Posts tagged as:

The FCC’s Open Internet Order is long and complex and the challenge to it is likewise difficult to untangle. The agency regularly engages in ad hoc rulemaking that results, per Judge Posner, in “unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have somehow to be conciliated.” The Open Internet Order is no exception and therefore faces several legal vulnerabilities.

In my view, the soft underbelly of the Order is the agency’s position that ISPs are not First Amendment speakers. While courts are generally very deferential to agencies, they are not deferential on constitutional questions. Further, the court panel (two Democrat appointees, one Republican appointee), unfortunately, was not in the carriers’ favor. The major carriers, however, have focused their arguments on whether the agency should receive deference in classifying Internet access as a telecommunications service.

That said, it’s possible the major carriers could get at least a partial win with their arguments. That likelihood is increased because Alamo Broadband and Dan Berninger raised the First Amendment problems with the Order. Given the strength of the First Amendment arguments, the Court might shy away from reaching the issue of whether ISPs are speakers. Below, some thoughts on the moments during oral arguments that surprised me and what went according to predictions.

The Unexpected

A receptive ear in Judge Williams re: the First Amendment arguments. (Good for: ISPs) The First Amendment arguments went better than I’d expected. Alamo and Berninger’s counsel, Brett Shumate, argued the First Amendment issues well and had good responses for skeptical questions. Shumate found a receptive ear in Judge Williams, who seemed to understand the serious First Amendment risks posed by the Order. Williams repeatedly brought up the fact that MetroPCS a few years ago tried to curate the Internet and provide its customers free YouTube, only to face resistance from the FCC and net neutrality activists.

The other two judges were more skeptical but Shumate corrected some misconceptions. The biggest substantive objection from Srinivasan, who sounded the most skeptical of the First Amendment arguments, was that if the Court reaches the First Amendment issues, it has determined that the FCC has reasonably classified Internet access as a common carrier service. He suggested that this means the First Amendment issues mostly disappear. No, Shumate explained. Congress and the FCC can call services whatever they want. They could declare Google Search or Twitter feeds a common carrier service tomorrow and that would have zero effect on whether filtering by Google and Twitter is protected by the First Amendment. Tatel asked whether Section 230’s liability protections suggest ISPs are common carriers and Shumate corrected that misconception, a subject I have written on before.

A major FCC concession that ISPs have to option to change their offerings and escape common carrier regulation. (Good for: ISPs) Title II advocates are spinning the terse First Amendment exchanges as a victory. I’m not convinced. The reason the arguments didn’t generate more heat was because the FCC lawyer made a huge concession at the outset: ISPs that choose to filter the Internet are not covered by the Open Internet Order.

FCC lawyer: “If [ISPs] want to curate the Internet…that would drop them out of the definition of Broadband Internet Access Service.” Judge Williams: “They have that option under the Order?” FCC lawyer: “Absolutely, your Honor. …If they filter the Internet and don’t provide access to all or substantially all endpoints, then they drop out of the definition of [BIAS] and the rules don’t apply to them.”

This admission seriously undermines the purposes of the Order. The FCC is stating outright that ISPs have the option to filter and to avoid the rules. That seems to mean that Comcast’s Stream Internet protocol television service, where it is curating streaming TV programs, is not covered by the rules. If Facebook’s Free Basics or a similar service launched in the US giving free, limited access to the Web, that is not covered by the Order. Finally, this means that the many broadband packages that offer family-friendly filtering are outside of the FCC’s rules. It’s not clear how much remains to be regulated since all ISPs reserve the right to filter content and each filters at least some content.

Judge Tatel directing most questioning. (Good for: wash) Many view Judge Tatel as the “swing vote” but I was surprised at the relative quiet from Williams and Srinivasan. Tatel was the most inquisitive, by my listening. He was much more skeptical of some of the FCC’s arguments regarding interconnection than I expected but also more skeptical of the First Amendment arguments than I expected.

Little discussion of Chevron Step 0. (Good for: FCC) Many on the free-market side wanted to make this case about Chevron Step 0 and the notion that Title II is too economically and socially significant to warrant deference. Unfortunately, at oral argument there was very little discussion of Chevron Step 0.

