Yesterday, the Supreme Court dropped a decision in Wayfair v. South Dakota, a case on the issue of online sales tax. As always, the holding is key: “Because the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753, are overruled.” What follows below is a roundup of reactions and comments to the decision.

Joseph Bishop-Henchman at the Tax Foundation thinks this decision sets up a new political fight in Congress and in the states:

All eyes will now turn to Congress and the states. Congress has been stymied between alternate versions of federal solutions: the Remote Transactions Parity Act (RTPA) or Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA), which lets states collect if they agree to simplify their sales taxes, and a proposal from retiring Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) that would make the sales tax a business obligation rather than a consumer obligation, and have it collected based on the tax rate where the company is located but send the revenue to the jurisdiction where the customer is located. RTPA and MFA are more workable and more likely to pass, but Goodlatte controls what makes it to the House floor, so nothing has happened. Maybe today’s decision will change that.

Berin Szoka at TechFreedom noted:

For the last twenty-six years, the Internet has flourished because of the legal certainty created by Quill. Now, no retailer can know whether it must collect taxes, and smaller retailers face huge challenges. As Chief Justice Roberts notes, the majority ‘breezily disregards the costs that its decision will impose on retailers.’ The majority insists that software will fix the problem of calculating the correct state and local sales tax for every transaction, but with over 10,000 jurisdictions taxing similar products differently, the problem is nightmarishly complicated.

My colleague Doug Holtz-Eakin explains the tension:

What is the economic upshot of this decision? Certainly, it puts in-state and brick-and-mortar retailers on a level playing field with online sellers. In isolation, that is an improvement in the efficiency of the economy because people will shop based on the product and experience and not the tax consequences. Recall, however, that in many states a resident is liable for the “use tax” on her out-of-state purchases. If the sales tax is now being collected, it will be important for states either to drop the use tax or to make sure that there is no double taxation in some other way. If not, then the result of this decision will be less efficiency.

Another aspect of the decision is the impact on federalism and the notion of representation. The decision means that South Dakota can now dictate some of the business operations of firms that have no representation in the South Dakota legislature. Is that fair? Moreover, firms can no longer shop among states to find the sales tax regime that they like best — they will be subject to the same sales taxes across the country regardless of where they operate.

Grover Norquist at American for Tax Reform had this to say:

Today the Supreme Court said ‘yes—you can be taxed by politicians you do not elect and who act knowing you are powerless to object.’ This power can now be used to export sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes, and opens the door for the European Union to export its tax burden onto American businesses—as they have been demanding…

We fought the American Revolution in large part to oppose the very idea of taxation without representation. Today, the Supreme Court announced, ‘oops’ governments can now tax those outside their borders—those who have no political power, no vote, no voice.

Adam Michel of the Heritage Foundation also focused on federalism at The Daily Signal:

The new status quo under Wayfair is untenable, creating a Wild West for state sales taxes. Some will point to seemingly easy solutions that have been promoted for decades. One example is the Remote Transactions Parity Act, sponsored by Rep. Kristi Noem, R-S.D.

Noem’s bill would maintain the new expanded power of state tax collectors, while imposing nominal limits and simplifications on states’ tax rules.

Such proposals that force sellers to track their sales to the consumer’s destination and comply with laws in other jurisdictions are fundamentally at odds with the principles of local government and American federalism.

Rob Port is concerned about the interstate commerce implications:

The purpose of the interstate commerce clause is to prevent the nightmare of fifty states squabbling with one another over trade wars between their constituent industries, or trying to exert political influence on one another. Congress, and not the states, is to regulate interstate commerce.

I feel like the Supreme Court, by overturning Quill and giving the states new powers to tax beyond their borders, has weakened interstate commerce protections and cracked open the lid to a real can of worms.

All Things SCOTUS has a list of reactions from conservatives.

The war among the states to see who can lavish the film industry with more generous tax credits in their attempt to become “the next Hollywood” continues, and it is quickly descending into a classic race to the bottom. A front-page article in today’s Wall Street Journal notes that the tax incentive bidding war has gotten so intense that it is hollowing out the old Hollywood labor pool and sending it on a road trip across the America in search of tax-induced job activity:

As film and TV production scatters around the country, more workers…  are packing up from California and moving to where the jobs are. Driving this exodus of lower-wage workers — stunt doubles, makeup artists, production assistants and others who keep movie sets humming — are successful efforts by a host of states to use tax incentives to poach production business from California. […]  Only two movies with production budgets higher than $100 million filmed in Los Angeles in 2013, according to Film L.A. Inc., the city’s movie office. In 1997, the year “Titanic” was released, every big-budget film but one filmed at least partially in the city. The number of feature-film production days in Los Angeles peaked in 1996 and fell by 50% through last year, according to Film L.A. Projects such as reality television and student films have picked up some of the slack. But overall entertainment-industry employment has slid. About 120,000 Californians worked in the industry in 2012, down from 136,000 in 2004, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The labor migration has arisen in part because California hasn’t competed aggressively on the tax-break front, officials and executives say, while states like Georgia have made efforts to grab a sizable chunk of the industry. More than 40 states and 30 foreign countries are offering increasingly generous and creative tax incentives to lure entertainment producers.

On one hand, hooray for labor mobility! But seriously, this stinks because this labor shift is taking place in a wholly unnatural way, with a complex and growing web of tax inducements leading to massive distortions in this marketplace. While proponents will insist these programs are job creators for the communities that win, in reality, they are really just job reshufflers that net limited jobs at that. Meanwhile, the costs to their taxpayers grows as more and more state and local governments jump in this game. It’s classic “smokestack chasing” activity, except in this case the firms probably didn’t even create that many jobs while they were there and then you don’t even have a factory left when the firms leave town!

If things continue like this, it probably won’t be long before some “innovative” state or local government leader gets the idea of actually just paying some film producers cold hard cash to come set up shop in their area. Hey, at least that way the programs would be on-budget and nominally more accountable!

Anyway, I’ve documented the cost of this ruinous race to the bottom in my essay, “State Film Industry Incentives: A Growing Cronyism Fiasco,” which documents the economic evidence about just how inefficient these programs are in practice.  I later expanded that essay and included in my massive paper with Brent Skorup, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” Warning: It makes for miserable reading if you care about fiscal accountability and good government. Maybe somebody will make a movie about this racket someday! (But don’t hold your breath.)

