pork – Technology Liberation Front https://techliberation.com Keeping politicians' hands off the Net & everything else related to technology Mon, 10 Apr 2023 14:17:32 +0000 en-US hourly 1 6772528 Book Review: “Questioning the Entrepreneurial State” https://techliberation.com/2022/04/26/book-review-questioning-the-entrepreneurial-state/ https://techliberation.com/2022/04/26/book-review-questioning-the-entrepreneurial-state/#comments Tue, 26 Apr 2022 20:14:03 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76975

An important new book launched this week in Europe on issues related to innovation policy and industrial policy. “Questioning the Entrepreneurial State: Status-quo, Pitfalls, and the Need for Credible Innovation Policy” (Springer, 2022) brings together more than 30 scholars who contribute unique chapters to this impressive volume. It was edited by Karl Wennberg of the Stockholm School of Economics and Christian Sandström of the Jönköping (Sweden) International Business School.

As the title of this book suggests, the authors are generally pushing back against the thesis found in Mariana Mazzucato’s book The Entrepreneurial State (2011). That book, like many other books and essays written recently, lays out a romantic view of industrial policy that sees government as the prime mover of markets and innovation. Mazzucato calls for “a bolder vision for the State’s dynamic role in fostering economic growth” and innovation. She wants the state fully entrenched in technological investments and decision-making throughout the economy because she believes that is the best way to expand the innovative potential of a nation.

The essays in Questioning the Entrepreneurial State offer a different perspective, rooted in the realities on the ground in Europe today. Taken together, the chapters tell a fairly consistent story: Despite the existence of many different industrial policy schemes at the continental and country level, Europe isn’t in very good shape on the tech and innovation front. The heavy-handed policies and volumes of regulations imposed by the European Union and its member states have played a role in that outcome. But these governments have simultaneously been pushing to promote innovation using a variety of technocratic policy levers and industrial policy schemes. Despite all those well-intentioned efforts, the EU has struggled to keep up with the US and China in most important modern tech sectors.

As Wennberg and Sandström note in their introductory chapter:

Grand schemes toward noble outcomes have a disappointing track record in human political and economic history. Conventional wisdom regarding authorities’ inability to selectively pinpoint certain technologies, sectors, or firms as winners, and the fact that large support structures for specific technologies are bound to distort incentives and result in opportunism, seem to have been forgotten.

In summarizing the chapters, they conclude that, “while the idea of aiming high and leveraging large portions of society’s resources to address some fundamental human challenges may sound appealing to many, such ideas have limited scientific credibility.”

Why do governments frequently fail in attempts to be entrepreneurial? Johan P. Larsson gets at the heart of the matter in his chapter when noting how, “[t]he state entrepreneur is not subject to real risk, often faces no market, and cannot be properly evaluated. It pays no price for being wrong and it struggles in assigning responsibility.” Which leads to two questions that are rarely asked, he notes: “[F]irst, how do we ensure that the state pays a price for being wrong? And second, when is that price high enough for us to know it is time to cut our losses?”

The authors of another chapter (Murtinu, Foss & Klein) concur and note how, “even well-intentioned and strongly motivated public actors lack the ability to manage the process of innovation.” “As stewards of resources owned by the public,” they note, “government bureaucrats do not exercise the ultimate responsibility that comes with ownership.” In other words, the state faces problems of misaligned incentives.

Several authors in the book highlight the various public choice problems often associated with large-scale industrial policy initiatives, including rent-seeking and capture. Wennberg and Sandström note how this results in less disruption as established players don’t seek to challenge existing market or technological status quos but instead simply seek to benefit from it. “[S]upport structures, platforms for private-public cooperation, and large volumes of technology-specific money usually end up in the hands of established interest groups,” they note. “Hence, they are not very likely to question these policies but will rather go along with the ride.”

John-Erik Bergkvist and Jerker Moodysson devote an entire chapter to this problem and offer a grim assessment of how past industrial policy schemes have exacerbated it:

Assuming that policies and programs are shaped by the interest groups that are affected by the policies, we highlight the risk that policymaking may end up as support for established interest groups rather than supporting the emergence of those who could act as institutional entrepreneurs or disruptors. Policies and programs may thus be captivated by dominant actors in the established regime, who have superior financial and relational resources. The result would then be that innovation policies sustain the established socio-technical structures of industries rather than contributing to the emergence of new structures.”

Other organizations are incentivized to support the status quo when big money is on the line. One of the most interesting chapters in the book was co-authored by Wennberg and Sandström along with Elias Collin. They examine the conflicts of interest inherent in many evaluations of industrial policy programs by various third parties, including academics and consultants who receive generous state contracts:

the overwhelming majority of evaluations are positive or neutral and that very few evaluations are negative. While this is the case across all categories of evaluators, we note that consulting firms stand out as particularly inclined to provide positive evaluations. The absence of negative or critical reports can be related to the fact that most of the studies do not rely upon methods that make it possible to discuss effects. This discrepancy between so many positive evaluations on the one hand and comparatively weak evaluation methods on the other hand leads us to suspect that evaluators are not sufficiently independent. Consultants and scholars that are funded by a government agency in order to evaluate the agency’s policies and programs are put in a position where it is difficult to maintain objectivity.

This is one reason why industrial policy continues to have such currency in European policy discussions despite a long track record of failure, as documented throughout this new book. The biggest problem for Europe lies in its layers of regulatory bureaucracy and heavy-handed treatment of entrepreneurs.

Later in the book, Zoltan J. Acs offers a grim account of just how bad things have been for Europe on the digital technology front in recent decades, despite the many state-led efforts to promote the sector. “The European Union protected traditional industries and hoped that existing firms would introduce new technologies. This was a policy designed to fail,” Acs argues. “What has been the outcome of E.U. policy in limiting entrepreneurial activity over recent decades?” he asks. Acs concludes that:

It is immediately clear… that the United States and China dominate the platform landscape. Based on the market value of top companies, the United States alone represents 66% of the world’s platform economy with 41 of the top 100 companies. European platform-based companies play a marginal role, with only 3% of market value.

He says that the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” from the European Union was a logical move, “because E.U. regulations were holding back the U.K.’s strong DPE (digital platform economy).” “If the United Kingdom was to realize its economic potential, it had to extricate itself from the European Union,” Acs says, due to the “dysfunctional E.U. bureaucracy.” No amount of industrial policy support is going to allow European firms to overcome those burdens. In fact, many of Europe’s industrial policy programs create the very disincentives that retard innovation and discourage entrepreneurialism in key sectors.

Several of the authors in the collection stress how the better role for the state is usually to set the table for innovation and growth without trying to determine everything that is served on the plate. As Wennberg and Sandström summarize:

the best policies to promote innovation are those that promote productive economic activity more generally: property rights protection, open and contestable markets, a stable monetary system, and legal rules that favor competition and entrepreneurship. Policy should promote an institutional environment in which innovation and entrepreneurship can flourish without trying to anticipate the specific outcomes of those processes—an impossible task in the face of uncertainty, technological change, and a dynamic, knowledge-based economy.