The Expected

Focus on agency discretion. (Good for: FCC) The judges generally seem to see this as a straightforward Chevron case and the questions focused on Chevron Step 1, whether there is ambiguity in the statute about “offering telecommunications” for the FCC to interpret. As expected, the FCC did fairly well in their arguments because these technical issues are very hard to untangle.

On Chevron Step 2, whether the reinterpretation of “telecommunications service” to include Internet access was reasonable, the US Telecom attorney was strong. He leaned heavily on the fact that in Section 230, which amends the Communications Act, Congress announces a national policy that the Internet and specifically Internet access services, should remain “unfettered by Federal regulation.” That would seem to preclude the FCC from using, at the very least, its most powerful regulatory weapon–common carriage–against Internet access providers. Even if “telecommunications service” is ambiguous, he stated, it was unreasonable to include Internet access in that definition.

Focus on whether mobile broadband can be properly classified under Title II. (Benefit: ISPs) As many commentators have noted, the idea that the traditional phone network and the mobile broadband network can be classified as the same interconnected network is far-fetched. Each judge seemed very skeptical of the FCC’s argument and Tatel suggested there was a lack of adequate notice.

Srinivasan pointed out that striking down the wireless rules and maintaining the wireline rules would mean that using the same tablet in different areas of your house would lead to different regulatory treatment, depending on whether you’re on the cellular broadband network or Wifi. Title II supporters think this is pretty clever gotcha but communications law already abounds with seemingly absurd FCC- and court-created legal distinctions. (The FCC invents its own absurd distinction and offers vastly different regulatory treatment for DNS operated by an ISP v. DNS operated by literally anyone else.)

Conclusion

Predictions about major regulatory cases are notoriously difficult. I’ve read (and made) enough predictions about big court cases to know that prognosticators almost always get it wrong. If that’s the case, at least consider one thought-provoking outcome: the rules are largely struck down because the FCC provided inadequate notice on most of the major issues of classification.

If the rules, in contrast, were sustained under Chevron and judged to have had adequate notice, the Court would likely need to confront the First Amendment issues. I don’t think Tatel and Srinivasan, especially, want to rule on these hard constitutional questions. The judges must know the Supreme Court has, as Prof. Susan Crawford says, an “absolutist approach” to the First Amendment that protects speakers of all kinds. Sustaining the rules means the FCC risks a loss on First Amendment grounds on appeal that would nearly eliminate the ability of the FCC to regulate the Internet. For that reason, and because of the notice problems, the Court may strike down the rules on notice and comment grounds, thereby preserving the ability of the FCC to take a fourth bite at the apple.

As FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel said of the Internet, “It is our printing press.” Unfortunately, for First Amendment purposes, regulators and courts treat our modern printing presses — electronic media — very differently from the traditional ones. Therefore, there is persistent political and activist pressure on regulators to rule that Internet intermediaries — like social networks and search engines — are not engaging in constitutionally-protected speech.

Most controversial is the idea that, as content creators and curators, Internet service providers are speakers with First Amendment rights. The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order designates ISPs as common carriers and generally prohibits ISPs from blocking Internet content. The agency asserts outright that ISPs “are not speakers.” These Title II rules may be struck down on procedural grounds, but the First Amendment issues pose a significant threat to the new rules.

ISPs are Speakers Courts and Congress, as explained below, have long recognized that ISPs possess editorial discretion. Extensive ISP filtering was much more common in the 1990s but still exists today. Take JNet and DNet. These ISPs block large portions of Internet content that may violate religious principles. They also block neutral services like gaming and video if the subscriber wishes. JNet offers several services, including DSL Internet access, and markets itself to religious Jews. It is server-based (not client-based) and offers several types of filters, including application-based blocking, blacklists, and whitelists. Similarly, DNet, targeted mostly to Christian families in the Carolinas, offers DSL and wireless server-based filtering of content like pornography and erotic material. A strict no-blocking rule on the “last mile” access connection, which most net neutrality proponents want enforced, would prohibit these types of services. Continue reading →

This week I will be attending two terrific conferences on Sec. 230 and Internet intermediary liability issues. On Thursday, the Stanford Technology Law Review hosts an all-day event on “Secondary and Intermediary Liability on the Internet” at the Stanford Law School. It includes 3 major panels on intermediary liability as it pertains to copyright, trademark, and privacy. On Friday, the amazing Eric Goldman and his colleagues at the Santa Clara Law School’s High Tech Law Institute host an all-star event on “47 U.S.C. § 230: a 15 Year Retrospective.”  Berin Szoka and Jim Harper will also be attending both events (Harper is speaking at Stanford event) and Larry Downes will be at the Santa Clara event.  So if you also plan to attend, come say ‘Hi’ to us.  We don’t bite! (We have, however, been known to snarl.)

