Over at Discourse magazine, Connor Haaland and I have an new essay (“Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?”) examining Europe’s effort to develop national champion in a variety of tech sectors using highly targeted industrial policy efforts. The results have not been encouraging, we find.

Thus far, however, the Europeans don’t have much to show for their attempts to produce home-grown tech champions. Despite highly targeted and expensive efforts to foster a domestic tech base, the EU has instead generated a string of industrial policy failures that should serve as a cautionary tale for U.S. pundits and policymakers, who seem increasingly open to more government-steered innovation efforts.

We examine case studies in internet access, search, GPS, video services, and the sharing economy. We then explore newly-proposed industrial policy efforts aimed at developing their domestic AI market. We note how:

no amount of centralized state planning or spending will be able to overcome Europe’s aversion to technological risk-taking and disruption. The EU’s innovation culture generally values stability—of existing laws, institutions and businesses—over disruptive technological change. […] There are no European versions of Microsoft, Google or Apple, even though Europeans obviously demand and consume the sort of products and services those U.S.-based companies provide. It’s simply not possible given the EU’s current regulatory regime.

It seems unlikely that Europe will have much better luck developing home-grown champions in AI and robotics using this same playbook. “American academics and policymakers with an affinity for industrial policy might want to consider a model other than Europe’s misguided combination of fruitless state planning and heavy-handed regulatory edicts,” we conclude.

Head over to Discourse  to read the entire essay.

In a New York Times op-ed this weekend entitled “You Can’t Say That on the Internet,” Evgeny Morozov, author of The Net Delusion, worries that Silicon Valley is imposing a “deeply conservative” “new prudishness” on modern society. The cause, he says, are “dour, one-dimensional algorithms, the mathematical constructs that automatically determine the limits of what is culturally acceptable.” He proposes that some form of external algorithmic auditing be undertaken to counter this supposed problem. Here’s how he puts it in the conclusion of his essay:

Quaint prudishness, excessive enforcement of copyright, unneeded damage to our reputations: algorithmic gatekeeping is exacting a high toll on our public life. Instead of treating algorithms as a natural, objective reflection of reality, we must take them apart and closely examine each line of code. Can we do it without hurting Silicon Valley’s business model? The world of finance, facing a similar problem, offers a clue. After several disasters caused by algorithmic trading earlier this year, authorities in Hong Kong and Australia drafted proposals to establish regular independent audits of the design, development and modifications of computer systems used in such trades. Why couldn’t auditors do the same to Google? Silicon Valley wouldn’t have to disclose its proprietary algorithms, only share them with the auditors. A drastic measure? Perhaps. But it’s one that is proportional to the growing clout technology companies have in reshaping not only our economy but also our culture.

It should be noted that in a Slate essay this past January, Morozov had also proposed that steps be taken to root out lies, deceptions, and conspiracy theories on the Internet.  Morozov was particularly worried about “denialists of global warming or benefits of vaccination,” but he also wondered how we might deal with 9/11 conspiracy theorists, the anti-Darwinian intelligent design movement, and those that refuse to accept the link between HIV and AIDS.

To deal with that supposed problem, he recommended that Google “come up with a database of disputed claims” or “exercise a heavier curatorial control in presenting search results,” to weed out such things. He suggested that the other option “is to nudge search engines to take more responsibility for their index and exercise a heavier curatorial control in presenting search results for issues” that someone (he never says who) determines to be conspiratorial or anti-scientific in nature.

Taken together, these essays can be viewed as a preliminary sketch of what could become a comprehensive information control apparatus instituted at the code layer of the Internet. Morozov absolutely refuses to be nailed down on the details of that system, however. In a response to his earlier Slate essay, I argued that Morozov seemed to be advocating some sort of Ministry of Truth for online search, although he came up short on the details of who or what should play that role. But in both that piece and his New York Times essay this weekend, he implies that greater oversight and accountability are necessary.  “Is it time for some kind of a quality control system [for the Internet]?” he asked in his Slate oped. Perhaps it would be the algorithmic auditors he suggests in his new essay. But who, exactly, are those auditors? What is the scope of their powers?

When I (and others) made inquiries via Twitter requesting greater elaboration on these questions, Morozov summarily dismissed any conversation on the point. Worse yet, he engaged in what is becoming a regular Morozov debating tactic on Twitter: nasty, sarcastic, dismissive responses that call into question the intellectual credentials of anyone who even dares to ask him a question about his proposals.  Unless you happen to be Bruno Latour — the obtuse French sociologist and media theorist who Morozov showers with boundless, adorning praise — you can usually count on Morozov to dismiss you and your questions or concerns in a fairly peremptory fashion.

I’m perplexed by what leads Morozov to behave so badly. When I first met him a couple of years ago, it was at a Georgetown University event he invited me to speak at. He seemed like an agreeable, even charming, fellow in person. But on Twitter, Morozov bears his fangs at every juncture and spits out venomous missives and retorts that I would call sophomoric except that it would be an insult to sophomores everywhere. Morozov even accuses me of “trolling” him whenever I ask him questions on Twitter, even though I am doing nothing more that posing the same sort of hard questions to him that he regularly poses to others (albeit in a much more snarky fashion).  He always seems eager to dish it out, but then throws a Twitter temper tantrum whenever the roles are reversed and the tough questions come his way. Perhaps Morozov is miffed by some of what I had to say in my mixed review of his first book, The Net Delusion, or my Forbes column that raised questions about his earlier proposal for an Internet “quality control” regime.  But I invite others to closely read the tone of those two essays and tell me whether I said anything to warrant Morozov’s wrath. (In fact, I actually said some nice things about his book in that review and later named it the most important information technology policy book of the year.)

Regardless of what motivates his behavior, I do not think it is unreasonable to ask for more substantive responses from Morozov when he is making grand pronouncements and recommendations about how online culture and commerce should be governed. The best I could get him to say on Twitter is that is that he only had 1,200 words to play with in his latest Times oped and that more details about his proposal would be forthcoming. Well, in the spirit of getting that conversation going, allow me to outline a few questions:

1)      What is the specific harm here that needs to be addressed?

• Do you have evidence of systematic algorithmic manipulation or abuse by Google, Apple, or anyone else, for that matter? Or is this all just about a handful of anecdotes that seemed to be corrected fairly quickly?

2)      What standard or metric should we use to determine the extent of this problem, to the extent we determine it is a problem at all?

• To the extent autocomplete results are what troubles you, can you explain how individuals or entities are “harmed” by those results?
• If this is about reputation, what is your theory of reputational harm and when it is legally actionable?
• If this is about informational quality or “truth,” can you explain what would constitute success?
• Can you appreciate the concerns / values on the other side of this that might motivate some degree of algorithmic tailoring? For example, some digital intermediaries may seek to curb the use of a certain amount of vulgarity, hate speech, or other offensive content on their sites since they are broad-based platforms with diverse audiences. (That’s why most search providers default to “moderate” filtering for image searches, for example.) While I think we both favor maximizing free speech online, do you accept that some of this private speech and content balancing is entirely rational and has, to some extent, always gone on? Also, aren’t there plenty of other ways to find the content you’re looking for besides just Google, which you seem preoccupied with?

3)      What is the proposed remedy and what are its potential costs and unintended consequences?

• Can you explain the mechanism of control that you would like to see put in place to remedy this supposed problem? Would it be a formal regulatory regime?
• Have you considered the costs and /or potentially unintended consequences associated with an algorithmic auditing regime if it takes on a regulatory character?
• For example, if you are familiar with how long many regulatory proceedings can take to run their course, do you not fear the consequences of interminable delays and political gaming?
• How often should the “auditing” you propose take place? Would it be a regular affair, or would it be driven by complaints?

4)      Is this regime national in scope? Global? How will it be coordinated /administered?

• In the United States, presumably the Federal Communications Commission or Federal Trade Commission would be granted new authority to carry out algorithmic audits, or would a new entity need to be created?
• Is additional regulatory oversight necessary and, if so, how is this coordinated by nationally and globally?

5)      Are there freedom of speech / censorship considerations that flow from (3) and (4)?

• At least in the United States, algorithmic audits that had the force of law behind them could raise serious freedom of speech concerns. (See Yoo’s paper on “architectural censorship” and the recent work of Volokh & Grimmelmann on search regulation) and long-settled First Amendment law (see, e.g., Tornillo) ensures that editorial discretion is housed in private hands. How would you propose we get around these legal obstacles?

6)      Are there less-restrictive alternatives to administrative regulation?

• Might we be able to devise various alternative dispute resolution techniques to flag problems and deal with them in a non-regulatory / non-litigious fashion?
• Could voluntary industry best practices and/or codes of conduct be developed to assist these efforts?
• Could an entity like the Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (BITAG) help sort out “neutrality” claims in this context, as they do in the broadband context?
• Might it be the case that social norms and pressure can keep this problem in check? The very act of shining light on silly algorithmic screw-ups — much as you have in your recent opeds — has a way of keeping this problem in check.

I hope that Morozov finds these questions to be reasonable. My skepticism of most Internet regulation is no secret, so I suppose that Morozov or others might attempt to dismiss some of these questions as the paranoid delusions of a wild-eyed libertarian. But I suspect that I’m not the only one who feels uneasy with Morozov’s proposals since they could open the door to regulators across the globe to engage in “algorithmic auditing” on the flimsy assumption that some great harm exists from a few silly autocomplete suggestions or a couple conspiratorial websites. We deserve answers to questions like these before we start calling in the Code Cops to assume greater control over online speech.

Boy, the symposium on “Competition in Online Search” that Daniel Sokol threw together this week over at the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog could not have been better timed! As most of you know, the European Commission stepped up its attack on Google this week and all signs are that a lot more antitrust activity is on the way on this front.

Anyway, all the entries in the symposium are in and a few rebuttals have followed, including one by me. In my response, I took on Frank Pasquale and Eric Clemons, who were the most aggressive in their calls for search regulation. I thought I would just re-post it here to complement my early entry in the symposium on Monday.

 _______________

I enjoyed the entries in this symposium and learned something from each of them. I have a few things to say in response to both Frank Pasquale and Eric Clemons and their sweeping indictments of not just Google but seemingly the entire modern information economy.

Everywhere they look, it seems, Pasquale and Clemons see villainy. Someone completely alien to the modern online ecosystem would read Pasquale’s description of it — “digital feudalism,” “absolute sovereignty,” “opaque technologies,” “leaving users in the dark,” etc., etc. — and likely conclude that a catastrophe had befallen modern man. Of course, Pasquale’s narrative is missing any reference to the unparalleled expansion in the stock of knowledge and human choices that has been made possible by Google and the others companies he castigates (Apple, Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon). Meanwhile, Clemons wants to group Google in with supposed Wall Street robber barons as well as characters from Sinclair’s “The Jungle.” It’s all a bit much.

Regardless, what about those high-tech feudal lords, especially Google? Can we keep their market power in check without extreme steps? It goes without saying that neither Pasquale nor Clemons places much faith in the sort of dynamic, disruptive competition and creative destruction (which I documented in my entry in the symposium) as being an effective check on market behavior. But their skepticism goes well beyond that and transcends tradition antitrust analysis. They seem to assert that we just can’t trust large digital intermediaries at all, primarily because they are profit-maximizers. Clemons suggests that paid search shouldn’t even be permitted, which is a bit like saying ad-supported, for-profit newspapers should have been forbidden or regulated long ago.

Their skepticism about concentrated power fades quickly, however, when it’s the concentrated power of government that will be calling the shots in the digital economy. Regulators, Pasquale says, will be able to devise forms of redress that “help[] us confront issues of discrimination, malfeasance, nonfeasance, and technological due process in a rapidly changing online environment.” He suggests transparency mandates, external regulatory oversight, and that something akin to a mandatory right of reply for search results are all needed. Meanwhile, Clemons wants full-blown structural separation of Google into three or four different firms.

Pasquale and Clemons don’t bother addressing the trade-offs associated with their proposals. They apparently want us to imagine that these proposed remedies are innocuous and costless. They also don’t seem to give much weight to the critiques set forth by Marvin Ammori, James Grimmelman, or Dan Crane regarding the incoherent and potentially counter-productive nature of “search neutrality” remedies. Clemons also doesn’t seem at all worried about the forgone benefits of vertical integration, even though those benefits can be substantial in the field of search. The rich content and specialized integrated services that Google has been able to freely offer consumers deserve greater consideration before imposing the nuclear option of structural separation.

That last point is essential. We can’t divorce this discussion from the real-world evidence of just how well consumers have been served by the search market today. That begins with the fact that consumers don’t pay a penny for the cornucopia of content or expanding universe of constantly innovating services that they enjoy currently. So, to repeat what I said in my initial entry, the traditional goals of public utility regulation — universal service, price competition, and quality service — are already being achieved quite nicely without intervention. That makes the case for search regulation even harder to sustain.

Finally, let’s just talk about the practicality of all the regulation they advocate. Pasquale asks: “Is it too much to ask for some entity outside Google to be able to ‘look under the hood’ and understand what is going on in plausibly contested scenarios?” Well, perhaps it is! The respected blog SearchEngineLand has estimated that approximately 34,000 searches are conducted per second (or 2 million per minute; 121 million per hour; 3 billion per day; 88 billion per month). That’s a lot of activity for regulators to keep tabs on. And Google’s search algorithm is constantly being tweaked– more than 500 changes each year — to offer websurfers improved results and enhanced security against spammers and other malicious activity. Having regulators constantly “looking under the hood” and trying to adjust those results via a political process would likely slow innovation to a crawl. It would also open up the process to a great deal of gaming by other parties — including spammers and scammers. Moreover, the dangers of political gaming of search should not be discounted. Once policymakers have the sort of authority over search that Pasquale and Clemons recommend, the danger of political influence and regulatory shenanigans both grow exponentially.

In the end, I believe the combination of public pressure, social norms and, most importantly, ongoing innovation and creative destruction, can do a better job of protecting consumer welfare than the sort of sweeping regulatory interventions that Pasquale and Clemons advocate. We should be patient and see how this marketplace develops instead of engaging in rash interventions.

The fine folks at George Mason University School of Law’s Henry G. Manne Program in Law & Economics Studies have put together another stellar agenda and lineup of speakers for their Second Annual Conference on Competition, Search & Social Media. The event will be held at GMU’s School of Law on Wednesday, May 16th from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. Panel topics are listed as follows:

PANEL 1:  Antitrust and Platform Competition in Search and Social Media (This panel will discuss issues involving market definition, network effects, and dynamic considerations when analyzing search and social media platform competition.)

PANEL 2:  Search, Duties to Deal, and Essential Facilities (This panel will explore the extent to which search engines should be viewed as utilities, and whether they may have a legal duty to assist their rivals under the essential facilities doctrine as it survives after Trinko and Linkline.)

PANEL 3:  The Interface Between Privacy and Competitive Analysis in Search and Social Media (This panel will explore the extent to which privacy should be germane to antitrust analysis of online search and social networks, including whether privacy can be viewed as a dimension of quality and the extent to which privacy regulation may affect competition.)

PANEL 4:  Are There Workable Remedies for “Search Engine Bias”? (This panel will discuss economic, legal (including First Amendment), and practical issues surrounding potential remedies to allegedly “biased” search engine results.)

I’m honored to have been asked to moderate the second panel since it focuses on an issue I’ve been given a lot of thought to lately. (See my recent working paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.“)

Seriously, you’d be hard-pressed to find a better set of speakers on these topics. Check them all out here, where you can also RSVP if you’re interested.

[By Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright.  Cross-posted at TOTM]

Our search neutrality paper has received some recent attention.  While the initial response from Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal was favorable, critics are now voicing their responses.  Although we appreciate FairSearch’s attempt to engage with our paper’s central claims, its response is really little more than an extended non-sequitur and fails to contribute to the debate meaningfully.

Unfortunately, FairSearch grossly misstates our arguments and, in the process, basic principles of antitrust law and economics.  Accordingly, we offer a brief reply to correct a few of the most critical flaws, point out several quotes in our paper that FairSearch must have overlooked when they were characterizing our argument, and set straight FairSearch’s various economic and legal misunderstandings.

We want to begin by restating the simple claims that our paper does—and does not—make.

Our fundamental argument is that claims that search discrimination is anticompetitive are properly treated skeptically because:  (1) discrimination (that is, presenting or ranking a search engine’s own or affiliated content more prevalently than its rivals’ in response to search queries) arises from vertical integration in the search engine market (i.e., Google responds to a query by providing not only “10 blue links” but also perhaps a map or video created Google or previously organized on a Google-affiliated site (YouTube, e.g.)); (2) both economic theory and evidence demonstrate that such integration is  generally pro-competitive; and (3) in Google’s particular market, evidence of intense competition and constant innovation abounds, while evidence of harm to consumers is entirely absent.  In other words, it is much more likely than not that search discrimination is pro-competitive rather than anticompetitive, and doctrinal error cost concerns accordingly counsel great hesitation in any antitrust intervention, administrative or judicial.  As we will discuss, these are claims that FairSearch’s lawyers are quite familiar with.

FairSearch, however, grossly mischaracterizes these basic points, asserting instead that we claim

“that even if Google does [manipulate its search results], this should be immune from antitrust enforcement due to the difficulty of identifying ‘bias’ and the risks of regulating benign conduct.”

This statement is either intentionally deceptive or betrays a shocking misunderstanding of our central claim for at least two reasons: (1) we  never advocate for complete antitrust immunity, and (2) it trivializes the very real—and universally-accepted–difficulty of distinguishing between pro- and anticompetitive conduct.

First, we acknowledge the obvious point that  as a theoretical matter discrimination can amount to an antitrust violation in some cases under certain specific circumstances—not the least important of which is proof of actual competitive harm.  To quote ourselves:

The key question is whether such a bias benefits consumers or inflicts competitive harm. Economic theory has long understood the competitive benefits of such vertical integration; modern economic theory also teaches that, under some conditions, vertical integration and contractual arrangements can create a potential for competitive harm that must be weighed against those benefits . . . .  From a policy perspective, the issue is whether some sort of ex ante blanket prohibition or restriction on vertical integration is appropriate instead of an ex post, fact-intensive evaluation on a case-by-case basis, such as under antitrust law. (Manne and Wright, 2011) (emphasis added).

This is not much of a concession.  While FairSearch tries to move the goalposts by focusing on a straw man proposition that search bias is categorically immune from antitrust scrutiny, this sleight of hand doesn’t accomplish much and reveals what FairSearch is missing.   After all, consider that almost every single form of business conduct  can be an antitrust violation under some set of conditions!  The antitrust laws apply in principle to (that is, do not categorically make immune) horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, long-term contracts, short-term contracts, exclusive dealing, partial exclusive dealing, burning down a rival’s factory, dealing with rivals, refusing to dealing with rivals, boycotts, tying contracts, overlapping boards, and all manner of pricing practices.  Indeed, it is hard to find categories of business conduct that are outright immune from the antitrust laws.  So—we agree:  “Search bias” can conceivably be anticompetitive.  Unfortunately for FairSearch, we never said otherwise and it’s not a very interesting point to discuss.