That’s good advice, as is everything found throughout the book. I encourage all those interested in these issues to take a hard look at it because it is particularly relevant even here in the Unites States, as Congress is currently considering a massive new 3,000-page, $350 billion industrial policy bill that I’ve labelled “The Most Corporatist & Wasteful Industrial Policy Ever.” There doesn’t seem to be anything stopping the momentum of this effort with both liberals and conservatives lining up to pass out the pork. I wish I could put a copy of Questioning the Entrepreneurial State in all their hands and ask them to read every word of it before they gamble hundreds of billions on such foolish efforts.

Additional Reading:

]]> https://techliberation.com/2022/04/26/book-review-questioning-the-entrepreneurial-state/feed/ 2 76975 Podcast: What’s Wrong with Industrial Policy? https://techliberation.com/2022/02/18/podcast-whats-wrong-with-industrial-policy/ https://techliberation.com/2022/02/18/podcast-whats-wrong-with-industrial-policy/#comments Fri, 18 Feb 2022 15:54:29 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76954

I recently joined Rep. Dan Crenshaw on his Hold These Truths podcast to discuss, “What’s Wrong with Industrial Policy.” We chatted for 25 minutes about a wide range of issues related to the the growing push for grandiose industrial policy schemes in the US, including the massive new 3,000-page, $350 billion “COMPETES Act” legislation that recently passed in the House and which will soon be conferenced with a Senate bill that already passed.

On the same day this podcast was released this week, I also had a new op-ed appear in  The Hill on “The Coming Industrial Policy Hangover.” In both that essay and the podcast with Rep. Crenshaw, I stress that, beyond all the other problems with these new industrial policy measures, no one is talking about the fiscal cost of it all. As I note:

In the rush to pass legislation, we’ve barely heard a peep about the $250-$350 billion price tag. This follows a massive splurge of recent government borrowing, which led to the U.S. national debt hitting another lamentable new record: $30 trillion. China already owns over $1 trillion of that debt, making one wonder if we’re really countering China by adopting a massive, new and unfunded industrial policy that they will end up financing indirectly.

Read my oped for more details and for a deeper dive of what’s wrong with the bills, see my earlier essay here on “Thoughts on the America COMPETES Act: The Most Corporatist & Wasteful Industrial Policy Ever.”

Additional Reading from Adam Thierer on Industrial Policy:

]]> https://techliberation.com/2022/02/18/podcast-whats-wrong-with-industrial-policy/feed/ 1 76954 Lavoie’s Lessons for Industrial Policy Planners https://techliberation.com/2021/11/09/lavoies-lessons-for-industrial-policy-planners/ https://techliberation.com/2021/11/09/lavoies-lessons-for-industrial-policy-planners/#comments Tue, 09 Nov 2021 15:55:23 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76917

Discourse magazine recently published my essay on what “Industrial Policy Advocates Should Learn from Don Lavoie.” With industrial policy enjoying a major revival in the the U.S. — with several major federal proposals are pending or already set to go into effect — I argue that Lavoie’s work is worth revisiting, especially as this weekend was the 20th anniversary of his untimely passing. Jump over to Discourse to read the entire thing.

But one thing I wanted to just briefly highlight here is the useful tool Lavoie created that helped us think about the “planning spectrum,” or the range of different industrial policy planning motivations and proposals. On one axis, he plotted “futurist” versus “preservationist” advocates and proposals, with the futurists wanting to invest in new skills and technologies, while the preservationists seek to prop up existing sectors. On the other axis, he contrasted “left-wing or pro-labor” and “right-wing or pro-business” advocates and proposals.

Lavoie used this tool to help highlight the remarkable intellectual schizophrenia among industrial policy planners, who all claimed to have the One Big Plan to save the economy. The problem was, Lavoie noted, all their plans differed greatly. For example, he did a deep dive into the work of Robert Reich and Felix Rohatyn, who were both outspoken industrial policy advocates during the 80s. Reich as affiliated with the Harvard School of Government at that time, and Rohatyn was a well-known Wall Street financier. The industrial policy proposals set forth by Reich and Rohatyn received enormous media and academic attention at the time, yet no one except Lavoie seriously explored the many ways in which their proposals differed so fundamentally. Rohatyn was slotted on the lower right quadrant because of his desire to prop up old sectors and ensure the health of various private businesses. Reich fell into the upper quadrant of being more of futurist in his desire to have the government promote newer skills, sectors, and technologies.

After identifying the many inconsistencies among these planners and their proposed schemes, Lavoie pointed out that these differences raised some obvious questions: Whose plan are we supposed to follow when proposed plans conflict? And how much stock should we place in the wisdom of industrial policy when the leading advocates cannot even agree on what sectors and technologies are worth preserving or promoting? It was a simply but powerful insight that should led us to calling into question anyone who tries to pretend that they have all the answers when it comes to industrial policy planning. And, as I argue in my new essay, this insight helps us identify the continuing intellectual schizophrenia among industrial policy planners and schemes today. If you jump over to my longer piece, you’ll see my breakdown of all this, but it’s plotted here:

In the end, I conclude that:

The limitations of industrial policy exist regardless of the policymaker’s intentions. There are no “good guys” versus “bad guys” when it comes to industrial policy efforts; there are just many people with many different technocratic plans, all of which are constrained by limited knowledge and resources.

Moreover, Lavoie most important piece of relevant advice is the simple adage that, if you find yourself in a hole, it is wise to stop digging. Constantly doubling down on planning efforts is not going to help governments escape the problems created by their earlier interventions. Unfortunately, this is exactly what many industrial policy advocates do: They insist that America already has an industrial policy, but that it lacks the sort of conscious design or coherent form or direction they desire. But that is the typical sort of hubris and folly we’ve always heard from planners. They always think there’s a proverbial “better path” out there and want us to imagine that they can lead us down it with wiser planning that avoids all the problems of all those past failed planning efforts.

As Lavoie taught us long ago, we’d be wise to reject their various schemes and recommendations. “In light of the inherent deficiencies of central planning, it might be argued that the U.S. should instead try to reduce current government interference with the competitive process to the absolute minimum consistent with other political goals,” he concluded. It remains wise advice for today’s policymakers.