In the meantime, down below, I just thought I would post a few links to the many things we have said about Section 230 and online intermediary liability issues here on the TLF in the past as well as this graphic depicting some of the emerging threats to Sec. 230 from various proposals to “deputize the online middleman.”  As we’ve noted here many times before, Sec. 230 is the “cornerstone of Internet freedom” that has allowed a “utopia of utopias” to develop online.  It would be a shame if lawmakers rolled back its protections and opted for an onerous new legal/regulatory approach to handling online concerns. Generally speaking, education and empowerment should trump regulation and punishing liability.

Deputization of the Middleman http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Continue reading →

Chalk up another victim to unwarranted political intimidation by state attorneys general. On Friday evening, Craigslist, which has long been under intense pressure to crack down on sex crimes, replaced its adult services section in the U.S. with a black censor bar. This move comes on the heels of a scathing letter sent to Craigslist by seventeen state AGs insinuating that Craigslist is culpable for the “victimization of children.” While the state attorneys general are likely celebrating victory this holiday weekend, all they’ve really done is to stifle free speech online and complicate efforts by law enforcement authorities to go after the real bad guys — you know, the ones who are forcing kids into sex slavery.

This isn’t the first time states have publicly attacked Craigslist for its involvement in sex crimes. Various AGs been trying to intimidate the site into eliminating avenues of adult content for years, as Alex Harris and Jim Harper have chronicled on these pages. In response to state AGs’ relentless saber-rattling, Craigslist made several major changes last year aimed at curbing illegal postings. The site shut down its notorious “erotic services” section and began charging $10 for every posting made to the adult services section. Craigslist even began manually screening all posts submitted to the adult services section. Since May 2009, over 700,000 postings have been rejected.

Apparently none of these concessions were enough for state AGs, always eager to score political points. Despite the safeguards Craigslist implemented last year, users continued to use the site in the commission of sex crimes. This is hardly surprising; given the sheer volume of user submissions and the increasingly complex measures taken by criminals to obfuscate their unlawful solicitations, some illegal postings are bound to circumvent any filtering regime. Now that Craigslist has censored its adult services section, former users of the section will invariably flock to other sites, as has happened every single time a major Bittorrent site has been taken offline or crippled by litigation. Craigslist is just one of many, many websites on the Internet that’s frequented by criminals, after all. From popular sites like Google and Yahoo! to small blogs that accept user comments, nearly any site that allows user submissions can be used to break the law.

Such websites generally aren’t legally liable for crimes committed by their users, as courts across the country have held time and time again (1,2,3,4). That’s because when Congress overhauled America’s telecom laws in 1996, it enacted the Communications Decency Act, which grants “providers” of “interactive computer service” immunity from state criminal prosecution for illegal content posted by users. Thus, while prosecutors can and do pursue criminal charges against individuals who post illegal content to Craigslist, they can’t go after Craigslist itself, as long as the site complies with enforceable governmental requests and promptly removes content it knows to be illegal.

Continue reading →

Robert Corn-RevereAs I noted here a few days ago, the Federal Communications Commission held a workshop on Tuesday about “Speech, Democratic Engagement, and the Open Internet.”  It was a shockingly one-sided affair with the deck being stacked almost entirely in favor of advocates of Net neutrality regulation. Worse yet, those advocates shamelessly made up spooky stories about a future of “private censorship” that could only be remedied by using the First Amendment as a club to beat private players into submission. The token opposition at this Chicken Little circus was Robert Corn-Revere, a Partner at the law firm of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Washington, D.C.   Bob set the record straight–both in terms of baseless accusations that were flying that day as well as the revisionist histories of the First Amendment that were being put forward. I’m happy to report that Bob allowed PFF to reprint his remarks as a new white paper entitled, “The First Amendment, the Internet & Net Neutrality: Be Careful What You Wish For.”