With that point firmly established, one can return focus to the topic FairSearch painstakingly avoids throughout its response and on which we think the issue really does (and should) turn:  Where’s the proof of consumer harm?

We make the rather common sense point that when engaging in a case-by-case factual analysis of the competitive effects of business conduct, one should take advantage of what we already know about the class of business practice generally.  Along those lines, we noted that the economic literature has extensively analyzed the competitive effects of such discrimination and concluded that in most cases it yields significant efficiencies and is therefore unlikely ex ante to amount to an antitrust violation.   Perhaps FairSearch was confused by this argument, though we explicitly frame the choice as one between ex ante categorical regulations and ex post case-by-case analyses, not as one between ex anteprohibitions and “allowing Google free rein to discriminate against competitors,” as FairSearch bizarrely claims.  This is something akin to claiming a defense attorney demands “immunity” for a client with an alibi rather than the correct outcome under a faithful application of the law.  (Although we hasten to add that it’s not clear that would be, in fact, anything at all wrong with Google “discriminating against competitors.”  We’re sure its shareholders would be apoplectic if it didn’t, in fact).

At any rate, even before we get to the question of whether there is any evidence of consumer harm, we do indeed think it is relevant to any analysis that bias is hard to identify, that one user’s “bias” is another user’s “relevant search result,” that a remedy would be difficult to design and harder to enforce, and that the costs of being wrong are significant.  These are not dispositive, nor do we claim they are.  But they do underscore another point that FairSearch misses:  That harmful search bias would be exceptionally difficult to detect even if it were assumed to exist.

This problem can’t be brushed off, and it mirrors the well-known uncertainty at the core of the antitrust enterprise:  That a given course of conduct may prove pro-competitive or anticompetitive under differing situations.  Former AAG Tom Barnettand current Google critic (representing Expedia) has himself echoed this point, observing that

No institution that enforces the antitrust laws is omniscient or perfect. Among other things, antitrust enforcement agencies and courts lack perfect information about pertinent facts, including the impact of particular conduct on consumer welfare . . . .  We face the risk of condemning conduct that is not harmful to competition . . . and the risk of failing to condemn conduct that does harm competition . . .

Barnett further notes that “discerning whether a monopolist’s actions have hurt or helped competition can be extremely difficult.”

At the same time, FairSearch does not dispute that significant efficiencies can arise from vertical integration in the search engine market.  Rather, FairSearch distracts itself from this substantial problem in its response by instead quibbling over the factual details of our shelf space analogy and arguing incoherently that Google’s conduct violates antitrust laws merely because it deprives rivals of scale.  But here FairSearch misses the mark in telling ways.

First, on the shelf space analogy:  As we’ve discussed numerous times (e.g., here and here) the shelf space analogy illustrates that promotional arrangements and vertical integration can have obvious benefits; for example, such arrangements can align incentives for product promotion between up- and downstream actors, thereby increasing output and consumer welfare.  FairSearch confuses the analogy by focusing upon the fact that supermarkets, unlike Google, certainly do not have monopoly power.  To borrow a quote, we do not think that means what FairSearch thinks it means.  That competitors without market power in highly competitive markets engage in a challenged conduct just as competitors with it do might suggest to the astute antitrust observer that the conduct has real competitive merit unrelated to any exclusionary effect.  Moreover, the shelf space analogy is designed to highlight the essential fact that because a firm is large (or has a large market share) does not mean its conduct does not also generate consumer benefits!  As the court in Berkey Photo noted:

[A] large firm does not violate § 2 simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market. So long as we allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its broad-based activity – more efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products, reduced transaction costs, and so forth. These are gains that accrue to any integrated firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.

The point of the analogy, which FairSearch entirely misses yet does not deny, is that these arrangements yield pro-competitive efficiencies – and that these efficiencies are not a function of monopoly power but rather of efficient—even innovative—forms of business organization.

Similarly, FairSearch’s arguments about scale in the search engine market are unpersuasive and represent a serious misunderstanding of the market dynamics.  FairSearch seems to argue that increased access to ad space leads to higher profits, and that Google, as the recipient of this windfall, can accordingly out-buy its rivals, implying that, eventually, they will simply wither on the vine as Google ends up possessing all the money in the world.  Or something like that.

Of course this argument is outlandish on its face.  Microsoft, which has overwhelming resources, is one of Google’s closest competitors and certainly cannot be easily out-bought.  Moreover, the initial claim itself is weak because (1) many advertisers multi-home, dissipating any efficiency that increased access would yield, and (2) advertisers pay  per click – because search engines with fewer users necessarily initiate fewer clicks, advertising may be cheaper on smaller platforms.  So, while the value on two different size platforms may diverge, so do prices.  Merely asserting that one has more value and therefore higher prices is not sufficient to demonstrate divergence on the relevant dimension; rather these factors could – and likely do – increase commensurately.

The most glaring flaw in FairSearch’s argument, however, is its failure to present any evidence whatsoever of competitive harm.  In demonstrating a Section 2 violation, the burden is on the plaintiff in the first instance to make a showing of harm to competition.  Rather than engage in this effort itself, FairSearch summarily dismisses our argument because we “do not seek to marshal evidence that Google does not manipulate search results to harm competition.”  However, this is not our burden to bear.  We repeat: FairSearch fails to present any evidence of its own case-in-chief; it relies on an economically incoherent and premature dismissal of claims we did not make (categorical immunity for “bias”) in making its own naked assertions.

Note FairSearch’s remarkable sleight of hand here – it (1) attempts to shift the burden of proof to us while (2) simultaneously equating bias with harm to consumer welfare, in an attempt to further simplify its burden.  Bias, however, does not implicate harm to consumers, as FairSearch suggests–nor has harmful bias ever even been convincingly demonstrated.

FairSearch asserts that research has shown that Google often ranks its own results above those of rivals “without any apparent relationship to the quality of these Google sites as compared to competing sites.”  However,  Professor Ben Edelman’s study, upon which FairSearch relies for this assertion, is a far cry from the sort of rigorous analysis Mr. Barnett called for in Section 2 cases as the Attorney General (“there seems to be consensus that we should prohibit unilateral conduct only where it is demonstrated through rigorous economic analysis to harm competition and thereby to harm consumer welfare”).  Indeed, comparing 32 hand-picked search queries across search engines is hardly an adequate sample size or methodology for these purposes – and certainly does not suggest that Google is entirely unconcerned with the quality of its results.  In any event, so-called “bias,” even if proven, may at most represent harm to rivals – and this is not the relevant metric of antitrust injury.  Furthermore, as noted above, bias offers significant benefits and more often than not enhances consumer welfare.

Overall, FairSearch’s critique of our paper is weak and crucially flawed.  FairSearch relies upon a bald assertion that bias exists to equate that bias to consumer harm while conceding (but ignoring) that vertical integration may introduce significant efficiencies in the search engine market.  It tries to wish these efficiencies out of existence by erroneously claiming that monopoly power in the downstream market forecloses that possibility.  The basic economic analysis of vertical integration says otherwise.  But most essentially, FairSearch simply offers no evidence at all of consumer harm.  By alleging antitrust injury, FairSearch has the burden of demonstrating competitive harm in the first instance.  This burden is especially high in the search engine market, where, in contrast to the dearth of evidence of consumer harm, evidence of innovation abounds.

All of which is to say, our original argument bears repeating:  Claims of anticompetitive conduct should be viewed with serious skepticism when there is abundant evidence of consumer benefits, in the form of innovation and competition, and zero evidence of consumer harm.  If FairSearch wishes to mount a credible challenge to our analysis they have a lot more work to do.

It remains unclear how interested the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is in bringing a formal antitrust action against Google, but we at least know that inquiries have been made. I suspect these inquires are far more serious than whatever the agency is fishing for with its new Twitter inquires. After all, as I note in my latest Forbes column, “Google isn’t even a teenager yet (having only been founded in September 1998), but the firm’s rise has been meteoric and it has made a long list of enemies in the process. Practically every major player in the Digital Economy… is gunning for Google these days, both in the commercial and political marketplace.” In this sense, it’s not surprising the FTC might take a keen interest in the company with so many competitors complaining.

Still, I just can’t find much merit in an antitrust case against Google since, as I noted in my column, “The firm’s success seems tied to high quality products that users prefer over rival services. Importantly, barriers to entry are low: there’s nothing stopping new entrants from innovating and offering competing online services to match Google.”

Regardless, instead of arguing about the merits of an antitrust action against Google, let’s consider the more interesting, and I think intractable, question of remedies. Here’s what I had to say about that in my Forbes essay:

[possible remedies] include a so-called Federal Search Commission that would monitor search results to achieve “fairness” or “search neutrality.” Some academics have also suggested a possible mandatory “right of reply” for companies or consumers if they don’t like what a search for their name reveals. This is the equivalent of a Fairness Doctrine for search results. Another idea, borrowed from Microsoft’s antitrust saga in Europe, is a “browser ballot” for specialized search results like maps, stock reports and weather. Just as Microsoft was required by European antitrust officials to offer a “ballot” of alternative browsers before consumers first got online, Google might be forced to show several alternative links for search queries if Google-owned sites are also shown in the results. Even if ballots could be implemented without reducing the usability of search engines—a tall order—it would be difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate all the choices available to consumers. And if government only chose a few, it would be picking winners and losers. Better to let markets decide. Making Google’s proprietary search algorithm more transparent also sounds great until you realize it would make it easier for spammers and scammers to game search results.  Search regulation might also lead to dangerous forms of speech control. Just as the Fairness Doctrine was abused by politicians in the Analog Era, search-tinkering will likely prove too tempting to pass up.  For paternalistic policymakers, search regulation could be an opening to do what they’ve always wanted: “clean up” the Net.

These are just some of the problems with the remedies that have been proposed. Please read some of the essays by Geoff Manne and Josh Wright listed down below for a more in-depth exploration of these issues. Of course, we’re still very early in this process and, if a case against Google moves forward, I suspect we’ll see a number of other possible remedies suggested.

Regardless, I can’t help but have a vague sense of unease about the mere thought of Uncle Sam as Search Czar. Again, from my Forbes essay:

These regulatory solutions would put government bureaucrats in control of the day-to-day management of one of the most dynamic digital technologies ever invented. Treating Google like an essential facility to which all must have equal access on regulated terms would mean subjecting the Internet, still largely free of government control, to public utility-style regulation. It’s hard to imagine that regulating search like local sewage service will benefit consumers in the long run. Government simply doesn’t have a very good track record of steering markets—especially dynamic, fast-evolving ones like this—in more innovative directions.

I think consumers will be better served by Google and its many competitors spending their time focused on creating innovative new products and services rather than making Washington bureaucrats happy.

Additional Reading from TLF Contributors:

• The FTC makes its Google investigation official, now what? – by Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright
• What’s really motivating the pursuit of Google? – by Geoffrey Manne
• Search Bias and Antitrust – by Josh Wright
• Sacrificing Consumer Welfare in the Search Bias Debate, Part II – by Josh Wright
• The Problem of Search Engines as Essential Facilities – by Geoffrey Manne
• Why Google probe should worry consumers – by Ryan Radia (in San Jose Mercury News)
• Wired on Google’s Coming Antitrust Nightmare – by Adam Thierer

I’m in front of a non-TiVo-enabled television this evening, which has permitted me to see ads for a search site called YP.com. It’s a rebranded YellowPages.com, affiliated with AT&T, and it’s organized to be a search engine for the things in your life—dining, travel nightlife—distinguished from Google’s utilitarian-tech web search. Meanwhile Microsoft’s Bing has overtaken Yahoo! as the number two search engine. I was surprised to learn that “undisputed search king” Google has only 65 percent of the search market. Google is doing well, of course, but it can’t be comfortable with all these well-funded rivals circling it.

This is good news for consumers. These competitors are driving Google to improve, and they can pull consumers away from Google by serving search niches such as lifestyle search (as YP does), more privacy protective search, and so on. Competitors will threaten and cut into Google’s advertising profits, too.

Television ads also remind us that HughesNet is offering broadband Internet via satellite. It’s mostly aimed at moving rural Internet users off of dial-up, but it’s an outlet for consumers anywhere who are unsatisfied with cable or DSL service. Critics will point out that it’s not very fast, kind of expensive, and includes daily usage caps. But this doesn’t deny HughesNet’s role as competition for cable and DSL.

Internet service provided badly enough by the major ISPs would make satellite broadband a viable competitor. If HughesNet’s investors were confident that they could sign up enough customers, they would make the investments that bring satellite broadband to the economy of scale it needs to be price-, speed-, and usage-competitive.

The spur of competition does not have to pierce the horse’s belly to have its effect.

Last July, Adam Thierer and I argued in a Forbes.com piece that the Microsoft/Yahoo! search partnership should be cause for “celebration among as a good thing for consumers. By providing a strong competitor with a combined 28% market share, the deal should also be a source of relief at Google, which has come under increasing attack for its supposed market dominance.” Today, 205 days later, the companies have finally announced that EU and US antitrust regulators have approved their deal.

So… how does a delay of nearly seven months help consumers? Wouldn’t we be better off if the two companies had been able to start working together immediately to develop a stronger search engine competitor without this “Mother, May I?” routine?

Last year, I described how Microsoft’s delayed entry into search advertising put them at a serious disadvantage in competing with Google. (The company dithered over buying search ad startup Overture and ultimately decided to build its own system—which proved a serious miscalculation.) I’ll just reiterate what we said about the Yahoo!/Microsoft deal when it was first announced.

Yahoo!/Microsoft pact is just the latest pairing of Web 1.0 titans struggling to reinvent themselves and compete with Google, a titan that still thinks of itself as a start-up. All three companies will struggle to meet new challenges as search evolves toward the social(reflecting what your friends like), the semantic (reflecting the precise, rather than presumed, meanings of Web content), the personalized (reflecting your own preferences) and the interactive (including user-generated comments or reviews)…. Despite this whirlwind of change, the Yahoo!/Microsoft deal is bound to lead to some hand-wringing from lawmakers and antitrust officials in Washington and Brussels. Regulators already blocked a somewhat similar advertising partnership between Google and Yahoo last year. What unites these regulatory responses is the belief that rapidly evolving digital technologies can be regulated like the static utilities of the analog era–and the failure to understand that antitrust is just another form of regulation. Instead, policymakers should recognize that the business, user and technological paradigms of the Web are constantly being re-invented and replaced. They shouldn’t delay approving this deal, especially as any delay would lengthen an awkward period of uncertainty for the corporate couple at the antitrust altar. Moreover, they should avoid micro-managing the transaction through regulatory blackmail: demanding “voluntary concessions” before giving their blessing. For many of the same reasons, policymakers should exercise great care and humility when listening to the growing cacophony of calls for antitrust intervention against Google. “Googlephobia” has reached a fever pitch in recent months with plenty of critics in both government and industry hinting that they’d like to see the company crippled with new restrictions or obligations–much as Microsoft was in the ’90s. The idea of antitrust regulators becoming a veritable “Federal Search Commission” for such a rapidly evolving sector seems highly problematic. America’s high-tech sector is the envy of the world precisely because, generally speaking, the U.S. has rejected heavy-handed regulation of the Information Economy. Indeed, no one knows better than Microsoft how much “antitrust oversight” can hamstring a company’s ability to stay ahead of transformative change.

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

We learned from The Wall Street Journal yesterday that “Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski gets a little peeved when people suggests that he wants to regulate the Internet.” He told a group of Journal reporters and editors today that: “I don’t see any circumstances where we’d take steps to regulate the Internet itself,” and “I’ve been clear repeatedly that we’re not going to regulate the Internet.”

We’re thankful to hear Chairman Julius Genachowski to make that promise. We’ll certainly hold him to it. But you will pardon us if we remain skeptical (and, in advance, if you hear a constant stream of “I told you so” from us in the months and years to come). If the Chairman is “peeved” at the suggestion that the FCC might be angling to extend its reach to include the Internet and new media platforms and content, perhaps he should start taking a closer look at what his own agency is doing—and think about the precedents he’s setting for future Chairmen who might not share his professed commitment not to regulate the ‘net. Allow us to cite just a few examples:

Net Neutrality Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

We’re certainly aware of the argument that the FCC’s proposed net neutrality regime is not tantamount to Internet regulation—but we just don’t buy it. Not for one minute.

First, Chairman Genachowski seems to believe that “the Internet” is entirely distinct from the physical infrastructure that brings “cyberspace” to our homes, offices and mobile devices. The WSJ notes, “when pressed, [Genachowski] admitted he was referring to regulating Internet content rather than regulating Internet lines.” OK, so let’s just make sure we have this straight: The FCC is going to enshrine in law the principle that “gatekeepers” that control the “bottleneck” of broadband service can only be checked by having the government enforce “neutrality” principles in the same basic model of “common carrier” regulation that once applied to canals, railroads, the telegraph and telephone. But when it comes to accusations of “gatekeeper” power at the content/services/applications “layers” of the Internet, the FCC is just going to step back and let markets sort things out? Sorry, we’re just not buying it.

Chairman Genachowski may sincerely believe that a clear, bright line can be drawn between the “infrastructure layer” (which he’s certainly going to regulate) and what he likes to think of as “the Internet” (which he promises not to regulate). But as we warned last October, the day after the FCC launched this NPRM:

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract… The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet….  whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

We explained how the intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu (father of “Net Neutrality”), Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain (father of “API/device Neutrality”), and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale (father of “Search Neutrality”). Joining this intellectual vanguard of Internet regulation is George Washington law school professor Dawn Nunziato, whose new book, Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age, is a veritable manifesto for expansive neutrality regulation (especially of Google)—and how the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law…”) should be twisted not just to allow such regulation of speech platforms, but to require it! Even Wu, whose work blazed a trail for these others, is pretty clear about the breadth of his original vision for “neutrality” regulation, as his popular Net Neutrality FAQ makes clear:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain, Pasquale, and Nunziato don’t pull any punches either: They don’t shy away from flirting with nebulous neutrality definitions and wide-ranging government powers to regulate. So we don’t have to imagine what the “slippery slope” might look like: There are plenty of very smart and highly influential legal academics out there hard at work sketching out precisely where the path Chairman Genachowski has started us down will ultimately lead.

It’s no less clear why we’ll wind up marching down that path, no matter what the current FCC leadership intends.