P.S. For more on the corrupting influence of cronyism on American capitalism, please visit this Mercatus Center page for a comprehensive set of studies on the issue. Also, check out this outstanding paper by my colleague Matt Mitchell (“The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of Government Favoritism“) and this excellent recent book on cronyism by Randall G. Holcombe and Andrea Castillo. And here’s a little slide show I put together on the costs of cronyism.

In July 2012, the D.C. Council approved the Social E-Commerce Job Creation Tax Incentive Act of 2012. The deal provided LivingSocial, a popular online coupon service, with corporate and property tax exemptions in Washington, D.C. worth approximately $32.5 million over five years beginning in 2015. Legislators feared that LivingSocial would relocate to areas with a lower tax rate. In exchange for the $32.5 million, LivingSocial said it would attempt to add 1,000 employees to its payroll (roughly doubling its number of employees in the District), although no contractual guarantee for job creation exists and even though the firm had never been profitable. Some of the few contractual obligations required for LivingSocial to receive these tax exemptions are that it must establish a program to mentor D.C. high school students, provide internships for D.C. students, and stay located in the District. LivingSocial must also ensure 50% of newly hired employees live in the District in order to receive the Act’s full $32.5 million in exemptions.

Just a few months after the deal was struck it had already become apparent just how risky of a bet the DC government has made with taxpayer dollars. In late November 2012, LivingSocial announced a net loss of $566 million for the third quarter and that hundreds of employees would be laid off. The promise to roughly doubling the size of its DC-based workforce seems fairly unlikely and some analysts doubt the company will survive much longer.

This serves as another case study for just how foolish it is for governments to make risky, taxpayer-backed bets on information tech companies. Sadly, it’s not the only case study in this regard. In a forthcoming white paper, Brent Skorup and I will be documenting the troubling rise of high-tech cronyism across America. Motorola, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, Groupon, film studios, video game makers, and many other information technology companies are lining up with hat in hand and asking for handouts or special favors from state and local governments. Tax credits and other tax code-based inducements (such as tax rebates) are being tapped increasingly by state and local lawmakers who hope to encourage investment by these companies.

This cronyist activity is troubling for many reasons. As Brent and I will argue, tax credits and other benefits for digital technology companies are particularly misguided since (a) the most successful companies certainly don’t need them; and (b) the smaller companies or startups that might benefit from them today probably present a very risky investment for taxpayers. Many of these companies may be here today but gone tomorrow. That appears it could be the case for LivingSocial.

Tax credits can also become a time-consuming morass for innovators and distract them from the entrepreneurial activities they should be focused on. A recent Wall Street Journal report noted that “many companies are saying ‘no, thanks’ and are likely paying more taxes than legally required,” because “the tax deductions are either too cumbersome or too confusing. In some cases, the cost of obtaining the tax benefit is greater than the benefit itself.”

Policymakers should leave such risky investments to venture capitalists and others so that taxpayers are not on the hook when things go off the rails, just as they already have in DC with LivingSocial. Generally speaking, the best industrial recruitment / retention efforts are simple rules, low taxes, and light-touch regulation. That’s how to attract and retain a base of serious high-tech innovators without putting taxpayers at risk when things go wrong as they so often will in this sector.

Update: Shortly after I posted this piece I was contacted by representatives of the D.C. Mayor’s office asking me to clarify for readers that LivingSocial cannot claim any of these tax benefits unless it has 1,000 employees in city and unless it creates a 200,000 sq. ft. headquarters inside the District. They also asked me to again stress (as I noted in the opening paragraph) that these benefits will not begin until 2015-16. The exact terms of the deal can be found in the first link provided above (click the bill name).

In theory, such strings and stipulations could help the DC government escape this mess before it becomes an embarrassing fiasco for the city, but I would argue that they should not be putting taxpayers at risk like this to begin with. Moreover, while more strings might seem to provide greater accountability, added requirements and red tape also create more hassle and costs for firms. As I noted in my essay, that can affect future innovation and entrepreneurialism. Special deals for risky tech ventures remains unwise public policy.

The FCC’s universal service tax is officially out of control. The agency announced yesterday that the “universal service contribution factor” for the 1st quarter of 2012 will go up to 17.9%.  This “contribution factor” is a tax imposed on telecom companies that is adjusted on a quarterly basis to accommodate universal service programs. The FCC doesn’t like people calling it a tax, but that’s exactly what it is. And it just keeps growing and growing. In fact, as the chart below reveals, it has been exploding in recent years. It was in single digits just a few years ago but is now heading toward 20%. And not only is this tax growing more burdensome, but it is completely unsustainable. As the taxable base (traditional interstate telephony) is eroded by new means of communicating, the tax rate will have to grow exponentially or the base will have to be broadened to cover new technologies and services. We should have junked the current carrier-delivered universal service subsidy system years ago and gone with a straight-forward voucher system. A means-tested voucher could have targeted assistance to those who needed it without creating an inefficient, unsustainable hidden tax like we have now. For all the ugly details, I recommend reading all of Jerry Ellig’s research on the issue.

The debate over the imposition of sales tax collection obligations on interstate vendors is heating up again at the federal level with the introduction of S. 1452, “The Main Street Fairness Act.” [pdf]  The measure would give congressional blessing to a multistate compact that would let states impose sales taxes on interstate commerce, something usually blocked by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced the bill in the Senate along with Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Jack Reed (D-RI).  The measure is being sponsored in the House of Representatives by John Conyers (D-MI) and Peter Welch (D-VT). At this time, there are no Republican co-sponsors even though Sen. Mike Enzi was rumored to be a considered co-sponsoring the measure before introduction.

Without any Republicans on board the effort, the measure may not advance very far in Congress. Nonetheless, to the extent the measure gets any traction, it is worth itemizing a few of the problems with this approach. My Mercatus Center colleague Veronique de Rugy and I have done some work on this issue together in the past and we are planning a short new paper on the topic. It will build on this lengthy Cato Institute paper we authored together in 2003, “The Internet Tax Solution: Tax Competition, Not Tax Collusion.” The key principle we set forth was this: “Congress must.. take an affirmative stand against efforts by state and local governments to create a collusive multistate tax compact to tax interstate sales.” “It would be wrong,” we argued, “for members of Congress to abdicate their responsibility to safeguard the national marketplace by giving the states carte blanche to tax interstate commercial activities through a tax compact. The guiding ethic of this debate must remain tax competition, not tax collusion.”

