[Originally published on the Cato Institute blog.]

Examples were everywhere. Distilleries started producing hand sanitizers to address shortages while average folks began sharing do‐​it‐​yourself sanitizer recipes online. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) looked to modify hand sanitizer guidelines quickly to allow for it, but few really cared because those rules weren’t going to stop them. Gray markets in face masks, medical face shields, and respirators developed. Some people and organizations worked together to make medical devices using off‐​the‐​shelf hardware and open source software. More simply, others just fired up sewing machines to make masks—and then, faced with an emerging public health consensus, the guidance from the federal government shifted dramatically: where formerly ordinary people were instructed not to buy or use masks, within a matter of days, the policy reversed, and all were encouraged to make and use cloth protective masks.

Meanwhile, doctors and nurses started “writing the playbook for treating coronavirus patients on the fly” by improvising treatments and then sharing them on social media. A few doctors even converted breathing machines to ventilators themselves using 3-D printed parts to address shortages for their patients even though the FDA had not yet authorized it.

Social media sites were also suddenly filled with discussions about how average people might come together to build tools or share information to assist with virus testing or treatments. A 17‐​year‐​old used his coding skills to build one of the most popular coronavirus‐​tracking websites in the world (ncov2019.live) after noticing how hard it was to use government sites. And two high school science teachers in Tennessee set up testing operations in their school lab to help reduce testing time in their area.

Meanwhile, journalists and columnists like the  Wall Street Journal’s Andy Kessler cheered on such activity, encouraging the public to “innovate from your couch.” Modern digital technologies and platforms that had been pariahs and the target of a regulatory‐​minded “techlash” just a few months earlier suddenly became essential public services that were showered with praise for helping people cope with social distancing and the solitude associated with shelter‐​in‐​place requirements. Headlines in major media outlets explained how “Facebook Is More Trustworthy than the President” and “Twitter Is Making the Coronavirus World a Better Place.”

Philanthropists like Bill Gates were also funding their own solutions. The former Microsoft founder and CEO pointed out that, in an effort to find testing solutions and vaccines, private groups like his Gates Foundation could likely mobilize faster than governments. Gates likely had grown frustrated with government responses after a Seattle‐​based lab that the Gates Foundation funded figured out an effective way to test for coronavirus, only to be blocked from expanding it by over‐​cautious federal bureaucrats. Frustrated by federal intransigence, that Seattle lab started testing for COVID-19 anyway to prove they indeed had an effective test. Commenting on the case study, the New York Times  expressed exasperation about “how existing regulations and red tape—sometimes designed to protect privacy and health—have impeded the rapid rollout of testing nationally.”

Wait, Isn’t All This Illegal?

What is interesting about all these examples of bottom‐​up innovation and evasive entrepreneurialism is that they are remarkably inspiring, but also mostly illegal. Almost all these activities butted up against longstanding regulations governing medical devices, practices, or therapies. Some of those rules are enforced by large and powerful federal bureaucracies like the FDA and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Others take the form of state‐​based occupational licensing limitations or certificate‐​of‐​need laws, which require healthcare providers to first obtain permission before they open or expand their facilities or services. This crazy quilt of medical laws and regulations accumulated steadily over time, creating what constitutional scholar Timothy Sandefur calls a “permission society,” which values proceduralism and conformity over practicality and common sense.

Eventually, however, the mountains of red tape that the permission society is built upon start to collapse under their own weight. Laws and agencies that previously commanded obedience are now viewed as an opaque, ossified, and confusing morass of one‐​size‐​fits‐​all mandates, prohibitions, and penalties that actually undermine the very health goals they were put in place to achieve. Suddenly, headlines in every major newspaper screamed of how, as it pertained to virus testing procedures, “The Government Failed” (Wall Street Journal) because of “Flawed Tests, Red Tape and Resistance” (Washington Post) and this resulted in “The Lost Month” (New York Times) in the United States.

Eventually, people take notice of how regulators and their rules encumber entrepreneurial activities, and they act to evade them when public welfare is undermined. Working around the system becomes inevitable when the permission society becomes so completely dysfunctional and counterproductive.

Technological Empowerment vs. the Status Quo

What’s going on here, and what lessons can we derive from it?

In a new Cato Institute book, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance, I document how the sort of behavior we have recently witnessed was growing rapidly even before the COVID-19 crisis. In many different contexts, evasive entrepreneurs—innovators who don’t always conform to social or legal norms—are using new technological capabilities to circumvent traditional regulatory systems. They at least want to put pressure on public policymakers to reform or selectively enforce laws and regulations that are outmoded, inefficient, or counterproductive.

Evasive entrepreneurs rely on a strategy of permissionless innovation in both the business world and the political arena. They push back against the permission society by creating exciting new products and services without always receiving the blessing of public officials before doing so. While evasive entrepreneurialism has always been with us to some extent, many of the responses to the pandemic would not have been possible even just a few decades ago. Recent advancements have supercharged in a more technologically empowered world of information abundance and decentralized, inexpensive tools.

As I show in the book, evasive entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the growth of what we might think of as technologies of freedom or resistance. These are devices and platforms that let citizens circumvent (or perhaps just ignore) public policies that limit their liberty or freedom to innovate or to enjoy the fruits of innovation. These can include common tools like smartphones, computers, and various new interactive platforms, as well as more specialized technologies like cryptocurrencies, private drones, immersive technologies (like virtual reality), 3D printers, the “Internet of Things,” and sharing economy platforms and services. But that list just scratches the surface. When the public uses tools such as these to explicitly evade public policies on moral grounds because they find then offensive, illogical, or perhaps just annoying, we can think of that as technological civil disobedience.

Common Sense Prevails

Evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience accelerated during the pandemic because both the practicality and morality of government policies came into question in stark fashion. The first month of the crisis witnessed “a torrent of governmental incompetence that is breathtaking in scale,” my Mercatus colleague Scott Sumner argues. “There are regulations so bizarre that if put in a novel no one would believe them,” he notes. “In contrast, the private sector has reacted fairly well, and has been far ahead of the government in most areas.”

Indeed, the pandemic has been a stress test for our institutions, and many of them have failed it. Confusing rules and inflexible agencies that should have been reformed years ago were suddenly exposed and judged harshly. Philip K. Howard, founder of Common Good, says that “Covid‐​19 is the canary in the bureaucratic mine.” Bloated bureaucracies and overbearing regulatory systems, he argues, have created a “toxic atmosphere that silenced common sense” and managed to “institutionalize failure.” Cato’s Paul Matzko has documented how the FDA has been particularly guilty of blocking sensible forms of progress on simple things like face mask production or distribution.

While countless others lambasted the practical failures of our institutions, the morality of government policies was also coming into focus. Why should citizens have their innovative efforts to help others stifled at seemingly every juncture? Must we really follow the law when it undercuts the basic human need to care for others and ourselves?

These are the issues addressed in my new book, which explains the practical reasons why evasive entrepreneurialism is on the rise and then provides a moral defense of it. When innovators and average citizens use tools and technological capabilities to pursue a living, enjoy new experiences, or improve the human condition, they often disrupt legal or social norms in the process. That is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, evasive entrepreneurialism can transform our society for the better because it can help expand the range of life‐​enriching (and often life‐​saving) innovations. Evasive entrepreneurialism can help citizens pursue lives of their own choosing—both as creators looking for the freedom to earn a living and as individuals looking to discover and enjoy important new goods and services.

Defending evasive entrepreneurialism is easy  after it occurs, but few defend it before or as it is happening. I argue in the book that the freedom to innovate is essential to human betterment—for each of us individually and for civilization as a whole—and that freedom deserves to be taken more seriously today. The COVID-19 pandemic has made this more apparent than ever before.

There are few things more human than acts of invention. At its root, innovation involves efforts to discover new and better ways of solving practical human needs and wants. People have a right to innovate and create technologies because they possess a more general right to take steps to improve their lot in life and the lives of others around them. When misguided or archaic government programs and policies blocked that potential during the pandemic, people began ignoring or evading them. That was both practically sensible and morally justifiable.

Innovation as the New Checks and Balances

By extension, the response to the pandemic has proven the second thesis set forth in my book: Evasive entrepreneurialism and technologically enabled civil disobedience can actually help us improve government by keeping public policies fresh, sensible, and in line with common sense and the consent of the governed. Evasiveness and technological disruption can act as a sort of relief valve or circuit breaker to counteract negative pressures in the system before things break down completely. By challenging legislators and regulators to reevaluate the wisdom of their policies, evasive entrepreneurs can help us break political logjams and force governments to become more adaptive and accountable.

The proof is in the pudding. As the crisis unfolded, agencies at the federal, state, and local levels were forced to suspend hundreds of regulations that were clearly undermining helpful responses. These “rule departures” would not have been necessary if governments had engaged in periodic spring cleanings earlier. When COVID-19 hit, it became essential to suspend or repeal hundreds of misguided old rules that clearly undermined public health. The only question now is whether those inefficient, counterproductive policies will be put back on the books to do harm again in the next crisis.

But even before the current crisis, rule departures by government actors were becoming more common because  even government officials could no longer understand their own rules. Just as private citizens have increasingly resorted to evasive techniques to get things done, many regulatory agencies have given up trying to “go by the book” themselves because endless regulatory accumulation has made it impossible to understand what the law means.

My book documents many cases of public officials essentially ignoring their own policies and making up governance solutions as they go along. This is another sign of profound institutional failure, yet it should also give us some hope that even policymakers themselves now realize that government cannot just grow forever without breaking down at some point. The need for comprehensive reform is now abundantly clear, and the pandemic has moved the so‐​called “Overton Window” (i.e., the acceptable range of possible policy reforms) on many fronts.

A New Approach to Governance

Policymakers need a new approach for technological governance that is more in line with modern realities. Flexibility and humility will be essential. Regulators do not need to throw out the old rulebooks altogether, though. Some precautionary rules still make sense, particularly in cases involving extreme risk. But why not embrace the entrepreneurial spirit of the citizenry and allow more experimental trials, flexible testing procedures, and perhaps even prizes for particularly innovative ideas?

When enforcing the rules that remain on the books, policymakers should also consider targeted waivers and ex post regulatory reviews as opposed to ex ante regulatory prohibitions on any and all evasive innovations. Liability rules can also be tweaked so innovators do not have to live in constant fear of getting sued for trying to make the world a better place. Finally, post‐​market monitoring and recall notices can also be used to ensure flexible experiments have some regulatory guardrails.

But shutting down creative solutions and unique thinking simply because they run counter to some crusty old rulebook is never the right response. We should view evasive entrepreneurialism as an important part of a broader discovery process that incorporates the profound importance of ongoing, decentralized, trial‐​and‐​error experimentation to the process of societal learning and improvement. Lawmakers should find a way to accommodate a little more outside‐​the‐​box thinking and innovating—and not just when our lives are on the line.

Additional Reading 

• read the opening chapter of the book
• watch the event launch video
• 10 Highlights from the Book
• 13 Key Terms from the Book
• 5 innovation policy scholars who inspired this book
• “Innovation & the Precautionary Principle” (AIER essay)
• “Congress as a Non-Actor in Tech Policy” (Medium essay)

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Patrick A. McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell, and me entitled, “A Fresh Start: How to Address Regulations Suspended during the Coronavirus Crisis.” Here’s a quick summary.

As the COVID-19 crisis intensified, policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels started suspending or rescinding laws and regulations that hindered sensible, speedy responses to the pandemic. These “rule departures” raised many questions. Were the paused rules undermining public health and welfare even before the crisis? Even if the rules were well intentioned or once possibly served a compelling interest, had they grown unnecessary or counterproductive? If so, why did they persist? How will the suspended rules be dealt with after the crisis? Are there other rules on the books that might transform from merely unnecessary to actively harmful in future crises?

Once the COVID-19 crisis subsides, there is likely to be considerable momentum to review the rules that have slowed down the response. If policymakers felt the need to abandon these rules during the current crisis, those same rules should probably be permanently repealed or at least comprehensively reformed to allow for more flexible responses in the future.

Accordingly, when the pandemic subsides, policymakers at the federal and state levels should create “Fresh Start Initiatives” that would comprehensively review all suspended rules and then outline sunsetting or reform options for them. To this end, we propose an approach based on the successful experience of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission.

Read the entire paper here to see how it would work. This is our chance to finally do some much-needed spring cleaning for the regulatory state.

by Adam Thierer and Trace Mitchell

This essay originally appeared on The Washington Examiner on September 12, 2019.

You won’t find President Trump agreeing with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama on many issues, but the need for occupational licensing reform is one major exception. They, along with many other politicians and academics both Left and Right, have identified how state and local “licenses to work” restrict workers’ opportunities and mobility while driving up prices for consumers.

Of course, not everybody has to agree with high-profile Democrats and Republicans, but let’s at least welcome the chance to discuss something important without defaulting to our partisan bunkers.

This past week, for example, ThinkProgress published an article titled “Koch Brothers’ anti-government group promotes allowing unlicensed, untrained cosmetologists.” Centered around an Americans for Prosperity video highlighting the ways in which occupational licensing reform could lower some of the barriers that prevent people from bettering their lives, the article painted a picture of an ideologically driven, right-wing movement.

In reality, it’s anything but that.

Occupational licensing has expanded significantly in the past several decades. It began as a relatively uncommon regulatory approach aimed at ensuring public safety and reserved for only those occupations that pose the greatest risk of harm or abuse. Now, it’s a fairly standard means of regulating all kinds of industries.

In the 1950s, around 5% of workers needed a license to perform their jobs. Today, it’s over 30%. This drastic change has raised concerns from people at virtually every point along the political spectrum.

In fact, one of the most crucial reports on occupational licensing was created by the Obama administration. It found that while occupational licensing can lead to higher quality services for consumers, “by making it harder to enter a profession, licensing can also reduce employment opportunities and lower wages for excluded workers, and increase costs for consumers.”

Last year, the independent Federal Trade Commission followed suit, releasing a report highlighting the negative effects of occupational licensing and proposing ways to combat them by making worker licenses more portable across state lines.

Hillary Clinton has also expressed support for targeted occupational licensing reform. In 2016, she released a set of policy proposals aimed at helping small businesses which included a goal to “streamline unnecessary licensing to make it less costly to start a small business.”

Fellow Democrat Joe Biden has talked about overly burdensome occupational licensing. In his words, “They’re making it harder and harder in a whole range of professions, all to keep competition down.”

In addition, groups across the ideological spectrum, including the Brookings Institution and the American Civil Liberties Union, have expressed concern over the costs of burdensome work requirements.

President Trump, a critic of the Koch brothers, has also shown support for occupational licensing reform. He recently praised Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey for his state’s new approach, saying, “We hope that other states are going to follow Arizona’s lead.”

Why are all of these people and organizations, with fairly distinct perspectives and goals, concerned about the same issue? Because occupational licensing is really costly, and those costs often fall upon the most vulnerable and disadvantaged Americans.

The report issued by the Obama administration found that occupational licensing serves as a hidden tax on consumer goods and services, increasing prices by anywhere between 3 and 16%. The report went on to assert that these costs fall disproportionately on certain segments of the population: immigrants, military spouses, and reformed convicts. Other research supports these findings.

Economist Morris Kleiner found that “restrictions from occupational licensing can result in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual cost to consumers of $203 billion.” Once again, these costs are not evenly distributed: Our colleague Matt Mitchell looked at the effect of occupational licensing on the poor and disadvantaged, finding that it can “disparately affect ethnic minorities and other specific populations.” Forcing barbers to obtain a license “reduces the probability of a black individual working as a barber by 17.3%.”

Propelled by the weight of the evidence, policymakers are starting to work together. It isn’t ideological; it’s just good policy. Isn’t that what we want?

[This essay originally appeared on the AIER blog on May 23, 2019 under the title, “Spring Cleaning for the Regulatory State.”]

Spring is in full blossom, and many of us are in the midst of our annual house-cleaning ritual. A regular deep clean makes good sense because it makes our living spaces more orderly and gets rid of the gunk and grime that has amassed over the past year.

Unfortunately, governments almost never engage in their own spring-cleaning exercise. Statutes and regulations continue to accumulate, layer by layer, until they suffocate not only economic opportunity, but also the effective administration of government itself. Luckily, some states have realized this and have taken steps to help address this problem.

Mountains of Regulations

First, here are some hard facts about regulatory accumulation:

• Red tape grows: Since the first edition of his annual publication Ten Thousand Commandments in 1993, Wayne Crews has documented how federal agencies have issued 101,380 rules. Other reports find agency staffing levels jumped from 57,109 to 277,163 employees from 1960 to 2017, while agency budgets swelled in real terms from $3 billion in 1960 to $58 billion in 2017 (2009$).
• Nothing ever gets cleaned up: A Deloitte survey of U.S. Code reveals that 68 percent of federal regulations have never been updated and that 17 percent have only been updated once. If a company never updated its business model, it would fail eventually. But governments get away with doing the same thing without any fear of failure. “If it were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world’s eighth-largest economy, ranking behind India and ahead of Italy,” Crews notes.
• The burden of regulatory accumulation is getting worse: “The estimate for regulatory compliance and economic effects of federal intervention is $1.9 trillion annually,” Crews finds, which is equal to 10 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product for 2017. When federal spending is added to regulatory costs are added to federal spending, Crews finds, the burden equals $4.173 trillion, or 30 percent of the entire economy. Mercatus Center research has found that “economic growth in the United States has, on average, been slowed by 0.8 percent per year since 1980 owing to the cumulative effects of regulation.” This means that “the US economy would have been about 25 percent larger than it actually was as of 2012” if regulation had been held to roughly the same aggregate level it stood at in 1980.

In sum, the evidence shows that the red tape is growing without constraint, hindering entrepreneurship and innovation, deterring new investment, raising costs to consumers, limiting worker opportunities/wages, and undermining economic growth.

Regulations accumulate in this fashion because the administrative state is on autopilot. Legislatures pass broad statutes delegating ambiguous authority to agencies. Bureaucrats are then free to roll the regulatory snowball down the hill until it has become so big that its momentum cannot be stopped.

The Death of Common Sense

Policy makers enact new rules with the best of intentions, of course, but we should not assume that the untrammeled growth of the regulatory state produces positive results. There is no free lunch, after all. Every regulation is a restriction on opportunities for experimentation with new and potentially better ways of doing things. Sometimes such restrictions make sense because regulations can pass a reasonable cost-benefit test. It would be foolish to assume that all regulations on the books do.

Spring cleaning for the regulatory state, therefore, should be viewed as an exercise in “good governance.” The goal is not to get rid of all regulations. The goal is to make sure that rules are reasonable and cost-effective so that the public can actually understand the law and get the highest value out of their government institutions.

Philip K. Howard, founder and chair of the nonprofit coalition Common Good and the author of The Death of Common Sense, has written extensively about how regulatory accumulation has become a chronic problem. “Too much law,” he argues, “can have similar effects as too little law.” “People slow down, they become defensive, they don’t initiate projects because they are surrounded by legal risks and bureaucratic hurdles,” Howard notes. “They tiptoe through the day looking over their shoulders rather than driving forward on the power of their instincts. Instead of trial and error, they focus on avoiding error.”

In such an environment, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism are more challenging and economic dynamism suffers. But regulatory accumulation also hurts the quality of government institutions and policies, which become fundamentally incomprehensible or illogical. “Society can’t function when stuck in a heap of accumulated mandates of past generations,” Howard concludes. This is why an occasional regulatory house cleaning is essential to unleash economic opportunity and improve the functioning of our democratic institutions.

Regulatory House Cleaning Begins

Reforms to address this problem are finally happening. In a series of new essays, my colleague James Broughel has documented how several states — including Idaho, Ohio, Virginia, and New Jersey — are undertaking serious efforts to get regulatory accumulation under control. They are utilizing a variety of mechanisms, including “regulatory reduction pilot programs” and “red tape review commissions.” Recently, Idaho actually initiated a sunset of its entire regulatory code and will now try to figure out how to clean up its 8,200 pages of regulations containing 736 chapters of state rules.

Meanwhile, other states are undertaking serious reform in one of the worst forms of regulatory accumulation: occupational licenses. The Federal Trade Commission notes that roughly 30 percent of American jobs require a license today, up from less than 5 percent in the 1950s. Research by economist Morris Kleiner and others finds that “restrictions from occupational licensing can result in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual cost to consumers of $203 billion.” And many of the rules do not even serve their intended purpose. A major 2015 Obama administration report on the costs of occupational licensing concluded that “most research does not find that licensing improves quality or public health and safety.”

