The FCC appears to be dragging the TV industry, which is increasingly app- and Internet-based, into years of rulemakings, unnecessary standards development and oversight, and drawn-out lawsuits. The FCC hasn’t made a final decision but the general outline is pretty clear. T he FCC wants to use a 20 year-old piece of corporate welfare, calculated to help a now-dead electronics retailer, as authority to regulate today’s TV apps and their licensing terms. Perhaps they’ll succeed in expanding their authority over set top boxes and TV apps. But as TV is being revolutionized by the Internet the legacy providers are trying to stay ahead of the new players (Netflix, Amazon, Layer 3), regulating TV apps and boxes will likely impede the competitive process and distract the FCC from more pressing matters, like spectrum and infrastructure.

In the 1996 Telecom Act, a provision was added about set top boxes sold by cable and satellite companies. In the FCC’s words, Section 629 charges the FCC “to assure the commercial availability of devices that consumers use to access multichannel video programming.”  The law adds that such devices, boxes, and equipment must be from “manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not affiliated with any multichannel video programming distributor.” In English: Congress wants to ensure that consumers can gain access to TV programming via devices sold by parties other than cable and satellite TV companies.

The FCC’s major effort to effect this this law did not end well. To create a market for “non-affiliated equipment,” the FCC created rules in 1998 that established the CableCARD technology, a module designed to the FCC’s specifications that could be inserted into “nonaffiliated” set top boxes.

CableCARD was developed and released to consumers, but after years of complex lawsuits and technology dead ends, cable technology had advanced and few consumers demanded CableCARD devices. The results reveal the limits of lawmaker-designed “competition.” In 2010, 14 years after passage of the law and all those years of agency resources, fewer than 1% of pay-TV customers had “unaffiliated” set top boxes.

It’s a strangely specific statute with no analogues for other technology devices. Why was this law created? Multichannel News reporting in 1998, representative of other reports at the time, has some clues.

[Rep.] Bliley, whose district includes the headquarters of electronics retailer Circuit City, sponsored the provision that requires the FCC to adopt rules to promote the retail sale of cable set-top boxes and navigation devices. 

So it it was a small addition to the Act, presumably added at the behest of Circuit City, so that electronics retailers and device companies could sell more consumer devices.

The good news is that by the law’s straightforward terms and intent, mission: accomplished. Despite CableCARD’s failure, electronics retailers today are selling devices that give consumers access to TV programming. That’s because, increasingly, TV providers are letting their apps do much of the work that set top boxes do. Today, many consumers can watch TV programming by installing a provider’s streaming TV app on their device of their choice, manufactured and sold by dozens of companies, like Samsung, Apple, and Google, and retailers. Unfortunately, Circuit City shuttered its last stores in 2009 and wasn’t around to benefit.

But the new FCC proposal says, no, mission: not accomplished. There’s some interpretative gymnastics to reach this conclusion. The FCC says “devices” and “equipment” should be interpreted broadly in order to capture apps made by pay-TV providers. Yet, while “devices and equipment” is broad enough to capture software like apps, it is not broad enough to capture actual devices and equipment, like smartphones, smart TVs, tablets, computers, and Chromecasts that consumers use to access pay-TV programming.

This strained reading of statutory language will create a regulatory mess out of the evolving pay-TV industry, that already has labyrinthine regulations.

But if you look at the history of FCC regulation, and TV regulation in particular, it’s pretty unexceptional. Advocates for FCC regulation have long seen a competitive and vibrant TV marketplace as a threat to the agency’s authority.

As former FCC chairman Newton Minow warned in his 1995 book, Abandoned in the Wasteland, the FCC would lose its ability to regulate TV if it didn’t find new justifications:

A television system with hundreds or thousands of channels—especially channels that people pay to watch—not only destroys the notion of channel scarcity upon which the public-trustee theory rests but simultaneously breathes life and logic into the libertarian model.

Minow advocated, therefore, that the FCC needed to find alternative reasons to retain some control of the TV industry, including affordability, social inclusiveness, education of youth, and elimination of violence. Special interests have manufactured a crisis in TV–“monopoly control” [sic] of set top boxes by TV distributors. As Scott Wallsten and others have suggested, bundling a set top box with a TV subscription is likely not a competitive problem and the FCC’s remedies are unlikely to work. 

The FCC’s blinkered view of the TV industry is necessary because the US TV and media marketplace is blossoming. Consumers have never had more access to programming on more devices. More than 100 standalone streaming video-on-demand products launched in 2015 alone. T he major TV providers are going where consumers are and launching their own streaming apps. The market won’t develop perfectly to the Commissioners’ liking and there will be hiccups, but competition is vigorous, output and quality are high, and consumers are benefiting.

The FCC decision to devote its highly-educated agency staff and resources (which will balloon when challenged in court or during the app specification proceedings) to an arcane consumer issue with such cynical origins is a lamentable waste of agency resources.

This an agency that for decades has done a hundred things poorly. In an increasingly competitive telecom and media marketplace, it should instead do a handful of things well. (Commissioner Pai has proposed useful infrastructure reforms and Commissioner Rosenworcel has an interesting proposal, that I’ve written about, to deploy federal spectrum into commercial markets). Let’s hope the agency leadership reassesses the necessity the this proceeding before dragging the TV industry into another wild goose chase.

Related research: This week Mercatus released a paper by MA Economics Fellow Joe Kane and me about the FCC’s reinvention as a social and cultural regulator: “The FCC and Quasi–Common Carriage A Case Study of Agency Survival.”

At the same time FilmOn, an Aereo look-alike, is seeking a compulsory license to broadcast TV content, free market advocates in Congress and officials at the Copyright Office are trying to remove this compulsory license. A compulsory license to copyrighted content gives parties like FilmOn the use of copyrighted material at a regulated rate without the consent of the copyright holder. There may be sensible objections to repealing the TV compulsory license, but transaction costs–the ostensible inability to acquire the numerous permissions to retransmit TV content–should not be one of them.

Economists can devise situations where transaction costs are immense and compulsory licenses are needed for a well-functioning market. Today, as when the compulsory license was created, the conventional wisdom is that TV compulsory licenses are still needed to prevent market failure.

In the 1970s, cable companies were capturing broadcast channels and retransmitting it to their subscribers for free because, per the Supreme Court, cable was a passive transmitter and didn’t need copyright permission. In 1976, to correct this perceived unfairness, Congress amended the Copyright Act and said this cable retransmission did necessitate copyright authorization. To make it easier on cable systems (most of which were small, local operations), the law created a compulsory license to broadcast TV content like NBC, ABC, and CBS programming.

The compulsory license primarily does two things: it provides cable operators local TV content royalty-free and provides non-local (“distant”) content (imagine a DC cable company importing a WGN broadcast from Chicago) at regulated rates.

As the House report says:

The Committee recognizes…that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.

The Copyright Office, early on, opposed the compulsory license and has called for the repeal of the compulsory license to broadcast TV content since 1981. As the Register of Copyrights said at a 2000 congressional hearing,

A compulsory license is not only a derogation of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, but it also prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair value of copyrighted works through government-set price controls.

But when the issue of repeal comes up, many parties cite “significant transaction costs” as a problem with conventional, direct licensing. GAO echoed these objections in an April 2015 report,

we have previously found that obtaining the copyright holders’ permission for all this content would be challenging. Each television program may have multiple copyright holders, and rebroadcasting an entire day of content may require obtaining permission from hundreds of copyright holders. The transaction costs of doing so make this impractical for cable operators.

That sounds sensible but we have powerful contradictory evidence: for decades, hundreds of TV channels requiring the bundling of thousands of copyright licenses are distributed seamlessly and completely outside of the compulsory license regime.

So it’s a mystery to me why analysts still talk about the difficulty in acquiring copyright permission from hundreds or thousands of rights holders. TV distributors outside of the compulsory license scheme do these complex content acquisition deals routinely. Hundreds of non-broadcast channels–like ESPN, CNN, Bravo, HGTV, MTV, and Fox News–are distributed to tens of millions of households via private contractual agreements and without regulated compulsory licenses. TBS, uniquely, in the late 1990s went from a broadcast channel, subject to a compulsory license, to a cable channel distributed via direct licensing with no apparent ill effects. Analysts raising the transactions costs for keeping compulsory licenses, to my knowledge, never explain why the market failure they predict is absent for these hundreds of cable and satellite channels.

Further, while cable and satellite companies don’t need to negotiate broadcast TV copyrights because of the compulsory license, the FCC’s retransmission consent process, part of the 1992 Cable Act, requires these companies to negotiate payment to retransmit broadcast signals–signals that contain the underlying copyrighted content. This process, though bizarre and artificial, is essentially the same negotiation cable and satellite companies would need to enter into in a world without compulsory license.

Finally, online programming from distributors like Hulu, Netflix, and (potentially) Apple TV operate entirely outside of the retrans-compulsory copyright system and undermine the transaction costs objection. Netflix, for instance, doesn’t negotiate with every individual right holder like GAO and Congress imply is necessary in a non-compulsory license regime. Content aggregators and intermediaries, not regulation, streamline the rights acquisition process without the need for a compulsory license. The ostensibly burdensome transaction costs don’t stop Netflix from licensing over 10,000 titles worth around $9 billion.

Certainly, converting from compulsory licensing to direct licensing has issues. Changing legal regimes can be costly and there is a need to prevent anticompetitive withholding of content. Understandably, many cable and satellite distributors oppose repeal of compulsory licenses if the complex FCC system of retransmission consent and must carry are maintained. I tend to agree. Nevertheless, it’s time to strike the transaction cost argument from the policy discussion. The predicted market failure is overcome by market forces.

For more background on TV regulation, see Adam Thierer and Brent Skorup, Video Marketplace Regulation: A Primer on the History of Television Regulation and Current Legislative Proposals (Mercatus working paper).

Congress is considering reforming television laws and solicited comment from the public last month. On Friday, I submitted a letter encouraging the reform effort. I attached the paper Adam and I wrote last year about the current state of video regulations and the need for eliminating the complex rules for television providers.

As I say in the letter, excerpted below, pay TV (cable, satellite, and telco-provided) is quite competitive, as this chart of pay TV market share illustrates. In addition to pay TV there is broadcast, Netflix, Sling, and other providers. Consumers have many choices and the old industrial policy for mass media encourages rent-seeking and prevents markets from evolving.

Dear Chairman Upton and Chairman Walden:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s December 2014 questions on video regulation.

…The labyrinthine communications and copyright laws governing video distribution are now distorting the market and therefore should be made rational. Congress should avoid favoring some distributors at the expense of free competition. Instead, policy should encourage new entrants and consumer choice.

The focus of the committee’s white paper on how to “foster” various television distributors, while understandable, was nonetheless misguided. Such an inquiry will likely lead to harmful rules that favor some companies and programmers over others, based on political whims. Congress and the FCC should get out of “fostering” the video distribution markets completely. A light-touch regulatory approach will prevent the damaging effects of lobbying for privilege and will ensure the primacy of consumer choice.

Some of the white paper’s questions may actually lead policy astray. Question 4, for instance, asks how we should “balance consumer welfare and the rights of content creators” in video markets. Congress should not pursue this line of inquiry too far. Just consider an analogous question: how do we balance consumer welfare and the interests of content creators in literature and written content? The answer is plain: we don’t. It’s bizarre to even contemplate.

Congress does not currently regulate the distribution markets of literature and written news and entertainment. Congress simply gives content producers copyright protection, which is generally applicable. The content gets aggregated and distributed on various platforms through private ordering via contract. Congress does not, as in video, attempt to keep competitive parity between competing distributors of written material: the Internet, paperback publishers, magazine publishers, books on tape, newsstands, and the like. Likewise, Congress should forego any attempt at “balancing” in video content markets. Instead, eliminate top-down communications laws in favor of generally applicable copyright laws, antitrust laws, and consumer protection laws.

As our paper shows, the video distribution marketplace has changed drastically. From the 1950s to the 1990s, cable was essentially consumers’ only option for pay TV. Those days are long gone, and consumers now have several television distributors and substitutes to choose from. From close to 100 percent market share of the pay TV market in the early 1990s, cable now has about 50 percent of the market. Consumers can choose popular alternatives like satellite- and telco-provided television as well as smaller players like wireless carriers, online video distributors (such as Netflix and Sling), wireless Internet service providers (WISPs), and multichannel video and data distribution service (MVDDS or “wireless cable”). As many consumers find Internet over-the-top television adequate, and pay TV an unnecessary expense, “free” broadcast television is also finding new life as a distributor.

The New York Times reported this month that “[t]elevision executives said they could not remember a time when the competition for breakthrough concepts and creative talent was fiercer” (“Aiming to Break Out in a Crowded TV Landscape,” January 11, 2015). As media critics will attest, we are living in the golden age of television. Content is abundant and Congress should quietly exit the “fostering competition” game. Whether this competition in television markets came about because of FCC policy or in spite of it (likely both), the future of television looks bright, and the old classifications no longer apply. In fact, the old “silo” classifications stand in the way of new business models and consumer choice.

Therefore, Congress should (1) merge the FCC’s responsibilities with the Federal Trade Commission or (2) abolish the FCC’s authority over video markets entirely and rely on antitrust agencies and consumer protection laws in television markets. New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, and other countries have merged competition and telecommunications regulators. Agency merger streamlines competition analyses and prevents duplicative oversight.

Finally, instead of fostering favored distribution channels, Congress’ efforts are better spent on reforms that make it easier for new entrants to build distribution infrastructure. Such reforms increase jobs, increase competition, expand consumer choice, and lower consumer prices.

Thank you for initiating the discussion about updating the Communications Act. Reform can give America’s innovative telecommunications and mass-media sectors a predictable and technology neutral legal framework. When Congress replaces industrial planning in video with market forces, consumers will be the primary beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

Brent Skorup Research Fellow, Technology Policy Program Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Congressional debates about STELA reauthorization have resurrected the notion that TV stations “must provide a free service” because they “are using public spectrum.” This notion, which is rooted in 1930s government policy, has long been used to justify the imposition of unique “public interest” regulations on TV stations. But outdated policy decisions don’t dictate future rights in perpetuity, and policymakers abandoned the “public spectrum” rationale long ago.

All wireless services use the public spectrum, yet none of them are required to provide a free commercial service except broadcasters. Satellite television operators, mobile service providers, wireless Internet service providers, and countless other commercial spectrum users are free to charge subscription fees for their services.

There is nothing intrinsic in the particular frequencies used by broadcasters that justifies their discriminatory treatment. Mobile services use spectrum once allocated to broadcast television, but aren’t treated like broadcasters.

The fact that broadcast licenses were once issued without holding an auction is similarly irrelevant.  All spectrum licenses were granted for free before the mid-1990s. For example, cable and satellite television operators received spectrum licenses for free, but are not required to offer their video services for free.

If the idea is to prevent companies who were granted free licenses from receiving a “windfall”, it’s too late. As Jeffrey A. Eisenach has demonstrated, “the vast majority of current television broadcast licensees [92%] have paid for their licenses through station transactions.”

The irrelevance of the free spectrum argument is particularly obvious when considering the differential treatment of broadcast and satellite spectrum. Spectrum licenses for broadcast TV stations are now subject to competitive bidding at auction while satellite television licenses are not. If either service should be required to provide a free service on the basis of spectrum policy, it should be  satellite television.

Although TV stations were loaned an extra channel during the DTV transition, the DTV transition is over. Those channels have been returned and were auctioned for approximately $19 billion in 2008. There is no reason to hold TV stations accountable in perpetuity for a temporary loan.

Even if there were, the loan was  not free. Though TV stations did not pay lease fees for the use of those channels, they nevertheless paid a heavy price. TV stations were required to invest substantial sums in HDTV technology and to broadcast signals in that format long before it was profitable. The FCC required “rapid construction of digital facilities by network-affiliated stations in the top markets, in order to expose a significant number of households, as early as possible, to the benefits of DTV.” TV stations were thus forced to “bear the risks of introducing digital television” for the benefit of consumers, television manufacturers, MVPDs, and other digital media.

The FCC did not impose comparable “loss leader” requirements on MVPDs. They are free to wait until consumer demand for digital and HDTV content justifies upgrading their systems — and they are still lagging TV stations by a significant margin. According to the FCC, only about half of the collective footprints of the top eight cable MVPDs had been transitioned to all-digital channels at the end of 2012. By comparison, the DTV transition was completed in 2009.

There simply is no satisfactory rationale for requiring broadcasters to provide a free service based on their use of spectrum or the details of past spectrum licensing decisions. If the applicability of a free service requirement turned on such issues, cable and satellite television subscribers wouldn’t be paying subscription fees.

Shortly after Tom Wheeler assumed the Chairmanship at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), he summed up his regulatory philosophy as “competition, competition, competition.” Promoting competition has been the norm in communications policy since Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order to “promote competition and reduce regulation.” The 1996 Act has largely succeeded in achieving competition in communications markets with one glaring exception: broadcast television. In stark contrast to the pro-competitive approach that is applied in other market segments, Congress and the FCC have consistently supported policies that artificially limit the ability of TV stations to compete or innovate in the communications marketplace.

Radio broadcasting was not subject to regulatory oversight initially. In the unregulated era, the business model for over-the-air broadcasting was “still very much an open question.” Various methods for financing radio stations were proposed or attempted, including taxes on the sale of devices, private endowments, municipal or state financing, public donations, and subscriptions. “We are today so accustomed to the dominant role of the advertiser in broadcasting that we tend to forget that, initially, the idea of advertising on the air was not even contemplated and met with widespread indignation when it was first tried.”

Section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934 thus provided the FCC with broad authority to authorize over-the-air subscription television service (STV). When the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this provision, it held that “subscription television is entirely consistent with [the] goals” of the Act. Analog STV services did not become widespread in the marketplace, however, due in part to regulatory limitations imposed on such services by the FCC. As a result, advertising dominated television revenue in the analog era.

The digital television (DTV) transition offered a new opportunity for TV stations to provide STV services in competition with MVPDs. The FCC had initially hoped that “multicasting” and other new capabilities provided by digital technologies would “help ensure robust competition in the video market that will bring more choices at less cost to American consumers.”

Despite the agency’s initial optimism, regulatory restrictions once again crushed the potential for TV stations to compete in other segments of the communications marketplace. When broadcasters proposed offering digital STV services with multiple broadcast and cable channels in order to compete with MVPDs, Congress held a hearing to condemn the innovation. Chairmen from both House and Senate committees threatened retribution against broadcasters if they pursued subscription television services — “There will be a quid pro quo.” Broadcasters responded to these Congressional threats by abandoning their plans to compete with MVPDs.

It’s hard to miss the irony in the 1996 Act’s approach to the DTV transition. Though the Act’s stated purposes are to “promote competition and reduce regulation, it imposed additional regulatory requirements on television stations that have stymied their ability to innovate and compete. The 1996 Act broadcasting provision requires that the FCC impose limits on subscription television services “so as to avoid derogation of any advanced television services, including high definition television broadcasts, that the Commission may require using such frequencies,” and prohibits TV stations from being deemed an MVPD. The FCC’s rules require TV stations to “transmit at least one over-the-air video programming signal at no direct charge to viewers” because “free, over-the-air television is a public good, like a public park, and might not exist otherwise.