1. The current net neutrality rulemaking sets a profoundly dangerous legal precedent of essentially unlimited claims of “ancillary jurisdiction”: As our friends at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (who have a soft spot for net neutrality in theory) put it, “If ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ is enough for net neutrality regulations (something we might like) today, it could just as easily be invoked tomorrow for any other Internet regulation that the FCC dreams up (including things we won’t like).” Our PFF colleague Barbara Esbin carefully dissected this issue for the Commission in her recent filing in this proceeding.
2. As explained above, the general regulatory principle of controlling “gatekeepers” doesn’t end with infrastructure.
3. As EFF notes, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.”
4. Now that FCC has opened the door to micro-managing online business practices in the name of “neutrality,” the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are already turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real “Big Brother,” and government, our savior.

This strategy of political escalation will thus quickly steamroll over whatever promises made today to narrowly cabin the principle of neutrality regulation—and end in “Mutually Assured Destruction.” That’s why we referred to the day the FCC started down this path back in September as “The Day Internet Freedom Died.”

If that title sounds melodramatic, take a step back and consider that, back in 1996, Congress decided to enshrine in law the principle that the Internet is different from traditional media: Apart from an ill-considered effort to censor online indecency and obscenity (which was quickly struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional) and the enforcement of intellectual property and criminal laws, Congress decided to take a purely laissez-faire approach to the Internet.  As Barbara reminded the Commission in her net neutrality filing, “Section 230(b)(2) flatly declares that it is the policy of the United States ― to preserve the vibrant competitive free market that presently exits for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”

So Chairman Genachowski’s decision to revert to the common carrier model of the railroad era marks a fundamental break with the approach Congress decided we would take to the Internet. The DC Circuit will likely soon rule that the FCC has vastly overstepped its authority in trying to set Internet policy without any clear grant of authority from Congress to do so.

Wireless Innovation & Investment Notice of Inquiry

In fact, the same kind of thinking is already being extended by this FCC in a number of other arenas using a flurry of innocuous-seeming “Notices of Inquiry.” While these notices purport only to ask questions, they either:

1. Foreshadow where the Commission intends to go in proposing new regulations based on its nearly limitless conception of its own regulatory authority;
2. Are intended to pressure Congress to give the agency more statutory authority; or
3. Are intended to intimidate industry into “playing ball” so the FCC won’t actually have to stick its neck out by trying to write rules to regulate Internet activities that are clearly beyond its existing authority and might well be unconstitutional even if Congress ever did expand that authority.

Exhibit A is the language in the Commission’s August 2009 Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry, (paragraph 60, pg. 21) that suggests the FCC is angling to become the Federal Cloud Commission:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

Good morning, Google!  Hello, Facebook! Is anyone out there in the cloud listening to the rumbling thunder of federal regulation? What began as academic theory in a law school ivory tower is coming soon to a regulatory agency near you! But wait… there’s more!

National Broadband Plan Public Notice #21 (Cloud Computing)

Last November, as part of the Commission’s ongoing effort to develop a National Broadband Plan, the FCC released a request for information “on data portability and its relationship to broadband.”  (NBP Public Notice #21) “The Commission seeks tailored comment on broadband and portability of data and their relation to cloud computing, transparency, identity, and privacy,” the notice says.  Here was the second item on the list of things the Commission said it was investigating (p. 2):

When considering the portability of data, we also consider the processes through which data are moved. In this context, we seek comment on how to identify and understand cloud computing as a model for technology provisioning…. What types of cloud computing exist (e.g., public, hybrid, and internal) and what are the legal and regulatory implications of their use? … To what extent are consumers protected by industry self-regulation (e.g., the Cloud Computing Manifesto), and to what extent might additional protections be needed? … What specific privacy concerns are there with user data and cloud computing? What precautions should government agencies take to prevent disclosure of personal information when providing data? Is the use of cloud computing a net positive to the environment? Are there specific studies that quantify the environmental impact of cloud computing?

We suppose some might claim there’s nothing wrong with the FCC looking into these issues, and that the agency’s interest in cloud computing is entirely benign. (Never mind the fact that the Federal Trade Commission already enforces the privacy policies of cloud computing providers and is looking hard at online privacy.)  Seeing all these open-ended questions about something so obviously beyond the scope of the FCC’s authority just makes the potential for—and perhaps even inevitability of—regulatory creep hard to miss.  Eventually, when a regulatory agency asks enough questions, especially the sort of questions highlighted above… well, to paraphrase Master Yoda:

Open-ended inquiries about new regulations are the path to the Dark side. Inquiries lead to agency oversight. Agency oversight leads to regulation. Regulation leads to suffering for innovators and consumers alike.

Again, we’re not just inventing bogeymen here. It’s quite clear that regulatory advocates want to take neutrality regulation into “the Cloud.” As Jason Lanier, author of the popular book You Are Not a Gadget summarizes one of his key themes:

While there is a lot of talk about networks and emergence from the top American technologists, in truth, most of them are hoping to thrive by controlling the network that everyone else is forced to pass through. Everyone wants to be a “Lord of a Computing Cloud.”

In Lanier’s dystopia of techno-feudalism, the Lords oppressing the poor digital “peasants” certainly aren’t just those running broadband service providers. It’s the Google, Facebooks, and Twitters of the world. It’s similar to the “sharecropper” concern raised by Nick Carr in his book The Big Switch. Complaints like those will only grow in the years to come, and few will buy—or even pause to remember—the distinction Chairman Genachowski seems to stand on now between infrastructure and “the Internet.”

National Broadband Plan Public Notice #29 (Privacy)

The “Recovery Act” passed in January 2009 tasked the FCC with formulating “a detailed strategy for achieving affordability of such service and maximum utilization of broadband infrastructure and service by the public.” The FCC seized this as an opportunity to solicit suggestions as to how regulate the use and collection of data by the private sector on the grounds that concerns about privacy might somehow be slowing broadband adoption.

Chairman Genachowski’s flurry of open-ended inquiries about new regulation are clearly intended to give a bully pulpit to regulatory advocates to demand that the FCC issue the very sort of Internet regulations the Chairman purports to abhor (or that Congress give the agency authority to do so). But most of these notices at least appear to be objective requests for comments written independently of the groups the Commission seems so eager to hear beg for Internet regulation. But in this case, the Commission dispensed with that tedious formality and just outsourced the writing of the inquiry itself to one of the outside groups clamoring the loudest for data regulation in the name of “privacy”: our friends at the Center for Democracy & Technology, with whom PFF has worked closely on many free speech issues in the past.

CDT is on to something when they write that “Consumers will not embrace broadband if they have a sense that everything they do online will be watched by government officials.” We’ll join with them in the fight to protect consumers’ privacy from the Real Big Brother—government!—but once again, as with net neutrality, advocates of regulation see government as the protector of our digital liberties (if only we can forever make sure noble civil-libertarians are in charge of the regulatory apparatus of the state!). So CDT has it exactly backwards when they say: “Consumer privacy concerns encompass not only what companies do with their data, but also the extent to which the government accesses it.” And instead of just suggesting that the FCC’s National Broadband Plan include a recommendation that Congress clean up the antiquated laws intended to limit government surveillance, CDT pushes for sweeping regulations that would affect the ability of most online services and sites to collect and use the data they need to improve their services, innovate, and maybe even try to make some money on advertising to support all the free content and services they give away.

Thus, instead of focusing on the clear harm from government, the FCC’s outsourced inquiry goes after online operators as “privacy proxies” for concerns about government action. At least Congress actually asked for the FCC’s recommendations in this case, unlike all the other inquiries the agency has launched sua sponte. But as Berin noted in his comments on this inquiry, the Recovery Act allowed the FCC to “recommend only those policies that it concludes will, on net, help achieve “affordability” and ‘maximum utilization’ of broadband.” That means the Commission would actually have to consider the many trade-offs inherent in the private sector use of data before recommending regulation: If the Internet ecosystem is impoverished by government intervention, however well-intentioned it may be, users will have that much less reason to adopt and “utilize broadband.” So the FCC would have a lot of cost-benefit analysis to do before it could actually make the kinds of regulatory recommendations CDT wants. And we suspect that, on the whole, that analysis wouldn’t turn out the way CDT thinks it would.

Child Safe Viewing Act Notice of Inquiry

In a somewhat similar vein, Congress last year asked the agency to examine how well parental control technologies work to allow parents to filter objectionable content online. So while the FCC may have had, for once, the authority to ask broad questions, it’s startling just how broad those questions were. The Commission obviously has no authority over video games or virtual worlds, online video distribution networks or video hosting sites, mobile web content, MP3 players or iPods, P2P networks, VCRs or DVD players, PVRs or TiVo, Internet filters, safe search tools, laptops, and so on. And yet, all these things (and much more) were mentioned in the Commission’s Child Safe Viewing Act Notice of Inquiry.

The proceeding raises the prospect of what Adam has called “convergence era content regulation” since it opens the doors to FCC meddling on a number of new fronts in the name of “protecting children.” Although the Commission’s final report to Congress stopped short of calling for an substantive expansion of the agency’s content regulatory regime, it teed up another proceeding, discussed next. (And if Congress hasn’t moved more quickly to grant the FCC new power in this area, it’s probably because they’re busy trying to figure out how to get around a line of First Amendment cases that consistently require government regulation to yield to “less restrictive” alternatives like parental control tools and education.)

Empowering Parents & Protecting Children Notice of Inquiry

This wide-ranging inquiry reads like the ultimate “fishing expedition” by a regulatory agency—fishing for new jurisdictional authority to regulate, that is!  The questions asked are too broad, far-flung and various to catalog here (we’ll have a big filing coming in the matter soon), but the Commission asks about extending to Internet media the model of the 1990 Children’s Television Act, which imposes “public interest” obligations on broadcasters and cable operators to offer “education” content while also strictly limiting how much advertising may be shown during children’s TV. The Commission also alludes, ominously, to the V-chip model for requiring universal ratings for television and hints that it would really like for “current laws [to] be updated to reflect this convergence and to keep pace with changes in technology” (¶ 41).

The Commission mentions only in passing at the very end of the Inquiry that it “has varying degrees of statutory authority with respect to different media. We ask commenters, in proposing any action, to discuss the source and extent of the Commission’s authority to take the action, or whether new legislation would be needed to authorize such action” (¶ 58). Translation: “Uh, yeah… so… we know we don’t have a statutory leg to stand on here, but we think it’d be really cool if we did, so let’s just all, you know, kinda brainstorm about what kind of regulation we could be imposing here and what kind of law we’d need get Congress to pass to make it all legal. Or if you have any creative ideas on how we could get away with just making up the jurisdiction thing on our own, that’d be even better!”

YouTube, you’re first on the list of targets for the kind of online video regulation the FCC is hinting at here—and none too subtly. But why stop there? The FCC’s laundry list of complaints aren’t limited just to video, but could apply to essentially all online media. But this is all in the name of “protecting the children,” and Chairman Genachowski doesn’t want to regulate the Internet, so we really don’t need to worry—right?

Future of Media Notice of Inquiry

Most recently, in late January, the Commission launched the ambitiously-named “Examination of the Future of Media and Information Needs of Communities in a Digital Age.” The FCC asks a number of good questions about how government could get out of the way of media struggling to reinvent themselves in the digital era by scrapping outdated regulations. The inquiry also tips its hat to the vital importance of advertising in supporting media. But it’s otherwise pretty bad news as a harbinger of a “Chill Wind” for the future of a free press in this country, as Ken Ferree, PFF’s former president and current board member noted.

In particular, the Commission comes right out with a “trial balloon” about imposing public interest obligations on online operators—the very thing it hinted at slightly more delicately in the “Empowering Parents” inquiry mentioned above:

Broadcasters have certain public interest obligations, including that they provide programming responsive to the needs and issues of their communities and comply with the Commission’s children’s programming requirements. Cable and satellite operators have their own responsibilities…  Should such obligations be applied to a broader range of media or technology companies, or be limited in scope?

OK, so we’re not going to “regulate” online content operators; we’re just going to impose “public interest” obligations on them to provide certain kinds of content preferred by politicians. Right… and if Google News or YouTube don’t do enough to “serve the public interest,” what then? Will the Federal Search Commission take away Google’s search license or cloud computing license?

Of course, we don’t mean to suggest that even the “Federal Cloud Commission” would ever be so unsubtle as to create a formal licensing system when they can probably achieve the same ends with far less obvious regulation. But how is this all going to work, exactly? Again, this is exactly the kind of hopelessly vague regulatory morass Congress had in mind when it declared that the federal government would avoid “fettering” the “vibrant competitive free market … for the Internet and other interactive computer services” with regulation.

The FCC goes on to revive the kinds of broad net neutrality ideas discussed above in asking:

How would policies related to “open Internet” or “universal broadband” or other FCC policies about communications infrastructure affect the likelihood that the Internet will meet the information needs of communities? Are there search engine practices that might positively or negatively affect web-based efforts to provide news or information?

In other words, “Tell us why and precisely how we should start regulating search engines in order to help ‘save  news.'” Google, here’s looking at you, kid! You want to keep your search license, dontcha? Well, just do what the nice men from Washington want and there won’t be any trouble.

Finally, the Commission opens the door to the noxious proposal for a “public option” for media, which Adam has lambasted. Here’s what the Commission says:

In general, what categories of journalism are most in jeopardy in the digital era? What categories are likely to flourish? While much is still to be determined as media companies test various business models and payment approaches in the coming years, based on what is known now, are there news and information needs that commercial market mechanisms alone are unlikely to serve adequately?

Don’t worry, it’s not as if government will exercise control over the media companies it funds if the media-socialist fantasies of the neo-Marxist Robert McChesney and his ironically-named “Free Press” group actually come true. Nope, government’s just here to help!

We’d all do well to remember that subsidies always come with strings attached—namely, regulation. That’s the Golden Rule: “He who has the gold, makes the rules!”

Conclusion

Chairman Genachowski, with all due respect, if you don’t like people suggesting that the FCC may be positioning itself to regulate the Internet and digital media platforms, then you might want to take a careful look at what your agency has been doing. You should think hard both about the precedents that will be set by “neutrality” regulation for online content and services, and also about the quasi-regulatory effect that your agency’s flurry of open-ended inquiries will have on the operators you claim not to want to regulate.

What will future Chairmen do with these precedents? What will emerge from every “Pandora’s Box” you’ve opened with each new sweeping inquiry? The answer, we fear, is an endless parade of new Internet regulations—and the death by a thousand cuts of real Internet freedom.

It may be possible to wring consistency from the “open” manifesto Google SVP of Product Management Jonathan Rosenberg published earlier this week, but I can’t.

He correctly extols the virtues of openness in technology and data for its pro-competitive effects. Closed systems may be profitable in the short run, but they are weak innovation engines:

[A] well-managed closed system can deliver plenty of profits. They can also deliver well-designed products in the short run — the iPod and iPhone being the obvious examples — but eventually innovation in a closed system tends towards being incremental at best (is a four blade razor really that much better than a three blade one?) because the whole point is to preserve the status quo. Complacency is the hallmark of any closed system. If you don’t have to work that hard to keep your customers, you won’t.

But his paean to openness draws a tight line around Google’s profitable products:

While we are committed to opening the code for our developer tools, not all Google products are open source. Our goal is to keep the Internet open, which promotes choice and competition and keeps users and developers from getting locked in. In many cases, most notably our search and ads products, opening up the code would not contribute to these goals and would actually hurt users. The search and advertising markets are already highly competitive with very low switching costs, so users and advertisers already have plenty of choice and are not locked in. Not to mention the fact that opening up these systems would allow people to “game” our algorithms to manipulate search and ads quality rankings, reducing our quality for everyone.

This is a fascinating exhibition of self-focus. Rosenberg finds that the benefits of openness cut off just exactly where Google’s profitability kicks in (credit: Rob Beschizza on BoingBoing).

If Google were to open its search algorithm, torments would befall users, he says—but much moreso torment would befall Google because their competitive edge in search and ad placement would shrink. Their competition would have a real chance to catch up and lower the premium Google could charge advertisers.

Now, would opening the algorithm allow gaming? Yes. And a new burst of competition and creativity would further improve search and ad serving across the entire Internet—exactly the kind of improvement Rosenberg says Google strives to produce.

Rosenberg’s attempt to strip Google down to a coherent philosophy of openness fails—search and ad-serving are a codpiece staring you right in the face. Or, if you prefer, Google’s heart is closed…

SVPs of product management are free to be wrong about philosophy, of course. It doesn’t matter at all—except when Google tries to impose its philosophy on others. And in the debate over ‘net neutrality regulation it has done exactly that.

Two years ago, Google sought and got “openness” conditions from the Federal Communication Commission on the 700MHz spectrum auction. Purchasers of it can’t use it as they see fit. For fear that it will cede profits to providers of transport, Google supports public utility-style regulation for network operators. Google thinks that “openness” rules to protect its profitability are ‘good for the Internet’. But they are just seeking competitive advantage through regulation.

This extraordinary self-focus—projecting one’s own interests onto others—is mirrored in the intellectual debate about openness versus proprietary systems. As I wrote in a 2007 book review, property rights and openness advocates both think their theories “explain the world.”

In fact, Google (and the Internet) benefit from openness some of the time and “closedness” some of the time. Open is not an organizing theory for Google, and it’s not an organizing theory for the Internet—just for parts of each.

Rosenberg’s myopia—thinking that what is good for Google is good for everyone—is the same as the myopia that politicians acquire after years in office. Fawned over by special pleaders and staff, they come to believe that their interests are the public interest. They honestly—but wrongly—believe that their defeat in an election would harm the country. So it is with Google’s support for net neutrality. L’Internet, c’est moi.

If Jonathan Rosenberg and the nice folks at Google were self-aware, it would be fair to call them hypocrites. But they are unlikely to see Google’s self-serving openness ideology as simply that. In Washington, D.C. we see all the time how hard it is to get a fish to talk about water.

2009 was not as big of a year for Internet and information technology (“info-tech”) policy books as 2008 was, but there were still some notable titles released that offered interesting perspectives about the future of the Net and the impact the Digital Revolution is having on our lives, culture, and economy.  So, like last year, I figured I would throw together my list of the 10 most important info-tech policy books of the year.

First, let me repeat a few of the same caveats and disclaimers that I set forth last year.  What qualifies as an “important” info-tech policy book? Simply put, it’s a title that many people are currently discussing and that we will likely be referencing for many years to come.  However, I want to be clear that merely because a book appears on my list it does not necessarily mean I agree with everything said in it. In fact, as was the case in previous years, I found much with which to disagree in my picks for the most important books of 2009 and I find that the cyber-libertarianism I subscribe to has very few fans out there.

Another caveat: Narrowly-focused titles lose a few points on my list. For example, if a book deals mostly with privacy issues, copyright law, or antitrust policy, it does not exactly qualify as the same sort of “tech policy book” as other titles found on this list since it is a narrow exploration of just one set of issues with a bearing on technology policy.