Arizona, West Virginia, and Nebraska are among the leaders in reforming occupational-licensing regimes using a variety of approaches. In some cases, the reforms sunset licensing rules for specific professions altogether. Other proposals grant workers reciprocity to use a license they obtained in another state. Finally, some states have proposed letting most professions operate without any license at all but then requiringall, but then require them to make it clear to consumers that they are unlicensed.

The Need for a Fresh Look

Sunsets are not silver-bullet solutions, and the recent experience with sunsetting and “de-licensing” requirements at the state level has been mixed because many legislatures ignore or circumvent requirements. Nonetheless, sunsets can still help prompt much-needed discussions about which rules make sense and which ones no longer do.

Sunsets can be forward-looking, too. I have proposed that when policy makers craft new laws, especially for fast-paced tech sectors, they should incorporate a clause that what we might think of as “the Sunsetting Imperative.” It would demand that any existing or newly imposed technology regulation should include a provision sunsetting the law or regulation within two years. Reforms like these are also sometimes referred to as “temporary legislation” or “fresh look” requirements. Policy makers can always reenact rules that are still relevant and needed.

By forcing a periodic spring cleaning, sunsets and fresh-look requirements can help stem the tide of regulatory accumulation and ensure that only those policies that serve a pressing need remain on the books. There is no good reason for governments not to clean up their messes on occasion, just like the rest of us have to.

In recent months, my colleagues and I at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University have published a flurry of essays about the importance of innovation, entrepreneurialism, and “moonshots,” as well as the future of technological governance more generally. A flood of additional material is coming, but I figured I’d pause for a moment to track our progress so far. Much of this work is leading up to my next on the freedom to innovate, which I am finishing up currently.

• Adam Thierer, “Deep Technologies & Moonshots: Should We Dare to Dream?” Medium , September 7, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “The Right to Pursue Happiness, Earn a Living, and Innovate,” The Bridge , September 20, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Is It “Techno-Chauvinist” & “Anti-Humanist” to Believe in the Transformative Potential of Technology?” Medium , September 18, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “How Technology Expands the Horizons of Our Humanity,” Medium, November 19, 2018.
• “Evasive Entrepreneurs and Permissionless Innovation: An Interview with Adam Thierer,” The Bridge , September 11, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Making the World Safe for More Moonshots,” The Bridge , February 5, 2018.
• Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell, “A Non-Partisan Way to Help Workers and Consumers,” The Bridge , September 25, 2018.
• Adam Thierer and Trace Mitchell, “The Many Forms of Entrepreneurialism,” The Bridge , August 30, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Evasive Entrepreneurialism and Technological Civil Disobedience: Basic Definitions,” The Bridge , July 20, 2018, 
• Adam Thierer, “The Pacing Problem and the Future of Technology Regulation,” The Bridge , August 8, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “The Pacing Problem, the Collingridge Dilemma & Technological Determinism,” Technology Liberation Front, August 16, 2018.
• Andrea O’Sullivan & Adam Thierer, “3D Printers, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Tech Regulation,” The Bridge , August 1, 2018.
• Jennifer Huddleston Skees, “The Regulatory Name Game,” The Bridge , September 13, 2018.
• Jennifer Skees, “Do You Need a License to Innovate?”, The Bridge , June 29, 2018. 
• Adam Thierer and Jennifer Skees, “Lemonade Stands and Permits,” The Bridge , August 20, 2018.
• Jennifer Huddleston Skees and Adam Thierer, “Pennsylvania’s Innovative Approach to Regulating Innovation,” The Bridge , September 5, 2018.
• Jennifer Huddleston Skees & Trace Mitchell, “Transportation 3.0”, The Bridge , August 29, 2018. 
• Jennifer Skees & Trace Mitchell, “Will The Electric Scooter Movement Lose Its Charge?” The Bridge , July 18, 2018. 
• Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell, “The Many Flavors of Food Entrepreneurialism,” The Bridge, September 26, 2018. 
• Jennifer Skees, “Should You Be Able to Fix Your Own iPhone,” Plain Text , June 18, 2018, https://readplaintext.com/should-you-be-able-to-fix-your-own-iphone-b4157e6cd23

Some older essays on related topics

• Adam Thierer, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, 2nd ed. (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016).
• Adam Thierer, “Wendell Wallach on the Challenge of Engineering Better Technology Ethics,” Technology Liberation Front, April 20, 2016.
• Adam Thierer, “Are “Permissionless Innovation” and “Responsible Innovation” Compatible?” Technology Liberation Front, July 12, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “Does “Permissionless Innovation” Even Mean Anything?” Technology Liberation Front, May 18, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “What Does It Mean to “Have a Conversation” about a New Technology?,” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• Adam Thierer, “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” August 23, 2013.
• Adam Thierer, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change” Medium, June 30, 2014.
• Adam Thierer, “Book Review: Calestous Juma’s “Innovation and Its Enemies”  Technology Liberation Front, July 29, 2016.
• Adam Thierer, “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation,” Cato Online Forum, November 17, 2014.
• Adam Thierer, “Defining ‘Technology’” Technology Liberation Front, originally published April 29, 2014, last updated July 2017.
• Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Skees & Adam Thierer, “Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future,” February 5, 2018, (Forthcoming – Colorado Technology Law Journal).

Over at the Mercatus Center Bridge blog, Trace Mitchell and I just posted an essay entitled, “A Non-Partisan Way to Help Workers and Consumers,” which discusses the new Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Economic Liberty Task Force report on occupational licensing.

We applaud the FTC’s calls for greater occupational licensing uniformity and portability, but regret the missed opportunity to address root problem of excessive licensing more generally. But while FTC is right to push for greater occupational licensing uniformity and portability, policymakers need to confront the sheer absurdity of licensing so many jobs that pose zero risk to public health & safety. Licensing has become completely detached from risk realities and actual public needs.

As the FTC notes, excessive licensing limits employment opportunities, worker mobility, and competition while also “resulting in higher prices, reduced quality, and less convenience for consumers.” These are unambiguous facts that are widely accepted by experts of all stripes. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations, for example, have been completely in league on the need for comprehensive  licensing reforms.

Trace and I argue that we need serious occupational reforms built on the idea of the “right to earn a living” that must pass this test: “All occupational regulations shall be limited to those demonstrably necessary and carefully tailored to fulfill legitimate public health, safety, or welfare objectives.”  Also, all licensing authorities should be put on the clock and be required, within one year, to reassess the wisdom of all existing licenses to ensure they meet that test. If not, they are repealed or reformed.

In recent testimony in Texas, our Mercatus Center colleague Matthew Mitchell has also discussed other reform options, including the “Occupational Board Reform Act,” which recently passed in Nebraska. The goal of the law is to “protect the fundamental right of an individual to pursue a lawful occupation;.” They key provision of the Act demands that state actors:

use the least restrictive regulation which is necessary to protect consumers from undue risk of present, significant, and substantiated harms that clearly threaten or endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the public when competition alone is not sufficient and which is consistent with the public interest;

That’s an excellent approach to reform and when combined with the Right to Earn a Living Act, policymakers can begin to reverse the protectionist, anti-competitive licensing schemes that encumber entrepreneurs and workers across the land.

In forthcoming work, I hope to more fully develop the connection between the right to earn a living, the need for comprehensive licensing reform, and the freedom to innovate more generally. In the meantime, hop over to The Bridge to read our new essay on how the FTC report helps advance this cause..

The FCC has signaled that it may vote to overhaul the Lifeline program this month. Today, Lifeline typically provides a $9.25 subsidy for low-income households to purchase landline or mobile telephone service from eligible providers. While Lifeline has problems–hence the bipartisan push for reform–years ago the FCC structured Lifeline in a way that generally improves access and mitigates abuse (the same cannot be said about the three other major universal service programs).

A direct subsidy plus a menu of options is a good way to expand access to low-income people (assuming there are effective anti-fraud procedures). A direct subsidy is more or less how the US and state governments help lower-income families afford products and services like energy, food, housing, and education. For energy bills there’s LIHEAP. For grocery bills there’s SNAP and WIC. For housing, there’s Section 8 vouchers. For higher education, there’s Pell grants.

Programs structured this way make transfers fairly transparent, which makes them an easy target for criticism but also promotes government accountability, and gives low-income households the ability to consume these services according to their preferences. If you want to attend a small Christian college, not a state university, Pell grants enable that. If you want to purchase rice and tomatoes, not bread and apples, SNAP enables that. The alternative, and far more costly, ways to improve consumer access to various services is to subsidize providers, which is basically how Medicare the rural telephone programs operate, or command-and-control industrial policy, like we have for television and much of agriculture.

Because the FCC is maintaining the consumer subsidy and expanding the menu of Lifeline options to include wired broadband, mobile broadband, and wifi devices, there’s much to commend in the proposed reforms.

Lifeline Broadband Subsidies

Ironically, despite tech activist declarations that 10 Mbps is not “real broadband,” the FCC considers 10 Mbps broadband totally adequate as low-income families’ sole connection to the digital world. If the proposals stand, Lifeline subsidies can be used for 10 Mbps wireline and wireless subscriptions.

The confusion about “real broadband” echoed from tech activists, some tech reporting, and a presidential candidate arises because the FCC has at least three different conceptions of “broadband,” essentially based on whatever definition will increase its regulatory control. For Title II purposes, even a mere 1 Mbps is “broadband” because the FCC wants to be inclusive and regulate all providers. For Section 706, defining “broadband” as high as practical increases the agency’s regulatory powers, so it’s not “real broadband” unless it’s 25 Mbps. For universal service and (apparently) Lifeline subsidies, 10 Mbps is “broadband” because setting it too high would be too restrictive for the consumers and carriers who benefit from a moderate standard.

Wireless Substitution

Expanding Lifeline to mobile broadband suggests an increasing awareness by the FCC that, for many Americans, wireless broadband is a substitute for wireline broadband. This is a little surprising because the FCC decided in January 2016 that “fixed and mobile broadband services are not functional substitutes.” The available data, however, shows that wireless is a substitute for the millions of homes that don’t contain avid Netflix watchers. While popular broadband offerings have monthly limits of 300 GB or more, based on Sandvine data, the typical US home with a wired Internet connection probably uses under 30 GB per month.

Pew surveys also reveal many Americans who substitute wireless for wireline. Of those in the growing number of smartphone-only households, 65% said their smartphones allow them to do everything online they need. Note also that, of those with no home broadband connection–which includes smartphone-only households–only 25% are interested in subscribing. This is why it’s good the FCC doesn’t simply subsidize carriers–most nonadopters simply have no interest in home Internet. Certainly there are some in these groups who don’t realize that their lives would be enriched by a wired broadband connection, but that is mainly a question of digital literacy and education.

Concerns and Reforms

While I support the FCC expanding the menu of Lifeline options and improving the eligibility process, I’m wary of some of the proposed reforms. More details will come out later but Commissioner O’Rielly has pointed out several potential problems with the direction this is going. For one, the eligibility process has always been a mess, in part because it’s based on a patchwork of federal and state programs. The largest problem is the FCC is proposing a major increase in the Lifeline budget, which will increase most Americans’ phone bills. Until the FCC gets its Lifeline house in order, it’s premature to increase the fund so substantially.

Further, I’d like to see satellite broadband on the “menu” of options for Lifeline consumers. Based on the preliminary reports, it’s not clear that satellite broadband will be eligible. Satellite broadband satisfies the speed requirement (10 Mbps) but the FCC plans to require a 150 GB allowance for fixed connections. Satellite is considered a fixed connection. However, satellite broadband providers generally have a low data allowance during daytime hours. On the other hand, they often have unmetered, unlimited data in off-peak hours. Arguably, because data is unmetered every day, satellite broadband should qualify. It would give low-income rural households, who have very low Internet penetration, one more option to be connected.

Finally, one possible reform to ensure the truly needy are benefiting would be to simultaneously increase substantially the $9.25 monthly subsidy but disallow subsidies to households with subscription TV. The most recent data I can find is a 2010 FCC report that 80% of Internet non-adopters have satellite or “cable premium” television. Tightening the requirements means fewer households are eligible but it would increase public support for the program and I think the FCC could then afford to be more generous with the Lifeline subsidy.

Yesterday, the White House Council of Economic Advisers released an important new report entitled, “Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Policymakers.” (PDF, 76 pgs.) The report highlighted the costs that outdated or unneeded licensing regulations can have on diverse portions of the citizenry. Specifically, the report concluded that:

the current licensing regime in the United States also creates substantial costs, and often the requirements for obtaining a license are not in sync with the skills needed for the job. There is evidence that licensing requirements raise the price of goods and services, restrict employment opportunities,  and make it more difficult for workers to take their skills across State lines. Too often, policymakers do not carefully weigh these costs and benefits when making decisions about whether or how to regulate a profession through licensing.

The report supported these conclusions with a wealth of evidence. In that regard, I was pleased to see that research from Mercatus Center-affiliated scholars was cited in the White House report (specifically on pg. 34). Mercatus Center scholars have repeatedly documented the costs of occupational licensing and offered suggestions for how to reform or eliminate unnecessary licensing practices. Most recently, my colleagues and I have explored the costs of licensing restrictions for new sharing economy platforms and innovators. The White House report cited, for example, the recently-released Mercatus paper on “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the ‘Lemons Problem,’” which I co-authored with Christopher Koopman, Anne Hobson, and Chris Kuiper. And it also cited a new essay by Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok on “The End of Asymmetric Information.”

Moreover, along with Christopher Koopman and Matt Mitchell, I recently submitted comments to the Federal Trade Commission for a sharing economy workshop. In those comments, as well as a recent paper on the same subject, we documented how occupational licensing rules were often “captured” by affected interests and are then used to discourage new forms of competition and innovation. This harms both consumers and workers by depriving them of new and better options. Many sharing economy operations are having great success in breaking down these barriers and proving that consumers and workers do better in an environment free of unnecessary and costly licensing restrictions. This suggests that consumer welfare would be improved even more by reforming other licensing regimes.

Mercatus has published dozens of other things related to this issue, many of which I have listed down below. Just recently, in fact, we published a new paper on “Breaking Down the Barriers: Three Ways State and Local Governments Can Improve the Lives of the Poor,” by economist Steven Horwitz. The report begins by documenting how “occupational licensure laws disproportionately burden the poor by requiring them to spend significant resources just to enter a market.” This is consistent with the findings from other Mercatus reports and other academic publications.

Anyway, check out the new White House report and, if you are serious about studying the issue of occupational licensing in more detail, you’ll want to take a closer look at some of these other Mercatus Center publications on the issue. The case for occupational licensing reform is strong and non-partisan, as the release of this White House report makes clear.

Mercatus Center publications and related material on occupational licensing & barriers to entry 

• Working Papers, Filings & Testimony
  • Mercatus research paper, “Breaking Down the Barriers: Three Ways State and Local Governments Can Get Out of the Way and Improve the Lives of the Poor” by Steve Horowitz (July 21 2015).
  • Testimony before the South Carolina Health Planning Committee department of Health and Environmental Control, “Certificate-of-Need laws: Implications for South Carolina” by Christopher Koopman, Thomas Stratmann, and Mohamad Elbarasse (June 12, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-of-Need Laws: Implications for Arkansas” by Christopher Koopman, Thomas Stratmann, and Mohamad Elbarasse (June 9, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for West Virginia” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (June 2, 2015).
  • Mercatus working paper, “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “ Lemons Problem” by Adam Thierer, Christopher Koopman, Anne Hobson, and Chris Kuiper (May 26, 2015).
  • Mercatus FTC filing, “The Sharing Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators” by Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell, and Adam Thierer (May 26, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for Kentucky” by Christopher Koopman, Thomas Stratmann and Mohamad Elbarasse (May 26, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for Michigan” by Christopher Koopman, Thomas Stratmann and Mohamad Elbarasse (May 19, 2015).
  • Mercatus publication, “How state CON Laws restrict Access to Health Care” by Christopher Koopman Thomas Stratmann, and Mohamad Elbarasse (May 13, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for Missouri” by Christopher Koopman, Thomas Stratmann and Mohamad Elbarasse (May 11, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for Georgia” by Christopher Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for South Carolina” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (May 5, 2015).
  • Testimony before the Indiana Senate Commerce and Technology Committee, “Occupational Licensing Gone Wild? Why Licensing is Not Always the Answer” by Edward Timmons (April 16, 2015).
  • Koopman, Thomas Stratmann and Mohamad Elbarasse (March 31, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for Tennessee” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (March 24, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-of-Need Laws: Implications for Florida” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (March 3, 2015).
  • Mercatus policy recommendations, “Florida Fiscal Policy: Responsible Budgeting in a Growing State” by Randall Holcombe (February 26, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for Virginia” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (February 24, 2015).
  • Mercatus working paper, “Bringing the Effects of Occupational Licensing into Focus: Optician Licensing in the United States” by Edward Timmons and Anna Mills (February 17 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for North Carolina” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (February 12, 2015).
  • Mercatus on Policy, “Certificate-Of Need Laws: Implications for New Hampshire” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (February 4, 2015).
  • Testimony before the New Hampshire House Health, Human Services and Elderly Affairs Committee, “Certificate-of-Need laws: Implications for New Hampshire” by Christopher Koopman and Thomas Stratmann (January 28, 2015).
  • Mercatus publication, “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change” by Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell, and Adam Thierer (December 8, 2014).
  • Mercatus interactive publication, “40 Years of Certificate-of-Need Laws across America,” by Matthew Mitchell and Christopher Koopman (October 14, 2014).
  • Mercatus working paper, “Do Certificate-of Need Laws Increase Indigent Care?” by Thomas Stratmann and Jake Russ (July 15, 2014).
  • Mercatus working paper, “Regulatory Reform in Florida: An Opportunity for Greater Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency” by Patrick McLaughlin, Jerry Ellig, and Dima Yazji Shamoun (March 18, 2014).
  • Mercatus on policy, “A Tale of Two Labor Markets: Government Spending’s Impact on Virginia” by Keith Hall and Robert Greene, (September 20, 2013).
  • Mercatus publication, “The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of Government Favoritism” by Matthew Mitchell, (July 8, 2012).
  • “Beyond Bailouts: What is Cronyism?” by Matthew Mitchell, (July 8, 2012).
• Journal Articles
  • Published in Econ Journal Watch, “Was Occupational Licensing Good for Minorities? A Critique of Marc Law and Mindy Marks” by Daniel B. Klein, Benjamin Powell, and Evgeny S. Vorotnikov (September 2012).
  • Published in Cato Journal, “Occupational Licensing and Asymmetric Information” by David Skarbek (Jan 2007).
• Charts and Videos
  • “The Wrath of CON | How Certificate-Of-Need Laws Affect Access to Health Care” by Matthew Mitchell (May 12, 2015).
  • “Occupational Licensing: Bad for Competition, Bad for Low-Income Workers” by Veronique de Rugy (March 25, 2014).
• Media
  • Christopher Koopman discusses certificate of need laws on The Bill LuMaye Show on WPTF in North Carolina (5/11/2015).
  • Edward Timmons and Anna Mills publish, “Short-Sighted Policy,” at S. News and World Report (2/17/15).
  • Veronique de Rugy publishes, “Free the Horse Masseuses!” in Reason Magazine (July 2014).
  • Veronique de Rugy discusses state occupational licensing on Richmond’s Morning News on WRVA in Virginia (6/6/14).
  • Veronique de Rugy publishes “Licensing laws protect special interests at the expense of opportunity,” at The Washington Examiner (3/28/14).
  • Patrick McLaughlin discusses occupational licensing on The Ed Dean Show in Florida (3/27/14).
  • Donald Boudreaux publishes “Occupational licensing: Reality differs from rhetoric,” in The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review (3/25/14).
  • Emily Washington blogs “Occupational Licensing Hurts Consumers and Limits Entrepreneurship,” at Neighborhood Effects (8/20/13).
  • Veronique de Rugy blogs “More State Occupational Licensing Law Abuse: Kentucky Edition,” at National Review’s The Corner (7/17/13).
  • Emily Washington blogs “Small steps in VA occupational licensing reform,” at Neighborhood Effects (6/25/12).

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking a more active interest in state and local barriers to entry and innovation that could threaten the continued growth of the digital economy in general and the sharing economy in particular. The agency recently announced it would be hosting a June 9th workshop “to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the [sharing] economy.” Filings are due to the agency in this matter by May 26th. (Along with my Mercatus Center colleagues, I will be submitting comments and also releasing a big paper on reputational feedback mechanisms that same week. We have already released this paper on the general topic.)