These and other draconian legislative and regulatory limitations have forced TV stations to follow the analog television business model into the 21st Century while the rest of the communications industry innovated at a furious pace. As a result of this government-mandated broadcast business model, TV stations must rely on advertising and retransmission consent revenue for their survival.

Though the “public interest” status of TV stations may once have been considered a government benefit, it is rapidly becoming a curse. Congress and the FCC have both relied on the broadcast public interest shibboleth to impose unique and highly burdensome regulatory obligations on TV stations that are inapplicable to their competitors in the advertising and other potential markets. This disparity in regulatory treatment has increased dramatically under the current administration — to the point that is threatening the viability of broadcast television.

Here are just three examples of the ways in which the current administration has widened the regulatory chasm between TV stations and their rivals:

• In 2012, the FCC required only TV stations to post “political file” documents online, including the rates charged by TV stations for political advertising; MVPDs are not required to post this information online. This regulatory disparity gives political ad buyers and incentive to advertise on cable rather than broadcast channels and forces TV stations to disclose sensitive pricing information more widely than their competitors.
• This year the FCC prohibited joint sales agreements for television stations only; MVPDs and online content distributors are not subject to any such limitations on their advertising sales. This prohibition gives MVPDs and online advertising platforms a substantial competitive advantage in the market for advertising sales.
• This year the FCC also prohibited bundled programming sales by broadcasters only; cable networks are not subject to any limitations on the sale of programming in bundles. This disparity gives broadcast networks an incentive to avoid limitations on their programming sales by selling exclusively to MVPDs (i.e., becoming cable networks).

The FCC has not made any attempt to justify the differential treatment — because there is no rational justification for arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

Sadly, the STELA process in the Senate is threatening to make things worse. Some legislative proposals would eliminate retransmission consent and other provisions that provide the regulatory ballast for broadcast television’s government mandated business model  without eliminating the mandate. This approach would put a quick end to the administration’s “death by a thousand cuts” strategy with one killing blow. The administration must be laughing itself silly. When TV channels in smaller and rural markets go dark, this administration will be gone — and it will be up to Congress to explain the final TV transition.

Today is a big day in Congress for the cable and satellite (MVPDs) war on broadcast television stations. The House Judiciary Committee is holding a hearing on the compulsory licenses for broadcast television programming in the Copyright Act, and the House Energy and Commerce Committee is voting on a bill to reauthorize “STELA” (the compulsory copyright license for the retransmission of distant broadcast signals by satellite operators). The STELA license is set to expire at the end of the year unless Congress reauthorizes it, and MVPDs see the potential for Congressional action as an opportunity for broadcast television to meet its Waterloo. They desire a decisive end to the compulsory copyright licenses, the retransmission consent provision in the Communications Act, and the FCC’s broadcast exclusivity rules — which would also be the end of local television stations.

The MVPD industry’s ostensible motivations for going to war are retransmission consent fees and television “blackouts”, but the  real motive is advertising revenue.

The compulsory copyright licenses prevent MVPDs from inserting their own ads into broadcast programming streams, and the retransmission consent provision and broadcast exclusivity agreements prevent them from negotiating directly with the broadcast networks for a portion of their available advertising time. If these provisions were eliminated, MVPDs could negotiate directly with broadcast networks for access to their television programming and appropriate TV station advertising revenue for themselves.

The real motivation is in the numbers. According to the FCC’s most recent media competition report, MVPDs paid a total of approximately $2.4 billion in retransmission consent fees in 2012. (See 15th Report, Table 19) In comparison, TV stations generated approximately $21.3 billion in advertising that year. Which is more believable: (1) That paying $2.4 billion in retransmission consent fees is “just not sustainable” for an MVPD industry that generated nearly $149 billion from video services in 2011 (See 15th Report, Table 9), or (2) That MVPDs want to appropriate $21.3 billion in additional advertising revenue by cutting out the “TV station middleman” and negotiating directly for television programming and advertising time with national broadcast networks? (Hint: The answer is behind door number 2.)

What do compulsory copyright licenses, retransmission consent, and broadcast exclusivity agreements have to do with video advertising revenue?

• The compulsory copyright licenses prohibit MVPDs substituting their own advertisements for TV station ads: Retransmission of a broadcast television signal by an MVPD is “actionable as an act of infringement” if the content of the signal, including “any commercial advertising,” is “in any way willfully altered by the cable system through changes, deletions, or additions” (see 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3), 119(a)(5), and 122(e));
• The retransmission consent provision prohibits MVPDs from negotiating directly with television broadcast networks for access to their programming or a share of their available advertising time: An MVPD cannot retransmit a local commercial broadcast television signal without the “express authority of the originating station” (see 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A)); and
• Broadcast exclusivity agreements (also known as non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity agreements) prevent MVPDs from circumventing the retransmission consent provision by negotiating for nationwide retransmission consent with one network-affiliated own-and-operated TV station. (If an MVPD were able to retransmit the TV signals from only one television market nationwide, MVPDs could, in effect, negotiate with broadcast networks directly, because broadcast programming networks own and operate their own TV stations in some markets.)

The effect of the compulsory copyright licenses, retransmission consent provision, and broadcast exclusivity agreements is to prevent MVPDs from realizing any of the approximately $20 billion in advertising revenue generating by broadcast television programming every year.

Why did Congress want to prevent MVPDs from realizing any advertising revenue from broadcast television programming?

Congress protected the advertising revenue of local TV stations because TV stations are legally prohibited from realizing any subscription revenue for their primary programming signal. (See 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)) Congress chose to balance the burden of the broadcast business model mandate with the benefits of protecting their advertising revenue. The law forces TV stations to rely primarily on advertising revenue to generate profits, but the law also protects their ability to generate advertising revenue. Conversely, the law allows MVPDs to generate both subscription revenue and advertising revenue for their own programming, but prohibits them from poaching advertising revenue from broadcast programming.

MVPDs want to upset the balance by repealing the regulations that make free over-the-air television possible  without repealing the regulations that require TV stations to provide free over-the-air programming. Eliminating only the regulations that benefit broadcasters while retaining their regulatory burdens is not a free market approach — it is a video marketplace firing squad aimed squarely at the heart of TV stations.

Adopting the MVPD version of video regulation reform would not kill broadcast programming networks. They always have the options of becoming cable networks and selling their programming and advertising time directly to MVPDs or distributing their content themselves directly over the Internet.

The casualty of this so-called “reform” effort would be local TV stations, who are required by law to rely on advertising and retransmission consent fees for their survival. Policymakers should recognize that killing local TV stations for their advertising revenue is the ultimate goal of current video reform efforts before adopting piecemeal changes to the law. If policymakers intend to kill TV stations, they should not attribute the resulting execution to the “friendly fire” of unintended consequences. They should recognize the legitimate consumer and investment-backed expectations created by the current statutory framework and consider appropriate transition mechanisms after a comprehensive review.

Adam and I recently published a Mercatus research paper titled Video Marketplace Regulation: A Primer on the History of Television Regulation And Current Legislative Proposals, now available on SSRN. I presented the paper at a Silicon Flatirons academic conference last week.

We wrote the paper for a policy audience and students who want succinct information and history about the complex world of television regulation. Television programming is delivered to consumers in several ways, including via cable, satellite, broadcast, IPTV (like Verizon FiOS), and, increasingly, over-the-top broadband services (like Netflix and Amazon Instant Video). Despite their obvious similarities–transmitting movies and shows to a screen–each distribution platform is regulated differently.

The television industry is in the news frequently because of problems exacerbated by the disparate regulatory treatment. The Time Warner Cable-CBS dispute last fall (and TWC’s ensuing loss of customers), the Aereo lawsuit, and the Comcast-TWC proposed merger were each caused at least indirectly by some of the ill-conceived and antiquated TV regulations we describe. Further, TV regulation is a “thicket of regulations,” as the Copyright Office has said, which benefits industry insiders at the expense of most everyone else.

We contend that overregulation of television resulted primarily because past FCCs, and Congress to a lesser extent, wanted to promote several social objectives through a nationwide system of local broadcasters:

1) Localism 2) Universal Service 3) Free (that is, ad-based) television; and 4) Competition

These objectives can’t be accomplished simultaneously without substantial regulatory mandates. Further, these social goals may even contradict each other in some respects.

For decades, public policies constrained TV competitors to accomplish those goals. We recommend instead a reliance on markets and consumer choice through comprehensive reform of television laws, including repeal of compulsory copyright laws, must-carry, retransmission consent, and media concentration rules.

At the very least, our historical review of TV regulations provides an illustrative case study of how regulations accumulate haphazardly over time, demand additional “correction,” and damage dynamic industries. Congress and the FCC focused on attaining particular competitive outcomes through industrial policy, unfortunately. Our paper provides support for market-based competition and regulations that put consumer choice at the forefront.

After yesterday’s FCC meeting, it appears that Chairman Wheeler has a finely tuned microscope trained on broadcasters and a proportionately large blind spot for the cable television industry.

Yesterday’s FCC meeting was unabashedly pro-cable and anti-broadcaster. The agency decided to prohibit television broadcasters from engaging in the same industry behavior as cable, satellite, and telco television distributors and programmers. The resulting disparity in regulatory treatment highlights the inherent dangers in addressing regulatory reform piecemeal rather than comprehensively as contemplated by the #CommActUpdate. Congress should lead the FCC by example and adopt a “clean” approach to STELA reauthorization that avoids the agency’s regulatory mistakes.

The FCC meeting offered a study in the way policymakers pick winners and losers in the marketplace without acknowledging unfair regulatory treatment. It’s a three-step process.

• First, the policymaker obfuscates similarities among issues by referring to substantively similar economic activity across multiple industry segments using different terminology.
• Second, it artificially narrows the issues by limiting any regulatory inquiry to the disfavored industry segment only.
• Third, it adopts disparate regulations applicable to the disfavored industry segment only while claiming the unfair regulatory treatment benefits consumers.

The broadcast items adopted by the FCC yesterday hit all three points.

“Broadcast JSAs”

The FCC adopted an order prohibiting two broadcast television stations from agreeing to jointly sell more than 15% of their advertising time using the three-step process described above.

• First, the FCC referred to these agreements as “JSA’s” or “joint sales agreements”.
• Second, the FCC prohibited these agreements only among broadcast television stations even though the largest cable, satellite, and telco video distributors sell their advertising time through a single entity.
• Third, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler said all the agency was “doing [yesterday was] leveling the negotiating table” for negotiations involving the largely unrelated issue of “retransmission consent”, even though the largest cable, satellite, and telco video distributors all sell their advertising through a single entity.

If the FCC had  acknowledged that cable, satellite, and telcos jointly sell their advertising, and had the FCC included them in its inquiry as well, Chairman Wheeler could not have kept a straight face while asserting that all the agency was doing was leveling the playing field. Hence the power of obfuscatory terminology and artificially narrowed issues.

“Broadcast Exclusivity Agreements”

The FCC also issued a further notice yesterday seeking comment on broadcast “non-duplication exclusivity agreements” and “syndicated exclusivity agreements.” These agreements, which are collectively referred to as “broadcast exclusivity agreements”, are a form of territorial exclusivity: They provide a local television station with the exclusive right to transmit broadcast network or syndicated programming in the station’s local market only.

Unlike cable, satellite, and telco television distributors, broadcast television stations are  prohibited by law from entering into exclusive programming agreements with other television distributors in the same market: The Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act (STELA) prohibits television stations from entering into exclusive retransmission consent agreements — i.e., a television station must make its programming available to all other television distributors in the same market. Cable, satellite, and telco distributors are legally permitted to enter into exclusive programming agreements on a nationwide basis — e.g., DIRECTV’s NFL Sunday Ticket.

If the FCC is concerned by the limited form of territorial exclusivity permitted for broadcasters, it should be even more concerned about the broader exclusivity agreements that have always been permitted for cable, satellite, and telco television distributors. But the FCC nevertheless used the three-step process for picking winners and losers to limit its consideration of exclusive programming agreements to broadcasters  only.

• First, the FCC uses unique terminology to refer to “broadcast” exclusivity agreements (i.e., “non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity”), which obfuscates the fact that these agreements are a limited form of exclusive programming agreements.
• Second, the FCC is seeking comment on exclusive programming agreements between broadcast television stations and programmers only even though satellite and other video programming distributors have entered into exclusive programming agreements.
• Third, it appears the pretext for limiting the scope of the FCC’s inquiry to broadcasters will again be “leveling the playing field” between broadcasters and other television distributors — to benefit consumers, of course.

“Joint Retransmission Consent Negotiations”

Finally, the FCC prohibited a television broadcast station ranked among the top four stations (as measured by audience share) from negotiating “retransmission consent” jointly with another top four station in the same market if the stations are not commonly owned. The FCC reasoned that “the threat of losing programming of two more top four stations at the same time gives the stations undue bargaining leverage in negotiations with [cable, satellite, and telco television distributors].”

As an economic matter, “retransmission consent” is essentially a substitute for the free market copyright negotiations that could occur absent the “compulsory copyright license” in the 1976 Copyright Act and an earlier Supreme Court decision interpreting the term “public performance”. In the absence of retransmission consent, compensation for the use of programming provided by broadcast television stations and programming networks would be limited to the artificially low amounts provided by the compulsory copyright license.

To the extent retransmission consent is merely another form of program licensing, it is indistinguishable from negotiations between cable, satellite and telco distributors and cable programming networks — which typically involve the sale of  bundled channels. If bundling two television channels together “gives the stations undue bargaining leverage” in retransmission consent negotiations, why doesn’t a cable network’s bundling of multiple channels together for sale to a cable, satellite, or telco provider give the cable network “undue bargaining leverage” in its licensing negotiations? The FCC avoided this difficultly using the old one, two, three approach.

• First, the FCC used the unique term “retransmission consent” to refer to the sale of programming rights by broadcasters.
• Second, the FCC instituted a proceeding seeking comment only on “retransmission consent” rather than all programming negotiations.
• Third, the FCC found that lowering retransmission consent costs could lower the prices consumers pay to cable, satellite, and telco television distributors — to remind us that it’s all about consumers, not competitors.

If it were really about lowering prices for consumers, the FCC would also have considered whether prohibiting channel bundling by cable programming networks would lower consumer prices too. For reasons left unexplained, cable programmers are permitted to bundle as many channels as possible in their licensing negotiations.

“Clean STELA”

After yesterday’s FCC meeting, it appears that Chairman Wheeler has a finely tuned microscope trained on broadcasters and a proportionately large blind spot for the cable television industry. To be sure, the disparate results of yesterday’s FCC meeting could be unintentional. But, even so, they highlight the inherent dangers in any piecemeal approach to industry regulation. That’s why Congress should adopt a “clean” approach to STELA reauthorization and reject the demands of special interests for additional piecemeal legislative changes. Consumers would be better served by a more comprehensive effort to update video regulations.

Most conservatives and many prominent thinkers on the left agree that the Communications Act should be updated based on the insight provided by the wireless and Internet protocol revolutions. The fundamental problem with the current legislation is its disparate treatment of competitive communications services. A comprehensive legislative update offers an opportunity to adopt a technologically neutral, consumer focused approach to communications regulation that would maximize competition, investment and innovation.

Though the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must continue implementing the existing Act while Congress deliberates legislative changes, the agency should avoid creating  new regulatory disparities on its own. Yet that is where the agency appears to be heading at its meeting next Monday.

A recent ex parte filing indicates that the FCC is proposing to deem joint retransmission consent negotiations by two of the top four Free-TV stations in a market a per se violation of the FCC’s good-faith negotiation standard and adopt a rebuttable presumption that joint negotiations by non-top four station combinations constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith.” The intent of this proposal is to prohibit broadcasters from using a single negotiator during retransmission consent negotiations with Pay-TV distributors.

This prohibition would apply in  all TV markets, no matter how small, including markets that lack effective competition in the Pay-TV segment. In small markets without effective competition, this rule would result in the absurd requirement that marginal TV stations with no economies of scale negotiate alone with a cable operator who possesses market power.

In contrast, cable operators in these markets would remain free to engage in joint negotiations to purchase their programming. The Department of Justice has issued a press release “clear[ing] the way for cable television joint purchasing” of national cable network programming through a single entity. The Department of Justice (DOJ) concluded that allowing nearly 1,000 cable operators to jointly negotiate programming prices would not facilitate retail price collusion because cable operators typically do not compete with each other in the sale of programming to consumers.

Joint retransmission consent negotiations don’t facilitate retail price collusion either. Free-TV distributors don’t compete with each other for the sale of their programming to consumers — they provide their broadcast signals to consumers for  free over the air. Pay-TV operators complain that joint agreements among TV stations are nevertheless responsible for retail price increases in the Pay-TV segment, but have not presented evidence supporting that assertion. Pay-TV’s retail prices have increased at a steady clip for years irrespective of retransmission consent prices.

To the extent Pay-TV distributors complain that joint agreements increase TV station leverage in retransmission consent negotiations, there is no evidence of harm to competition. The retransmission consent rules  prohibit TV stations from entering into exclusive retransmission consent agreements with any Pay-TV distributor — even though Pay-TV distributors are allowed to enter into such agreements for cable programming — and the FCC has determined that Pay- and Free-TV distributors do not compete directly for viewers. The absence of any potential for competitive harm is especially compelling in markets that lack effective competition in the Pay-TV segment, because the monopoly cable operator in such markets is the de facto single negotiator for Pay-TV distributors.

It is even more surprising that the FCC is proposing to prohibit joint sales agreements among Free-TV distributors. This recent development apparently stems from a DOJ Filing in the FCC’s incomplete media ownership proceeding.

A fundamental flaw exists in the DOJ Filing’s analysis: It failed to consider whether the relevant product market for video advertising includes other forms of video distribution, e.g., cable and online video programming distribution. Instead, the DOJ relied on precedent that considers the sale of advertising in  non-video media only.

Similarly, the Department has repeatedly concluded that the purchase of broadcast television spot advertising constitutes a relevant antitrust product market because advertisers view spot advertising on broadcast television stations as sufficiently distinct from advertising on other media (such as radio and newspaper). (DOJ Filing at p.8)

The DOJ’s conclusions regarding joint sales agreements are clearly based on its incomplete analysis of the relevant product market.

Therefore, vigorous rivalry between multiple independently controlled broadcast stations in each local radio and television market ensures that businesses, charities, and advocacy groups can reach their desired audiences at competitive rates. (Id. at pp. 8-9, emphasis added)

The DOJ’s failure to consider the availability of advertising opportunities provided by cable and online video programming renders its analysis unreliable.

