I’ve been commenting on yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox, and criticizing the logic of the majority’s decision the case, which was driven solely by procedural / admin law considerations. [See Part 3.]  I also discussed Justice Thomas’s very interesting concurring opinion, which took a serious look at the constitutional issues in play here and signaled his willingness to potentially overturn Red Lion and Pacifica. [See Part 4.]  In this fifth installment, I will briefly outline some of the dissenting arguments.

Justice Stephen Breyer penned a lengthy dissent and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.  Like the Scalia majority decision, the Breyer dissent also focused on the procedural / APA-related issues at stake in the case.  Breyer, however, was not buying the FCC’s assertion that it had adequately justified its significant expansion of indecency enforcement in recent years.  Whereas the majority deferred to the agency and found “no basis in the Act or this Court’s opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review,” the four dissenting justices saw things quite differently.  Breyer noted that while the “law grants those in charge of independent administrative agencies broad authority to determine relevant policy,” it “does not permit them to make policy choices for purely political reasons nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences.”  He goes on to appropriately note that:

Federal Communications Commissioners have fixed terms of office; they are not directly responsible to the voters; and they enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from “‘the exercise of political oversight.’” [citations omitted] That insulation helps to secure important governmental objectives, such as the constitutionally related objective of maintaining broadcast regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds. But that agency’s comparative freedom from ballot-box control makes it all the more important that courts review its decision making to assure compliance with applicable provisions of the law — including law requiring that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.

Breyer goes on to restate much of what is already clear from the APA and all that surrounds it. “[A]n agency must act consistently. The agency must follow its own rules,” he notes.  Moreover: 

“The law has also recognized that it is not so much a particular set of substantive commands but rather it is a process, a process of learning through reasoned argument, that is the antithesis of the “arbitrary.” This means agencies must follow a “logical and rational” decisionmaking “process.”

Finally, while admitting that agencies have generally been granted “generous leeway” to establish new policies, “this leeway is not absolute,” Breyer notes.  Breyer then finds that the FCC did not measure up to these standards when crafting and announcing changes to its indecency enforcement policies.  I will spare you all the details which you can read for yourself, but I think Breyer makes a very solid case that that the agency over-stepped its bounds and acted in a way that was “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion.”  Alas, Breyer could not find one more vote to make that the majority holding in this case.

Incidentally, in separate dissents, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens had some feisty things to say about the FCC’s actions and the majority decision.  Justice Ginsburg appropriately noted that “there is no way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the Commission has done. Today’s decision does nothing to diminish that shadow.”  On the question of the continuing wisdom of the Pacifica decision, which Justice Thomas hinted he was ready to revisit and potentially overturn, Justice Ginsburg had this to say:

The Pacifica decision, however it might fare on reassessment, was tightly cabined, and for good reason. In dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the Government should take care before enjoining the broadcast of words or expressions spoken by many “in our land of cultural pluralism.” 438 U. S., at 775.  That comment, fitting in the 1970’s, is even more potent today.  If the reserved constitutional question reaches this Court, see ante, at 26 (majority opinion), we should be mindful that words unpalatable to some may be “commonplace” for others, “the stuff of everyday conversations.” 438 U. S., at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

What a strange world we live in when Justices Ginsburg and Thomas are jointly leading a First Amendment revolution!

Finally, in his separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued that, “The FCC’s shifting and impermissibly vague indecency policy only imperils these broadcasters and muddles the regulatory landscape. It therefore makes eminent sense to require the Commission to justify why its prior policy is no longer sound before allowing it to change course.”  He goes on to discuss semantic issues and the dangers of allowing the government to regulate speech and determine the context in which it is appropriate and when it is not.  It makes for some very entertaining reading that you just don’t see every day in a Supreme Court decision.  He states:

There is a critical distinction between the use of an expletive to describe a sexual or excretory function and the use of such a word for an entirely different purpose, such as to express an emotion. One rests at the core of indecency; the other stands miles apart. As any golfer who has watched his partner shank a short approach knows, it would be absurd to accept the suggestion that the resultant four-letter word uttered on the golf course describes sex or excrement and is therefore indecent. But that is the absurdity the FCC has embraced in its new approach to indecency.

Having spent many frustrating hours on the links attempting to master the (inappropriately-named) “gentleman’s game,” I can vouch for the level of vulgarity uttered during seemingly all moments of play, and I certainly can’t remember anyone thinking that sexual or excretory functions where the subject of discussion.  Anyway, Justice Stevens goes on to conclude that:

Even if the words that concern the Court in this case sometimes retain their sexual or excretory meaning, there are surely countless instances in which they are used in a manner unrelated to their origin. These words may not be polite, but that does not mean they are necessarily “indecent” under §1464.  By improperly equating the two, the Commission has adopted an interpretation of “indecency” that bears no resemblance to what Pacifica contemplated. Most distressingly, the Commission appears to be entirely unaware of this fact, see Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd., at 13308 (erroneously referencing Pacifica in support of its new policy), and today’s majority seems untroubled by this significant oversight. Because the FCC has failed to demonstrate an awareness that it has ventured far beyond Pacifica’s reading of §1464, its policy choice must be declared arbitrary and set aside as unlawful.