In his essay, Corn-Revere discusses the relationship between the First Amendment and regulatory policy, particularly the treatment of new communications technologies, and he warns that government regulation of broadband networks could “provide the vehicle for advancing new First Amendment theories for media regulation” and online speech and expression more generally.  “It should not be forgotten,” he argues, “that the federal government’s initial impulse was to censor the Internet and to subject it to a far lower level of First Amendment protection. It pursued this agenda for more than a decade but was blocked by a series of First Amendment rulings.”  The Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act are just two notable examples. Luckily, the courts determined that “the open Internet would be at great risk if the government is allowed to exercise such power,” he notes, and they struck down such laws.

Continue reading →

The House Judiciary Committee’s Crime subcommittee yesterday held a hearing yesterday on the painful issues of cyberbullying (webcast). Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) talked about her bill, the “Megan Meier Cyber Bullying Prevention Act” (H.R. 1966), which would create of a new federal felony to punish cyberharassment, including fines and jail time for violators. Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL) talked about her bill, the “Adolescent Web Awareness Requires Education Act (AWARE Act)” (H.R. 3630), which would instead allocate $125 million over five years in grants for education and awareness-building about these problems. Without endorsing any particular approach, Adam and I discussed the general advantages of education over criminalization in our “Cyberbullying Legislation: Why Education is Preferable to Regulation” paper published by PFF in June, which we updated and submitted as written testimony. But we really couldn’t have done a better job at making this point than Ranking Member Louie Gohmert (R-TX), who powerfully articulated his opposition to the run-away growth of federal criminal law. Chairman Scott (D-VA) also expressed a commendable reluctance to just pass another law and assume that fixes the problem.

Problems with Criminalization

Three lawyers on the panel generally agreed on the thorny speech and due process concerns raised by criminalization and agreed that the Sánchez bill would require serious revision to pass constitutional muster.  UVA Law Prof. Robert O’Neil (testimony) suggested that of the exceptions to free speech protection recognized by the Supreme Court, the only one that could likely be used to do what advocates of cyberbullying criminalization want to accomplish is the intentional infliction of emotional distress. But O’Neill emphasized that this is generally a tort, not a criminal action—which seems like a pretty big distinction to me, especially when the criminal sanction might involve a felony conviction, as Sánchez has proposed. Felony convictions are the “Mark of Cain” in modern life, exceeded only in their lasting effect by being required to register on a sex offender registry. Cato Adjunct Fellow and civil rights lawyer Harvey Silverglate (testimony) highlighted the serious problems raised by vagueness and over-breadth in attempting to define harassment—as evidenced by speech codes at many universities. Harvard Law Prof. John Palfrey (testimony) generally echoed these concerns.

Criminalizing what is mostly child-on-child behavior simply will not solve the age-old problem of kids mistreating each other, a problem that has traditionally been dealt with through counseling and rehabilitation at the local level. For all the talk of how to craft a criminal law (especially its definitions) to minimize constitutional problems, I was very surprised that no one at the hearing raised the critical issue of just who it is we’re trying to protect and from whom. Continue reading →

Dan GillmorIn a post earlier this week, I discussed Randy Cohen’s “guideline” for anonymous blogging. Specifically, Cohen argued in a recent New York Times piece that, “The effects of anonymous posting have become so baleful that it should be forsworn unless there is a reasonable fear of retribution.  By posting openly, we support the conditions in which honest conversation can flourish.”  While sympathetic to that guideline, I noted I agreed with it as an ethical principle, not a legal matter.  In others words, what might make sense as a “best practice” for the Internet and its users would not make sense as a regulatory standard.  I prefer using social norms and public pressure to drive these standards, not regulation that could have an unintended chilling effect on beneficial forms of anonymous online speech.

Dan Gillmor of the Center for Citizen Media of the Harvard Berkman Center has a new column up at the UK Guardian in which he takes a slightly different cut at a new standard or social norm for dealing with some of the more caustic anonymous speech out there:

One of the norms we’d be wise to establish is this: People who don’t stand behind their words deserve, in almost every case, no respect for what they say. In many cases, anonymity is a hiding place that harbours cowardice, not honour. The more we can encourage people to use their real names, the better. But if we try to force this, we’ll create more trouble than we fix.  But we don’t want, in the end, to turn everything over to the lawyers. The rest of us — the audience, if you will — need to establish some new norms as well.