Proponents of simply extending current sales tax collection obligations to interstate sales will claim that the so-called “Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement” (SSTUA) they want Congress to bless has solved the compliance cost and complexity problem associated with taxing “remote” interstate sales. Yet, as I pointed out in my recent Forbes essay, “The Internet Taxman Cometh,” this 200-page “simplification” effort remains a Swiss cheese tax system, however, riddled with loopholes and complexities that could burden vendors, especially mom-and-pop operators. America’s estimated 7,400 local jurisdictions still have many different definitions and exemptions that complicate the sales tax code. For example, is a cookie a “candy,” (which is taxed in most jurisdictions) or a “baked good,” (which is typically tax-exempt)? Thus, forcing online vendors to collect local taxes would create significant burdens on interstate commerce.

This is not to say there aren’t some legitimate tax “fairness” arguments in play here. It really is unfair that “Main Street” vendors are burdened with significant tax collection responsibilities while others are not. But “fairness” cuts many ways. It’s also unfair and unconstitutional to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales taxes on behalf of a jurisdiction where they have no physical presence. After all, at least in theory, those who are taxed should expect to receive some benefit for it. Interstate vendors receive no benefit but bear all the cost.

To the extent we want to “level the playing field,” therefore, one approach is to cut or eliminate sales taxes on in-state vendors. Of course, that’s a tough pill for many states and localities to swallow. If they got their profligate spending habits under control, however, that might be easier.

Another alternative would be the creation of a national Internet sales tax that would avoid the complexity problem by imposing a single rate and set of definitions on all vendors. But that just opens the door to a new federal tax base, which would grow to be burdensome in other ways at a time when American consumers and companies are already over-taxed. I doubt the idea would get much traction in Congress, anyway.

Perhaps the best alternative would be to switch the sourcing methodology for state sales tax collection obligations from destination-based to “origin-based.”  Stated differently, the rule would be “you can tax your own exports, not the imports from other states.” Here’s how Veronique and I summarized an origin-based solution in our old Cato paper:

under an origin-based sourcing rule—also referred to as a “seller state,” “vendor-state,” or “source-based” rule by some scholars—all interstate sales through all channels (traditional stores or cyber-retailers) would be taxed at the point of sale (meaning the company’s “principal place of business”) instead of at the point of destination, if the state or locality chooses to impose a tax. All goods within a given state or locality would be taxed at the locally applicable rate no matter how they were purchased and no matter where they were consumed.  This option would take care of most of the problems posed by the destination-based methodology that is favored by most state and local policymakers today.

Specifically, an origin-based sourcing rule would have the following advantages:

• Minimize the burden on sellers by requiring sellers to know and abide by the tax rates and regulations within their principal place of business instead of the rates and definitions of thousands of different taxing jurisdiction.
• Ensure tax parity between Main Street vendors and interstate sellers.
• Do away with the need for a multistate collection arrangement such as the SSTUA by eliminating any need to trace interstate transactions to the final point of consumption.
• Remove nexus uncertainties and constitutional concerns, because only companies within a state or local government’s borders would be taxed.
• Largely remove any need for continued reliance on the use tax because all transactions would henceforth be sourced to the origin of sale and collected immediately by the vendor at that point.
• Respect buyers’ privacy rights by eliminating the need to collect any special or unique information about a buyer, and  by not using third-party tax collectors to gather information about buyers.
• Respect federalism principles and enhance jurisdictional tax competition  by permitting each state to determine its  own tax policies and encouraging healthy state-by-state tax rivalry.
• Preserve local jurisdictional tax authority where a harmonization proposal like the SSTUA plans would create a de facto national sales tax system and run roughshod over local governments.
• Because it is more politically / constitutionally feasible it may maximize the amount of tax collected for states by making compliance easier and incorporating activities that are currently untaxed.

Please see the old Cato paper for more details and answers to potential objections, but I hope it’s clear why an “origin-based” solution offers a sensible way to break the current logjam and achieve tax “fairness” in the process.

Some states officials will object to the vigorous tax competition spawned by an origin-based sourcing rule. But that’s a feature, not a bug! Tax competition is good for consumers and the continued vitality of American federalism. A multistate tax compact, by contrast, would encourage tax collusion and let states too easily raise rates on interstate sales.

Moreover, I think it bears repeating that state officials have been at this for 15 years and still not found a way to truly simplify their sales taxes and get around constitutional limitations on the taxation of interstate activity. An origin-based system, therefore, may offer them the only way for them to finally tax the Internet and interstate sales.  I’d prefer they scale back their taxing ways, of course, but to the extent they insist on pushing out the boundaries of their tax authority, an origin-based solution — not the “Main Street Tax Fairness Act” — is the only sensible, constitutional way for them to do so.

My latest Forbes column notes how “Taxes On Talking Are On the Rise Across the U.S.” with levies on mobile phones and devices skyrocketing.  I build my argument around data and arguments found in Dan Rothschild’s excellent recent Mercatus Center paper, which makes “The Case Against Taxing Cell Phone Subscribers,” as well as an important recent study by Scott Mackey, an economist and partner at KSE Partners LLP, which documents the growing burden of these wireless taxes and fees.

“Wireless users now face a combined federal, state, and local tax and fee burden of 16.3%, a rate two times higher than the average retail sales tax rate and the highest wireless rate since 2005,” Mackey finds. Mobile tax rates range from a high of 23.7% in Nebraska to a low of 6.9% in Oregon.  48 states have an average combined wireless tax rate above 11%.  These burdensome taxes on talking just don’t make any sense, argues Rothschild. “There is no economic justification for these high tax rates: reducing cell phone ownership is not a public policy goal, cell phone use by one customer does not affect other customers or other people, and these taxes fall disproportionately on lower-income households.”

You can read my entire essay here, but also make sure to re-read Dan Rothschild’s guest post here at the TLF on the issue. It’s much better than my own treatment.  For me, the key point is this: If the primary policy goal in this arena is to build out a first-class communications and data infrastructure and make sure all Americans have access to it, discriminatory taxes on wireless services and networks are highly counter-productive. Policymakers should hang up on the Talking Tax.

[The following essay is a guest post from Dan Rothschild, Managing Director of the State and Local Policy Project at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.]