Relatedly, just yesterday, the FTC sent a letter to Michigan policymakers about restricting entry by Tesla and other direct-to-consumer sellers of vehicles. Michigan passed a law in October 2014 prohibiting such direct sales. The FTC’s strongly-worded letter decries the state’s law as “protectionism for independent franchised dealers” noting that “current provisions operate as a special protection for dealers—a protection that is likely harming both competition and consumers.” The agency argues that:

consumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the vehicles they want to buy and how they want to buy them. Automobile manufacturers have an economic incentive to respond to consumer preferences by choosing the most effective distribution method for their vehicle brands. Absent supportable public policy considerations, the law should permit automobile manufacturers to choose their distribution method to be responsive to the desires of motor vehicle buyers.

The agency cites the “well-developed body of research on these issues strongly suggests that government restrictions on distribution are rarely desirable for consumers” and the staff letter continues on to utterly demolish the bogus arguments set forth by defenders of the blatantly self-serving, cronyist law. (For more discussion of just how anti-competitive and anti-consumer these laws are in practice, see this January 2015 Mercatus Center study, “State Franchise Law Carjacks Auto Buyers,” by Jerry Ellig and Jesse Martinez.)

The FTC’s letter is another example of how the agency can take steps using its advocacy tools to explain to state and local policymakers how their laws may be protectionist and anti-consumer in character. Needless to say, this also has ramifications for how the agency approaches parochial restraints on entry and innovation affecting the sharing economy.

In our forthcoming Mercatus Center comments to the FTC for its June 6th sharing economy workshop, Christopher Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I will address many issues related to the sharing economy and its regulation. Beyond addressing all five of the specific questions asked in the Commission’s workshop notice, we also include a discussion about “Federal Responses to Local Anticompetitive Regulations.” Down below I have reproduced the current rough draft of that section of our filing in the hope of getting input from others. Needless to say, the idea of the FTC aggressively using its advocacy efforts or even federal antitrust laws to address state and local barriers to trade and innovation will make some folks uncomfortable–especially on federalism grounds. But we argue that a good case can be made for the agency using both its advocacy and antitrust tools to address these issues. Let us know what you think.

The Federal Trade Commission possesses two primary tools to address public restraints of trade created by state and local authorities: advocacy and antitrust.[1]

Through its advocacy program, the Commission can provide specific comments to state and local officials regarding the effects of both proposed and existing regulations.[2] Commissioner Joshua Wright has noted that, “For many years, the FTC has used its mantle to comment on legislation and regulation that may restrain competition in a way that harms consumers.”[3] Thus, at a minimum, the Commission can and should shine light on parochial governmental efforts to restrain trade and limit innovation throughout the sharing economy.[4] By shining more light on state or local anti-competitive rules, the Commission will hopefully make governments, or their surrogate bodies (such as licensing boards), more transparent about their practices and more accountable for laws or regulations that could harm consumer welfare. However, to be successful, the Commission’s advocacy efforts depend upon the willingness of state and local legislators and regulators to heed its advice.^[5]

The Commission has already used its advisory role in its recent guidance to state and local policymakers regarding the regulation of ridesharing services. The Commission noted then that “a regulatory framework should be responsive to new methods of competition,” and set forth the following vision regarding what it regards as the proper approach to parochial regulation of passenger transportation services:

Staff recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle transportation should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate consumer protections. [Regulators] also should proceed with caution in responding to calls for change that may have the effect of impairing new forms or methods of competition that are desirable to consumers. . . .  In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to achieve some countervailing procompetitive virtue or other public benefit such as protecting the public from significant harm.[6]

This represents a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about parochial regulation of the sharing economy more generally.

Unfortunately, in areas relevant to the regulation of the sharing economy (e.g., taxicab regulations and rules governing home and apartment rentals) anticompetitive regulations have remained on the books—and in some instances have expanded—in spite of more than 30 years of Commission comment and advocacy.[7]  In fact, as Public Citizen noted in a recent Supreme Court filing:

[M]any more occupations are regulated than ever before, and most boards doing the regulating—in both traditional and new professions—are dominated by industry members who compete in the regulated market. Those board member-competitors, in turn, commonly engage in regulation that can be seen as anticompetitive self-protection. The particular forms anticompetitive regulations take are highly varied, the possibilities seemingly limited only by the imaginations of the board members.[8]

In these instances, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement authority may need to be utilized when its advocacy efforts fall short with regard to regulations that favor incumbents by limiting competition and entry.[9] Many academics have endorsed expanded antitrust oversight of public barriers to trade and innovation.[10] As Commissioner Wright has argued, “the FTC is in a good position to use its full arsenal of tools to ensure that state and local regulators do not thwart new entrants from using technology to disrupt existing marketplace.”[11] He notes specifically that he is “quite confident that a significant shift of agency resources away from enforcement efforts aimed at taming private restraints of trade and instead toward fighting public restraints would improve consumer welfare.”[12] We agree.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission made it clear that local authorities cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws.[13] This is particularly true, the Court noted, “where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” such as a professional licensing board consisting primarily of members of the affected interest being regulated.[14] “Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,” the Court held, “for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy.”[15]

The touchstone of this case and the Court’s related jurisprudence in this area is political accountability.[16] State officials must (1) “clearly articulate” and (2) “actively supervise” licensing arrangements and regulatory bodies if they hope to withstand federal antitrust scrutiny.[17] The Court clarified this test in N.C. Dental holding that “the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls.”[18] In other words, if state and local officials want to engage in protectionist activities that restrain trade in pursuit of some other countervailing objective, then they need to own up to it by being transparent about their anticompetitive intentions and then actively oversee the process after that to ensure it is not completely captured by affected interests.[19]

Some might argue that this does not go far enough to eradicate anti-competitive barriers to trade at the state or local level that could restrain the innovative potential of the sharing economy. While that may be true, some limits on the Commission’s federal antitrust discretion are necessary to avoid impinging upon legitimate state and local priorities.

Over time, it is our hope that by empowering the public with more options, more information and better ways to shine light on bad actors, the sharing economy will continue to make many of those old regulations unnecessary. Thus, in line with Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen’s wise advice, the Commission should encourage state and local officials to exercise patience and humility as they confront technological changes that disrupt traditional regulatory systems.[20]

But when parochial regulators engage in blatantly anti-competitive activities that restrain trade, foster cartelization, or harm consumer welfare in other ways, the Commission can act to counter the worst of those tendencies.[21] The Commission’s standard of review going forward was appropriately articulated by Commissioner Wright recently when he noted that, “in the context of potentially disruptive forms of competition through new technologies or new business models, we should generally be skeptical of regulatory efforts that have the effect of favoring incumbent industry participants.”[22]

Such parochial protectionist barriers to trade and innovation will become even more concerning as the potential reach of so many sharing economy businesses grows larger. The boundary between intrastate and interstate commerce is sometimes difficult to determine for many sharing economy platforms. Clearly, much of the commerce in question occurs within the boundaries of a state or municipality, but sharing economy services also rely upon Internet-enabled platforms with a broader reach. To the extent state or local restrictions on sharing economy operations create negative externalities in the form of “interstate spillovers,” the case for federal intervention is strengthened.[23] It would be preferable if Congress chose to deal with such spillovers using its Commerce Clause authority (Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution),[24] but the presence of such negative externalities might also bolster the case for the Commission’s use of antitrust to address parochial restraints on trade.

[1]     See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 19-20.

[2]     Id., at 20. (“The primary goal of such advocacy is to convince policymakers to consider and then minimize any adverse effects on competition that may result from regulations aimed at preventing various consumer harms.”) Also see James C. Cooper and William E. Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, (August 2010): 1582, “Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens.”).

[3]     Joshua D. Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets:  Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC,” Remarks of Joshua D. Wright Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the Big Ideas about Information Lecture Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2015, at 15, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/04/regulation-high-tech-markets-public-choice-regulatory-capture-ftc.

[4]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1610, (“Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions are realized in practice.”)

[5]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1582, (“The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.”).

[6]     Federal Trade Commission, Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado Regulations, (March 6, 2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.

[7]     Marvin Ammori, “Can the FTC Save Uber,” Slate, March 12, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.html (noting that, “not only does the FTC have the authority to take these cities to impartial federal courts and end their anticompetitive actions; it also has deep expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”) Also see, Edmund W. Kitch, “Taxi Reform—The FTC Can Hack It,” Regulation, May/June 1984, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1984/5/v8n3-3.pdf.

[8]     Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 24.

[9]     Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 6, 2014): 24, (“Antitrust review is entirely appropriate for curbing the excesses of occupational licensing because the anticompetitive effect has a similar effect on the market—and in particular consumers—as does traditional cartel activity.”)

[10]   See Mark A. Perry, “Municipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 57, (Fall 1990): 1413-1445; William J. Martin, “State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, (Summer, 2005): 1079-1102; Jarod M. Bona, “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol 5, (Spring 2011): 28-51; Ingram Weber “The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 79, (2012); Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw, “Cartels by Another Name:  Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, (2014): 1093-1164.

[11]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 28-9.

[12]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 29.

[13]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[14]   Id.

[15]   Id. Also see Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1143, (“Who could seriously argue that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the state’s?”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 3, (“Antitrust immunity for private parties who act under color of state law is especially problematic, given that anticompetitive conduct is most likely to occur when private parties are in a position to exploit government’s regulatory powers.”)

[16]   See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 16, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/reflections-supreme-courts-north-carolina-dental-decision-ftcs-campaign, (“states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers.”); Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1137, (“political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.)

[17]   See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy and Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003): 54, (“clear articulation requires that a state enunciate an affirmative intent to displace competition and to replace it with a stated criterion. Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly placed with the state.”) This test has been developed and refined in a variety of cases over the past 35 years. See: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

[18]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[19]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1156. (“Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-regulation to professionals and walk away.”) See also North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“[Federal antitrust] immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).

[20]  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Commission, “Regulatory Humility in Practice,” Remarks of the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 2015).

[21]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1094, (“state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of criminal sanction.”). See also Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 2, 21, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-534_resp_amcu_plf-cato.authcheckdam.pdf, (noting that courts “should presume strongly against granting state-action immunity in antitrust cases.  It makes little sense to impose powerful civil and criminal punishments on private parties who are deemed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct, while exempting government entities—or, worse, private parties acting under the government’s aegis—when they engage in the exact same conduct. . . . “Whatever one’s opinion of antitrust law in general, there is no justification for allowing states broad latitude to disregard federal law and erect private cartels with only vague instructions and loose oversight.”)

[22]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 7.

[23]   FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force, 44, (“an unfortunate gap has emerged between scholarship and case law. Although many of the leading commentators have expressed serious concern regarding problems posed by interstate spillovers, their thinking has yet to take root in the law. Such spillovers undermine both economic efficiency and some of the same political representation values thought to be protected by principles of federalism.”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 13, (“Allowing states expansive power to exempt private actors from antitrust laws would also disrupt national economic policy by encouraging a patchwork of state-established entities licensed to engage in cartel behavior. This would disrupt interstate investment and consumer expectations, and would have spillover effects across state lines.”) Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1598, (“When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.”

[24]   See Adam Thierer, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce, and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1998): 81-118.

I want to bring to everyone’s attention an important new white paper by Dr. Robert Graboyes, a colleague of mine at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University who specializes in the economics of health care. His new 67-page study, Fortress and Frontier in American Health Care, seeks to move away from the tired old dichotomies that drive health care policy discussions: Left versus Right, Democrat versus Republican, federal versus state, and public versus private, and so on. Instead, Graboyes seeks to reframe the debate over the future of health care innovation in terms of “Fortress versus Frontier” and to highlight what lessons we can learn from the Internet and the Information Revolution when considering health care policy.

What does Graboyes mean by “Fortress and Frontier”? Here’s how he explains this conflict of visions:

The Fortress is an institutional environment that aims to obviate risk and protect established producers (insiders) against competition from newcomers (outsiders). The Frontier, in contrast, tolerates risk and allows outsiders to compete against established insiders. . . .  The Fortress-Frontier divide does not correspond neatly with the more familiar partisan or ideological divides. Framing health care policy issues in this way opens the door for a more productive national health care discussion and for unconventional policy alliances. (p. 4)

He elaborates in more detail later in the paper:

the Frontier encourages creative destruction and disruptive innovation. Undreamed-of products arise and old, revered ones vanish. New production processes sweep away old ones. This is a place where unknown innovators in garages destroy titans of industry. The Frontier celebrates and rewards risk, and there is a brutal egalitarianism to the creative process. In contrast, the Fortress discourages creative destruction and disruptive innovation. Insiders are protected from competition by government or by private organizations (such as insurers and medical societies) acting in quasigovernmental fashion. In the Fortress, insiders preserve the existing order. Innovation comes from well-established, credentialed insiders who, it is presumed, have the wisdom and motives and competence to identify opportunities for innovation.

In framing the debate in this fashion, Graboyes hopes that we will start paying more attention to the supply side of health care policy debates:

The debate over coverage (and over related issues concerning how health care providers are paid) has focused attention almost exclusively on the demand side of health care markets—who pays how much to whom for which currently offered services. The debate underplays questions of supply—how innovation can alter the very nature of the health care delivery system. (p. 3-4)

This is where Graboyes brings the Internet and information technology into the story to illustrate a powerful point: We could unlock many important life-enriching and potentially life-saving innovations by embracing the same vision we applied to the Internet and IT sectors. Graboyes is kind enough to cite my work on permissionless innovation and the importance of not letting public policy be dictated by excessive fear of worst-case scenarios regarding new technological innovations. As I noted in my book on the topic, “living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.”

Had fear of potential worst-case outcomes driven policy for the Net, we might have never seen many of the life-enriching innovations that we enjoy today, as Graboyes explains eloquently in this passage:

Knowing what we know today, it would not be hard to persuade a cautious observer in 1989 to radically slow the pace of IT innovation. IT arguably poses personal risks as grave as those that health care poses. Cell phones have been essential components of improvised explosive devices in war zones. The 9/11 atrocities would have been difficult or impossible to carry out without cell phones. Thieves have used the Internet to steal. Stalkers have used the Internet to terrify their prey. Child predators find their victims on the web. People have been murdered by strangers they met in chatrooms. IT has allowed individuals and governments to violate others’ privacy in countless ways. Drug dealers and terrorist networks organize their efforts via cell phone and Internet. The Internet has greatly reduced the cost of destroying another’s reputation, and news accounts tell of suicides following cyberbullying. Our laws demand terribly high standards of safety and efficacy for drugs. We require no such standards for computers, cell phones, and software, but given the nefarious uses to which they are sometimes put, decades ago one could easily have argued for doing so. Had we done so, we would now be living in a much poorer, less interesting world—and perhaps one with even greater risks to life and limb than we have now. No online predators or improvised explosive devices, but also no OnStar to save you after an automobile crash or smartphone to alert police to your life-threatening situation and geographic location. (p. 41)

In other words–and this is another lesson I stress at length in my work–precautionary policies create profound trade-offs that are not always well understood upon enactment of new laws or regulations. As I noted in my book, “When commercial uses of an important resource or technology are arbitrarily prohibited or curtailed, the opportunity costs of such exclusion may not always be immediately evident. Nonetheless, those ‘unseen’ effects are very real and have profound consequences for individuals, the economy, and society.”

What Graboyes does so well in his new paper is prove that these trade-offs are already at work in the American health care system and that we had better get serious about acknowledging them before real damage is done. And what makes Fortress and Frontier such an enjoyable read is that Graboyes is a gifted story-teller who explains in clear terms how expanded health care innovation opportunities could improve the lives of real people. It’s not just abstract, textbook talk. We hear stories of real-world innovators and the patients who need their inventions. For example, Graboyes tells of “an unheralded doctor who pioneered stem-cell therapy in a small-town hospital, a carpenter and puppet-maker who invented functional prosthetic hands costing one-thousandth the price of professionally made devices (aided by an evolutionary biologist who started a worldwide consortium of amateur prosthetists), and college students who devised a low-cost treatment for clubfoot.” (p. 4) And much, much more.

“The most important thing to understand about disruptive innovation is that it often comes (perhaps usually comes) from strange and unexpected places,” Graboyes notes. (p. 20) “[A] shift from Fortress to Frontier would benefit the health and finances of Americans,” he argues, and “the task begins by easing limits on the supply of health care services, thereby clearing the way for innovators to take health care in directions we cannot yet imagine.” (p. 39)

Importantly, Graboyes also offers another reason why America should embrace the “frontier” spirit: Our global competitive advantage in this space is at risk if we don’t:

Moving health care from the Fortress to the Frontier may be more a matter of necessity than of choice. We are entering a period of rapid technological advances that will radically alter health care. Many of these advances require only modest capital and labor inputs that governments cannot easily control or prohibit. If US law obstructs these technologies here, it will be feasible for Americans to obtain them by Internet, by mail, or by travel. (p. 41-2)

He highlights several areas in which this debate will play out going forward including (and notice the intersection with the modern digital technologies and tech policy debates we often discuss here): genomic knowledge and personalized medicine, 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, information sharing via social media, wearable technology, and telemedicine.

To make sure that America can capitalize on the same innovative spirit that gave us the Information Revolution, Graboyes concludes his study with a laundry list of needed policy reforms. These include:

• reform of FDA drug & device approval process to expedite reviews.
• ensure that Americans have a “right to know” about themselves and their health (i.e., that individuals have a right to possess their own genetic information and to receive information about how to interpret the results.)
• abolish state certificate-of-need laws, which unnecessarily “require that hospital developers obtain government permission before building a new facility, or expanding an existing one, or even adding a specific piece of medical equipment.”
• reform state-based licensing laws, which “put barriers in the way of doctors moving from other states” and create physician shortages. Also need to reform state laws to allow nurse practitioners, optometrists, and others to practice independently of physicians.
• reform tort law by capping noneconomic damages, instituting a “loser pays” rule to discourage frivolous lawsuits, establishing safe harbors for vaccine developers, and more.
• revising tax laws to make sure medical devices are not hit with discriminatory tax burdens that discourage innovation, and then also revising other taxes that skew incentives in the health insurance marketplace.

Graboyes itemizes dozens of other potential reforms to give policymakers a smorgasbord of options from which to choose. It is unlikely that all the reforms he lists will be adopted, but even if policymakers would just pick a few of those proposed action items, it could provide a real boost to medical innovation in the short term. Importantly, most of these proposed reforms could be implemented without stirring up contentious debate over the future of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

Needless to say, I highly recommend Fortress and Frontier and I very much hope that the vision that Graboyes articulates in it comes to influence public thinking and future policymaking in the health care arena. In a follow-up post, I will also discuss how Fortress versus Frontier provides us with another “innovation paradigm” that can help us frame future innovation policy debates in many other contexts.

Last week, the Mercatus Center and the R Street Institute co-hosted a video discussion about copyright law. I participated in the Google Hangout, along with co-liberator Tom Bell of Chapman Law School (and author of the new book Intellectual Privilege), Mitch Stoltz of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Derek Khanna, and Zach Graves of the R Street Institute. We discussed the Aereo litigation, compulsory licensing, statutory damages, the constitutional origins of copyright, and many more hot copyright topics.

You can watch the discussion here:

There is bipartisan agreement that the 1996 Telecom Act was antiquated only shortly after President Clinton’s signature had dried on the legislation. There is also consensus that spectrum policy, still largely grounded in the 1934 communications statute, absolutely distorts today’s wireless markets. And there is frequent criticism from thought leaders, right and left, that the FCC has been, for decades, too accommodating to the firms it regulates and too beholden to the status quo (economist Thomas Hazlett quips the agency’s initials stand for “Forever Captured by Corporations”).

For these reasons, members of Congress every few years announce their intention to reform the 1934 and 1996 communications laws and modernize the FCC. Yesterday, some powerful House members unexpectedly reignited hopes that Congress would overhaul our telecom, broadband, and video laws. In a Google Hangout (!), Reps. Fred Upton and Greg Walden said they wanted to take on the ambitious task of passing a new law in 2015.

Much depends on next year’s elections and the composition of Congress, but hopefully the announcement spurs a major re-write that eliminates regulatory distortions in communications, much as airlines and transportation were deregulated in the 1970s–an effort led by reformist Democrats.

About ten years ago, more than fifty scholars and technologists crafted reports which constituted the Digital Age Communications Act (or DACA) that is largely deregulatory (a majority of the group had served in Democratic administrations, interestingly enough). In 2005, then-Sen. Jim DeMint proposed a bill similar to the working group’s proposals. The working group’s recommendations aged very well in eight years–which you can’t say about the 1996 Act–and represents a great starting point for future legislation.