Additional Reading:

]]> https://techliberation.com/2021/11/09/lavoies-lessons-for-industrial-policy-planners/feed/ 2 76917 Keeping Uncle Sam out of the Industrial Policy Casino https://techliberation.com/2021/07/16/keeping-uncle-sam-out-of-the-industrial-policy-casino/ https://techliberation.com/2021/07/16/keeping-uncle-sam-out-of-the-industrial-policy-casino/#comments Fri, 16 Jul 2021 19:01:32 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76898

Financial Help for Gamblers: How to Get Find ReliefIn my latest column for The Hill, I consider that dangers of government gambling our tax dollars on risky industrial policy programs. I begin by noting:

Roll the dice at a casino enough times, and you are bound to win a few games. But knowing the odds are not in your favor, how much are you willing to risk losing by continuing to gamble? This is the same issue governments confront when they gamble taxpayer dollars on industrial policy efforts, which can best be described as targeted and directed efforts to plan for specific future industrial outputs and outcomes. Throwing enough money at risky ventures might net a few wins, but at what cost? Could those resources have been better spent? And do bureaucrats really make better bets than private investors?

I continue on to note that, while the US is embarking on a major new industrial policy push, history does not provide us with a lot of hope regarding Uncle Sam’s betting record when he starts rolling those industrial policy dice. “How much tolerance should the public have for government industrial policy gambling?” I ask. I continue on:

Generally speaking, “basic” support (broad-based funding for universities and research labs) is wiser than “applied” (targeted subsidies for specific firms or sectors). With basic R&D funding, the chances of wasting resources on risky investments can be contained, at least as compared to highly targeted investments in unproven technologies and firms.

I also argue that “The riskiest bets on new technologies and sectors are better left to private investors,” and note how, “America’s venture capital industry remains the envy of the world because it continues to power world-beating advanced technology.” Accordingly, I conclude:

While some government investments will always be necessary, policymakers engaging in casino economics means bad industrial policy bets and taxpayer money squandered on risky ventures best made by private actors. We need to keep Uncle Sam’s gambling habits in check.

Read the whole thing here. And here’s a list of more of my recent writing on industrial policy:

]]> https://techliberation.com/2021/07/16/keeping-uncle-sam-out-of-the-industrial-policy-casino/feed/ 2 76898 Skeptical Takes on Expansive Industrial Policy Efforts https://techliberation.com/2021/03/15/skeptical-takes-on-expansive-industrial-policy-efforts/ https://techliberation.com/2021/03/15/skeptical-takes-on-expansive-industrial-policy-efforts/#comments Mon, 15 Mar 2021 17:09:11 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76845

[Last updated 3/25/22]

Industrial Policy is a red-hot topic once again with many policymakers and pundits of different ideological leanings lining up to support ambitious new state planning for various sectors — especially 5G, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors. A remarkably bipartisan array of people and organizations are advocating for government to flex its muscle and begin directing more spending and decision-making in various technological areas. They all suggest some sort of big plan is needed, and it is not uncommon for these industrial policy advocates to suggest that hundreds of billions will need to be spent in pursuit of those plans.

Others disagree, however, and I’ll be using this post to catalog some of their concerns on an ongoing basis. Some of the criticisms listed here are portions of longer essays, many of which highlight other types of steps that governments can take to spur innovative activities. Industrial policy is an amorphous term with many definitions of a broad spectrum of possible proposals. Almost everyone believes in  some form of industrial policy if you define the term broadly enough. But, as I argued in a September 2020 essay “On Defining ‘Industrial Policy‘,” I believe it is important to narrow the focus of the term such that we can continue to use the term in a rational way. Toward that end, I believe a proper understanding of industrial policy refers to targeted and directed efforts to plan for specific future industrial outputs and outcomes.

The collection of essays below is merely an attempt to highlight some of the general concerns about the most ambitious calls for expansive industrial policy, many of which harken back to debates I was covering in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I first started a career in policy analysis. During that time, Japan and South Korea were the primary countries of concern cited by industrial policy advocates. Today, it is China’s growing economic standing that is fueling calls for ambitious state-led targeted investments in “strategic” sectors and technologies. To a lesser extent, grandiose European industrial policy proposals are also prompting new US counter-proposals.

All this activity is what has given rise to many of the critiques listed below. If you have suggestions for other essays I might add to this list, please feel free to pass them along. FYI: There’s no particular order here.

Scott Lincicome and Huan Zhu, “Questioning Industrial Policy: Why Government Manufacturing Plans Are Ineffective and Unnecessary,” Cato Institute Working Paper, June 16, 2021.

[I]ndustrial policy – properly defined – has an extensive and underwhelming history in the United States, featuring high costs (seen and unseen), failed objectives, and political manipulation. Surely, not every U.S. industrial policy effort has ended in disaster, but facts here and abroad argue strongly against new government efforts to boost “critical” industries and workers and thereby fix alleged market failures. Such efforts warrant intense skepticism – skepticism that today is unfortunately in short supply.

Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy as Casino Economics,” The Hill, July 12, 2021.

While some government investments will always be necessary, policymakers engaging in casino economics means bad industrial policy bets and taxpayer money squandered on risky ventures best made by private actors. We need to keep Uncle Sam’s gambling habits in check.

Adam Thierer, “Thoughts on the America COMPETES Act: The Most Corporatist & Wasteful Industrial Policy Ever,” Technology Liberation Front, January 26, 2022.

As far as industrial policy measures go, the COMPETES Act is one of the most ambitious and expensive central planning efforts in American history. It represents the triumph of top-down, corporatist, techno-mercantilist thinking over a more sensible innovation policy rooted in bottom-up competition, entrepreneurialism, private investment, and free trade.

Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Does the US Need a More Targeted Industrial Policy for AI & High-Tech?” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Special Study, November 2021.

This paper considers how both the recent history of high-tech industrial policy efforts at the national and international level—as well as some state and local economic development efforts in the United States—might better inform the wisdom of proposed efforts for AI or other high-tech sectors. That history is spotted with some limited successes alongside a long string of costly failures. We explore the reasons for those failures and recommend that the US refocus on the policy prerequisites that helped give rise to the computing and internet revolutions: a more generalized approach to economic development rooted in light-touch regulation and taxation of emerging technology.

Samuel Gregg, “Can America Build A Broad-Based Economy?”  Law & Liberty, March 1, 2022

Of course, if a government decides to put enough money and resources behind a given industrial policy, it will likely produce some results. Yet the same is true of the gambler. If she stays in the casino long enough and spends enough money, she will win a few hands of cards. But the odds are that she will also lose a great deal of money, especially if she is as inept a gambler as the government is maladroit at identifying industry trends or entrepreneurial opportunities. Moreover, just as a compulsive gambler’s behavior will have numerous negative effects on her family’s well-being, so too does industrial policy risk inflicting wider damage upon a nation’s economy and political system. The harms range from gross misallocations of resources to the rampant cronyism and rent-seeking that seems inseparable from industrial policy (which, I again note, its advocates studiously avoid discussing), to name just a few.

Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, “Peace Through Strength Requires Economic Freedom,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2022.

