That’s all nice-sounding rhetoric but it sure doesn’t seem to match up with Hawley’s recent essays and policy proposals, which are straight out of the old era’s elitist and highly paternalistic Washington-Knows-Best playbook. Specifically, Hawley has called for a top-down, technocratic regulatory regime for the Internet and the digital economy more generally. Hawley has repeatedly made claims that digital technology companies have gotten a sweetheart deal from government and they they have censored conservative voices. That’s utter nonsense, but those arguments have driven his increasingly fanatic rhetoric and command-and-control policy proposals. If he succeeds in his plan to empower unelected bureaucrats inside the Beltway to reshape the Internet, it will destroy one of the greatest American success stories in recent memory. It’s hard to understand how that could be labelled “conservative” in any sense of the word.

I’ve been tracking Sen. Hawley’s increasingly radical plans for the digital economy in a series of essays, including:

• “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“
• “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“
• “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“
• “The Not-So-SMART Act“

In these articles, I have documented how Sen. Hawley has been whipping up a panic about digital technology companies and social media platforms to soften to ground for massive intervention by DC elites. Consider his hotly-worded USA Today op-ed from May in which he argued that, “social media wastes our time and resources,” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” Sen. Hawley refers to sites like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter as “parasites” and blames them for a litany of social problems (including an unproven link to increased suicide). He has even suggested that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared” and seems to hope the same for other sites.

More insultingly, he has argued that the entire digital economy was basically one giant mistake. He says that America’s recent focus on growing the Internet and information technology sectors has “encouraged a generation of our brightest engineers to enter a field of little productive value,” which he regards as “an opportunity missed for the nation.” “What marvels might these bright minds have produced,” Hawley asks, “had they been oriented toward the common good?”

Again, this isn’t the sort of rhetoric that conservatives are usually known for. This is elitist, paternalistic tripe that we usually hear from market-hating neo-Marxists. It takes a lot of hubris for Sen. Hawley to suggest that he knows best which professions or sectors are in “the common good.” As I responded in one of my essays:

Had some benevolent philosopher kings in Washington stopped the digital economy from developing over the past quarter century, would all those tech workers really have chosen more noble-minded and worthwhile professions? Could he or others in Congress really have had the foresight to steer us in a better direction?

Why would Sen. Hawley think DC elites could do a better job centrally planning the economy? He doesn’t really tell us, instead preferring to fall back on conspiratorial rhetoric about evil “Big Tech” companies “censoring” conservatives voices. That’s the same card he played when he joined President Trump at the White House for the surreal, rambling “Social Media Summit” that took place last month. Trump used the same approach that Sen. Hawley and Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) have been using during recently Senate Judiciary Committee hearings: brow-beat witnesses and make wild claims about the whole digital world being out to muzzle conservative voices. As Andrea O’Sullivan and I noted in our essay about the Social Media Summit:

The President and other conservatives are tapping another approach: indirect censorship through both subtle and direct threats. This is an old playbook that goes by many different names: “jawboning,” “administrative arm-twisting,” “agency threats,” and “regulation by raised eyebrow.” These were the names given to broadcast-era efforts to pressure old radio and TV outlets to bring their programming choices in line with the desires of politicians and bureaucrats.

This is an old DC playbook that elites have used for decades to “work the refs” and try to extract promises from various parties under threat of more far-reaching regulation if they fail to comply with the demands of politicians. Again, there’s nothing remotely “conservative” about it.

Brushing aside such concerns, Sen. Hawley has started sketching out what a comprehensive regulatory regime for the Internet and social media might look like. He does so in two new bills, the “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” (co-sponsored by Sen. Cruz) and the “Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology (SMART) Act.” These two measures, if implemented, would radically remake the digital economy and lead to a remarkably intrusive regulatory regime for online speech and commerce.

The ridiculously named “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” would actually encourage the exact opposite result than its title suggests. The proposal would mandate that regulators at the Federal Trade Commission evaluate whether platforms have engaged in “politically biased moderation,” which is defined as moderation practices that are supposedly, “designed to negatively affect” or those that “disproportionately [restrict] or promote access to … a political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint.” Social media providers would need to petition the FTC for “immunity certifications” to then get regular audits to ensure they are moderating content in a government-approved manner. If they didn’t, they would lose their platform liability protections, which could effectively run them out of business.

This is permission slip-based regulation and it makes the old Federal Communications Commission licensing regime for broadcast radio and television look like child’s play by comparison. Hawley’s “Mother, May I?” licensing scheme for the Net would have unelected FTC bureaucrats make speech decisions for the entire Internet. It’s a massive First Amendment violation, and it would almost certainly face constitutional challenge if implemented.

What makes this all the more shocking, as I noted in response, this measure combines core elements of the old Fairness Doctrine as well as “net neutrality” mandates that conservatives have traditionally decried. The bill would also empower insider-the-Beltway lawyers, lobbyists, and consultants, who would be needed to navigate the maze of red tape this measure would give rise to. Worst of all, the measure is a massive gift to the trial lawyers Republicans love to hate because Hawley’s new regulatory regime would empower them to file an endless string of frivolous suits aimed at simply shaking down companies through early settlements. Again, how is this “conservative”?

Then there’s Hawley’s new “SMART Act,” which as Andrea O’Sullivan and I argue in our latest essay is really quite stupid. The highly technocratic measure lists a variety of business practices that would be automatically verboten. As Andrea and I summarize:

On the chopping block are infinite scrolling, video autoplay, and “gamification” features like offering badges or streaks for accomplishing certain feats. The bill would also require that social media companies build default time limits and pop-up notifications telling users how long they’ve been on a platform within six months of the bill passing. Weirdly, the bill specifies a time limit of 30 minutes on all social media platforms on all devices per day, after which point they will be locked out. The user would be able to raise that limit through platform settings, but it would reset to 30 minutes at the beginning of each month.

Who would have ever thought we now be living in a world where conservatives are calling for paternalistic, Washington-knows-best nannyism that lets agency bureaucrats forcibly shut down your social media access each day after just 30 minutes of use? Hell, why stop there? Perhaps Sen. Hawley could next impose daily limits how many Netflix shows we stream, how many podcasts we listen to, or how much time we spend playing video games. After all, he clearly thinks he knows what is in our own best interest.

No matter how much Sen. Hawley rails against elites and big government, what he has been saying and proposing represent elitism and regulatory paternalism of the very highest order. He may say that “the old era is ending and the old ways will not do” in his speeches, but through his actions he has whole-hardheartedly embraced the old order. And while he can mouth lines about how “it’s time that we stood up to big government, to the people in government who think they know better,” and while he might claim that he is “for free competition [and] the free market,” in reality, Sen. Hawley has become the most aggressive Republican booster of Big Government and managed markets that I have seen in my 30 years covering technology policy.

Hopefully, the real conservatives left out there will make a stand against Sen. Hawley’s abominable corruption of their movement and ideals.

Shane Greenstein, Kellogg Chair in Information Technology at Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management, discusses his recent paper, Collective Intelligence and Neutral Point of View: The Case of Wikipedia , coauthored by Harvard assistant professor Feng Zhu. Greenstein and Zhu’s paper takes a look at whether Linus’ Law applies to Wikipedia articles. Do Wikipedia articles have a slant or bias? If so, how can we measure it? And, do articles become less biased over time, as more contributors become involved? Greenstein explains his findings.

Download

Related Links

• Is Wikipedia Biased?, Greenstein, Zhu
• Harvard Business School Biography, Greenstein
• Harvard Business School Biography, Zhu
• The Irony of Public Funding, The Virulent World of Mouse

Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden’s new book, Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age, will go down as one of the most important Internet policy books of 2013 for two reasons. First, their book offers an excellent overview of how Internet regulation has unfolded on five different fronts: privacy and data protection; copyright; content censorship; social networks and user-generated content issues; and net neutrality regulation. They craft detailed case studies that incorporate important insights about how countries across the globe are dealing with these issues. Second, the authors endorse a specific normative approach to Net governance that they argue is taking hold across these policy arenas. They call their preferred policy paradigm “prosumer law” and it envisions an active role for governments, which they think should pursue “smarter regulation” of code.

In terms of organization, Brown and Marsden’s book follows the same format found in Milton Mueller’s important 2010 book Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance; both books feature meaty case studies in the middle bookended by chapters that endorse a specific approach to Internet policymaking. (Incidentally, both books were published by MIT Press.) And, also like Mueller’s book, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code does a somewhat better job using case studies to explore the forces shaping Internet policy across the globe than it does making the normative case for their preferred approach to these issues.

Thus, for most readers, the primary benefit of reading either book will be to see how the respective authors develop rich portraits of the institutional political economy surrounding various Internet policy issues over the past 10 to 15 years. In fact, of all the books I have read and reviewed in recent years, I cannot think of two titles that have done a better job developing detailed case studies for such a diverse set of issues. For that reason alone, both texts are important resources for those studying ongoing Internet policy developments.

That’s not to say that both books don’t also make a solid case for their preferred policy paradigms, it’s just that the normative elements of the texts are over-shadowed by the excellent case studies. As a result, readers are left wanting more detail about what their respective policy paradigms would (or should) mean in practice. Regardless, in the remainder of this review, I’ll discuss Brown and Marsden’s normative approach to digital policy and contrast it with Mueller’s since they stand in stark contrast and help frame the policy battles to come on this front.

Governing Cyberspace: Mueller vs. Brown & Marsden

Mueller’s normative goal in Networks and States was to breathe new life into the old cyber-libertarian philosophy that was more prevalent during the Net’s founding era but which has lost favor in recent years. He made the case for a “cyberliberty” movement rooted in what he described as a “denationalized liberalism” vision of Net governance. He argued that “we need to find ways to translate classical liberal rights and freedoms into a governance framework suitable for the global Internet. There can be no cyberliberty without a political movement to define, defend, and institutionalize individual rights and freedoms on a transnational scale.”

I wholeheartedly endorsed that vision in my review of Mueller’s book, even if he was a bit short on the details of how to bring it about. But it is useful to keep Mueller’s paradigm in mind because it provides a nice contrast with the approach Brown and Marsden advocate, which is quite different.

Generally speaking, Brown and Marsden reject most forms of “Internet exceptionalism” and certainly reject the sort of “cyberliberty” ethos that Mueller and I embrace. They instead endorse a fairly broad role for governments in ordering the affairs of cyberspace. In their self-described “prosumer” paradigm, the State is generally viewed as benevolent actor, well-positioned to guide the course of code development toward supposedly more enlightened ends.

Consistent with the strong focus on European policymaking found throughout the book, the authors are quite enamored with the “co-regulatory” models that have become increasing prevalent across the continent. Like many other scholars and policy advocates today, they occasionally call for “multi-stakeholderism” as a solution but they do not necessarily mean the sort of truly voluntary, bottom-up multi-stakeholderism of the Net’s early days. Rather, they are usually thinking of multi-stakeholderism as what is essentially pluralistic politics; it’s the government setting the table, inviting the stakeholders to it, and then guiding (or at least “nudging”) policy along the way. “We are convinced that fudging with nudges needs to be reinforced with the reality of regulation and coregulation, in order to enable prosumers to maximize their potential on the broadband Internet,” they say. (p. 187)

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?

Thus, despite the new gloss, their “prosumer law” paradigm ends up sounding quite a bit like a rehash of traditional “public interest” law and common carrier regulation, albeit with a new appreciation of just how dynamics markets built on code can be. Indeed, Brown and Marsden repeatedly acknowledge how often law and regulation fails to keep pace with the rapid evolution of digital technology. “Code changes quickly, user adoption more slowly, legal contracting and judicial adaptation to new technologies slower yet, and regulation through legislation slowest of all,” they correctly note (p. xv). This reflects what Larry Downes refers to as the most fundamental “law of disruption” of the digital age: “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”

At the end of the day, however, that insight doesn’t seem to inform Brown and Marsden’s policy prescriptions all that much. Theirs is a world in which policy tinkering errors will apparently be corrected promptly and efficiently by still more policy tinkering, or “smarter regulation.” Moreover, like many other Internet policy scholars today, they don’t mind regulatory interventions that come early and often since they believe that will help regulators get out ahead of the technological curve and steer markets in preferred directions. “If regulators fail to address regulatory objects at first, then the regulatory object can grow until its technique overwhelms the regulator,” they say (p. 31).

This is the same mentality that is often on display in Tim Wu’s work, which I have been quite critical of here and elsewhere. For example, Wu has advocated informal “agency threats” and the use of “threat regimes” to accomplish policy goals that prove difficult to steer though the formal democratic rulemaking process. As part of his “defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts,” Wu stresses the importance of regulators taking control of fast-moving tech markets early in their life cycles. “Threat regimes,” Wu argues, “are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid change — under conditions of ‘high uncertainty.’ Highly informal regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology or business model, or a practice about which little is known,” Wu concludes.

This is essentially where most of the “co-regulation” schemes that Brown and Marsden favor would take us: Code regulators would take an active role in shaping the evolution of digital technologies and markets early in its life cycle. What are the preferred regulatory mechanisms? Like Wu and many other cyberlaw professors today, Brown and Marsden favor robust interconnection and interoperability mandates bolstered by antitrust actions as well. And, again, they aren’t willing to wait around and let the courts adjudicate these issues in an ex post fashion. “Essential facilities law is a very poor substitute for the active role of prosumer law that we advocate, especially in its Chicago school minimalist phase” (p. 185). In other words, we shouldn’t wait for someone to bring a case and litigate it through the courts when preemptive, proactive regulatory interventions can sagaciously steer us to a superior end.

More specifically, they propose that “competition authorities should impose ex ante interoperability requirements upon dominant social utilities… to minimize network barriers” (p. 190) and they model this on traditional regulatory schemes such as must-carry obligations, API interface disclosure requirements, and other interconnection mandates (such as those imposed on AOL/Time Warner a decade ago to alleviate fears about instant messaging dominance). They also note that “Effective, scalable state regulation often depends on the recruitment of intermediaries as enforcers” to help achieve various policy objectives (p. 170).

The Problem with Interoperability Über Alles

So, in essence, the Brown-Marsden Internet policy paradigm might be thought of as interoperability über alles. Interoperability and interconnection in pursuit of more “open” and “neutral” systems is generally considered an unalloyed good and most everything else is subservient to this objective.

This is a serious policy error and one that I address in great detail in my absurdly long review of John Palfrey and Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems. I’m not going to repeat all 6,500 words of that critique here when you can just click back and read it, but here’s the high level summary: There is no such thing as “optimal interoperability” that can be determined in an a priori fashion. Ongoing marketplace experimentation with technical standards, modes of information production and dissemination, and interoperable information systems, is almost always preferable to the artificial foreclosure of this dynamic process through state action. The former allows for better learning and coping mechanisms to develop while also incentivizing the spontaneous, natural evolution of the market and market responses. The latter (regulatory foreclosure of experimentation) limits that potential.