As Adam has said the DACA reports have five primary reform objectives:

– Replacing the amorphous “public interest” standard with a consumer welfare standard, which is more well-established in field of antitrust law – Eliminate regulatory silos and level the playing field through deregulation – Comprehensively reform spectrum not just through more auctioning but through clear property rights – Reform universal service by either voucherizing it or devolving it to the States and let them run their own telecom welfare programs; and – Significantly reforming & downsizing the scope of the FCC’s power of the modern information economy

DACA redefines the FCC as a specialized competition agency for the communications sector. The FCC largely sees itself as a competition agency today but the current statutes don’t represent that gradual change in purpose. The FCC is slow, arbitrary, Balkanizes industries artificially, and attempts to regulate in areas it isn’t equipped to regulate–the agency has a notoriously bad record in federal courts. These characteristics create a poor environment for substantial investments in technology and communications infrastructure. The DACA proposals aren’t perfect but it is a resilient framework that minimizes the effect of special interests in communications and encourages investments that improve consumers’ lives.

CBS and Time Warner Cable have been embroiled in a heated contractual battle over the past week that has resulted in viewers in some major markets losing access to CBS programming. When disputes like these go nuclear and signal blackouts occur, it is inevitable that some folks will call for policy interventions since nobody likes it when the content they love goes dark.

While some policy responses are warranted in this matter, policymakers should proceed with caution. Heated contractual negotiations are a normal part of any capitalist marketplace. We shouldn’t expect lawmakers to intervene to speed up negotiations or set content prices because that would disrupt the normal allocation of programming by placing a regulatory thumb too heavily on one side of the scale. This is why I am somewhat sympathetic to CBS in this fight. In an age when content creators struggle to protect their copyrighted content and get compensation for it, the last thing we need is government intervention that undermines the few distribution schemes that actually work well.

On the other hand, Time Warner Cable deserves sympathy here, too, since CBS currently enjoys some preexisting regulatory benefits. As I noted in this 2012 Forbes oped, “Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming,” many layers of red tape still encumber America’s video marketplace and prevent a truly free market in video programming from developing. The battle here revolves around the “retransmission consent” rules that were put in place as part of the Cable Act of 1992 and govern how video distributors carry signals from TV broadcasters, which includes CBS.

But those “retrans” rules are not the only part of the regulatory mess here. There are many related federal rules that tip the scales toward broadcasters and content creators, such as the requirement that video distributors carry broadcast signals even if they don’t want to (“must carry”); rules that prohibit distributors from striking deals with broadcasters outside their local communities (“network non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity” rules); regs specifying where broadcast channels appear on the cable channel lineup; and prohibitions against carrying sporting events on cable when the local stadium doesn’t sell all its seats on game day (“sports blackout rule”).

As they say on TV.. ” But Wait, There’s More!” Working in the favor of video distributors are the compulsory licensing requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, which essentially forced a “duty to deal” upon broadcasters. Broadcasters have to let cable operators and other video distributors retransmit local stations, though the system at least ensures they get compensated for it. As I noted in my old Forbes essay, along with must carry rules, “Compulsory licensing is the original sin of video marketplace regulation. We could have avoided most of the regulatory mess of the past quarter century if Congress had simply left these rights and contractual negotiations alone. Once Congress forced broadcasters to share their programming, however, marketplace manipulation was off and rolling.”

Of course, the more primal and problematic intervention came decades before in the 1920s and ’30s when the government decided to nationalize spectrum management. Once mandates instead of markets where chosen as the primary allocation agent, America was off and running with a grand experiment in spectrum central planning. We’re still living with the results today. The very fact that spectrum is licensed and can only be used and sold for very narrow purposes as detailed in meticulous FCC regulations is a sign of just how far-removed we are from a pure free market here.

The question now is, what are we going to do about this fine mess? And is there any chance we can get it done?

The problem in this debate is that there are multiple layers of interventions that have built up over the years and created constituencies that are wedded to their preservation. Broadcasters, networks, independent content creators, big cable companies, small cable companies, satellite companies, sports leagues, and viewing consumers themselves — they all have conflicting interests and a stake in how this debate turns out. In his 2012 Mercatus Center working paper, “Consumer Welfare and TV Program Regulation,” media economist Bruce M. Owen noted that “What distinguishes TV programs from other mass media content, including both traditional print and new online media, is the extreme eagerness of Washington to engage in efforts to prevent markets from working freely, often in response to interest group pressures and opportunities for political advantage and with almost complete indifference to the welfare of consumers.”

As a result, if you talk to almost anyone involved in this debate, they will all insist that only their very specific reforms are the ones that can or should be implemented. Consequently, comprehensive reform will be challenging precisely because of all the conflicting interests and layers of law and regulation that must be eradicated.

But at least there is a blueprint for how to get the job done right. Many times here before I have written about “The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act,” which was floated last session by Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA) and then-Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC). It proposed wiping off the books all the archaic rules outlined above. Alas, the bill never went anywhere in the last Congress and now that Sen. DeMint has left to lead the Heritage Foundation, there is no supporter in the Senate this session. Instead, we have some lawmakers floating bad ideas like S.912, the “Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013,” which just proposes more regulatory gaming of an already over-gamed system.

We instead need policy reforms like the old DeMint-Scalise bill that clean up the regulatory mess of the past. But there just isn’t much appetite for such a house-cleaning. Most parties affected by these rules want very specific outcomes and deregulation won’t give them any such guarantees. After all, there will still be blackouts after deregulation. And the cost of some content may continue to go up in response to demand. And there will still be fights over sports programming. And there’s no certainty that all local broadcasters or small video distributors will survive. And so on, and so on.

But it is also true that a deregulatory environment is more likely to lead to even more experimentation and innovation with new business models, technologies, and methods of content creation and delivery. We already see much innovation in this marketplace despite all the red tape that exists. Just look at what’s been going on recent years with alternative video delivery platforms, including: Netflix, Hulu, XBox Live, Vudu, Roku, Redbox, Boxee, Amazon, Apple TV, Aereo, Google Chromecast, and so on. And don’t forget the strides that the old broadcast and cable giants have made here, too. CBS is actually a pretty good model for how content can be re-purposed online in creative ways on a firm’s own digital platform. Likewise, cable companies like Time Warner Cable are slowly but surely adapting to consumers’ demand for video to be delivered to multiple devices.

Of course, there there will always be hiccups along the road to video nirvana. Some regulatory activists seemingly expect that all content can be delivered effortless and cheaply to consumers without giving a thought in the world to just how complicated it is to get that content financed and distributed in the first place. Great content and great delivery platforms don’t just happen by magic or the good intentions of activists or policymakers. Those platforms happen because new markets and monetization mechanisms develop to facilitate them. If we cut back the regulatory deadwood in our modern information marketplace, we’d likely get even more experimentation and innovation that would likely produce all new ways of financing, creating, and delivering content to consumers. But we’ll never know unless we are willing to embrace change and kill all those old regulatory weeds that continue to grow in our information garden.

Alas, if Congress can’t muster the courage to do that, then lawmakers ought to at least consider asking the broadcasters to return all that juicy spectrum they are sitting on. After all, the current retrans racket gives the broadcasters an increasingly lucrative revenue stream when they deliver content on cable and satellite systems (in addition to the advertising revenues they already receive). No good reason exists to give them preferential treatment relative to any other cable channel out there today. Don’t forget, there are all sorts of garden-variety cable carriage disputes that happen outside the regulated retrans system today. (Remember last year’s big spats between AMC vs. Dish and Viacom vs. DirecTV?) There are no special rules that either side can rely on in those instances. So why should special rules be applied to other content companies simply because some of their properties are broadcast channels? Answer: they shouldn’t.

But if no other reforms occur and if companies like CBS still want to be more like a cable mega-channel — albeit, a very handsomely compensated cable channel — then by all means go for it. In the meantime, however, they can return all that spectrum for re-auction for some better purpose. In fact, back early 2009, CBS Corp. President and CEO Les Moonves told an investor conference that moving all CBS network programming to cable and satellite platforms would be “a very interesting proposition.” I agree! But, absent other reforms, it might be time to make that “interesting proposition” a mandatory one.

It was my pleasure this week to host a terrific panel discussion about the future of broadband policy and FCC reform featuring Raymond Gifford, a Partner at the law firm of Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP,  Jeffrey Eisenach, a Managing Director and Principal at Navigant Economics and an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University Law School, and Howard Shelanski, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law School who previously served as Chief Economist for the Federal Communications Commission and as a Senior Economist for the President’s Council of Economic Advisers at the White House. We discussed two new papers by Gifford and Eisenach on these issues.

Gifford discussed his new Mercatus Center Working Paper on “The Continuing Case for Serious Communications Law Reform.” Gifford’s paper outlines what substantive FCC reform would entail and considers what antitrust agencies and enforcement can teach us about the way the FCC should work going forward.  Eisenach discussed his important new paper on “Theories of Broadband Competition,” which similarly considers how competition oversight of broadband markets could be modeled after modern antitrust principles.  Shelanski offered his thoughts on both papers. It was an interesting discussion and I encourage you to watch the entire thing.

During the discussion period, we debated the likelihood that serious communications policy / FCC reform could occur in the current political environment.  I argued that the stars just don’t line up at this time to achieve such reforms. However, keep in mind that many deregulatory experiments in the past sometimes started slowly and then something sparked sudden action.  Scholars have noted (see McCraw’s “Prophets of Regulation”) sometimes just a couple of key players (such as Alfred Kahn in the airline context) were able to change the underlying dynamics of deregulation very rapidly to push through long-lasting reforms.

The key difference between then and now, of course, is that, back then, liberal Democrats in Congress and the Carter Admin came to understand how regulation was having a deleterious impact on marketplace competition and consumer welfare.  I simply cannot find a single Democrat who makes that same case today for the communications or media sectors.  And if telecom / media reform remains a highly politically charged, partisan issue, then the hopes for reform remain quite slim. But I haven’t given up all hope just yet!

Anyway, watch the event video for more discussion on this matter.

On Wednesday, November 9th, the Mercatus Center will be hosting an event on “A New Framework for Broadband and the FCC.” It will take place at the Reserve Officers Association from 10:00am – 11:30am. At the event, telecom experts Raymond Gifford, Jeffrey Eisenach, and Howard Shelanski that will examine if a new framework might be needed for broadband policy and the possibility of reforming the Federal Communications Commission. Both Eisenach and Gifford will be presenting new papers at the event and Shelanski will be offering commentary. RSVP here to hold a seat.  Complete event summary follows.

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Broadband policy continues to be a contentious subject of debate with many policymakers and advocates suggesting that a new framework might be needed to foster increased competition, innovation, higher speeds, greater coverage, and lower prices. Meanwhile, there’s talk in Washington once again of reforming the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to bring the agency into the information age.

These issues are explored in new studies by Raymond Gifford, a Partner at the law firm of Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP, and by Jeffrey Eisenach, a Managing Director and Principal at Navigant Economics and an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University Law School. In a new Mercatus Center working paper, Gifford outlines what substantive FCC reform would entail and considers what antitrust agencies and enforcement can teach us about the way the FCC should work going forward.  In a similar vein, Eisenach’s new study considers how competition oversight of broadband markets could be modeled after modern antitrust principles.

Gifford and Eisenach will outline these alternative approaches to broadband policy and FCC reform in a Mercatus Center event on Wednesday, November 9 ^th at 10:00am at the Reserve Officers Association. Also joining us for the discussion will be Howard Shelanski, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law School who previously served as Chief Economist for the Federal Communications Commission and as a Senior Economist for the President’s Council of Economic Advisers at the White House. Register for the event here.

I was very pleased to hear this announcement today from leading Senate and House Democrats regarding a much-needed update of our nation’s communications laws:

Today, Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Rep. Henry A. Waxman, the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Senator John F. Kerry, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet, and Rep. Rick Boucher, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet announced they will start a process to develop proposals to update the Communications Act. As the first step, they will invite stakeholders to participate in a series of bipartisan, issue-focused meetings beginning in June. A list of topics for discussion and details about this process will be forthcoming.

This is great news, and an implicit acknowledgment by top Democratic leaders that the FCC most certainly does not have the authority to move forward unilaterally with regulatory proposals such as Net neutrality mandates or Title II reclassification efforts.

I very much look forward to engaging with House and Senate staff on these issues since this is something I’ve spent a great deal of time thinking about over the past 15 years. Most recently, Mike Wendy and I released a paper entitled, “The Constructive Alternative to Net Neutrality Regulation and Title II Reclassification Wars,” in which we outline some of the possible reform options out there. We built upon PFF’s “Digital Age Communications Act Project,” (DACA) which was introduced in February of 2005 with the ultimate aim of crafting policy that is adaptive to the frequently changing communications landscape. You can find all the white papers from the 5 major working groups here.  I also encourage those interested in this issue to take a look at the video from this event we hosted earlier this month asking, “What Should the Next Communications Act Look Like?” Lots of good ideas came up there.

Anyway, down below I have included the video from that event as well as a better description of the DACA model for those interested in details about how that model of Communications Act reform would work. I think DACA holds great promise going forward since it represents a moderate, non-partisan approach to reforming communications policy for the better.  I pulled this summary from the paper that Mike Wendy and I recently penned:

In 2005-06, The Progress & Freedom Foundation brought together over 50 scholars—a nonpartisan collection of lawyers, economists, engineers and other experts—with the ultimate aim of crafting a new regulatory framework more appropriate for a frequently-changing communications landscape. The resulting Digital Age Communications Act (DACA) project proposed scraping the old regulatory “silos” (Title II for telecom, Title III for broadcast, Title VI for cable) and replacing them all with a Federal Trade Commission-like “unfair competition” standard. Under DACA, the FCC would retain some baseline regulatory authority to oversee the marketplace, but this authority would be limited and based upon more settled principles of competition law and economics—essentially, streamlined antitrust regulation. Serious anticompetitive actions that lead to demonstrable consumer harm would still be policed and punished under this model. But this would be done on a limited, case-by-case basis without prejudging business models or practices or by imposing prophylactic regulatory regimes. In essence, DACA stood for the proposition that an ex post approach to regulatory oversight was preferable to ex ante forms of preemptive and prophylactic regulation by the FCC. Indeed, the DACA model was based on a model we already have in place: antitrust laws and the adjudicatory process administered by the Federal Trade Commission. The DACA experts, therefore, advocated not that the FCC be abolished, but that an FTC-like enforcement model be imported into the FCC. To be clear, this is regulation. In fact, when the DACA working group released its initial framework in June 2005, some critiqued the plan on the grounds that it did not do enough to tie the hands of regulators. Others argued that there was no need to import a competition policy regime into the FCC when the FTC and Department of Justice remain perfectly capable of enforcing antitrust laws where anti-competitive conduct can be proven. While those concerns are understandable, they’re also not very practical. Scrapping the FCC is untenable, especially since the FCC still engages in some sector-specific forms of regulation (spectrum standards, interconnection mandates, universal service administration, etc.) that Congress would likely insist remain within the hands of a sector-specific regulator. Nonetheless, the DACA framework would be vastly superior to the sort of heavy-handed regulatory approach currently on the books, or the even stricter “Mother, may I?” approach that some Net Neutrality proponents favor. DACA has the added advantage of not being as susceptible to the problems of regulatory creep and regulatory capture.

Click To Play

PFF today released the fifth installment in our ongoing series on “The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media.” This series of papers explores various tax and regulatory proposals that would have government play an expanded role in supporting the press, journalism, or other media content. In the latest essay, Berin Szoka, Ken Ferree, and I discuss proposals for direct subsidies for failing media outlets and out-of-work journalists.

We argue taxpayer support for failing outlets and unemployed journalists implicates significant First Amendment concerns. On the whole, subsidies can make “journalists and media operators more dependent upon the State; compromise press independence and diminish public trust in the free press; and result in government discrimination in the politically inescapable dilemma of determining eligibility for subsidies.” Such an agenda would also entail huge cost to taxpayers—initially about $35 billion per year according to advocates—and would represent “a massive wealth transfer from one class of speakers to another…”

We warn that calls for seemingly beneficent bailouts “to save” the media and journalism may actually be driven by those who have something more nefarious in mind: a “post-corporate” world shorn of media capitalists, and “such radicalism must be rejected if we hope to sustain a truly free press and uphold America’s proud tradition of keeping a high and tight wall of separation between Press and State.”

The ideas within these and other essays in the series will be worked into a major PFF filing in the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) proceeding on the “Future of Media” on May 7. The paper may be viewed online here and I’ve attached it down below in a Scribd reader.

Wrong Way to Reinvent Media Part 5 – Media Bailouts [Thierer Szoka Ferree – PFF] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

As I’ve mentioned here previously, PFF has been rolling out a new series of essays examining proposals that would have the government play a greater role in sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting more “public interest” content. We’re releasing these as we get ready to submit a big filing in the FCC’s “Future of Media” proceeding (deadline is May 7^th).  Here’s a podcast Berin Szoka and I did providing an overview of the series and what the FCC is doing.

In the first installment of the series, Berin and I critiqued an old idea that’s suddenly gained new currency: taxing media devices or distribution systems to fund media content. In the second installment, I took a hard look at proposals to impose fees on broadcast spectrum licenses and channeling the proceeds to a “public square channel” or some other type of public media or “public interest” content.

In our latest essay, “The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 3: Media Vouchers,” Berin and I consider whether it is possible to steer citizens toward so-called “hard news” and get them to financially support it through the use of “news vouchers” or “public interest vouchers”?  We argue that using the tax code to “nudge” people to support media — while less problematic than direct subsidies for the press — will likely raise serious issues regarding eligibility and be prone to political meddling.  Moreover, it’s unlikely the scheme will actually encourage people to direct more resources to hard news but instead just become a method of subsidizing other content they already consume.

I’ve attached the entire essay down below.

The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 3: Media Vouchers

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka*

PFF Progress on Point 17.4 [PDF]

Should the government play a greater role in the media sector in the name of sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting public media?  In this ongoing series of essays, we’ve been analyzing proposals that would have public policymakers use taxes, subsidies, or regulations to accomplish those objectives.

Part 1 of this series examined proposals to fund media content via a tax on consumer electronics, broadband service, or cell phone bills.^[1] Part 2 critiqued proposals to impose fees on broadcast spectrum licenses and channeling the proceeds to a “public square channel” or some other type of public media or “public interest” content.^[2] Other essays in this series will address proposals to tax private advertising revenues to support public media; expand postal subsidies; directly subsidize out-of-work journalists; and to prop up or bail out failing media entities.  A wrap-up essay will then focus on some potentially constructive policy reforms that could assist media enterprises without a massive infusion of state support or regulation of the press.

In this installment, we will consider whether it is possible to steer citizens toward so-called “hard news” (“serious” journalism)—and get them to financially support it—through the use of “news vouchers” or “public interest vouchers”?  We will argue that using the tax code to nudge people to support media—while less problematic than direct subsidies for the press—will likely raise serious issues regarding eligibility and be prone to political meddling.  Moreover, it’s unlikely the scheme will actually encourage people to direct more resources to hard news but instead just become a method of subsidizing other content they already consume.

Funding Hard News is Hard

Funding “hard news” has always been challenging.  Financing a team of dedicated local beat reporters, investigative journalists, national desks, foreign bureaus, and all the associated production facilities and support staff is an extremely expensive undertaking.[3] And, for all that trouble and expense, hard news rarely turns a healthy profit.  Often it has been considered a “loss leader” for media companies and has been cross-subsidized by other types of content or services.[4] This is why “bundling” has been such a popular model for many media operations such as newspapers, magazines, and cable television.  By tying news production to other types of content or services, media operators have been able to sustain the production of hard news, despite its general unprofitability on its own.

It’s worth recalling that a business model to sustain hard news production and dissemination on a mass scale really only developed mid-way through our Republic.  The early history of media in this country was characterized by the “partisan press” due to the heavy reliance on a patronage model and direct association with political parties and figures. This changed with the rise of large daily newspapers in the mid-1800s and then broadcast radio and television in the early half of the 20 ^th century.[5] Media providers were able to cross-subsidize news production independent of private or political patronage thanks to three things: (1) high-speed printing presses or broadcast facilities, (2) geographic-based market and pricing power, and (3) the widespread advertising base that was made possible by (1) and (2).

Over just the past 15-20 years, we’ve seen this traditional model upended.  Increased competition and technological/platform proliferation are placing an enormous strain on traditional media operations and business models. Schumpeterian “creative destruction” is at work in a serious, and for many, painful, way.