The America Competes Act is the House’s effort to outdo the Chinese Communist Party’s latest five-year plan. The 2,900-page bill would make an old Soviet commissar blush.  [. . . ] America’s success in the world economy has never depended on industrial policy or government subsidies. It has come from the relative absence of government planning and subsidies. This is hardly news. The U.S. government provided support for the efforts of Samuel Langley, the greatest aviation expert of the 1890s, in his effort to make America first in powered flight. His manned Aerodrome flopped into the Potomac River. It was the Wright brothers, two unsubsidized but determined bicycle makers from Dayton, Ohio, who flew at Kitty Hawk, N.C., and changed the world.

Scott Lincicome, “Moving Fast and Breaking Things,” Capitolism, February 2, 2022.

Adam Thierer, “The Coming Industrial Policy Hangover,”  The Hill, February 16, 2022.

In the rush to pass legislation, we’ve barely heard a peep about the $250-$350 billion price tag. This follows a massive splurge of recent government borrowing, which led to the U.S. national debt hitting another lamentable new record: $30 trillion. China already owns over $1 trillion of that debt, making one wonder if we’re really countering China by adopting a massive, new and unfunded industrial policy that they will end up financing indirectly.

Podcast: “What’s Wrong with Industrial Policy,” Hold These Truths with Rep. Dan Crenshaw, February 16, 2022.

Tad DeHaven and Adam Thierer, “ The Military-Industrial Complex Offers a Cautionary Tale for Industrial Policy Planning,” Discourse, March 25, 2022.

Wayne Crews, “What To Do Instead Of The America COMPETES Act,” Forbes, February 2, 2022.

All this spending and expansion of the federal government, atop which our leaders would lay the America COMPETES Act and doubtless its own accompanying guidebook, has massive, ignored regulatory effects. Trillions in government spending (”investment”) have altered and will alter the entire trajectory and competitive environment of industries engaged in large-scale enterprises and transactions. This removes vast swaths of business activity from free competitive enterprise altogether, and creates displacements and distortions such that the restoration of free enterprise becomes a near-impossible disentanglement. The result is, after 100 years of big government and seduction of and fusion with big business, the greatest endeavors—from infrastructure to artificial intelligence, from smart cities to space—now consist of “partnerships” with governments rather than free enterprise, at scales and at costs so gigantic they can only be ignored.

Adam Thierer, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse,” Discourse, June 28, 2021.

Perhaps the most ironic indictment of industrial policy punditry lies in the way all the earlier books and essays about Japanese planning not only failed to forecast the many flops associated with it, but also did not foresee China as a potential future economic juggernaut. [. . .] What might that tell us about the ability of experts to predict the future course of countries and economies?

Adam Thierer, “Can Government Reproduce Silicon Valley Everywhere?”  Technology Liberation Front, September 12, 2021.

government efforts to artificially try to create regional innovation hubs in a top-down, technocratic fashion will almost certainly persist. As they do, some will argue that this time will be different! Perhaps, but it is more likely that the past is prologue; these new hubs will likely cause federal politicians to jockey for position to have their regions named one of the winners and get a big cut of all the new high-tech pork being served up by Washington.

Weifeng Zhong, “Beijing Can’t Make Sense of Biden’s China Strategy. Can Biden?” Washington Examiner, July 01, 2021.

America is not China, and it would be a fatal mistake to equate competing with China with imitating what China does. Doing so would risk the advantageous U.S. position as the world’s chief innovator, whose ideas are turned into products by vibrant private sectors both domestically and internationally.

Mike Watson, “Industrial Policy in the Real World,” National Affairs, Summer 2021.

Given the nature of industrial policymaking in the United States, there’s little reason to believe future attempts at industrial planning will result in a more coherent, rational, or strategic allocation of resources than they have in the past. [. . .] In short, industrial policy in the United States cannot be steered by a small group of enlightened individuals, because a small group of enlightened individuals will never be at the helm. Indeed, in some sense, there is no single “helm” to speak of.
 

Samuel Gregg, “Industrial Policy Mythology Confronts Economic Reality,” Law & Liberty, September 3, 2021.

If prizes in policy debates were given out for persistence, those advocating for more widespread use of industrial policy in America would be first in line. No matter how many times it is pointed out that they don’t understand the nature and workings of comparative advantage; or avoid acknowledging how industrial policy fosters rampant cronyism and corruption; or highlight what they consider examples of countries in which industrial policy has been employed successfully (only to have it demonstrated that it didn’t quite work out the way they suggested), they don’t give up.

Elizabeth Nolan Brown, “If This Is How America COMPETES, We’re Going to Lose,” Reason, January 26, 2022.

the bill can’t simply address one main issue or a few critical needs. Instead, it tries to insert the government into every aspect of all sorts of industries and markets and pretend that bureaucrats can solve complex social and cultural issues.

Chang-Tai Hsieh, “Countering Chinese Industrial Policy Is Counterproductive,” Project Syndicate, September 15, 2021.

US political leaders have long tried to counter Chinese industrial policy. And now they seem to have decided that the best way to do that is to emulate it. But their agenda betrays a profound lack of understanding of the unique challenge posed by China’s coupling of an authoritarian political regime with a dynamic market economy.

Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy Advocates Should Learn from Don Lavoie,” Discourse, November 5, 2021.

“In light of the inherent deficiencies of central planning,” Lavoie said, “it might be argued that the U.S. should instead try to reduce current government interference with the competitive process to the absolute minimum consistent with other political goals.” It remains wise advice for today’s policymakers.
Image

Anne O. Krueger, “America’s Muddled Industrial Policy,” CGTN, June 25, 2021.

Governments have a poor track record of identifying “winners” – be it a company or a category of technology – whereas private companies have proved better at transforming new discoveries into new products or cost savings. That is why the U.S. state traditionally has stuck to funding basic research.

Eric Boehm, “Massive Subsidies Won’t Solve the Semiconductor Supply Chain Crisis,” Reason, January 28, 2022.

Tracy C. Miller, “The Case for Limiting Government Semiconductor Subsidies,” The Hill, June 26, 2021.

Without the subsidies, firms would be more cautious about building or expanding foundries. If long-term production capacity is truly insufficient, high prices and anticipated profits give firms the right incentives to build or expand and satisfy demand at cost-covering prices.

Scott Lincicome, “The ‘Endless Frontier’ and American Industrial Policy,” Cato Institute Blog, May 26, 2021.

U.S. industrial policy has a long history of struggling to overcome political pressures, just as public choice predicts, and the EFA is no different. None of this means that all legislating is bad, or that politicians don’t at least occasionally vote in the national interest. Instead, the public choice framework simply adds another hurdle—along with things like the “knowledge problem,” seen and unseen costs, and misaligned incentives—to designing and implementing commercial policies specifically intended to beat the admittedly messy and imperfect situation that the market generates. It’s imperative that we understand these risks before supporting policies that, while they might look good on paper, could easily morph into a counterproductive boondoggle—one we’ve seen countless times with respect to U.S. industrial policy.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Is the United States capable of industrial policy in 2021?” Washington Post, June 14, 2021.