With those caveats in mind, here are my choices for the Most Important Info-Tech Policy Books of 2009.

(1) Chris Anderson – Free: The Future of a Radical Price

Chris Anderson’s 2006 book The Long Tail will be remembered as one of the most influential tech policy books of the decade.  It changed the way we talk about the digital marketplace and it instantly garnered a huge audience outside of the nerdy world of Internet policy.  While Free: The Future of a Radical Price will forever live in the shadow of The Long Tail, it too is an important book and in many ways it is a much better one.

In The Long Tail, Anderson tried too hard to invent the latest business theory du jour, and in doing so he went much too far in proclaiming that, as the subtitle of the book argued, “the future of the business is selling less of more.”  That’s just not true. While there’s certainly a lot more action in the long tail than ever before since it is so much more accessible, that does not mean the entire future of business lies in “selling less of more.”  To the contrary, the fat head of the tail is just as profitable as ever.

Free certainly contains some of the flamboyance on display in The Long Tail, but Anderson has matured as a writer and is now far more willing to point out the limitations of his theories in a business sense.  He does a splendid job in Free of creating a taxonomy of free-oriented business models to guide discussions about these issues.  And he explains how “free” can be part of many different business models and strategies. His historical treatment of the issues is outstanding and includes many entertaining examples of how these “free” strategies have been used over time to offer innovative new goods and services.

The reason his book is important for Internet policy discussions is obvious: “free” is increasingly viewed as a threat to many existing companies, industry sectors, and traditional media business models.  For example, battles about the future of journalism and search engine indexing of news sites are obviously tied up with battles over “free.”  And, it goes without saying that the traditional entertainment industry business models are increasingly challenged by “free” as many struggle to adapt to the new realities of the online world, in which “free” (primarily advertising-supported  and “freemium” models) seems to be the only model with any legs.

Much like my top pick for 2008 book of the year, Jonathan Zittrain’s The Future of the Net and How to Stop It, Chris Anderson’s Free is the most important information technology book of the year because it is the one we will still be talking about the most a decade from now.  However, unlike Zittrain’s book and thesis, which I think will be largely discredited in another ten years, Anderson’s book will likely be viewed as an important and lasting contribution to the field.

(2) Larry Downes – The Laws of Disruption: Chaos and Control in Your Virtual Future

The Laws of Disruption is the closest thing you will find to a genuine cyber-libertarian manifesto these days.  But Downes isn’t a rigid ideologue; his skepticism of government regulation of the high-tech economy is based more on practical considerations and the fundamental “law of disruption”: “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.” Downes says this law is “a simple but unavoidable principle of modern life” and that it will have profound implications for the way businesses, government, and culture evolve going forward. “As the gap between the old world and the new gets wider,” he argues, “conflicts between social, economic, political, and legal systems” will intensify and “nothing can stop the chaos that will follow.” In this sense, The Laws of Disruption reads like an addendum to one of Alvin Toffler’s old books on technology and futurism in that Downes is essentially walking us through the practical consequences of life in a “post-industrial society.”

In terms of what it all means for public policy, Downes doesn’t so much fear legal and regulatory over-reach the way many cyber-libertarians do. Rather, he thinks most regulatory schemes just won’t work. In essence, he is a technological fatalist or consequentialist: Progress happens whether we like it or not, so get used to it!  Thus, the “laws of disruption” he articulates serve primarily as “Just-Don’t-Bother” warnings to over-eager government meddlers. “The best way to regulate innovation is to leave it alone,” he counsels.

In terms of structure, The Laws of Disruption resembles Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness After the Digital Explosion by Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis, (which I reviewed here last year and named to my 2008 list). Both books survey a vast swath of territory — privacy, copyright, security, etc — and each chapter offers unique perspectives on each debate. In that sense, the book is useful to readers if for no other reason than you get a taste for how a wide variety of issues are playing out. Downes also owes much to Clayton M. Christensen and his seminal 1997 book The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Like that book, The Laws of Disruption is a business book with a strong policy hook.  That is, both books focus on advice-dishing for companies and innovators looking to “stay ahead of the curve” in the midst of relentless, gut-wrenching technological change, but the books also include important lessons regarding the public policies that should govern high-tech sectors.

I highly recommended The Laws of Disruption and found it to be the most enjoyable of all the books I read this year.

(3) Dawn C. Nunziato – Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age

Dawn Nunziato is the perfect foil for Larry Downes. Her book is a manifesto for cyber-collectivism and “media access theory.”  (For those unfamiliar with media access theory, see my old essay: “Your Soapbox is My Soapbox! Thoughts on the Media Access Movement in General and the Media & Democracy Coalition’s ‘Bill of Media Rights’ in Particular.”)  She attempts to bring media access theory up to date by taking the ideas made famous by Jerome Barron, Owen Fiss, Cass Sunstein, and others, and applying them to the Internet and digital technologies.  Like those earlier legal thinkers, she argues for “an affirmative conception” of the First Amendment that would allow government to use the First Amendment to “facilitate the conditions necessary for democratic self-government” (whatever that means). Net neutrality regulation becomes one of many ways she would put this theory into action. Importantly, she would not stop with ISPs. She makes the case for extending the entire regulatory regime to Google and search platforms. Welcome to the Brave New World of the the FCC as the Federal Search Commission or Federal Cloud Commission!

Her attempt to cast Net neutrality as the Internet’s First Amendment is a grotesque contortion of the real First Amendment, and a complete betrayal of the Founder’s original intentions.  As I made clear in my recent essay on “Net Neutrality Regulation & the First Amendment,” the Internet’s First Amendment is the First Amendment, not some new, top-down, heavy-handed regulatory regime that puts the Federal Communications Commission in control of the Digital Economy. Her conception of the First Amendment would convert it from a shield against government control into a sword that the government could use as it wished. It would mean that “Congress shall make no law…” would suddenly be replaced by “Congress shall make whatever law it wants” so long as it serves some amorphous “public interest.” Can you say “tyranny of the majority”?

Regardless, event though I find her views to be morally repugnant and the antithesis of true digital freedom, Nunziato’s book is a concise articulation of that vision and it deserves everyone’s attention. It serves as a blueprint for where the Net neutrality wars are taking us.

(4) David Bollier – Viral Spiral: How the Commoners Built a Digital Republic of Their Own

David Bollier’s Viral Spiral is the first major history of the “digital commons” / “free culture” movement, and despite my many person disagreements with him and this movement, it is an excellent treatment of the topic. Bollier surveys this growing intellectual movement from its early open source days to the rise of the Creative Commons and on into the present.  The cast of characters in this drama will be well-known to anyone involved in modern tech policy debates: Richard Stallman, Lawrence Lessig, Jonathan Zittrain, Yochai Benkler, et al.

There is absolutely no doubt that this intellectual movement is winning the war of ideas in cyberlaw front today, as I noted in a recent debate with Lessig and Zittrain over at Cato Unbound.  As a cyber-libertarian, I find myself occasionally at odds with these guys and this movement on a variety of policy issues, but that didn’t stop me from enjoying David Bollier’s treatment of this movement and these issues.

(5) David Post – In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace

David Post is one of the early intellectual giants in the field of cyberlaw. Back in the days when most of us were still just trying to get our 14.4 modems to work properly to get on Al Gore’s “Information Highway,” David Post was writing essays and law review articles that were a decade ahead of their time.  In particular, his work on Internet governance and jurisdictional matters was path-breaking, and much of it is updated and extended in Jefferson’s Moose.

I must admit, however, that I was hoping for a bit more from David in this book.  Beyond just being a first-rate intellectual in this space, he is also one of the few remaining defenders of “Internet exceptionalism,” and he has genuine cyber-libertarian leanings.  After waiting almost 10 years for David to wrap this thing up after he first told me about it back around 2000, I was thinking he might come up with the sort of cyber-libertarian manifesto I’ve always hoped he would write.  Although he fell a bit short in that regard, it doesn’t mean it’s not a good book. It is. You will enjoy it no matter what cyber-philosophy you subscribe to.

Read my entire review of Jefferson’s Moose here.

(6) Dennis Baron – A Better Pencil: Readers, Writers, and the Digital Revolution

Baron’s A Better Pencil is a splendid history of techno-pessimism and the endless battles about the impact of new technologies on life and learning, something I have written about here before in my essays on “Internet optimists vs. pessimists” (See: 1, 2, 3).   Baron notes that almost as soon as people learned to put chisel to stone and then quill to paper, a great debate began about the impact of new communications technology on culture and education. And that debate rages on today with a new generation of optimists and skeptics battling over the impact that computing, the Internet, and digital technologies have on our lives and on how we learn about the world.

Baron walks us through a litany of historical examples—the printing press, the telegraph, telephones, typewriters, pocket calculators, personal computers, word processors, webpages, blogs, social-networking sites, and more—and identifies the usual pattern: we greet each new technology with deep distrust and dire warnings, but in time we adapt to the new realities. Indeed, as a species, we have an unparalleled ability to learn new ways of doing things. We don’t always like technological change, and often we deeply resent or fear it, but in the end, we learn to live with it and eventually to embrace it.  With the rise of the Internet and digital technologies, we see this pattern unfolding once again. But Baron counsels patience and understanding instead of the sort f hysteria and backlash we see from the likes of Andrew Keen, Lee Siegel and others.  It’s a refreshing and uplifting perspective.

Highly recommended. See my complete review of Baron’s A Better Pencil over at the City Journal website.

(7) Mark Helprin – Digital Barbarism: A Writer’s Manifesto

No book has been more disappointing to me in recent memory than Mark Helprin’s Digital Barbarism. As someone who still finds a lot to defend in copyright law, I was excited when I learned that one of America’s most gifted authors–and the author of my favorite literary work of the late 20th century (A Soldier of the Great War)–was taking a crack defending copyright in a short manifesto.

Alas, as I argued in my review of the book for National Review, while Helprin occasionally rises to great heights in his defense of copyright, he too often sinks to lamentable lows–by resorting to the same unbecoming rhetorical tactics used by the “cyber-mob” he seeks to condemn. Indeed, his book is filled with gratuitous vitriol and neo-Luddite ramblings about the Internet and Information Age that severely detract from his defense of copyright. Channeling the ghost of the late social critic Neil Postman, Helprin’s critique of copyright skeptics quickly turns into an all-out assault on modern digital culture and cyberspace. He argues that we are witnessing “the decline of culture,” the “mechanization of the soul,” our “intellectual and spiritual destruction,” and the rise of a movement of “wacked-out muppets led by little professors in glasses” that “threatens in a decade or two to dissolve the accomplishments of millennia, reordering the ways in which we think, write, and communicate.” And it just gets worse from there. Much like recent rants by Andrew Keen and Lee Siegel, Helprin speaks repeatedly about the “surrender of human nature” to “the machine revolution” and the corresponding need to “control the machine.”

How a man who has penned some of the most beautiful prose in modern times could craft an off-the-rails screed of this magnitude remains incomprehensible  to me.  What’s worse is that he set back the cause of defending what’s best about copyright in the process. Luckily for Helprin, there’s plenty of hysteria on the other side, as the next book on my list makes clear.

(8) William Patry – Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars

Bill Patry is an angry man. He is the anti-Helprin. The vitriol that Helprin directs against the copyright-haters is reversed in this screed and turned against not just copyright holders and content creators, but against the entire capitalist system. Patry, who is the author of a multi-volume treatise on copyright law, has done the intellectual equivalent of “going postal” within his own intellectual community. He has turned his intellectual guns on anyone and everyone who has ever had a kind word to say about copyright. He cannot find one nice thing to say about copyright or anyone who defends copyright in this book. Not one.

What’s most ironic about the book is that Patry seems utterly oblivious to the fact that in the process of critiquing the inflammatory rhetoric and “misuse of language” occasionally emanating from some copyright defenders, he goes completely over the top himself and engages in even more egregious rhetorical flourishes. Choice gems from the book include: “digital guillotines,” copyright as “cancer,” “copyright dwarves,” Maoism, the “sins” of copyright, “socialism for the wealthy,” and a comparison of the DMCA to “Mussolini’s Fascist Italy.”  Apparently when it comes to the “misuse of language,” Patry believes that two wrongs make a right.

And then there is his mind-boggling conclusion that: “I cannot think of a single significant innovation in either the creation or distribution of works of authorship that owes its origins to the copyright industries.”  Apparently, every great book, every great movie, every great video game, and ever great musical composition of the past century was done solely for the love of it all. Copyright had apparently had absolutely nothing to do with it according to Patry’s logic. That is just an astonishingly naive notion, in my opinion. Apparently this man’s hatred for copyright-related industries is so intense that it has blinded him to any potentially positive effects of copyright law. If nothing else, it would have been nice to see Mr. Patry address how it is that America is the world’s leading creator and exporter of creative arts.  Certainly copyright law must have had something to do with that!

Chapter 5 of his book makes it clear that Patry’s critique of copyright is actually rooted in a much deeper suspicion about capitalism itself.  He speaks of “the myth of economic freedom” and claims that “free market fundamentalism… destroyed much of the world’s economies.”  He then launches into a neo-Marxist critique of property rights more generally, treating property as a zero-sum game of winners and losers.  At times it all begins to sound like a rant from an old Herbert Marcuse book with questions like: “why are the interests of one social group favored over another?” and “What social objective is being furthered by the decision to privilege one group over another?”  And there’s all sorts of talk about “regulation in the public interest,” which I have critique as a meaningless non-standard here many times before.

In the end, Patry’s book will–along with Helprin’s–long be remember as marking the nadir in the “copyright wars;” a moment when grown men of great intelligence decided to trade in their integrity for the opportunity to engage in below-the-belt rhetorical cheap shots that would typically be reserved for college student debating politics over beers and shots at two in the morning.  They should both be ashamed of themselves.

(9) Gary Reback – Free the Market!  Why Only Government Can Keep the Marketplace Competitive

Gary Reback’s over-the-top ode to antitrust as the great savior of capitalism reads like an extended love letter. As I noted in my lengthy critique of his book, his fairy tale narrative of antitrust as the savior of capitalism is hopelessly one-sided, and his recommendations to expand antitrust enforcement wouldn’t “Free the Market” as he argues in his book’s shameful title, but would instead wrap it in regulatory chains.

He repeatedly insults the intelligence of the reader by claiming antitrust is supposedly not a form of economic regulation and that is can only have beneficial effects. He wants antitrust officials to intervene early and often in high-tech markets to guide markets to a supposedly better place. Reback considers just about everything “the Chicago School” taught us to be antitrust apostasy and he would like to erase four decades worth of economic literature and evidence that suggests antitrust law is a form of economic regulation and does have unintended consequences that often hurt consumer welfare.  Even if you are not an inherent antitrust skeptic like me, I think most people would hope for a better treatment of the other side of this story.

Read my lengthy review of Reback’s Strangle Free the Market here.

(10) tie – Tyler Cowen – Create Your Own Economy: The Path to Prosperity in a Disordered World and John Freeman – The Tyranny of E-Mail: The Four-Thousand-Year Journey to Your Inbox

OK, so I just couldn’t figure out which of these two to cut from the list so I took the easy way out by having them tie for the last slot!  In this case, however, there’s another reason it makes sense for both of them to round out the list: Both Freeman and Cowen explore how humans are coping with information overload–albeit from two very different perspectives.

As I noted in my lengthy essay on the topic earlier this year, Cowen is an unrepentant optimist. He believes humans have the ability to adapt to new technological realities and a world of information abundance. In fact, Cowen argues, new tools and information gathering and processing technologies actually “lengthens our attention spans in another way, namely by allowing greater specialization of knowledge.”

John Freeman, by contrast, wants us all to take a high-tech time out. Like other Internet skeptics, he is worried that cyberspace and digital technologies are reshaping humanity–and not for the better. “If we are to step off this hurtling machine, we must reassert principles that have been lost in the blur,” he argues. “It is time to launch a manifesto for a slow communication movement, a push back against the machines and the forces that encourage us to remain connected to them.”

Unlike most other Internet pessimists, however, Freeman’s tone is more measured and his recommendations more reasonable.  Of course, it helps that he is magical wordsmith. Even if you find yourself disagreeing with many of his ultimate conclusions–as I did–you should read The Tyranny of E-Mail for a lesson in how to construct an argument and to appreciate the gift of fine writing. It’s easily the best tract by any Net skeptic since Nick Carr’s The Big Switch, and a much better one in many ways. It will force you to ask tough questions about the impact of the Information Age on you and the world around you.  Nonetheless, I remain an unrepentant techno-optimist (albeit a pragmatic one)!

Honorable Mentions: Here are a couple of other books that I couldn’t fit on my list but that you might want to also consider adding to your bookshelf:

• Manuel Castells – Communication Power
• James Boyle – The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind
• Randall Stross – Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know [my review]
• Ken Auletta – Googled: The End of the World As We Know It [my review]
• Scott Rosenberg- Say Everything: How Blogging Began, What It’s Becoming, and Why It Matters
• John W. Dozier Jr. and Sue Scheff – Google Bomb

Please let me know what titles might be missing from this list and which books you think are the best of the year.

And speaking of bookshelves, here’s my Shelfari digital bookshelf in case anyone is interested. If you hadn’t figured it out yet, I am a bit of book nerd!  My life is spent swimming through oceans of paper.  My friends often ask me, “How can you spend so much time reading?” My question back to them is: “How can you not?”

As I noted here a few days ago, the Federal Communications Commission held a workshop on Tuesday about “Speech, Democratic Engagement, and the Open Internet.”  It was a shockingly one-sided affair with the deck being stacked almost entirely in favor of advocates of Net neutrality regulation. Worse yet, those advocates shamelessly made up spooky stories about a future of “private censorship” that could only be remedied by using the First Amendment as a club to beat private players into submission. The token opposition at this Chicken Little circus was Robert Corn-Revere, a Partner at the law firm of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Washington, D.C.   Bob set the record straight–both in terms of baseless accusations that were flying that day as well as the revisionist histories of the First Amendment that were being put forward. I’m happy to report that Bob allowed PFF to reprint his remarks as a new white paper entitled, “The First Amendment, the Internet & Net Neutrality: Be Careful What You Wish For.”

In his essay, Corn-Revere discusses the relationship between the First Amendment and regulatory policy, particularly the treatment of new communications technologies, and he warns that government regulation of broadband networks could “provide the vehicle for advancing new First Amendment theories for media regulation” and online speech and expression more generally.  “It should not be forgotten,” he argues, “that the federal government’s initial impulse was to censor the Internet and to subject it to a far lower level of First Amendment protection. It pursued this agenda for more than a decade but was blocked by a series of First Amendment rulings.”  The Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act are just two notable examples. Luckily, the courts determined that “the open Internet would be at great risk if the government is allowed to exercise such power,” he notes, and they struck down such laws.