This is what is keeping the Federal Communications Commission,[6] the Federal Trade Commission,[7] some in Congress,[8] and many media worrywarts up at night: the fear that, as traditional financing mechanisms falter (advertising, classifieds, subscription revenues, etc.), many traditional news-gathering efforts and institutions will disappear.  And that’s leading to calls for government intervention or assistance of some sort to prop up struggling entities or directly subsidize the hard news that many of them have traditionally provided but may not be able to for much for longer.

Can Vouchers “Nudge” Citizens to Support Hard News?

One much-discussed proposal would create a “public interest voucher” or what Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, authors of the new book The Death and Life of American Journalism, call a “Citizenship News Voucher.”^[9] This is a variant on the “artistic freedom voucher,” an idea first put forward in 2003 by economist Dean Baker as an alternative to copyright law as a means of incentivizing artistic creation.[10] The regulatory activist group Free Press, which McChesney founded, has also endorsed a news voucher scheme.[11]

The idea is fairly straightforward: give every American a voucher (McChesney and Nichols propose $200) to support the non-profit news entities of their choice by listing those entities on their tax return.  (If half of all adult Americans actually used their voucher, that would cost at least $20 billion/year.[12])  They assume this would be an efficient way of channeling money to hard news providers while avoiding the serious concerns that arise when government officials or agencies are the ones providing or steering the subsidies.  McChesney and Nichols go so far as to call their tax-and-redistribute proposal “a libertarian’s dream,” since “people can support whatever political viewpoint they prefer or do nothing at all.”[13]

McChesney and Nichols seem to be building on the approach popularized by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their highly influential 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness.^[14] Based on behavioral economics studies, Thaler and Sunstein argue that both government and private actors must inevitably make decisions about “choice architecture” and that, by setting defaults, incentives and rules smartly, “choice architects” can and should improve private decision-making—but only where they can do so without blocking, fencing-off or significantly burdening choices.^[15] While their proposal might not qualify as a nudge in the strict sense defined by Thaler and Sunstein, the essential similarity between the concepts lies in trying to restructure the choices Americans make about media consumption by changing how they spend money on media—with the declared goal of “improving” both media consumption and the media itself (by “freeing it” of supposedly evil corporate influences).

Problems with the News Voucher Proposal

While nudges might be less objectionable in circumstances where it’s objectively evident what’s really “good” for us, the same can hardly be said for media consumption.  “Nudging” consumers towards better media choices isn’t based on clear science about, say, eating better or getting more exercise, but on highly subjective decisions about what kind of information consumption is really good for individuals, communities, and polities.  For policymakers to imagine that they can steer the public’s tastes or behavior in more desirable directions through law (including media subsidy schemes) is a profoundly elitist enterprise.^[16] In the case of “news vouchers,” the hope is that the public can be encouraged to at least channel some additional support to news-gathering activities and institutions.  The problem, however, is that some people just don’t much like being “nudged” by officials from afar and they’ll often take steps to evade such paternalism—however ostensibly “libertarian” it might be.  And it could lead to a host of unintended consequences, discussed further below.[17]

As a general matter, it simply isn’t possible to make consumers choose the “right” media in an age of information abundance.^[18] With so many voices competing for our attention, it’s impossible make people watch, listen, or read if they don’t want to.  That’s especially true with hard news, which has never netted major ratings.  As Ellen P. Goodman of the Rutgers-Camden School of Law has noted: “Given the proliferation of consumer filtering and choice, these kinds of interventions are of questionable efficacy.  Consumers equipped with digital selection and filtering tools are likely to avoid content they do not demand no matter what the regulatory efforts to force exposure.”[19] As Goodman rightly argues, “regulation cannot, in a liberal democracy, force viewers to consume media products they do not think they want in the name of the public interest.”[20] There’s no reason to believe this situation has ever been different or will ever change:  Writing in 1922, famed journalist Walter Lippmann noted that, “it is possible to make a rough estimate only of the amount of attention people give each day to informing themselves about public affairs,” but “the time each day is small when any of us is directly exposed to information from our unseen environment.”[21]

McChesney and Nichols’ effort to sell this scheme as “a libertarian’s dream” is a huge stretch.  There aren’t too many libertarians—or anyone else for that matter—who favor sending more money to the federal government only to win back the right to spend it on “qualifying media entities.”  And regarding their claim that “people can support whatever political viewpoint they prefer or do nothing at all,” well, people are already free to do whatever they want with their money when it comes to media products!  Why do we need to send money to Washington first and then have policymakers tell us how we can spend it?  This seems like a needless nudge—and one that would likely result in government bureaucracy taking a cut of the money or meddling in media markets.

Analogies to educational vouchers don’t work because we long ago decided to treat education as a public good and force everyone to pay for it.  “Voucherization” may make sense as a more efficient and “libertarian” way to fund such traditional public goods, when we absolutely have to force people to spend money on certain goods or services.  While McChesney and Nichols claim that the time has come for the government to fund media as such a public good, most people probably wouldn’t agree, since the private provision of media services has worked quite well for some time—being funded by a mix of advertising and subscription revenues for centuries.  They repeatedly claim that era is over (with little substantiation) but, in reality, it is their policies that would end private, for-profit media by taxing and regulating it to death.[22]

Second, what counts as a “qualifying media entity,” and how will the IRS make that call?  Can just any outlet that purports to gather and report “news” draw support from this new federal program?  McChesney and Nichols aren’t clear: They want the IRS to “determine eligibility—according to universal standards that err on the side of expanding rather than constraining the number of serious sources covering and commenting on issues of the day.”[23] They specify only that the entity must be a non-profit (though not necessarily a federally-recognized 501(c)(3)); not accept advertising; “do exclusively media content”; “cannot be part of a larger organization or have any non-media operations”; and that everything the medium produces must be made available immediately upon publication on the Internet and made available for free to all.”[24] But, anticipating objections about the dangers of political meddling, they also insist that “the government will not evaluate the content to see that the money is going toward journalism.  Our assumption is that these criteria will effectively produce that result, and if there is some slippage so be it.”[25] The only mechanism they can suggest for reducing fraud and ensuring “seriousness” is that, “for a medium to receive funds it would have to get commitments for at least $20,000 worth of vouchers” (100 full donations of the $200 voucher).[26]

But will policymakers really let citizens redeem their vouchers on The National Inquirer or People magazine?  How about the satirical The Onion or Jon Stewart’s Daily Show?  “This is a risk we are more than willing to take,” McChesney and Nichols say since they are “operating on a gut instinct that people will use their vouchers to fund serious media while reaching into their pockets to pay for copies of The National Inquirer at the supermarket checkout.”^[27] Of course, it’s always easier to take such risks when you are playing with other people’s money!  (Nearly half of all Americans don’t pay any Federal income taxes,[28] so their $200 news voucher is definitely coming out of someone else’s tax bill.)

But it’s naïve to believe this idea is going to change the face of journalism in any serious way.  Most people will spend their vouchers on whatever media outlets and content they are currently consuming, which probably isn’t what McChesney and Nichols (or most policymakers) would prefer.  “The program may not develop exactly the type of journalism our greatest thinkers believe is necessary,” McChesney and Nichols admit.[29] But the real question is: What sort of demands will policymakers begin making if the voucher program ends up channeling money into media entities that don’t measure up to their standards or desires?  Qualification criteria would inevitably become the tool of political meddling.

The Inevitable Strings & the Political/Constitutional Paradox

This raises a fourth concern: How long will it be before government starts attaching more strings to the vouchers?  To borrow a recent headline from The Wall Street Journal, how long will it be before the “Economic Policy ‘Nudge’ Gives Way to a Shove?”^[30] Although, in theory, the news voucher idea lets consumers figure out how to steer the funds, it’s unlikely much of those funds would go toward hard news, civic-minded or “high brow” content if consumers were actually free to choose.  How do we know this?  Because we already know what consumers choose today—and those “poor” choices are part of the supposed “problem” to be solved by media vouchers.  Once people start redirecting taxpayer dollars to content that the elites and policymakers don’t like, the nudge will become a shove and more interventions will follow in the form of “voucher guidance and compliance” hearings, rules, etc.

But the pressure for strings won’t just come from the top down because, as Thomas Jefferson famously put it in the 1786 Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”[31] That is, we naturally—and rightly—resent subsidizing speech that is antithetical to our own values.  McChesney and Nichols dismiss this natural (presumably bourgeois?) indignation by saying, “people will have to accept that some of the vouchers are going to go to media that they detest.”^[32] In one sense, they are dead wrong: People won’t just accept that.  They may accept subtle, indirect subsidies, but the more clear it becomes that they are being forced to pay for media they detest—and that could scarcely be more clear than with a refundable tax credit “voucher”—they will protest and demand that certain viewpoints, or at least kinds of content, be deemed out of bounds.

But in another sense, McChesney and Nichols are probably correct: For such a scheme to work, it probably can’t come with any content strings, because this is probably what the First Amendment would require.  Yet they don’t actually explain that point, stopping only to say that we all just have to become more tolerant of “dissent”— i.e., subsidize those who disagree with us!  In this sense, news vouchers therefore would likely fall prey to a common paradox faced by proposals for the government to subsidize speech: What’s politically feasible is unconstitutional and what’s constitutional is politically impossible.  Specifically, the kinds of eligibility restrictions necessary to push a voucher scheme through Congress would probably cause the courts to strike down the whole scheme.  Even if the courts were willing to strike down only the eligibility provisions as “severable” from the rest of the scheme, the whole scheme would likely die in the very next federal budget if the courts require the funding of “offensive” or “frivolous” content.  Understanding why this is the case requires a brief overview of key First Amendment case law.

In general, “when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”^[33] Thus, in its 1991 Rust v. Sullivan decision, the Supreme Court upheld a law forbidding federal funding for family planning services to go to abortion counseling.^[34] But the Supreme Court later clarified that such viewpoint discrimination is permissible only “[w]hen the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message.”^[35] By contrast, where subsidies are “designed to facilitate private speech,” government may not discriminate against viewpoints it does not like.^[36] Thus, the government may not fund legal services but bar funding for defendants trying to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.^[37]

The First Amendment prohibits not only such viewpoint discrimination but content discrimination as well.  In 2003, the Supreme Court held that the University of Virginia could not exclude religious groups from drawing on the University’s Student Activity Fund, even though the Fund’s eligibility requirements did not discriminate against any particular religion.^[38] Yet in 1995, the Court had upheld another content restriction: a requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) “take into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” when making grants to “help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the release of . . . creative talent.”^[39] The Court concluded, in an 8-1 majority, that the “’decency and respect’ criteria do not silence speakers by expressly threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.”^[40] This decision rested largely on the fact that “Educational programs are central to the NEA’s mission” and “it is well established that ‘decency’ is a permissible factor where ‘educational suitability’ motivates its consideration.”^[41] The Court left the door open to future First Amendment challenges to the statute “as applied,” such as “[i]f the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.”^[42]

What explains these starkly different outcomes is that the Court decided that the University of Virginia’s Student Activity Fund constituted a “limited public forum”^[43] intended to “encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,” but the NEA did not.  The University had funded all speech except “religious editorial viewpoints” from its Student Activities Fund, into which every student paid a $14 mandatory fee each semester.  By contrast, the NEA made only a limited number of grants through a “competitive process” according to principles of inherently content-based principles of “excellence” as well as “geographic, ethnic, and esthetic diversity.”  Thus, it was permissible, in principle, for the NEA to exclude “indecent” content.

The Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. American Library Association, Inc. (2003) also suggests that content restrictions regarding Citizen News Vouchers would be struck down.  The Court held that the First Amendment did not bar Congress from requiring in the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) that “a public library may not receive federal assistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them.”^[44] Critically, the Court held that libraries were not public fora:

A public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it collects books in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak. It provides Internet access, not to “encourage a diversity of views from private speakers” … but for the same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and appropriate quality.^[45]

But what is the purpose of the news voucher scheme if not to “encourage a diversity of views from private speakers?”  Indeed, this is precisely how McChesney and Nichols attempt to sell their scheme—as a “libertarian’s dream.”  But, paradoxically, the more “libertarian” and broader subsidies for speech are, the more likely the political/constitutional paradox mentioned above is to arise.

The Citizenship News Voucher Fund proposed by McChesney and Nichols strongly resembles the University of Virginia’s Student Activity Fund:  In both cases, consumers are taxed to finance a fund that is, in theory, available to any entity that meets certain basic eligibility criteria.  No attempt is made in either case to ensure the quality of content or activities being funded.  Indeed, McChesney and Nichols explicitly reject such oversight of voucher spending and insist that taxpayers must accept that much of the fund will simply be wasted on media that falls well short of the “hard” or “serious” news they’re trying to save.  (By contrast, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, whose budget McChesney and Nichols propose increasing nine-fold to fund more public media,[46] more closely resembles the NEA as a selective grant-maker.)

Also distinguishing the Court’s decision upholding CIPA’s content-based restrictions is the fact that both Justice Kennedy in his concurrence and Justice Souter in his dissent (joined by Justice Ginsburg) agreed that First Amendment problems could be solved to the extent that adults could opt-out of filtering.^[47] But with news vouchers, the government either restricts the eligibility of certain publications to receive vouchers depending on their eligibility or it does not.

Furthermore, unlike with CIPA or the NEA, the Citizenship News Voucher wouldn’t be related to educational settings, so it’s not even clear a “decency” requirement like that Congress imposed on the NEA’s grant-making could be imposed on voucher eligibility.[48] Magazines like Playboy offer a mix of pornography and thoughtful commentary on the news, proving that there is a market for such combination of journalism and controversial entertainment and photography.  Going even further, “Naked News” is a daily show whose buxom anchors strip while delivering the news.^[49] Why wouldn’t millions of Americans, especially younger men, use their voucher for such content?  Who’s going to draw the line between porn-spiced news and “serious” content?

The typical taxpayer will be outraged by having to subsidize some media outlet, whether because of its objectionable viewpoint or indecent or unserious content.  He will fiercely resist being compelled “to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors,” as Jefferson put it.  Good luck getting even the most “tolerant” gay voters, for example, to accept being taxed to pay for fundamentalist Christian perspectives on the news—or vice versa!  McChesney and Nichols don’t actually say anything about the First Amendment, but do recognize that, for their program to be accepted, the American people will have to swallow the “hard pill” of accepting that “some of the vouchers are going to go to media that they detest” and “embrace dissent in reality and not just rhetoric.”^[50] They seem to think this “hard pill” is a benefit of their scheme because it would teach us all to be more tolerant of “dissent.”  That’s easy for an endowed professor at a taxpayer-funded university and avowed neo-Marxist like Robert McChesney to say, but it’s not likely to fly with most Americans.  Disputes over “qualifying entity” eligibility will only add new rancor to the Culture Wars (over sex, abortion, religion, politics, etc.).

Realistically, it would likely take years for a news voucher bill to make its way through Congress, and if it ever did pass, it would likely be tied up in the courts for years, requiring at least one visit to the Supreme Court.  If any content strings are included, the law could well lead to the same kind of ordeal as with the 1998 Child Online Protection Act, which spent nearly 9 years in litigation and went up to the Supreme Court twice.^[51] Yet somehow McChesney and Nichols imagine their proposal will save media today at this critical moment of technological transition.

Down with Copyright, Down with Capitalism?

There’s another problematic caveat to the McChesney-Nichols variant of the news voucher idea: They would disallow any copyright protection or advertising support for an entity who receives voucher funds.  That’s an effort by the authors to steer even more media activity away from the commercial sphere and toward what might be thought of as a “public option” for the press—what McChesney and Nichols euphemistically (and repeatedly) call “post-corporate” media.

Let’s not forget that McChesney has argued (during an interview on the Canadian-based “Socialist Project”) that “the ultimate goal is to get rid of the media capitalists,” and that, “unless you make significant changes in the media, it will be vastly more difficult to have a revolution.”  So, it’s important to keep his true intentions in mind when he starts claiming to have found “a libertarian’s dream” of a solution to what ails America’s media sector.^[52] It sounds more like a central planner’s dream.  The true “libertarian’s dream” would be to leave Americans free to make their own choices about media without additional meddling from the State, and to look to innovation to fund media through a combination of advertising, sponsorship, subscriptions and micropayments.

Related PFF Publications

• The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 2: Broadcast Spectrum Taxes to Subsidize Public Media , Adam Thierer, Progress on Point 17.2, March 2010.
• The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 1: Taxes on Consumer Electronics, Mobile Phones & Broadband, Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, PFF Progress on Point 17.1, March 2010.
• Testimony at FCC’s Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era”, Adam Thierer, March 2010.
• Public Option for Press Should Get the Red Pen, Adam Thierer, The Daily Caller, Jan. 2010.
• Chairman Leibowitz’s Disconnect on Privacy Regulation & the Future of News, Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, Progress Snapshot 6.1, Jan. 13, 2010.
• Socializing Media in Order to Save It, Adam Thierer, City Journal, March 2009.
• A Manifesto for Media Freedom, Adam Thierer and Brian Anderson, 2008.
• Media Ownership Proceedings, W. Kenneth Ferree, Testimony before the Federal Communications Commission, Nov. 3, 2009.
• Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership, Adam Thierer, June 2005.

[1] Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 1: Taxes on Consumer Electronics, Mobile Phones & Broadband, PFF Progress on Point 17.1, March 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2010/pop17.1-the_wrong_way_to_reinvent_media.pdf.

[2] Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 2: Broadcast Spectrum Taxes to Subsidize Public Media, Progress on Point 17.2, March 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2010/pop17.2-wrong_way_part_2.pdf

[3] “Until now, the iron core of news has been somewhat sheltered by an economic model that was able to provide extra resources beyond what readers—and advertisers—would financially support. This kind of news is expensive to produce, especially investigative reporting.” Alex S. Jones, Losing the News: The Future of the News that Feeds Democracy (2009) at 4.

[4] “For a long time, publishers have used news as a ‘loss leader,’ a product sold below costs to create other sales.” The Media Consortium, The Big Thaw: Charting a New Future for Journalism, July 2009, at 36, www.themediaconsortium.org/thebigthaw.

[5] James T. Hamilton notes that, “nonpartisan reporting emerged as a commercial product in American newspaper markets in the 1870s.  Before that time, many papers openly proclaimed association with a particular political party.”  James T. Hamilton, All the News That’s Fit to Sell (2004), at 3.

[6] The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently kicked off a new “Future of Media” effort with a workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Launches Examination of the Future of Media and Information Needs of Communities in a Digital Age, FCC Public Notice, GN Docket No. 10-25, Jan. 21, 2010, at 2, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-10-100A1.pdf

[7] The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has hosted two workshops asking “How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

[8] Both the Senate and House of Representatives have held hearings about “the future of journalism,” and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) recently introduced the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become nonprofit organizations in an effort to help them stay afloat—but also curtail their political editorializing.  See http://cardin.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=310392.

[9] Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, The Death and Life of American Journalism (2010) at 201-206. McChesney discussed this idea in more detail when he spoke at the recent FTC event on saving journalism.  Robert W. McChesney, Rejuvenating American Journalism: Some Tentative Policy Proposals, Presentation to FTC Workshop on Journalism, March 10, 2010, www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/mar9/docs/mcchesney.pdf

[10] Dean Baker, The Artistic Freedom Voucher: An Internet Age Alternative to Copyrights, Nov. 5, 2003, www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ip_2003_11.pdf.

[11] Free Press, Saving the News: Toward a National Journalism Strategy, May 2009, at 36, www.freepress.net/files/saving_the_news.pdf.

[12] McChesney & Nichols, supra note 9 at 205.

[13] Id. at 204.

[14] Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).

[15] They define choice architecture as follows:  “A structure designed by a choice architect(s) to improve the quality of decisions made by homo sapiens. Often invisible, choice architecture is the specific user-friendly shape of an organization’s policy or physical building when homo sapiens come into contact with it. Examples of choice architecture include a voter ballot, a procedure for handling well-meaning people who forget a deadline, or a skyscraper.”  Nudge Glossary of Terms, www.nudges.org/glossary.cfm.

[16] See Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation?, Progress on Point 16.19, Aug. 11, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.19-unites-speech-and-privacy-reg-advocates.pdf.

[17] As Glen Whitman notes in challenging such “nudging”: “the new paternalism carries a serious risk of expansion. Following its policy recommendations places us on a slippery slope from soft paternalism to hard. This would be true even if policymakers — including legislators, judges, bureaucrats, and voters — were completely rational. But the danger is especially great if policymakers exhibit the same cognitive biases attributed to the people they’re trying to help.”  Glen Whitman, The Rise of the New Paternalism, Cato Unbound, April 5, 2010, www.cato-unbound.org/2010/04/05/glen-whitman/the-rise-of-the-new-paternalism.