More importantly, when interoperability is treated as sacrosanct and forcibly imposed through top-down regulatory schemes, it will often have many unintended consequences and costs. It can even lock in existing market power and market structures by encouraging users and companies to flock to a single platform instead of trying to innovate around it. (Go back and take a look at how the “Kingsbury Commitment” — the interconnection deal from the early days of the U.S. telecom system — actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry instead of assisting independent operators.)

Citing Palfrey and Gasser, Brown and Marsden do note that “mandated interoperability is neither necessary in all cases nor necessarily desirable” (p. 32), but they don’t spend as much time as Palfrey and Gasser itemizing these trade-offs and the potential downsides of some interoperability mandates. But what frustrates me about both books is the almost quasi-religious reverence accorded to interoperability and open standards when such faith is simply not warranted after historical experience is taken into consideration.

Plenty of the best forms of digital innovation today are due to a lack of interoperability and openness. Proprietary systems have produced some of the most exciting devices (iPhone) and content (video games) of modern times. Then again, voluntary interoperable and “open” services and devices thrive, too. The key point here — and one that I develop in far greater detail in my book chapter, “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters” — is that the market for digital services is working marvelously and providing us with choices of many different flavors. Innovation continues to unfold rapidly in both directions along the “open” vs. “closed” continuum. (Here are 30 more essays I have written on this topic if you need more proof.)

Generally speaking, we should avoid mandatory interop and openness solutions. We should instead push those approaches and solutions in a truly voluntary, bottom-up fashion. And, more importantly, we should be pushing for outside-the-box solutions of the Schumpeterian (creative destruction / disruptive innovation) variety instead of surrendering so quickly on competition through forced sharing mandates.

The Case for Patience & Policy Restraint

But Brown and Marsden clearly do not subscribe to that sort of Schumpeterian thinking. They think most code markets tip and lock into monopoly in fairly short order and that only wise interventions can rectify that. For example, they claim that Facebook’s “monopoly is now durable,” which will certainly come as a big surprise to the millions of us who do not use it all. And the story of MySpace’s rapid rise and equally precipitous fall has little bearing on this story, they argue.

But, no matter how you define the “social networking market,” here are two facts about it: First, it is still very, very young. It’s only about a decade old. Second, in that short period of time, we have already witnessed the entire first generation of players fall by the wayside. While the second generation is currently dominated by Facebook, it is by no means alone. Again, millions like me don’t use it at all and get along just fine with other “social networking” technologies, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, and even older tech like email, SMS, and yes, phone calls! Accusations of “monopoly” in this space strain credulity in the extreme. I invite you to read my Mercatus working paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” for a more thorough debunking of this logic. (Note: The final version of that paper will be published in the CommLaw Conspectus shortly.)

Such facts should have a bearing on the debate about regulatory interventions. We continue to witness the power of Schumpeterian rivalry as new and existing players battle in a race for the prize of market power. Brown and Marsden fear that the race is already over in many sectors and that it is time to throw in the towel and get busy regulating. But when I look around at the information technology marketplace today, I am astonished just how radically different it looks from even just a few years ago, and not just in the social media market. I have written extensively about the smartphone marketplace, where innovation continues at a frantic pace. As I noted in my essay here on “Smartphones & Schumpeter,” it’s hard to remember now, but just 6 short years ago:

• The iPhone and Android had not yet landed.
• Most of the best-selling phones of 2007 were made by Nokia and Motorola.
• Feature phones still dominated the market; smartphones were still a luxury (and a clunky luxury at that).
• There were no app stores and what “apps” did exist were mostly proprietary and device or carrier-specific; and,
• There was no 4G service.

It’s also easy to forget just how many market analysts and policy wonks were making absurd predictions at the time about how the telecom operators at the time had so much market power that they would crush new innovation without regulation. Instead, in very short order, the market was completely upended in a way that mobile providers never saw coming. There was a huge shift in relative market power flowing from the core of these markets to the fringes, especially to Apple, which wasn’t even a player in that space before the launch of the iPhone.

As I noted in concluding that piece last year, these facts should lead us to believe that this is a healthy, dynamic marketplace in action. Not even Schumpeter could have imagined creative destruction on this scale. (Just look as BlackBerry). But much the same could be said of many other sectors of the information economy.  While it is certainly true that many large players exist, we continue to see a healthy amount of churn in these markets and an astonishing amount of technological innovation.

Public Choice Insights: What History Tells Us

One would hope these realities would have a greater bearing on the policy prescriptions suggested by analysts like Brown and Marsden, but they don’t seem to. Instead, the attitude on display here is that governments can, generally speaking, act wisely and nudge efficiently to correct short-term market hiccups and set us on a better course. But there are strong reasons to question that presumption.

Specifically, what I found most regrettable about Brown and Marsden’s book was the way — like all too many books in this field these days — the authors briefly introduce “public choice” insights and concerns only to summarily dismiss them as unfounded or overblown. (See my review of Brett Frischmann’s book, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources for a more extended discussion of this problem as it pertains to discussions about not just infrastructure regulation by the regulation of all complex industries and technologies.)

Brown and Marsden make it clear that their intentions are pure and that their methods would incorporate the lessons of the past, but they aren’t very interested in dwelling on the long, lamentable history of regulatory failures and capture in the communications and media policy sectors. They do note the dangers of a growing “security-industrial complex” and argue that “commercial actors dominate technical actors in policy debates.” They also say that the “potential for capture by regulated interests, especially large corporate lobbies, is an essential insight” that informs their approach. The problem is that it really doesn’t. They largely ignore those insights and instead imply that, to the extent this is a problem at all, we can build a better breed of bureaucrats going forward who will craft “smarter regulation” that is immune from such pressures. Or, they claim that “multi-stakeholderism” — again, the new, more activist and government-influenced conception of it — can overcome these public choice problems.

A better understanding of power politics that is informed by the wisdom of the ages would instead counsel that minimizing the scope of politicization of technology markets is the better remedy. Capture and cronyism in communications and media markets has always grown in direct proportion to the overall scope of law governing those sectors. (I invite you to read all the troubling examples of this that Brent Skorup and I have documented in our new 72-page working paper, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” Warning: It makes for miserable reading but proves beyond any doubt that there is something to public choice concerns.)

To be clear, it’s not that I believe that “market failures” or “code failures” never occur, rather, as I noted in this debate with Larry Lessig, it’s that such problems are typically “better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).” It’s not just that traditional regulatory remedies cannot keep pace with code markets, it’s that those attempting to craft the remedies do not possess the requisite knowledge needed to know how to steer us down a superior path. (See my essay, “Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset,” for more on that point.)

Regardless, at a minimum, I expect scholars to take seriously the very real public choice problems at work in this arena. You cannot talk about the history of these sectors without acknowledging the horrifically anti-consumer policies that were often put in place at the request of one industry or another to shield themselves from disruptive innovation. No amount of wishful thinking about “prosumer” policies will change these grim political realities. Only by minimizing chances to politicize technology markets and decisions can we overcome these problems.

Conclusion

For those of us who prefer to focus on freeing code, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code is another reminder that liberty is increasingly a loser in Internet policy circles these days. Milton Mueller’s dream of decentralized, denationalized liberalism seems more and more unlikely as armies of policymakers, regulators, special interests, regulatory advocates, academics, and others all line up and plead for their pet interest or cause to be satisfied through pure power politics. No matter what you call it — fudging, nudging, coregulation, smart regulation, multistakeholderism, prosumer law, or whatever else, — there is no escaping the fact that we are witnessing the complete politicization of almost every facet of code creation and digital decisionmaking today.

Despite my deep reservations about a more politicized cyberspace, Brown and Marsden’s book is an important text because it is one of the most sophisticated articulations and defenses of it to date. Their book also helps us better understand the rapidly developing institutional political economy of Internet regulation in both broad and narrow policy contexts. Thus, it is worth your time and attention even if, like me, you are disheartened to be reading yet another Net policy book that ultimately endorses mandates over of markets as the primary modus operandi of the information age.

Additional Resources about the book:

• the official MIT Press website for Regulating Code
• shorter Brown & Marsden paper on “Prosumer Law” (via SSRN)
• Little Atoms podcast featuring Brown & Marsden discussing Regulating Code
• Ian Brown edited this beefy Research Handbook On Governance Of The Internet, which makes a nice complement to Regulating Code. It offers even more detailed case studies on the major issues featured in the book. A terrific resource (if you can afford it!)
• a video of Brown & Marsden discussing the book at the Oxford Internet Institute (also embedded below):

Other books you should read alongside “Regulating Code” (links are for my reviews of each):

• Milton Mueller’s Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance
• John Palfrey & Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems
• Rebecca MacKinnon’s Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom
• David G. Post’s In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace
• Christopher Yoo’s The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are Transforming the Network
• Larry Lessig’s Code (my 2-part exchange with Lessig upon Code’s 10^th anniversary: Part 1, Part 2)

Here’s a presentation I delivered on “The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy” at the latest meeting of the Southern Economic Association this weekend. It outlines concerns about vertical integration in the tech economy and specifically addresses regulatory proposals set forth by Tim Wu (arguing for a “separations principle” for the tech economy) & Jonathan Zittrain (arguing for “API neutrality” for social media and digital platforms). This presentation is based on two papers published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University: “Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy” (with Brent Skorup) & “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.”

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

Looking for a concise overview of how Internet architecture has evolved and a principled discussion of the public policies that should govern the Net going forward? Then look no further than Christopher Yoo‘s new book, The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are Transforming the Network. It’s a quick read (just 140 pages) and is worth picking up.  Yoo is a Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science at the University of Pennsylvania and also serves as the Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation & Competition there. For those who monitor ongoing developments in cyberlaw and digital economics, Yoo is a well-known and prolific intellectual who has established himself as one of the giants of this rapidly growing policy arena.

Yoo makes two straight-forward arguments in his new book. First, the Internet is changing. In Part 1 of the book, Yoo offers a layman-friendly overview of the changing dynamics of Internet architecture and engineering. He documents the evolving nature of Internet standards, traffic management and congestion policies, spam and security control efforts, and peering and pricing policies. He also discusses the rise of peer-to-peer applications, the growth of mobile broadband, the emergence of the app store economy, and what the explosion of online video consumption means for ongoing bandwidth management efforts. Those are the supply-side issues. Yoo also outlines the implications of changes in the demand-side of the equation, such as changing user demographics and rapidly evolving demands from consumers. He notes that these new demand-side realities of Internet usage are resulting in changes to network management and engineering, further reinforcing changes already underway on the supply-side.

Yoo’s second point in the book flows logically from the first: as the Internet continues to evolve in such a highly dynamic fashion, public policy must as well. Yoo is particularly worried about calls to lock in standards, protocols, and policies from what he regards as a bygone era of Internet engineering, architecture, and policy. “The dramatic shift in Internet usage suggests that its founding architectural principles form the mid-1990s may no longer be appropriate today,” he argues. (p. 4) “[T]he optimal network architecture is unlikely to be static. Instead, it is likely to be dynamic over time, changing with the shifts in end-user demands,” he says. (p. 7) Thus, “the static, one-size-fits-all approach that dominates the current debate misses the mark.” (p. 7)

Yoo makes a particular powerful case for flexible network pricing policies. His outstanding chapter on “The Growing Complexity of Internet Pricing” offers an excellent overview of the changing dynamics of pricing in this arena and explains why experimentation with different pricing methods and business models must be allowed to continue. Getting pricing right is essential, Yoo notes, if we hope to ensure ongoing investment in new networks and services. He also notes how foolish it is to expect the government to come in and save the day thought massive infrastructure investment to cover the hundreds of billions of dollars needed to continue to build-out high-speed services:

Most industry and political observers believe that the federal government will not be in a position to allocate that amount of money to upgrade our nation’s broadband infrastructure for the foreseeable future. The next-generation network will thus be built by private enterprise. But private corporations cannot be expected to undertake such investments unless they have a reasonable prospect of recovering their upfront costs from consumers who are using the increased bandwidth and other enhancements to the existing network. (p. 102)

Again, that’s why flexible pricing policies and ongoing experimentation with various business models is vital. This insight is particularly timely in light of the recent renewed interest in data caps. A lot of people who don’t know a lick about economics and have never run a real business in their lives are seemingly obsessed with telling private operators how to run theirs. If the Net neutrality wars devolve into a battle over price controls — exactly as I predicted they would 7 years ago this month — then we could be headed for a day when federal policymakers derail the advances in broadband we’ve seen in recent years by substituting mandates for markets.

Throughout the second half of his book, Yoo explains why that would be a disaster for consumers and high-tech innovation. To most of us, the arguments Yoo advances here are perfectly logical, but to many Ivory Tower intellectuals who dominate Net policy debates today, it will all be considered apostasy of the very highest order. Those that elevate Net neutrality and so-called “public interest” regulation to quasi-religious concepts will likely be constructing Christopher Yoo voodoo dolls and attempting to sew his mouth shut. Yet, the policy standard Yoo is advancing here is perfectly logical. In essence, he’s trying to counter the gradual growth of a Precautionary Principle mindset for Internet policy. Here’s how he puts it:

Just as engineers must design structures that preserve room for experimentation, so must regulators. In particular, regulators should avoid promulgating policies that foreclose certain technical approaches or require industry actors to obtain advance approval before they can experiment with new technological solutions. The benefits of most practices will remain ambiguous before they are deployed, and placing the burden on industry actors to prove consumer benefit before implementation would chill experimentation and effectively prevent ambiguous practices from ever being deployed. This in turn would prevent engineers from obtaining the real-world experience they need to evaluate different technological solutions and eliminate the breathing room on which technological progress depends. In the face of uncertainty, policymakers should not attempt to predict which particular network solution will ultimately prevail; rather, they ought to focus on creating regulatory structures that give industry participants the freedom to pursue a wide range of business strategies and allow consumers to decide which one (or ones, if consumer demand is sufficiently diverse to support multiple business models targeted at different market niches) ultimately proves to be the best.” (p. 8)

In other words, public policy must not restrict experimentation based on conjectural fears and boogeyman scenarios. Public policy should generally seek to avoid ex ante forms of preemptive, prophylactic Internet regulation and instead rely on an ex post approach when and if things go wrong. As I have argued here many times before, as a general rule, our policymakers should embrace “techno-agnosticism” toward ongoing debates over standards, protocols, business models, pricing methods, and so on. Lawmakers should not be preemptively tilting the balance in one direction or the other or, worse yet, restricting experimentation that can help us find superior solutions. Here’s how Yoo articulates this same principle of techno-agnosticism:

network engineering is inherently an exercise in tradeoffs that does not lend itself to broad generalizations. There is no such thing as a perfect, inherently superior architecture. Instead, the optimal infrastructure for any particular network depends on the nature of the flows passing through the network as well as the costs of the technologies comprising the network. This perspective stands in stark contrast to the categorical tone that has dominated debates over Internet policy for the past five years. (p. 138)

Indeed it does. If you read through books by Zittrain, Lessig, Wu, van Schewick, Frischmann, and others, you will notice the consistent assertion that we already have the magic formula for the Internet and all networks, for that matter. It almost always comes down to what I have referred to as an ideology of “openness at any cost” or “neutrality uber alles.” In this religion, everything is subservient to openness and neutrality, no matter what the cost (and no matter how defined, even if that is much trickier than those academics let on). But for all the reasons Yoo lays out in his book, we should reject neutrality uber alles as the basis of public policy. “The shifts in the technological and economic environment surrounding the network should remind everyone involved in Internet policy of the importance of embracing change.” (p. 139).  Again, that counsels techno-agnosticism and light-touch, responsive regulation — not a preemptive Precautionary Principle for Internet decision-making. As Yoo states in his conclusion:

Perhaps the best means for creating such an environment is to create a regulatory-enforcement regime that evaluates any charges of improper behavior on a case-by-case basis after the fact… So long as the burden of proof is placed on the party challenging the practice, such a regime should provide sufficient breathing room for industry participants to experiment with new solutions for emerging problems while simultaneously safeguarding consumers against any anticompetitive practices. (p. 139).