Again, regrettably, this logic did not carry the day.

Breaking news: The Supreme Court as just ruled in the important First Amendment case of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations and held in the government’s favor by a 5-4 vote. Decision is here.

My background info about the case is here and will publish some essays throughout the day as I digest the decision. Importantly, the case was decided squarely on procedural grounds, not constitutional grounds. However, Justice Thomas has some very important and interesting things to say about those constitutional issues in his separate concurrence. Coverage from AP, Reuters, and UPI.

The full decision can be viewed below in a Scribd reader:

[Supreme Court Decision] FCC v. Fox 07-582 http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=14715905&access_key=key-21fh1qa1sk7qthfi40is&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Anthony Prestia of Laws of Play, a blog dedicated to covering legal developments in the gaming industry, somehow got some face time with Supreme Court Justice Scalia and was able to ask for his feelings concerning the constitutionality of recent state video game legislation. “In particular,” Prestia says, “I asked him whether as an originalist he believed that state laws banning the sale of mature-rated video games to minors ran afoul of the First Amendment.” Here’s Prestia’s summary and analysis of Scalia’s answer:

In his most succinct reply of the day, Justice Scalia replied that he did believe such legislation was constitutional. He began by explaining his belief that sound constitutional precedent holds that minors may be subjected to prohibitions that adults are not–-he instantly drew the parallel to regulation of pornography sales. However, Justice Scalia emphasized that unprotected speech, such as obscenity–which he was unwilling to define for reasons that are immediately evident to any constitutional scholar–-can be prohibited from sale regardless of the purchaser’s age. I think the important thing to note here is that Justice Scalia did not suggest that violent and/or sexual content in games rises to the level of unprotected speech. In fact, he did not even suggest that video games themselves are not protected by the First Amendment despite his strict originalist beliefs.

That’s an interesting response in that Scalia’s latter comments imply that even older, more conservative judges are coming around to understanding how video games are a form of artistic expression deserving the protection of the First Amendment. But Scalia’s earlier suggestion that state laws banning sales of certain video games to minors maybe constitutional deserves a response.

Scalia is certainly correct that states have passed laws banning the sale of pornographic material to minors, but their are two important differences between those bans and a ban on the sale of video games to children. One is obvious: No video game has ever been defined as “obscene to minors.” Now, it may be the case that some game will be defined as such in the future. But for now, the primary concern about video games to sales has related to the violence in video games, not the sexual content. And violence has never been equated with obscenity, although Kevin W. Saunders of Michigan State University has been making the argument for many years that the two should be equated in an effort to ban violent video game sales. And there are others who agree with him. But no legislature or court has yet agreed with that reasoning. So, that’s the first difference that Scalia ignores.

The second difference Scalia ignores is the mechanism of controlling the sale of video games to children. Every legislature that has so far sought to regulate the sale of video games has proposed that the bans been linked to the sale of games rated a certain way by the game industry’s private rating body, the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB). And every one of those measures has been struck down by the courts as unconstitutional. One of the reasons the laws have been overturned is because other court precedents have held that the state may not give a private, voluntary rating system the force of law.

Again, when state governments regulate obscenity, they are not doing so by co-opting some private industry rating system. In the case of video games, however, the states would seek to use “AO” (Adults Only) or even “M” (Mature) ratings that were assigned by the ESRB as the trigger for the law to kick in. That’s generally been forbidden by the courts when some states in the 1970s and 80s sought to use the movie industry’s private rating system (the MPAA system) to regulate or ban the showing of certain movies or their sale. The reason the courts have blocked such enactments is not just because it would be misguided to allow a private labeling code to become a tool of public censorship. The other reason is actually more compelling: As I pointed out in my big PFF study on video game regulation, if a state sought to use a voluntary rating system to ban certain types of content, it would likely kill voluntary rating systems:

why would game developers continue to voluntarily rate their content if the threat of fines or prosecution looms overhead? Fearing such liability, there is a real risk that many in the industry would likely stop rating games altogether since there would be no penalty for refusing to label content. If this were to occur, parents and all game consumers would lose valuable information about the age appropriateness and content of the games that they are thinking of buying.

So, these are just a few of the factors that Justice Scalia and the Supreme Court would need to consider if a case came before them dealing with the constitutionality of regulating video game sales to minors. This is not to say anyone is in favor of actually selling mature or adult-oriented games to minors. It’s just to say that there are more sensible (and constitutional) ways of handling this problem. Parents have many less-restrictive means of dealing with underage access to potentially objectionable games—such as the industry’s private rating and labeling system, third-party ratings and info, console-based controls, and the fact that they don’t have to buy the games in the first place! [See my study and parental controls book for more details on all these things.]