As cell phone ownership has tripled in the United States over the last decade, policymakers have increasingly seen mobile devices as a cash cow. In some states, consumers now pay as much as a quarter of their cell phone bills in taxes. And while state revenues are beginning to tick back up from their low point during the recession, Medicaid costs are fast on their tails. So it’s likely that over the coming years, states will be looking to find taxes to hike or new taxes to create — all without calling them tax hikes, of course.

Policy makers may be tempted to hike taxes on cell phones, or to create (or “equalize”) taxes on untaxed (or “under taxed”) parts of wireless telephony, such as cell phone data plans or e-readers with cellular connections. As I argue in a recent issue of Mercatus on Policy, this is a bad idea for a number of reasons.

First, it’s bad economics. Having special taxes on cell phone violates the well-established principle of tax neutrality, which holds that taxes should treat all economic activities similarly. The purpose of taxes is to raise funds for necessary government services; when taxes treat different activities unequally, it distorts consumer behavior. Empirical evidence suggests that, at the margin, consumer spending on wireless service is elastic. This makes it a particularly poor choice for excise taxation.

There are two economic justifications for a tax that singles out a particular good or service for a higher tax: if it’s something that policymakers deem “sinful” (a so-called “sin tax”), or if it causes negative externalities that the tax corrects (a Pigouvian tax). In both of these cases, policymakers enact these taxes explicitly to discourage the use of the object of the tax; think cigarettes and alcohol. Neither of these rationales apply to cell phones, and (hopefully) no policymaker believes it’s a worthy policy to reduce consumer access to this technology. Nobody seriously argues that cell phones are sinful, nor that cell phones create net negative externalities.

Second, it runs counter to a number of other policy goals. On the national level, politicians are tripping over themselves to extoll the virtues of broadband internet access and its almost magical effects on everything from health outcomes to urban entrepreneurship. But taxing wireless service, which is frequently bundled with wireless broadband, runs counter to that goal (as would any attempts to “equalize” taxes between the voice and data sections of a bill by applying voice tariffs to data services). Similarly, the FCC’s universal service fund is meant to, inter alia, support telephone access in low-income and rural households. The most efficient way to increase take-up of telephony in these households is to lower the price rather than relying on notoriously inefficient subsidies.

Third, it’s a regressive tax. In all likelihood, cell phones are taxed at a higher rate because not so long ago they were seen as toys of the wealthy. This is obviously no longer the case. The marginal consumers today are largely lower-income, and high taxes keep them from adopting technologies.

On the federal level, the Wireless Tax Fairness Act would prohibit states and localities from “imposing a new discriminatory tax on cell phone services, providers, or property.” This is probably a step in the right direction, though it still leaves (from my reading) loopholes for states. For instance, states could argue that they are not imposing a new tax if they applied the same taxes on wireless voice products to wireless data products. This could allow them to easily slap monthly fees on Kindles, iPads, and other devices that use cellular networks. In many ways, this would be more pernicious than raising taxes on voice products.

The bottom line is that taxes on cell phones are inefficient, inequitable, and run counter to other public policies. They likely cost more in lost consumer welfare than they collect in revenues. There’s no reason for them, and states looking to improve their tax structure could do well by eliminating them altogether.

Read the whole thing here.

I was pleased to see columnists George Will of The Washington Post and Jeff Jacoby of The Boston Globe take on the Internet sales tax issue in two smart recent essays. Will’s Post column (“Working Up a Tax Storm in Illinois“) and Jacoby’s piece,”There’s No Fairness in Taxing E-Sales,” are both worth a read. They are very much in line with my recent Forbes column on the issue (“The Internet Tax Man Cometh,”) as well as this recent oped by CEI’s Jessica Melugin, which Ryan Radia discussed here in his recent essay “A Smarter Way to Tax Internet Sales.”

I was particularly pleased to see both Will and Jacoby take on bogus federalism arguments in favor of allowing States to form a multistate tax cartel to collect out-of-state sales taxes.  Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Mike Enzi (R-WY) will soon introduce the “Main Street Fairness Act,” which would force all retailers to collect sales tax for states who join a formal compact. It’s a novel—and regrettable—ploy to get around constitutional hurdles to taxing out-of-state vendors. Sadly, it is gaining support in some circles based on twisted theories of what federalism is all about. Real federalism is about a tension between various levels of government and competition among the States, not a cozy tax cartel.

Will rightly notes that “Federalism — which serves the ability of businesses to move to greener pastures — puts state and local politicians under pressure, but that is where they should be, lest they treat businesses as hostages that can be abused.” And Jacoby argues that an “origin-based” sales tax sourcing rule is the more sensible solution to leveling the tax playing field:

The current system is far fairer than the one [Senator] Durbin wants. Bricks-and-mortar merchants charge sales taxes based on their physical location. The same rule applies to online merchants. A Pennsylvania tobacco shop doesn’t collect Ohio sales taxes whenever it sells a humidor to a visitor from Ohio. Amazon shouldn’t have to, either.

Jacoby also addresses the “tax fairness” argument as follows:

All other things being equal, consumers no doubt prefer a tax-free shopping experience. But all other things are rarely equal. E-retailers (or mail-order catalogs) may have a price advantage, but well-run “Main Street’’ businesses have competitive advantages of their own. They attract customers with eye-catching window displays. They play up local ties and neighborhood loyalty. They give shoppers the chance to see, feel, or try on items before buying them. They enable the serendipitous joys of browsing. They don’t charge for shipping. And they offer potential customers a degree of personal service and warmth that no website can match.

And Will says:

[bricks and mortar] stores have the competitive advantage of local loyalties and customers being able to handle merchandise.Besides, Main Street stores pay sales taxes to support local police, fire and rescue, sewage, schools and other services. If Amazon’s Seattle headquarters catches fire, will Champaign, Ill., firefighters extinguish it?

Anyway, read both columns and stay tuned: this fight is about to get hot once again.

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

In a series of upcoming essays, we will be examining proposals being put forward today that would have the government play a greater role in sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting more “public interest” content. The reason we’re working up this multi-part series is because, with many traditional media operators struggling, and questions being raised about how journalism in particular will be supported in the future, Washington policymakers are currently considering what role government can and should play in helping media providers reinvent themselves in the face of tumultuous technological change wrought by the Digital Revolution.