[18] Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Why Expansion of the FCC’s Public Interest Regulatory Regime is Unwise, Unneeded, Unconstitutional, and Unenforceable, Testimony Before the Federal Communications Commission Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era,” March 4, 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2010/2010-03-04-Thierer_Remarks_at_FCC_Hearing.pdf.

[19] Ellen P. Goodman, “Proactive Media Policy in an Age of Content Abundance,” in Philip M. Napoli, ed., Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics (2007) at 370, 374.

[20] Id.

[21] Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922), at 53, 57.

[22] For example, among other things, McChesney and Nichols call for a 5% tax on consumer electronics, a 3% tax on monthly ISP & cell phone bills, a 2% sales tax on advertising, and a 7% tax on broadcasters.  See McChesney & Nichols, supra note 9 at 209-11.

[23] Id. at 202.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 205.

[28] http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001289_who_pays.pdf

[29] McChesney & Nichols, supra note 9 at 205.

[30] Jonathan Weisman, Economic Policy ‘Nudge’ Gives Way to a Shove, Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704869304575103980232739138.html.

[31] http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/vaact.html

[32] McChesney & Nichols, supra note 9 at 205.

[33] Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).

[34] Id. (emphasis added).

[35] Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (emphasis added).

[36] Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 US 533, 542 (2001).  The Court in Rosenberger noted:

even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not “ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,” Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983), and if a subsidy were “manipulated” to have a “coercive effect,” then relief could be appropriate. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“[D]ifferential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints”). In addition…, a more pressing constitutional question would arise if Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to drive “certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).

Id. at 587.

[37] 531 U.S. at 542.

[38] Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).  The University’s rule prohibited funding of any group that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”

[39] National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998).

[40] 524 U.S. at 583 (quoting R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).

[41] Id. at 584 (citing  Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982); see also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).

[42] Id. at 587.

[43] 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

[44] U.S. v. American Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  See generally Robert Corn-Revere, United States v. American Library Association: A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Clarify Application of First Amendment Law to Publicly Funded Expressive Institutions, Cato Supreme Court Rev. 105, 2003, www.cato.org/pubs/scr2003/publiclyfunded.pdf.

[45] Id. at 207 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).

[46] McChesney & Nichols, supra note 9 at 192, 199.

[47] “If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant delay, there is little to this case.” American Library Association, 539 U.S. at 214 (Kennedy, J. concurring).  Justice Souter agreed that it would ‘‘tak[e] the curse off the statute for all practical purposes’’ if adult patrons could obtain an unblocked Internet terminal ‘‘simply for the asking,’’ but doubted this would actually happen in practice.  Id. at 232.

[48] Cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 584 (“Educational programs are central to the NEA’s mission.… And it is well established that ‘decency’ is a permissible factor where ‘educational suitability’ motivates its consideration.”).

[49] See www.nakednews.com.

[50] Id. at 205.

[51] See Adam Thierer, Closing the Book on COPA?, Technology Liberation Front, Jan. 21, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/01/21/closing-the-book-on-copa/.

[52] Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Free Press, Robert McChesney & the “Struggle” for Media, Aug. 10, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/08/free_press_robert_mcchesney_the_struggle_for_media.html

Wrong Way to Reinvent Media Part 3 – Media Vouchers [Thierer & Szoka – PFF] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

As we mentioned yesterday, in a new series of essays, we will be examining proposals being put forward today that would have the government play a greater role in sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting more “public interest” content. With many traditional media operators struggling, and questions being raised about how journalism in particular will be supported in the future, Washington policymakers are currently considering what role government can and should play in helping media providers reinvent themselves in the face of tumultuous technological change wrought by the Digital Revolution. We will be releasing 6 or 7 essays on this topic leading up to our big filing in the FCC’s “Future of Media” proceeding (deadline is May 7^th).

In the first installment of our series, we will critique an old idea that’s suddenly gained new currency: taxing media devices or distribution systems to fund media content. We argue that such media income redistribution is fundamentally inconsistent with American press traditions, highly problematic under the First Amendment, difficult to implement in a world of media abundance and platform convergence, and likely to cause serious negative side effects.  Bottom line: Don’t tax our iPhones or broadband to subsidize media!

We’ve attached the entire text of the piece below. (Installment #2, on broadcast spectrum taxes to subsidize public media, will be released next week.)

The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part I: Taxes on Consumer Electronics, Mobile Phones & Broadband

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka*

PFF Progress on Point 17.1 [PDF]

With many traditional media operators struggling, and questions being raised about how journalism in particular will be supported in the future,[1] Washington policymakers are currently considering what role government can and should play in helping media providers reinvent themselves in the face of tumultuous technological change wrought by the Digital Revolution. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently kicked off a new “Future of Media” effort with a workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has hosted two workshops asking “How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?”  Meanwhile, the Senate has already held hearings about “the future of journalism,” and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) recently introduced the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become tax-exempt non-profits in an effort to help them stay afloat.

In a series of forthcoming essays leading up to the May 7 filing deadline for the FCC’s “Future of Media” proceeding, we will discuss and critique some of the leading proposals being put forward that would have the government play a greater role in sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting more “public interest” content.

In this essay, we discuss an old idea that‘s gained new currency: taxing media  devices or distribution systems to fund media content. We argue that such media income redistribution is fundamentally inconsistent with American press traditions, highly problematic under the First Amendment, difficult to implement in a world of media abundance and platform convergence, and likely to cause serious negative side effects.

The BBC Model: Taxing Devices

Taxing devices to subsidize media content has never gained much traction here in the U.S., but it’s been used by some foreign governments for many decades.  Most famously, taxes on radios, eventually replaced by taxes on televisions, have sustained the BBC in the U.K. since its inception as the world’s first national broadcasting system in 1922. According to the most recent BBC annual report, the annual “fee” was raised to £142.50/year (currently $213.43) as of April 2009.  Failure to pay the fee is, of course, a crime and punished with stiff fines up to £1000 ($1497.75)—and radio emissions from unlicensed televisions can be detected by government vans that rove Britain’s streets looking for violators.  The revenue generated by the tax is then allocated among various BBC media products, with most of it going to the BBC 1 and BBC 2 television channels.

The U.S. has taken a different approach.  We’ve not embedded a tax in the cost of new media devices to pay for the content delivered over those devices.  (Of course, that’s at least partially because we’ve had a strong tradition of free markets in media ever since we revolted against the Brits and mercantilism, their system of state-directed economic planning!)  Generally speaking, private media operators have been expected to pay their own way in this country and not look to government for direct support.

America has had some indirect subsidies in the form of reduced postal rates for print media, as well as tax treatment for advertising.  And taxpayer dollars have been channeled to the CPB/PBS/NPR regime, of course.  But such public subsidy is small potatoes when compared to private media in the U.S.  For example, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s 2010 budget is just $400 million.[2] While many look to CPB to fund children’s programming (among its many other activities), its entire budget is no more than a quarter of the total amount of U.S. advertising revenue produced by children’s programming from food and beverages products alone: $1.6 billion in 2006 by the FTC’s most conservative estimates.[3] That comparison illustrates the vital importance of advertising to media,[4] but subscriptions, direct sales, and private patronage have also been major economic engines of media in United States.

But the idea of more direct government support for media (and journalism, in particular) has always been lurking out there.  There’s long been a small but vociferous crowd of academics and policymakers advocating huge increases in government spending on non-commercial or public media.  And some of them have even toyed with a tax on technology to cross-subsidize the media content that flows over those devices or networks.  Most recently, Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols, authors of the new book The Death and Life of American Journalism, have proposed a 4-part tax plan to raise money ($18-21 billion) for a massive $35 billion/year “public works” program for the press (with the remainder coming from other sources):[5]

• a 5% tax on consumer electronics (they estimate it would bring in $4 billion/year)
• a 3% tax on monthly ISP & cell phone bills (estimated $6 billion/year)
• a 2% sales tax on advertising (estimated $5 to $6 billion/year)
• a 7% tax on broadcasters (estimated $3-6 billion/year)

Similarly, Leonard Downie, Jr., Vice President at Large of The Washington Post, and Michael Schudson, a Professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, have advocated the creation of a “Fund for Local News” that “would make grants for advances in local news reporting and innovative ways to support it.”[6] The Fund would make grants to news organizations through “Local News Fund Councils” and would be financed by “fees paid by radio and television licensees, or proceeds from auctions of telecommunications spectrum, or new fees imposed on Internet service providers.”[7] (Note: Proposals to impose fees on radio and television licensees will be discussed in a subsequent installment of this PFF series.  But for purposes of this installment, we reference the Downie & Schudson plan because of its call for fees on ISPs as one method of financing media going forward.)

More Platforms, More Taxes

McChesney and Nichols don’t go into a lot of detail about their tax proposals, but the consumer electronics tax they favor appears to be based on the 1967 Carnegie Commission Report, which called for a 5% tax on all new television purchases—a variant on Britain’s annual licensing fee.  But instead of just taxing “televisions”—which would be very difficult in a world of technological convergence where consumers can “watch television” on any number of devices (PCs, mobile phones, portable gaming devices, portable media players, etc.)—they apparently want to tax all consumer electronic devices.  Thus, they seem to recognize the reality of convergence but their answer is to just tax everything!

The British themselves have struggled with technological change: In 1971, the radio fee first introduced in 1922 was abolished, and in 1972, so was the BBC’s radio monopoly, with commercial radio stations being allowed to compete with BBC Radio for the first time.  One might argue that abolishing the radio tax and relying on a single tax (on televisions) to fund the BBC’s television programming (67% of BBC spending) as well as BBC radio (17%) was simply more efficient—since most consumers had a television as well as a radio.  Indeed, actually implementing any media device tax in the U.S. could prove very difficult, since countering evasion would require imposing sales taxes on online retailers ranging from Amazon.com to TigerDirect.com to countless small operators who sell TVs, DVD players, cell phones, and a wide variety of other gadgets.  So much for the Internet sales tax moratorium!

But the evasion problem is a real one. The BBC estimates an 8.7% evasion rate, and it’s not clear how much more (or less) of a problem evasion might be when the tax is imposed at the point of sale (as McChesney and Nichols propose) rather than every year (as in Britain).  But clearly, the problem can’t be solved simply by trying to tax all consumer electronics:  The higher the tax rate, the more likely a black market will develop for discounted devices—with all the problems that generally come with black markets, such as funding organized crime. Whenever someone proposes a single-digit tax rate for anything, it’s worth remembering that the federal income tax started out at 1-7% back in 1913—and, well, we all know how that turned out!  (Top rates rose to 67-73% during World War I, fell again to the mid-20s under Coolidge, then jumped again to 63% by 1933 and didn’t fall below 50% till 1986!)  Maybe McChesney and Nichols realize how ugly black markets would get if tax rates on devices rise in the future—and perhaps that’s why they’re trying to spread the pain around by taxing broadband and wireless service, advertising and broadcasting, too.  But, as discussed next, that’s another problem with the plan.

Taxation’s Negative Disincentives

Taxes distort markets and human behavior.  Long ago, Chief Justice John Marshall taught us that “the power to tax is the power to destroy.”  As the late Clarence B. Carson noted in an article of the same name:

Any level of taxation will make some undertakings unprofitable or submarginal. In practice, any increase in taxes will drive some people out of business, prevent them from going into business, or make it difficult or impossible for them to sustain themselves by whatever they are doing.[8]

This helps us understand why raising taxes on mobile phones and broadband bills would be particularly foolish way of supporting media:  it will distort beneficial behavior by both providers and consumers of communications conduit.

The FCC just recently reported that cost is a major factor for many households who decide not to buy broadband service (even though it’s available).  Why, after the FCC spent 13 months producing a 376-page, Congressionally mandated National Broadband Report on ways to increase the utilization and affordability of broadband, would we want to do anything to boost broadband bills, even in the name of “saving journalism”?  Increased taxes on broadband bills might discourage some broadband providers from rolling out innovative new services as rapidly as planned.  And once the new service tax is passed along to consumers—as all business taxes inevitably are—they might be less likely to adopt broadband, or might even cancel existing service.  How would that benefit media and journalism?

The same goes for mobile phones. CTIA—The Wireless Association estimates that wireless users already pay an average 15% tax (local state and federal) on their cell phone bills.  Moreover, if there is one thing we can count on, it’s that taxes inevitably rise once they get on the books, whatever the intention of their initial architects.  That‘s especially true when the tax creates a new class of subsidy recipients who have a vested interest in keeping the scheme alive and growing. Thus, what starts out as 3-5% tax on phones, broadband, and consumer electronics, will likely grow to be much higher over time.  Pretty soon the FCC will look like the massively inefficient Department of Agriculture, doling out subsides to everybody and his brother who qualifies for media industry corporate welfare.

How Will the Government Spend Your Money?

But the more interesting question about such a media tax may be on the  payout side of the scheme.  Herein lies a fundamental difference between the BBC model and what McChesney and Nichols are proposing: The BBC fees have always been used to fund BBC content only, not for all media.  True, the BBC once held monopolies in radio and television, but those monopolies died long ago, and when they did, the British did not share fee revenue with the BBC’s competitors.  Instead, commercial radio and television in the UK have had to rely on subscription and advertising revenues, just as in the US.  Thus, the British model does not answer a profoundly difficult question: Even if we assume government could create a reasonably effective media tax collection regime, who would qualify for a cut of the money?

In an age of user-generated content and a wide variety of hybrid media products, it would seem that defining eligibility criteria for the subsidy might be significantly more challenging than it was in the past. Would blogs qualify?  What about live reporting via Twitter or photo-journalism via Flickr?  Who gets to decide what qualifies as news worth subsidizing, as opposed to mere opinions or aggregation?  Similarly, the “Fund for Local News” and “Local News Fund Councils” favored by Downie and Schudson would be doubly problematic.  They propose that, “The criteria for grants should be journalistic quality, local relevance, innovation in news reporting, and the capacity of the news organization, small or big, to carry out the reporting.”[9] But, again, who determines “journalistic quality” and “the capacity… to carry out the reporting” or even what constitutes “local” news?

Beyond such practical problems, determining eligibility raises profound First Amendment questions because, as the Supreme Court has held, “in the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.”[10] The Court has also held that “Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”[11] Thus, the government may not pick preferred classes of speakers for subsidies, just as it may not single out disfavored classes for penalties.  For example, a state university may not selectively deny funding to a gay and lesbian students association, because, as the Eighth Circuit has held:

a public body that chooses to fund speech or expression must do so even-handedly, without discriminating among recipients on the basis of their ideology.  The University need not supply funds to student organizations; but once having decided to do so, it is bound by the First Amendment to act without regard to the content of the ideas being expressed.  This will mean, to use Holmes’s phrase, that the taxpayers will occasionally be obligated to support not only the thought of which they approve, but also the thought that they hate. That is one of the fundamental premises of American law.[12]

And there’s also a First Amendment-related concern here associated with the potentially—if subtly—coercive effects of subsidies on the independent editorial discretion of news-gatherers.  Downie and Schudson insist they “understand the complexity of establishing a workable grant selection system and the need for strict safeguards to shield news organizations from pressure or coercion from state councils or anyone in government.”^[13] Yet they hope political pressure can, somehow, be kept to a minimum.  Likewise, McChesney and Nichols largely dismiss such concerns about undue political influence on subsidized entities—even though they cite several examples of politicians attempting to use the purse strings to influence PBS and NPR funding over the past four decades![14]

Regardless, these scholars fail to account for the fact that, going forward, political pressure would likely grow in proportion to dependence of media entities upon such public subsidy and the overall amount of those subsidies.  After all, we’re talking about taxpayer funding for the press on an unprecedented scale here.  Moreover, the more visible these subsidies become—especially then the funding goes to highly controversial media content or outlets ( e.g., involving pornography, vulgarity, politics, religion, abortion, homosexuality)—the more likely the public and politicians are to clamor for rules on who gets what.  We’ve already seen a microcosm of that concern with National Endowment for the Arts funding for controversial art and culture in the past.  Now imagine media subsidies on the scale that McChesney and Nichols envision coupled with Downie and Schudson’s “Local News Fund Councils” sorting out competing claims and concerns.  Media funding will quickly become a political circus—and another front in the ongoing Culture Wars.

Here’s another concern: Will this scheme lead to more or less media competition?  It would be misguided to argue that such a tax system couldn’t fund some quality journalism and even entertainment.  After all, there’s some wonderful stuff on the BBC.  But without having run the numbers for all countries, there seems to be a correlation between the level of government investment in media and the overall number of media outlets at the public’s disposal.  When visiting Europe, one is struck by how even the largest European countries have so few choices compared to what we have here in the States, and that’s true across media (video, audio, print, online).  Could that be because government spending / investment in media has had a crowding-out effect on private media?  That possibility is at least worth considering as some look to broaden public support for media here in the U.S. Government simply doesn’t have a very good track record of creating innovative, competitive businesses and markets.

How the Death of Private, For-Profit Media Becomes a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Which leads to a final concern: There’s just a gut-level discomfort many of us would have with the idea of government imposing even more taxes on us to support industries or interests we might find distasteful or not deserving of corporate welfare.  It’s one thing to say that the government should play a role at the margin funneling some money into public broadcasting efforts via the CPB for limited purposes, but it’s quite another to suggest that this should be the new model upon which all media should rest.  That’s essentially what McChesney and Nichols propose in their book, on the grounds that “the old order is collapsing” and private media is dead.

Of course, it’s virtually a self-fulfilling prophecy that private media operators will fail if you impose a smorgasbord of new tax burdens on them and related devices and distribution channels—and then channel the money to “public media” competitors!  As will be discussed in a future installment in this series of essays, taxing advertising is particularly harmful because those taxes come straight out of the advertising revenues upon which most publishers depend for their lifeblood.

But raising prices of innovative consumer electronics like readers ( e.g., Amazon’s Kindle, Barnes & Noble’s Nook, Sony’s Reader or Apple’s iPad) and the wireless broadband services that connect them isn’t such a bright idea either at a time when traditional publishers are hoping that new media distribution and consumption technologies will also allow them to experiment with new business models (like selling subscriptions for magazines or newspapers tailored for these devices).  Unlike the British annual license fee, a tax imposed at the point of purchase would discourage users from buying new devices.  This, in turn would slow adoption of new technologies and retard innovation in a market that has seen consumers move increasingly towards replacing their old devices every few years, due to the constant increased in processing power and functionality made possible by Moore’s Law.

Taken together, these tax proposals are a sure-fire way to achieve McChesney’s true radical end: the destruction of private, commercial media and journalism.  Let’s not forget, after all, that McChesney has argued (during this interview with the Canadian-based “Socialist Project”) that “the ultimate goal is to get rid of the media capitalists,” and that, “unless you make significant changes in the media, it will be vastly more difficult to have a revolution.”[15] And in his book with Nichols, he concludes by noting that “We have responded in a time of crisis not with tinkering reforms but with revolution.”[16]

Indeed they have!  But such radicalism must be rejected if we hope to sustain a truly free press and uphold America’s proud tradition of keeping a high and tight wall of separation between Press and State.  Americans would do well remember to remember the (other) Golden Rule: “Whoever Has the Gold, Makes the Rules!”[17] The more control politicians have over funding media, the more control they will inevitably have over media itself.

Related PFF Publications

• Testimony at FCC’s Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era ,” Adam Thierer, March 2010.
• Public Option for Press Should Get the Red Pen, Adam Thierer, The Daily Caller, Jan. 2010.
• Chairman Leibowitz’s Disconnect on Privacy Regulation & the Future of News, Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, Progress Snapshot 6.1, Jan. 13, 2010.
• Socializing Media in Order to Save It, Adam Thierer, City Journal, March 2009.
• A Manifesto for Media Freedom , Adam Thierer & Brian Anderson, 2008.
• Media Ownership Proceedings, W. Kenneth Ferree, Testimony before the Federal Communications Commission, Nov. 3, 2009.
• Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership, Adam Thierer, June 2005.

[1] The Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism reports that: “The numbers for 2009 reveal just how urgent these questions are becoming. Newspapers, including online, saw ad revenue fall 26% during the year, which brings the total loss over the last three years to 43%. Local television ad revenue fell 22% in 2009, triple the decline the year before. Radio also was off 22%. Magazine ad revenue dropped 17%, network TV 8% (and news alone probably more). Online ad revenue over all fell about 5%, and revenue to news sites most likely also fared much worse. Only cable news among the commercial news sectors did not suffer declining revenue last year.” Pew Project For Excellence in Journalism, Introduction, The State of the News Media 2010, March 2010, www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/overview_intro.php.