Moreover, the FCC’s proposed rules would result in another video market double standard. Cable, satellite, and telco video programming distributors, including DIRECTV, AT&T U-verse, and Verizon FIOS, have entered into a joint agreement to sell advertising through a  single entity, NCC Media (owned by Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Cox Media). NCC Media’s Essential Guide to planning and buying video advertising says that cable programming has surpassed 70% of all viewing to ad-supported television homes in Prime and Total Day, and 80% of Weekend daytime viewing. According to NCC, “This viewer migration to cable [programming] is one of the best reasons to shift your brand’s media allocation from local broadcast to Spot Cable,” especially with the advent of NCC’s new consolidated advertising platform. (Essential Guide at p. 8) The Essential Guide also states:

• “It’s harder than ever to buy the GRP’s [gross rating points] you need in local broadcast in prime and local news.” (Id. at p. 16)
• “[There is] declining viewership on broadcast with limited inventory creating a shortage of rating points in prime, local news and other dayparts.” (Id. at p. 17)
• “The erosion of local broadcast news is accelerating.” (Id. at p. 18)
• “Thus, actual local broadcast TV reach is at or below the cume figures for wired cable in most markets.” (Id. at p. 19)

This Essential Guide clearly indicates that cable programming is part of the relevant video advertising product market and that there is intense competition between Pay- and Free-TV distributors for advertising dollars.  So why is the FCC proposing to restrict joint marketing agreements among Free-TV distributors in local markets when virtually the entire Pay-TV industry is jointly marketing all of their advertising spots nationwide?

The FCC should refrain from adopting new restrictions on local broadcasters until it can answer questions like this one. Though it is appropriate for the FCC to prevent anticompetitive practices, adopting disparate regulatory obligations that distort competition in the same product market is not good for competition  or consumers. Consumer interests would be better served if the FCC decided to address video competition issues more broadly — or there might not be any Free-TV competition to worry about.

My response to Free State Foundation’s blog post, “Understanding the Un-Free Market for Retrans Consent Is the First Step for Reforming It”

The Free State Foundation (FSF) questioned my most recent blog post at RedState, which noted that the American Television Alliance’s (ATVA) arguments supporting FCC price regulation of broadcast television content are inconsistent with the arguments its largest members make against government intervention proposed by net neutrality supporters. FSF claimed that my post created a “false equivalency” between efforts to modify an existing regulatory regime and efforts to impose new regulations in a previously free market.

FSF’s “false equivalence” theory is a red herring that is apparently intended to distract from the substantive issues I raised. The validity of the economic arguments related to two-sided markets discussed in my blog doesn’t depend on the regulatory status of the two-sided markets those arguments address. The notion that the existence of regulation in the video marketplace gives ATVA a free pass to say anything it wants without heed for intellectual consistency is absurd.

I suspect FSF knows this. Its blog post does not dispute that ATVA’s arguments at the FCC are inconsistent with the arguments its largest members make against net neutrality; in fact, FSF failed to address the ATVA petition at all. Though the FSF blog was ostensibly prompted by my post at RedState, FSF decided to “leave the merits of ATVA’s various proposals to others” (except me, apparently).

FSF’s decision to avoid the merits of ATVA’s arguments at the FCC (the subject of my blog post), begs the question: What was the FSF blog actually about? It appears FSF wrote the blog to (1) reiterate its previous (and misleading) analyses of the video programing market, and (2) argue that the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act “represents the proper direction” for reforming it.

To be clear, I haven’t previously addressed either issue. But, in the spirit of collegial dialogue initiated by FSF, I discuss them briefly in this blog.

Retransmission Consent

FSF is right that, “In a truly free marketplace, private parties have the liberty to pursue [or not pursue] commercial deals with whomever they choose.” I also agree that the market for video programming is not a “truly free marketplace,” and that the rules governing retransmission consent “restrict private bargaining.” But, FSF’s one-sided characterization of retransmission consent as granting “special rights” to broadcasters only is flatly misleading.

FSF highlights how local broadcasters benefit from (1) “must carry” rules and (2) non-duplication and syndication agreements.

The must carry rules require for-pay video distributors (e.g., cable operators) to carry the programming of broadcasters who elect mandatory program carriage while prohibiting distributors from charging such broadcasters for that carriage. Although I agree with FSF that the must carry rules are particularly intrusive, they are also irrelevant to retransmission consent negotiations. Once a broadcaster elects to engage in retransmission consent negotiations for carriage, it cannot take advantage of must carry for three years. Even if it could, the existence of must carry wouldn’t provide the broadcaster any pricing advantage in negotiations with for-pay video distributors, whose goal is to carry the programming at the lowest possible cost (which must carry sets at zero).

FSF correctly notes that non-duplication and syndication agreements limit the ability of for-pay video distributors (e.g., cable operators) to bargain with non-local broadcasters for new and syndicated broadcast programming, respectively. But FSF sidesteps the fact that these limitations are created in the free market by private contractual arrangements between broadcast stations and the providers of network or syndicated programming, not the government. The FCC’s non-duplication and syndication “rules do not create these rights but rather provide a means for the parties to exclusive contracts to enforce them through the Commission rather than the courts.”

Finally, FSF fails to mention, either in its blog post or its scholarly papers, that the retransmission consent rules limit the ability of broadcasters to choose with whom they bargain by prohibiting broadcasters from entering into exclusive program carriage agreements with for-pay video distributors – a limitation on bargaining that does not apply to programming owned by for-pay video distributors. Unlike non-duplication and syndication, this exclusivity prohibition is not grounded in private contractual arrangements.

FSF does not address whether the potential negotiating advantages conferred on broadcasters by FCC enforcement of network non-duplication and syndication agreements is more valuable in retransmission consent negotiations than the potential disadvantages imposed by the prohibition on exclusive program carriage agreements. To the extent the value of exclusive carriage agreements (the opportunity cost of the retransmission consent regime for broadcasters) outweighs the value of network non-duplication and syndication enforcement (the benefit to broadcasters), for-pay video distributors benefit more from the retransmission consent regime than broadcasters.

Next Generation TV Act

To be sure, even if for-pay video distributors benefit more from retransmission consent than broadcasters, retransmission consent negotiations do not occur in a “truly free market.” I agree with FSF that, “The ultimate goal should be to eliminate regulatory intrusion in this space – and to thereby eliminate occasions for debate over whether this or that particular modification to the old regulations will tip the scales in favor of one class of competitors over another.” Unfortunately, the modifications proposed by the Next Generation TV Act (the Bill) would not eliminate such debates.

FSF describes the Bill as a “comprehensive free market reform.” It would indeed eliminate FCC enforcement of network non-duplication and syndication agreements (and compulsory copyright licenses—an issue that merits additional discussion), but it is far from comprehensive.

First, the Bill doesn’t eliminate must carry for non-profit (e.g., religious and educational) broadcasters – the broadcasters most likely to elect mandatory carriage. Retaining such protections for religious and educational broadcasters is certainly reasonable when viewed from a political perspective; however, it falls short of being a free market approach to video regulation generally.

More importantly, the Bill wouldn’t eliminate any of the underlying reasons for which broadcasters enter into non-duplication and syndication agreements. Broadcasters negotiate exclusive distribution rights in local markets because government regulations require broadcasters to provide their programming for free. As a result of this government mandate, broadcasters rely on local advertising revenue to generate profit. If for-pay video distributors could retransmit duplicative programming (syndicated or otherwise) from non-local broadcasters (e.g., because the local broadcaster had not negotiated exclusive distribution rights), the local broadcaster would lose a substantial portion (if not all) of its advertising revenue. In a “truly free market,” the local broadcaster could respond to the potential loss of advertising revenue by charging subscription fees for its over-the-air video programming delivery or repurposing its spectrum for an alternative use. But broadcasters today don’t operate in a truly free market, and the government generally won’t allow them to pursue other business models.

Although the Bill aims toward a more vibrant free market, my primary concern is that it would leave in place the intrusive business model restrictions on broadcasters while eliminating rules that help make the government-mandated business model work. Perhaps FSF would agree that, if the goal is to “eliminate regulatory intrusions in this space,” the Bill should also eliminate government restrictions on broadcast business models and spectrum use. Anything less is better described as “picking winners and losers,” not “comprehensive free market reform.”

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

There is renewed interest in unlicensed spectrum as the FCC approaches the TV white space issue (again). Tim B. Lee reports on some of the unlicensed supporters,

Activists at the South by Southwest Interactive festival in Austin, TX, built a free wireless network to help publicize the power of unlicensed “white spaces” technology. The project is part of a broader campaign to persuade the FCC not to auction off this spectrum for the exclusive use of wireless carriers.

Unlicensed spectrum for high-powered devices has been called Super Wifi (“wifi” in this context is used loosely; Super Wifi is a PR term and has nothing to do with the wifi technical standard). Frankly, there are many reasons to be cautious about assigning more unlicensed spectrum, especially given the confusing information out there about the technology. (For instance, despite a popular rumor, Super Wifi would not provide free Internet access to everyone with a device, as Matt Yglesias and Jon Brodkin point out.)

The unlicensed/licensed debate is several years old and often technical. I won’t rehash the old issues here, but there is a point I’d like to highlight about the nature of unlicensed spectrum: In spectrum assignments, you generally want to create “apartments, not condos.” Like most, I favor unlicensed spectrum under certain circumstances. However, we should be aware of the rigidity unlicensed spectrum imposes on future reassignments.

If you’re a property developer in a city and you want to raze and build on property occupied by a residential high-rise, you want that high-rise to be an apartment complex, not a condominium building. With apartments, you can bargain with the property management company and, with time, all tenants can be cleared out. Not so with condos, many urban developers are finding. Even if most condo owners in a building are contacted and compensated for leaving, the remaining owners have an effective veto over the new development.

Similarly, unlicensed device users can veto the future reassignment or transfer of the spectrum they occupy. Smartphone and satellite radio users, for example, have no veto ability–they are “apartments,” essentially leasing space from a spectrum “owner.” Like real property, you really need small-numbers bargaining to transfer and lease spectrum for its highest-valued use. Many unlicensed “owners” in a band creates a tragedy of the anticommons. Control over devices drives most unlicensed spectrum advocates mad, but it is also what permits technology upgrades and relatively fast spectrum transfers. (Mobile phones with 1G (analog) are long gone. Not so with old baby monitors, cordless phones, and garage door openers, which are all unlicensed. There’s no spectrum manager to clear these old devices out.) Once unlicensed devices populate a band, the spectrum almost certainly cannot be transferred and used for other technologies.

The time will come when–not if–a brand new social need arises that requires substantial amounts of spectrum as an input. If the FCC wanted to reassign spectrum in the future for, say, driverless car technology, Super Wifi bands are out of the question. It’s simply impractical to locate all the (mobile and transient) high-powered Super Wifi devices that will be using the band, install a new radio, and move them to another band. Even if you could identify most of them, people who buy or sell devices–many of whom will be powerful institutions like public safety, transportation, and tech companies–will have built business models based on the unlicensed spectrum. Entrenched users will not relinquish their spectrum easily after making substantial investments in the technology.

Ideally, you want a spectrum manager that can be compensated to discontinue services or move their users to another band when better uses come along. This is not to say we should not have “Super Wifi” or other unlicensed bands. But we should hesitate before creating these spectrum condos, particularly in the valuable bandwidth under 1 GHz. By permitting unlicensed operators, future spectrum reassignment of unlicensed bands moves from the marketplace to lengthy administrative resolution* by the FCC and NTIA because of the fragmented and numerous users–which is what the Congress and the FCC have tried to avoid for the past 20 years with auctions and secondary markets. Instead of negotiation and compensation, the reassignment becomes a shouting match between interested parties and their lobbyists. In the end, consumers typically lose.

* Recent history is illuminating. Just look at LightSquared’s dealings with Inmarsat (apartments) versus GPS users (condos). Conflicts with GPS users killed LightSquared’s new nationwide LTE network because there were too many GPS parties to bargain with. For another example, observe how NextNav is running into interference problems with WISPs (condos).

On Forbes today, I have a long article on the progress being made to build gigabit Internet testbeds in the U.S., particularly by Gig.U.

Gig.U is a consortium of research universities and their surrounding communities created a year ago by Blair Levin, an Aspen Institute Fellow and, recently, the principal architect of the FCC’s National Broadband Plan.  Its goal is to work with private companies to build ultra high-speed broadband networks with sustainable business models .

Gig.U, along with Google Fiber’s Kansas City project and the White House’s recently-announced US Ignite project, spring from similar origins and have similar goals.  Their general belief is that by building ultra high-speed broadband in selected communities, consumers, developers, network operators and investors will get a clear sense of the true value of Internet speeds that are 100 times as fast as those available today through high-speed cable-based networks.  And then go build a lot more of them.

Google Fiber, for example, announced last week that it would be offering fully-symmetrical 1 Gbps connections in Kansas City, perhaps as soon as next year.  (By comparison, my home broadband service from Xfinity is 10 Mbps download and considerably slower going up.)

US Ignite is encouraging public-private partnerships to build demonstration applications that could take advantage of next generation networks and near-universal adoption.  It is also looking at the most obvious regulatory impediments at the federal level that make fiber deployments unnecessarily complicated, painfully slow, and unduly expensive.

I think these projects are encouraging signs of native entrepreneurship focused on solving a worrisome problem:  the U.S. is nearing a dangerous stalemate in its communications infrastructure.  We have the technology and scale necessary to replace much of our legacy wireline phone networks with native IP broadband.  Right now, ultra high-speed broadband is technically possible by running fiber to the home.  Indeed, Verizon’s FiOS network currently delivers 300 Mbps broadband and is available to some 15 million homes.

But the kinds of visionary applications in smart grid, classroom-free education, advanced telemedicine, high-definition video, mobile backhaul and true teleworking that would make full use of a fiber network don’t really exist yet.  Consumers (and many businesses) aren’t demanding these speeds, and Wall Street isn’t especially interested in building ahead of demand.  There’s already plenty of dark fiber deployed, the legacy of earlier speculation that so far hasn’t paid off.

So the hope is that by deploying fiber to showcase communities and encouraging the development of demonstration applications, entrepreneurs and investors will get inspired to build next generation networks.

Let’s hope they’re right.

What interests me personally about the projects, however, is what they expose about regulatory disincentives that unnecessarily and perhaps fatally retard private investment in next-generation infrastructure.  In the Forbes piece, I note almost a dozen examples from the Google Fiber development agreement where Kansas City voluntarily waived permits, fees, and plodding processes that would otherwise delay the project.  As well, in several key areas the city actually commits to cooperate and collaborate with Google Fiber to expedite and promote the project.

As Levin notes, Kansas City isn’t offering any funding or general tax breaks to Google Fiber.  But the regulatory concessions, which implicitly acknowledge the heavy burden imposed on those who want to deploy new privately-funded infrastructure (many of them the legacy of the early days of cable TV deployments), may still be enough to “change the math,” as Levin puts it, making otherwise unprofitable investments justifiable after all.

Just removing some of the regulatory debris, in other words, might itself be enough to break the stalemate that makes building next generation IP networks unprofitable today.

The regulatory cost puts a heavy thumb on the side of the scale that discourages investment.  Indeed, as fellow Forbes contributor Elise Ackerman pointed out last week, Google has explicitly said that part of what made Kansas City attractive was the lack of excessive infrastructure regulation, and the willingness and ability of the city to waive or otherwise expedite the requirements that were on the books.(Despite the city’s promises to bend over backwards for the project, she notes, there have still been expensive regulatory delays that promoted no public values.)

Particularly painful to me was testimony by Google Vice President Milo Medin, who explained why none of the California-based proposals ever had a real chance.  “Many fine California city proposals for the Google Fiber project were ultimately passed over,” he told Congress, “in part because of the regulatory complexity here brought about by [the California Environmental Quality Act] and other rules. Other states have equivalent processes in place to protect the environment without causing such harm to business processes, and therefore create incentives for new services to be deployed there instead.”

Ouch.

This is a crucial insight.  Our next-generation communications infrastructure will surely come, when it does come, from private investment.  The National Broadband Plan estimated it would take $350 billion to get 100 Mbps Internet to 100 million Americans through a combination of fiber, cable, satellite and high-speed mobile networks.  Mindful of reality, however, the plan didn’t even bother to consider the possibility of full or even significant taxpayer funding to reach that goal.

Of course, nationwide fiber and mobile deployments by network operators including Verizon and AT&T can’t rely on gimmicks like Google Fiber’s hugely successful competition, where 1,100 communities applied to become a test site.  Nor can they, like Gig.U, cherry-pick research university towns, which have the most attractive demographics and density to start with.  Nor can they simply call themselves start-ups and negotiate the kind of freedom from regulation that Google and Gig.U’s membership can.

Large-scale network operators need to build, if not everywhere, than to an awful lot of somewheres.  That’s a political reality of their size and operating model, as well as the multi-layer regulatory environment in which they must operate.  And it’s a necessity of meeting the ambitious goal of near-universal high-speed broadband access, and of many of the applications that would use it.

Unlike South Korea, we aren’t geographically-small, with a largely urban population living in just a few cities.  We don’t have a largely- nationalized and taxpayer-subsidized communications infrastructure.   On a per-person basis, deploying broadband in the U.S. is much harder, complicated and more expensive than it is in many competing nations in the global economy.

Under the current regulatory and economic climate, large-scale fiber deployment has all but stopped for now.  Given the long lead-time for new construction, we need to find ways to restart it.

So everyone who agrees that universal broadband is a critical element in U.S. competitiveness in the next decade or so ought to look closely at the lessons, intended or otherwise, of the various testbed projects.  They are exposing in painful detail a dangerous and useless legacy of multi-level regulation and bureaucratic inefficiency that makes essential private infrastructure investment economically impossible.

Don’t get me wrong.  The demonstration projects and testbeds are great.  Google Fiber, Gig.U, and US Ignite are all valuable efforts.  But if we want to overcome our “strategic bandwidth deficit,” we’ll need something more fundamental than high-profile projects and demonstration applications.  Most of all, we need a serious housecleaning of legacy regulation at the federal, state, and local level.

Regulatory reform might not be as sexy as gigabit Internet demonstrations, but the latter ultimately won’t make much difference without the former.  Time to break out the heavy demolition equipment—for both.

Better late than never, I’ve finally given a close read to the Notice of Inquiry issued by the FCC on June 17^th.  (See my earlier comments, “FCC Votes for Reclassification, Dog Bites Man”.)  In some sense there was no surprise to the contents; the Commission’s legal counsel and Chairman Julius Genachowski had both published comments over a month before the NOI that laid out the regulatory scheme the Commission now has in mind for broadband Internet access.

Chairman Genachowski’s “Third Way” comments proposed an option that he hoped would satisfy both extremes.  The FCC would abandon efforts to find new ways to meet its regulatory goals using “ancillary jurisdiction” under Title I (an avenue the D.C. Circuit had wounded, but hadn’t actually exterminated, in the Comcast decision), but at the same time would not go as far as some advocates urged and put broadband Internet completely under the telephone rules of Title II.