For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently kicked off a new “Future of Media” effort with a workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” (The  filing deadline for the FCC’s “Future of Media” proceeding is May 7^th).  Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has hosted two workshops asking “How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?”  Meanwhile, the Senate has already held hearings about “the future of journalism,” and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) recently introduced the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become tax-exempt non-profits in an effort to help them stay afloat.

Thus, in light of Washington’s sudden interest in the future of media and journalism, we will be taking a hard look at several issues and proposals that are being floated today, including:

• Taxes on media devices, mobile phones, or broadband bills to channel money to media enterprises / content;
• Taxes / fees on broadcasters to funnel support to their public sector competitors or to public interest programs;
• “News vouchers” or “public interest vouchers” that would encourage citizens to channel support to media providers;
• Taxes on private advertising to subsidize non-commercial / public media content;
• Expanded postal subsidies for media mail; and
• Targeted welfare programs for out-of-work journalists or corporate welfare in the form of bailouts for failing media enterprises.

You won’t be surprised to hear that we are generally quite skeptical of most of these ideas, but we promise to give each one serious consideration.  We’ll kick things off tomorrow with our essay on why taxing media devices or distribution systems to fund media content is not a particularly good idea.

A new study in the December 2009 Archives of Ophthalmology reports the beginnings of a new public health epidemic: a dramatic increase in nearsightedness (myopia).  The authors compared the prevalence of myopia in Americans aged 12-54  in 1971-72 and 1999-2004. Prevalence of myopia increased from 25 percent of the population in 1971-72 to 41.6 percent in 1999-2004 — a 66.4 percent increase!  Myopia increased for both blacks and whites (the only two racial categories investigated in the study) and for both men and women (the only two gender categories investigated in the study).

According to the article, genetics and environment both play a role in myopia. It cites several previous studies showing that people with more education are at greater risk, presumably because they’re more likely to spend a lot of time doing “up-close” work like reading and using computers. The authors note that although it’s easy to treat myopia with contact lenses or eyeglasses, the costs of having 25 percent of the population with myopia are about $2 billion per year. 

So stop reading this, get outside, and throw that football around! 

More seriously, I am counting the days until some advocate gloms onto this study to justify a tax on e-mails and social networking, the same way advocates have cited the costs of obesity, alcoholism, and smoking to justify higher taxes on “sins” like soda pop, alcohol, and cigarettes. (Yes, a soda pop tax was under discussion to fund this year’s health care bill!) In fairness to the study’s authors, I should note that they suggest no such thing.

Education is a risk factor for myopia, but I doubt anyone would propose a tax on education as a cure. Education, after all, is generally regarded as a good thing that generates significant private and social benefits. E-mails, Facebook, and Twitter, on the other hand, have a “fun” aspect that makes it much easier to classify them as sins in the same category as getting drunk, smoking, and sipping Coca-Cola. They may also be addictive; anybody heard the term “crackberry”?

There are, of course, some counter-arguments:

• The biggest costs of myopia are borne privately; they are not “externalities” imposed on unwilling recipients. I always wear glasses because I simply hate having blurred vision. My daughter asked for eyeglasses because she couldn’t read the blackboard from the back of the classroom. Bumping into and tripping over things are also costs of myopia that are borne almost completely by the person who has myopia. Those are pretty strong incentives to get it corrected or change behavior to reduce the risk of becoming myopic. Therefore, an e-mail or social networking tax would not likely have a marginal effect on myopia.
• Social costs of myopia can be corrected with targeted, less restrictive alternatives. My state driver’s license has a restriction saying I have to wear glasses or contacts to drive. This controls the aspect of my myopia that poses the biggest risk of harm to other people.
• To the extent that treating myopia is costly, we can find ways to reduce the cost. For example, James C. Cooper’s research has found that online vendors and warehouse clubs sell contact lenses for 20 percent less than other brick-and-mortar sellers. State laws or regulations that prevent online sales, or prevent warehouse clubs from selling contacts, increase the cost of treating myopia substantially. 
• A majority of the population does not have myopia! For them, an e-mail tax would merely siphon money from their electronic wallets or induce them to cut back e-mail use with no effect on the social ills the tax is supposed to cure.  These folks are like the responsible majority who drink rum, cola, or both in moderation and just keep paying the taxes.

That last analogy reminds me —  those counter-arguments might apply to a lot of existing sin taxes too!

Joe Tighe, an IT Infrastructure Consultant, has an interesting essay up over at Circle ID.  He takes a hard look at Rep. Ed Markey’s proposed “Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009” and makes an argument that many of us here have made ad nauseum — regulation involves trade-offs and unintended consequences:

One of the main problems with the proposed legislation is the lack of recognition of costs to provide internet services. Some applications, such as video are bandwidth hogs and require significantly greater network infrastructure and associated costs to deliver when compared to the network infrastructure costs to deliver email access. Under the proposed legislation, services providers would have to charge the low bandwidth users (casual browsers and email readers) more to offset the higher costs of the video users. One result of the proposed legislation would be less consumer choice and a hidden “bandwidth hog tax”. Today, most service providers offer tiered products and pricing to consumers and businesses to account for the additional costs to deliver bandwidth intensive applications. You pay more if you use more under the tiered pricing model. These are not “discriminatory” practices. Rather, tiered pricing and application prioritization are sound business models delivering reliable, profitable product choices and unburdened internet ecommerce. Consumers and businesses currently have choices. The proposed legislation takes away choice and increases costs to consumers and businesses.

Quite right.  Read the whole essay here.

Adam Thierer and I have warned that neutrality regulation, once imposed on broadband providers, will extend to other Internet services wherever “gatekeepers” are alleged to control access to a platform used by others. In short, the slippery slope of creeping common carriage is real and we’re already heading down it, with cyber-collectivist “luminaries” like Jonathan Zittrain and Frank Pasquale demanding neutrality regulation for devices, application platforms like iTunes and Facebook, and search!

TLF Reader Jim Reardon made a particularly astute observation on my post asking whether Americans really want net neutrality regulation:

Regulation of any service, product or industry is preceded by definition. Once defined, it is subject to taxation. [Net Neutrality regulation] is a prelude to taxation of Internet products and services. It will likely start with telephony services and proceed accordingly to financial services, and continue from there. As such, the activity is essentially neutral insofar as technology innovation is concerned — so long as applicable taxes are paid the government will ensure that the service is not disfavored by the network operators.

