g., Berin Szoka, Google, CDT, Online Advertising & Preserving Persistent User Choice Across Ad Networks Through Plug-ins, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 13, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/ 03/13/google-cdt-online-advertising-preserving-persistent-user-choice-across-ad-networks-through-plug-ins/.

I’ve just had a new article published by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in which I make the case against “techno-panics,” which refers to public and political crusades against the use of new media or technologies by the young. The article is entitled “Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics‘” and it appears in the July 2009 Inside ALEC newsletter.  This is something I have spent a lot of time writing about here in recent years (See 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and I finally got around to putting it altogether in a concise essay here.  I have pasted the full text below. [And I just want to send a shout-out to my friend Anne Collier of Net Family News.org, whose work on this topic has been very influential on my thinking.]

“Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics‘” by Adam Thierer

A cursory review of the history of media and communications technologies reveals a reoccurring cycle of “techno-panics” — public and political crusades against the use of new media or technologies by the young.  From the waltz to rock-and-roll to rap music, from movies to comic books to video games, from radio and television to the Internet and social networking websites, every new media format or technology has spawned a fresh debate about the potential negative effects they might have on kids.

Inevitably, fueled by media sensationalism and various activist groups, these social and cultural debates quickly become political debates. Indeed, each of the media technologies or outlets mentioned above was either regulated or threatened with regulation at some point in its history. And the cycle continues today. During recent sessions of Congress, countless hearings were held and bills introduced on a wide variety of media and content-related issues. These proposals dealt with broadcast television and radio programming, cable and satellite television content, video games, the Internet, social networking sites, and much more.  State policymakers, especially state Attorneys General (AGs), have also joined in such crusades on occasion.  The recent push by AGs for mandatory age verification for all social networking sites is merely the latest example.

What is perhaps most ironic about these techno-panics is how quickly yesterday’s boogeyman becomes tomorrow’s accepted medium, even as the new villains replace old ones.  For example, the children of the 1950s and 60s were told that Elvis’s hip shakes and the rock-and-roll revolution would make them all the tools of the devil. They grew up fine and became parents themselves, but then promptly began demonizing rap music and video games in the ‘80s and ‘90s.  And now those aging Pac Man-era parents are worried sick about their kids being abducted by predators lurking on MySpace and Facebook. We shouldn’t be surprised if, a decade or two from now, today’s Internet generation will be decrying the dangers of virtual reality.

These techno-panics are almost always disproportionate to the real risk posed by new media and technology, which typically do not have the corrupting influence on youth that older generations fear.  Parents and public policymakers alike need to remember they were once kids, too, and managed to live through many of the same fears and concerns about media and popular culture. As the late University of North Carolina journalism professor Margaret A. Blanchard once noted: “[P]arents and grandparents who lead the efforts to cleanse today’s society seem to forget that they survived alleged attacks on their morals by different media when they were children. Each generation’s adults either lose faith in the ability of their young people to do the same or they become convinced that the dangers facing the new generation are much more substantial than the ones they faced as children.” And Thomas Hine, author of The Rise and Fall of the American Teenager, argues that: “We seem to have moved, without skipping a beat, from blaming our parents for the ills of society to blaming our children. We want them to embody virtues we only rarely practice. We want them to eschew habits we’ve never managed to break.”

The better response by both parents and policymakers is a measured and balanced approach to children’s exposure to media content and online interactions.  All-or-nothing extremes are never going to work.  In particular, techno-panics are hopelessly counter-productive. “Fear, in many cases, is leading to overreaction, which in turn could give rise to greater problems as young people take detours around the roadblocks we think we are erecting,” argue John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, authors of Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives. What parents, educators, and policymakers need to understand, they argue, “is that the traditional values and common sense that have served them well in the past will be relevant in this new world, too.”

Most simply, we need to be willing to talk to our kids about the new technologies and cultural developments that shape their generation. When we as parents (or policymakers) do not fully comprehend or appreciate the new-fangled gadget in our kids’ pocket—or whatever they are playing, watching, or listening to on it—instead of engaging in demagoguery and driving a wedge between us and them, we should instead invite them to have a conversation with us about it.  Ask three simple questions to get that conversation started: “What is this new thing all about?”  “Tell me how you use it.”  “Why is it important to you?”  Once you’ve got them talking to you, good ‘ol fashion common sense and timeless parenting principles should kick in. “Do you understand why too much of this might be bad for you?” “Will you please come talk to me if you don’t understand something you’ve seen or heard?” And so on.

In sum, it’s about parental responsibility and rational, measured responses. The “techno-panic” mentality, by contrast, creates distrust and distance between our kids and us. As Anne Collier of Net Family News notes, techno-panics “cause fear, which interferes with parent-child communication, which in turn puts kids at greater risk.”

Parents and policymakers need to engage kids in an ongoing conversation about the technologies du jour—even when we don’t fully understand or appreciate them.

————— [printable Scribd version follows] —————

“Against Techno-Panics” by Adam Thierer, PFF (July 2009 – Inside ALEC) http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=17392730&access_key=key-2gdkqylyeu5h376buyyi&page=1&version=1&viewMode=