And even under that regime, Yoo makes it clear throughout the book that there should be a very high bar established before regulation is pursued. This is particularly true because of the First Amendment values at stake when the government attempts to regulate speech platforms. In Chapter 9 of the book, Yoo walks the reader through all the relevant case law on this front and makes it clear how “the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the editorial discretion exercised by intermediaries serves important free speech values.” (p. 120). Yoo also makes the case that a certain degree of intermediation helps serve consumer needs by helping them more easily find the content and services they desire. Law should not seek to constrain that and, under current Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence, it probably cannot.

So, in conclusion, I strongly encourage everyone to pick up a copy of Christopher Yoo’s  Dynamic Internet. It strikes just the right balance for Net governance and public policy in the information age. It all comes down to flexibility and freedom.  If the Internet and all modern digital technologies are to thrive, we must reject the central planner’s mindset that dominated the analog era and forever bury all the static thinking it entailed.

Additional Reading:

• The Real Net Neutrality Debate: Pricing Flexibility Versus Pricing Regulation (Oct 2005)
• More on Net Neutrality, the Importance of Business Model Experimentation & Pricing Flexibility (May 2012)
• Smartphones & Usage-Based Pricing: Are Price Controls Coming? (July 2011)
• Netflix Falls Prey to Marginal Cost Fallacy & Pleads for a Broadband Free Ride (July 8, 2011)
• Why Congestion Pricing for the iPhone & Broadband Makes Sense (October 7, 2009)
• The (Un)Free Press Calls for Internet Price Controls: “The Broadband Internet Fairness Act” (June 17, 2009)
• Free Press Hypocrisy over Metering & Internet Price Controls (June 18, 2009)
• Mueller’s “Networks and States” = Classical Liberalism for the Information Age (Nov. 2010)
• Doctorow’s Definition of “Techno-Optimism” Is Full of Fear & False Choices (May 2011)
• review of Zittrain’s “Future of the Internet” (March 2008)
• Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of “Perfect Control” [review of Lessig’s “Code” at 10th anniversary] (May 2009)

I’ve been hearing more rumblings about “API neutrality” lately. This idea, which originated with Jonathan Zittrain’s book, The Future of the Internet–And How to Stop It, proposes to apply Net neutrality to the code/application layer of the Internet. A blog called “The API Rating Agency,” which appears to be written by Mehdi Medjaoui, posted an essay last week endorsing Zittrain’s proposal and adding some meat to the bones of it. (My thanks to CNet’s Declan McCullagh for bringing it to my attention).

Medjaoui is particularly worried about some of Twitter’s recent moves to crack down on 3rd party API uses. Twitter is trying to figure out how to monetize its platform and, in a digital environment where advertising seems to be the only business model that works, the company has decided to establish more restrictive guidelines for API use. In essence, Twitter believes it can no longer be a perfectly open platform if it hopes to find a way to make money. The company apparently believes that some restrictions will need to be placed on 3rd party uses of its API if the firm hopes to be able to attract and monetize enough eyeballs.

While no one is sure whether that strategy will work, Medjaoui doesn’t even want the experiment to go forward. Building on Zittrain, he proposes the following approach to API neutrality:

• Absolute data to 3rd party non-discrimination : all content, data, and views equally distributed on the third party ecosystem. Even a competitor could use an API in the same conditions than all others, with not restricted re-use of the data.
• Limited discrimination without tiering : If you don’t pay specific fees for quality of service, you cannot have a better quality of service, as rate limit, quotas, SLA than someone else in the API ecosystem.If you pay for a high level Quality of service, so you’ll benefit of this high level quality of service, but in the same condition than an other customer paying the same fee.
• First come first served : No enqueuing API calls from paying third party applications, as the free 3rd-party are in the rate limits.

Before I critique this, let’s go back and recall why Zittrain suggested we might need API neutrality for certain online services or digital platforms. Although Zittrain does not label it as such, API neutrality assumes the platform or device in question is a sort of public utility or common carrier. Zittrain is concerned that the absence of API neutrality could imperil “generativity,” technologies or networks that invite or allow tinkering and all sorts of creative secondary uses. Primary examples include general-purpose personal computers (PCs) and the traditional “best efforts” Internet. By contrast, Zittrain contemptuously refers to “tethered, sterile appliances,” or digital technologies or networks that discourage or disallow tinkering. Zittrain’s primary examples are proprietary devices like Apple’s iPhone or the TiVo, or online walled gardens like the old AOL and current cell phone networks. Such “take it or leave it” devices or platforms earn Zittrain’s wrath. He argues that we run the risk of seeing the glorious days of generative devices and the open Internet give way to those tethered appliances and closed networks. He fears most users will flock to tethered appliances in search of stability or security, and worries because those tethered appliances are less “open” and more “regulable,” thus allowing easier control by either large corporate intermediaries or government officials. In other words, the “future of the Internet” Zittrain is hoping to “stop” is a world dominated by tethered digital appliances and walled gardens, because they are too easily controlled by other actors. He argues:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Because he fears the rise of “walled gardens” and “mediated experiences,” Zittrain goes on to wonder, “Should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for appliancized systems?” He responds to his own question as follows:

The answer lies in that subset of appliancized systems that seeks to gain the benefits of third-party contributions while reserving the right to exclude it later. . . . Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms. (p. 183-4)

While many would agree that API neutrality represents a fine generic norm for online commerce and interactions, Zittrain implies it should be a legal standard to which online providers are held. He even alludes to the possibility of applying the common law principle of adverse possession more broadly in these contexts. He notes that adverse possession “dictates that people who openly occupy another’s private property without the owner’s explicit objection (or, for that matter, permission) can, after a lengthy period of time, come to legitimately acquire it.” (p. 183) He does not make it clear when that principle would be triggered as it pertains to digital platforms or social media APIs. But it would seem clear that his API neutrality rule would eventually regulate the major information providers and platforms of our day, including: Apple, Google, Twitter, Facebook, and many others.

As I argued in my paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” API neutrality regulation is a dangerous notion. There are many problems with the logic of Zittrain’s API neutrality proposal and with the application of adverse possession to social media platforms or digital applications. What follows below is my critique of the notion that appeared in that paper, and it also explains why Medjaoui’s new formulation and clarification of the principle is equally problematic.

First, most developers who offer open APIs are unlikely to close them later because they do not want to incur the wrath of “those who built on top of their interfaces,” to use Zittrain’s parlance. Social media services make themselves more attractive to users and advertisers by providing platforms with plentiful opportunities for diverse interactions and innovations. The “walled gardens” of the Internet’s first generation are largely things of the past. Thus, a powerful self-correcting mechanism is at work in this space. If social media operators were to lock down their platforms or applications in a highly restrictive fashion, both application developers and average users would likely revolt. Moreover, a move to foreclose or limit generative opportunities could spur more entry and innovation as other application (“app”) developers and users seek out more open, pro-generative alternatives.

Consider an example involving Apple and the iPhone. Shortly after the iPhone’s release, Apple reversed itself and opened its iPhone platform to third-party app developers. The result was an outpouring of innovation. Customers in more than 123 countries had downloaded more than eighteen billion apps from Apple’s App Store at a rate of more than 1 billion apps per month as of late 2011.

But what if Apple decides to suddenly shut its App Store and prohibit all third-party contributions, after initially allowing them? There is no obvious incentive for Apple to do so, and there are plenty of competitive reasons for Apple not to close off third-party development, especially as its application dominance is a key element of Apple’s success in the smartphone and tablet sectors. Under Zittrain’s proposed paradigm, regulators would treat the iPhone as the equivalent of a commoditized common carriage device and force the App Store to operate on regulated, public utility–like terms without editorial or technological (and perhaps interoperability) control by Apple itself. But if Apple were to open the door to developers only to slam it shut a short time later, the company would likely lose those developers and customers to alternative platforms. Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and others would be only too happy to take Apple’s business by offering a wealth of stores and devices that allow users greater freedom. Market choices, not regulatory edicts such as mandatory API neutrality, should determine the future of the Internet.

The same logic indicates the likely counterproductive effects of efforts to impose API neutrality on Twitter. Until recently, Twitter had a voluntary open access policy in that it allowed nearly unlimited third-party reuse and modification of its API. It is now partially abandoning that policy by taking greater control over the uses of its API. This policy reversal will, no doubt, lead to claims that the company is acting like one of Tim Wu’s proverbial “information empires” and that perhaps Zittrain’s API neutrality regime should be put in place as a remedy. Indeed, Zittrain has already referred to Twitter’s move as a “bait-and-switch” and recommended an API neutrality remedy. Zittrain’s actions could foreshadow more pressure from academics and policymakers that will first encourage Twitter to continue open access, but then potentially force the company to grant nondiscriminatory access to its platform on regulated terms. Nondiscriminatory access would represent a step toward the forced commoditization of the Twitter API and the involuntary surrender of the company’s property rights to some collective authority that will manage the platform as a common carrier or essential facility.

Yet again, innovation and competitive entry remain possible in this arena. There is nothing stopping other microblogging or short-messaging services from offering alternatives to Twitter. Some people would decry the potential lack of interoperability among competing services at first, but innovators would quickly find work-arounds. A decade ago, similar angst surrounded AOL’s growing power in the instant-messaging (IM) marketplace. Many feared AOL would monopolize the market and exclude competitors by denying interconnection. Markets evolved quickly, however. Today, anyone can download a free chat client like Digsby or Adium to manage IM services from AOL, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook, and just about any other company, all within a single interface, essentially making it irrelevant which chat service your friends use. These innovations occurred despite a mandate in the conditions of Time Warner’s acquisition of AOL that the post-merger firm provide for IM interoperability. The provision was quietly sunset as irrelevant a short three years later.

A similar market response could follow Twitter’s to exert excessive control over its APIs. In web 2.0 markets—that is, markets built on pure code—the fixed costs of investment are orders of magnitude less than they were with the massive physical networks of pipes and towers from the era of analog broadcasting and communications. Thus, major competition for Twitter is more than possible, and it is likely to come from sources and platforms we cannot currently imagine, just as few of us could have imagined something like Twitter developing.

Even if some social media platform owners did want to abandon previously open APIs and move to a sort of walled garden, there is no reason to classify such a move as anticompetitive foreclosure or leveraging of the platform. Marketplace experimentation in search of a sustainable business model should not be made illegal. Since most social media sites such as Twitter do not charge for the services they provide, some limited steps to lock down their platforms or APIs might help them earn a return on their investments by monetizing traffic on their own platforms. If a social media provider had to live under a strict version of Zittrain’s API neutrality principle, however, it might be extremely difficult to monetize traffic and increase businesses since the company would be forced to share its only valuable intellectual property.

In sum, if the government were to forcibly apply API neutrality or adverse possession principles through utility-like regulation, it would send a signal to social media entrepreneurs that their platforms are theirs in name only and could be coercively commoditized once they are popular enough. Such a move would constitute a serious disincentive to future innovation and investment. “API neutrality” would upend the way much of the modern digital economy operates and cripple many of America’s most innovative companies and sectors. In the long run, such changes could sacrifice America’s current role as a global information technology leader. For these reasons, API neutrality mandates should be rejected.

Additional Reading

• Twitter, the Monopolist? Is this Tim Wu’s “Threat Regime” In Action?
• A Vision of (Regulatory) Things to Come for Twitter?
• review of Zittrain’s “Future of the Internet”

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my new white paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.” [PDF] I first presented a draft of this paper last November at a Michigan State University conference on “The Governance of Social Media.” [Video of my panel here.]

In this paper, I note that to the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Internet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered “essential facilities” or “natural monopolies” and regulated as public utilities. The debate over “net neutrality” regulation has been animated by such concerns.

While that debate still rages, the rhetoric of public utilities and essential facilities is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about other layers of the Internet, such as the search layer. More recently, there have been rumblings within academic and public policy circles regarding whether social media platforms, especially social networking sites, might also possess public utility characteristics. Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of those sites’ structures and business practices.

Proponents of treating social media platforms as public utilities offer a variety of justifications for regulation. Amorphous “fairness” concerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational concerns are also frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation. Proponents of regulation also sometimes invoke “social utility” or “social commons” arguments in defense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear definition.

Social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities, however, and there are good reasons why policymakers should avoid a rush to regulate them as such. Treating these nascent digital services as regulated utilities would harm consumer welfare because public utility regulation has traditionally been the archenemy of innovation and competition. Furthermore, treating today’s leading social media providers as digital essential facilities threatens to convert “natural monopoly” or “essential facility” claims into self-fulfilling prophecies. Related proposals to mandate “API neutrality” or enforce a “Separations Principle” on integrated information platforms would be particularly problematic. Such regulation also threatens innovation and investment. Marketplace experimentation in search of sustainable business models should not be made illegal.

Remedies less onerous than regulation are available. Transparency and data-portability policies would solve many of the problems that concern critics, and numerous private empowerment solutions exist for those users concerned about their privacy on social media sites.

Finally, because social media are fundamentally tied up with the production and dissemination of speech and expression, First Amendment values are at stake, warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny of proposals for regulation. Social media providers should possess the editorial discretion to determine how their platforms are configured and what can appear on them.

This 63-page paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader. Eventually, a shorter version of this paper will appear as a chapter in a MIT Press book.

Social Networks as Public Utilities [Adam Thierer]

It remains unclear how interested the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is in bringing a formal antitrust action against Google, but we at least know that inquiries have been made. I suspect these inquires are far more serious than whatever the agency is fishing for with its new Twitter inquires. After all, as I note in my latest Forbes column, “Google isn’t even a teenager yet (having only been founded in September 1998), but the firm’s rise has been meteoric and it has made a long list of enemies in the process. Practically every major player in the Digital Economy… is gunning for Google these days, both in the commercial and political marketplace.” In this sense, it’s not surprising the FTC might take a keen interest in the company with so many competitors complaining.

Still, I just can’t find much merit in an antitrust case against Google since, as I noted in my column, “The firm’s success seems tied to high quality products that users prefer over rival services. Importantly, barriers to entry are low: there’s nothing stopping new entrants from innovating and offering competing online services to match Google.”