But we must be vigilant in defending our free speech rights, Corn-Revere warns. He notes that, “the constitutional ramifications of the network neutrality debate extend far beyond the question of whether the FCC should or should not adopt a given set of rules. On a doctrinal level the question is whether technological convergence should also lead to regulatory convergence, where the least common denominator of First Amendment protection becomes the governing rule.”

“The First Amendment, the Internet & Net Neutrality: Be Careful What You Wish For” is available on the PFF website and can also be viewed down below in a Scribd document reader. I want to also recommend that everyone take a look at the brief remarks that FCC Commissioner Robert McDowell delivered at the opening of that FCC event that Corn-Revere spoke at. “Efforts to advance ‘First Amendment values’ through additional government regulation risks turning over two hundred years of First Amendment jurisprudence on its head,” McDowell rightly argued. And that’s also consistent with the outstanding address delivered last week by Kyle McSlarrow, President & CEO of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, on the same issue, in which he correctly noted that, “the First Amendment is framed as a shield for citizens, not a sword for government.” “By its plain terms and history, the First Amendment is a limitation on government power, not an empowerment of government,” McSlarrow said.

Thank God a few people in this town are still taking a stand for the real First Amendment.

Robert Corn-Revere Remarks at FCC Workshop on Speech and Democracy http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=24208240&access_key=key-2h2o9rho7g9qr414utqi&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list

As I’ve been saying, search is “Getting Better All the Time,” with constant innovation like Bing’s new integrated social functionality. I’m eagerly awaiting Microsoft’s new Bing 2.0. Here’s another small but very cool innovation from Google:

I’ve noted that Google and Microsoft both face what Clayton Christensen famously called the “Innovator’s Dilemma” in trying to handle disruptive innovation in search technology. But noting Microsoft’s innovations in bringing social functionality to search with its “Ping” tools in Bing, I pointed out a few days ago that, “Microsoft, with less to lose and without a huge installed user base to worry about annoying by violating Google’s ‘Prime Directive’ of elegant simplicity, may have an easier time introducing ‘disruptive’ innovations to search than Google.”

The trick will be for Microsoft to find ways of promoting radical innovation from inside, despite the forces of inertia inherent in any large company. One way to do that, as I noted, would be by imitating Google’s “20 percent” program. But a more radical way would be for Microsoft to make Bing a “skunkworks” much like Lockheed Martin’s original “skunkworks,” Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), AT&T’s Bell Labs, GM’s Saturn Motors—or Microsoft’s own XBox. That’s precisely what SEO guru Rand Fishkin (CEO of SEOmoz) suggests Microsoft needs to do to “get serious” in an interview with Affilorama:

I think Google[‘s search market share] could be reduced from like 85% to like 75%, and you could see Microsoft, basically Bing taking over 25%. I don’t think they’ll get more than that. I don’t think they have the ability to do it. Until or unless they are willing do with Bing what they did with Xbox. So Microsoft had, you know, the game market was well established – Sony competing head to head with Nintendo and other players like Neo Geo coming in and this kind of thing and how is Microsoft going to win this? They didn’t know the first thing about it, you know, they weren’t in this field. So what they did with XBox is they made it a startup. They didn’t even put it on Microsoft campus, they made it a different team of people who were only reporting to Xbox people, they basically built a separate company. The fact that it was owned by Microsoft just means that they get the benefits of the cash and the relationships. That’s extremely powerful. The fact that they’re unwilling to do this with search tells me they’re not serious about it. Right? So you might hear like Steve Balmer and other executives from Microsoft say like “search is very important to us, we’re really serious about it”. I think it’s like “serious to them” and I’m using air quotes here, like serious to them in the same way that Google says “competing with Microsoft Office is serious to us”. It’s just sort of like, “Oh yeah?! You’re going to fight us there, well we’re going to fight you on this front!” Like, serious my ass. I just don’t see it. If they do serious and spin it out, I’ll be interested – I’ll be very interested if it becomes it’s own startup if it becomes like its own XBox, that kind of thing, that could be exciting – that could be interesting.

Microsoft is making a major push to integrate social networking tools like Facebook and Twitter into its Bing search engine: users will soon be able to “Ping” search results they like to their friends directly from Bing. Back in January, in “Google, the Innovator’s Dilemma and the Future of Search & Web Ads,” I talked about the implications of this history of search from the WSJ):

Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail.  The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete.  This dynamic was described brilliantly in Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s classic 1997 book The Innovator’s Dilemma:  When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail… Let’s hope that Microsoft—as well as Yahoo!—have carefully studied the vast literature produced by business schools in the wake of Christensen’s book about how big companies can avoid the Innovator’s Dilemma by promoting—and capitalizing on—radical innovation from within.  Indeed, this seems to be precisely what has guided Google’s own strategy as it has grown from “disruptive innovator” to become the very sort of behemoth that cannot easily escape the Dilemma, even if corporate managers are fully aware of the problem on a theoretical level.  If Google can do it, Microsoft should be able to, too.  But let’s also not discount the possibility that, no matter how hard Google’s management might try to retain the innovative culture of a start-up, the giant  can’t do that well enough to prevent its own apparent market dominance from being disrupted by new upstart innovators in search and advertising technologies.

My prediction seems to be coming true: Microsoft, with less to lose and without a huge installed user base to worry about annoying by violating Google’s “Prime Directive” of elegant simplicity, may have an easier time introducing “disruptive” innovations to search than Google. Of course, it’s unlikely that any one feature will prove the “killer app” that suddenly causes Bing’s market share to explode—and Google’s to plummet—but a steady stream of such nifty features could convince many users to switch to Bing.

At 29, I’m old enough to remember when Microsoft seemed as cool as Google does today. Hell, I remember being thrilled as a sophomore in high school by Bill Gates’ 1995 book The Road Ahead and the accompanying CD-ROM (which included, as I recall, a tour of Gates’s ultra-futuristic home).  If Microsoft can “get its mojo back,” the company could truly become a web services provider to rival Google.  We’d all benefit from having more choices in search engines, advertising platforms and related tools. And, driving each other to “build a better mousetrap,” the two companies could lead us down the “Road Ahead” from Search 2.0 to Search 3.0 and beyond. So here’s to hoping that Redmond can solve the “Innovator’s Dilemma” with tools like Google’s “20 percent” time that free engineers to innovate!

We’ve written a lot lately about Microsoft’s efforts to reinvent itself, first rebranding its Live search engine as the Bing, and then partnering with Yahoo! to make Bing the search engine on Yahoo!’s still-impressive empire of content and services. But if Microsoft is going to beat Google in Search 3.0 and master shifts in the driving paradigms of the Internet from search and browsers to ubiquitous integration of social networking and other paradigms as yet unforeseen, Microsoft will need more than just brilliant engineering: They’ll need clever marketing.

So it seems that the software titan is turning to user-generated advertising, such as this gem:

WARNING: Battlestar Galactica spoiler: Google may well be in danger of losing its monopoly on cool to Microsoft if Bing can get at least four of the Final Five Cylons to volunteer as back-up singers in a promo video contest.

Google clearly considers Microsoft a threat, having recently launched an ad campaign of its own for its Apps services, which compete directly with Microsoft Office.

I’m listening to the audiobook of Telecosm, George Gilder’s prophetic book about how abundant broadband would revolutionize the planet—which I recommend to everyone. I came across this passage, which reminded me just how good we really have it:

Reported to catalog only 16 percent of web pages, the best Internet search engines are foundering under the load, taking as long as six months to add new content.

If that was Search 1.0, Search 2.0 is great! Today’s search engines will index this post in a matter of minutes and while there are still parts of the “Deep Web” that aren’t crawled, a number of Search 3.0 upstarts are working on solving that problem, too!

Nick Wingfield has a great piece in today’s WSJ: Yahoo Tie-Up Is Latest Sign Tide Turning for Microsoft’s Ballmer (subscription required but can be found through a Google News search) about how Microsoft’s fortunes may be looking up across the board—especially with yesterday’s Yahoo!/Microsoft search/advertising partnership. The most interesting passage is this one:

For [Microsoft CEO Steve] Ballmer, the agreement provides some redemption in an area he has stressed is critical to Microsoft’s future. In an interview, he says the Yahoo deal received “more of my personal attention over the last 18 months than anything else we’re involved with,” including focusing on its most important new product in years, Windows 7. “It’s a big deal,” he says.

Of course, complex partnerships always require lots of time from senior management, but in this case, Ballmer’s quip speaks directly to the costs of antitrust scrutiny in terms of one of the most valuable resources available to any company: the time and attention of senior management. The “attentional cost” can of this deal for Microsoft could be broken into four parts beyond the normal costs of structuring any deal to make the most business sense:

1. How to structure the a Microsoft/Yahoo! deal so that it would be approved by regulators (defensive);
2. How to block a Google/Yahoo! deal (offensive);
3. Nursing the deal through the regulatory approval process over the coming months; and
4. The possibility that all of these costs could be wasted, to varying degrees, if antitrust regulators decide to block or restrict the deal.

These are all “deadweight losses” on the economy pure and simple—and ultimately costs to consumers.

I also speculated yesterday that uncertainty as to whether DOJ would block a Google/Yahoo! deal probably contributed to a delay of well over a year in concluding a Microsoft/Yahoo! deal—exacerbating the attentional costs to Microsoft. Yahoo! will also bear costs Nos. 1, 3 & 4 and Google bore its own costs in responding to Cost No. 2 and in trying to craft its own deal with Yahoo! last year, cost No. 1, which Yahoo! shared.

All three companies could have—and should have—been spending these critical attentional resources on the very things antitrust is, in theory, is supposed to promote: developing better products! If a company’s senior management spends all day on the phone with overpaid lawyers tinkering with deal structure and rearranging commas, all the engineering genius in the world won’t do much good.

As I noted yesterday, in rapidly evolving markets like search and advertising, distractions or delays of even a few months, can make a big difference to a company’s long-term ability to stay ahead of technological change:

the delay of over a year in reaching a [Yahoo!/Microsoft] deal is itself a significant cost of what economists would call the “regime uncertainty” created antitrust: Without clear rules, it’s difficult for economic actors to predict the decisions by regulators. A delay of a year could well prove to make a big difference in the ability of the two companies to mount a successful response to Google in search and advertising—just as Microsoft’s 18 month delay back in 2003-2004 in developing a search ad auction system to respond to Google’s AdWords system (which now produces 2/3 of its revenue) probably did much to thwart Microsoft’s initial efforts to compete in search.

As Adam as put it, Antitrust Law Can’t Keep Up with High-Tech! The sooner we learn this, and take antitrust off the table in high tech markets—both as a risk to corporate planning and as a potential weapon against competitors—the better all companies will be able to re-invent themselves as the paradigms of the web continually evolve.

Let’s hope that, as Holman W. Jenkins suggested last week in a WSJ op/ed, that Google and Microsoft in particular will find a way to work out a “cease-fire” in the rapidly accelerating arms race they’ve been in for the last decade—and agree to do battle on the field of pure competition.

We’ve just published an op-ed over at Forbes.com about today’s big Yahoo!-Microsoft deal.

Searching For Success: Web 1.0 Titans Struggle to Reinvent Themselves by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

Yahoo! and Microsoft on Wednesday announced a partnership in which Microsoft’s Bing search engine technology will power search for both companies, but Yahoo! will manage advertising sales and content creation.

This should be cause for celebration as a good thing for consumers. By providing a strong competitor with a combined 28% market share, the deal should also be a source of relief at Google, which has come under increasing attack for its supposed market dominance. But if recent concerns about online search, advertising, competition and privacy are any guide, many will fail to appreciate why the deal is pro-consumer, or what it says about the rapid evolution of the Internet.

It’s easy to forget that just a decade ago most of us still hadn’t done our first Google search, Microsoft was still focused on the desktop and Yahoo! was still serving up the online equivalent of the Yellow Pages. AltaVista, AOL, CompuServe and Geocities still ruled the roost.

Today, as we enjoy the fruits of a true cyber-renaissance, cyberspace circa 1999 increasingly looks like the Digital Dark Ages: The old online walled gardens have crumbled, desktop applications have migrated to the cloud and search has redefined our experience of the Web.

Oh, and did we mention just about all of it is “free“? Sounds like exactly the sort of vigorous innovation, expanding consumer choice, falling prices and cut-throat competition that policymakers should want, right?

Alas, regulators seem stuck in the past. European officials in particular seem hell-bent on continuing the antitrust crusade of the ’90s against Microsoft, myopically focused on fading paradigms (desktop operating systems and Web browsers). But instead of narrowly defining high-tech markets based on yesterday’s technologies or market structures, policymakers should embrace the one constant of the Internet economy: dynamic, disruptive and irrepressible change.

Innovation isn’t just transforming the way we use the Web, it’s rapidly changing the competitive landscape too. Some of the predictions of the ’90s are finally coming true: Browsers have morphed into platforms for applications including e-mail, word processing and real-time collaboration. A decade ago, few would have predicted Google would build its own browser, turn that browser into an operating system, build an OS for smart phones, or go head-to-head with Microsoft Office. And the idea that Microsoft would ever take Office into the cloud was at one point unthinkable, but that’s happening now too. Meanwhile Google, and more recently Microsoft, have become full-fledged advertising companies–in competition with traditional media giants. Again, no one saw this coming.

The Yahoo!/Microsoft pact is just the latest pairing of Web 1.0 titans struggling to reinvent themselves and compete with Google, a titan that still thinks of itself as a start-up. All three companies will struggle to meet new challenges as search evolves toward the social (reflecting what your friends like), the semantic (reflecting the precise, rather than presumed, meanings of Web content), the personalized (reflecting your own preferences) and the interactive (including user-generated comments or reviews).

Even the business model of search is changing, with Microsoft offering consumers cash back for their searches. Meanwhile, new paradigms of social networking like Facebook and Twitter are emerging with business models whose potential remains both unclear and unlimited.

Despite this whirlwind of change, the Yahoo!/Microsoft deal is bound to lead to some hand-wringing from lawmakers and antitrust officials in Washington and Brussels. Regulators already blocked a somewhat similar advertising partnership between Google and Yahoo last year. What unites these regulatory responses is the belief that rapidly evolving digital technologies can be regulated like the static utilities of the analog era–and the failure to understand that antitrust is just another form of regulation.

Instead, policymakers should recognize that the business, user and technological paradigms of the Web are constantly being re-invented and replaced. They shouldn’t delay approving this deal, especially as any delay would lengthen an awkward period of uncertainty for the corporate couple at the antitrust altar. Moreover, they should avoid micro-managing the transaction through regulatory blackmail: demanding “voluntary concessions” before giving their blessing.

For many of the same reasons, policymakers should exercise great care and humility when listening to the growing cacophony of calls for antitrust intervention against Google. “Googlephobia” has reached a fever pitch in recent months with plenty of critics in both government and industry hinting that they’d like to see the company crippled with new restrictions or obligations–much as Microsoft was in the ’90s. The idea of antitrust regulators becoming a veritable “Federal Search Commission” for such a rapidly evolving sector seems highly problematic. America’s high-tech sector is the envy of the world precisely because, generally speaking, the U.S. has rejected heavy-handed regulation of the Information Economy. Indeed, no one knows better than Microsoft how much “antitrust oversight” can hamstring a company’s ability to stay ahead of transformative change.

Some will protest that this is just a case of the big getting bigger, but there have always been big fish in the high-tech pond. The difference today is that there are new fish jumping in the pond more rapidly than ever before, and today’s pond probably won’t be tomorrow’s evolutionary battleground.

Lacking a technological crystal ball with which to predict the future of this fast-paced sector, there’s no way to know which of those players or technologies will thrive or what the digital paradigms of the next decade will look like. But heavy-handed antitrust regulation based on static thinking will lock us into an “industrial policy” for the Internet. Treating America’s tech titans like smokestack-era utilities won’t benefit consumers or enhance America’s competitive standing in the world.

Cory Doctorow has called for a Wikipedia-style effort to build an open source, non-profit search engine. From his column in The Guardian:

What’s more, the way that search engines determine the ranking and relevance of any given website has become more critical than the editorial berth at the New York Times combined with the chief spots at the major TV networks. Good search engine placement is make-or-break advertising. It’s ideological mindshare. It’s relevance… It’s a terrible idea to vest this much power with one company, even one as fun, user-centered and technologically excellent as Google. It’s too much power for a handful of companies to wield. The question of what we can and can’t see when we go hunting for answers demands a transparent, participatory solution. There’s no dictator benevolent enough to entrust with the power to determine our political, commercial, social and ideological agenda. This is one for The People. Put that way, it’s obvious: if search engines set the public agenda, they should be public.

He goes on to claim that “Google’s algorithms are editorial decisions.”   For Doctorow, this is an outrage: “so much editorial power is better vested in big, transparent, public entities than a few giant private concerns.”

I wish Doctorow well in his effort to crowdsource a Google-killer, but I’m more than a little skeptical that anyone would actually want to use his search engine of The People.  My guess is that, like most things produced in the name of “The People” (Soviet toilet paper comes to mind), it will probably won’t be much fun to use, and will likely chafe noticeably. (For the record, I love and regularly use Wikipedia; I just don’t think that model is unlikely to produce a particularly useful search engine.  As Doctorow himself has noted of Google, “they make incredibly awesome search tools.”)

But I’m glad to see that Doctorow has conceded an important point of constitutional law: The First Amendment protects the editorial discretion of search engines, like all private companies, to decide what to content to communicate.  For a newspaper, that means deciding which articles or editorials to run.  For a library or bookstore, it means which books to carry.  For search engines, it means how to write their search algorithims.

Doctorow’s “We’ll build our own darn rocket ship in the backyard!” response  to his deep concerns about Google’s dominance of search does not, of course, impinge on Google’s editorial discretion—and for that, I commend him.  But others, most notably Frank Pasquale, have indeed proposed government action to address such concerns in ways that most surely would impinge on the First Amendment rights of all search engines.

Pasquale’s comlpaint about Google is essentially the same as Doctorow’s, but rather than proposing an innovative (if unrealistic) alternative (like Doctorow), he  has called (PDF) for the “creation of a Federal Search Commission to parallel the Federal Communications Commission” and declared that ” In order to reduce opportunities for clickfraud and unfair treatment of indexed entities, qualified transparency will be needed in order to open up the ‘black box’ of search engine operations to at least some third parties.”   He focuses on search algorithms because:

The heart of a search engine and the key to its success is its search algorithm. Effective algorithms are protected by a veil of secrecy and by various intellectual property rights. As a result, new entrants cannot easily appropriate existing algorithms. Moreover, many algorithms are trade secrets. Unlike patents, which the patent holder must disclose and which eventually expire, these trade secrets may never enter the public domain. Search algorithms may be analogous to the high-cost infrastructure required for entry into the utility or railroad markets.