To believe that the United States can pursue a high-caliber industrial policy, however, requires assuming a more competent state than I have seen in the past decade.

Douglas Holtz-Eakin, “The Nicest Thing I Can Write About Supply Chain Policy,” The Daily Dish, June 10, 2021.

Nevertheless, the Senate just passed a provision for $50 billion to subsidize chip fabrication – something the president had requested – and the House will doubtlessly concur. That might seem like an industry victory, but wait until it realizes that the administration will assume it gives it the right to insist on union jobs, micromanage the design of chips, and dictate the pricing and distribution of the products. Good luck with that. As the definitive volume on policy analysis (Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack) put it, “He that lieth down with dogs shall rise up with fleas.”

Lipton Matthews, “Industrial Policy—a.k.a. Central Planning—Won’t Make America Great,” Mises Wire, November 5, 2021.

Although industrial policy is in vogue, the evidence suggests that it is not necessary for long-term development. Moreover, despite the popularity of industrial policy in China, America remains the world’s economic power, and by following China, it may lose this vaunted position.

Richard Beason, “Japanese Industrial Policy: An Economic Assessment,” National Foundation for American Policy, November 2021.

There is no evidence to support the claim that Japanese industrial policy during the 1955-1990 period enhanced growth rates by sector, industries with economies of scale (greater efficiency when produced in increased amounts), productivity growth or “competitiveness.” The reality of the political process and government spending priorities makes it very difficult for such policies to be effective. Furthermore, even if political pressures had not intervened, it seems questionable to suggest that government policymakers would be better than actual market participants in determining the most efficient allocation of resources to produce the best economic outcomes.

Douglas Irwin, “ Memo to the Biden administration on how to rethink industrial policy,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2020.

The challenge for policymakers is to identify such industries without succumbing to the notion that every industry is vital to some public objective. For example, the goal of “economic security” is so broadly defined and open-ended that virtually every domestic producer could claim the need for government support on that basis. The risk is that ill-conceived government programs will encourage corrupt behavior in which industries benefit themselves without contributing to national welfare.

Jim Pethokoukis, “Will Biden’s embrace of industrial policy pay off?” AEI Blog, January 15, 2021.

The history of such efforts in advanced capitalist economies gives ample reason for skepticism about the effectiveness of such top-down government planning, from Japanese economic stagnation to the now-mothballed Concorde supersonic jet to France’s failed attempt to create a thriving tech sector. The Internet might seem like the exception that negates the rule, but what turned out to be a successful partnership of government and entrepreneurs didn’t arise out of some master plan from Washington. And what do even the smartest plans look like when filtered through the dodgy quality of American governance? Maybe as an excuse for cronyism and protectionism.

Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Should the U.S. Copy China’s Industrial Policy?” Discourse, March 11, 2021.

America needs to embrace its already vibrant venture capital market, the benefits of basic science and prize competitions, and a light-touch regulatory approach instead of gambling taxpayer dollars on grandiose industrial policy schemes that would likely become boondoggles.

Connor Haaland & Adam Thierer, “Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?” Discourse, February 11, 2021.

Thus far, however, the Europeans don’t have much to show for their attempts to produce home-grown tech champions. Despite highly targeted and expensive efforts to foster a domestic tech base, the EU has instead generated a string of industrial policy failures that should serve as a cautionary tale for U.S. pundits and policymakers, who seem increasingly open to more government-steered innovation efforts.

Phil Levy & Christine McDaniel, “ Does the U.S. Need a Vigorous Industrial Policy?” Discourse, February 16, 2021.

we are certainly hearing new enthusiasm these days about industrial policy. It seems to have proponents or converts on both sides of the aisle. This either means that a new consensus has emerged, or it means that the term is being used so loosely that it has lost its original meaning. I’ll go with the latter; it now means different things to different people.

Wall Street Journal columnist Greg Ip discussing why “ The traditional skepticism toward industrial policy is well deserved.”

The traditional skepticism toward industrial policy is well deserved. Once Washington starts writing checks for semiconductors, other industries may get in line with the outcome determined more by political clout than economic merit. As in shipbuilding, the targeted companies may end up in perpetual need of federal protection and unable to compete internationally

David Ignatius, “The U.S. is quietly mobilizing its economy against China,” Washington Post, March 4, 2021.

The industrial policy the AI commission recommends could unlock talent and innovation. But if officials aren’t careful, government intervention could also afflict our best companies with the dead weight and dysfunction of our broken political system. We need government to spawn brainpower, not bureaucracy.

Veronique de Rugy, “Support for Industrial Policy is Growing,” AIER, January 18, 2020.

Looking at the federal government today tells me that the problems surrounding R&D programs in the past continue today, and will continue tomorrow, because they are simply a consequence of the normal functioning of government. It is hard to wish these problems away, even in the face of the private sector’s “imperfections.” Those arguing for more funding in R&D should proceed with caution.
This bill is proposing to give money with risk-averse restrictions to a risk-averse organization (the NSF) to be dispersed among other risk-averse organizations (Universities) into a system with increasingly risk-averse incentives. Note that I’m not saying “it’s all fubar’d lets burn it to the ground!” but I am suggesting that instead of slamming on the accelerator, we should be asking “what would a tune-up and an oil change look like instead?”

Ryan Bourne, “Do Oren Cass’s Justifications for Industrial Policy Stack Up?”  Cato Commentary, August 15, 2019.

Oren Cass asserts that markets cannot generally allocate resources efficiently by industry. Yet he provides no meaningful metrics to show this is the case, nor shows why his policies would deliver better outcomes. His two main claims about the benefits of a manufacturing sector — “stable employment” and “strong productivity growth” — are directly contradictory. A plethora of evidence suggests as countries’ get richer due to automation and technological improvements, they demand relatively more services, and so the industrial sector declines in employment terms.
Scott Lincicome, “ Manufactured Crisis: ‘Deindustrialization, Free Markets, and National Security,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 907, January 27, 2021.
This skepticism—mostly absent from Washington—is indeed warranted: analyses of the U.S. manufacturing sector and the relationship between trade and national security, as well as the United States’ long and checkered history of security‐​related protectionism, undermine the theoretical justifications for imposing protectionism and industrial policy in the name of national defense. Instead, open trade, freer markets, and global interdependence will in almost all cases produce better outcomes in terms of national security and, most importantly, preventing wars and other forms of armed conflict.
Matthew Lau, “Trudeau government’s ‘industrial policy’ creates all the wrong incentives,” Toronto Sun, March 16, 2021.
]]> https://techliberation.com/2021/03/15/skeptical-takes-on-expansive-industrial-policy-efforts/feed/ 4 76845 DC’s LivingSocial Cronyism Experiment Already Going off the Rails https://techliberation.com/2012/11/29/dcs-livingsocial-cronyism-experiment-already-going-off-the-rails/ https://techliberation.com/2012/11/29/dcs-livingsocial-cronyism-experiment-already-going-off-the-rails/#comments Thu, 29 Nov 2012 15:48:34 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=42919