Regardless, instead of arguing about the merits of an antitrust action against Google, let’s consider the more interesting, and I think intractable, question of remedies. Here’s what I had to say about that in my Forbes essay:

[possible remedies] include a so-called Federal Search Commission that would monitor search results to achieve “fairness” or “search neutrality.” Some academics have also suggested a possible mandatory “right of reply” for companies or consumers if they don’t like what a search for their name reveals. This is the equivalent of a Fairness Doctrine for search results. Another idea, borrowed from Microsoft’s antitrust saga in Europe, is a “browser ballot” for specialized search results like maps, stock reports and weather. Just as Microsoft was required by European antitrust officials to offer a “ballot” of alternative browsers before consumers first got online, Google might be forced to show several alternative links for search queries if Google-owned sites are also shown in the results. Even if ballots could be implemented without reducing the usability of search engines—a tall order—it would be difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate all the choices available to consumers. And if government only chose a few, it would be picking winners and losers. Better to let markets decide. Making Google’s proprietary search algorithm more transparent also sounds great until you realize it would make it easier for spammers and scammers to game search results.  Search regulation might also lead to dangerous forms of speech control. Just as the Fairness Doctrine was abused by politicians in the Analog Era, search-tinkering will likely prove too tempting to pass up.  For paternalistic policymakers, search regulation could be an opening to do what they’ve always wanted: “clean up” the Net.

These are just some of the problems with the remedies that have been proposed. Please read some of the essays by Geoff Manne and Josh Wright listed down below for a more in-depth exploration of these issues. Of course, we’re still very early in this process and, if a case against Google moves forward, I suspect we’ll see a number of other possible remedies suggested.

Regardless, I can’t help but have a vague sense of unease about the mere thought of Uncle Sam as Search Czar. Again, from my Forbes essay:

These regulatory solutions would put government bureaucrats in control of the day-to-day management of one of the most dynamic digital technologies ever invented. Treating Google like an essential facility to which all must have equal access on regulated terms would mean subjecting the Internet, still largely free of government control, to public utility-style regulation. It’s hard to imagine that regulating search like local sewage service will benefit consumers in the long run. Government simply doesn’t have a very good track record of steering markets—especially dynamic, fast-evolving ones like this—in more innovative directions.

I think consumers will be better served by Google and its many competitors spending their time focused on creating innovative new products and services rather than making Washington bureaucrats happy.

Additional Reading from TLF Contributors:

• The FTC makes its Google investigation official, now what? – by Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright
• What’s really motivating the pursuit of Google? – by Geoffrey Manne
• Search Bias and Antitrust – by Josh Wright
• Sacrificing Consumer Welfare in the Search Bias Debate, Part II – by Josh Wright
• The Problem of Search Engines as Essential Facilities – by Geoffrey Manne
• Why Google probe should worry consumers – by Ryan Radia (in San Jose Mercury News)
• Wired on Google’s Coming Antitrust Nightmare – by Adam Thierer

Twitter could be in for a world of potential pain. Regulatory pain, that is. The company’s announcement on Friday that it would soon be cracking down on the uses of its API by third parties is raising eyebrows in cyberspace and, if recent regulatory history is any indicator, this high-tech innovator could soon face some heat from regulatory advocates and public policy makers. If this thing goes down as I describe it below, it will be one hell of a fight that once again features warring conceptions of “Internet freedom” butting heads over the question of whether Twitter should be forced to share its API with rivals via some sort of “open access” regulatory regime or “API neutrality,” in particular. I’ll explore that possibility in this essay. First, a bit of background.

Understanding Forced Access Regulation

In the field of communications law, the dominant public policy fight of the past 15 years has been the battle over “open access” and “neutrality” regulation. Generally speaking, open access regulations demand that a company share its property (networks, systems, devices, or code) with rivals on terms established by law. Neutrality regulation is a variant of open access regulation, which also requires that systems be used in ways specified by law, but usually without the physical sharing requirements. Both forms of regulation derive from traditional common carriage principles / regulatory regimes. Critics of such regulation, which would most definitely include me, decry the inefficiencies associated with such “forced access” regimes, as we prefer to label them. Forced access regulation also raises certain constitutional issues related to First and Fifth Amendment rights of speech and property.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 got this ball rolling with its mandated access provisions for local phone service. To make a very long and tortured history much shorter, this was a battle over how far law should go to force local telephone companies to share their phone lines with rivals at regulated rates. (Check this old piece of mine for a flavor of how well that turned out.) The advocates of open access regulation eventually turned their attention to cable systems and tried (but failed) to apply similar sharing / access rules there. Following those fights, which involved many nasty court skirmishes, the Net neutrality wars broke out. Net neutrality is a type of forced access regime for broadband platforms. Although Net neutrality regulation would not necessarily require carriers to share networks with rivals, it would at least require that platform providers play by special access and interconnection rules set by federal regulators.

Forced access provisions have been used in other contexts. We might think of the provisions we saw at work in the Microsoft antitrust case as a form of forced access regulation. Some may also recall the interconnection provisions that governed AOL’s instant messaging service following its merger with Time Warner (discussed more below). There are other examples, but I think you get the point.

New Frontiers for Forced Access Regulation?

All this history is well known to all readers of this blog and followers of communications policy. The reason I repeat it here is because this fight is now spreading to new sectors, platforms, and technologies.

For example, “search neutrality” is one of those new frontiers of the forced access fight. Some academics and regulatory advocates are pushing for rules that would govern how search results are shown or for special requirements on search providers to eliminate supposed “search bias” or to ensure search “fairness” of various sorts. Make sure to read James Grimmelmann’s terrific treatment of the concept from his chapter in TechFreedom’s book, The Next Digital Decade, and then also listen to this podcast featuring Danny Sullivan dissecting the issue.

Some critics also want to treat search engines (and Google in particular) as “essential facilities.” In another essay from The Next Digital Decade, Geoff Manne has done a good job pointing out why that’s such a misguided idea.

Similarly, some folks (such as danah boyd) are already calling for Facebook to be regulated as a public utility or essential facility. I responded in my essay, “Facebook Isn’t a “Utility” & You Certainly Shouldn’t Want it to Be Regulated As Such,” in which I pointed out that Facebook isn’t exactly a “life-essential” service that is gouging customers, who have plenty of other choices in social networking services.

Adverse Possession & API Neutrality for Twitter?

An equally interesting battle is now set to unfold for Twitter following Friday’s announced changes. To get a flavor for what might lie ahead for the company, we might begin by taking a second look at what Harvard University’s Jonathan Zittrain proposed in his 2008 book, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It. In that book, Zittrain suggested that “API neutrality” might be needed to ensure fair access to certain cyber-services or digital platforms to ensure “generativity” was not imperiled. On pg. 181 of the book, Zittrain argued that:

“If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.”

After engaging in some hand-wringing about “walled gardens” and “mediated experiences,” Zittrain went on to ask: “So when should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for appliancized systems?” He responds to his own question as follows:

“The answer lies in that subset of appliancized systems that seeks to gain the benefits of third-party contributions while reserving the right to exclude it later. … Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms.” (p. 184)

This might be a fine generic principle, but Zittrain implies that this should be a legal standard to which online providers are held. At one point, he even alludes to the possibility of applying the common law principle of adverse possession more broadly in these contexts. He notes that adverse possession “dictates that people who openly occupy another’s private property without the owner’s explicit objection (or, for that matter, permission) can, after a lengthy period of time, come to legitimately acquire it.” But he doesn’t make it clear when it would be triggered as it pertains to digital platforms or APIs.

As I noted in the first of my many reviews of his book, there are many problems with the logic of API neutrality or the application of adverse possession in these contexts. Here’s my critique of the “API neutrality” notion (again, this is from 2008):

First, most developers who offer open APIs aren’t likely to close them later precisely because they don’t want to incur the wrath of “those who built on top of their interface.” But, second, for the sake of argument, let’s say they did want to abandoned previously open APIs and move to some sort of walled garden. So what? Isn’t that called marketplace experimentation? Are we really going to make that illegal? Finally, if they were so foolish as to engage in such games, it might be the best thing that ever happened to the market and consumers since it could encourage more entry and innovation as people seek out more open, pro-generative alternatives. Consider this example: Now that Apple has opened to door to third-party iPhone development a bit with the SDK, does that mean that under Jonathan’s proposed paradigm we should treat the iPhone as the equivalent of commoditized common carriage device? That seems incredibly misguided to me. If Steve Jobs opens the development door just a little bit only to slam it shut a short time later, he will pay dearly for that mistake in the marketplace. For God’s sake, just spend a few minutes over on the Howard Forums or the PPC Geeks forum if you want to get a taste for the insane amount of tinkering going on out there in the mobile world right now on other systems. If Apple tries to roll back the clock, Microsoft and others will be all too happy to take their business by offering a wealth of devices that allow you to tinker to your heart’s content. We should let such experiments continue and let the future of the Internet be determined by market choices, not regulatory choices such as forced API neutrality.

I think the same critique would apply to efforts to impose API neutrality on Twitter. But before going into more detail, we need to first ask another question: Does Twitter possess “market power” such that their actions warrant antitrust or regulatory scrutiny at all?

But Isn’t Twitter a “Monopoly”?

Savvy readers will recall that influential Columbia Law School cyberlaw professor Tim Wu has already labeled Twitter a “monopoly,” although he has not yet bothered telling us what the relevant market is here. As I pointed out in an essay critiquing the way Prof. Wu flippantly assigns the label “monopoly” to just about any big tech provider, it’s very much unclear what to call the market Twitter serves. After all, the service is only a few years old and competes with many other forms of communication and information dissemination. For me, Twitter is a partial substitute for blogging, IMs, email, phone calls, and my RSS feed. Yet, like most others, I continue to use all those other technologies and those technologies continue to pressure Twitter to innovate.

Regardless, Prof. Wu is now in a position to put his ideas into action since he is currently serving a short tenure as special advisor to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  Might he act on his instincts, therefore, and advise the agency to take action against Twitter? It is unlikely that Prof Wu will be around the FTC long enough to help them bring any sort of formal action against Twitter, but he could help lay the groundwork for a creative interpretation of our nation’s antitrust laws such that Twitter somehow comes to be labeled a “monopoly” or what he refers to as an “information empire” in his new book The Master Switch. (See my last review of the book here.)

But I think he’d have a very hard time convincing the folks in the FTC’s Economics Bureau that Twitter is really worth worrying about or that it has anything approximating a “monopoly” in this emerging market, whatever that market is. But Wu has the ear of key people in government right now and could be lobbying for more expansive constructions of “information monopoly” since he made it very clear in his book that traditional antitrust analysis was not sufficient for information sectors. “[I]nformation industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,” Wu claimed, and even traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries,” he says. (p. 303)

The Principle of the Matter

So here’s my take on the issue. Twitter is an amazing innovator. It created the space it now plays in and that market is still so new and unique that we don’t even have a name for it yet. In America, we should – and usually do – celebrate such entrepreneurialism. But sometimes certain Ivory Tower elites, regulatory-minded advocates, paternalistic policymakers, or even disgruntled competitors, claim that such innovators “owe” the rest of us something because they got rich or powerful thanks to that innovation. “Forced access” or “neutrality” mandates becomes a convenient regulatory prescription to achieve that end even though the motivating principle behind such regulation is, essentially, “what’s yours is mine.”

Indeed, from my perspective, the entire notion of forced access to the Twitter API could be dismissed by noting that, technically speaking, Twitter’s API is its private property and they should be free to do as they wish with it. That’s why I’m particularly concerned with Zittrain’s notion that we might consider applying adverse possession principles to any digital platform with enough users; at root, it’s a call to limit or even abolish property rights for digital platforms once they gain popularity or have a large number of users. As noted below, that has extremely dangerous ramifications for digital innovation but, more profoundly in my opinion, it is an unjust and unconstitutional taking of an innovator’s property. Of course, I understand that property rights aren’t exactly in vogue in America anymore and that this isn’t really a satisfying answer from the consumer’s perspective, so let’s continue on and consider a few other reasons why forced access regulation of Twitter via API neutrality would be a mistake.

First, we should not forget that Twitter has yet to find a way to turn its service into a serious revenue-generator. The most obvious reason for that is that Twitter (a) doesn’t charge anything for the service it provides and (b) doesn’t lock down its platform / API such that they might be able to earn a return on their investment by monetizing eyeballs via advertising on their own platform. That’s why Twitter’s announcement on Friday won’t come to a shock to anyone with a whiff of business sense in their heads. At some point, Twitter probably had to do something like this if they wanted to find a way to monetize and grow their business.

I can hear some out there screaming out “but it’s not fair!” as if there was cosmic sense of cyber-justice that has been betrayed because Twitter had the audacity to lock-down their platform. Of course, it is certainly true that some third-party app providers may suffer because of Twitter’s move here.  I’m not going to lie to you; if Twitter’s move to exert greater control over its API somehow destroys the beauty that is the TweetDeck desktop interface, I am going to be screaming mad myself! I do not think there has ever been a slicker, more user-friendly interface for any web service in Internet history than what TweetDeck offers consumers. For my money – which means nothing since TweetDeck is free! – TweetDeck is digital perfection defined. And, incidentally, I’d be happy to pay for it if they asked.

But despite my gushing love for it, let’s be clear about something: TweetDeck has no inherent right to exist. Indeed, TweetDeck owes its very existence to the fact that Twitter offered its API to the world on a completely free, unlicensed, unrestricted basis. The same holds true for all those other third-party platforms that depend upon the Twitter API. What Twitter giveth, Twitter can taketh away.

Stated differently, Twitter has thus far had a voluntary open access policy in place for the first few years of its existence but now wants to partially abandon that policy. This policy reversal will, no doubt, lead to claims that the company is acting like one of Wu’s proverbial “information empires” and that perhaps Zittrain’s API neutrality regime should be put in place as a remedy.  Indeed, Zittrain has already referred to it as a “bait-and-switch” and cited back to the provisions of his book that I outlined above. I believe that foreshadows what’s to come: more pressure from the Ivory Tower and then, potentially, from public policy makers that will first encourage and then push to force Twitter to grant access to its platform on terms set by others.  It’s a potential first step toward the forced commoditization of the Twitter API and the involuntary surrender of its property rights to some collective authority who will manage it as a “collective good,” “common carrier,” or “essential facility.”

But Consider This… (on API Neutrality and Disincentives)

Of course, the people at Twitter certain realize how important all those third-party apps and platforms have been to growing the Twitter information empire. Thus, an overly-zealous move to crush third parities by denying them the API or any incidental use of the Twitter name / branding could backfire in two ways: it could lead to a major consumer backlash which in turn spurs the development of alternative platforms and entirely new types of competing services.