He diagnoses the problem as follows:

given the emphasis on secrecy in the search engine business model, no one can verify that such rankings have not been manipulated or that subtler biases in favor of search engines’ partners are not being worked into the search algorithm… If search engines are to be accountable at all, if their interest is to be balanced against those of the various other claimants involved in search-related disputes, and if social values are to be given any weight, some governmental agent should be able to peer into the black box of search and determine whether or not illegitimate manipulation has occurred.

But what about editorial discretion?  Why should Google be forced to change its PageRank algorithms any more than The New York Times should be forced to change how it decides which stories to run?  Moreover, why should Google be forced to disclose how this process works?  Assigning a government monitor to sit in on meetings of the Times‘ editorial board “to detect bias” would clearly impinge on their editorial discretion.  Similarly, I don’t see why forcing a Yahoo!, Microsoft or any other search engine to disclose their equivalent processes for ranking search results should pass constitutional muster.

Editorial discretion means getting to make your own decisions, even if they might seem biased to those wise elites who “know better” because, well, it’s your decision and not the government’s!  Saying that speakers can make whatever decisions they want as long as they’re not biased means speakers don’t really have editorial discretion after all.

So, if recognizing that search algorithms are a form of editorial discretion is a problem (as Doctorow implies), it’s only insofar as this might frustrate the desires of those who would regulate search.

Found here.

I finally got around to reading Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know, by Randall Stross. It’s very well done. Stross is a frequently contributor to the New York Times and the author of several other interesting books on the technology industry. He knows how to weave a story together, and it helps that Google’s story is a pretty amazing one.

Each chapter discusses a different part of Google’s growing family of services — GMail, Google Maps, Google Earth, Book Search, and YouTube. Of course, it all started with search and Stross does a good job explaining how the ingenious Google search algorithm has grown from dorm room project to the greatest aggregator of human knowledge that the world has ever known. This, in turn, has powered Google’s hugely successful online advertising system. The real secret of their success with online advertising, Stross argues, is that “Google’s impersonal, mathematical approach search also provides you with the ability to serve advertisements that are tailored to a search, rather than to the person submitting the search request, whose identity would have to be known.”

Despite the benefits of such generally anonymous searching, as Google has grown and added new services and capabilities, concerns about the sheer volume of data that the company collects have led to heightened privacy concerns. Indeed, privacy is a core theme that Stross uses in the book to tie many of the chapters and issues together. Google is constantly struggling to strike the right balance between providing more access to the world’s information while also being careful not to raise privacy concerns. But it’s unclear exactly how much more information collection that users (or public officials) will tolerate before advocating stricter limits on Google’s reach.  As Stross points out:

Guided by its founding mission, to organize all the world’s information, Google has created storage capacity that allows it to gain control of what its users are you doing in a comprehensive way that no other company has done, and to preserve those records indefinitely, without the need to clear out old records to make way for new ones. Moreover, Google differentiates its service by refining its own proprietary software formula to mine and massage the data, technology that it zealously protects from the sight of rivals. This sets up a conflict between Google’s wish to operate a “black box” (completely opaque to the outside) and its users’ wish for transparency.

At the very least, users would like Google to disclose what protections are in place to safeguard their privacy. It is also natural that users would be curious about the machines that hold their personal data, as well as about which employees within Google have access to that data, and about the risks that it might be leaked, stolen, or transferred, for example, to a government agency that requests it. (p. 62)

Personally, I think most of these privacy fears are overblown. The mundane, trivial aspects of our daily lives aren’t really of much interest to Google. And to the extent users are concerned about their privacy, there are plenty of ways they can take steps to better protect their personal information or web-surfing habits.  Blocking ads, rejecting cookies, and using encryption are three steps that privacy-sensitive users can take to better shield the personal info or surfing habits. Finally, the concern about government access to data is best remedied by limits on what government can access in the first place. We shouldn’t be regulating Google or other companies to limit information collection based on a fear of government access; we just need to tightly limit the government’s ability to enlist private companies as agents of the state.

Still, as Stross points out, privacy concerns persist:

How can users be certain that their personal information won’t be put to uses to which an individual would never willingly consent? Privacy concerns extend across all Internet companies, but those concerns of our greatest where personal information is gathered in the largest pool. This makes the stewardship of Google’s machine a subject of public interest. Whatever is behind a door that is intentionally kept closed will appear sinister, whether deservedly so or not. For the sake of improving its public image, it’s possible that Google may relent and open its doors, at least enough to afford a peek inside. (p. 62)

I think that’s a fair point and this is something Google is really going to struggle with in coming years, especially as its search algorithm and other applications grow more powerful and comprehensive.  A good example of that is already seen with Google’s amazing “Street View” technology, which provides panoramic street-level views of maps searched via Google Maps. “What neither Google nor its critics realized,” Stross says, “was that our anonymity while walking about in public space in the predigital age was protected not by law but by the crude state of technology–we felt invisible only because cameras were not in place to capture our images.” (p. 145)

As a society, we had better get used to this because Street View is just the beginning of what will eventually grow into a far more sophisticated set of technologies as geo-mapping, geo-location, and image retrieval are married to virtual reality technologies. We’re really not that far away from Star Trek “holodecks” being projected into our living rooms, and once those holodecks let us walk down any street in the world, things are going to get both really exciting and a little bit creepy at the same time. But even if Google abandoned Street View tomorrow, somebody else would pick it up and run with it. Innovation in this space cannot be frozen. (Microsoft’s recent launch of Photosynth shows us that).  Google has already taken steps to protect privacy on Street View by blurring facial images and letting users flag “inappropriate or sensitive imagery for blurring or removal.”  That’s about all we can ask for.

Another theme that Stross develops nicely in the book is the ongoing war between Google and Microsoft. He argues that “Google’s ascendance has been accompanied by Microsoft’s decline.” (p. 195)  But that does not mean Google will be able to hold their current lead. As Stross rightly points out:

No computer company has ever been able to enjoy pre-eminence that spans two successive technological eras. IBM in the mainframe era could not head off the ascent of Digital Equipment Corporation in the minicomputer era, which, in turn, could not head off the ascent of Microsoft in the personal computer era.

And now Google has “succeeded in pushing Microsoft into a defensive crouch” and made life very difficult for that supposed “monopolist” of the PC era.  As a result, some Google critics claim this latest King of the Tech Hill cannot be toppled and that Google is the new “monopoly” we need to worry about.  But these fears are also overblown. Google faces threats today from many different providers and doesn’t really even have its act together in other areas. For example, Stross points out how Facebook and other social networking sites have been a real pain for Google. Facebook, in particular, is creating a massive walled garden that is largely outside Google’s search and information retrieval capabilities. “In a twinkling,” Stross argues, “Facebook became a miniature Web universe–behind a wall, inaccessible to Google.” (p. 30)  Meanwhile, in recent months, Google has annouced layoffs and has scuttled a variety of programs and projects which haven’t panned out, including experiments in social networking, virtual worlds, and a Twitter competitor.

But it is tomorrow’s providers and technologies that will pose the most serious challenge to Google’s current hegemony. No one can predict what big application(s) or competitor(s) will emerge next, but it all could happen faster than you think.  After all, let’s not forget that most of us hadn’t even conducted our first Google search 10 years ago, and no one considered Google a serious threat to Microsoft back in 1999.  Just a decade later, Google has Microsoft wondering if they have a future at all. Things can change that rapidly in the digital world and it should make us question the wisdom of government intervention into such a fast-moving field.

Moreover, government micromanagement of the services Google provides–especially search–is troubling to imagine. I don’t even want to think about how a DOJ consent decree would seek to control Google’s algorithm or the search business in general. But some critics are already speaking of “Googleopoly” and calling for a “Federal Search Commission,” foreshadowing the fight to come.  Google’s rapid growth and sheer size may end up tilting both policymakers and public opinion against them more and more in coming years as such “Googlephobia” increases. Stross notes that:

Google’s future will be determined to no small degree by the view that its users hold of the company itself. Google has enjoyed mostly favorable public notice in its first ten years, but maintaining a cuddly, anticorporate image when it stands among the U.S. companies with the largest market capitalization may pose an increasingly difficult challenge. (p. 18)

Indeed, Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” motto is already wearing a little thin in some quarters. And some of us still aren’t even sure what it means. As Google grows bigger and makes buckets more money in coming years–and they likely will–I think Stross is correct in arguing that Google’s honeymoon with the public and policymakers will likely come to an end. That doesn’t mean they won’t still be a great company doing great things, it’s just that they’ll be antagonizing even more competitors, lawmakers, and other groups than they already do today. And that will likely spell serious trouble for them. It’s never good to have so many enemies. Just ask Microsoft!

In the meantime, we shouldn’t lose sight of what an amazing capitalist success story Google has been and how lucky we are that they have been at least a little bit successful in their mission “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”  It’s an incredible story, and Planet Google is a fine early history of the company and the new era of computing it has ushered in.

My problem with what Nick Carr is saying about Wikipedia here — as well as in his book The Big Switch — is that he always seems to assume that Wikipedia constitutes the totality of most searches for information online. I suppose it does for some people, but I have a hard time accepting the argument that everyone’s search for enlightenment ends there, even if Wikipedia does rank high in many search results today.

For me, Wikipedia is just a launch pad; a great starting point in the search for truth. I take much of what I read on Wikipedia with a large grain of salt, however, because I know not every entry is as trustworthy as others, and entries could change at any moment. But that’s true of much of what one finds online!  If one adopts a sort of caveat emptor attitude toward Wikipedia, and then uses it to seek out truth from alternative sources found in each entry, or from other searches, then were is the harm?  Only if one could show that the search for truth ends with Wikipedia would I be as concerned as Carr and other Internet pessimists and Wikipedia critics (like Lee Siegel and Andrew Keen). But I just don’t believe that is the case.

Moreover, it is impossible for me to believe that we have fewer authoritative sources of information at our disposal today than we did in the past.  When I was growing up in the 1970s and attending a tiny school in the middle of a rural Indiana cornfield, my version of Wikipedia was named “Mrs. Flowers.” She was the nice little old lady who ran our school’s library. When I began at search for information back then, I would often ask Mrs. Flowers to help me work my way through the mysteries of the Dewey Decimal System to find whatever we had in stock at Winfield Elementary regarding astronauts and rockets (a particular boyhood obsession of mine). Our “search results” were pretty miserable. (I probably have more books in my basement right now than were in that school’s library!) We had Britannica on hand and would grab whatever we could there, and there was a book about the Mercury program and another about the moon landing, but there wasn’t much else. That  really was it. Our search was for enlightenment ended that quickly. No other books. No newspaper or magazine archives to search through (expect an incomplete set of National Geographic). No video or audio tapes. No computer software. Just nothing more.  Consequently, I think I checked out that same book about the Mercury program a dozen times before the 4th grade started.

Contrast that dismal state of affairs with the homework project I just helped my 1st grade daughter with, which required me to help her find out 3 interesting facts about Squanto. Did we stumble upon Wikipedia with our first Google search? Yep. Was that the end of it? Nope. There were 236,000 more search results for us to figure out how to sort through! So, I tried first jumping every 10 pages or so just to randomly see what else showed up, and then refined our search to see what other hits we could get. We spent over an hour just walking around cyberspace learning all sorts of fun facts about Squanto.

Nick Carr may have a different word for it, but I call this progress. And if he doesn’t like the fact that Wikipedia entries often come up first in most search results, than there’s an easy solution: Just skip those links and peruse the hundreds of thousands of hits that follow.

[Note: Tim has addressed similar Wikipedia criticsms here many times before, including Carr’s earlier rants about it.]

I used to have a (semi-crazy) uncle who typically began conversations with lame jokes or bad riddles. This sounds like one he might have used had he lived long enough: What do Thomas Jefferson, a moose, and cyberspace have in common?

The answer to that question can be found in a new book, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace, by David G. Post, a Professor of Law at Temple University. Post, who teaches IP and cyberspace law at Temple, is widely regarded as one of the intellectual fathers of the “Internet exceptionalist” school of thinking about cyberlaw.  Basically, Post sees this place we call “cyberspace” as something truly new, unique, and potentially worthy of some special consideration, or even somewhat different ground rules than we apply in meatspace. More on that in a bit.

[ Full disclosure: Post’s work was quite influential on my own thinking during the late 1990s, so much so that when I joined the Cato Institute in 2000, one of the first things I did was invite David to become an adjunct scholar with Cato. He graciously accepted and remains a Cato adjunct scholar today. Incidentally, Cato is hosting a book forum for him on February 4th that I encourage you to attend or watch online. Anyway, it’s always difficult to be perfectly objective when you know and admire someone, but I will try to do so here.]

Post’s book is essentially an extended love letter — to both cyberspace and Jefferson. Problem is, as Post even admits at the end, it’s tough to know which subject this book is suppose to teach us more about. The book loses focus at times — especially in the first 100 pages — as Post meanders between historical tidbits of Jefferson’s life and thinking and what it all means for cyberspace. But the early focus is on TJ.  Thus, those who pick up the book expecting to be immediately immersed in cyber-policy discussions may be a bit disappointed at first.  As a fellow Jefferson fanatic, however, I found all this history terrifically entertaining, whether it was the story of Jefferson’s Plow and his other agricultural inventions and insights, TJ’s unique interest in science (including cryptography), or that big moose of his.

OK, so what’s the deal with the moose? When TJ was serving as a minister to France in in the late 1780s, at considerable expense to himself, he had the complete skeleton, skin and horns of a massive American moose shipped to the lobby of his Paris hotel. Basically, Jefferson wanted to make a bold statement to his French hosts about this New World he came from and wake them up to the fact that some very exciting things were happening over there that they should be paying attention to. That’s one hell of way to make a statement!

Questions about Frontiers, Both Old and New

Now you see the connection to Post’s investigation into the state of cyberspace. Like Jefferson, Post is very excited about a new frontier and he wants to alert people to it. Importantly, however, Post isn’t at all ashamed to admit when he doesn’t understand why some things are the way they are in this new world.  And so Post begins asking questions — lots and lots of questions — to guide our investigation.

Thus, in much the same way that Jefferson penned Notes on the State of Virginia as guidebook for newcomers to the strange new world of his time, David Post has penned this slender volume as a guidebook to our modern cyber-frontier. If you’re looking for a book with concrete positions on all of cyberspace’s pressing policy problems, this book is not it. Instead, it is meant to help us frame the issues and questions properly and consider how this new frontier is unfolding in the early years of its existence. As Post puts it:

We are at the very beginning of what will become a centuries-long conversation about these questions, and my goal here was not to put anything to rest but to put everything in play, not to conclude any part of that conversation but to help you get started. We need, more than answers to today’s questions about law and policy on the network, new ways of thinking about the questions themselves, new vocabularies, new visions of the possible, new ways of identifying and organizing what we know and what we don’t know about the new place. (p. 209)

Post does a very nice job of giving us “new ways of thinking about questions” in his book. These questions generally fall into two categories.  First, Post wants to know why cyberspace works the way it does, or more profoundly, why it works at all. How did this little experiment with networking protocols turn into the most revolutionary global communications and information distribution system of modern times?  Second, Post wants to know “Who makes the rules ‘there’… and what should they be? What does the law look like there? How does it get made, and by whom? Who governs? By what means, and by what right?” (p. 4)

What Jefferson (and Hamilton) Can Teach Us

Post brings Jefferson into the story in the hope that TJ’s profound thinking on the issues of his time might help us getter a better handle on the cyber-controversies of our own time. After all, Jefferson was a man who spent much of his life thinking about uncharted subjects and frontiers. And law, of course!

Using this approach to help us explore cyberspace and cyberlaw works quite well in many cases. It works particularly well when Post brings TJ’s leading intellectual nemesis into the drama — Alexander Hamilton.  “Their feud the longest-running in American political history,” Post correctly notes, “for they stood on opposite shores of the great intellectual divide, a divide that encapsulates something fundamental in the way we think about society and government.” (p. 107). Jefferson desired liberty above all else; Hamilton stressed order and authority. Whereas Jefferson trusted decentralization and wanted diffuse communities making political decisions, Hamilton looked to a strong central authority to guide the nation.

Many modern cyberspace disputes, Post suggests, can be viewed through this same Jeffersonian vs. Hamiltonian philosophical dichotomy. Post continues:

Cyberspace is not the American West of 1787, of course. But like the American West of 1787, cyberspace is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian kind of place. Jeffersonians always predominate in new places, because new places attract people who find new places attractive and retell people who do not. […] Hamiltonians, though, inevitably make their way to Jeffersonian places (certainly once gold is discovered there!), claims of order and authority and power assert themselves, and struggles over the shape of the place begin in earnest. And like the West of 1787, cyberspace poses some hard questions, and could use some new ideas, about governance, and law, and order, and scale. The engineers have bequeathed to us a remarkable instrument, one that has managed to solve prodigious technical problems associated with communication on a global scale. The problem is the one that Jefferson and his contemporaries faced: How do you build “republican” institutions — institutions that respect the equal worth of all individuals and their right to participate in the formation of the rules under which they live — that scale? (p. 116-117)

Will Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian thinking prevail as this process unfolds? That remains to be seen, and although Post clearly falls in the Jeffersonian camp on these issues, he doesn’t really place odds on the outcome. Moreover, I would have liked to see Post offer a more full-throated defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism and Interent exceptionalism, or at least better explain to the reader how the debate between exceptionalism and unexceptionalism — or Jeffersonianism vs. Hamiltonianism — has progressed since the mid-1990s.

I think it’s clear that the cyber-Hamiltonians (i.e., the Internet unexceptionalists) are in the midst of a major “Empire Strikes Back” moment today as cyberspace is coming under increasing political pressure from many corners, and calls for more centralized authority abound — whether we are talking about domain name regulation, net neutrality mandates, speech controls, or whatever else. I just wish Post would have spent more time developing a “Return of the Jedi” defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism in this book.

Central Planning vs. Self-Governing Communities

Incidentally, Post has put forward such a defense elsewhere. Along with my former Cato colleague Wayne Crews, I co-edited a beefy book on Net governance issues back in 2003 entitled Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction. It contained some truly wonderful essays and they are all still quite relevant today. Jonathan Zittrain’s essay on “Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law” remains one of the best primers on the subject you can find. But the exchange about Internet governance between David Post and Jack Goldsmith in that book is really a classic Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian debate about cyberlaw. [You can read their chapters at the link above.]

In Jefferson’s Moose, Post comes closest to developing a fuller theory of Internet exceptionalism in his excellent chapter “Governing Cyberspace III: Law.” In that chapter, he takes the unexceptionalists to task for their troubling logic, which “leads inexorably to the conclusion that (just about) everything you do on the Web may be subject to (just about) everybody’s law.” (p. 167). Indeed, the unexceptionalist vision is quite a miserable one when you get right down to it; one that treats this new frontier as a plaything in an endless power struggle between competing political bodies. Meanwhile, as Post points out, the rule of law loses its meaning and becomes less about the consent of the governed and more like a game of “Jurisdictional Whack-a-Mole,” with countless “sovereigns” asserting authority and trying to beat cyberspace and digital denizens into submission in one way or another.