Instead, the Commission would propose a “lite” version of Title II, based on a few guiding principles:

• Recognize the transmission component of broadband access service—and only this component—as a telecommunications service;
• Apply only a handful of provisions of Title II (Sections 201, 202, 208, 222, 254, and 255) that, prior to the Comcast decision, were widely believed to be within the Commission’s purview for broadband;
• Simultaneously renounce—that is, forbear from—application of the many sections of the Communications Act that are unnecessary and inappropriate for broadband access service; and
• Put in place up-front forbearance and meaningful boundaries to guard against regulatory overreach.

The NOI pretends not to take a position on any of three possible options – (1) stick with Title I and find a way to make it work, (2) reclassify broadband and apply the full suite of Title II regulations to Internet access providers, or (3) compromise on the Chairman’s Third Way, applying Title II but forbearing on any but the six sections noted above—at least, for now (see ¶ 98).  It asks for comments on all three options, however, and for a range of extensions and exceptions within each.

I’ve written elsewhere (see “Reality Check on ‘Reclassifying’ Broadband” and  “Net Neutrality and the Inconvenient Constitution”) about the dubious legal foundation on which the FCC rests its authority to change the definition of “information services” to suddenly include broadband Internet, after successfully (and correctly) convincing the U.S. Supreme Court that it did not.  That discussion will, it seems, have to wait until its next airing in federal court following inevitable litigation over whatever course the FCC takes.

This post deals with something altogether different—a number of startling tidbits that found their way into the June 17 ^th NOI.  As if Title II weren’t dangerous enough, there are hints and echoes throughout the NOI of regulatory dreams to come.  Beyond the hubris of reclassification, here are seven surprises buried in the 116 paragraphs of the NOI—its seven deadly sins.  In many cases the Commission is merely asking questions.  But the questions hint at a much broader—indeed overwhelming—regulatory agenda that goes beyond Net Neutrality and the undoing of the Comcast decision.

Pride:  The folly of defining “facilities-based” provisioning – The FCC is struggling to find a way to apply reclassification only to the largest ISPs – Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, Time Warner, etc.  But the statutory definition of “telecommunications” doesn’t give them much help.  So the NOI invents a new distinction, referred to variously as “facilities-based” providers (¶ 1) or providers of an actual “physical connection,” (¶ 106) or limiting the application of Title II just to the “transmission component” of a provider’s consumer offering (¶ 12).

All the FCC has in mind here is “a commonsense definition of broadband Internet service,” (¶ 107) (which they never provide), but in any case the devil is surely in the details.  First, it’s not clear that making that distinction would actually achieve the goal of applying the open Internet rules—network management, good or evil, largely occurs well above the transmission layers in the IP stack.

The sin here, however, is that of unintentional over-inclusion.  If Title II is applied to “facilities-based” providers, it could sweep in application providers who increasingly offer connectivity as a way to promote usage of their products.

Limiting the scope of reclassification just to “facilities-based” providers who sell directly to consumers doesn’t eliminate the risk of over-inclusion.  Some application providers, for example, offer a physical connection in partnership with an ISP (think Yahoo and Covad DSL service) and many large application providers own a good deal of fiber optic cable that could be used to connect directly with consumers.  (Think of Google’s promise to build gigabit test beds for select communities.)  Municipalities are still working to provide WiFi and WiMax connections, again in cooperation with existing ISPs.  (EarthLink planned several of these before running into financial and, in some cities, political trouble.)

There are other services, including Internet backbone provisioning, that could also fall into the Title II trap (see ¶ 64).  Would companies, such as Akamai, which offer caching services, suddenly find themselves subject to some or all of Title II?  (See ¶ 58)  How about Internet peering agreements (unmentioned in the NOI)?  Would these private contracts be subject to Title II as well?  (See ¶ 107)

Lust:  The lure of privacy, terrorism, crime, copyright – Though the express purpose of the NOI is to find a way to apply Title II to broadband, the Commission just can’t help lusting after some additional powers it appears interested in claiming for itself.  Though the Commissioners who voted for the NOI are adamant that the goal of reclassification is not to regulate “the Internet” but merely broadband access, the siren call of other issues on the minds of consumers and lawmakers may prove impossible to resist.

Recognizing, for example, that the Federal Trade Commission has been holding hearings all year on the problems of information privacy, the FCC now asks for comments about how it can use Title II authority to get into the game (¶ 39, 52, 82, 83, 96), promising of course to “complement” whatever actions the FTC is planning to take.

Cyberattacks and other forms of terrorism are also on the Commission’s mind.  In his separate statement, for example, Chairman Genachowski argues that the Comcast decision “raises questions about the right framework for the Commission to help protect against cyber-attacks.”

The NOI includes several references to homeland security and national defense—this in the wake of publicity surrounding Sen. Lieberman’s proposed law to give the President extensive emergency powers over the Internet.  (See Declan McCullaugh, “Lieberman Defends Emergency Net Authority Plan.”)  Lieberman’s bill puts the power squarely in the Department of Homeland Security—is the FCC hoping to use Title II to capture some of that power for itself?

And beyond shocking acts of terrorism, does the FCC see Title II as a license to require ISPs to help enforce other, lesser crimes, including copyright infringement, libel, bullying and cyberstalking, e-personation—and the rest?  Would Title II give the agency the ability to impose its content “decency” rules, limited today merely to broadcast television and radio, to Internet content, as Congress has unsuccessfully tried to help the Commission do on three separate occasions?

(Just as I wrote that sentence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC’s recent effort to craft more aggressive indecency rules, applied to Janet Jackson’s nipple, violates the First Amendment.  The Commission is having quite a bad year in the courts!)

Anger:  Sharing the pain of CALEA – That last paragraph is admittedly speculation.  The NOI contains no references to copyright, crime, or indecency.  But here’s a law enforcement sin that isn’t speculative.  The NOI reminds us that separate from Title II, the FCC is required by law to enforce the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). (¶ 89) CALEA is part of the rich tapestry of federal wiretap law, and requires “telecommunications carriers” to implement technical “back doors” that make it easier for federal law enforcement agencies to execute wiretapping orders.  Since 2005, the FCC has held that all facilities-based providers are subject to CALEA.

Here, the Commission assumes that reclassification would do nothing to change the broader application of CALEA already in place, and seeks comment on “this analysis.”  (¶ 89)  The Commission wonders how that analysis impacts its forbearance decisions, but I have a different question.  Assuming the definition of “facilities-based” Internet access providers is as muddled as it appears (see above), is the Commission intentionally or unintentionally extending the coverage of CALEA to anyone selling Internet “connectivity” to consumers, even those for whom that service is simply in the interest of promoting applications?

Again, would residents of communities participating in Google’s fiber optic test bed awake to discover that all of that wonderful data they are now pumping through the fiber is subject to capture and analysis by any law enforcement officer holding a wiretapping order?  Oops?

Gluttony:  The Insatiable Appetite of State and Local Regulators – Just when you think the worst is over, there’s a nasty surprise waiting at the end of the NOI.  Under Title II, the Commission reminds us, many aspects of telephone regulation are not exclusive to the FCC but are shared with state and even local regulatory agencies.

Fortunately, to avoid the catastrophic effects of imposing perhaps hundreds of different and conflicting regulatory schemes to broadband Internet access, the FCC has the authority to preempt state and local regulations that conflict with FCC “decisions,” and to preempt the application of those parts of Title II the FCC may or may not forbear.

But here’s the billion dollar question, which the NOI saves for the very last (¶ 109):  “Under each of the three approaches, what would be the limits on the states’ or localities’ authority to impose requirements on broadband Internet service and broadband Internet connectivity service?”

What indeed?  One of the provisions the FCC would not apply under the Third Way, for example, is § 253, which gives the Commission the authority to “preempt state regulations that prohibit the provision of telecommunications services.” (¶ 87)  So does the Third Way taketh federal authority only to giveth to state and local regulators?  Is the only way to avoid state and local regulations—oh, well, if you insist–to go to full Title II?  And might the FCC decide in any case to exercise their discretion, now or in the future, to allow local regulations of Internet connectivity?

What might those regulations look like?  One need only review the history of local telephone service to recall the rate-setting labyrinths, taxes, micromanagement of facilities investment and deployment decisions—not to mention the scourge of corruption, graft and other government crimes that have long accompanied the franchise process.  Want to upgrade your cable service?  Change your broadband provider?  Please file the appropriate forms with your state or local utility commission, and please be patient.

Fear-mongering?  Well, consider a proposal that will be voted on this summer at the annual meeting of the National Association of Utilities Commissioners.  (TC-1 at page 30)  The Commissioners will decide whether to urge the FCC to adopt what it calls a “fourth way” to fix the Net Neutrality problem.  Their description of the fourth way speaks for itself.  It would consist of:

“bi-jurisdictional regulatory oversight for broadband Internet connectivity service and broadband Internet service which recognizes the particular expertise of States in: managing front-line consumer education, protection and services programs; ensuring public safety; ensuring network service quality and reliability; collecting and mapping broadband service infrastructure and adoption data; designing and promoting broadband service availability and adoption programs; and implementing  competitively neutral pole attachment, rights-of-way and tower siting rules and programs.”

The proposal also asks the FCC, should it stick to the Third Way approach, to add in several other provisions left out of Chairman Genachowski’s list, including one (again, § 253) that would preserve the state’s ability to help out.

Or consider a proposal currently being debated by the California Public Utilities Commission.  California, likewise, would like to use reclassification as the key that unlocks the door to “cooperative federalism,” and has its own list of provisions the FCC ought not to forbear under the Third Way proposal.

Among other things, the CPUC’s general counsel is unhappy with the definition the FCC proposes for just who and what would be covered by Title II reclassification.  The CPUC proposal argues for a revised definition that “should be flexible enough to cover unforeseen technological [sic] in both the short- and long-term.”

The CPUC also proposes the FCC add to the list of those regulated by Title II providers Voice over Internet Protocol telephony, which is often a software application riding well above the “transmission” component of broadband access.

California is just the first (tax-starved) state I looked for.  I’m sure there are and will be others who will respond hungrily to the Commission’s invitation to “comment” on the appropriate role of state and local regulators under either a full or partial Title II regime.  (¶ 109, 110)

Sloth:  The sleeping giant of basic web functions – browsers, DNS lookup, and more – The NOI admits that the FCC is a bit behind the times when it comes to technical expertise, and they would like commenters to help them build a fuller record.  Specifically, ¶ 58 asks for help “to develop a current record on the technical and functional characteristics of broadband Internet service, and whether those characteristics have changed materially in the last decade.”

In particular, the NOI wants to know more about the current state of web browsers, DNS lookup services, web caching, and “other basic consumer Internet activities.”

Sounds innocent enough, but those are very loaded questions.  In the Brand X case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the FCC that broadband Internet access over cable fit the definition of a Title I “information service” and not a Title II “telecommunications service,” browsers, DNS lookup and other “basic consumer Internet activities” were crucial to the analysis of the majority.  Because cable (and, later, it was decided, DSL) providers offered not simply a physical connection but also supporting or “enhanced” services to go with it—including DNS lookup, home pages, email support and the like—their offering to consumers was not simple common carriage.

Justice Scalia disagreed, and in dissent made the argument that cable Internet was in fact two separable offerings – the physical connection (the packet-switched network) and a set of information services that ran on top of that connection.  Consumers used some information services from the carrier, and some from other content providers (other web sites, e.g.).  Those information services were rightly left unregulated under Title I, but Congress intended the transmission component, according to Justice Scalia, to be treated as a common carrier “telecommunications service” under Title II.

The Third Way proposal in large part adopts the Scalia view of the Communications Act (see ¶ 20, 106), despite the fact that it was the FCC who argued vigorously against that view all along, and despite the fact that a majority of the Court agreed with them.

By asking these innocent questions about technical architecture, the FCC appears to be hedging its bets for a certain court challenge.   Any effort to reclassify broadband Internet access will generate long, complicated, and expensive litigation.  What, the courts will ask, has driven the FCC to make such an abrupt change in its interpretation of terms like “information service” whose statutory definitions haven’t changed since 1996?

We know it is little more than that the Chairman would like to undo the Comcast decision, of course, and thereafter complete the process of enrolling the open Internet rules proposed in October.  But in the event that proves an unavailing argument, it would be nice to be able to argue that the nature of the Internet and Internet access have fundamentally changed since 2005, when Brand X was decided.  If it’s clear that basic Internet services have become more distinct from the underlying physical connection, at least in the eyes of consumers, so much the better.

Or perhaps something bigger is lumbering lazily through the NOI.  Perhaps the FCC is considering whether “basic Internet activities” (browsing, searching, caching, etc.) have now become part of the definition of basic connectivity.  Perhaps Title II, in whole or in part, will apply not only to facilities-based providers, but to those who offer basic Internet services essential for web access.  (Why extend Title II to providers of “basic” information service?  See below, “Greed.”)   If so, the exception will swallow the rule, and just about everything else that makes the Internet ecosystem work.

Vanity:  The fading beauty of the cellular ingénue – Perhaps the most worrisome feature of the proposed open Internet rules is that they would apply with equal force to wired and wireless Internet access.  As any consumer knows, however, those two types of access couldn’t be more different.

Infrastructure providers have made enormous progress in innovating improvements to existing infrastructure—especially the cable and copper networks.  New forms of access have also emerged, including fiber optic cable, satellite, WiFi/WiMax, and the nascent provisioning of broadband over power lines, which has particular promise in remote areas which may have no other option for access.

Broadband speeds are increasing, and there’s every expectation that given current technology and current investment plans, the National Broadband Plan’s goal of 100 million Americans with access to 100 mbps Internet speeds by 2010 will be reached without any public spending.

The wireless world, however, is a different place.  After years of underutilization of 3G networks by consumers who saw no compelling or “killer” apps worth using, the latest generation of portable computing devices (iPhone, Android, Blackberry, Windows) has reached the tipping point and well beyond.  Existing networks in many locations are overcommitted, and political resistance to additional cell tower and other facilities deployment is exacerbating the problem.

Just last week, a front page story in the San Francisco Chronicle reported on growing tensions between cell phone providers and residents who want new towers located anywhere but near where they live, go to school, shop, or work.  CTIA-The Wireless Association announced that it would no longer hold events in San Francisco, after the city council, led by Mayor Gavin Newsome, passed a “Cell Phone Right to Know” ordinance that requires retail disclosure of a phone’s specific adoption rate of emitted radiation.

Given the likely continued lagging of cellular deployment, it seems prudent to consider less stringent restrictions on network management for wireless than for wireline.  Under the open Internet rules, providers would be unable to limit or ban outright certain high-bandwidth data services, notably video services and peer-to-peer file sharing, that the network may simply be unable to support.  But the proposed open Internet rules will have none of that.

The NOI does note some of the significant differences between wired and wireless (¶ 102), but also reminds us that the limited spectrum for wireless signals affords them special powers to regulate the business practices of providers. (¶ 103)  Under Title III of the Communications Act, which applies to wireless, the FCC has and makes use of the power to ensure spectrum uses are serving a broad “public interest.”

In some ways, then, Title III gives the Commission powers to regulate wireless broadband access beyond what they would get from a reclassification to Title II.  So even if the FCC were to choose the first option and leave the current classification scheme alone, wireless broadband providers might still be subject to open Internet rules under Title III.  It would be ironic if the only broadband providers whose network management practices were to be scrutinized were those who needed the most flexibility.  But irony is nothing new in communications law.

One power, however, might elude the FCC, and therefore might give further weight to a scheme that would regulate wireless broadband under Title III and Title II.  Title III does not include the extension of Universal Service to wireless broadband (¶ 103).  This is a particular concern given the increased reliance of under-served and at-risk communities on cellular technologies for all their communications needs.  (See the recent Pew Internet & Society study for details.)

While the NOI asks for comment on whether and to what extent the FCC ought to treat wireless broadband differently and at a later time from wired services, the thrust of this section makes clear the Commission is thinking of more, not less regulation for the struggling cellular industry.

Greed:  Universal Service taxes – So what about Universal Service?  In an effort to justify the Title II reclassification as something more than just a fix to the Comcast case, the FCC has (with some hedging) suggested that D.C. Circuit’s ruling also calls into question the Commission’s ability to implement the National Broadband Plan, published only a few weeks prior to the decision in Comcast.

At a conference sponsored by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research that I attended, Chairman Genachowski was emphatic that nothing in Comcast constrained the FCC’s ability to execute the plan.

But in the run-up to the NOI, the rhetoric has changed.  Here the Chairman in his separate statement says only that “the recent court decision did not opine on the initiatives and policies that we have laid out transparently in the National Broadband Plan and elsewhere.”

Still, it’s clear that whether out of genuine concern or just for more political and legal cover, the Commission is trying to make the case that Comcast casts serious doubt on the Plan, and in particular the FCC’s recommendations for reform of the Universal Service Fund (USF).  (¶¶ 32-38).

Though the NOI politely recites the legal theories posed by several analysts for how USF reform could be done without any reclassification, the FCC is skeptical.  For the first and only time in the NOI, the FCC asks not for general comments on its existing authority to reform Universal Service but for the kind of evidence that would be “needed to successfully defend against a legal challenge to implementation of the theory.”

There is, of course, a great deal at stake.  The USF is fed by taxes paid by consumers as part of their telephone bills, and is used to subsidize telephone service to those who cannot otherwise afford it.  Some part of the fund is also used for the “E-Rate” program, which subsidizes Internet access for schools and libraries.

Like other parts of the fund, E-Rate has been the subject of considerable corruption.  As I noted in Law Four of “The Laws of Disruption,” a 2005 Congressional oversight committee labeled the then $2 billion E-Rate program, which had already spawned numerous criminal convictions for fraud, a disgrace, “completely [lacking] tangible measures of either effectiveness or impact.”

Today the USF collects $8 billion annually in consumer taxes, and there’s little doubt that the money is not being spent in a particularly efficient or useful way.  (See, for example, Cecilia Kang’s Washington Post article this week, “AT&T, Verizon get most federal aid for phone service.”)  The FCC is right to call for USF reform in the National Broadband Plan, and to propose repurposing the USF to subsidize basic Internet access as well as dial tone.  The needs for universal Internet access—employment, education, health care, government services, etc.—are obvious.

But what has this to do with Title II reclassification?  There’s no mention in the NOI of plans to extend the class of services or service providers obliged to collect the USF tax, which is to say there’s nothing to suggest a new tax on Internet access.  But Recommendation 8.10 of the NBP encourages just that.  The Plan recommends that Congress “broaden the USF contributions base” by finding some method of taxing broadband Internet customers.  (Congress has so far steadfastly resisted and preempted efforts to introduce any taxes on Internet access at the federal and state level.)

If Congress agreed with the FCC, broadband Internet access would someday be subject to taxes to help fund a reformed USF.  The bigger the category of providers included under Title II (the most likely collectors of such a tax), the bigger the USF.  The temptation to broaden the definition of affected companies from “facilities based” to something, as the California Public Utilities Commission put it, more “flexible,” would be tantalizing.