Vertical integration might be one way to partially alleviate those problems. Twitter could start cutting deals with existing third-party platforms that rely upon its API such that they were brought under the Twitter corporate umbrella, where more standardization could occur. But Twitter doesn’t have the money to buy them all out. Moreover, Twitter doesn’t want to see dozens of interfaces under its corporate umbrella. For them, this is about “a consistent user experience.” In other words, they’d obviously prefer a more standardized platform / interface that simply got rid of some of those third-party apps and platforms altogether.

As a result, in the short term, I think we’ll likely end up with a market dominated by Twitter’s proprietary platform(s) but with a couple of other leading existing third-party providers being tolerated by the company so as not to rock the boat too much. And that’s not a bad thing. Here’s the key principle to keep in mind: If we apply API neutrality or adverse possession principles forcibly, it sends a horrible signal to entrepreneurs that basically says their platforms are theirs in name only and will be forcibly commoditized once they are popular enough. That’s a horrible disincentive to future innovation and investment. However, it means we must sometimes tolerate short term spells of “market power” when we allow entrepreneurs to realize the benefits of their past innovations and investments if we hope to get more of them in the future.

Avoiding Static Snapshots

But wait, you say, isn’t this all quite horrible for the consumers and competition? Isn’t this just Wu’s “information empire” fear manifesting itself such that antitrust or API neutrality really is required?

Here’s where those warring conceptions of “Internet freedom” come into play. As I’ve noted here many times before in my work on the “conflict of visions” about Internet freedom today, it is during what some might regard as a market’s darkest hour when some of the most exciting disruptive technologies and innovations develop. People don’t sit still; they respond to incentives, including short spells of apparently excessive private power.

By contrast, the “static snapshot” crowd gets so worked up about short term spells of “market power” – which usually don’t represent serious market power at all – that they call for the reordering of markets to suit their tastes.  Sadly, they sometimes do this under the banner of “Internet freedom,” claiming that we can “free” consumers from the supposed tyranny of the marketplace. In reality, that vision wraps markets in chains and ultimately leaves consumers worse off by stifling innovation and inviting in ham-handed regulatory edits and bureaucracies to plan this fast-paced sector of our economy.

“Splitting the Root”

And innovation is possible. Is it really that unthinkable that a Twitter competitor might come along? In a sense, TweetDeck shows the way forward.  TweetDeck has already bucked Twitter’s 140-character limit by offering “Deck.ly,” an exclusive service that allows TweetDeck users to type Twitter messages longer than 140 characters, but which will only be visible via TweetDeck platforms. What if TweetDeck took the next bold step and offered an entirely separate API in direct competition to Twitter? It would be the tweeting equivalent of “splitting the root,” to borrow a concept from the domain name space.

Some would decry the potential lack of interoperability at first. But I bet some sharp folks out there would quickly find work-arounds. Has everyone forgotten the hand-wringing that took place over instant message interoperability just a decade ago (and the resulting restrictions placed on the company following its merger with Time Warner)? Big bad AOL was going to eat everyone’s lunch in the IM space, don’t you remember? But all the hand-wringing about AOL’s looming monopolization of instant messaging seems particularly silly now since anyone can download a free chat client like Digsby or Adium to manage IM services from AOL, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook and just about anyone else, all within a single interface — essentially making it irrelevant which chat service your friends use.

Again, people respond to incentives, and sometimes it takes bone-headed moves by market leaders to really get people off their butts and motivate them to code work-arounds and superior solutions. Is it so hard to imagine that a similar response might follow Twitter’s move this week? After all, we are not talking about replicating a massive physical network of pipes or towers here. We are talking about pure code, for God’s sake! Competition to Twitter is more than possible and it’s likely to come from sources and platforms we cannot currently imagine (just as few of us could have imagined something like Twitter developing just five years ago).

Conclusion

So, Twitter’s move is not an end but rather a new beginning. Personally, I think it could spawn another amazing round of innovation in this space. Again, we must not forget that we are dealing with a space that is still so new that we do not know what to call it. For that reason alone, we should be skeptical of calls for a preemptive regulatory strike. We need to have a little faith in the entrepreneurial spirit and the dynamic nature of markets built upon code, which have the uncanny ability to morph and upend themselves seemingly every few years. In the short term, Twitter will continue to possess a dominant position in whatever we call this market that it serves. But the short term is just that; it’s not the end of the story.

Now excuse me while I get back to Tweeting!

Could net neutrality rules be unconstitutional?  Maybe so, says Daniel Lyons of Boston College Law School.  In a piece released last week by the Free State Foundation (based on a more extensive research paper for Boston College last March) he argues that rules of the sort being considered by the FCC may constitute a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. 

The idea that a regulation could be considered a “taking” is certainly nothing new.   For decades, courts have recognized the concept of “regulatory takings,” rules so restrictive that they constitute a seizure of property under the Fifth Amendment.  But Lyons doesn’t just argue that “net neutrality” is a regulatory seizure in some abstract sense. He argues that neutrality rules would constitute a very real  seizure of tangible, albeit invisible, property.

Specifically, he says the rules would allow content providers to “physically invade [ISP networks] “with their electronic signals and to permanently occupy space on those networks, all without having to pay the network owner for access.”   This, he concludes is tantamount to a forced easement to content providers.   As he puts it:

“[T]he transmission of content over broadband networks is not some metaphysical act. It takes place in a real physical space: the fiber-optic and copper wires, and associated electronics, that comprise the broadband network… While the electrons are invisible to the naked eye and travel very quickly within a sheathed wire, the physical act of transmission is nothing more than a microscopic version of vehicles traveling along a highway—or pedestrians traversing an easement. In other words, the mandatory transmissions do physically occupy the service providers’ property.”

The argument has generated quite a bit of debate, including a harsh rebuttal by Mike Masick over at Techdirt.   Calling it “ridiculously tortured,” he dismissed Lyon’s argument, relegating it to his “oh please,” department.

There is no physical invasion, Masick maintains.  Instead, he argues, ISPs voluntarily connect to the Internet, which allows their customers to request content which travels through the ISPs network.  “That’s how the open internet works. If the ISPs don’t like it, they shouldn’t have offered an internet service” he concludes.

But this reasoning is just a little bit circular.   Who decided that’s how the open Internet works?  Masick seems to assume that open Internet rules as a given, when that is in fact the issue.   And the fact that content is requested by users, rather than arriving from content providers unbidden, doesn’t necessarily change the situation.   Government regulations granting subscribers the right to decide what content travels over an ISP’s network is conceptually little different,  in Fifth Amendment terms, than giving access rights to content providers directly.

At any rate, none of these technical details seem to matter, since Masick also makes a sweeping – and rather startling – claim that ISP networks are not privately owned anyway.

“The key problem is defining the internet as a private broadband network,” he says, “when in nearly every case, the broadband infrastructure involved includes tremendous use of government granted rights of ways and other government subsidies.  If the telcos actually had built their network entirely on their own and negotiated privately with land owners for rights of way, they might have a point on this one. But they didn’t and they don’t’.

Putting aside the fact that not all ISPs received subsidies (or are “telcos”), the logical consequences of this line of reasoning are staggering.  If you got a subsidy or some other government benefits, the government now owns your network.  This will certainly come as a surprise to ISPs, and ISP shareholders, who thought they actually owned their networks.    But why stop there?  What of the millions of American’s with mortgages financed by Fannie Mae?   Or cars that they drive on government-owned roads? 

This is exactly the sort of thing the Fifth Amendment was intended to prevent.  Property is not something to be shifted, transferred or parsed based on the whim of policymakers (or bloggers).   You can’t just assume away property rights, just because they conflict with your notions of how things should be – or should have been – done.

In the end, I don’t know whether Lyon’s arguments will stand up to judicial scrutiny.   Courts have been reluctant to find regulatory takings without a clear taking of tangible property being involved.   And,  whatever the merits of the argument,  its hard to see a judge wading into electrical engineering arguments about the path of electrons.   But the argument is a serious one that should not be dismissed out of hand.

Leo Laporte claimed today on Twitter that Facebook had censored Texas radio station, KNOI Real Talk 99.7 by banning them from Facebook “for talking about privacy issues and linking to my show and Diaspora [a Facebook competitor]. Since Leo has a twitter audience of 193,884 follower s and an even larger number of listeners to his This Week In Tech (TWIT) podcast, this charge of censorship (allegedly involving another station, KRBR, too) will doubtless attract great deal of attention, and helped to lay the groundwork for imposing “neutrality” regulations on social networking sites—namely, Facebook.

Problem is: it’s just another false alarm in a long series of unfounded and/or grossly exaggerated claims. Facebook spokesman Andrew Noyes responded:

The pages for KNOI and KRBR were disabled because one of our automated systems for detecting abuse identified improper actions on the account of the individual who also serves as the sole administrator of the Pages. The automated system is designed to keep spammers and potential harassers from abusing Facebook and is triggered when a user sends too many messages or seeks to friend too many people who ignore their requests. In this case, the user sent a large number of friend requests that were rejected. As a result, his account was disabled, and in consequence, the Pages for which he is the sole administrator were also disabled. The suggestion that our automated system has been programmed to censor those who criticize us is absurd.

Absurd, yes, but when the dust has settled, how many people will remember this technical explanation, when the compelling headline is “Facebook Censors Critics!”? There is a strong parallel here to arguments for net neutrality regulations, which always boil down to claims that Internet service providers will abuse their “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” power to censor speech they don’t like or squelch competitive threats. Here are just a few of the silly anecdotes that are constantly bandied about in these debates as a sort of “string citation” of the need for regulatory intervention:

• August 2007: AT&T was attacked for “censoring” a webcast of a Pearl Jam concert by bleeping out words critical of our former Dear Leader, George W. Bush. AT&T quickly apologized for the incident, explaining that an over-anxious contractor hired to bleep out indecent content had simply gone overboard.
• October 2007: A low-level Verizon employee initially declined to issue a short messaging (SMS) code to NARAL—allegedly because of anti-abortion bias.  But the company quickly realized what happened, under heavy public criticism, reversed this decision within barely 24 hours of it coming to public attention, as Tim Lee and Adam Thierer noted.
• The Christian Coalition still supports Net Neutrality regulation, apparently because they have been conned into thinking that Comcast deliberately singled out the Bible when it throttled BitTorrent traffic back in 2007. (The AP reporter who wrote the original story very cleverly chose to transmit a small text file of the Bible by bit torrent, knowing that it would be the throttle just like all other bit torrent packets, but making for a better headline.)
• Most recently Free Press and Public Knowledge blatantly fabricated another phoney censorship “incident” in which Sprint supposedly blocked Catholic Charities from getting an SMS code for Haiti fundraising efforts.

These tempests-in-teapots seem rather silly in retrospect, but that doesn’t stop advocates sweeping, prophylactic “neutrality” regulations from citing them incessantly as “evidence” (the plural of “anecdote,” as everyone knows!) of the need for government to intervene swiftly.

Such stories are sure to arise with increasing frequency regarding social networking sites and search engines—especially when the underlying process that causes someone’s speech to be removed is technically complicated and difficult for bloggers and journalists to understand or explain succinctly to a lay audience. I squelched just such a story back in 2008, when some conservative critics of net neutrality regulations unfairly leapt to the conclusion that Google was censoring my think tank, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, because of our skeptical views on net neutrality. In fact, Google’s anti-malware service had flagged our site as potentially dangerous because our SQL database had been hacked, potentially exposing visitors to our site to malicious code—and our webmaster simply didn’t deal with the problem.

SNSes like Facebook and search engines like Google necessarily rely on automated processes to police content and protect users from real threats. Inevitably, these processes will make mistakes, or will sometimes punish people for good reason who leap to the conclusion that they are being censored for their views. As Adam Thierer and I wrote last October in our Forbes.com editorial, “Net Neutrality, Slippery Slopes & High-Tech Mutually Assured Destruction,” warning that the rationale for net neutrality would inevitably extent to online services and applications—to the great detriment of online innovation and the consumers it benefits:

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

So I’m quite serious when I call for the creation of something like an “Internet Corporate Censorship Squad” of objective experts to “separate the wheat from the chaff” when it comes to these claims (although, to be precise, “censorship” is something only governments can do). Until that happens, we’ll be left with dealing with blogosphere-frenzy over “censorship” after another—at least, until the government decides to fix the non-existent “problem” by imposing ex ante, prophylactic regulation.

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

We learned from The Wall Street Journal yesterday that “Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski gets a little peeved when people suggests that he wants to regulate the Internet.” He told a group of Journal reporters and editors today that: “I don’t see any circumstances where we’d take steps to regulate the Internet itself,” and “I’ve been clear repeatedly that we’re not going to regulate the Internet.”

We’re thankful to hear Chairman Julius Genachowski to make that promise. We’ll certainly hold him to it. But you will pardon us if we remain skeptical (and, in advance, if you hear a constant stream of “I told you so” from us in the months and years to come). If the Chairman is “peeved” at the suggestion that the FCC might be angling to extend its reach to include the Internet and new media platforms and content, perhaps he should start taking a closer look at what his own agency is doing—and think about the precedents he’s setting for future Chairmen who might not share his professed commitment not to regulate the ‘net. Allow us to cite just a few examples:

Net Neutrality Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

We’re certainly aware of the argument that the FCC’s proposed net neutrality regime is not tantamount to Internet regulation—but we just don’t buy it. Not for one minute.

First, Chairman Genachowski seems to believe that “the Internet” is entirely distinct from the physical infrastructure that brings “cyberspace” to our homes, offices and mobile devices. The WSJ notes, “when pressed, [Genachowski] admitted he was referring to regulating Internet content rather than regulating Internet lines.” OK, so let’s just make sure we have this straight: The FCC is going to enshrine in law the principle that “gatekeepers” that control the “bottleneck” of broadband service can only be checked by having the government enforce “neutrality” principles in the same basic model of “common carrier” regulation that once applied to canals, railroads, the telegraph and telephone. But when it comes to accusations of “gatekeeper” power at the content/services/applications “layers” of the Internet, the FCC is just going to step back and let markets sort things out? Sorry, we’re just not buying it.

Chairman Genachowski may sincerely believe that a clear, bright line can be drawn between the “infrastructure layer” (which he’s certainly going to regulate) and what he likes to think of as “the Internet” (which he promises not to regulate). But as we warned last October, the day after the FCC launched this NPRM:

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract… The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet….  whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

We explained how the intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu (father of “Net Neutrality”), Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain (father of “API/device Neutrality”), and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale (father of “Search Neutrality”). Joining this intellectual vanguard of Internet regulation is George Washington law school professor Dawn Nunziato, whose new book, Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age, is a veritable manifesto for expansive neutrality regulation (especially of Google)—and how the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law…”) should be twisted not just to allow such regulation of speech platforms, but to require it! Even Wu, whose work blazed a trail for these others, is pretty clear about the breadth of his original vision for “neutrality” regulation, as his popular Net Neutrality FAQ makes clear:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain, Pasquale, and Nunziato don’t pull any punches either: They don’t shy away from flirting with nebulous neutrality definitions and wide-ranging government powers to regulate. So we don’t have to imagine what the “slippery slope” might look like: There are plenty of very smart and highly influential legal academics out there hard at work sketching out precisely where the path Chairman Genachowski has started us down will ultimately lead.