Because Post believes that the unexceptionalists are wrong in their assertion that the Internet is merely the “functional equivalent of mail, or telephone, or smoke signals,” he offers — but does not fully develop — an alternative framework based on Jefferson’s vision for how to settle the Western frontier: Give settlers maximum flexibility to create free, independent, self-governing communities. In Jefferson’s words, “an empire of liberty.. built not on conquest, but on principles of compact and equality.” And this empire of liberty would be, in Post’s words, “held together by consensual bonds and adherence to republican principles, not coercive power, an ever-expanding union of self-governing commonwealths joined together as peers.”

Now that is a beautiful vision for cyberspace!  And, in many ways, it partially explains why cyberspace has been such a special place — at least so far in its early history. But as more and more Hamiltonians assert the need for greater “order,” all that could change. Again, I wish Post would have put some more meat on the bones of his beautiful cyber-Jeffersonian framework to counter the increasing calls we hear for more cyber-Hamiltonianism.  Specifically, Post needs to better address the accusation made by the Digital Age Hamiltonians that Internet exceptionalism is little more than cyber-anarchism. In reality, Internet exceptionalism is essentially something akin to decentralized federalism for the Internet; a federalism that the Founders — or at least Jefferson — would have likely strongly supported.  As I wrote here recently, I like to think of Internet exceptionalism as a variation on Robert Nozick’s “utopia of utopias” vision of an ideal society: “a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others.” (Nozick, 1974)

Post begins a sketch of that Nozickian vision for cyberspace in Jefferson’s Moose, but he doesn’t really finish painting his masterpiece. To be fair, however, Post did make it clear right from the start of the book that it was going to be about asking the right questions, not necessarily providing all the answers.

Two Big Issues, Both Then and Now

Incidentally, using Jefferson as a guide to understanding modern cyberlaw controversies also works well when it comes to “the two issues [that] have been featured in virtually all of the Internet’s Big Cases” — free speech and intellectual property. As Post reminds us, Jefferson had a bit to say about those issues during his own lifetime.

“Jefferson was America’s first, and probably its greatest, First Amendment absolutist”  Post says, (p. 188), because Jefferson viewed free speech as part of a greater “interconnected whole”:

republican self-government, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and freedom of speech. You couldn’t have any without the others; they were inextricably bound together into a single system, and they would stand, or fall, together. (p. 189-190)

Consequently:

To a Jeffersonian, then, free speech questions are always simultaneously (a) of supreme importance and (b) pretty easy. The answer to free speech questions is always (or almost always) simple:  The more protection for, and the fewer the restrictions on, speech, the better. (p. 194)

And Jefferson held true to that principle throughout his life, most notably with his strenuous opposition to the horrendous Sedition Act of 1798.

But intellectual property is a far thornier issue — for both Jefferson and modern cyberlaw. Jefferson was a great inventor himself and keenly interested in the topic. But he also saw IP rights in a different light than speech rights.  Post explains Jefferson’s position:

Unlike free speech rights, intellectual property… cannot, in nature, be a subject of property; they do derive from the “social law,” from the laws of England, or Virginia, or whatever; they’re not antecedent to the law, but entirely dependent on it. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have intellectual property rights. It only means that we get to decide (and we have to decide) whether to have them or not, and how much of them to have. (p. 198) […] Intellectual property law in a Jeffersonian world, then, is always a matter of degree, of finding that balance, of drawing the line… Protection for intellectual property shouldn’t be too weak (or it won’t give creators enough of an incentive to create) or too strong (or it will choke off future creativity), but just right. We’ll never get it exactly right, but it is what we are always aiming for — in a Jeffersonian world, at least. (p. 201)

Of course, finding that “balance” is easier said than done and efforts to strike it engender even more controversy today in the digital world than they did during Jefferson’s time.

Conclusion

David Post has given us an enlightening map to help us navigate the new frontier of cyberspace and cyberlaw. I’m confident Jefferson’s Moose will be on my next end-of-year list of important tech policy books. And I hope my handful of small nitpicks here about the lack of details or answers regarding Post’s beautiful Jeffersonian vision for cyberspace will inspire him to pen yet another book on the subject! We need more friends of true cyber-freedom like David Post.

P.S. David Post is also the co-author of an outstanding treatise on cyberlaw with Patricia L. Bellia and Paul Schiff Berman: Cyberlaw: Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age. The text sits on top of my desk at all times, never far from reach when I need to a quick refresher on some arcane aspect of early Internet jurisprudence. A highly recommended resource.

Jerry Yang’s departure as Yahoo! CEO opens the door to a renewed bid by Microsoft to buy Yahoo!’s search business (or Yahoo! itself).  Such a merger could produce a significantly stronger challenger to Google in the search market.  With this possibility in mind, the WSJ just ran a fascinating history of the “paid search” business—the placement of “contextually targeted” ads next to search engine results based on the search terms that produced those results.

In a nutshell, Microsoft failed to see (back in 1998-2003) the enormous potential of paid search—just as small start-ups (such as Google) were starting to develop the technology and business model that today account for a $12+ billion/year industry, which is  twice the size of the display ad market and which supports a great deal of the online content and services we have all come to take for granted online.  Microsoft first put its toe in the water of paid search with a small-scale partnership with Goto.com in 1999-2000.  But this partnership failed because of internal resistance from the managers of Microsoft’s display-ad program.  In 2000, Google launched Adwords and thus began its transformation from start-up into economic colossus.  By 2002, Microsoft realized that it needed to catchup fast, and approached Goto.com (by then renamed Overture) about a takeover.  But Microsoft ultimately chose in 2003 not to buy the startup because  Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer “balked at Overture’s valuation of $1 billion to $2 billion, arguing that Microsoft could create the same service for less.” 

Microsoft, meanwhile, spent the next 18 months deploying hundreds of programmers to build a search engine and a search-ad service, which it code-named Moonshot. The company launched its search engine in late 2004 and its search-ad system in May 2006.

But Microsoft’s ad system came too late:

Advertisers applauded Moonshot for its technical innovation. But Microsoft had trouble coaxing people to migrate to its search engine from Google; advertisers were unwilling to spend large sums on MSN’s search ads. By building a new system instead of buying Overture, Mr. Mehdi says, “we really delayed our time to market.”

What’s most fascinating about the piece is that it seems to suggest that Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail.  The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete.  This dynamic was described brilliantly in Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s classic 1997 book The Innovator’s Dilemma:  When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail.  (Read chapter one here and Tim Lee’s recent discussion of the book here.)  

Whatever one thinks about the debate over whether antitrust intervention is necessary to restrain Google’s growth, I’m sure we’d all applaud the evolution of increased competition in the paid search market through market forces.  Let’s hope that Microsoft—as well as Yahoo!—have carefully studied the vast literature produced by business schools in the wake of Christensen’s book about how big companies can avoid the Innovator’s Dilemma by promoting—and capitalizing on—radical innovation from within.  Indeed, this seems to be precisely what has guided Google’s own strategy as it has grown from “disruptive innovator” to become the very sort of behemoth that cannot easily escape the Dilemma, even if corporate managers are fully aware of the problem on a theoretical level.  If Google can do it, Microsoft should be able to, too.  But let’s also not discount the possibility that, no matter how hard Google’s management might try to retain the innovative culture of a start-up, the giant  can’t do that well enough to prevent its own apparent market dominance from being disrupted by new upstart innovators in search and advertising technologies.  

The head of Google Research talked about some of these possibilities in July 2007 and the Google has recently covered other possibilities.  Here are my own bets—for what little they’re worth—as to what such “disruptors” might be:

• Semantic search and social search – whichever search engine masters these tools will likely dominate the market for search, and thus search advertising.
• Micro-payments to search users for using a search engine and discounts for clicking on ads – something Microsoft has pioneered with its Cashback system but which is probably still only in its infancy.
• Behavioral targeting that can make display ads competitive with search ads by making display ads as relevant to consumers as search ads (or even more so), rather than simply trying to target display ads based on the context of a page—which limits the economic value of the ad “display inventory” that websites try to fill with ads, especially for smaller websites in the Internet’s “long tail” whose subject matter might have little relevance to the keywords for products or services that are more highly valued by advertisers.  
• Technologies that allow contextual targeting of ads in or around videos based on the contents of the video (and associated discussion by viewers in comments). Even the imperfect ability to automatically create transcripts of a video, and then search for keywords, could hugely increased the value of advertising associated with video content.

I suspect we’d all be at least a little surprised if we could see what search engines—and online advertising—really looked like in, say, 2019.  But I won’t be terribly surprised if Google—for all its ingenuity—ends up making some of the same mistakes Microsoft made with Search 1.0 ( c. 1998-2005).

I’ve just finished reading Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness After the Digital Explosion, by Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis, and it’s another title worth adding to your tech policy reading list. The authors survey a broad swath of tech policy territory — privacy, search, encryption, free speech, copyright, spectrum policy — and provide the reader with a wonderful history and technology primer on each topic.

I like the approach and tone they use throughout the book. It is certainly something more than “Internet Policy for Dummies.” It’s more like “Internet Policy for the Educated Layman”: a nice mix of background, policy, and advice. I think Ray Lodato’s Slashdot review gets it generally right in noting that, “Each chapter will alternatively interest you and leave you appalled (and perhaps a little frightened). You will be given the insight to protect yourself a little better, and it provides background for intelligent discussions about the legalities that impact our use of technology.”

Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis aren’t really seeking to be polemical in this book by advancing a single thesis or worldview. To the extent the book’s chapters are guided by any central theme, it comes in the form of the “two basic morals about technology” they outline in Chapter 1:

The first is that information technology is inherently neither good nor bad — it can be used for good or ill, to free us or to shackle us. Second, new technology brings social change, and change comes with both risks and opportunities. All of us, and all of our public agencies and private institutions, have a say in whether technology will be used for good or ill and whether we will fall prey to its risks or prosper from the opportunities it creates. (p. 14)

Mostly, what they aim to show is that digital technology is reshaping society and, whether we like or it not, we better get used to it — and quick!  “The digital explosion is changing the world as much as printing once did — and some of the changes are catching us unaware, blowing to bits our assumptions about the way the world works… The explosion, and the social disruption that it will create, have barely begun.” (p 3)

In that sense, most chapters discuss how technology and technological change can be both a blessing and a curse, but the authors are generally more optimistic than pessimistic about the impact of the Net and digital technology on our society. What follows is a quick summary of some of the major issues covered in Blown to Bits.

Privacy: In the chapter on privacy, the authors conclude that it is increasingly difficult to bottle up our personal information and protect it and ourselves entirely from the outside world. “Despite the very best efforts, and the most sophisticated technologies, we can not control the spread of our private information. And we often want information to be made public to serve our own, or society’s purposes.” (p. 70) They argue that there still may be some ways to deal with the misuse of information and that some new technologies might be able to help protect our privacy at the margins. Generally speaking, however, this is a losing battle, and, more importantly, there is an increasing tension between privacy and freedom of speech:

A continuing border war is likely to be waged, however, along an existing free speech front: the line separating my right to tell the truth about you from your right not to have that information used against you. In the realm of privacy, the digital explosion has left matters deeply unsettled. (p. 70)

These are issues I discussed in more detail in my recent review of Daniel Solove’s important new book, Understanding Privacy. Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis are right to point out that these tensions are only going to increase in coming years and their chapter outlines many of the new fault lines in the debate over online privacy.

Encryption: Having followed the “crypto wars” closely in the mid-1990s, I also found their chapter on cryptography intriguing. The authors note that encryption has gone mainstream. “Keys are cheap. Secret messages are everywhere on the Internet. We are all cryptographers now.” Despite that, the authors note that “very little email is encrypted today.” With the exception of some human rights groups and some particularly privacy-sensitive users, most of us are perfectly content to send our e-mails unencrypted. They argue that there are three reasons most people are unconcerned about their e-mail privacy:

First, there is still little awareness of how easily our e-mail can be captured as the packets flow through the Internet. […] Second, there is little concern because most ordinary citizens feel they have little to hide, so why would anyone bother looking? […] Finally, encrypted email is not built into the Internet infrastructure in the way encrypted web browsing is. (p. 191-92)

They continue and conclude:

Overall, the public seems unconcerned about privacy of communication today, and that privacy fervor that permeated the crypto wars a decade ago is nowhere to be seen. In a very real sense, the dystopian predictions of both sides of that debate are being realized: On the one hand, encryption technology is readily available around the world, and people can hide the contents of their messages, just as law-enforcement feared… At the same time, the spread of the Internet has been accompanied by an increase in surveillance, just as the opponents of encryption regulation feared. (p. 193)

Actually, I’m not sure there really was a “privacy fervor that permeated the crypto wars a decade ago.” Many of us who argued passionately for crypto-freedom back then knew it was unlikely that the masses were going to rush right out and start encrypting all their mail the minute the policy battle ended. In reality, most of us live pretty mundane lives and just don’t care enough to go through the hassle of encrypting the random chatter of e-mail. But it was the principle of the matter that counted — the government should never be given the keys to unlock all private communications. That is what we were fighting about in the crypto wars — not the necessity of everyone encyrpting every e-mail they sent.

Importantly, however, the authors correctly note how the truly beneficial result of the fight for crypto-freedom was an explosion of online commerce, facilitated by behind-the-scenes crypto protecting our transactions. Amazon, eBay, and many other e-commerce vendors, both big and small, have prospered because of strong crypto. That was the security blanket many of us needed before we were willing to take the plunge and begin doing most of our shopping and financial transactions online. This is a great public policy success story, and Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis do a wonderful job relaying it to the reader.

Online Free Speech / Age Verification: As a passionate First Amendment advocate, the chapter on free speech issues was also of great interest to me. The authors run through the early history of efforts to censor online speech, including the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) and the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 (COPA), and bring us right up to speed with congressional efforts such as the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which would ban social networking sites and services in publicly funded schools and libraries. “DOPA, which has not passed into law, is the latest battle in a long war between conflicting values,” note the authors. “On the one hand, society has an interest in keeping unwanted information away from children. On the other hand, society as a whole has an interest in maximizing open communication.” (p. 231)

Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis go on to outline the dangers of online censorship and the importance of defending the First Amendment from new legislative and regulatory attacks, but they would have done well to cite the growing diversity of parental control tools and methods that are now on the market. I share their passion for defending free speech values, but it is equally important we work hard to show parents and policymakers how many effective self-help tools and strategies are out there on the market today to help them guide — or even control — their child’s media and Internet experiences. Not everyone is equally excited about what a world of media abundance offers us, or out children. If we hope to continue to fend off attacks on the First Amendment, we have to make sure parents are empowered to mentor their kids and limit access to content they find objectionable so they don’t expect Uncle Sam to play the role of national nanny.

I was glad to see the authors spend some time focusing on online age verification / identity authentication since that is probably the most important free speech debate raging today. [I’ve written quite a bit here about the battle over online age verification for social networking sites and other online sites.] The authors point out Congress already attempted to impose age verification on the Internet when they passed the Child Online Protection Act in 1998. “The big problem,” the authors note, “was that these methods either didn’t work or didn’t even exist.” (p. 248) Indeed, the effort in COPA to require “adult personal identification numbers” or a “digital certificate that verifies age” was in their words, “basically a plea from Congress for the industry to come up with some technical magic for determining age at a distance.” (p. 248)  And things really haven’t advanced much since then, they argue:

In the state-of-the-art, however, computers can’t reliably tell the if party on the other end of the communications link is a human or is another computer. For a computer to tell whether a human is over or under the age of 17, even imperfectly, would be very hard indeed. Mischievous 15-year-olds could get around any simple screening system that could be used in the home. The Internet just isn’t like a magazine store. (p. 249)

I hope policymakers are listening — especially the many stubborn state attorneys general who continue to push age verification as a silver-bullet solution to online child safety concerns.

Spectrum Policy: The authors point out how the death of media scarcity has profound implications for the future of speech regulation and spectrum policy alike. “As a society,” they argue, “we simply have to confront the reality that our mindset about radio and television is wrong. It has been shaped by decades of the scarcity argument.” (p. 292)  Regarding what it means for speech controls, they note:

If almost anyone can now send information that many people can receive, perhaps the government’s interest in restricting transmissions should be less than what it once was, not greater. In the absence of scarcity, perhaps the government should have no more authority over what gets said on radio and TV than it does over what gets printed in newspapers. (p. 261)

I couldn’t agree more, and I’ve written voluminously on the topic of creating a “consistent First Amendment standard for the Information Age.” Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis seem to agree with what I said there when they argue:

Other regulation of broadcast words and images should end. Its legal foundation survives no longer in the newly engineered world of information. There are too many ways for the information to reach us. We need to take responsibility for what we see, and what our children are allowed to see. And they must be educated to live in a world of information plenty. (p. 293)

The death of the scarcity doctrine should also have a profound impact on the future spectrum policy decisions, they say. Perhaps scarcity-based rationales for regulation made (some) sense in the past, but:

These were facts of the technology of the time. They were true, but they were contingent truths of engineering. They were never universal laws of physics, and are no longer limitations of technology. Because of engineering innovations over the past 20 years, there is no practically significant “natural limitation” on the number of broadcast stations. Arguments from inevitable scarcity can no longer justify U.S. government denials of the use of the airwaves. The vast regulatory infrastructure, built to rationalize use of the spectrum but much more limited radio technology, has adjusted slowly — as it almost inevitably must: Bureaucracies don’t move as quickly as technological innovators. The FCC tries to anticipate resource needs centrally and far in advance. But technology can cause abrupt changes in supply, and market forces can cause abrupt changes in demand. Central planning works no better for the FCC than it did for the Soviet Union. (p. 272)

I completely agree, although challenging questions remain about how to get us out of the current mess. Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis argue that “commons-based” approaches make the most sense. I am certainly open to the idea of treating certain swaths of spectrum as a commons, but it’s important to recognize that this does not necessarily get the regulators completely out of the picture. In fact, as my TLF colleague Jerry Brito has persuasively argued, there is the real potential that the FCC could become an aggressive device regulator if we switch to this approach. “A ‘commons’ model is not a third way between regulation and property, it is just another kind of regulation,” Brito concludes. That’s why I continue to believe that a property rights-based approach for most spectrum allocation makes the most sense and will get the spectrum deployed for its most highly-valued use. Commons-based approaches should supplement, not supplant, that model.

Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis also fail to sweat the details about how to handle the issue of incumbent spectrum users in the transition to their preferred commons-based model. That strikes me as a pretty big problem. They repeatedly mention how incumbents often seek to block beneficial spectrum reforms — which is no doubt true on some occasions — but that doesn’t mean incumbent spectrum holders don’t have legitimate rights in their existing allocations that should be honored. I would hope that, even if they wanted to go with a pure commons approach going forward, the authors would at least be willing to grandfather-in existing spectrum users. If the goal is to encourage them to vacate what they currently have, incentivize them with flexible use and resale rights. For example, for the right price, a lot of broadcast spectrum holders might be willing to give up their current allotment. Alternatively, if flexible use was allowed, they might deploy their spectrum for a different purpose. Unfortunately, both of these options are currently prohibited by the FCC’s command-and-control regulatory system.

Overall, however, I enjoyed the spectrum chapter and found the history and technology primer in this chapter to be the best in the book.

Copyright: The authors have a strongly-worded chapter on copyright that generally argues for relaxing copyright protections. Interestingly, however, (unless I am missing something) I notice they don’t offer their book for free download on their site.  I’m always intrigued by copyright critics who refuse to put their own content online. Apparently, it’s another case of ‘copying is good for me, but not for thee.’ Regardless, in their copyright chapter, they argue that:

The war over copyright and the Internet has been escalating for more than 15 years. It is a spiral of more and more technology that makes it ever easier for more and more people to share more and more information. This explosion is countered by a legislative response that brings more and more acts within the scope of copyright enforcement, subject to punishments that grow ever more severe. Regulation tries to keep pace by banning technology, sometimes even before the technology exists… If we cannot slow the arms race, tomorrow’s casualties may come to include the open Internet and dynamic of innovation that fuels the information revolution. (p. 199)

The authors make a fair point about the perils of banning technologies to protect copyright. That’s never the right answer. Regrettably, however, they pay less attention to what I regard as the legitimate concerns of copyright holders about how to protect their creative works and expressive endeavors going forward. And it’s not just about protecting large-scale industries, as they and other copyright critics are often prone to claim. It’s about whether or not we want a workable copyright system going forward. Of course, some critics wouldn’t mind seeing copyright law fade into the sunset altogether. But Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis don’t really make it clear how far they’d be willing to go. They do have a brief discussion about collective licensing approaches as a possible solution, which may be coming sooner than we think for the Net. Unfortunately, they don’t spend much time developing the details. I remain skeptical about the sensibility of that approach — especially since it will likely end up being compulsory in nature and fraught with fairness problems (i.e. Who pays in? How much? On the other end, who gets paid how much when their content appears online? etc.) Nonetheless, I think that’s where we’ll end up before the copyright wars are over, so it would have been nice to see the authors spend more time on collective licensing issues.

They also spend a lot of time discussing DRM. I was surprised by their comment that, “Developers of DRM and trusted platforms may be creating effective technologies to control the use of information, but no one has yet devised effective methods to circumscribe the limits of that control.” (p. 212) I must say, that does not seem to match up with the reality of the market we see around us today in which DRM systems are rapidly crumbling and being abandoned left and right.

Conclusion

I didn’t agree with everything in Blown to Bits, such as their unfortunate call for Net neutrality regulation. Overall, however, I enjoyed the book and recommend it. The narrative can be a little disjointed at times, almost sounding like a series of e-mail exchanges between friends (which may have been the case since the book had three authors). But the text is very accessible and contains a great deal of useful information to bring you up to speed on the hottest tech policy debates under the sun. If the authors are smart, they’ll throw the book online and update it periodically to keep it fresh. As I have found with my parental controls and Media Metrics reports, that’s the only way to keep up with the frantic pace of change in the tech policy arena — version your books like software and release periodic updates.

This book will definitely appear on my big, end-of-year “Most Important Tech Policy Books of 2008” list, which I should have wrapped up shortly. Also, I think this book makes a nice complement to Palfrey and Gasser’s Born Digital, which I reviewed here last month. And, if you are interested in another title that takes an approach similar to what Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis have taken here, you might want to check out Bruce Owen’s outstanding 1999 book “The Internet Challenge to Television.” It’s an oldy but a goodie, as I noted here.

Finally, given the title of the book and the countless times in the text that Abelson, Ledeen, and Lewis talk about the “bits revolution,” how “bits are bits,” and how “bits behave strangely,” shockingly, they never seem to get around to crediting Nicholas Negroponte for his pioneering work on this front in Being Digital. Long before anybody else gave a damn about how the movement from a world of atoms to a world bits would change our entire existence, Nicholas Negroponte was preaching that gospel to the unconverted. And considering he was saying all that back in the dark (dial-up) ages of 1995, the man deserves some credit, as I have noted here before.

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

As we noted in our intro to this ongoing series, Google’s tenth anniversary has passed with Googlephobia reaching new heights of hysteria.

But is Google really too big and dangerous, or are people just too lazy to find other alternatives to each of the wonderful services that Google offers?  If one is truly paranoid about the firm’s supposed dominance, it doesn’t take much effort to live a Google-free life. To prove it, we set out to find alternatives to each of the services that Google provides.  After awhile, we got a little tired of compiling alternatives in each category and just provided links for the additional choices at your disposal.  It’s tough to see what the fuss is about with the cornucopia of choices at our disposal.  If you don’t like Google, then just don’t use it or any of its services.  The choice is yours.

In each case, we’ve listed Google first, even though Google may not be the market leader ( e.g., Google’s relatively unknown social network Orkut).

Search Engines

• Google
• Microsoft Live Search
• Yahoo!
• Ask.com
• AltaVista
• Cuil
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_search_engines

eMail

• Google Gmail
• MSN Hotmail
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• Yahoo!
• AOL
• others: www.emailaddresses.com/email_web.htm

Encyclopedia

• Knol (Google)
• Wikipedia
• Citizendium
• Microsoft Encarta
• Britannica Online
• World Book Online
• others: www.surfnetkids.com/encyclopedia.htm

Instant Messaging

• Google Talk
• Yahoo Messenger
• Windows Live Messenger (Microsoft)
• AOL AIM
• Jabber
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant_messaging#User_base

Web Browsers

• Chrome (Google)
• Firefox (Mozilla Foundation)
• Internet Explorer (Microsoft)
• Safari (Apple)
• Opera
• Flock
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_web_browsers

Social Networks

• Orkut (Google) – (not popular in the U.S.)
• Facebook
• Myspace
• Bebo
• LinkedIn
• Friendster
• LiveJournal
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Social_network_service

Mapping

• Google Maps
• Microsoft Live Search Maps
• MapQuest
• WikiMapia
• Google Earth
• Virtual Earth (Microsoft)
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_online_map_services

Mobile Search / Portal Services

• Google mobile
• Yahoo! mobile
• Microsoft Windows mobile & Mobile Live Search
• AOL Mobile

Video Hosting

• YouTube (Google)
• Google Video
• Flickr (Yahoo!)
• Yahoo Video
• Vimeo
• Photobucket
• BlipTV
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video_sharing_websites

Photohosting

• Picasa (Google)
• Flickr (Yahoo!)
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• Photobucket
• Snapfish
• Shutterfly
• Imageshack
• AOL Pictures
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photo_sharing#Online_photo_sharing_websites

Document / Spreadsheet Creation

• Google Docs
• Microsoft Office
• OpenOffice
• ThinkFree Office
• EditGrid
• NumSum
• Zoho Sheet
• Zoho Writer
• ajaxWrite
• Glide Write
• others: www.editgrid.com/user/siulung/Web-based_Spreadsheets_Comparison_Matrix

Online File Storage

• Google Docs
• Windows Live SkyDrive (Microsoft)
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• Mozy
• Buzzword (Adobe)
• Xdrive
• Box.net
• others: http://www.listible.com/list/online-file-storage

Blog hosting services

• Blogger (Google)
• Wordpress
• Windows Live Spaces (Microsoft)
• Skyrock (based in France, but bigger than WordPress and almost as big as Blogger)
• LiveJournal
• Note: many social networking services also have a blogging component
• others: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog_hosting_service#Developer-hosted

RSS blog feed aggregators

• Google Reader
• My MSN
• My Yahoo!
• NewsGator Online
• Bloglines
• FeedBucket
• others: dmoz.org/Computers/Software/Internet/Clients/WWW/Feed_Readers/Web_Based
• others: www.newsonfeeds.com/faq/aggregators

WebClipping Services

• Google Notebook
• Digg
• Del.icio.us (Yahoo)
• Reddit
• Clipmarks
• Zotero
• WebResearch
• ScrapBook
• Diigo

News Aggregators

• Google News
• Yahoo News
• MSN News & MSNBC (Microsoft)
• News Directory.com
• Reuters
• CNN.com
• Digg
• Topix
• others: news.nettop20.com
• others: newsonfeeds.com/faq/aggregators

Calendar Services

• Google Calendar
• Microsoft Outlook
• Lotus Notes
• Lightning/Sunbird (Mozilla Foundation)
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• others: www.calendarzone.com

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer as part of an ongoing series

With Google celebrating its 10th anniversary this week, many panicky pundits are using the occasion to claim that Google has become the Great “Satan” of the Internet.  Nick Carr wonders what the future holds for “The OmniGoogle.” The normally level-headed Mike Malone worries that Google is “turning into Big Brother.”  And Washington Post’s Rob Dubbin says that he can’t escape Google’s “tentacles,” even for just 24 hours.  Meanwhile, speculation abounds that the Justice Department is preparing a major antitrust lawsuit against Google concerning its advertising partnership with Yahoo! or perhaps even a broader suit concerning Google’s “dominance” of online advertising generally.

Carr quotes Google co-founder Sergey Brin’s now-famous 2003 interview:

I think people tend to exaggerate Google’s significance in both directions.  Some say Google is God.  Others say Google is Satan.  But if they think Google is too powerful, remember that with search engines, unlike other companies, all it takes is a single click to go to another search engine. People come to Google because they choose to.  We don’t trick them.

In the last five years, Google has become far more than just a search engine.  As Google’s suite of suite of complementary products continues to grow, so too does the specter of Google as an all-knowing and therefore all-powerful economic colossus.  Yet Google isn’t even close to being the sort of nefarious monopolist out to destroy user privacy at every turn, as some seem to imply—if not exclaim.  Indeed, in our view, the Net is overall a far better place because of the existence of Google and the many free services it provides consumers.

Our point is not that Google should be immune from criticism.  Indeed, healthy criticism of corporate actions plays a vital role in the free market by disciplining corporate policies and behavior—often thus providing an effective alternative to government regulation.  This is particularly important in the area of consumer privacy protection, as demonstrated by Google’s quick response to public concern about its Chrome EULA.

We hold no brief for Google and our aim is not to be Google apologists.  In fact, we’ve had more than a few run-ins with Google on many important policy issues in the past ( e.g., on net neutrality, spectrum policy, and the need for “baseline Federal privacy legislation”) and will likely continue to do so in the future.  We are always willing to engage serious, rational discussions about other policy issues involving Google, such as concerns about its alleged market power, but it seems to us that the hysteria about Google’s supposed dominance of the Internet is clouding rational discussion of the policy issues raised by Google, its innovations and its success.  Indeed, the creeping paranoia about all things Google-related that is most evident throughout the blogosphere (but that reaches far beyond it) has produced an environment that resembles nothing so much as a lynch mob:  Angry, short-tempered, out for corporate blood, and unwilling to engage in reasoned discussion.

The specter of Google’s market power driving—and confusing—so many of today’s Internet policy debates is reminiscent of the previous generation of conspiracy theories about how Microsoft, like the Borg (perhaps sci-fi’s scariest villains), would assimilate all in its path—forever controlling the digital revolution.  We don’t want Google to become the victim of the same regulatory & antitrust ordeal that Microsoft has endured over the past decade, with the kind of hysterical claims of Chicken Little-ism that drove a ten-year crusade against Microsoft.  Short-sighted, heavy-handed government intervention can cripple a creative company while doing little to actually benefit consumers because regulators cannot keep pace with technological change—perhaps the only constant fact in the every-changing digital world.

Of course, like all temporal things, Microsoft’s seemingly permanent “monopoly” has faded, and the bulk of the criticism it once faced has shifted focus to Google.  Microsoft continues to be the subject of many unfair attacks because of its success (a/k/a “dominance”) in the OS, office product, and browser markets.  Other companies have experienced similar attacks on a smaller scale:  Facebook and the once-angelic Apple have both been subject to increasing criticism for their success in certain sectors of the digital economy, customer complaints about openness ( e.g., “locked” devices or portability of social networking data) and privacy policies.  The hysteria surrounding Google is not unique in kind, yet it is clear that the mantle of “Great (digital) Satan” has clearly passed from Microsoft to Google.

Thus, we have decided to start a new series of essays on “Googlephobia” (a term that seems to have taken off in the spring of 2005, when the French government seriously proposed creating its own alternative to the Google search engine).  We’ve already penned a few essays on the topic here (as have a number of our TLF colleagues) and, therefore, our next installment in the series will be #5—in which we will outline the many competitors to Google’s many products.

But here are a few of our past essays on the topic, which clearly belong on the list even though they weren’t part of a series at the time:

• Market Forces At Work: The PR Backlash Against Google Chrome’s EULA, by Berin Szoka, September 4, 2008.
• “Cry [Censorship] and Let Slip the Dogs of [Regulation]!” – A Lesson in the Dangers of Googlephobia, by Berin Szoka, July 14, 2008.
• Google, California’s Privacy Policy Law & Our Sci-Fi Future, by Berin Szoka, June 4, 2008
• Is Google Evil? The Never-Ending Search for High-Tech Villainy, by Adam Thierer, June 30, 2005.

And here’s an oldie on the same topic:

• “Google as a Public Utility? No Results in This Search for Monopoly,” by Adam Thierer and Wayne Crews, November 14, 2003.

Over at Ars, Ben Kuchera has a review of Ask.com’s redesign of its web portal for kids, AskKids.com. It’s a great new addition to the growing list of safe seach tools and web portals geared toward younger surfers.

I’m also a big fan of KidZui, the new browser for kids that provides access to over 800,000 kid-friendly websites, videos, and pictures that have been pre-screened by over 200 trained teachers and parents. The company employs a rigorous 5-step “content selection process” to determine if it is acceptable for kids between 3-12 years of age. My kids, both under the age of 7, just love it, but I can’t see many kids older than 10 enjoying it because it is mostly geared toward the youngest web surfers.

Last year, as part of my 10-part series coinciding with “Internet Safety Month,” I wrote about the market for safe search tools and web portals for kids. I generally divide these sites and services into two groups:

(1) “Safe Search” Tools and Portals for Kids (2) Child- and Teen-Oriented Websites

Below I will describe each group and list the many sites and services currently available. I encourage readers to offer additional suggestions for sites that belong on the list. (I keep a running list of these sites and services in my book, “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.”)

(1) “Safe Search” Tools and Portals for Kids: These sites help direct children to sites and information that are educational and enriching. Most major search engine providers offer “safe search” tools that provide filtered search results.

ALA’s Great Web Sites for Kids ( www.ala.org/greatsites)

AOL for Kids (U.S.) (http://kids.aol.com)

AOL for Kids (Canada) (http://canada.aol.com/aolforkids)

Ask Kids (www.askkids.com)

Awesome Library for Kids (www.awesomelibrary.org)

Diddabdoo ( www.dibdabdoo.com)

Education World ( www.education-world.com)

Fact Monster ( www.factmonster.com)

FirstGov for Kids ( www.kids.gov)

KidsClick (www.kidsclick.org)

Kid Zui (www.kidzui.com)

Noodle Net (www.noodlenet.com)

NetTrekker (www.nettrekker.com)

SearchEdu.com ( www.searchedu.com)

Surfing the Net with Kids (www.surfnetkids.com)

Surf Safely.com (www.surfsafely.com)

TekMom’s Search Tools for Students ( www.tekmom.com/search)

ThinkQuest Library ( www.thinkquest.org/library)

Yahoo! Kids (http://kids.yahoo.com)

(2) Child- and Teen-Oriented Websites: The child-friendly web portals discussed above generally direct children to informational and educational sites and resources. But there exist many other ways to tailor the web-surfing experience to a family’s specific needs and values. The Internet is full of wonderful sites dedicated to kids and teens. Many have an educational focus, whereas others offer enjoyable games and activities for children. Table 2 highlights some of the best of these websites, but this list just scratches the surface. If parents wanted, they could configure their web browsers to access only sites such as these and then block access to all other webpages.

Table 2: Child- and Teen-Oriented Websites

Candy Stand (www.candystand.com)

Clever Island (www.cleverisland.com)

Club Penguin (www.clubpenguin.com)

Disney’s Club Blast (http://disney.go.com/blast)

Disney’s DGamer (http://disney.go.com/dxd2/index.html?channel=68447)

Disney’s Playhouse (http://disney.go.com/playhouse/today/index.html)

Disney Toontown Online (http://play.toontown.com)

Habbo (www.habbo.com)

HBO Family XE “ HBO Family” Games (www.hbofamily.com/games)

Imbee (www.imbee.com)

Iland5 (www.iland5.com)

JuniorNet (www.juniornet.com)

Kaboose Family Network (www.kaboose.com)

Kaboose FunSchool (http://funschool.kaboose.com)

KidsClick (www.kidsclick.org)

KidsFirst (www.kidsfirst.org)

Microsoft At School (www.microsoft.com/education/atschool.mspx)

Net Smartz Kids (www.netsmartzkids.org)

Nickelodeon Games (www.nick.com/games)

Nick Jr. Games (www.nickjr.com)

Nicktropolis (www.nicktropolis.com)

Noggin XE “ Noggin” Games (www.noggin.com/games)

PBS Kids (http://pbskids.org/go)

Surfing the Net with Kids (www.surfnetkids.com)

Webkinz (www.webkinz.com)

Yahoo! Kids (http://kids.yahoo.com)

YoKidsYo (www.yokidsyo.com)

Zeeks (www.zeeks.com)

ZoeysRoom.com (www.zoeysroom.com)

Zoey’s Room and Club Penguin are two of the most popular of these sites. Here’s some screenshots:

Again, please let me know if you have suggested updates to these lists.

Declan has got it exactly right here in commenting about the antitrust circus taking place between Google and Microsoft right now as the rhetorical war between them heats up and the feds—both in Congress and at the DOJ—get more and more involved in monitoring this market:

The underlying problem is that antitrust law is so malleable that it can be bent into virtually any shape that its practitioners desire. Given nearly any set of hard-nose business practices, some economist can be hired to claim that “predatory” prices are illegally low (hurting competitors) or illegally high (hurting consumers). No wonder Lester Thurow, the former dean of MIT’s business school, concluded that “the time has come to recognize that the antitrust approach has been a failure. The costs it imposes far exceed any benefits it brings.” And no wonder that some state attorneys general are now sniffing around to see if there’s a way for them to join the antitrust hunt.

And things are only going to get worse–far, far worse–in coming months.