***

Other than these minor quibbles, the NOI offers nothing to worry about!

Back on St. Paddy’s Day, I offered a few comments on the “funding gap” identified in the FCC’s just-released national broadband plan. Since then, the FCC has put out a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of inquiry seeking public comment on reforms that would allow its universal service fund to subsidize broadband. The FCC has also released a 137-page technical paper that details how the staff calculated the broadband “availability gap” and funding gap.

So, now there’s more to chew on, and another round of online mastication would be timely given the open FCC proceeding.  Here are three big issues:

1. Definition of broadband

The plan announced a goal of making broadband with actual download speeds of 4 mbps available to all Americans.  In the plan, this goal appeared to be based on the actual average speed of broadband service (4 mbps), even though the median speed is just 3.1 mbps (p. 21). The technical paper, however, also projects that, based on past growth rates in broadband speed, “the median will likely be higher than 4 mbps by the end of 2010.” (p. 43)  Contrary to what I thought back in March, it appears the FCC is justifying the 4 mbps goal based on the median speed, not the average. 

The technical report also argues that 4 mbps is necessary to run high-speed video, which a “growing portion of subscribers” (not including me) apparently use. (p. 43) So, if the broadband plan achieves its goals, every Amercian will have the opportunity to subscribe to Internet access capable of delivering high-quality porn! Fortunately, the technical report uses a different and more productive example — streamed classroom lectures. 

Reasonable people could still question whether the median is the appropriate benchmark to guide government actions intended to equalize broadband access opportunities.  The technical report includes a helpful graphic that shows the most common broadband speed users actually buy is 2 mbps, and 38 percent of all subscribers have speeds of 2 mbps or less. (p. 43) The FCC staff’s model calculates that if the goal were set at 1.5 mbps, the number of “unserved” households would fall from 7 million to 6.3 million, and the required subsidy would fall from $18.6 billion to $15.3 billion. (p. 45) 

If almost half of broadband subscribers have decided that something less than 4 mbps is perfectly adequate, that suggests 4 mbps may go far beyond what is necessary to ensure that all Americans have access to basic broadband service. So, that 4 mbps goal is still questionable.

2. Omission of 3G wireless

The 4 mbps goal allowed the FCC to ignore third generation wireless when it estimated the “availability gap.” The technical paper shows that 95 percent of households have 4 mbps broadband available. About 3 percent of households have no broadband available, while 2 percent have broadband available at speeds ranging from 384 kbps – 3 mbps. (p. 17)  That 2 percent probably includes households with slow DSL and 3G wireless.

The technical paper also revealed that it did not include service from fixed Wireless Internet Service Providers due to data availability. (p. 25) These serve 2 million subscribers in rural areas (p. 66), so the omission potentially accounts for a large chunk of the households considered “unserved.” No telling how many, since apparently the data aren’t available.

Back in March, I guesstimated that the 7 million household “availability gap” might overstate the size of the problem by more than half, simply because 3G wireless is available to 98 percent of American households. Looks like my guesstimate is pretty much in line with the more detailed figures in the FCC technical paper.

 3. Role of satellite

The broadband plan did not count satellite broadband when assessing availability. The technical paper (pp. 89-94)provides a much more detailed explanation of the capacity constraints the FCC staff believes will prevent satellite broadband from serving more than a couple million subscribers.   (The current satellite subscriber base is approximately 900,000.)

The technical paper pointed out that satellites are expensive and take three years to build. (p. 92) To put the time frame in perspective, that’s about as long as the FCC and the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service have been discussing universal service subsidies for broadband. Lord knows we shouldn’t make consumers wait that long!

There is, however, something a little asymmetrical about the way the FCC staff treated satellite and other forms of broadband. The point of estimating the broadband availability gap was to determine how much of a subsidy would be required to induce the private sector to build the infrastructure to close the gap. But while the study assumed that the subsidies would call forth the requisite cable, DSL, and wireless infrastructure within some unnamed but acceptable time frame, it decided that three years is just too long to wait for satellite infrastructure to expand. So, satellite plays a minimal role in the FCC’s plan.

Yet even this minimal role has a big impact. To its credit, the technical paper calculated how satellite broadband could dramatically slash the cost of serving the most expensive 250,000 homes. It estimated (pp. 91-92) that the net present value of subsidies required to serve these homes with satellite would range between $800 million and $2 billion — compared to a $13.4 billion subsidy required to serve these homes with terrestrial broadband. (This implies an annual subsidy of $105-255 million, which is pretty close to my March 17 guesstimate of $100-200 million.)

So, satellite broadband could help prevent costs from skyrocketing, even assuming it plays only the limited role envisioned in the FCC staff’s analysis.

I testified this morning in the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet at a hearing titled, “An Examination of the Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC Universal.” Among those testifying were Comcast Chairman and CEO Brian L. Roberts, and NBC Universal President and CEO Jeff Zucker.  Down below I have attached my brief remarks (we only had 5 minutes), but see the Scribd doc at the very bottom to also see the embedded charts. I also wrote a paper about the proposed deal back in December entitled, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC” as well as this editorial for Forbes.

____________

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Adam Thierer and I am the President of The Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF).

Although we are still early in this process, there has already been a great deal of hand-wringing and even some dire predictions about the pending merger of Comcast and NBC Universal. I hope to put this proposed marriage in some historical context and explain why the deal certainly won’t have the detrimental impact some critics fear, and also explain why it might even be one potential model for how to sustain traditional media going forward.

Beware Media Merger Hysteria

First, let’s remember that we’ve been here before. Paranoid predictions of a media apocalypse have accompanied the announcements of many previous media mergers, from AOL-Time Warner to News Corp.-DirecTV to XM-Sirius.[i] In these cases and almost all others, however, the “sky is falling” claims proved to be greatly overstated.[ii] The only “harm” that one could reasonably claim came from those mergers was not to consumers or content providers, but to the merging firms themselves and their shareholders. That’s because many mergers simply fail to create the sort of synergies and benefits originally hoped for and consequently die of natural causes over time.

Other firms, however, have found ways to make deals work and deliver important new services that previously were unimaginable or simply too expensive to offer alone.[iii] Regardless, the point here is that we’ll never know what works unless we permit marketplace experimentation with new and innovative business models.

“Gatekeeper” Myths: Why Restricting Content Options is Economic Suicide

Second, the fear that Comcast-NBCU will act as a “gatekeeper” over video content is also largely overblown—especially in light of the preemptive concessions they have already made on program access and carriage. But it’s important to realize that the merger will only marginally affect vertical integration in the cable marketplace. Currently, the percentage of cable channels owned by video distributors is in the single digits, and even after this merger it will only be in the teens.[iv] (See Exhibit 1) Stated differently, the vast majority of cable channels will be independent of Comcast-NBCU control.

More importantly, it’s hard to believe the new firm would restrict its content to just Comcast-owned distribution networks since they would be losing the eyeballs, advertisers, and revenues that would accompany the carriage of their content on other video platforms. Likewise, it would make little sense for the firm to block new or competing channels on their own platform since they would incur the wrath of the programmers and the viewing public alike. And those channels will likely quickly find a home elsewhere, which could incentivize subscribers to switch video service providers. (See Exhibits 2-6)

Indeed, the great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find what they want. Comcast faces increasingly robust competition in the video programming marketplace from satellite and telco providers, as well as from Internet-based video providers.^[v] (See Exhibit 7) And NBC Universal’s stable of programming, while impressive, is a mere trickle in an ocean of content that consumers can choose from.^[vi]

Meanwhile, many consumers are increasingly “cutting the cable cord” altogether and instead getting the video they want from a bewildering array of online video services.[vii] Netflix, Hulu, Joost, Roku, Apple, the Sony PlayStation Store, the Microsoft Xbox store, and others offer traditional TV fare while sites like YouTube, Vimeo and Justin.TV offer a mix of professional and amateur content.

In sum, there has never been so much competition for our eyes and ears, and audiences and advertising dollars have become increasingly fragmented as a result.[viii] (See Exhibits 8-10)

What Future for Broadcasting & Local News in Turbulent Times?

Finally, we need to realize that the ongoing digital revolution is upending many traditional media business models—especially advertising supported over-the-air broadcasting—and that alliances like Comcast-NBCU may be one blueprint for how traditional media operators can evolve and compete going forward.  With both the FCC and FTC currently investigating whether journalism is in trouble and what it might take to “save the news,” many media economists and industry analysts seem to agree that at least some degree of consolidation or collaboration might be necessary.

Consider last week’s news that NBC Universal saw quarterly profits plunge by a whopping 30% in the fourth quarter of 2009.[ix] This is indicative of the general downturn the entire media sector has been experiencing as of late.  Why not then let Comcast help NBCU try to get back on track rather than force them to make it on their own in a radically uncertain future?  And it goes without saying that Comcast might be better positioned to protect NBC Universal’s copyrighted content from digital piracy, at least over its own pipes.

Those who are concerned about the future of broadcasting and local news should remember that news—and local broadcast news in particular—isn’t cheap. Unless we want to embark on a massive government subsidization scheme to bailout traditional media providers, Congress and regulatory officials must be willing to grant private media operators the flexibility to restructure their business affairs so they can continue to provide important public needs while also turning a profit.[x] That can’t happen unless we allow media markets to evolve and let operators experiment with new business models and ownership structures.[xi] Although there are no guarantees, creator/distributor alliances like Comcast-NBCU may be one model that helps firms create, extend, and then also monetize their media content.  But, again, regulatory flexibility is crucial so we can figure out what works and what doesn’t.

Thank you again for inviting me here to testify.

[ii] Adam Thierer, A Media Morality Play, Forbes, Dec. 15, 2009, www.forbes.com/2009/12/14/media-merger-antitrust-opinions-contributors-adam-thierer.html

[iii] A good example: Disney’s seamless and successful integration of ABC Television Group (ABC + Disney cable properties), Walt Disney Studios, the Walt Disney Internet Group, its many ESPN properties, and its parks and resorts.

[iv] 2006 is the last for which the FCC has made data available, but as of that time the overall number of national programming networks available in America stood at 565 channels. That is up from just 70 channels in 1990, an astonishing increase in program choices.  The FCC noted that, “Of the 565 networks, 84 (14.9 percent) were vertically integrated, or affiliated, with at least one cable operator.” Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adopts 13^th Annual Report to Congress on Video Competition and Notice of Inquiry for the 14^thAnnual Report, Nov. 27, 2007, at 4, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A1.pdf What that summary fails to mention, however, is that vertical integration has fallen steadily since the FCC’s first Annual Video Competition Report was issued, when over 50 percent of all channels were affiliated with a cable operator. Indeed, the video marketplace exhibits less vertical integration than ever before. As far as vertically integrated industries go, no impartial observer would conclude that this industry is being controlled by “gatekeeper,” pay TV platforms, as some critics suggest. Most new pay TV channels today are independently owned and offer an unprecedented diversity of programming options. This trend is a strong sign of how healthy and vibrantly competitive this marketplace is today. Finally, these numbers do not take into account the split between Time Warner Entertainment and Time Warner Cable, which represented a significant portion of the 15% of vertically owned channels before 2006. That is the percentage of cable channels owned by video distributors is in the single digits today.

[v] Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Competition in a Digital Age, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet, U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Oct. 22, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2009/10-22-09-thierer-testimony-video-competition-digital-age.pdf

[vi] Adam Thierer, The Media Cornucopia, City Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 2007, at 84-89, www.city-journal.org/html/17_2_media.html

[vii] See generally The Progress & Freedom Foundation, “Cutting the Video Cord,” PFF Blog Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/cutting_the_video_cord/

[viii] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, PFF Special Report, Summer 2008), www.pff.org/mediametrics

[ix] David B. Wilkerson, NBC Quarterly Profit Plunges 30%, MarketWatch, Jan. 22, 2010.

[x] W. Kenneth Ferree, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Another Naïve Proposal for Government Entanglement with the Fourth Estate, PFF Blog, Feb. 1, 2010, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2010/02/another_naive_proposal_for_government_entanglement.html;  Adam Thierer, Socializing Media in Order to Save It, City Journal, March 27, 2009, www.city-journal.org/2009/eon0327at.html; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Public Option for Press Should Get the Red Pen, Progress Snapshot 6.4, Jan. 25, 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2010/ps6.4-OP-ED-for-Daily-Caller-A-Public-Option-for-the-Press.html

[xi] W. Kenneth Ferree, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Ownership Proceedings, Testimony before the Federal Communications Commission, Nov. 3, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2009/11-03-09-ferree-media-ownership-testimony.pdf; Adam Thierer, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (The Progress & Freedom Foundation, 2005), www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf

Testimony of Adam Thierer – House Hearing about Comcast-NBC Merger 2-4-10 http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on. True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money. Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_GroupsStatement-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

In a recent PFF paper I argued that “We Are Living in the Golden Age of Children’s Programming,” and showed how, despite incessant complaints by many policymakers:

the overall market for family and children’s programming options continues to expand quite rapidly. Thirty years ago, families had a limited number of children’s television programming options at their disposal on broadcast TV. Today, by contrast, there exists a broad and growing diversity of children’s television options from which families can choose.

I then documented there and in my book, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection:

• the many excellent family- or child-oriented networks available on cable, telco, and satellite television today;
• the growing universe of religious / spiritual television networks;
• the many family or educational programs that traditional TV broadcasters offer; or
• the massive market for interactive computer software or Internet websites for children.

And every time I turn around I find another great show, service, or site for families to choose from.  Earlier today I highlighted the excellent new online video search service, Clicker.com, which is essentially a “TV Guide for the Internet.”  It is absolutely awesome and I highly recommend you play with it. You’ll be instantly hooked if you are TV junkie.

Better yet, Clicker.com offers a wonderful compendium of kid- and family-oriented video programming options. Although the site is still fairly new, you can already find 660 shows and almost 5,000 unique episodes of kids programming there.  A lot of it is just good ‘ol fashion couch potato fare ranging from the old (The Jetsons, Fat Albert, The Flintstones, etc) to the new stuff that you’d find on various cable channels today.  But there’s also plenty of wonderful educational programming to be found on Clicker including shows like Arthur, Sesame Street (over 1,000 episodes), Martha Speaks, The Electric Company, Animal Exploration with Jarod Miller, Jonathan Bird’s Blue World, Postcards From Buster, Science on Brain Pop, Technology on Brain Pop, and more.

Although my kids aren’t really into TV, as they grow older, I bet they’ll be watching a lot more programming via services like Clicker.  Currently, my kids enjoy watching snippets of video via kid-oriented online search portals like KidZui and Glubble.  Such online walled gardens offer a safe place for parents to find terrific online content for their kids.   Bottom line: compared to the miserable state of affairs some of us faced growing up in the 1970s, kids and parents have never had it better in terms of the video programming options at their disposal.

Anyway, some of “kid-vid” issues — including potential expansion of the Children’s Television Act of 1990 — could be up for discussion in the FCC’s new proceeding, “Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving Media Landscape” (MB Docket 09-194).  The FCC just tweeted about it here and I posted my thoughts on where the agency might be heading in this proceeding in this post last month.

The Tennis Channel and ESPN have teamed up to offer live coverage of the US Open online. Not only is this a wonderful thing for consumers, but it also demonstrates just how easily content creators (including traditional television programming networks) can completely bypass cable companies, who once supposedly used their “bottleneck” power to act as “gatekeepers” over the content Americans could receive. If this was ever true, it certainly isn’t true in the era of Internet video!

The venture will, of course, be ad-supported. But just how much content such a  model can support will depend  heavily on whether Internet video programming distributors like this venture (or Hulu.com) will be able to personalize the ads shown on their videos based on the likely interests of users.  Ad industry observer David Hallerman has predicted that spending on behavioral advertising:

is projected to reach $1.1 billion in 2009 and $4.4 billion in 2012 [a quarter of U.S. display advertising].The prime mover behind this rapid increase will be the mainstream adoption of online video advertising, which will increasingly require targeting to make it cost-effective.

The problem isn’t just the expense involved in streaming online video, it’s that contextually targeting advertising (based on keywords) is easy when the content is text but far more difficult when the content is video.

So if you’re hoping to cut the cord to cable and save the expense of a monthly cable subscription, you’d better hope the privacy zealots don’t wipe out advertising model necessary to make Internet video a true substitute for traditional subscription video sources!

The D.C. Circuit has struck down as arbitrary and capricious the FCC’s “cable cap.”  The cap prevented a single cable operator from serving more than 30% of U.S. homes—precisely the same percentage limit struck down by the court in 2001.  The court ruled that the FCC had failed to demonstrate that “allowing a cable operator to serve more than 30% of all cable subscribers would threaten to reduce either competition or diversity in programming.”

The court’s decision rested on the two critical charts (both generated by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer in his excellent Media Metrics special report) at the heart of the PFF amicus brief I wrote with our president, Ken Ferree:

First, the record is replete with evidence of ever increasing competition among video providers: Satellite and fiber optic video providers have entered the market and grown in market share since the Congress passed the 1992 Act, and particularly in recent years. Cable operators, therefore, no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that concerned the Congress in 1992.

Second, over the same period there has been a dramatic increase both in the number of cable networks and in the programming available to subscribers.

Our chart shows the explosion in the number of programmers (though not the total amount of programming), as well as the falling rate of affiliation between cable operators and programmers, which was among the prime factors motivating Congress when it authorized a cable cap in the 1992 Cable Act:

These two charts show how much less defensible the FCC’s 30% cap is now than it was back in 2001. If the Court had needed still more evidence, it could have cited the broader trend towards “Cutting the Video Cord.” As we explained in our amicus brief, viewers are shifting away from cable, satellite and fiber (“Multichannel Video Programming Distributors,” in FCC-speak) towards sites like Hulu and Netflix (which we dubbed “Internet Video Programming Distributors” in the hopes that a familiar-sounding acronym might resonate inside a regulatory agency that can’t even figure out how to stream its own meetings properly). Nothing better demonstrates how the Internet is revolutionizing video distribution than the fact that Hulu.com has actually overtaken TimeWarner cable in viewership:

What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation? [pdf]

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point No. 16.19

Anyone who has spent time following debates about speech and privacy regulation comes to recognize the striking parallels between these two policy arenas. In this paper we will highlight the common rhetoric, proposals, and tactics that unite these regulatory movements. Moreover, we will argue that, at root, what often animates calls for regulation of both speech and privacy are two remarkably elitist beliefs:

1. People are too ignorant (or simply too busy) to be trusted to make wise decisions for themselves (or their children); and/or,
2. All or most people share essentially the same values or concerns and, therefore, “community standards” should trump household (or individual) standards.

While our use of the term “elitism” may unduly offend some understandably sensitive to populist demagoguery, our aim here is not to launch a broadside against elitism as Time magazine culture critic William H. Henry once defined it: “The willingness to assert unyieldingly that one idea, contribution or attainment is better than another.”^[1] Rather, our aim here is to critique that elitism which rises to the level of political condescension and legal sanction. We attack not so much the beliefs of some leaders, activists, or intellectuals that they have a better idea of what it in the public’s best interest than the public itself does, but rather the imposition of those beliefs through coercive, top-down mandates.