It’s no less clear why we’ll wind up marching down that path, no matter what the current FCC leadership intends.

1. The current net neutrality rulemaking sets a profoundly dangerous legal precedent of essentially unlimited claims of “ancillary jurisdiction”: As our friends at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (who have a soft spot for net neutrality in theory) put it, “If ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ is enough for net neutrality regulations (something we might like) today, it could just as easily be invoked tomorrow for any other Internet regulation that the FCC dreams up (including things we won’t like).” Our PFF colleague Barbara Esbin carefully dissected this issue for the Commission in her recent filing in this proceeding.
2. As explained above, the general regulatory principle of controlling “gatekeepers” doesn’t end with infrastructure.
3. As EFF notes, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.”
4. Now that FCC has opened the door to micro-managing online business practices in the name of “neutrality,” the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are already turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real “Big Brother,” and government, our savior.

This strategy of political escalation will thus quickly steamroll over whatever promises made today to narrowly cabin the principle of neutrality regulation—and end in “Mutually Assured Destruction.” That’s why we referred to the day the FCC started down this path back in September as “The Day Internet Freedom Died.”

If that title sounds melodramatic, take a step back and consider that, back in 1996, Congress decided to enshrine in law the principle that the Internet is different from traditional media: Apart from an ill-considered effort to censor online indecency and obscenity (which was quickly struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional) and the enforcement of intellectual property and criminal laws, Congress decided to take a purely laissez-faire approach to the Internet.  As Barbara reminded the Commission in her net neutrality filing, “Section 230(b)(2) flatly declares that it is the policy of the United States ― to preserve the vibrant competitive free market that presently exits for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”

So Chairman Genachowski’s decision to revert to the common carrier model of the railroad era marks a fundamental break with the approach Congress decided we would take to the Internet. The DC Circuit will likely soon rule that the FCC has vastly overstepped its authority in trying to set Internet policy without any clear grant of authority from Congress to do so.

Wireless Innovation & Investment Notice of Inquiry

In fact, the same kind of thinking is already being extended by this FCC in a number of other arenas using a flurry of innocuous-seeming “Notices of Inquiry.” While these notices purport only to ask questions, they either:

1. Foreshadow where the Commission intends to go in proposing new regulations based on its nearly limitless conception of its own regulatory authority;
2. Are intended to pressure Congress to give the agency more statutory authority; or
3. Are intended to intimidate industry into “playing ball” so the FCC won’t actually have to stick its neck out by trying to write rules to regulate Internet activities that are clearly beyond its existing authority and might well be unconstitutional even if Congress ever did expand that authority.

Exhibit A is the language in the Commission’s August 2009 Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry, (paragraph 60, pg. 21) that suggests the FCC is angling to become the Federal Cloud Commission:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

Good morning, Google!  Hello, Facebook! Is anyone out there in the cloud listening to the rumbling thunder of federal regulation? What began as academic theory in a law school ivory tower is coming soon to a regulatory agency near you! But wait… there’s more!

National Broadband Plan Public Notice #21 (Cloud Computing)

Last November, as part of the Commission’s ongoing effort to develop a National Broadband Plan, the FCC released a request for information “on data portability and its relationship to broadband.”  (NBP Public Notice #21) “The Commission seeks tailored comment on broadband and portability of data and their relation to cloud computing, transparency, identity, and privacy,” the notice says.  Here was the second item on the list of things the Commission said it was investigating (p. 2):

When considering the portability of data, we also consider the processes through which data are moved. In this context, we seek comment on how to identify and understand cloud computing as a model for technology provisioning…. What types of cloud computing exist (e.g., public, hybrid, and internal) and what are the legal and regulatory implications of their use? … To what extent are consumers protected by industry self-regulation (e.g., the Cloud Computing Manifesto), and to what extent might additional protections be needed? … What specific privacy concerns are there with user data and cloud computing? What precautions should government agencies take to prevent disclosure of personal information when providing data? Is the use of cloud computing a net positive to the environment? Are there specific studies that quantify the environmental impact of cloud computing?

We suppose some might claim there’s nothing wrong with the FCC looking into these issues, and that the agency’s interest in cloud computing is entirely benign. (Never mind the fact that the Federal Trade Commission already enforces the privacy policies of cloud computing providers and is looking hard at online privacy.)  Seeing all these open-ended questions about something so obviously beyond the scope of the FCC’s authority just makes the potential for—and perhaps even inevitability of—regulatory creep hard to miss.  Eventually, when a regulatory agency asks enough questions, especially the sort of questions highlighted above… well, to paraphrase Master Yoda:

Open-ended inquiries about new regulations are the path to the Dark side. Inquiries lead to agency oversight. Agency oversight leads to regulation. Regulation leads to suffering for innovators and consumers alike.

Again, we’re not just inventing bogeymen here. It’s quite clear that regulatory advocates want to take neutrality regulation into “the Cloud.” As Jason Lanier, author of the popular book You Are Not a Gadget summarizes one of his key themes:

While there is a lot of talk about networks and emergence from the top American technologists, in truth, most of them are hoping to thrive by controlling the network that everyone else is forced to pass through. Everyone wants to be a “Lord of a Computing Cloud.”

In Lanier’s dystopia of techno-feudalism, the Lords oppressing the poor digital “peasants” certainly aren’t just those running broadband service providers. It’s the Google, Facebooks, and Twitters of the world. It’s similar to the “sharecropper” concern raised by Nick Carr in his book The Big Switch. Complaints like those will only grow in the years to come, and few will buy—or even pause to remember—the distinction Chairman Genachowski seems to stand on now between infrastructure and “the Internet.”

National Broadband Plan Public Notice #29 (Privacy)

The “Recovery Act” passed in January 2009 tasked the FCC with formulating “a detailed strategy for achieving affordability of such service and maximum utilization of broadband infrastructure and service by the public.” The FCC seized this as an opportunity to solicit suggestions as to how regulate the use and collection of data by the private sector on the grounds that concerns about privacy might somehow be slowing broadband adoption.

Chairman Genachowski’s flurry of open-ended inquiries about new regulation are clearly intended to give a bully pulpit to regulatory advocates to demand that the FCC issue the very sort of Internet regulations the Chairman purports to abhor (or that Congress give the agency authority to do so). But most of these notices at least appear to be objective requests for comments written independently of the groups the Commission seems so eager to hear beg for Internet regulation. But in this case, the Commission dispensed with that tedious formality and just outsourced the writing of the inquiry itself to one of the outside groups clamoring the loudest for data regulation in the name of “privacy”: our friends at the Center for Democracy & Technology, with whom PFF has worked closely on many free speech issues in the past.

CDT is on to something when they write that “Consumers will not embrace broadband if they have a sense that everything they do online will be watched by government officials.” We’ll join with them in the fight to protect consumers’ privacy from the Real Big Brother—government!—but once again, as with net neutrality, advocates of regulation see government as the protector of our digital liberties (if only we can forever make sure noble civil-libertarians are in charge of the regulatory apparatus of the state!). So CDT has it exactly backwards when they say: “Consumer privacy concerns encompass not only what companies do with their data, but also the extent to which the government accesses it.” And instead of just suggesting that the FCC’s National Broadband Plan include a recommendation that Congress clean up the antiquated laws intended to limit government surveillance, CDT pushes for sweeping regulations that would affect the ability of most online services and sites to collect and use the data they need to improve their services, innovate, and maybe even try to make some money on advertising to support all the free content and services they give away.

Thus, instead of focusing on the clear harm from government, the FCC’s outsourced inquiry goes after online operators as “privacy proxies” for concerns about government action. At least Congress actually asked for the FCC’s recommendations in this case, unlike all the other inquiries the agency has launched sua sponte. But as Berin noted in his comments on this inquiry, the Recovery Act allowed the FCC to “recommend only those policies that it concludes will, on net, help achieve “affordability” and ‘maximum utilization’ of broadband.” That means the Commission would actually have to consider the many trade-offs inherent in the private sector use of data before recommending regulation: If the Internet ecosystem is impoverished by government intervention, however well-intentioned it may be, users will have that much less reason to adopt and “utilize broadband.” So the FCC would have a lot of cost-benefit analysis to do before it could actually make the kinds of regulatory recommendations CDT wants. And we suspect that, on the whole, that analysis wouldn’t turn out the way CDT thinks it would.

Child Safe Viewing Act Notice of Inquiry

In a somewhat similar vein, Congress last year asked the agency to examine how well parental control technologies work to allow parents to filter objectionable content online. So while the FCC may have had, for once, the authority to ask broad questions, it’s startling just how broad those questions were. The Commission obviously has no authority over video games or virtual worlds, online video distribution networks or video hosting sites, mobile web content, MP3 players or iPods, P2P networks, VCRs or DVD players, PVRs or TiVo, Internet filters, safe search tools, laptops, and so on. And yet, all these things (and much more) were mentioned in the Commission’s Child Safe Viewing Act Notice of Inquiry.

The proceeding raises the prospect of what Adam has called “convergence era content regulation” since it opens the doors to FCC meddling on a number of new fronts in the name of “protecting children.” Although the Commission’s final report to Congress stopped short of calling for an substantive expansion of the agency’s content regulatory regime, it teed up another proceeding, discussed next. (And if Congress hasn’t moved more quickly to grant the FCC new power in this area, it’s probably because they’re busy trying to figure out how to get around a line of First Amendment cases that consistently require government regulation to yield to “less restrictive” alternatives like parental control tools and education.)

Empowering Parents & Protecting Children Notice of Inquiry

This wide-ranging inquiry reads like the ultimate “fishing expedition” by a regulatory agency—fishing for new jurisdictional authority to regulate, that is!  The questions asked are too broad, far-flung and various to catalog here (we’ll have a big filing coming in the matter soon), but the Commission asks about extending to Internet media the model of the 1990 Children’s Television Act, which imposes “public interest” obligations on broadcasters and cable operators to offer “education” content while also strictly limiting how much advertising may be shown during children’s TV. The Commission also alludes, ominously, to the V-chip model for requiring universal ratings for television and hints that it would really like for “current laws [to] be updated to reflect this convergence and to keep pace with changes in technology” (¶ 41).

The Commission mentions only in passing at the very end of the Inquiry that it “has varying degrees of statutory authority with respect to different media. We ask commenters, in proposing any action, to discuss the source and extent of the Commission’s authority to take the action, or whether new legislation would be needed to authorize such action” (¶ 58). Translation: “Uh, yeah… so… we know we don’t have a statutory leg to stand on here, but we think it’d be really cool if we did, so let’s just all, you know, kinda brainstorm about what kind of regulation we could be imposing here and what kind of law we’d need get Congress to pass to make it all legal. Or if you have any creative ideas on how we could get away with just making up the jurisdiction thing on our own, that’d be even better!”

YouTube, you’re first on the list of targets for the kind of online video regulation the FCC is hinting at here—and none too subtly. But why stop there? The FCC’s laundry list of complaints aren’t limited just to video, but could apply to essentially all online media. But this is all in the name of “protecting the children,” and Chairman Genachowski doesn’t want to regulate the Internet, so we really don’t need to worry—right?

Future of Media Notice of Inquiry

Most recently, in late January, the Commission launched the ambitiously-named “Examination of the Future of Media and Information Needs of Communities in a Digital Age.” The FCC asks a number of good questions about how government could get out of the way of media struggling to reinvent themselves in the digital era by scrapping outdated regulations. The inquiry also tips its hat to the vital importance of advertising in supporting media. But it’s otherwise pretty bad news as a harbinger of a “Chill Wind” for the future of a free press in this country, as Ken Ferree, PFF’s former president and current board member noted.

In particular, the Commission comes right out with a “trial balloon” about imposing public interest obligations on online operators—the very thing it hinted at slightly more delicately in the “Empowering Parents” inquiry mentioned above:

Broadcasters have certain public interest obligations, including that they provide programming responsive to the needs and issues of their communities and comply with the Commission’s children’s programming requirements. Cable and satellite operators have their own responsibilities…  Should such obligations be applied to a broader range of media or technology companies, or be limited in scope?

OK, so we’re not going to “regulate” online content operators; we’re just going to impose “public interest” obligations on them to provide certain kinds of content preferred by politicians. Right… and if Google News or YouTube don’t do enough to “serve the public interest,” what then? Will the Federal Search Commission take away Google’s search license or cloud computing license?

Of course, we don’t mean to suggest that even the “Federal Cloud Commission” would ever be so unsubtle as to create a formal licensing system when they can probably achieve the same ends with far less obvious regulation. But how is this all going to work, exactly? Again, this is exactly the kind of hopelessly vague regulatory morass Congress had in mind when it declared that the federal government would avoid “fettering” the “vibrant competitive free market … for the Internet and other interactive computer services” with regulation.

The FCC goes on to revive the kinds of broad net neutrality ideas discussed above in asking:

How would policies related to “open Internet” or “universal broadband” or other FCC policies about communications infrastructure affect the likelihood that the Internet will meet the information needs of communities? Are there search engine practices that might positively or negatively affect web-based efforts to provide news or information?

In other words, “Tell us why and precisely how we should start regulating search engines in order to help ‘save  news.'” Google, here’s looking at you, kid! You want to keep your search license, dontcha? Well, just do what the nice men from Washington want and there won’t be any trouble.

Finally, the Commission opens the door to the noxious proposal for a “public option” for media, which Adam has lambasted. Here’s what the Commission says:

In general, what categories of journalism are most in jeopardy in the digital era? What categories are likely to flourish? While much is still to be determined as media companies test various business models and payment approaches in the coming years, based on what is known now, are there news and information needs that commercial market mechanisms alone are unlikely to serve adequately?

Don’t worry, it’s not as if government will exercise control over the media companies it funds if the media-socialist fantasies of the neo-Marxist Robert McChesney and his ironically-named “Free Press” group actually come true. Nope, government’s just here to help!

We’d all do well to remember that subsidies always come with strings attached—namely, regulation. That’s the Golden Rule: “He who has the gold, makes the rules!”

Conclusion

Chairman Genachowski, with all due respect, if you don’t like people suggesting that the FCC may be positioning itself to regulate the Internet and digital media platforms, then you might want to take a careful look at what your agency has been doing. You should think hard both about the precedents that will be set by “neutrality” regulation for online content and services, and also about the quasi-regulatory effect that your agency’s flurry of open-ended inquiries will have on the operators you claim not to want to regulate.

What will future Chairmen do with these precedents? What will emerge from every “Pandora’s Box” you’ve opened with each new sweeping inquiry? The answer, we fear, is an endless parade of new Internet regulations—and the death by a thousand cuts of real Internet freedom.

A funny thing happened to the FCC Friday on its way to regulating the Internet:  a federal appeals court panel questioned the agency’s authority to regulate the web.    There’s no final decision yet, but an adverse ruling could stop the agency’s Internet regulation plans in their tracks.    And for good reason.