In July 2012, the D.C. Council approved the Social E-Commerce Job Creation Tax Incentive Act of 2012. The deal provided LivingSocial, a popular online coupon service, with corporate and property tax exemptions in Washington, D.C. worth approximately $32.5 million over five years beginning in 2015. Legislators feared that LivingSocial would relocate to areas with a lower tax rate. In exchange for the $32.5 million, LivingSocial said it would attempt to add 1,000 employees to its payroll (roughly doubling its number of employees in the District), although no contractual guarantee for job creation exists and even though the firm had never been profitable. Some of the few contractual obligations required for LivingSocial to receive these tax exemptions are that it must establish a program to mentor D.C. high school students, provide internships for D.C. students, and stay located in the District. LivingSocial must also ensure 50% of newly hired employees live in the District in order to receive the Act’s full $32.5 million in exemptions.

Just a few months after the deal was struck it had already become apparent just how risky of a bet the DC government has made with taxpayer dollars. In late November 2012, LivingSocial announced a net loss of $566 million for the third quarter and that hundreds of employees would be laid off. The promise to roughly doubling the size of its DC-based workforce seems fairly unlikely and some analysts doubt the company will survive much longer.

This serves as another case study for just how foolish it is for governments to make risky, taxpayer-backed bets on information tech companies. Sadly, it’s not the only case study in this regard. In a forthcoming white paper, Brent Skorup and I will be documenting the troubling rise of high-tech cronyism across America. Motorola, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, Groupon, film studios, video game makers, and many other information technology companies are lining up with hat in hand and asking for handouts or special favors from state and local governments. Tax credits and other tax code-based inducements (such as tax rebates) are being tapped increasingly by state and local lawmakers who hope to encourage investment by these companies.

This cronyist activity is troubling for many reasons. As Brent and I will argue, tax credits and other benefits for digital technology companies are particularly misguided since (a) the most successful companies certainly don’t need them; and (b) the smaller companies or startups that might benefit from them today probably present a very risky investment for taxpayers. Many of these companies may be here today but gone tomorrow. That appears it could be the case for LivingSocial.

Tax credits can also become a time-consuming morass for innovators and distract them from the entrepreneurial activities they should be focused on. A recent Wall Street Journal report noted that “many companies are saying ‘no, thanks’ and are likely paying more taxes than legally required,” because “the tax deductions are either too cumbersome or too confusing. In some cases, the cost of obtaining the tax benefit is greater than the benefit itself.”

Policymakers should leave such risky investments to venture capitalists and others so that taxpayers are not on the hook when things go off the rails, just as they already have in DC with LivingSocial. Generally speaking, the best industrial recruitment / retention efforts are simple rules, low taxes, and light-touch regulation. That’s how to attract and retain a base of serious high-tech innovators without putting taxpayers at risk when things go wrong as they so often will in this sector.

Update: Shortly after I posted this piece I was contacted by representatives of the D.C. Mayor’s office asking me to clarify for readers that LivingSocial cannot claim any of these tax benefits unless it has 1,000 employees in city and unless it creates a 200,000 sq. ft. headquarters inside the District. They also asked me to again stress (as I noted in the opening paragraph) that these benefits will not begin until 2015-16. The exact terms of the deal can be found in the first link provided above (click the bill name).

In theory, such strings and stipulations could help the DC government escape this mess before it becomes an embarrassing fiasco for the city, but I would argue that they should not be putting taxpayers at risk like this to begin with. Moreover, while more strings might seem to provide greater accountability, added requirements and red tape also create more hassle and costs for firms. As I noted in my essay, that can affect future innovation and entrepreneurialism. Special deals for risky tech ventures remains unwise public policy.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/11/29/dcs-livingsocial-cronyism-experiment-already-going-off-the-rails/feed/ 5 42919 Cronyism: History, Costs, Case Studies and Solutions https://techliberation.com/2012/11/18/cronyism-history-costs-case-studies-and-solutions/ https://techliberation.com/2012/11/18/cronyism-history-costs-case-studies-and-solutions/#comments Sun, 18 Nov 2012 14:22:29 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=42807

Here’s a presentation I’ve been using lately for various audiences about “Cronyism: History, Costs, Case Studies and Solutions.” In the talk, I offer a definition of cronyism, explain its origins, discuss how various academics have traditionally thought about it, outline a variety of case studies, and then propose a range of solutions. Readers of this blog might be interested because I briefly mention the rise of cronyism in the high-tech sector. Brent Skorup and I have a huge paper in the works on that topic, which should be out early next year.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/11/18/cronyism-history-costs-case-studies-and-solutions/feed/ 1 42807 More Confusion about Internet “Freedom” https://techliberation.com/2011/03/01/more-confusion-about-internet-freedom/ https://techliberation.com/2011/03/01/more-confusion-about-internet-freedom/#comments Tue, 01 Mar 2011 18:18:37 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=35407

Nate Anderson of Ars Technica has posted an interview with Sen. Al Franken (D-MN) about Defining Internet “Freedom”. Neither Sen. Franken nor Mr. Anderson ever get around to defining that term in their exchange, but the clear implication from the piece is that “freedom” means freedom for the government to plan more and for policymakers to more closely monitor and control the Internet economy.  The clearest indication of this comes when Sen. Franken repeats the old saw that net neutrality regulation is “the First Amendment issue of our time.”

As a lover of liberty, I find this corruption of language and continued debasement of the term “freedom” to be extremely troubling. The thinking we see at work here reflects the ongoing effort by many cyber-progressives (or “cyber-collectivists,” as I prefer to call them) to redefine Internet freedom as liberation from the supposed tyranny of the marketplace and the corresponding empowerment of techno-cratic philosopher kings to guide us toward a more enlightened and noble state of affairs. We are asked to ignore our history lessons, which teach us that centralized planning and bureaucracy all too often lead to massively inefficient outcomes, myriad unforeseen unintended consequences, bureaucratic waste, and regulatory capture.  Instead, we are asked to believe that high-tech entrepreneurs are the true threat to human progress and liberty. They are cast as nefarious villains and their innovations, we are told, represent threats to our “freedom.” We even hear silly comparisons likening innovators like Apple to something out of George Orwell’s 1984. 

To be clear, I am not saying everything will be sunshine and roses in a free information marketplace. Mistakes will be made by those innovators and there will even be short-term spells of what many would regard as excessive corporate market power. The question is how much faith we should place in central planners, as opposed to evolutionary market forces, to solve that problem.  Those who truly love liberty and real human freedom would have more patience with competition and technological change and be willing to see how things play out. In other words, “market failures” and “code failures” are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up responses than by coercive, top-down approaches.