That sort of elitism—elitism enforced by law—is often the objective of speech and privacy regulatory advocates. Our goal is to identify the common themes that unite these regulatory movements, explain why such political elitism is unwarranted, and make it clear how it threatens individual liberty as well as the future of free and open Internet. As an alternative to this elitist vision, we advocate an empowerment agenda: fostering an environment in which users have the tools and information they need to make decisions for themselves and their families.

I. The Elitism of Speech Regulation

First, consider how those two elitist beliefs identified above are on display when lawmakers or regulatory advocates make efforts to control speech or content.^[2] Calls to regulate free speech are often premised on the belief that something must be done to “protect The Children.”^[3] Personal and parental responsibility ^[4] are regarded as inadequate safeguards ^[5] since some parents will inevitably fall down on the job by not adequately shielding their children’s eyes and ears from potentially objectionable (or supposedly harmful) speech. Therefore, government must regulate content that is indecent, profane, excessively violent, and so on. The definition of those things is then left to unelected bureaucrats and judges to make on our behalf.

But it’s not just about “The Children.” Some regulatory advocates believe that even the choices made by consenting adults must be disregarded because some people fail to understand the supposedly destructive nature of the speech they are consuming. Government must act to protect people from making what some regulatory advocates regard as destructive or even immoral choices that could bring harm to them or their loved ones.

In sum, regulatory advocates are essentially saying that people cannot be trusted or left to their own devices and, therefore, government must intervene and establish a baseline “community standard” on behalf of the entire citizenry to tell them what‘s best for them.^[6] Even if those citizens have tools and information at their disposal to make sensible decisions about objectionable content, that’s not good enough because they might not do the job properly. Government must do it for them!

II. The Elitism of Privacy Regulation

This same mentality motivates calls for privacy regulations. Those who call for government interventions to “protect privacy” often claim that people too willingly surrender personal information about themselves and that they don’t understand the adverse consequences of those actions.^[7] Alternatively, regulatory advocates claim that advertising and marketing efforts are inherently “manipulative” and that people do not realize they are being duped into surrendering personal information or into buying products or services they supposedly don’t need.^[8] Of course, those regulatory advocates rarely pause to explain to us how it is that they were not also duped and manipulated by the same things—again revealing their deeply-rooted elitism! (As discussed below, this makes it clear how the psychological phenomenon of “third-person effect hypothesis” is driving much of this debate.)

“Protecting The Children” is also used as a rhetorical cover for regulation here, but not as often in debates over speech controls.^[9] Instead, regulatory advocates mostly focus on adults who are presumed not to know what is in their own best interest—necessitating paternalistic government intervention on their behalf.

III. Intellectual Schizophrenia on Both the Left & Right

What is particularly interesting about all this is the way these two issues expose a sort of intellectual schizophrenia at work on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum. Left-leaning policymakers and intellectuals typically decry censorship efforts (except where “commercial speech,” “hate speech” and “bias” are at issue), but are quick to rally around proposals to layer privacy regulations on the Internet. The opposite is often true of many on the Right of the political spectrum: They typically declare privacy regulations to be paternalistic and antithetical to free enterprise (or perhaps just erosive of efforts to legislate morality),^[10] but in the next breath advocate controls on content they find objectionable.

Few on either side stop to consider the relationship between speech and privacy. In fact, they are but two sides of the same coin. After all, what is your “right to privacy” but a right to stop me from observing you and speaking about you?^[11] “Protecting privacy,” therefore, typically means restricting speech rights in the process. Advocates of privacy regulation often insist that the use, processing and collection of information are “conduct” unprotected by the First Amendment, but in fact, the First Amendment broadly protects the gathering and distribution of information as part of the process of communication (“speech”).^[12] Similarly, attempts to “clean up” speech or “protect The Children,” often require regulations that would betray the privacy of adults by expanding the role of government, and impose serious burdens on businesses and markets—such as age verification mandates ^[13] or extensive data retention requirements.^[14]

IV. Common Tactics & Regulatory Mechanisms

The two movements also share common political tactics and regulatory approaches. Privacy advocates generally favor “opt-in” mandates as the federal “baseline standard” for any website collecting information about users, especially their browsing habits (regardless of whether the information is “personally identifiable”). In other words, the law would create a property right in such “personal information” (ironically, many advocates of this approach criticize or reject intellectual property.) In a similar vein, many advocates of speech controls push for mandatory parental control tools or restrictive default settings.^[15] That is, if government won’t censor speech outright, regulatory advocates want lawmakers to at least (1) require that media, computing and communications devices be shipped to market with parental controls embedded or included (as proposed in Australia and with China’s “Green Dam” filter),^[16] and possibly, (2) that such controls be defaulted to their most restrictive position—forcing users to opt-out of the controls later if they want to consume media rated above a certain threshold.

More sophisticated advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation will likely argue that their paternalism is less elitist or intrusive because they merely want to “nudge” the public into making “better” decisions. Economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein (director of President Obama’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, responsible for analyzing most new federal regulations) popularized this approach with their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Based on behavioral economics studies, they argue that both government and private actors must inevitably make decisions about “choice architecture” and that, by setting defaults, incentives and rules smartly, “choice architects” can and should improve decision-making without blocking, fencing-off or significantly burdening choices.^[17]

In this regard, Sunstein and Thaler’s approach parallels the work of Lawrence Lessig, one of the most influential Internet policy thinkers. Lessig has argued that the “architecture” of “code” (how software is written) “regulates” all online activities and requires government oversight and intervention to keep in check. Otherwise, he warned ominously a decade ago, “Left to itself, cyberspace will become a perfect tool of control.”^[18] Lessig’s hyper-pessimistic predictions have proven unwarranted, however. Far from fostering a world of “perfect control,” code and cyberspace have proven remarkably difficult to regulate, but nonetheless has generally benefited consumers and citizens without centralized direction.^[19] Still, Lessig, Sunstein, and others of this ilk persist in their advocacy of “nudges” of many varieties to impose their will on cyberspace through mandates from above.

But while it might be possible to define “better decisions” and argue that poor choice architecture leads people to choose things they clearly don’t want in contexts like investment decisions and mortgages, how can elites know what other people really want in highly subjective contexts like privacy and speech? Should they rely on opinion polls—the highly subjective results of which depend heavily on “choice architecture” of question-crafting—to guess what the right default should be?^[20] Was the Chinese proposal to mandate deployment of “Green Dam” just a harmless “nudge” because users weren’t barred from uninstalling the filtering software that must accompany their computers (i.e., “opting-out”)? The problem becomes even more difficult where trade-offs among competing values are inevitable. For example, data collection about Internet users raises privacy concerns for some but benefits all, creating more funding for “free” content (i.e., speech) and services users prefer by making more valuable the advertising that supports online publishers. In short, regulations of speech and privacy are likely to be pure paternalism, even when billed as “libertarian paternalism as Thaler and Sunstein label their approach.^[21]

What might be called “regulatory blackmail” is also a time-honored tradition among both advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation. When censorship advocates have previously been impeded by the First Amendment, they have worked behind the scenes with lawmakers or regulatory agencies to use indirect pressure and strong-arming tactics to extract “voluntary concessions” from companies or others.^[22] For example, in 2004, the FCC strong-armed radio giant Clear Channel into agreeing to a “voluntary” consent decree that involved taking Howard Stern off the air.^[23] Similarly, in 2008, XM and Sirius Satellite Radio finally agreed to set aside 4% of their system capacity for use by politically favored racial minorities (a kind of speech control) as a “voluntary condition” of their merger—after the FCC had sat on their application for nearly 16 months.^[24] This race-based preference would have been unconstitutional if the FCC had imposed it directly.^[25] While the FTC has been far less prone to such abuse and actually plays a key role in holding companies to their promises, its current Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, has hung the “regulatory sword of Damocles” over the heads of the online advertising industry, threatening them with a “day of reckoning” if he doesn’t get what he wants from industry self-regulatory efforts.”^[26] The sword could actually fall if the FTC turns self-regulation into the European model of “co-regulation,” where the government steers and industry simply rows.^[27]

V. The Crisis Mentality that Drives Regulation

Speech and privacy regulatory advocates share another trait in common: an affinity for the use of a crisis mentality as a method of spurring political action. In his 1995 book The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy, political philosopher and economist Thomas Sowell formulated a model that he argued drives ideological crusades to expand government power over our lives and economy. “The great ideological crusades of the twentieth-century intellectuals have ranged across the most disparate fields,” noted Sowell. But what they all had in common, he argued, was “their moral exaltation of the anointed above others, who are to have their different views nullified and superseded by the views of the anointed, imposed via the power of government.”^[28] These government-expanding crusades shared several key elements, which Sowell identified as follows:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society, a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many, in response to the prescient conclusions of the few.
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes.

We see this model at work on a daily basis today with our government’s various efforts to reshape our economy, but the model is equally applicable to debates over speech controls and privacy regulation. In particular, the various “technopanics”^[29] we have witnessed in recent years fit this model. For example, consider how this model plays out in the debate over online social networking:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [online sexual predators], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [such as mandatory online age verification ^[30] or the Deleting Online Predators Act ^[31]] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [must stop kids and adults from being online together on same sites], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [some state Attorneys General].^[32]
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [child safety researchers and others are told that their research is meaningless or offbase].^[33]

We also see this model in play in other debates, such as efforts to regulate “excessively violent” video games and television programming.^[34] And consider how this model plays out on the privacy front:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [amorphous privacy violations], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [“baseline federal privacy regulation”] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [anyone who shares information online], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [a handful of privacy advocacy groups].
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [any suggestion that privacy concerns are being overblown and that most information-sharing is socially beneficial is dismissed out-of-hand].

Worse yet, regulatory intervention in these cases simply begets more and more intervention to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions.^[35] Thus, the “crisis” cycle never ends.

VI. Third-Person Effect Hypothesis as an Explanation

Something more profound than simple political elitism seems to be at work here, however. A phenomenon psychologists refer to as the “third-person effect hypothesis” can explain many calls for government intervention, especially in the media world.^[36] Simply stated, speech and privacy critics sometimes seem to only see and hear in media or communications what they want to see and hear—or what they don’t want to see or hear. When they encounter perspectives or preferences that are at odds with their own, they are more likely to be concerned about the impact of those things on others throughout society and come to believe that government must “do something” to correct those perspectives. Many people desire regulation because they think it will be good for others, not necessarily for themselves. The regulation they desire has a very specific purpose in mind: “re-tilting” speech or market behavior in their desired direction.

The third-person effect hypothesis was first formulated by W. Phillips Davison in a seminal 1983 article:

In its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves.^[37]

Davison used this hypothesis to explain how media critics on both the Left and Right seemed to simultaneously find “bias” in the same content or reports when they couldn’t possibly both be correct. In reality, their own personal preferences were biasing their ability to fairly evaluate that content. Davison’s article prompted further research by many other psychologists, social scientists, and public opinion experts to test just how powerful this phenomenon was in explaining calls for censorship and other social phenomena.^[38] In these studies, third-person effect has been shown to be the primary explanation for why many people fear—or even want to ban—various types of speech or expression, including news,^[39] misogynistic rap lyrics,^[40] television violence,^[41] video games,^[42] and pornography.^[43] In each case, the subjects surveyed expressed strong misgivings about allowing others to see or hear too much of the speech or expression in question, but greatly discounted the impact of that speech on themselves. Such studies thus reveal the strong paternalistic instinct behind proposals to regulate speech. As Davison notes:

Insofar as faith and morals are concerned… it is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having been adversely affected by the information whose dissemination is to be prohibited. Even the censor’s friends are usually safe from the pollution. It is the general public that must be protected. Or else, it is youthful members of the general public, or those with impressionable minds.^[44]

It’s easy to see how this same phenomenon is at work in debates about privacy. Regulatory advocates imagine their preferences are “correct” (right for everyone) and that the masses are being duped by external forces beyond their control or comprehension, even though the advocates themselves are somehow immune from the brain-washing and privy to some higher truth that the hoi polloi simply cannot fathom. Again, this is Sowell’s “Vision of the Anointed” at work.

Consider the flare-up in 2004 over the introduction of Gmail, Google’s free email service. At a time when Yahoo! mail (then as now the leading webmail provider) offered customers less than 10 megabytes of email storage, Gmail offered an astounding gigabyte of storage that would grow over time (now over 7 GB). Rather than charging some users for more storage or special features, Google paid for the service by showing advertisements next to each email “contextually” targeted to keywords in that email—a far more profitable form of advertising than “dumb banner” ads previously used by other webmail providers.^[45] Self-appointed (or, to extend Sowell’s framework, “self-anointed”) privacy advocates howled that Google was going to “read users’ email,” and led a crusade to ban such algorithmic contextual targeting.^[46] Thierer responded to these critics by pointing out that the service was purely voluntary and noted:

you don’t speak for me and a lot of other people in this world who will be more than happy to cut this deal with Google. So do us a favor and don’t ask the government to shut down a service just because you don’t like it. Privacy is a subjective condition and your value preferences are not representative of everyone else’s values in our diverse nation. Stop trying to coercively force your values and choices on others. We can decide these things on our own, thank you very much.^[47]

Interestingly, however, the frenzy of hysterical indignation about Gmail was followed by a collective cyber-yawn: Users increasingly understood that algorithms, not humans, were doing the “reading” and that, if they didn’t like it, they didn’t have to use it. Today, nearly 150 million of people around the world use Gmail, and it has a steadily growing share of the webmail market. Even though cyber-consumers have embraced the service, some privacy advocates persist in their effort to shut down Gmail. They appear determined to stop at nothing to impose their will on others—the essence of political elitism—even if that means cutting off free email service for 150 million people!^[48]

A similar debate has played out more recently regarding targeted online advertising in general. Advertising on search engines is, much like Gmail, targeted “contextually” based on search terms entered by users and most advertising on other websites is based on the nature of content on a site or page. But certain data is collected about users as they browse to make that advertising more effective—by measuring its performance, reducing fraud, preventing over-exposure, etc. Some privacy advocates have insisted that industry self-regulation of such practices (even if enforced by the FTC) is inadequate and have called for preemptive regulation. They are even more offended by “behavioral advertising” which allows publishers whose content would have little value as the basis for contextually targeting advertising on their own sites to compete for more highly valued advertising by showing ads to users based on other sites they’ve visited. In both cases, data collection can increase the funding available to publishers to produce more of the content and services preferred by users, thus conferring an enormous indirect benefit on users, but also directly benefits users by increasing the relevance of the advertising they see.^[49] For some of the more extreme advocates of privacy regulation, however, there are no trade-offs, only absolutist “solutions:” To them, privacy is so obviously desirable that they feel at ease in deciding what’s best for everyone else. Such absolutists often respond with righteous indignation and conspiratorial fulmination when challenged to identify the harm against which they’re protecting consumers, while disdainfully dismissing all talk of the benefits of online advertising as self-serving industry propaganda.^[50]

VII. The Principled Alternative: Trust People & Empower Them

There is an alternative to this elitist mentality: freedom and personal responsibility. Individuals should be permitted to live a life of their own, even if they sometimes make mistakes or choices that are at odds with what elites think is best for them. ^[51]

Of course, the world isn’t perfect. In an ideal world, adults would be fully empowered to tailor speech and privacy decisions to their own values and preferences. Specifically, in an ideal world, adults (and parents) would have (1) the information necessary to make informed decisions and (2) the tools and methods necessary to act upon that information. Importantly, those tools and methods would give them the ability to not only block the things they don’t like—objectionable content, annoying ads or the collection of data about them—while also finding the things they want.

Achieving that ideal is likely impossible, but the good news is that we are moving closer to it with each passing day. Citizens have more tools and methods at their disposal than ever before which enable them to make decisions for themselves and their families. And this is true for both parental controls ^[52] and privacy controls.^[53]

Of course, some speech and privacy elitists will argue that we can’t trust empowerment tools ( e.g., filters, rating systems, or other controls) that are created by companies or other affected parties. But rather than trying to enhance those tools and educate users about how to use them, these elitists skip right past user empowerment and channel their energies into regulations that would impose a top-down, one-size-fits all standard on all adults and families—or even into trying to craft the perfect “nudge” that will help users make what elites believe to be the “right” decisions. Of course, these tools can, and should, be improved. Those groups worried about speech/content and privacy issues should focus on how we might drive such protections from the bottom-up by empowering individuals instead of government bureaucrats. The goal in both cases should be a “let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom” approach, which offers diverse tools and strategies for our diverse citizenry.^[54] We need not accept “one-size-fits” all approaches, whether they be regulatory mandates or “nudges,” based on the presumption that elites know best.

Finally, it is vital not to lose sight of what’s ultimately at stake here. If regulatory approaches trump the empowerment agenda we have described, the future of a free and open Internet—indeed, as technology converges, the future of all media—is at risk.^[55] By imposing technological solutions from the top-down that can never keep pace with technological change, regulation necessarily forecloses freedom and innovation.^[56] By contrast, individual empowerment allows innovation to flourish. The better approach across the board is education, not regulation.^[57] Empowerment, not elitism, is the path forward. The digital elite should be leading this effort by developing and promoting technologies of empowerment, not crafting regulatory mandates to force their will upon us.^[58]

#

Adam Thierer is a Senior Fellow with The Progress & Freedom Foundation and the director of its Center for Digital Media Freedom. Berin Szoka  is a Senior Fellow with PFF and the Director of PFF’s Center for Internet Freedom.

[1] . William A. Henry, In Defense of Elitism (1995) at 2-3.

[2] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Congress, Content Regulation, and Child Protection: The Expanding Legislative Agenda, Progress Snapshot 4.4, Feb. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.4childprotection.html. Like American courts, we use the term “speech” as a broad catch-all for communications, including both actual speaking as well as other forms of transmitting, as well as receiving, information (“content”).

[3] . See generally Adam Thierer, Don’t Scapegoat Media, USA Today, Dec. 4, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.24scapegoatmedia.html; Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the Children, “Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (2001); Karen Sternheimer, It’s Not the Media: The Truth about Pop Culture’s Influence on Children (2003); Karen Sternheimer, Kids These Days: Facts and Fictions about Today’s Youth (2006).

[4] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, FCC Violence Report Concludes that Parenting Doesn’t Work, PFF Blog, Apr. 26, 2007, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2007/04/fcc_violence_re.html.

[5] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sen. Rockefeller Gives Up on Parenting at Senate Violence Hearing, PFF Blog, June 26, 2007, blog.pff.org/archives/2007/06/sen_rockefeller_1.html.

[6] . Adam Thierer, Conservatives, Porn, and “Community Standards,” The Technology Liberation Front, March 2, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/02/conservatives-porn-and-community-standards.