In proposing new neutrality rules last October, the FCC one rather inconvenient obstacle:   there isn’t anything in the Communications Act, or any other statute, actually giving them power to regulate such things.   Internet service, by the FCC’s own reckoning, is not a telecommunications service, nor is it cable TV, or broadcasting, or anything else the law give the FCC authority to regulate.

The Commission, as it had in last year’s Comcast decision, dismissed such details, citing “ancillary jurisdiction.”  This court-defined doctrine, itself to be found nowhere in the text of the Communications Act, holds that the Commission can in matters that fall within its general statutory grant of jurisdiction and are “necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities.”

It is in itself a remarkable legal theory, allowing a regulatory agency to act in areas where there is no grant of authority, simply because it is related to an area in which authority has been granted.   In a very real sense, it is a “horseshoes and hand grenades” doctrine, in which close is good enough to count. Even within the framework of ancillary jurisdiction, however, the case for jurisdiction in this case is startlingly tenuous and dangerously broad.  (For an excellent analysis of the problems, see James Speta’s new study here.)

On Friday, the FCC got to air out its arguments in court, during oral arguments in the appeal of the Comcast ruling.  By all accounts, it didn’t go well.  “You have yet to identify a specific statute,” said Judge Raymond Randolph at one point.  As the FCC’s lawyers metaphorically searched their pockets for something to cite, Judge David Sentelle added:  “You can’t get an unbridled, roving commission to go about doing good.”

Of course, comments at oral arguments don’t always signal how a case will be decided.  Still, things aren’t looking good for the FCC.   And an adverse decision would not just negate the Comcast decision, but also derail Commission’s plans to finalize the new, more extensive regulations they formally proposed last October.  As former FCC general counsel Sam Feder put it:  “A lot of regulation — both present and future — could go down with this case.”

The next step would be for everyone to trundle on over to Capitol Hill to continue the foodfight over net neutrality.  That’s bad news for regulation proponents, who had been hoping for a quick win.  But its good news for the rule of law, and the idea that the power to regulate isn’t at all similar to horsehoes.  Or hand grenades.

Stay tuned.

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

The Post, hardly a bastion of radical cyber-libertarianism, has come out strongly against FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s plans to have the FCC issue “Net Neutrality” regulations. The editorial asks the critical threshold question we crazy cyber-libertarians always insist on:

Is this intervention necessary? Mr. Genachowski claims to have seen “breaks and cracks” in the Internet that threaten to change the “fundamental architecture of openness.” He and other proponents of federal involvement cite a handful of cases they say prove that, left to their own devices, ISPs… will choke the free flow of information and technology. One example alluded to by the chairman: Comcast’s blocking an application by BitTorrent that would allow peer-to-peer video sharing. Yet that conflict was ultimately resolved by the two companies — without FCC intervention — after Comcast’s alleged bad behavior was exposed by a blogger.

Thus, the FCC oppposes pre-emptive regulation that would “prohibit ISPs from ‘discriminating against’ different applications,” noting that  this would mean that “ISPs, which have poured billions of dollars into building infrastructure, would have little control — if any — over the kinds of information and technology flowing through their pipes.”

Three cheers for the Post for recognizing both the property rights of ISPs in their networks and the fact that, even with Genachowski’s “slight concession” to allow “managed services in limited circumstances… unneeded regulation could still interfere with [ISPs] ability to manage bandwidth-hogging applications that can hamper service, especially during peak times.” Instead, the Post called for simple transparency, supporting a requirement that “ISPs be candid with the agency and the public about network management practices. The last paragraph hits the ball out of the park:

Mr. Genachowski claims that the FCC “will do as much as we need to do, and no more, to ensure that the Internet remains an unfettered platform for competition, creativity and entrepreneurial activity.” He will advance this goal by insisting on transparency; he will jeopardize it — and stifle further investments by ISPs — with attempts to micromanage what has been a vibrant and well-functioning marketplace.

Amen! The Post is about as “mainstream” as it gets in American journalism, so their strong opposition really underscores that preemptive “net neutrality” regulation isn’t the popular cause some in Washington think it is. It is simply infrastructure socialism.

In a week in which neutrality regulation is making a lot of news, I hope that Robert Hahn and Hal Singer’s terrific new study, “Why the iPhone Won’t Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote its Successor” gets some attention. It provides a wonderful overview of how dynamically competitive the mobile marketplace has been over the past two decades and why critics are wrong to get worked up about the short-term “dominance” of Apple’s iPhone. Here’s the abstract of their paper:

Because of the overwhelming, positive response to the iPhone as compared to other smart phones, exclusive agreements between handset makers and wireless carriers have come under increasing scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. In this paper, we document the myriad revolutions that have occurred in the mobile handset market over the past twenty years. Although casual observers have often claimed that a particular innovation was here to stay, they commonly are proven wrong by unforeseen developments in this fast-changing marketplace. We argue that exclusive agreements can play an important role in helping to ensure that another must-have device will soon come along that will supplant the iPhone, and generate large benefits for consumers. These agreements, which encourage risk taking, increase choice, and frequently lower prices, should be applauded by the government. In contrast, government regulation that would require forced sharing of a successful break-through technology is likely to stifle innovation and hurt consumer welfare.

“New technologies often seemingly emerge from nowhere, but also frequently lose their luster quickly,” Hahn and Singer go on to argue. As evidence they cite the recent examples of Second Life and MySpace, which were hyped as potentially become dominant providers in their respective areas just a few years ago, but now are subjected to intense competition. “[T]he the mobile handset market is subject to these same disruptive forces,” they argue:

an iconic handset emerges, is quickly crowned the “winner,” and soon thereafter is replaced by another technology that was not even conceived of at the time the “winner” was launched. Many iPhone-inspired smartphones, including the Blackberry Storm and the HTC G1, could unseat the iPhone in the smartphone segment. We argue that heavy-handed regulation of such dynamic markets is likely to reduce welfare on net. The cost of erring through regulatory intervention—for example, by restricting voluntary private agreements that promote risk taking—can be significant. Delaying the benefits associated with innovation in mobile handsets could cost consumers dearly. In sum, exclusive contracts between handset makers and wireless carriers benefit consumers by encouraging innovation by both handset makers and wireless service providers that are vying for market share, and by enabling some handset makers to remain viable. These benefits take the form of greater variety of choices in handsets, greatly enhanced capabilities, and a more affordable range of device options. Banning exclusive contracts could have the unintended consequence of reducing innovation, reducing options, raising prices, and potentially establishing market dominance for an incumbent handset maker.

The End of Innovation?

In their excellent history of handset innovation over the past two decades, Hahn and Singer point out that there were many other “iconic” phones that some felt represented the end of the road in terms of innovation. I just love this quote they unearthed from a 1989 Fortune article about how the release of Motorola’s MicroTAC flip phone represented the apparent pinnacle of handset innovation: “Portable phones won’t get a lot smaller than this one. After all, they have to reach from your ear to your mouth.”

This highlights the myopia that sometimes accompanies technological forecasting and public policymaking.  We sometimes just can’t think “outside the box” and comprehend the ways in which technological devices or services might come along and leapfrog today’s market leaders. It gets back to the point I made in my recent book review of Gary Reback’s over-the-top ode to antitrust regulation, Free the Market:  Those who view markets through the lens of the a static competition, fixed-pie mentality always seem to live in fear of short term “market power” while those of us who believe in dynamic competition see markets in a constant state of flux and expect that sub-optimal market developments or configurations are exactly the spark that incentivizes new form of market entry, innovation, price competition, and so on.  And the real problem with that static competition mentality is that it often leads to knee-jerk regulatory responses.  Here’s how I put it in my recent debate with Larry Lessig:

What concerns me about the way Prof. Lessig approaches these issues in Code and in his subsequent work is that he is far too quick to declare the debate over by labeling short-term.. hiccups as sky-is-falling market failures. The end result of such myopic techno-pessimism is the inevitable call for governments to intervene and “do something” to correct supposed [market] failures.

In other words, have a little faith and some patience.  Apple’s iPhone is today’s hottest handset, but it’s hardly the end of innovation in this marketplace.  And we certainly don’t need handset regulation or “device neutrality” as a solution to this non-problem.  Read Hahn and Singer’s dynamite new paper for a better understanding of why that’s the case.

Adam Thierer and I have warned that neutrality regulation, once imposed on broadband providers, will extend to other Internet services wherever “gatekeepers” are alleged to control access to a platform used by others. In short, the slippery slope of creeping common carriage is real and we’re already heading down it, with cyber-collectivist “luminaries” like Jonathan Zittrain and Frank Pasquale demanding neutrality regulation for devices, application platforms like iTunes and Facebook, and search!

TLF Reader Jim Reardon made a particularly astute observation on my post asking whether Americans really want net neutrality regulation:

Regulation of any service, product or industry is preceded by definition. Once defined, it is subject to taxation. [Net Neutrality regulation] is a prelude to taxation of Internet products and services. It will likely start with telephony services and proceed accordingly to financial services, and continue from there. As such, the activity is essentially neutral insofar as technology innovation is concerned — so long as applicable taxes are paid the government will ensure that the service is not disfavored by the network operators.

Absolutely right! One of the greatest barriers to government regulation and taxation of the Internet today is the lack of clear definitions: The FCC rules will tell you precisely what “cable television” or “commercial radio” mean, but the concepts of “social networking,” “Internet video,” “blogging,” and even “search” are indeterminate and constantly evolving.

Ronald Reagan once quipped:

Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it moves, tax it.  If it keeps moving, regulate it.  And if it stops moving, subsidize it.

Fortunately, government’s ability to implement this view depends—to paraphrase President Clinton—”on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ ‘it’ is”: Allowing “it” to remain beautifully amorphous may be the best way to keep government at bay.

Those who advocate regulating Internet service providers as common carriers subject to “open access” mandates (a/k/a “Net Neutrality”) want us to believe that their cause is the “Civil Rights” issue of the digital age, with huge popular support and opposed only by self-interested cable companies and their henchmen. In fact, such regulations would actually harm consumers, increase broadband prices, retard the heretofore-explosive growth of bandwidth, and dramatically increase government control over the Internet. Of course, the degree of public interest in a cause doesn’t actually tell us anything about its justice and, fortunately, we live in a democratic oligarchic republic, not a pure democracy. But it’s worth asking whether Americans are really up in arms about the need for “Net Neutrality” regulations. Google Trends suggests not:

This kind of comparison should dispel once and for all the myth of a popular groundswell for net neutrality regulation—especially since online search volumes heavily over-represent the interests of the digerati, thus over-stating general interest in web-related topics.

In fact, “Net Neutrality” regulation is a niche cause trumpeted incessantly by the blogosphere with about the same level of broad popular interest online as “housing rights”—a topic about which most of us probably don’t often fall into conversation (unless we happen to live in Bakuninist Berkeley or the Bolivarian Caliphate of Cambridge, MA, ground-zero of American Chavismo). “Net neutrality” currently seems to attract about the same level of interest as the term “end the Fed,” the title of Rep. Ron Paul’s call for abolishing America’s central bank—something I’ve been ranting about for years but which, until recently, most people found about as bizarre and irrelevant as my (sincere) insistence that President Jefferson should have obtained a constitutional amendment rather than simply assuming the power to execute the Louisiana Purchase.

So just how much do Americans care about Net Neutrality? About 83% as much as they care about “kibble,” which usually refers to the ground meat used in dog food and other forms of animal feed—but about fifty times less than about “dog food.”

Finally, since we all write a lot about privacy, “online privacy” gets 1% as many searches as “privacy.”  “Internet privacy” and “privacy Internet” each get about 4% as many searches as “privacy,” for a total of about 9% as many searches as “privacy” or about three times as many searches as “net neutrality.”  Americans seem to be far more concerned about “identity theft,” which gets 30% as many searches as “privacy”—or 3.33 times more than the three online-privacy terms mentioned above. This is consistent with Tom Leonard and Paul Rubin’s findings that identity theft, not online data collection for advertising purposes, is the real harm facing consumers, and regulating online data collection and use in the name of “protecting privacy” isn’t likely to benefit consumers, while the costs to consumers from such regulations are likely to be significant, as Adam Thierer and I have noted here, here, here, here and here.

Over at TechDirt, Mike Masnick has an interesting post asking “Why Did Apple Approve Spotify?” which builds on an AdAge column asking a similar question: “Did Apple Sacrifice ITunes With Latest Apps?”  As the title of that AdAge piece suggests, some folks are wondering if Apple shot itself in the foot by approving Spotify, a music streaming app that some regard as a potential iTunes killer.  I don’t really have any comment on the business angle here, rather, I wanted to just comment on Mike’s suggestion that one possible explanation for Apple’s approval of the app is that:

As we noted when the app was approved, Apple appears to be somewhat gunshy, following the FCC inquiry into why it “blocked” Google Voice on the iPhone (and, yes, Apple still insists it didn’t actually block the app, but Google says otherwise). Given the scrutiny, Apple probably realized that it was in for some serious political trouble if it blocked an app like Spotify, which would have received a lot of press attention. Oddly, the AdAge article doesn’t mention this at all.

Indeed, it is odd that AdAge didn’t bother mentioning that fact.  But what I find doubly odd here is that nobody is even blinking an eye at the prospect of such political meddling with — or even possible FCC regulation of — Apple, iTunes, or music streaming market in general!  Seriously, have we gotten to the point now in our Bold New World of Neutrality Regulation that innovative high-tech companies must live in fear of constant regulatory intervention even when they completely lack any statutory authority to play these games?  Moreover, does anyone think that the a bunch of Beltway bureaucrats can micro-manage music and high-tech application markets and give us more options than we have today?

I know the prospect of such meddling makes some academics and regulatory activists groups happy, but I can’t see how this ends well for consumers or high-tech markets more generally.  Regardless, for those of you who laugh when we suggest that the slippery slope of regulation is real, consider this case to be Exhibit A.  Or perhaps it’s Exhibit B since the Google Voice spat with Apple was already moving the FCC in the direction of becoming a device regulator and applying “handset neutrality” principles that have no basis in law.  It’s your anything-goes government at work.

Forbes.com has just published an editorial that Berin Szoka and I penned about yesterday’s net neutrality announcement from the FCC.

The Day Internet Freedom Died

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

There was a time, not so long ago, when the term “Internet Freedom” actually meant what it implied: a cyberspace free from over-zealous legislators and bureaucrats. For a few brief, beautiful moments in the Internet’s history (from the mid-90s to the early 2000s), a majority of Netizens and cyber-policy pundits alike all rallied around the flag of “Hands Off the Net!” From censorship efforts, encryption controls, online taxes, privacy mandates and infrastructure regulations, there was a general consensus as to how much authority government should have over cyber-life and our cyber-liberties. Simply put, there was a “presumption of liberty” in all cyber-matters.

Those days are now gone; the presumption of online liberty is giving way to a presumption of regulation. A massive assault on real Internet freedom has been gathering steam for years and has finally come to a head. Ironically, victory for those who carry the banner of “Internet Freedom” would mean nothing less than the death of that freedom.