Absolutely right! One of the greatest barriers to government regulation and taxation of the Internet today is the lack of clear definitions: The FCC rules will tell you precisely what “cable television” or “commercial radio” mean, but the concepts of “social networking,” “Internet video,” “blogging,” and even “search” are indeterminate and constantly evolving.

Ronald Reagan once quipped:

Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it moves, tax it.  If it keeps moving, regulate it.  And if it stops moving, subsidize it.

Fortunately, government’s ability to implement this view depends—to paraphrase President Clinton—”on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ ‘it’ is”: Allowing “it” to remain beautifully amorphous may be the best way to keep government at bay.

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka — (Ver. 1.0 — Summer 2009)

We are attempting to articulate the core principles of cyber-libertarianism to provide the public and policymakers with a better understanding of this alternative vision for ordering the affairs of cyberspace. We invite comments and suggestions regarding how we should refine and build-out this outline. We hope this outline serves as the foundation of a book we eventually want to pen defending what we regard as “Real Internet Freedom.” [Note:  Here’s a printer-friendly version, which we also have embedded down below as a Scribd document.]

I. What is Cyber-Libertarianism?

Cyber-libertarianism refers to the belief that individuals—acting in whatever capacity they choose (as citizens, consumers, companies, or collectives)—should be at liberty to pursue their own tastes and interests online.

Generally speaking, the cyber-libertarian’s motto is “Live & Let Live” and “Hands Off the Internet!”  The cyber-libertarian aims to minimize the scope of state coercion in solving social and economic problems and looks instead to voluntary solutions and mutual consent-based arrangements.

Cyber-libertarians believe true “Internet freedom” is freedom from state action; not freedom for the State to reorder our affairs to supposedly make certain people or groups better off or to improve some amorphous “public interest”—an all-to convenient facade behind which unaccountable elites can impose their will on the rest of us.

B.  Application in Social & Economic Contexts

The cyber-libertarian draws no distinction between social and economic freedom when applying this vision:

• Social Freedom: Individuals should be granted liberty of conscience, thought, opinion, speech, and expression in online environments.
• Economic Freedom: Individuals should be granted liberty of contract, innovation, and exchange in online environments.

Cyber-libertarians also argue that social and economic freedoms are inextricably intertwined:  It is not enough to support liberty of action in one sphere; foreclosing freedom in one sphere will eventually affect freedom in the other.

C.  How “Code Failures” Are to Be Addressed

The cyber-libertarian believes that “code failures” (the digital equivalent of so-called “market failures”) are better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions.   From a practical perspective, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those responses.  Stated differently, cyber-libertarians have a strong aversion to the politicization of technology issues and efforts to replace market processes with bureaucratic processes.

Importantly, the cyber-libertarian defines “markets” broadly to include monetary and non-monetary transactions as well as proprietary and non-proprietary modes of production.  To be clear, collaborative, non-proprietary technologies and efforts ( e.g., Wikipedia and open source software) are not at odds with cyber-libertarianism.  But the cyber-libertarian does reject the notion these models are the only acceptable model or that they should be imposed on us by law.  The proper policy position with regards to the “open vs. closed” or “proprietary vs. non-proprietary” debate should be one of techno-agnosticism.  Lawmakers and courts should not be tilting the balance in one direction or the other.

More generally speaking, instead of seeking to define or impose a single utopian vision, the cyber-libertarian seeks to enable what libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick called a “Utopia of Utopias:” a framework within which many different models of organizing commerce and community can flourish alongside, and in competition with, each other.

D.  General Relationship to “Internet Exceptionalism”

Internet exceptionalists are first cousins to cyber-libertarians:  They believe that the Internet has changed culture and history profoundly and is deserving of special care before governments intervene.  [See Section IV for an expanded discussion.]

II. The Intellectual Foundations of Cyber-Libertarianism

A.  Traditional Libertarian Philosophy

• Natural Rights philosophers –John Locke, Ayn Rand, The Founders
• Utilitarian philosophers – John Stuart Mill (On Liberty), Herbert Spencer
• “Austrian School” of Economics – Ludwig von Mises, F.A.  Hayek, Murray Rothbard
• Milton Friedman (Free to Choose)
• Robert Nozick – argument for a minimalist state; “utopia of utopias” notion
• Thomas Sowell – critique of “The Vision of the Anointed”
• Richard Epstein – vision of “Simple Rules for a Complex World

B.  Modern Cyber-Libertarian Theorists

• Ithiel de Sola Pool (Technologies of Freedom)
• Alvin Toffler (The Third Wave , Future Shock)
• George Gilder (Microcosm , Telecosm)
• Peter Huber (Law & Disorder in Cyberspace)
• Tom W.  Bell
• Technology Liberation Front bloggers

C.  Internet Exceptionalists[see Sec.  IV below]

• Nicholas Negroponte (Being Digital)
• John Perry Barlow (“Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”)
• David Post
• Eric Goldman
• H.  Brian Holland

III. The Contrast with Cyber-Collectivism

A.  Cyber-Collectivism Defined

Cyber-collectivism is the opposite of cyber-libertarianism.  Cyber-collectivism refers to the general belief that cyber-choices should be guided by the State or an elite class according to some amorphous “general will” or “public interest.”  The distant influence of Plato, Rousseau, and Marx can often been seen in the work of cyber-collectivists.

Cyber-collectivism comes in many flavors, however.  “Left”-leaning cyber-collectivists, for example, are more focused on social concerns than economic ones.  Some “Right”-leaning cyber-collectivists are focused on controlling the impact of the Internet on culture or security.  In other words, cyber-collectivism is not as philosophically coherent as cyber-libertarianism—which, though it comes in many flavors, shares a larger core of common agreement

B.  General Relationship to “Information Commons” Movement

There is a close relationship between the Leftist variant of cyber-collectivism and the “digital commons” or “information commons” movement, which generally refers to the belief that digital resources should be shared or perhaps commonly owned instead of held privately—both because cyber-collectivists think this is more equitable and because they generally think such arrangements will ultimately work better.

Cyber-collectivists are typically not Marxists; few of them call for state ownership of the information means of production.  Rather, cyber-collectivists might better be thought of a “cyber social Democrats” (in a European sense) or “Digital New Dealers” (in the American tradition).  They advocate a generous role for law and regulation in many online matters, but do not typically resort to full-blown nationalization.