The decisive advantage of the market-driven approach is nimbleness. It is during what some might regard as a market’s darkest hour when some of the most exciting disruptive technologies and innovations develop. People don’t sit still; they respond to incentives, including short spells of apparently excessive private power. But they can only do so if they are truly free from artificial constraint from government forces who, inevitably, are always one or two steps behind fast-moving technological developments. Thus, we shouldn’t allow the cyber-collectivists to sell us their version of “freedom” in which markets are instead constantly reshaped through incessant regulatory interventions. That isn’t freedom, it’s tyranny.

More insulting to me is the continued repetition of this balderdash about how Net neutrality is “the First Amendment issue of our time.”  As I’ve pointed out before here before in my essay on “Net Neutrality Regulation & the First Amendment,” the Internet’s First Amendment is the First Amendment, not some new, top-down, heavy-handed regulatory regime that puts Federal Communications Commission bureaucrats in control of the Digital Economy. America’s Founding Fathers intended the First Amendment to serve as a shield from government encroachment on our liberties, not as a sword for government to wield to reshape markets and speech according to the whims of five unelected bureaucrats at the FCC. Anyone who suggests otherwise is engaging in revisionist history of the highest order.

Sadly, however, countless people seem to buy into this twisted vision of “Internet freedom” today. They stand ready to empower the techno-planners, to call in the code cops, and to roll out the tech pork barrel in their invitation to Washington to give the Digital Economy a great big bear hug.

You can call this vision many things, but pro-freedom is not one of them.  As Berin Szoka and I have argued here in the past, true “Internet freedom” is freedom from state action; not freedom for the State to reorder our affairs to supposedly make certain people or groups better off or to improve some amorphous “public interest” — an all-to convenient facade behind which unaccountable elites can impose their will on the rest of us.

If you stand for liberty, the choice of which conception of “Net freedom” to embrace is simple.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2011/03/01/more-confusion-about-internet-freedom/feed/ 8 35407 Who Cares about Broadband? https://techliberation.com/2010/08/12/who-cares-about-broadband/ https://techliberation.com/2010/08/12/who-cares-about-broadband/#comments Thu, 12 Aug 2010 15:13:23 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=31120

The folks at the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project came out with another installment of their “Home Broadband” survey yesterday. This one, Home Broadband 2010, finds that “adoption of broadband Internet access slowed dramatically over the last year.” “Most demographic groups experienced flat-to-modest broadband adoption growth over the last year,” it reports, although there was 22% growth in broadband adoption by African-Americans.  But the takeaway from the survey that is getting the most attention is the finding that:

By a 53%-41% margin, Americans say they do not believe that the spread of affordable broadband should be a major government priority. Contrary to what some might suspect, non-internet users are less likely than current users to say the government should place a high priority on the spread of high-speed connections.

This has a number of Washington tech policy pundits scratching their heads since it seems to cut against the conventional wisdom.  Cecilia Kang of The Washington Post penned a story about this today (“Support for Broadband Loses Speed as Nationwide Growth Slows“) and was kind enough to call me for comment about what might be going on here.

I suggested that there might be a number of reasons that respondents downplayed the importance of government actions to spur broadband diffusion, including that: (1) many folks are quite content with the Internet service they get today; (2) others might get their online fix at work or other places and not feel the need for it at home; and (3) some may not care two bits (excuse the pun) about broadband at all.  More generally, I noted that, with all the other issues out there to consider, broadband policy just isn’t that important to most folks in the larger scheme of things. As I told Kang, “Let’s face it, when the average family of four is sitting around the dinner table, to the extent they talk about U.S. politics, broadband is not on the list of topics.”

I also noted that many Americans are getting increasingly fed up with the scope of government power and the sort of wasteful spending that is increasingly bankrupting our nation and future generations.  More specifically, to the extent people know about them, existing universal service schemes for telephone service are massively inefficient and a prime example of why many Americans don’t trust their government to deliver on such grandiose tech-entitlement promises. One government report after another lambastes the waste, fraud, and abuse that runs rampant today our universal service system, and yet, those programs just keep growing and growing, year after year.

That’s why I told Kang that extending the same kind of federal aid to broadband providers is not likely to be any more efficient. “My skepticism comes from a poor government track record on tech funding,” I told her.  And I suspect that many people are equally skeptical for such reasons, and that might be influencing their answers when responding to Pew or other surveys.

Finally, I bet there are some folks out there who believe that, to the extent government should have a role in the “spread of affordable broadband” at all, that role should be focused on (1) clearing the deck of unnecessary regulatory burdens that prevent quicker rollout of privately-funded networks, and (2) limiting any subsidies that may be needed after that to targeted state and local programs for the truly neediest, not grandiose federal tech-pork barrel schemes.  Indeed, that’s my own position.

Of course, as I’ve noted here many times before, liberty is a loser these days and the natural progression of history is for Big Government to just grow and grow and grow.  So, I am prepared to get in line for my own tech handouts, as I noted in my essay last October, “Broadband as a Human Right (and a short list of other things I am entitled to on your dime).”

]]> https://techliberation.com/2010/08/12/who-cares-about-broadband/feed/ 2 31120 Broadband as a Human Right (and a short list of other things I am entitled to on your dime) https://techliberation.com/2009/10/14/broadband-as-a-human-right-and-a-short-list-of-other-things-i-am-entitled-to-on-your-dime/ https://techliberation.com/2009/10/14/broadband-as-a-human-right-and-a-short-list-of-other-things-i-am-entitled-to-on-your-dime/#comments Thu, 15 Oct 2009 04:35:18 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=22616

pay-upHey people. You owe me.  All of you.  You owe me free broadband.  I am entitled to it, after all. That seems to be where our current FCC is heading, anyway.  And hey, Finland’s just done it, and the supposed Silicon Valley capitalists at TechCrunch are giddy with delight about it.  We’re apparently all just Scandinavian socialists at heart now.

Thus, I too have decided to throw in the towel on the idea of everyone carrying their own weight and picking up their own tab.  So, get your wallets open and ready for me because I have lots and lots of things that I believe I have an inalienable right to receive free of charge from the government (i.e, “the people”;  i.e., “YOU”).   Please let me know which of the things on my high-tech wish list that you’ll be purchasing for me and I’ll check you off my registry so I don’t have to send the cops to your house to collect:

  • free broadband (fiber, Wi-Max, and whatever else is around the corner);
  • a couple of free new computers (and a really fast ones, thank you very much);
  • 3 new HDTVs for my home (including one of those sweet new DLP projectors that usually cost about $10,000 bucks.  And I’ll need you to pay for someone to help me install it. Or could you just come over and do that for me perhaps?);
  • 3 free new DVRs for each new TV set that you are buying me (and could I get a nice universal remote to control everything, please);
  • a free subscription in my area to either DirecTV, Cox Cable, or Verizon FIOS TV (with all the premium channels and sports packages… and don’t forget the Playboy Channel!);
  • a free lifetime subscription to Netflix (or I guess I would settle for a free Blu-Ray player and some free movies);
  • free new wi-fi router and signal extenders for my home (N-standard please, none of that B or G garbage… too slow for me);
  • free mobile phone service for life + an iPhone + unlimited downloads in their app store (oh, could you have that iPhone autographed by Steve Jobs if you get a chance?);
  • free Playstation or XBox + lots of games (and if I could get one of those driving wheels to play my new Gran Turismo game that would be dandy); and finally,
  • free lifetime tech support when all this crap breaks down.