Specifically, Gillmor argues that, ” We need to readjust our internal BS meters in a media-saturated age,” because “We are far too prone to accepting what we see and hear.”  I think Gillmor has too little faith in most digital denizens; most of us take anonymous comments with a grain of salt and assume that the ugliest of those comments are often untrue.  And that’s generally the “principle” he recommends each of us adopt going forward: Continue reading →

Jonathan Frieden (who runs the e-commerce law blog) has a nice, pithy summary of Section 230:

If the “essential published content” is willingly provided by a third-party, the interactive computer service provider publishing that content enjoys the full immunity afforded by Section 230.

Amen, brother! I noted Eric Goldman’s excellent outline about Section 230 back in June. As Adam has noted, Section 230 is about more than just protecting online intermediaries bottom line or even about freeing them to provide the content and services we all take for granted.

Section 230 is the very cornerstone of Internet Freedom, the law that makes possible Robert Nozick’s “framework for utopias”: Online communities (“utopias”) can flourish in their infinite variety only because those who build, host or enable access to such communities (social network operators, search engines, aggregators, etc.) do not have to worry about legal liability for user-generated content. The fundamental difference between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 lies in the movement of online speech away from individual websites where the speaker was operator to online speech platforms where the potential number of speakers is essentially unlimited. This ongoing shift makes Section 230 more important than ever.

Never before has it been so easy for users to “vote with their feet,” sorting themselves into communities of their own choosing, and not since the the 1890 Census declared the American frontier “closed” has it been been so easy for the individual to start entirely new communities if they don’t like their current options.

libertyby Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka — (Ver. 1.0 — Summer 2009)

We are attempting to articulate the core principles of cyber-libertarianism to provide the public and policymakers with a better understanding of this alternative vision for ordering the affairs of cyberspace. We invite comments and suggestions regarding how we should refine and build-out this outline. We hope this outline serves as the foundation of a book we eventually want to pen defending what we regard as “Real Internet Freedom.” [Note:  Here’s a printer-friendly version, which we also have embedded down below as a Scribd document.]

I. What is Cyber-Libertarianism?

Cyber-libertarianism refers to the belief that individuals—acting in whatever capacity they choose (as citizens, consumers, companies, or collectives)—should be at liberty to pursue their own tastes and interests online.

Generally speaking, the cyber-libertarian’s motto is “Live & Let Live” and “Hands Off the Internet!”  The cyber-libertarian aims to minimize the scope of state coercion in solving social and economic problems and looks instead to voluntary solutions and mutual consent-based arrangements.

Cyber-libertarians believe true “Internet freedom” is freedom from state action; not freedom for the State to reorder our affairs to supposedly make certain people or groups better off or to improve some amorphous “public interest”—an all-to convenient facade behind which unaccountable elites can impose their will on the rest of us.

Continue reading →

The Wired article (“Great Wall of Facebook: The Social Network’s Plan to Dominate the Internet — and Keep Google Out“) I discussed yesterday touched on another issue near & dear to my heart (besides the importance of smarter advertising): the future of online anonymity. The article lays out Facebook’s “4-Step Plan for Online Domination,” which involves “colonizing” the web though Facebook’s Connect (launched Dec. 2008) and Open Stream API (launched April 2009) initiatives, which:

don’t just allow users to access their Facebook networks from anywhere online. They also help realize Facebook’s longtime vision of giving users a unique, Web-wide online profile. By linking Web activity to Facebook accounts, they begin to replace the largely anonymous “no one knows you’re a dog” version of online identity with one in which every action is tied to who users really are. To hear Facebook executives tell it, this will make online interactions more meaningful and more personal. Imagine, for example, if online comments were written by people using their real names rather than by anonymous trolls. “Up until now all the advancements in technology have said information and data are the most important thing,” says Dave Morin, Facebook’s senior platform manager. “The most important thing to us is that there is a person sitting behind that keyboard. We think the Internet is about people.”

The bolded prediction of what I would call “Online Identity Integration” is already happening.  To take one tiny example, readers can now post comments on the TLF by logging into Disqus (our Comment Management System) through their Facebook (or Twitter) account, which will also allow them to automatically share those comments on Facebook (or Twitter). This is purely opt-in: Users are free to continue to post anonymous comments. But as more websites and platforms implement such Identity Integration functionality, a growing percentage of online speech will be tied to profiles offered by major social networks.

Some free speech advocates are sure to bemoan Identity Integration as directly undermining online anonymity. Continue reading →