[7] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate, Progress Snapshot 4.19, Sept. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.19onlinetargeting.html.

[8] . Jeff Chester, for decades the great gadfly of American advertising, has decried “the system … developed to track each and every one of us and our behavior for one-on-one marketing efforts” as “manipulative, intrusive and un-democratic.” Wendy Melillo, Q&A: Chester Writes the Book on Privacy, Dec. 11, 2007, www.gfem.org/node/227. For instance, Chester and other leading “privacy advocates” ridicule the idea of smart phones as a “liberating technology” and insist that,

Despite the glowing words about customization and personalized service, what marketers and advertisers are increasingly offering consumers is merely the illusion of free choice. Mobile operators offer their various options and services, not on an individual basis, but preconfigured according to segmented demographic profiles.

Center for Digital Democracy and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Complaint and Request for Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Mobile Marketing Practices, Jan. 13, 2009 (emphasis original), www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCmobile_complaint0109.pdf. See generally Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?, Progress on Point 16.2, Feb. 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.2targetonlinead.pdf.

[9] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Privacy, Age Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, Progress on Point 16.11, May 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.11-COPPA-and-age-verification.pdf.

[10] . The Supreme Court has used a “right to privacy” to strike down laws against the use of contraception by married couples, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[11] . Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (2000), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop7.15freedomofspeech.pdf.

[12] . See , Amicus Brief for Association Of National Advertisers, Cato Institute, Coalition For Healthcare Communication, Pacific Legal Foundation And The Progress & Freedom Foundation In Support Of Appellants, IMS Health v. Sorrell, No. 09-1913-cv(L), 09-2056-cv(CON) (2nd Cir. 2009), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/071309-Brief-Amici-Curiae-ANA-et-al-Second-Circuit-(09-1913-cv).pdf.

[13] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Social Networking and Age Verification: Many Hard Questions; No Easy Solutions, Progress on Point No. 14.5, March 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ pops/pop14.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf; www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.5ageverification.pdfAdam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Statement Regarding the Internet Safety Technical Task Force’s Final Report to the Attorneys General, Jan. 14, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/090114ISTTFthiererclosingstatement.pdf; Nancy Willard, Why Age and Identity Verification Will Not Work—And is a Really Bad Idea, Jan. 26, 2009, www.csriu.org/PDFs/digitalidnot.pdf; Jeff Schmidt, Online Child Safety: A Security Professional’s Take, The Guardian, Spring 2007, www.jschmidt.org/AgeVerification/Gardian_JSchmidt.pdf.

[14] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Mandatory Data Retention: How Much is Appropriate, PFF Blog, June 26, 2006, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2006/06/mandatory_data.html

[15] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Perils of Mandatory Parental Controls and Restrictive Defaults, Progress on Point 14.4, Apr. 11, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15.4defaultdanger.pdf.

[16] . Adam Thierer, China’s Green Dam Filter and the Threat of Rising Global Censorship, PFF Blog, June 17, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/06/chinas_green_dam_filter_and_threat_of_rising_globa.html

[17] . They define choice architecture as follows: “A structure designed by a choice architect(s) to improve the quality of decisions made by homo sapiens. Often invisible, choice architecture is the specific user-friendly shape of an organization’s policy or physical building when homo sapiens come into contact with it. Examples of choice architecture include a voter ballot, a procedure for handling well-meaning people who forget a deadline, or a skyscraper.” Nudge Glossary of Terms, www.nudges.org/glossary.cfm.

[18] . Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) at 6.

[19] . See Adam Thierer, Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of “Perfect Control,” Cato Unbound, May 2009, www.cato-unbound.org/2009/05/08/adam-thierer/code-pessimism-and-the-illusion-of-perfect-control

[20] . See Solveig Singleton & Jim Harper, With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us, 2001, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299930.

[21] . As Cato Institute scholar Will Wilkinson has argued, the book’s “agreeably banal doctrine of choice-preserving helpfulness” blurs the lines between paternalism and libertarianism, and thus “the thrust of the conceptual renovation behind the term libertarian paternalism is to empower, not limit, political elites.” Why Opting Out Is No “Third Way,” Reason, October 2008, www.reason.com/news/show/128916.html. See also Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sunstein’s “Libertarian Paternalism” is Really Just Paternalism, PFF Blog, April 7, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/04/sunsteins_liber.html.

[22] . See Robert Corn-Revere, “’Voluntary’ Self-Regulation and the Triumph of Euphemism,” in Rationales & Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic Media (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., 1997), at 183-208.

[23] . Telecom Policy Report, Commission Settles Indecency Charges, But At What Cost?, June 30, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_25_2/ai_n6091525.

[24] . See Adam Thierer, XM-Sirius, Regulatory Blackmail, and Diversity, June 17, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/06/xmsirius_regula.html.

[25] . See Comments of W. Kenneth Ferree on Implementation of Sirius-XM Merger Condition, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, MB Docket No. 07-57, March 30, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/033009siriusXMconditionfiling.pdf.

[26] . See Szoka & Adam Thierer, supra note 8 at 3.

[27] . See id. at 2.

[28] . Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (1995) at 5.

[29] . Alice Marwick, To Catch a Predator? The MySpace Moral Panic, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 6-2, June 2008, www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2152/1966; Wade Roush, The Moral Panic over Social Networking Sites, Technology Review, Aug. 7, 2006, www.technologyreview.com/communications/17266; Anne Collier, Why Techopanics are Bad, Net Family News, April 23, 2009, www.netfamilynews.org/2009/04/why-technopanics-are-bad.html; Adam Thierer, Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics,’ Inside ALEC, July 2009, at 16-17, www.alec.org/am/pdf/Inside_July09.pdf; Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Technopanics and the Great Social Networking Scare, PFF Blog, June 10, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/07/10/technopanics-and-the-great-social-networking-scare.

[30] . Supra note 13.

[31] . In the 109th Congress, former Rep. Michael Fitzpatrick (R-PA) introduced the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on social networking sites in public schools and libraries. DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a lopsided 410-15 vote, but failed to pass the Senate. The measure was reintroduced just a few weeks into the 110th Congress by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the ranking minority member and former chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. It was section 2 of a bill that Sen. Stevens sponsored titled the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act” (S. 49), but was later removed from the bill. See Declan McCullagh, Chat Rooms Could Face Expulsion, CNet News.com, July 28, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6099414.html?part=rss&tag=6099414&subj=news.

[32] . See Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, MySpace Receives More Pressure to Limit Children’s Access to Site, Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2006, online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115102268445288250-YRxkt0rTsyyf1QiQf2EPBYSf7iU_20070624.html; Susan Haigh, Conn. Bill Would Force MySpace Age Check, Yahoo News.com, March 7, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17502005.

[33] . See, e.g., Letter of Henry McMaster, Attorney General, South Carolina to Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and Attorney General Roy Cooper Regarding Internet Safety Task Force (“ISTTF”) Report, January 14, 2009, www.scag.gov/newsroom/pdf/2009/internetsafetyreport.pdf

[34] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Games and “Moral Panic,” PFF Blog, Jan. 23, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/01/video_games_and_moral_panic.html ; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Fact and Fiction in the Debate over Video Game Regulation, Progress Snapshot 13.7, March 2006, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.7videogames.pdf.

[35] . “All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.” Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, at 858 (3rd ed. 1963) (1949).

[36] . See generally Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 119-123, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf (Explaining how the third-person effect serves as a powerful explanation for the heated backlash that followed an FCC effort to moderately liberalize media ownership rules in 2003-04).

[37] . W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 Public Opinion Quarterly 1, Spring 1983, at 3.

[38] . For the best overview of third-person effect research, see Douglas M. McLeod, Benjamin H. Detenber, and William P. Eveland., Jr., Behind the Third-Person Effect: Differentiating Perceptual Processes for Self and Other, 51 Journal of Communication, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2001, at 678-695.

[39] . Vincent Price, David H. Tewksbury & Li-Ning Huang, Third-person Effects of News Coverage: Orientations Toward Media, Journalism & Mass Communications Quarterly, Vol. 74, at 525-540.

[40] . Douglas M. McLeod, William P. Eveland & Amy I. Nathanson, Support for Censorship of Violent and Misogynic Rap Lyrics: And Analysis of the Third-Person Effect, Communications Research, Vol. 24, 1997, at 153-174.

[41] . Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber, For the Good of Others: Censorship and the Third-Person Effect, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 8, 1996, at 163-186.

[42] . James D. Ivory, Addictive, But Not For Me: The Third-Person Effect and Electronic Game Players’ Views Toward the Medium’s Potential for Dependency and Addiction, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Aug. 2002.

[43] . Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The Third-person Perception and Support for Censorship of Pornography, Journal of Communication, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1995, at 27-38

[44] . Supra note 37 at 14. Along these lines, a December 2004 Washington Post article documented the process by which the Parents Television Council, a vociferous censorship advocacy group, screens various television programming. One of the PTC screeners interviewed for the story talked about the societal dangers of various broadcast and cable programs she rates, but then also noted how much she personally enjoys HBO’s “The Sopranos” and “Sex and the City,” as well as ABC’s “Desperate Housewives.” Apparently, in her opinion, what’s good for the goose is not good for the gander! See Bob Thompson, Fighting Indecency, One Bleep at a Time, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2004, at C1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49907-2004Dec8.html.

[45] . See Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price at 112-118 (2009).

[46] . See Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Beth Givens, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Pam Dixon, World Privacy Forum, to California Attorney General Lockyer, May 3, 2004, http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/agltr5.3.04.html.

[47] . See email from Adam Thierer to Declan McCullaugh on Politech Email discussion group, April 30, 2004, http://lists.jammed.com/politech/2004/04/0083.html (emphasis added).

[48] . See Complaint and Request for Injunction of the Electronic Privacy Information Center against Google, Inc., March 17, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf; see also Ryan Radia, Should the FTC Shut Down Gmail and Google Docs Because of an Already-Fixed Bug?, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 18, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/18/should-the-ftc-shut-down-gmail-and-google-docs-because-of-an-already-fixed-bug/.

[49] . See Berin Szoka & Mark Adams, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Benefits of Online Advertising & the Costs of Regulation, PFF Working Paper, forthcoming.

[50] . Anti-advertising crusader Jeff Chester often resorts to questioning the motives of those who question whether his regulatory prescriptions would actually benefit consumers, see, e.g., http://techliberation.com/2009/06/17/behavioral-advertising-industry-practices-hearing-some-issues-that-need-to-be-discussed/#comment-11698840. See generally Jeff Chester, Digital Destiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy (2007).

[51] . “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1859, 1986) at 72.

[52] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection, Special Report, Version 4.0, Summer 2009, www.pff.org/parentalcontrols.

[53] . Adam Thierer, Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Privacy Solutions, PFF Blog, Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/privacy_solutions.

[54] . Comments of Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, In the Matter of Implementation of the Child Save Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming; MB Docket No. 09-26, April 16, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/041509-%5bFCC-FILING%5d-Adam-Thierer-PFF-re-FCC-Child-Safe-Viewing-Act-NOI-(MB-09-26).pdf.

[55] . See Adam Thierer, FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age, Engage, Feb. 20, 2009, www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090216_ThiererEngage101.pdf

[56] . “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.” Friedrich von Hayek, “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in The Essence of Hayek, (Hoover Inst., 1984), at 276.

[57] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Two Sensible, Education-Based Legislative Approaches to Online Child safety, Progress Snapshot 3.10, Sept. 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2007/ps3.10safetyeducationbills.pdf.

[58] . See, e.g., Berin Szoka, Google, CDT, Online Advertising & Preserving Persistent User Choice Across Ad Networks Through Plug-ins, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 13, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/ 03/13/google-cdt-online-advertising-preserving-persistent-user-choice-across-ad-networks-through-plug-ins/.

The latest edition (Version 4.0) of my PFF special report on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now up.  For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education and media literacy efforts, and various other tools, methods, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety.  After evaluating that state of this market, I conclude: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”  Moreover, I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation.

Version 4.0 of the report is now over 250 pages long (up from 200 pages in Version 3.0) and it contains almost 70 exhibits (up from 50), 725 references (up from roughly 500), and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. Other new sections or appendices have also been added to the report, including:

• a new section examining how many households really need parental control tools;
• a new appendix on the downsides of mandatory parental controls and restrictive default settings;
• a new section on the dangers of “deputizing the online middleman” solution as an approach to solving child safety concerns;
• a new appendix reviewing the findings of 5 past online safety task forces;
• … and much more.

I issue major updates once a year and 1 or 2 minor tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety marketplace and debate. The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past couple of years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

The Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing yesterday where a number of Senators as well as Julius Genachowski, the new Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, did a lot of fretting about the state of the modern children’s television programming marketplace.  According to the Wall Street Journal, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV):

suggested that a “little red button” be required on TVs so that a child could push the button to find out how a show is rated. Democratic Sen. Mark Pryor of Arkansas agreed that a red button might help since parents often have difficulties figuring out which shows are appropriate for their children to watch.

Well, I have some good news for the Senators: There are already quite a few little buttons on every remote control made today, and at least one of those buttons can pull up an on-screen guide to get more program info! (Another of them can turn the TV off!) Moreover, the ratings for just about every program already appear at the beginning of each show, and sometimes in between. And you can find out plenty more online about every TV show under the sun if you care to look.  So, I’m not sure what that fuss is all about, and we certainly don’t need to mandate “little red buttons” on every TV set when program information can be found in so many other ways.

What is more troubling about all the hand-wringing taking place at the hearing, as well as the talk of reopening the Children’s Television Act of 1990 to potentially impose more content mandates on video programmers and distributors, is that: (1) there doesn’t seem to be much appreciation for just how much wonderful children’s programming is out there today compared to the past, and (2) there doesn’t seem to be much recognition of the serious First Amendment issues at stake when government gets involved in the messy business of regulating video programming.

On that first point, let me just reiterate what I have found after conducting an exhaustive survey of the market for children’s programming in my ongoing PFF special report, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.  I found that the overall market for family and children’s programming options continues to expand quite rapidly. Thirty years ago, families had a limited number of children’s television programming options at their disposal on broadcast TV.  Today, by contrast, there exists a broad and growing diversity of children’s television options from which families can choose. The list below highlights just some of the more popular family- or child-oriented networks available on cable, telco, and satellite television today. And this list continues to grow rapidly.

• ABC Family Channel (http://abcfamily.go.com)
• Animal Planet (http://animal.discovery.com)
• Anime Network (www.theanimenetwork.com)
• Black Family Channel (www.blackfamilychannel.com)
• Boomerang (www.cartoonnetwork.com/tv_shows/boomerang)
• Cartoon Network (www.cartoonnetwork.com)
• Discovery Channel (www.discovery.com)
• Discovery Kids (http://kids.discovery.com)
• Disney Channel (www.disney.go.com/disneychannel)
• Encore WAM!
• Familyland Television Network (www.familyland.org/content/Content.aspx?CategoryID=51)
• FUNimation (www.funimation.com)
• Hallmark Channel (www.hallmarkchannel.com)
• Hallmark Movie Channel (www.hallmarkmoviechannel.com)
• HBO Family (www.hbofamily.com)
• History Channel (www.history.com)
• KTV – Kids & Teens Television (www.ktvzone.com)
• Learning Channel (http://tlc.discovery.com)
• National Geographic Channel (http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel)
• Nickelodeon (www.nick.com)
• Nick 2
• Nick Toons (http://nicktoonsnetwork.nick.com/home.html)
• Noggin (www.noggin.com)
• N Channel (www.the-n.com)
• PBS (www.pbs.org)
• PBS Kids (http://pbskids.org/go)
• Science Channel (http://science.discovery.com)
• Showtime Family Zone
• Sprout (www.sproutonline.com)
• Starz! Kids and Family (http://www.starz.com/appmanager/seg/s?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=starz_kids_family)
• Toon Disney (http://psc.disney.go.com/abcnetworks/toondisney)
• Varsity World (www.varsityworld.com)

Importantly, this list does not include the growing universe of religious / spiritual television networks. Nor does it include the many family or educational programs that traditional TV broadcasters offer. Finally, the list does not include the massive market for interactive computer software or websites for children.  All of this begs the obvious question: What more is it that policymakers want?

More offerings are always welcome, of course.  But, on a personal note, as the parents of two young kids (ages 5 and 7), my wife and I regularly struggle to sort through all the wonderful video programming options at our disposal.  We often find ourselves swimming through an ocean of choices available from our local broadcasters and multichannel video provider. Moreover, our kids are spending an increasing amount of time watching snippets of video via kid-oriented online search portals like KidZui and Glubble. Such online walled gardens offer a safe place for parents to find terrific online content for their kids.

I have to admit, all the choices my kids have today have left me a bit jealous!  I grew up in small central Illinois town with a couple of crummy (Iowa-based!) broadcast stations that were barely visible on our TV (and usually only when my Dad made me hold the antenna and stick my arms up in the air to get reception!) There was also one local cinema in town that usually showed old movies from the ‘50s and ‘60s that few kids cared to see.  And that was generally the extent of video choices for kids in our town.  Sure, the 1970s brought us Sesame Street as well as Mister Rogers (if that was your cup of tea).  Today, however, we still have those shows and much, much more.  Our kids now enjoy an unprecedented cornucopia of media alternatives and, contrary to what some policymakers would have us believe, many of them are extremely high-quality in nature.  My parents would have likely given anything to just have even one network as incredibly enriching as Noggin at their disposal in the ‘60s and ‘70s.  Instead, on the occasions that the TV had to become a babysitter and nothing worthwhile was on the tube, I usually ended up watching trashy soap operas.  (Don’t even get me started on “Days of Our Lives.” I could write a short history of the show’s 1975-1982 seasons!)

Speaking of trashy shows, there was a lot of talk at yesterday’s hearing about the “need to protect our children from harmful content,” as Sen. Rockefeller began the hearing by arguing.  But as I have shown in my parental controls report, not only are there more and better quality options to steer your kids toward today, but it is easier than ever before to steer them right to those preferred options and lock down everything else in sight.  As I concluded in that report:

there has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children. […] parents now have [many tools and techniques] at their disposal to better control media content and raise their children as they see fit. That is not to say that media and communications technologies don’t continue to play a major role in our society and culture. But… parents have been empowered with tools, controls, strategies, and information, that can help them devise and then enforce a media plan for their families that is in line with their own values.

So, again, it must be asked: What is the problem here?