[2] Corporation for Public Broadcasting, FY 2010 Operating Budget, www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/leadership/board/resolutions/090915_fy10OperatingBudget.pdf.

[3] See FTC’s 2008 report, Marketing Food to Children and Adolescents: A Review of Industry Expenditures, Activities, and Self-Regulation, at ES-1-2, www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P064504foodmktingreport.pdf.

[4] Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Hidden Benefactor: How Advertising Informs, Educates & Benefits Consumers, PFF Progress Snapshot 6.5, Feb. 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2010/ps6.5-the-hidden-benefactor.html.

[5] Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, The Death and Life of American Journalism (2010) at 210-11.

[6] Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American Journalism, Columbia Journalism Review, Oct. 20, 2009, at 92, available at www.scribd.com/doc/21268382/Reconstruction-of-Journalism.

[7] Id.

[8] Clarence B. Carson, The Power to Tax is the Power to Destroy, The Freeman, Vol. 26, No. 10, Oct. 1976, www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-power-to-tax-is-the-power-to-destroy.

[9] Downie & Schudson, supra note 6 at. 93.

[10] Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).

[11] Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).

[12] Gay & Lesbian Students Assoc, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1988).

[13] Id.

[14] McChesney & Nichols, supra note 5 at 193-99.

[15] Socialist Project, Media Capitalism, the State and 21st Century Media Democracy Struggles: An Interview with Robert McChesney, The Bullet, Socialist Project, E-Bulletin No. 246, Aug. 9, 2009, www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/246.php.

[16] Id.

[17] The Big Apple, Golden Rule (“He Who Has the Gold Makes the Rules”), June 13, 2009,  www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/golden_rule_he_who_has_the_gold_makes_the_rules.

Wrong Way to Reinvent Media Part 1 – Media Taxes [Thierer & Szoka – PFF] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

In a series of upcoming essays, we will be examining proposals being put forward today that would have the government play a greater role in sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting more “public interest” content. The reason we’re working up this multi-part series is because, with many traditional media operators struggling, and questions being raised about how journalism in particular will be supported in the future, Washington policymakers are currently considering what role government can and should play in helping media providers reinvent themselves in the face of tumultuous technological change wrought by the Digital Revolution.

For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently kicked off a new “Future of Media” effort with a workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” (The  filing deadline for the FCC’s “Future of Media” proceeding is May 7^th).  Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has hosted two workshops asking “How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?”  Meanwhile, the Senate has already held hearings about “the future of journalism,” and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) recently introduced the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become tax-exempt non-profits in an effort to help them stay afloat.

Thus, in light of Washington’s sudden interest in the future of media and journalism, we will be taking a hard look at several issues and proposals that are being floated today, including:

• Taxes on media devices, mobile phones, or broadband bills to channel money to media enterprises / content;
• Taxes / fees on broadcasters to funnel support to their public sector competitors or to public interest programs;
• “News vouchers” or “public interest vouchers” that would encourage citizens to channel support to media providers;
• Taxes on private advertising to subsidize non-commercial / public media content;
• Expanded postal subsidies for media mail; and
• Targeted welfare programs for out-of-work journalists or corporate welfare in the form of bailouts for failing media enterprises.

You won’t be surprised to hear that we are generally quite skeptical of most of these ideas, but we promise to give each one serious consideration.  We’ll kick things off tomorrow with our essay on why taxing media devices or distribution systems to fund media content is not a particularly good idea.

PFF has just released the transcript of an excellent panel discussion I moderated last week entitled, “Let’s Make a Deal: Broadcasters, Mobile Broadband, and a Market in Spectrum.”  As I’ve mentioned here before, one of the hottest issues in DC right now is the question of broadcast TV spectrum reallocation.  Blair Levin, who serves as the Executive Director of the Omnibus Broadband Initiative at the Federal Communications Commission, recently raised the possibility of reallocating a portion of broadcast television spectrum for alternative purposes, namely, mobile broadband. Such a “cash-for-spectrum” swap would give mobile broadband providers to spectrum they need to roll out next generation wireless broadband networks while making sure broadcaster receive compensation for any spectrum they hand over.  The FCC just recently released a public notice on “Data Sought on Users of Spectrum,” (NBP Public Notice # 26) that looks into the matter. “This inquiry,” the agency says,” takes into account the value that the United States puts on free, over-the-air television, while also exploring market-based mechanisms for television broadcasters to contribute to the broadband effort any spectrum in excess of that which they need to meet their public interest obligations and remain financially viable.” Meanwhile, the House Energy and Commerce Communications Subcommittee is set to hold a hearing on the issue next Tuesday.

PFF’s panel discussion on this issue featured an all-star cast of characters, including opening remarks by Blair Levin, and a terrific discussion ensued. [You can hear the full audio from the event here.]  Down below I have highlighted some of the major points each speaker made during the discussion and also embedded the complete transcript in a Scribd reader.  Also, just a reminder that my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin and I authored a short paper on this issue recently: “An Offer They Can’t Refuse: Spectrum Reallocation That Can Benefit Consumers, Broadcasters & the Mobile Broadband Sector.”

• Blair Levin, Executive Director of the FCC’s Omnibus Broadband Initiative, began the discussion by describing how additional spectrum will be needed to expand wireless broadband and why spectrum currently held by broadcasters would be a good option.  In addition to identifying spectrum that has the technical qualities to support broadband, he explained, “You also would look at things like where there’s an economic gap between the current use and potential wireless use.  You would want to look at bands where maybe there are regulations which constrain the market mechanism.  You also might want to look at bands where you can have a meaningful reallocation of spectrum while, nonetheless, preserving current uses.”
• Coleman Bazelon, Principal at The Brattle Group, presented findings from his recent paper on the value of spectrum currently held by broadcasters if it was reallocated to commercial mobile or wireless broadband uses. “This analysis shows that there are significant gains from reallocating the broadcast band, and I think the takeaway should be that there are significant gains, not that its $42 billion or $51 billion, but that its tens and tens of billions of dollars,” Bazelon stated.
• David Donovan, President of the Association for Maximum Service Television, Inc., questioned the estimates of the additional value of broadcast spectrum that could be gained if it was auctioned for other uses.  “If you are valuing over the air television broadcasting and its importance to the American public, using a snapshot based on an auction valuation at a particular point in time is really highly inappropriate,” he stated. “The business model of broadcasting is heavily regulated. … and that defines, of course, the value, just like heavy zoning defines the price of land.”
• Kostas Liopiros, Principal of The Sun Fire Group, discussed the technical feasibility of using various blocks of spectrum for wireless broadband use.  “Only additional spectrum can produce the required gains of capacity in the future, but if the gains capacities are oriented towards wireless broadband, for national wireless broadband capability, you need to focus on the right type of spectrum,” he explained.
• John Hane, Counsel in the Communications Practice Group of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, warned of the legal difficulties of modifying broadcast licenses.  “Extinguishing licenses requires a hearing, potentially hundreds of them, each one affecting one or more Congressional districts.”  Although the FCC is able to modify a license without the licensee’s consent, he continued, “that is a very long and complicated process with an uncertain time frame.  If there really is a spectrum crisis, the stick approach …is not going to solve it very fast.”
• Paul Gallant, Senior Vice President of Concept Capital, discussed the possible effects of Congress involvement in auction of broadcast spectrum.  If broadcasters are reluctant to modifying their business model, Gallant explained, it might be beneficial for them to have Congress involved in such a deal.  However, he warned that Congressional involvement could also result in uncertainty for the broadcasters.  “It is not clear, if Congress does pass a bill, whether broadcasters come out better or worse than they would if they had worked something out with the FCC.  The main reason is there is tremendous budget pressure in Congress today.  They are looking for new sources of revenue,” Gallant explained.
• Andrew Jay Schwartzman, President and CEO of Media Access Project, expressed that he was resistant to the idea of auctioning spectrum.  “It isn’t property,” He stated.  “They favor incumbents.  They’re rigged.  They don’t generate the revenues that OMB and Congress seem to think they will.” He also warned of the possible impact of auctions on innovation. “Auctions lock in existing technology and near-term foreseeable technology. The people who are able and willing to bid are basing it on technology that they know they can generate and that does not allow the spectrum to be used in better ways coming down the road.”

Transcript of Dec 1 PFF Event on Broadcaster TV Spectrum Reallocation [PFF – Thierer] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=23980532&access_key=key-wdpoolnrm5gxq1xu7c6&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list

Along with my colleague Barbara Esbin, the Director of PFF’s Center for Communications and Competition Policy, I have just released a new paper on discussing the possibility of reallocating a portion of broadcast television spectrum for alternative purposes, namely, mobile broadband. As I discussed here before, Blair Levin, the Executive Director of the FCC’s Omnibus Broadband Initiative, has been suggesting that it might be possible to craft a grand bargain whereby broadcasters get cash for some (or all) of their current spectrum allocations if they return spectrum to the FCC for reallocation and re-auction, likely to mobile broadband services.

In our paper, “An Offer They Can’t Refuse: Spectrum Reallocation That Can Benefit Consumers, Broadcasters & the Mobile Broadband Sector,” [PDF] Barbara and I argue that:

the benefits of such a deal could be enormous for wireless broadband providers, developers of digital technologies, and consumers.  Expanding the pool of spectrum available for next-generation wireless broadband offerings will ensure that innovative new networks, devices, and services are made available to the public on a timely basis.  Ultimately, that will mean more high-speed choices for consumers, especially those in rural areas harder to reach with high-speed wireline networks.  Finally, more generally, anything that moves us in the direction of a freer market in spectrum is a good thing. But fairness to broadcasters lies at the heart of this spectrum reallocation plan. If a deal can’t be structured that broadcasters would find acceptable, they should not be forced to come to the table. When we speak of an offer they can’t refuse, we mean one so attractive that no rational businessperson or investor would pass it up. It is essential broadcasters be willing partners in the deal, and be full participants in the process of shaping its contours.

Read the entire thing here, or below the fold as a Scribd document.

Broadcast TV Spectrum Reallocation (Thierer & Esbin – PFF) http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=22365493&access_key=key-2cs1sry5qv9xd3x6d5bv&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list

I’ve spent a lot of time here deconstructing and criticizing the proposals set forth by the Free Press, the radical media “reformista” group founded by the prolific Marxist media theorist Robert McChesney.  I have been trying to shine more light on their proposals and activities because I believe they are antithetical to freedom of speech and a free society.  That’s because, as media scholar Ben Compaine has noted, “What the hard core reformistas really want, it seems, is not diversity or an open debate but a media that promotes their own vision of society and the world.”  That’s exactly right and, more specifically, as I argued in my 2005 Media Myths book, the media reformistas want to impose this control by taking the fantasy that “the public owns the [broadcast] airwaves” and extending it to ALL media platforms and outlets.  In other words, McChesney and the Free Press want an UnFree Press.  To cast things in neo-Marxist terms that they could appreciate, they want to take control of the information means of production.  And it begins, McChesney argues, by all of us having to give up this “sort of religious attachment to the idea of a ‘free-press'” from which we all suffer.

Some people accuse me of “red-baiting” or “McCarthyite” tactics when I use the “M-word” (Marxism) or the “S-Word” (socialism) to describe McChesney, the Free Press, and the movement they have spawned.  But these are labels with real meaning and ones that McChesney himself embraces in his work. In his 1999 book Rich Media, Poor Media, he says that “Media reform cannot win without widespread support and such support needs to be organized as part of a broad anti-corporate, pro-democracy movement.” He casts everything in “social justice” terms and speaks of the need “to rip the veil off [corporate] power, and to work so that social decision making and power may be made as enlightened and as egalitarian as possible.”  What exactly would all that mean in practice for media? In his 2002 book Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media with John Nichols of The Nation, McChesney argues that media reform efforts must begin with “the need to promote an understanding of the urgency to assert public control over the media.” They go on to state that, “Our claim is simply that the media system produces vastly less of quality than it would if corporate and commercial pressures were lessened.”

If you want additional proof of his intentions, then I encourage you to read this lengthy interview with McChesney that appears in the new edition of The Bullet, an online newsletter produced by the Canada-based “Socialist Project.”  (If you ask me, there’s something strangely appropriate about a socialist newsletter named “The Bullet” in light of the millions of people who died while living under socialist tyranny!)  Anyway, let’s ignore that and focus on what neo-Marxist media reform entails according to McChesney.  Because never before has he laid his cards on the table as clearly as he does in this interview.

The “Struggle” for “Media Democracy”

In the interview, as in all his work, McChesney speaks repeatedly about the Marxist concept of “struggles,” which  usually refers to class struggles and worker struggles. But McChesney’s work focuses on “media democracy struggles” as part of an overall struggle for “social justice.”  He says:

Instead of waiting for the revolution to happen, we learned that unless you make significant changes in the media, it will be vastly more difficult to have a revolution. While the media is not the single most important issue in the world, it is one of the core issues that any successful Left project needs to integrate into its strategic program.

In other words, media reform is part of The Big Struggle. The Big Struggle is the effort to overthrow free-market capitalism. And the struggle for “media democracy” is crucial to that, you see, because we are all just pawns whose minds are being manipulated by some far-off corporate puppet-masters in New York and L.A., who are, of course, just feeding us nothing but pro-capitalist propaganda 24/7.  Thus, we have to burn the village to save it, McChesney says:

Many say that corporate journalism, based on profit maximization, best serves a free and democratic society. The position is incorrect. The connection of capitalism to journalism, which has always been fraught with problems, has always been unstable. The relationship between capitalism, journalism, and democracy has never been a sure thing. In the U.S, the notion that capitalism is the natural steward of journalism and should be left alone to provide for a free and self-governing society refers to a period that began during the 19th century. This period ended when owners realized they could make a lot of money by turning journalism into big business. Corporations are not in a position to generate and pay for quality journalism. The news is not a commercial product. It is a public good, necessary for a self-governing society.

In other words, down with private media!  McChesney basically declares that the entire history of private media in America to be one gigantic case of market failure and must be abandoned.

Subsidies to “Save Journalism”

But what’s going to replace private media once McChesney and his media reformistas have moved the regulatory wrecking ball in?  In a nutshell, he wants massive state subsidization of the media:

Once we accept this [the supposed “public goods” nature of all media], we can talk about the kind of media policies and subsidies we want. What are the best ones? How should they be implemented? We are now trying to answer those questions and organize around them.

Herein lies one of the great ironies of McChesney’s work: He spends a great deal of time arguing that the entire history of American media has basically been one big government-created construct (monopolies, entry barriers, subsidies, etc), only to turn around and advocate massive state intervention and subsidies as a solution!  McChesney plays revisionist historian and even tries to paint Jefferson and Madison as media socialists because postal rates from the founding period on down have been reduced for print media mailings. Somehow, McChesney reads this to mean that “the U.S. state has always played a direct and indirect role in facilitating and legitimizing the corporate media system.”  Which is rubbish. The idea that postal subsidies have created “the corporate media system” is preposterous. McChesney is on stronger ground in arguing the state has occasionally helped foster and then protect monopolies, but that is a function of the very “public utility” regulatory regime that McChesney favors! [More on this point down below.]

Meanwhile, in true Rahm Emanual-ian “you-never-want-a-crisis-to-go-to-waste” fashion, the Free Press has started a new project to “Save the News” and move America “Toward a National Journalism Strategy” by endorsing a lot of the same regulations, subsidies, and tax credits that McChesney and John Nichols recently advocated in their Nation magazine essay, “The Death and Life of Great American Newspapers.” As I noted in my City Journal response to that essay back in March, you can file this all under “socializing media in order to save it,” complete with Soviet-style 5-year plans dictated by some faceless elite inside a Beltway bureaucracy. Oh, and there’s the little matter of $60 billion price tag that taxpayers will be left footing.  (But hey, what’s another $60 billion these days?)  Even Free Press favorite Dan Rather is on board with his plan to have President Obama give us “The News America Needs” by “form[ing] a commission to address the perilous state of America’s news media.”  Perhaps once the car commission folks get done driving the U.S. auto industry into the ground they can shift gears, so to speak, and see what they can do to steer journalism onto a supposedly better path.

Down with Advertising

If McChesney and Free Press don’t succeed in destroying private media with their regulatory plans, there’s always Plan B… bleed free market media operators and Internet companies dry by taking away their mother’s milk, advertising.  McChesney argues that “the Internet is increasingly hyper-commercialized” and it is “open[ing] our entire lives to 24/7 injections of advertising messages.”  Thus, wouldn’t you know it, yet another “struggle” is in order!

We need to organize against hyper-commercialism. This is an easy-sell for the Left. We understand that advertising is not something done by all people equally, but rather, done by a very small group of people working on behalf of multinational corporations. Advertising is commercial propaganda…  Advertising is the voice of capital. We need to do whatever we can to limit capitalist propaganda, regulate it, minimize it, and perhaps even eliminate it. The fight against hyper-commercialism becomes especially pronounced in the era of digital communications.  […] There is a fundamental crisis when you are in a world that is entirely commercial, in terms of the integrity of speech and thought. We are at the tipping point and we need to struggle directly against it.

Struggle, struggle, struggle!

Of course, McChesney will have plenty of allies in this particular struggle as Washington continues to wage a war against advertising of all sorts. Of course, there really is no free lunch in this world and something will have to pay for serious news-gathering (and entertainment, for that matter). Of course, McChesney and his Free Press allies will, no doubt, respond that still more subsidies are in order!  There is, apparently, always someone else in their world to whom the buck can be passed.  [But I wonder: Who would be left to pay all the taxes needed to support public media if McChesney’s “struggle” to overthrow The Man succeeds??]

Net neutrality & Infrastructure Nationalization

And don’t for one minute think that McChesney and Free Press are only out for the old media operators.  They’re out for private broadband and Internet players as well.

When speaking about the centrality of Net neutrality regulation to this “struggle” and coming “revolution,” McChesney does a nice job reminding some of us why we have been so concerned about politicizing a debate over network engineering when he says: “What we want to have in the U.S. and in every society is an Internet that is not private property, but a public utility.”  Ah yes, because public utilities have been soooo efficient and innovative in other contexts!  Please.

In advocating increased regulation or state-ownership of communications networks or broadband companies and connections, McChesney seems utterly oblivious to the fact that the very state power he advocates on one hand is the same state power that private parties can corrupt on the other.  He says, for example, that “Our struggle to make the Internet into a public utility conflicts with the interests of telephone and cable firms,” because “Their power rests upon their ability to successfully buy off politicians.”  How does he not see the contradiction?  He’s certainly right to fear that public officials can be co-opted by private interests. (Read up on your public choice theory, buddy!)  But I suppose McChesney believes that his perfect socialist state will be immune to these pressures because it will be run by enlightened, public-minded philosopher kings… you know… like himself.  But that’s nonsense.  See my old essay on the fantasy of “Building a Better Bureaucrat” or Tim Lee’s old essay on “Real Regulators” for more details on why it never works out that way in practice. Or, better yet, since I know he would never read anything I penned on the subject, I encourage McChesney to take a hard look at the definitive 2-volume Economics of Regulation by a far more experienced progressive Democrat, Professor Alfred E. Kahn. In Kahn’s masterwork, you will find the following words of wisdom (and caution) from someone who spent a lifetime studying these issues:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

McChesney makes one final point about Net neutrality that is worth highlighting. When asked whether he had any reservations about making short-term alliances with new media companies or Internet operators such as Google, eBay, Amazon, and Microsoft in the push for Net neutrality regulations, McChesney says: “Absolutely.. But I’ve learned, by participating in over a decade of specific media struggles, that when you are in the short-term and you are fighting to win, sometimes you make tactical alliances.” Nonetheless, he notes, ” the ultimate goal is to get rid of the media capitalists in the phone and cable companies and to divest them from control.” And, so, the ends justify the means in terms of striking short-term alliances with those evil, blood-sucking capitalists.  I hope the folks at Google, eBay, Amazon, and Microsoft are reading McChesney’s radical thinking on communications policy and realize that he and his Free Press reformistas will eventually turn their sights on them just as soon as they are finished socializing the infrastructure layer of the Internet.

Conclusion: Against Media Tyranny

In a very strange sense, I admire Robert McChesney.  He is a man of principle.  And he isn’t ashamed to advocate his principles publicly (whereas some of his Free Press disciples do a very nice job disguising their true intentions).