We refer to the gradual but certain movement to have the federal government impose “neutrality” regulation for all Internet actors and activities—and in particular, to yesterday’s announcement by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Julius Genachowski that new rules will be floated shortly. “But wait,” you say, “You’re mixing things up! All that’s being talked about right now is the application of ‘simple net neutrality,’ regulations for the infrastructure layer of the net.” You might even claim regulations are not really regulation but pro-freedom principles to keep the net “free and open.”

Such thinking is terribly short-sighted. Here is the reality: Because of the steps being taken in Washington right now, real Internet Freedom—for all Internet operators and consumers, and for economic and speech rights alike—is about to start dying a death by a thousand regulatory cuts. Policymakers and activists groups are ramping up the FCC’s regulatory machine for a massive assault on cyber-liberty. This assault rests on the supposed superiority of common carriage regulation and “public interest” mandates over not just free markets and property rights, but over general individual liberties and freedom of speech in particular. Stated differently, cyber-collectivism is back in vogue—and it’s coming very soon to a computer near you!

“Net Neutrality” proponents insist, however, that only regulation can save us from nefarious corporate schemers out to quash our rights and destroy all innovation. Over the last decade, a cabal of activist-minded cyber-law professors have successfully turned the world of Internet policy upside down by persuading an entire generation of law students, policymakers, and a number of large Internet companies that “Internet Freedom” means the very opposite of what it used to mean. Borrowing tactics that would have made Orwell proud, they have convinced many in the public and the policymaking community that the old Internet Freedom is slavery, in that we are all just tools of Corporate Big Brother. Thus, they offer us a new Internet Freedom: Neutrality über alles! Their freedom, as in Orwell’s Oceania, is not a freedom from the State, but a gleaming utopia that can only be created by the State.

We see the triumph of this thinking with Chairman Genachowski’s proclamation that, “This is not about government regulation of the Internet. It’s about fair rules of the road for companies that control access to the Internet. We will do as much as we need to do, and no more, to ensure that the Internet remains an unfettered platform for competition, creativity and entrepreneurial activity.”

Yet, no matter how vociferously the proponents of FCC-enforced “neutrality” insist that it is not regulation they seek, the reality is that the steps they counsel would put the FCC in the driver’s seat for a host of Internet economic and social issues. Internet companies and technologies will come to be regulated like crusty old “common carriers” and broadcast stations that must serve some amorphous “public interest.”

But as the FCC’s long history of meddling in media and communications markets makes clear, micro-management of dynamic markets is a recipe for economic stagnation, strangled innovation, and speech controls. And the path to regulation does not end with infrastructure providers. The specter of neutrality haunts not just today’s Internet service providers but also all high-tech innovators, like Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and their descendents. Although the FCC’s original mandate was mostly to deal with spectrum “interference”—something that could have been, and actually was being, dealt with using property rights—the agency quickly expanded its mission: Broadcast regulation metastasized into government control over speech, innovation, campaign advertising and a “fairness doctrine” for news coverage. Likewise, Net Neutrality mandates will give rise to neutrality mandates for other areas.

The slope is slippery and we’re already heading down it: The push for “Wireless Neutrality” is already well under way and the FCC is currently investigating Apple’s rejection of the Google Voice application for the iPhone. Thus, “Net Neutrality” leads to “Device Neutrality” and “Application Neutrality,” but the same rationale would apply equally to any circumstance in which access to a communications platform is supposedly limited to a few “gatekeepers.” Some academics have already proposed a “Federal Search Commission” to deal with accusations of “search bias.” At the end of the day, we’ll need a full-blown Federal Information Commission with a Search Bureau, a Cloud Computing Division and several other ministries to micro-manage the many flavors of neutrality regulation.

The path back toward real Internet freedom lies in restoring the presumption of liberty enshrined in the First Amendment, which is not a sword with which the government can ensure fairness, diversity or openness, but a shield against government meddling in media, communications and online markets.

If you happen to be in the New York city area next Tuesday, April 21, stop by Cardozo Law school for what promises to be a great event starting at 11:15:

The Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal is pleased to present a symposium on Internet openness, net neutrality, content diversity and competition.  What is the new definition of net neutrality and what are the developing mandates?  How do policymakers promote or harm the richness and diversity online content/media? Join the lively debate with speakers including Sascha Meinrath (New America Foundation); Berin Szoka (Progress & Freedom Foundation); John Morris (Center for Democracy & Technology); Matthew Lasar (Ars Technica); Fred Benenson (Creative Commons); Jonathan Askin (Brooklyn Law School).

During the 11:30-1 pm panel, I’ll be talking about “Unrecognized to Internet Openness: Regulatory Mandates & Increased Liability”—explaining how the work Adam Thierer & I have been doing about privacy regulation, online advertising, Section 230, age verification mandates, etc. are all fundamentally issues of “openness.”  As we noted in our recent response (PDF) to the FTC’s self-regulatory guidelines:

We stand at an important crossroads in the debate over the online marketplace and the future of a “free and open” Internet. Many of those who celebrate that goal focus on concepts like “net neutrality” at the distribution layer, but what really keeps the Internet so “free and open” is the economic engine of online advertising at the applications and content layers. If misguided government regulation chokes off the Internet’s growth or evolution, we would be killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.

Tim Lee’s long anticipated Cato Institute Policy Analysis has been released today.

The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality without Regulation is a must-read for people on both sides of the debate over network neutrality regulation.

What I like best about this paper is how Tim avoids joining one “team” or another. He evenly gives each side its due – each side is right about some things, after all – and calls out the specific instances where he thinks each is wrong.

Tim makes the case for treating the “end-to-end principle” as an important part of the Internet’s fundamental design. Tim disagrees with the people who argue for a network with “smarter” innards and believes that neutrality advocates seek the best engineering for the network. But they are wrong to believe that the network is fragile or susceptible to control. The Internet’s end-to-end architecture is durable, despite examples where it is not an absolute.

Tim has history lessons for those who believe that regulatory control of network management will have salutary effects. Time and time again, regulatory agencies have fallen into service of the industries they regulate.

“In 1970,” Tim tells us, “a report released by a Ralph Nader group described the [Interstate Commerce Commission] as ‘primarily a forum at which transportation interests divide up the national transportation market.'” Such is the likely fate of the Internet were management of it given to regulators at the FCC and their lobbyist friends at Verizon, AT&T, Comcast, and so on.

This paper has something for everyone, and will be a reference work as the network neutrality discussion continues. Highly recommended: The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality without Regulation.

My colleague Barbara Esbin, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Communications and Competition Policy at The Progress & Freedom Foundation, was asked to pen a short history of the net neutrality wars in the U.S. for a French publication, La Lettre de l’Autorité.  Her essay provides an excellent, concise overview of where we’ve come from and where we might be heading on this front.  I’ve pasted the entire essay down below, or you can download the PDF here.

Net Neutrality Regulation in the United States by Barbara Esbin

PFF Progress Snapshot Release 4.21 October 2008

The United States moved closer to “Net Neutrality” regulation this year when the Federal Communications Commission found that Comcast, a cable broadband Internet service provider, violated a set of Internet policy principles the FCC adopted in 2005 by limiting peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic. The ruling was the culmination of a ten-year effort that began as a call for wholesale “open access” to the cable platform for third-party Internet service providers. Requests for open access first emerged in 1998 when the FCC considered AT&T’s acquisition of cable operator TCI. The FCC rejected open access, but the issue quickly re-emerged in a subsequent proceeding to determine the appropriate regulatory classification of cable Internet service. Depending on how the FCC categorized cable Internet service, it would either be subject to telecommunications “common carrier” requirements, “cable service” requirements, or treated as a then-unregulated “information service.”

In 2002, the FCC classified cable Internet service as an “information service.” This meant that the telecommunications common carrier requirements — that service be provided upon request, without unreasonable discrimination as to rates, terms and conditions of service — would not apply to cable Internet services. The FCC’s decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in NCTA v. Brand X. Afterwards, advocates of open access re-directed their efforts away from advocating wholesale access for third-party ISPs, and towards rules aimed at consumer rights to a “neutral network” or “net neutrality.”

 In 2005 the FCC extended its deregulatory “information service” approach to wireline broadband Internet services provided, thus freeing telephone companies of traditional common carrier mandates for these services. The FCC’s decisions not to impose cable open access and to relieve telcos of common carrier obligations reflected a policy of fostering infrastructure deployment through market operations. Concurrently, the FCC released a “Policy Statement,” declaring four “entitlements” that Internet service consumers should enjoy: (1) access to lawful content of their choice; (2) ability to run chosen applications and services; (3) ability to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) competition among network, application and content providers. The Policy Statement expressly stated that the FCC was not adopting rules and that the principles are subject to reasonable network management. The FCC subsequently stated that it would entertain complaints concerning violations of the principles, and in early 2007, the FCC opened an “Inquiry” into broadband industry practices, seeking information about network management and asking whether it should impose rules.

In late 2007, an advocacy group filed a Complaint alleging that Comcast had violated the FCC’s Policy Statement by “secretly degrading” BitTorrent traffic, thus interfering with the Internet rights of its subscribers, and that its practices did not constitute reasonable network management. Several months later, Comcast and BitTorrent agreed to work together to resolve network congestion issues through the use of protocol-agnostic network management. Yet on Aug. 20, 2008, the FCC released an Order purporting to rule on the Complaint, finding that Comcast had violated the Internet policy principles, and rejecting its defense that its practices were reasonable. The FCC ruled that Comcast’s network management practices: discriminated among Internet applications and protocols rather than treating all equally; effectively blocked Internet traffic; posed significant risks of anti-competitive abuse; were inconsistent with “an open and accessible Internet;” and that Comcast’s failure to disclose its practices compounded the harms. Alternative means of managing network congestion approved by the FCC include metered usage and throttling the connection speeds of excessive users.

This action was said to be an “adjudication,” although traditional agency complaint rules were not followed. Comcast was given 30 days to disclose to the FCC “the precise contours” of its network management practices and describe what it will do instead to address network congestion. The effect of the Order is to establish a fifth “non-discrimination” Internet policy principle, to be implemented by the FCC through case-by-case adjudication of individual complaints rather than ex ante rules. Thus, 10 years later, and without explicit acknowledgment, the FCC has effectively abandoned its “hands off” approach and imposed a form of common carrier regulation on ISPs.

I have written elsewhere on legal and procedural flaws that may doom the Network Management Order. In summary: (1) the FCC has not been granted explicit authority to regulate the provision of broadband “information services;” (2) the “ancillary jurisdiction” on which the FCC relied was not reasonably related to its other statutorily mandated responsibilities; (3) having failed to adopt enforceable rules concerning broadband network management, the FCC could not lawfully subject Comcast to an “adjudication” concerning its practices; and (4) the Complaint filed against Comcast was defective in several respects and should have been dismissed.

The Network Management Order has been appealed by Comcast and several advocacy groups. Comcast challenges the basis on which the FCC found that it had violated federal policy in the absence of pre-existing legally enforceable rules. The advocacy groups appealed the FCC’s failure to order Comcast to immediately cease and desist interfering with P2P traffic. The appeals have been consolidated and will be heard by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a court that has shown little patience for the FCC’s unusual procedures and the FCC’s use of the doctrine of “ancillary jurisdiction” to expand its reach. Meanwhile, several network operators have announced bandwidth caps or plans to implement them. In addition, there are renewed calls both for the FCC to establish ex ante rules and for legislative action to grant the FCC express regulatory authority over broadband Internet service providers. In short, the legal and policy debate over net neutrality continues.

• Barbara Esbin is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Communications and Competition Policy at The Progress & Freedom Foundation.

Google’s Chief Internet Evangelist Vint Cerf, one of the fathers of the Net, has a very thoughtful post up on the Google Public Policy Blog today asking “What’s a Reasonable Approach for Managing Broadband Networks?” He runs through a variety of theoretical approaches to network load management. There’s much there to ponder, but I just wanted to comment briefly on the very last thing he says in the piece:

Over the past few months, I have been talking with engineers at Comcast about some of these network management issues. I’ve been pleased so far with the tone and substance of these conversations, which have helped me to better understand the underlying motivation and rationale for the network management decisions facing Comcast, and the unique characteristics of cable broadband architecture. And as we said a few weeks ago, their commitment to a protocol-agnostic approach to network management is a step in the right direction.

I found this of great interest because for the last few months I have been wondering: (a) why isn’t there more of that sort of inter- and intra-industry dialogue going on, and (b) what could be done to encourage more of it? With the exception of those folks at the extreme fringe of the Net neutrality movement, most rational people involved in this debate accept the fact that there will be legitimate network management issues that industry must deal with from time to time. So, how can we get people in industry — from all quarters of it — to sit down at a negotiating table and hammer things out voluntarily before calling in the regulators to impose ham-handed, inflexible solutions? What we are talking about here is the need for a technical dispute resolution process that doesn’t involve the FCC. If the anti-Net neutrality regulation crowd (and that includes me!) wants to be taken seriously when they talk about “self-regulatory” solutions, this sort of dispute resolution process becomes essential. And the pro-Net neutrality regulation crowd needs to understand that, even if they ultimately desire some role for the FCC here, regulatory resolutions to technical disputes are notoriously slow and ultimately will always be one step behind the technical dispute du jour.

Therefore, wouldn’t it be nice if, as Cerf suggests above, those parties with a technical dispute about network management had a way of talking things through immediately and before they went to the regulatory equivalent of mutually assured destruction?

All the relevant players in the broadband / Internet sector need to put their heads together and think about how to create a forum or process that can serve as such a technical dispute resolution mechanism. On a smaller scale, Comcast and Bit Torrent did this in a voluntary, bilateral fashion when they sat down to hammer out a collaborative agreement in March. As their press announcement noted:

Comcast Corporation and BitTorrent, Inc. announced today that they will undertake a collaborative effort with one another and with the broader Internet and ISP community to more effectively address issues associated with rich media content and network capacity management. While BitTorrent and Comcast are talking directly, they are also in discussions with other parties to help facilitate a broader dialogue and cooperation across industries.

But we know that countless more technical disputes will arise in the future at every layer of the Internet — not just with Comcast and BitTorrent. Thus, if we are really going to achieve “a broader dialogue and cooperation across industries” then what we really need is the equivalent of a multilateral trade negotiating process or forum to achieve sensible resolutions to complex technical difficulties surround Internet network management.

I am not prepared to say whether a new, formal organization is needed to accomplish this or if existing institutions and individuals (academic, trade associations, etc) might be able to work together to make this happen. For example, and I am just thinking out loud here so don’t quote me on this, what if we had the Internet Society working in conjunction with several major industry trade associations and some respected academic institutions to form some sort of collaborative, dialogue-oriented dispute resolution process? Sort of GATT or WTO for technical Internet dispute resolution.

Certainly that would be preferable to a politicized FCC taking over the show and making all these technical decisions, no? I’d be interested in hearing some input from others.