Finally, it should be noted that any effort by Congress or the FCC to tinker with video programming marketplace will eventually run up against serious First Amendment concerns and eventual court challenges.  In a previous session of Congress, before he became Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Sen. Rockefeller aggressively pushed for expanded content controls, not just for broadcast television, but for cable and satellite platforms as well.  In a 2005 PFF report on Sen. Rockefeller’s “Indecent and Gratuitous and Excessively Violent Programming Control Act of 2005,” First Amendment attorney Robert Corn-Revere of the law firm Davis Wright Tremaine argued that efforts to expand the horizons of FCC regulation to cover more content and platforms “would be almost certain to fail a constitutional challenge.”  Likewise, in a 2007 PFF white paper, constitutional law expert Laurence H. Tribe of the Harvard Law School, noted that the old “it’s-for-the-children” rationale for such content regulation is exactly backwards:

the malleability of children—how easy it is to mold their minds and to influence them—counts against and not in favor of centralized governmental controls. One of the arguments that you will often find is, yes, it’s all very well to believe in free speech between consenting adults but we’re talking about kids here and their minds are like plastic and they are being molded and shaped and, therefore, we have greater power to protect them. Therefore, you should keep your hands off them because they are so easy to shape. No, no, no. The argument is not that kids are malleable and therefore, Big Brother should be empowered. The argument is that kids are malleable and, therefore, families should be empowered. Parental authority should be at the center of decision making.

Indeed. And, as already noted, parents have more tools and strategies to exercise that authority than ever before, as well as more programming options to choose from. Policymakers should be celebrating these modern media marketplace developments, not bemoaning them.  We are blessed to be living in the Golden Age of children’s video programming.

I’ve just had a new article published by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in which I make the case against “techno-panics,” which refers to public and political crusades against the use of new media or technologies by the young. The article is entitled “Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics‘” and it appears in the July 2009 Inside ALEC newsletter.  This is something I have spent a lot of time writing about here in recent years (See 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and I finally got around to putting it altogether in a concise essay here.  I have pasted the full text below. [And I just want to send a shout-out to my friend Anne Collier of Net Family News.org, whose work on this topic has been very influential on my thinking.]

“Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics‘” by Adam Thierer

A cursory review of the history of media and communications technologies reveals a reoccurring cycle of “techno-panics” — public and political crusades against the use of new media or technologies by the young.  From the waltz to rock-and-roll to rap music, from movies to comic books to video games, from radio and television to the Internet and social networking websites, every new media format or technology has spawned a fresh debate about the potential negative effects they might have on kids.

Inevitably, fueled by media sensationalism and various activist groups, these social and cultural debates quickly become political debates. Indeed, each of the media technologies or outlets mentioned above was either regulated or threatened with regulation at some point in its history. And the cycle continues today. During recent sessions of Congress, countless hearings were held and bills introduced on a wide variety of media and content-related issues. These proposals dealt with broadcast television and radio programming, cable and satellite television content, video games, the Internet, social networking sites, and much more.  State policymakers, especially state Attorneys General (AGs), have also joined in such crusades on occasion.  The recent push by AGs for mandatory age verification for all social networking sites is merely the latest example.

What is perhaps most ironic about these techno-panics is how quickly yesterday’s boogeyman becomes tomorrow’s accepted medium, even as the new villains replace old ones.  For example, the children of the 1950s and 60s were told that Elvis’s hip shakes and the rock-and-roll revolution would make them all the tools of the devil. They grew up fine and became parents themselves, but then promptly began demonizing rap music and video games in the ‘80s and ‘90s.  And now those aging Pac Man-era parents are worried sick about their kids being abducted by predators lurking on MySpace and Facebook. We shouldn’t be surprised if, a decade or two from now, today’s Internet generation will be decrying the dangers of virtual reality.

These techno-panics are almost always disproportionate to the real risk posed by new media and technology, which typically do not have the corrupting influence on youth that older generations fear.  Parents and public policymakers alike need to remember they were once kids, too, and managed to live through many of the same fears and concerns about media and popular culture. As the late University of North Carolina journalism professor Margaret A. Blanchard once noted: “[P]arents and grandparents who lead the efforts to cleanse today’s society seem to forget that they survived alleged attacks on their morals by different media when they were children. Each generation’s adults either lose faith in the ability of their young people to do the same or they become convinced that the dangers facing the new generation are much more substantial than the ones they faced as children.” And Thomas Hine, author of The Rise and Fall of the American Teenager, argues that: “We seem to have moved, without skipping a beat, from blaming our parents for the ills of society to blaming our children. We want them to embody virtues we only rarely practice. We want them to eschew habits we’ve never managed to break.”

The better response by both parents and policymakers is a measured and balanced approach to children’s exposure to media content and online interactions.  All-or-nothing extremes are never going to work.  In particular, techno-panics are hopelessly counter-productive. “Fear, in many cases, is leading to overreaction, which in turn could give rise to greater problems as young people take detours around the roadblocks we think we are erecting,” argue John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, authors of Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives. What parents, educators, and policymakers need to understand, they argue, “is that the traditional values and common sense that have served them well in the past will be relevant in this new world, too.”

Most simply, we need to be willing to talk to our kids about the new technologies and cultural developments that shape their generation. When we as parents (or policymakers) do not fully comprehend or appreciate the new-fangled gadget in our kids’ pocket—or whatever they are playing, watching, or listening to on it—instead of engaging in demagoguery and driving a wedge between us and them, we should instead invite them to have a conversation with us about it.  Ask three simple questions to get that conversation started: “What is this new thing all about?”  “Tell me how you use it.”  “Why is it important to you?”  Once you’ve got them talking to you, good ‘ol fashion common sense and timeless parenting principles should kick in. “Do you understand why too much of this might be bad for you?” “Will you please come talk to me if you don’t understand something you’ve seen or heard?” And so on.

In sum, it’s about parental responsibility and rational, measured responses. The “techno-panic” mentality, by contrast, creates distrust and distance between our kids and us. As Anne Collier of Net Family News notes, techno-panics “cause fear, which interferes with parent-child communication, which in turn puts kids at greater risk.”

Parents and policymakers need to engage kids in an ongoing conversation about the technologies du jour—even when we don’t fully understand or appreciate them.

————— [printable Scribd version follows] —————

“Against Techno-Panics” by Adam Thierer, PFF (July 2009 – Inside ALEC) http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=17392730&access_key=key-2gdkqylyeu5h376buyyi&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

As anyone who has spent time searching for comments on the FCC’s website can tell you, the agency doesn’t exactly have the most user-friendly website.  In the interest of making it easier for others to read the comments that came in last week in the agency’s “Child Safe Viewing Act” Notice of Inquiry, I have compiled all the major comments (those over 3 or 4 pages) and provided links to them below the fold.

Again, this proceeding was required under the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of the bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB 09-26) is to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.”  I filed 150+ pages worth of comments in this matter last week, and here’s my analysis of why this bill and the FCC’s proceeding are worth monitoring closely.

• Association of National Advertisers (ANA)
• AT&T
• Center for Democracy & Technology (Individual Comments)
• CDT (Joint Comments with other Public Interest Groups)
• Children’s Media Policy Coalition
• Coalition for Independent Ratings
• Comcast
• Common Sense Media
• Consumer Electronic Association (CEA)
• CTIA – The Wireless Association
• Cox Communications
• CustomPlay
• Digimarc Corp
• Digital Watermarking Alliance
• Digital Media Association
• Dish Network
• DirecTV
• Entertainment Software Association (ESA)
• Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI)
• Google (+ attachments A, B, C)
• Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)
• Microsoft
• NAB + NCTA + MPAA (0n TV Guidelines)
• National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA)
• Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF)
• Sanyo
• Smart Television Alliance
• Sprint-Nextel
• TiVo
• TV Guardian
• TV Watch
• U.S. Telecom Association
• Verizon & Verizon Wireless
• Wi-LAN V-Chip Corp

Today I filed comments with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its proceeding examining the marketplace for “advanced blocking technologies.”  This proceeding was required under the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of the bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB 09-26) is to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.”  My colleagues will no doubt laugh about the fact that I have dropped an absurd 150 pages worth of comments on the FCC in this matter, but I had a lot to say on this topic!  Parental controls, child safety, and free speech issues have been the focus of much of my research agenda over the past 10 years.

In my filing, I argue that the FCC should tread carefully in this matter since the agency has no authority over most of the media platforms and technologies described in the Commission’s recent Notice of Inquiry.  Moreover, any related mandates or regulatory actions in in this area could diminish future innovation in this field and would violate the First Amendment rights of media creators and consumers alike.  The other major conclusions of my filing are as follows:

• There exists an unprecedented abundance of parental control tools to help parents decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.
• There is a trade-off between complexity and convenience for both tools and ratings, and no parental control tool is completely foolproof.
• Most homes have no need for parental control technologies because parents rely on other methods or there are no children in the home.
• The role of household media rules and methods is underappreciated and those rules have an important bearing on this debate.
• Parental control technologies work best in combination with educational efforts and parental involvement.
• The search for technological silver-bullets and “universal” solutions represent a quixotic, Holy Grail-like quest and it will destroy innovation in this marketplace.
• Enforcement of “household standards” made possible through use of parental controls and other methods negates the need for “community standards”-based content regulation.

My entire filing can be found here and down below in a Scribd reader.  All comments in the matter are due tomorrow and then reply comments are due on May 18th.

[FCC FILING] Adam Thierer-PFF Re Child Safe Viewing Act NOI (MB 09-26) http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=14264143&access_key=key-2nrvjm96q9cl5vep567l&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Today, it was my great privilege to guest lecture at Princeton University’s Center for Information Technology Policy. Under the leadership of Ed Felten, who also runs the excellent “Freedom to Tinker” blog, the CITP has quickly become one of America’s premier institutions in the field of IT policy matters. David Robinson, who some of you will remember from his days as an editor at The American, serves as associate director of the CITP program and was kind enough to invite me to speak.  And our own Tim Lee is currently studying there as well.  I wish I was smart enough to get into that program!

The topic of my talk was “The Future of the First Amendment in an Age of Technological Convergence” and I used the opportunity to create a narrated video of this presentation, which I have made to several other groups through the years. In this presentation, I talk about “America’s First Amendment Twilight Zone,” which refers to the fact that identical words and images are being regulated in completely different ways today depending on the mode of transmission. This illogical and unfair situation could eventually threaten the Internet, video games, and all new media with many of the misguided regulations that have long been imposed on broadcast television and radio operators. In my presentation, which you can watch below, I make the case for changing our First Amendment regime to ensure “bit equality”; all speech and media platforms should be accorded the gold standard of First Amendment protection.

The presentation is based upon several other essays, court filings, and law review articles I have written on the topic, including:

• “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age,” by Adam Thierer, 7/10/07.
• “FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age,” by Adam Thierer, 1/20/09.
• Joint Amicus Brief of The Center for Democracy & Technology and The Progress & Freedom Foundation, U.S. Supreme Court in the matter of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, by Adam Thierer, John B. Morris, Jr., and Sophia Cope, August 8, 2008

There was a hearing today in the House Energy and Commerce Committee on “Reauthorization of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act,” which got into the sticky of issue of whether must carry mandates should be applied to satellite television (DBS) operators. My boss, Ken Ferree, president of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, testified in opposition to that notion. Here’s what he had to say about proposals that would require satellite operators to carry local broadcast TV stations from even the smallest markets:

Because Congress cannot repeal the laws of physics, there are only two ways in which a satellite company might comply with such a mandate: 1) it may add capacity (i.e., launch new satellites and build associated ground equipment), or 2) it may convert capacity currently used for other purposes to local television carriage in the most sparsely populated parts of the country. Neither approach makes economic sense. That is, these proposals, if they were to become law, would impose considerable costs on satellite operators while generating no appreciable revenue.

Building and launching new satellites in order to carry local television stations in the smallest markets would of course cost hundreds of millions of dollars, while the return on such an investment, without any doubt, would be negligible. On the other hand, satellite television operators make capacity decisions in order to maximize net revenue. If they are required to delete program services that are profitable to make room for those that are less so, they necessarily lose in the transaction. Indeed, if delivering local television signals in the smallest markets made sound business sense, the satellite companies would be doing so already and no legal mandate would be necessary. Moreover, and fatally for any such proposal, requiring DBS companies to provide local signals (effectively adopting a satellite must-carry requirement) would almost certainly be unconstitutional. Cable must-carry was upheld by the Supreme Court by a bare majority only because there was a voluminous record suggesting that weaker broadcast stations would fail absent a cable must-carry requirement, thus depriving over-the-air viewers of additional video programming choices. There is no similar record, nor any reason to believe that one might be assembled, suggesting that the same would hold true absent some enhanced satellite carriage rule. Carriage requirements impose significant burdens on the commercial and First Amendment rights of those bound by them. In the current environment, imposing enhanced carriage mandates on DBS operators would be unwarranted, economically indefensible, and unconstitutional.

Digital video recorders (DVRs) may turn out to be the “last gasp” of cable, satellite and other traditional multichannel subscription video providers.  If users can get the same basic functionality (on demand viewing of the shows they want) over the Internet for free or paying for each show rather than a hefty monthly subscription, Who Needs a DVR?, as Nick Wingfield at the WSJ asks:

Among a more narrow band of viewers -– 18- to 34-year-olds -– SRG found that 70% have watched TV online in the past. In contrast, only 36% of that group had watched a show on a TiVo or some other DVR at any time in the past. That last figure is a fairly remarkable statistic. Remember that DVRs have the advantage of playing video back on a device where the vast majority of television consumption has traditionally occurred –- that is, the TV set. Although it’s also possible to watch shows over the Internet on a TV set through a device like Apple TV and Microsoft’s Xbox 360, most people watch online TV shows through their computers — which have inherent disadvantages, like smaller screens and, in most cases, no remote controls.

Indeed, if users are going to buy a piece of hardware, why buy a DVR when they can buy a Roku box or a game console like the XBox 360 that will put Internet-delivered TV on their programming on their “television” (a term that increasingly simply means the biggest LCD in the house, or the one that faces a couch instead of an office chair)— and save money?

This is precisely the point Adam Thierer and I have been hammering away at in this ongoing series.  The availability of TV through the Internet and the ease with which consumers can display that content on a device, and at a time, of their choosing are quickly breaking down the old “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” power of cable.  Let’s see how long it takes Congress and the FCC to realize that the system of cable regulation created in the analog 1990s no longer makes sense in this truly digital age.

Just before the New Year, Mike Masnick reported:

It’s been well over five years since we first heard about a plan in Oregon to attach GPS devices to cars and tax drivers based on how much they drove and the idea hasn’t become any better in the intervening years… but apparently it’s still being pushed. Oregon’s governor is trying to move forward with the plan.  One of the reasons behind the bill has nothing to do with a more efficient way to tax drivers, but because the state is gaining less revenue from its gas tax since there are more fuel-efficient cars on the roads these days. Of course, rather than reward drivers for driving more fuel efficient cars, this sort of tax punishes them, and actually encourages the use of less fuel efficient vehicles. And, of course, that doesn’t even begin to get into the potential (and likely) privacy problems brought about by any system whereby the government has full access to a GPS system on your car.

This is a great example of the problems that often arise when trying to bring into the digital age areas of the economy monopolized or dominated by government.  There’s a clear (if imperfect) analogy here to Obama’s ambitious goal of digitizing health records:  both are great ideas that raise special privacy concerns because of the heavy involvement of government.  These privacy concerns are certainly not unwarranted:  I wouldn’t want the government to have access to my car’s location or my medical history at any given moment or a complete record of where I’ve driven or what doctors I’ve seen.  But just as relying on paper health records is clearly stupid (and dangerous), it would make a hell of a lot more sense for drivers to pay for road use depending on “where, when and how far they drove”—as in a small pilot project in the UK.

Today, state and Federal taxes on every gallon of gasoline are intended to serve two conflicting purposes—but do a poor job with both.  First, the taxes fund the cost of building and maintaining roads.  But the tax provides only a very rough proxy for how much driving Americans are doing, and says nothing about which roads are actually being used or when.  So government road planners have to guess at which roads need to be upgraded or where new roads are required.  Worse, the current system does nothing to encourage rational decisions on the part of drivers, who currently have no direct economic incentive (other than saving time) not to drive during rush hour or to use less-congested roads.

Second, the current tax system is what economists would call “Pigouvian“: it is intended to correct the negative externalities (air pollution) caused by driving.  But, again, taxing total gallons of gas consumed is a poor proxy for emissions.  As Cato’s Jerry Taylor points out (start podcast at 1:33), cars are already sufficiently computerized that if we really wanted to punish pollution through the tax system, we could directly tax emissions themselves by having each car keep track of unhealthy emissions and then uploading that data, say, at the car’s annual inspection.

So in a rational world, we’d abolish gasoline taxes entirely and institute user fees to fund the cost of roads & highways that reflect actual use.   If government insists on it, we could also tax emissions directly.  (We could make the whole transition revenue-neutral, lest this reform result in higher taxes/fees.)  Merely by reducing congestion, better economic incentives could significantly reduce air pollution.

If roads weren’t run by government monopolies, this kind of change would have happened a long time ago.  Although many people associate toll booths with road privatization, no private business would ever choose a technology as cumbersome (and costly) as toll booths if they had the option of using a system as seamless and invisible to the user as GPS-tracking or even existing transponder-based systems ( e.g.,  E-Z Pass, FasTrak).  Maybe there’s a more efficient or privacy-friendly option out there, or at least on the horizon.  I don’t know, but I suspect competing road operators would figure it out.

Some drivers might still be uncomfortable with the idea of a private company having access to their driving data, but that private company would have a strong incentive to compete for privacy-sensitive drivers by offering strong data protection policies (such as data anonymization and retention limits), which would of course be enforced under the FTC’s existing “unfair & deceptive trade practices.”

But because government has virtually monopolized the road system, we’re stuck with a terrible choice:

• Continue to use a “pricing” (tax) system from the 1950s when modern satellite and computer technology offers us clearly superior alternatives that could reduce congestion and pollution and perhaps even save lives; OR
• Risk putting the data created by those modern technologies directly into the government’s hands.

It’s a hard choice.  I don’t know what the right answer is—other than privatizing the roads, enforcing corporate privacy policies strictly under existing law, and increasing Fourth Amendment protections against government access to user data kept by companies.  Since road privatization is unlikely to happen in an era when we are (re)nationalizing core industries through bailouts, I suspect that we’ll end up having to choose either technology (with all its benefits)  or privacy, when we should be able to have both.

President Obama has talked about “investing” $50 billion in tax money over the next five years to subsidize the digitization of health records.  While one might hope that these records wouldn’t be directly accessible to government in the same way that driving records would be under the Oregon or UK projects, it’s by no means clear that this won’t be the case, given the Federal government’s dominant role in the health care sector.  If the Golden Rule (“He Who Has the Gold, Makes the Rules”) holds, increased government spending on health care across the board—whether in the name of e-Health or universal health—will surely lead to greater government control of the health care system.  That will probably mean greater access to e-health records.  If politicians can access FBI files of their opponents, they’ll probably abuse access to health care records, too.  No safeguards are ever perfect, of course, and invasions of privacy would happen if the data were kept by private companies, but at least those companies would be accountable in court, in the court of public opinion and in the marketplace if they allowed such violations by their employees or corporate partners, or simply failed to protect such a “honey pot” of data.

I’d like to see the most modern technology used across the board—whether it’s for roads or health care.  I just don’t want the real Big Brother—government—to have access to that information, a problem that is only going to increase as government’s role in our lives grows.