That being said, McChesney’s principles are dangerous ones. Very dangerous.  They are antithetical to a free society, freedom of speech, and technological progress.  At its core, as I noted in my old essay, “Your Soapbox is My Soapbox,” the repugnant morality behind this “media access” movement is that nothing is truly yours.  “Media democracy” means everything is up for grabs.  Here’s how I put it in that old “soapbox” essay:

Imagine you built a platform in your backyard for the purpose of informing or entertaining your friends of neighbors. Now further imagine that you are actually fairly good at what you do and manage to attract and retain a large audience. Then one day, a few hecklers come to hear you speak on your platform. They shout about how it’s unfair that you have attracted so many people to hear you speak on your soapbox and they demand access to your platform for a certain amount of time each day. They rationalize this by arguing that it is THEIR rights as listeners that are really important, not YOUR rights as a speaker or the owner of the soapbox. That sort of scenario could never happen in America, right? Sadly, it’s been the way media law has operated for several decades in this country. This twisted “media access” philosophy has been employed by federal lawmakers and numerous special interest groups to justify extensive and massively unjust regime of media regulation and speech redistributionism. And it’s still at work today.

Indeed, McChesney has taken this old “media access” movement that Jerome Barron, Owen Fiss, Cass Sunstein and others pioneered long ago, and advanced it to a whole new level, and to its logical conclusion.  The aim is not just to co-opt someone else’s soapbox; it is to smash their soapbox into pieces. It is to tear the very fabric of the First Amendment into shreds and rebuild “media democracy” around the principles not of true freedom, but of state servitude.  You only have as much freedom to engage in speech, reporting, or entertaining as your media overlords will allow.  And God help you if any of it proves popular because then they will really want to crush you like an ant!

I’ll close this rant the same way I concluded my earlier “soapbox” rant:

This arrogant, elitist, anti-property, anti-freedom ethic is what drives the media access movement and makes it so morally repugnant. Freedom doesn’t begin by fettering the press with more chains, it begins by removing those that already exist and then erecting a firm wall between State and Press. The media access crowd has succeeded in breaching that wall with seven decades of misguided and unjust regulation of the press. The movement back toward a truly free press begins by understanding the error in their thinking, rejecting that reasoning, and then embracing, once again, the original vision of the First Amendment as a bulwark against government control of speech and the press.

I’ve posted another response in the Cato Unbound online debate over the impact of Lawrence Lessig’s Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace upon the book’s 10th anniversary.  You will recall that I went fairly hard on Prof. Lessig in my essay, “Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of ‘Perfect Control,’” and Lessig responded with a counter-punch that went after me for it.  I respond in a new essay about “Our Conflict of Cyber-Visions.” In the piece, I address Lessig’s assertion that I just didn’t understand the central teachings of Code, as well as his reluctance to accept the “cyber-collectivism” label that I affixed to his book and life’s work.  Again, please hop over to Cato Unbound for my complete response.

But one thing from the essay that I thought worth reproducing here is my effort to better define the key principles that separate the cyber-libertarian and cyber-collectivist schools of thinking.  I argue that it comes down to this:

The cyber-libertarian believes that “code failures” are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).

Of course, another key difference relates to how quickly one jumps to the conclusion that “code failures” are actually occurring at all. I argue:

What concerns me about the way Prof. Lessig approaches these issues in Code and in his subsequent work is that he is far too quick to declare the debate over by labeling short-term code hiccups as sky-is-falling market failures. The end result of such myopic techno-pessimism is the inevitable call for governments to intervene and “do something” to correct supposed code failures.  The cyber-libertarian instead counsels patience. Let’s give those other forces — alternative platforms, new innovators, social norms, public pressure, etc. — a chance to work some magic. Evolution happens, if you let it. Moreover, if you are always running around crying “market failure!” and calling in the code cops, it creates perverse marketplace incentives by discouraging efforts to innovate or “route around” bad code or code failure. We don’t want the whole world sitting around waiting for government to regulate the mousetrap to improve it or even give everyone better access to it; we should want the world to be innovating to create better mousetraps! To reiterate a key point I already stressed in my original essay: One need not believe that the markets in code are “perfectly competitive” to accept that they are “competitive enough” — or at least, better than regulatory alternatives.

Anyway, please head over to the Cato site to read the whole thing and let me know what you think.  If nothing else, I’m sure that Seth Finkelstein will have something incredibly nasty to say about me!  And I will wear his scorn as a badge of honor.

The week-long Cato Unbound online debate about the 10th anniversary of Lawrence Lessig’s Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace continues today with Prof. Lessig’s response to Declan McCullagh’s opening essay, “What Larry Didn’t Get,” Jonathan Zittrain’s follow-up essay, and my essay on, “Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of ‘Perfect Control.’”  Needless to say, Prof. Lessig isn’t too happy with my response. You should jump over to the Cato site to read the entire thing, but here are a couple of excerpts and my response.

To my suggestion that there is a qualitative difference between law and code, Prof. Lessig says:

I’ve argued that things aren’t quite a simple as some libertarians would suggest. That there’s not just bad law. There’s bad code. That we don’t need to worry just about Mussolini. We also need to worry about DRM or the code AT&T deploys to help the government spy upon users. That public threats to liberty can be complemented by private threats to liberty. And that the libertarian must be focused on both.  […] Of course, law is law. Who could be oblivious to that? And who would need a book to explain it?  But the fact that “law is law” does not imply that it has a “much greater impact in shaping markets and human behavior.” Sometimes it does — especially when that “law” is delivered by a B1 bomber. But ask the RIAA whether it is law or code that is having a “greater impact in shaping markets” for music. Or ask the makers of Second Life whether the citizens of that space find themselves more constrained by the commercial code of their geo-jurisdiction or by the fact that the software code of Second Life doesn’t permit you simply to walk away (so to speak) with another person’s scepter. Whether and when law is more effective than code is an empirical matter — something to be studied, and considered, not dismissed by banalities spruced up with italics.

Well, I beg the professor’s pardon for excessive use of italics.  [I won’t ask for an apology for misspelling my last name in his piece!] Regardless, it’s obvious that we’ll just never see eye-to-eye on the crucial distinction between law and code. Again, as I stated in my essay: “With code, escape is possible. Law, by contrast, tends to lock in and limit; spontaneous evolution is supplanted by the stagnation of top-down, one-size-fits-all regulatory schemes.”

Lessig largely dismisses much of this with that last line above, suggesting that we just need to keep studying the matter to determine the right mix of what works best.  To be clear, while I’m all for studying the impact of law vs. code as “an empirical matter,” that in turn begs the question of how we define effectiveness or success. I suspect that the professor and I would have a “values clash” over some rather important first principles in that regard.  This is, of course, a conflict of visions that we see throughout the history of philosophy; a conflict between those who put the individual and the individual’s rights at the core of any ethical political system versus those who would place the rights of “the community,” “the public” or some other amorphous grouping(s) at the center of everything.  It’s a classic libertarian vs. communitarian / collectivist debate.

Lessig, however, makes it clear in his response that he doesn’t take kindly to being called a cyber-collectivist, even accusing me of “red-baiting” by using the term.  But the collectivism of which I speak is a more generic type; not the hard-edged Marxist brand of collectivism of modern times.   What separates Lessig’s brand of cyber-collectivism from the cyber-libertarianism that I espouse is a general preference for who calls the shots most of the time.  Quite obviously, I place an enormous amount of faith in largely unfettered markets in code to generally advance the values of individual liberty, freedom of speech, and economic innovation more often than rule by politics and public officials will.  Prof. Lessig is obviously far more enamored with the potential of the state and politics to play a beneficial role in shaping things.

Thus, even though Prof. Lessig rejects the association, Declan McCullagh was right to point to the distant influence of Plato on Code and much of Lessig’s other work.  (And there’s a bit of Rousseauian influence there, too.)  In any event, if Prof. Lessig takes offense at this label and wants to call his approach something other than cyber-collectivism, than by all means be my guest; invent a new term and I’ll use it.  But to me, as a student of political philosophy, I see his philosophy as just another variant of collectivism and just don’t know what else to call it.  This isn’t “red-baiting;” it’s simply an exercise in philosophical classification.

To some extent, Prof.  Lessig undercuts my arguments here in concluding his essay by asking that we “focus on a large number of difficult questions that remain… about how to preserve the liberty of society and the Net against the ever-expanding harm caused by the captured corruption that we call democratic government.”  Hey, now that sounds like something a true libertarian might say! (Except that we would have likely used the phrase “preserve the liberty of the individual” instead of “society”!) Regardless, Lessig is at least willing to admit that there may be some problems in paradise for Platonist thinking or Rousseauian romanticism.

Alas, for reasons articulated quite nicely here by Tim Lee in the past, “Lessig clearly understands what it takes to catch the interest of conservative- and libertarian-minded readers, and he’s not above spinning his arguments to maximize their appeal to the people he’s addressing.” For the libertarian, there is only one fool-proof solution to the problem of government corruption: You shrink the Leviathan. From what I’ve seen of Lessig’s proposals so far to address corruption, however, he’s not really willing to have that conversation. It’s all about the old “getting money out of politics” and “kill all the lobbyists” approach. Unfortunately, as Tim notes:

The problem isn’t that there’s a discrete list of corrupt practices that we can identify and prohibit. The problem is that if politicians are willing to be corrupted, and special interests are willing to spend resources to corrupt them, they’ll find ways to get it done. You can certainly reduce the effect on the margin — by banning overt bribery, for example — but once you’ve banned the really obvious categories of back-scratching, it becomes more and more difficult to make any further progress. What’s going on in Washington is disgusting, to be sure, but it’s not new or unique to the United States. And I think fixing it is going to be a lot more challenging than Lessig imagines.

I couldn’t agree more.  Nonetheless, I eagerly await more details from Prof. Lessig regarding his new effort to address corruption in our political system, however he defines it.  He may set forth some reform proposals that we libertarians find quite sensible and ultimately endorse.  But if “reform” instead comes in the form of layers of additional campaign finance regulations, well then, I think we’ll find ourselves disagreeing once again. Because many of those so-called reforms are simply free-speech violating restrictions on the rights of both individuals to petition their government.

But to conclude this exchange on a good note, let me just say that — at least in theory — I wholeheartedly endorse Lawrence Lessig’s call to protect “the Net against the ever-expanding harm caused by the captured corruption that we call democratic government.”   And I hope someday he will be more open to the notion that limits on the power of the state are the ultimate key to accomplishing that goal.

Before commenting on Lawrence Lessig’s latest call to abolish the Federal Communications Commission (he issued a similar call for the FCC’s abolition earlier this year, which I commented on here), let’s recall what Tim Lee posted yesterday about “Real Regulators“:

Too many advocates of regulation seem to have never considered the possibility that the FCC bureaucrats in charge of making these decisions at any point in time might be lazy, incompetent, technically confused, or biased in favor of industry incumbents. That’s often what “real regulators” are like, and it’s important that when policy makers are crafting regulatory scheme, they assume that some of the people administering the law will have these kinds of flaws, rather than imagining that the rules they write will be applied by infallible philosopher-kings.

Ironically, Prof. Lessig — who typically defends many forms of high-tech regulation like Net neutrality and online content labeling — is essentially agreeing with Tim’s critique of bureaucracy. But Lessig seems to ignore the underlying logic of Tim’s critique and instead imagines that we need only reinvent bureaucracy in order to save it. But I’m getting ahead of myself. First, let’s hear what Lessig proposes.

In a Newsweek column this week entitled “Reboot the FCC,” Lessig argues that the FCC is beyond saving because, instead of protecting innovation, the agency has succumb to an “almost irresistible urge to protect the most powerful instead.” Consequently, he continues:

The solution here is not tinkering. You can’t fix DNA. You have to bury it. President Obama should get Congress to shut down the FCC and similar vestigial regulators, which put stability and special interests above the public good. In their place, Congress should create something we could call the Innovation Environment Protection Agency (iEPA), charged with a simple founding mission: “minimal intervention to maximize innovation.” The iEPA’s core purpose would be to protect innovation from its two historical enemies–excessive government favors, and excessive private monopoly power.

As was the case with his earlier call to “blow up the FCC,” I am tickled to hear Lessig call for shutting down an agency that many of us have been fighting against for the last few decades. (Here’s a 1995 blueprint for abolishing the FCC that I contributed to, and here’s PFF’s recent “DACA” project to comprehensively reform and downsize the agency.)

But is Lessig really calling for the same sort of sweeping regulatory reform and downsizing that others have been calling for? And has he identified the real source of the problem that he hopes to correct?  I don’t think so. There are 3 basic problems with the argument Lessig is putting forward in his essay. I will address each in turn.

(1) Real Reform or Just Reshuffling of Deck Chairs?

The first problem is that Lessig isn’t really calling for complete abolition of the FCC; just the transfer of many of its regulatory responsibilities to the supposedly less “corrupt” new Innovation Environment Protection Agency (iEPA). As you read the paragraphs below, note how in the process of re-branding the FCC as the “iEPA,” Lessig seems to be handing that new agency a lot of the FCC’s old powers:

The iEPA’s first task would thus be to reverse the unrestrained growth of these monopolies. For example, much of the wireless spectrum has been auctioned off to telecom monopolies, on the assumption that only by granting a monopoly could companies be encouraged to undertake the expensive task of building a network of cell towers or broadcasting stations. The iEPA would test this assumption, and essentially ask the question: do these monopolies do more harm than good? With a strong agency head, and a staff absolutely barred from industry ties, the iEPA could avoid the culture of favoritism that’s come to define the FCC. And if it became credible in its monopoly-checking role, the agency could eventually apply this expertise to the area of patents and copyrights, guiding Congress’s policymaking in these special-interest hornet nests. The iEPA’s second task should be to assure that the nation’s basic communications infrastructure spectrum— the wires, cables and cellular towers that serve as the highways of the information economy—remain open to new innovation, no matter who owns them. For example, “network neutrality” rules, when done right, aim simply to keep companies like Comcast and Verizon from skewing the rules in favor of or against certain types of content and services that run over their networks. The investors behind the next Skype or Amazon need to be sure that their hard work won’t be thwarted by an arbitrary decision on the part of one of the gatekeepers of the Net. Such regulation need not, in my view, go as far as some Democrats have demanded. It need not put extreme limits on what the Verizons of the world can do with their network—they did, after all, build it in the first place—but no doubt a minimal set of rules is necessary to make sure that the Net continues to be a crucial platform for economic growth. Beyond these two tasks, what’s most needed from the iEPA is benign neglect. Certainly, it should keep competition information flowing smoothly and limit destructive regulation at the state level, and it might encourage the government to spend more on public communications infrastructure, for example in the rural areas which private companies often ignore.

“But beyond these limited tasks, ” Lessig claims, “whole phone-books worth of regulation could simply be erased. And with it, we would remove many of the levers that lobbyists use to win favors to protect today’s monopolists.”

Again, from what he’s said here, it sure doesn’t sound like “whole phone books worth of regulation” are being erased. What Lessig has done is essentially restate the current powers and responsibilities of the FCC.  I don’t see much serious downsizing being proposed here at all. Indeed, his call for Net neutrality regulation represents an expansion of bureaucracy.

Instead, what Lessig seems to be saying is that the new iEPA will do the job right because it will be less “corrupt” and enlightened. But that’s not true either.

(2) What Larry Doesn’t Get (about Bureaucracy)

Lessig is essentially calling for the same sort of “scientific” or “professional” bureaucracy that his progressive forefathers advocated a century ago when the modern regulatory leviathan was being envisioned and erected. But what has changed since then? Nothing. Special interests were able to gain influence then just as they do now.

This gets back to Tim Lee’s point about how many pundits and policymakers foolishly believe that everything will magically be better once rules are “applied by infallible philosopher-kings.” Apparently Lessig believes that lots of those folks will be walking the halls at the new iEPA. They’ll somehow be immune from the the “almost irresistible urge to protect the most powerful” that FCC bureaucrats have fallen prey to.

But Lessig provides no rational reason for us to believe that this will really be the case. And really, why should we believe that story? Do we have any good historical evidence to support such a proposition? To the contrary, everything we know from the history of regulation and bureaucracy tells us that exactly the opposite will be the case.

As I so often do when I debate quixotic progressives who say they can construct a more “enlightened” regulatory state, I invite Prof. Lessig to take a hard look at the definitive 2-volume Economics of Regulation by a far more experienced progressive Democrat, Professor Alfred E. Kahn. In Kahn’s masterwork, Prof. Lessig will find the following words of wisdom (and caution) from someone who spent a lifetime studying the issue:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition.  … Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

(3) No Right to Petition Government ?

At this point, Prof. Lessig and his defenders will no doubt say that everything will be different this time around when they reinvent bureaucracy. The secret, they seem to suggest, is “getting money out of politics” or “ending corruption” by “special interests.” Again, hard to argue against any of that — except to say as we have here many times before that if Big Government exists, special interests will exist to influence it (probably unduly so). Thus, the logical solution is real regulatory reform and downsizing of bureaucracy. That is the only way we are ever really going to solve the problem Prof. Lessig wants to address.

But Prof. Lessig and his supporters are obviously not going to accept that. What they want is government activism without the ugly downsides of lobbying and special interest influence polluting the process. Is there any way to do it? Again, for the reasons I have stated here, I doubt it. But what, exactly, would it mean in practice to let them try?  I fear that what Prof. Lessig and many other “progressives” mean by “ending special interest influence” is really ending the free speech rights of citizens to petition their government if those citizens happen to be corporations.

Let’s remember what the First Amendment says:

“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

Now, I certainly realize how unpopular this will be to some, but if you believe in the plain text of the Constitution then you should respect the right of citizens (including corporate entities) to petition (i.e., “lobby”) the government for consideration of their interests, especially if the government is imposing significant regulatory burdens on them. Calling for limits on the ability of the regulated to petition their regulators is a fundamental betrayal of the plain language of the First Amendment.

I don’t want to put words in Prof. Lessig’s mouth, but I have a feeling that this is where his proposal is heading. He says that the staff of his new iEPA will be “absolutely barred from industry ties” but doesn’t really spell out what that means. If it just means limits on who can be hired for certain positions in the new agency, I’m generally fine with that (even though I do not for one minute believe it will magically “end corruption.”) If, however, Lessig and his fellow progressives want rules restricting the ability of “interests” to communicate with this new agency, then I find such a proposal quite troubling.

One final point: What exactly counts as a “special interest”? No doubt, Lessig and other progressives equate interests with corporations. But what about unions, co-ops, non-profits, schools, charities, think tanks, etc.?  They all petition government endlessly. Would Lessig limit their rights?

I hope Prof. Lessig takes the time to ellaborate on his proposal because he may have good answers to many of the quibbles I have raised here. I really do want to take him at his word and believe that he is ready to radically reform the regulatory beast that has so completely failed in its mission to improve consumer welfare.  But I have my doubts. And, sadly, I have history on my side.

Geese are flying overhead. Leaves are orange. The election is over. A historic moment. And I will be optimistic, and hope that although the economics of the moment seems to be a return to things past… to the 1930s, it will turn out to be otherwise, for a good bit is known now that was not known then, whatever one’s ideology.

This column offering thoughts from Europe anticipates a wave of hostility to free markets. Well, that would perhaps not be that much of a change. I will venture far out on a doctrinal limb here, why not, and venture to ask where the free marketers went wrong? [Wait, you mean that they did something wrong? Can that be possible? Surely not]. (There is a good bit that went wrong, of course, that is not the fault of markets or their advocates… the fact that markets are not perfect, problems with rent-seeking, the fondness of the press for dwelling on the negative, and so on). But there have been consistent problems with our presentation, which I diagnose as follows:

-Use of nineteenth century models and rhetoric, and too much movement jargon, much of which is pointlessly disparaging and negative.

-Failure to empathize with people’s real concerns, such as concern about the environment or income disparity. There is the perennial addiction of wonks to Reason-and our awkwardness with emotion that leads us to dismiss it as irrelevant. Makes it look like we don’t care–a false impression, but a real factor none-the-less.

-Specializing in the defense of unpopular causes, whether it is free speech, the super-rich, or the large company of the day. Advocates tend to focus on these causes in the hope of getting attention as contrarians-but as a result the image of advocates for the market becomes identified with unpopular interests, and our energy gets expended in short run battles.

The solution? Well, I’ll save that for another day.

Meanwhile, how about this for a thought? In recognition of the nation’s leaning to the left, I’ll make a concession. Have some social programs. Have all the social programs you want. But there is one thing that I will insist on. Just one thing.

Y’all will have to be ruthlessly honest about how well the programs actually work. About the unintended consequences. About the rules that pile up costs with no benefits. About the forces and factors that lead institutions like public schools or regulatory agencies to fail.

If you can just manage a genuine curiousity about whether the plans that you dream up to help people will actually work, then we’ve got a deal. I promise that if the programs don’t work, we can try something else. Institutional re-design. Heck, maybe even a market.

But I don’t think anyone’s going to go for it.