In closing, I thank you for your generosity.  I mean, look, I know I don’t actually deserve any of this stuff, and that there’s no good reason that you should have to pay for my free-riding ways, and there’s obviously nothing in our Constitution to support all this, but hey… screw all that!  This is my God-given birthright. I am entitled, baby!  Now get busy thinking of how you are all going to start paying for me, you selfish bastards.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/10/14/broadband-as-a-human-right-and-a-short-list-of-other-things-i-am-entitled-to-on-your-dime/feed/ 46 22616 Are Gamers Served by More Government Regulation and Spending? https://techliberation.com/2009/01/26/are-gamers-served-by-more-government-regulation-and-spending/ https://techliberation.com/2009/01/26/are-gamers-served-by-more-government-regulation-and-spending/#comments Tue, 27 Jan 2009 01:30:56 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=15931

The Entertainment Consumers Association (ECA) is a group that does some good things to mobilize gamers to fight misguided regulation of video games. I greatly appreciate their tireless efforts to fight stereotypes and myths about games and gamers, and to specifically counter the hysteria about video games that we sometimes see in the press, and definitely see in political circles on a regular basis.  They’re a great ally in the fight for freedom of speech and artistic expression in this field.

That’s why I was so sorry to see the ECA launch a new campaign that encourages gamers to petition their congressional leaders and encourage them to regulate the high-tech economy more and waste more taxpayer dollars on inefficient universal service programs and subsidies:

Net Neutrality and Universal Broadband are not only great for America; they allow us to play the games we want at high speeds! … ECA believes that Universal Broadband and Net Neutrality are vital for the development of the national infrastructure, and believes that this bill is an important opportunity to let Congress know that you agree.

Sorry, but someone at the ECA will have to tell me how Net neutrality regulation will make my online Madden and Tiger Woods Golf experience move faster. If anything, such regulations would slow things down by making it more difficult for carriers and gaming networks to create more effective bandwidth management schemes and pricing plans such that my video game bits can get through faster. Is that called “discrimination”? You better believe it, and it’s a great thing. Go ask Microsoft why they signed up Limelight Networks a couple of years ago to help them make the Xbox Live experience more tolerable.  Empowering regulators to micromanage this process, by contrast, is just going to quash innovative approaches to the problem and invite more regulation of high-tech markets in general. That won’t help gamers in the long run.

Regarding the call for universal service subsidies… I suppose I could see the ECA’s logic if those schemes actually worked. But we have 70 years of experience with these pork subsidy programs and they have proven to be an abysmal failure. They are prone to extreme waste, fraud, and abuse and, worse yet, those inefficient subsidies have discouraged competition in rural areas. You’re not going to get more entry in the broadband business by subsidizing favored local operators all day long. And subsidizing risky new ventures isn’t much better since it just lets bureaucrats roll the dice with our tax dollars.  Bad idea.

Finally, there’s a more important principle matter at stake here: If you want to hold the line on future government attempts to regulate video games, it’s generally not a good idea to come to Congress asking for favors in the form of new regulation or spending. With one hand government giveth; with the other they (eventually) take away.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/01/26/are-gamers-served-by-more-government-regulation-and-spending/feed/ 11 15931 NYT’s Hansell on Broadband Stimulus “Hooey” https://techliberation.com/2009/01/24/nyts-hansell-on-broadband-stimulus-hooey/ https://techliberation.com/2009/01/24/nyts-hansell-on-broadband-stimulus-hooey/#comments Sat, 24 Jan 2009 14:10:54 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=15869

Some sensible thinking here about broadband pork stimulus plans from Saul Hansell of the New York Times. In his piece on the NYT Bits blog this week, “Does Broadband Need a Stimulus?” he argues that people should stop grumbling about the “relatively small sum” of $6 billion that the new administration has proposed for wiring rural areas and urban centers. Hansell argues:

This also seems to be a rather sound policy choice because, as I look at it, the noise about a broadband gap is hooey. With new cable modem technology becoming available, 19 out of 20 American homes eventually will be able to have Internet service that is faster than any available now anywhere in the world. And that’s without one new cable being laid. That fact hasn’t prevented a lot of folks involved in telecommunications policy from calling for a lot of money to be spent on backhoes and cable riggers. For example, the Communications Workers of America and the Telecommunications Industry Association called for $25 billion in subsidies to network providers as well as tax breaks. The Free Press, a group that advocates for media diversity, recommended spending $44 billion, with an emphasis on subsidizing companies to compete with existing cable and phone companies. Running a new fiber-optic cable to every American home may well increase competition in broadband providers, but it isn’t needed to deliver high-speed Internet service. Current cable modems use just one of the more than 100 channels on a typical cable system and can often offer speeds of 16 megabits per second or more. The next generation of modems, using a technology called Docsis 3, allows several of those video channels to be combined to offer what ultimately can be Internet service as fast as 1 gigabit per second — 10 times faster than is offered in Japan, which generally is regarded as having the fastest broadband infrastructure.

What is most significant about Docsis 3 is that it turns out to be quite inexpensive to upgrade existing cable systems to use it. As a result, Comcast and other cable systems are already deploying the technology rather quickly. In other words, with no government intervention, the country is going to have the infrastructure very soon to provide almost everyone with the fastest possible Internet service. To be sure, Verizon and, to a much lesser degree, AT&T, are already building out fiber-optic-based networks that compete with the cable companies in broadband, voice and video. Clearwire, a venture that includes Sprint, is building a wireless broadband network. Certainly, competition often lowers prices and increases choices. But it is hardly clear that the country would get an adequate return from subsidizing what is essentially duplicate capacity.

Amen to all that. Plus, Hansell might have cited the 70 years of experience we have with universal service programs, which have proven to be the very model of waste, fraud, and abuse that many tax-and-spenders claim they now wish to avoid. Moreover, those inefficient subsidies have discouraged competition in rural areas. If we only subsidized McDonalds in rural area, do you think Burger King, Taco Bell or any other fast-food chain would have ever come to town?  But that’s basically the way this racket has worked in the telecom world for years.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/01/24/nyts-hansell-on-broadband-stimulus-hooey/feed/ 8 15869