C. Exponents of Cyber-Collectivism

Some notable cyber-collectivists or information commons adherents (and their key works):

• Lawrence Lessig (Code , Free Culture)
• Tim Wu (Who Controls the Internet?)
• Yochai Benkler (The Wealth of Networks)
• Jonathan Zittrain (The Future of the Internet & How to Stop It)
• David Bollier (Viral Spiral)
• Harvard Berkman Center*
• New America Foundation*
• Public Knowledge*

(*We are, of course, generalizing a bit here. Not everyone in these institutions is a cyber-collectivist and, again, there are many flavors of cyber-collectivism, just as there are many flavors of cyber-libertarianism. Individuals in some of these organizations diverge significantly in attitudes towards technological change and the proper scope of government influence throughout the high-tech sector.)

IV. Relationship Between Cyber-Libertarianism & Internet Exceptionalism

Some non-libertarians occasionally join ranks with cyber-libertarians out of a belief that the Internet is different and deserving of special consideration and care. This is commonly referred to as “Cyber-Exceptionalism” or “Internet Exceptionalism.” John Perry Barlow’s 1996 “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” was probably the earliest (and most extreme) articulation of “Internet Exceptionalism”:

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions. You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.

Similarly, in 1994, The Progress & Freedom Foundation brought together four leading technology visionaries (Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin Toffler) to pen A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age. In that manifesto, the authors argued:

Cyberspace is the land of knowledge, and the exploration of that land can be a civilization’s truest, highest calling. The opportunity is now before us to empower every person to pursue that calling in his or her own way. The challenge is as daunting as the opportunity is great. The Third Wave has profound implications for the nature and meaning of property, of the marketplace, of community and of individual freedom. As it emerges, it shapes new codes of behavior that move each organism and institution—family, neighborhood, church group, company, government, nation—inexorably beyond standardization and centralization, as well as beyond the materialist’s obsession with energy, money and control. Turning the economics of mass-production inside out, new information technologies are driving the financial costs of diversity—both product and personal—down toward zero, “demassifying” our institutions and our culture. Accelerating demassification creates the potential for vastly increased human freedom. It also spells the death of the central institutional paradigm of modern life, the bureaucratic organization. (Governments, including the American government, are the last great redoubt of bureaucratic power on the face of the planet, and for them the coming change will be profound and probably traumatic.)

As that last paragraph suggests, this “Magna Carta” for cyberspace contained some hints of cyber-libertarian thinking, but the general thrust of the document was more generally of the Internet Exceptionalist school of thought.

Internet Exceptionalists are sometime critiqued for sounding like techno-utopians, but it is a mistake to conflate the two. There are not always synonymous.

V. Cyber-Libertarianism’s Early Legal Foundations & Victories

• Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 is probably the best example of cyber-exceptionalism in practice. It grants broad immunity to online intermediaries for third party content except for criminal and IP law—breaking with traditional tort liability standards. Specifically, Sec. 230 rejected the “deputization of the middleman” model of liability.
• Overturning of the Communications Decency Act’s indecency & obscenity provisions in Reno v. ACLU decision
• Various court decisions blocking enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1999
• The encryption wars & the defeat of the “Clipper Chip”
• The Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998

VI. Applications: How Cyber-Libertarians Think about Various Policy Issues

• Free speech & online child safety: Favor parental empowerment and industry self-regulation over censorship. “Household standards” should trump “community standards.”
• Privacy policy & online advertising: Privacy is a subjective condition and efforts to regulate to “protect privacy” could have unintended consequences for freedom of speech and the growth of online content and commerce. User empowerment and industry self-regulation represent the superior way to address privacy concerns.
• Net neutrality / infrastructure regulation: “Open access” regulation is nothing more the infrastructure socialism. Network operators should be free to own, operate, and price their systems and services as they see fit, subject only to enforcement of their terms of service and other voluntary disclosures as contracts with their users. New entry and innovation are better alternative to regulating yesterday’s networks and technologies.
• Internet taxation: No special taxes should be imposed on online services or Internet access. To the extent the Net disrupts traditional tax bases that should be seen as an opportunity to reform those tax systems.
• Online gambling: People should be free to do what they want with their money and Internet gambling is likely impossible to shut down entirely anyway, given the nature of the Internet.
• Antitrust: “Market power” and “code failures” are best dealt with by spontaneous evolution of markets and new entry, not bureaucratic micro-management of old technologies or market structures. Regulation often creates, or tends to foster, most monopolies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool once noted, “The force that preserves most monopoly privilege is law… most would vanish in the absence of enforcement.”
• IP issues: Cyber-libertarians are deeply divided over IP issues (especially copyright) and this reflects a long-standing division within libertarian ranks on these issues more generally. Some believe IP rights are a natural extension of traditional property rights and/or a sensible way to incentivize scientific and artistic creativity. Others believe no one has a right to “property-tize” intangible creations or that copyright is simply industrial protectionism. And there are many views in between.

VII. Prospects for Cyber-Libertarianism

A. The Pessimistic View

• Government’s will quash online freedom and bring the Internet under their thumbs.
• Regulatory efforts are expanding at a breathtaking pace and will not slow anytime soon.

B. The Optimistic View

• “Technologies of Freedom” (tools and methods to avoid online regulation, censorship and control) will ultimately triumph.
• Technology is evolving faster than government’s ability to regulate it.

VIII. Related Reading on Cyber-Libertarianism & Internet Exceptionalism

• John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996).
• Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence , 87 U. Minn. L. Rev. 743 (2003).
• Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, & Alvin Toffler, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age (1994).
• Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, Santa Clara Magazine (Winter 2008).
• H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, Kansas L. Rev. (2007).
• Peter Huber, Law & Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm (1997).
• Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (1983).
• David Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace (2009).
• Adam Thierer, The Pragmatic Internet Optimist’s Creed, Technology Liberation Front Blog (Nov. 11, 2008).
• Technology Liberation Front Blog, About the Technology Liberation Front (August 2004, revised 2008).

Cyber-Libertarianism: The Case for Real Internet Freedom [Ver 1.0 – Thierer & Szoka] http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=18490847&access_key=key-14tt6eb4f2cdcil8wnf2&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Watch out for a bill that will be heard in committee today in the North Carolina  General Assembly that could be the first example (that I know) of a tax that on its face discriminates against the Internet. Senate Bill 99 singles-out the Internet ticket resale market for a “privilege tax”, and because it only applies to Internet sales, it violates the federal moratorium on “multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.”

The Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendment Acts of 2007 (Public Law No: 110-108) provides a moratorium through November 1, 2014 that bars federal, state and local governments from imposing discriminatory Internet-only taxes such as bit taxes, bandwidth taxes, and email taxes.

It also prohibits the sort of prima facie discrimination exhibited by SB 99—“Reselling or offering to resell admission tickets on the Internet…”). Because this tax applies to revenues received from Internet transactions but not to offline sales, it clearly violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act.

Here’s where it gets even more interesting — this tax could even be an example of a “multiple” tax. SB 99 imposes a privilege tax on Internet ticket sales that amounts to double taxation. Income earned ticket reselling is already taxed. Companies and individuals that earn revenue from reselling tickets already pay income tax. Moreover, the same ticket could be resold numerous times, resulting in multiple taxation of the same increment over face value.

There are other problems with SB 99 that we lay out in our NetChoice letter, but federal law seems to be clearly against the bill.

ICANN has just released a second draft of its Applicant Guidebook, which would guide the creation of new generic topmore generic top-level domains (gTLDs) such as .BLOG, .NYC or .BMW. As ICANN itself declared (PDF), “New gTLDs will bring about the biggest change in the Internet since its inception nearly 40 years ago.”  PFF Adjunct Fellow Michael Palage and former ICANN Board member addressed the key problems with ICANN’s original proposal in his  paper ICANN’s “Go/ No-Go” Decision Concerning New gTLDs (PDF & embedded below), released earlier this week.

ICANN deserves credit for its detailed analysis of the many comments on the original draft which Mike summarized back in December.  ICANN also deserved credit for addressing two strong concerns of the global Internet community in response to the first draft:

• ICANN has removed its proposed 5% global domain name tax on all registry services, something Mike explains in greater detail in his “Go/No-Go” paper.
• ICANN has commissioned a badly-needed economic study on the dynamics of the domain name system “in broad.” But such a study must address how the fees ICANN collects from specific user communities relate to the actual costs of the services ICANN provides. The study should also consider why gTLDs should continue to provide such a disproportionate percentage of ICANN’s funding—currently 90%—given increasing competition between gTLDs and ccTLDs (e.g., the increasing use of .CN in China instead of .COM).

These concerns are part of a broader debate:  Will ICANN abide by its mandate to justify its fees based on recovering the costs of services associated with those fees, or will ICANN be free to continue “leveraging its monopoly over an essential facility of the Internet ( i.e., recommending additions to the Internet’s Root A Server) to charge whatever fees it wants?”  If, as Mike has discussed, ICANN walks away from its existing contractual relationship with the Department of Commerce and claims “fee simple absolute” ownership of the domain name system, who will enforce such a cost-recovery mandate?  

But ICANN simply “kicked the can down the road on the biggest concern”: how to minimize abusive domain name registrations ( e.g., cybersquatting, typosquatting, phishing, etc.) and reduce their impact on consumers. ICANN seems only to have made a vague promise to engage in additional outreach and consultation on this problem.  But Mike has proposed a number of potential solutions that are narrowly tailored to protect brand holders while respecting the fair use rights of other, including: 

• A Rebuttable Reserve Names List that would minimize the need for defensive registrations of marks that have been subject to abusive registrations by freezing registration of domain names (e.g., DELTA.AIR) that precisely correspond to those marks (e.g., Delta Airlines’ “Delta” trademark)  for the 60 days leading up to the opening of a new TLD (e.g., .AIR)—although anyone can rebut this presumption upon making a fair use showing under existing UDRP principles.
• An Expedited Domain Suspension Policy, either  as a new policy, or an amendment to the existing UDRP, that would provide a faster and more cost-effective remedy for abusive domain name registrations on an ongoing basis, but only for marks that have been registered with a national trademark authority (or the equivalent thereof).
• A Uniform Proxy Registration Policy governing the use of proxy services that substitute their own contact information for the registration’s information in the Whois database; such baseline practices and safeguards would reduce abuse that could harm legitimate users while preserving the option of proxy registration for privacy-sensitive users.

Washington Internet Daily (subscription-only) reports that:

ICANN is also rethinking its timeline for launching the gTLD application process, it said. There will be a third draft guidebook, making it unlikely applications will be accepted before December, it said. The new draft leaves provisions on four major issues – security and stability, malicious misconduct, trademark protection and demand/economic analysis of the need for new gTLDs – unchanged pending further discussion, ICANN said. Comments are due April 13. 

PFF wil continue to respond to ICANN’s call for comment to promote responsible expansion of the domain name space.  Here’s Mike’s paper (click on the rectangle-in-rectangle button at the top right to maximize the iPaper viewer):

I have an editorial appearing on CNet News today about “New Mexico’s video game nanny tax.” Quick background: The New Mexico legislature has introduced a new tax measure that would force consumers to pay a 1 percent excise tax on purchases of video games, gaming consoles, and TVs. The revenue generated from the game and TV tax would be used to fund a new state educational effort aimed at getting kids out of the house more. True to the aim of the measure, they have even given the bill the creative title, “The Leave No Child Inside Act.” In my editorial, I argue that:

legislators shouldn’t be using the tax code to play the role of nanny for our kids. It is the responsibility and right of parents to determine how their kids are raised. Many of us would agree that more outdoor time is a laudable goal. But should the government be using the tax code to accomplish that objective?

I point out that the proposal raises serious fairness questions that makes a constitutional challenge likely since older court cases dealing with other media have also made it clear that public-policy makers are forbidden from using the power to tax in an effort to discriminate against speech or expression that they disfavor. Moreover, on the fairness point:

Why just blame video games for kids not getting enough time outdoors? How about a tax on social-networking Web sites or instant messaging? Many kids are spending almost as much time online right now as they do playing video games. And what about other types of non-digital games that might keep kids indoors? My daughter spends a lot of time playing Sudoku puzzles, for example. Perhaps we should tax Sudoku books, chess boards, and even arts and crafts! After all, the goal here is to do whatever it takes to get kids outside, right? Or is it really just to get kids to stop playing video games?

Read the entire piece here if you are interested.