Corbin Barthold invited me on Tech Freedom’s “Tech Policy Podcast” to discuss the history of antitrust and competition policy over the past half century. We covered a huge range of cases and controversies, including: the DOJ’s mega cases against IBM & AT&T, Blockbuster and Hollywood Video’s derailed merger, the Sirius-XM deal, the hysteria over the AOL-Time Warner merger, the evolution of competition in mobile markets, and how we finally ended that dreaded old MySpace monopoly!

What does the future hold for Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix? Do antitrust regulators at the DOJ or FTC have enough to mount a case against these firms? Which case is most likely to have legs?

Corbin and I also talked about the of progress more generally and the troubling rise of more and more Luddite thinking on both the left and right. I encourage you to give it a listen:

At the same time FilmOn, an Aereo look-alike, is seeking a compulsory license to broadcast TV content, free market advocates in Congress and officials at the Copyright Office are trying to remove this compulsory license. A compulsory license to copyrighted content gives parties like FilmOn the use of copyrighted material at a regulated rate without the consent of the copyright holder. There may be sensible objections to repealing the TV compulsory license, but transaction costs–the ostensible inability to acquire the numerous permissions to retransmit TV content–should not be one of them.

Economists can devise situations where transaction costs are immense and compulsory licenses are needed for a well-functioning market. Today, as when the compulsory license was created, the conventional wisdom is that TV compulsory licenses are still needed to prevent market failure.

In the 1970s, cable companies were capturing broadcast channels and retransmitting it to their subscribers for free because, per the Supreme Court, cable was a passive transmitter and didn’t need copyright permission. In 1976, to correct this perceived unfairness, Congress amended the Copyright Act and said this cable retransmission did necessitate copyright authorization. To make it easier on cable systems (most of which were small, local operations), the law created a compulsory license to broadcast TV content like NBC, ABC, and CBS programming.

The compulsory license primarily does two things: it provides cable operators local TV content royalty-free and provides non-local (“distant”) content (imagine a DC cable company importing a WGN broadcast from Chicago) at regulated rates.

As the House report says:

The Committee recognizes…that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.

The Copyright Office, early on, opposed the compulsory license and has called for the repeal of the compulsory license to broadcast TV content since 1981. As the Register of Copyrights said at a 2000 congressional hearing,

A compulsory license is not only a derogation of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, but it also prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair value of copyrighted works through government-set price controls.

But when the issue of repeal comes up, many parties cite “significant transaction costs” as a problem with conventional, direct licensing. GAO echoed these objections in an April 2015 report,

we have previously found that obtaining the copyright holders’ permission for all this content would be challenging. Each television program may have multiple copyright holders, and rebroadcasting an entire day of content may require obtaining permission from hundreds of copyright holders. The transaction costs of doing so make this impractical for cable operators.

That sounds sensible but we have powerful contradictory evidence: for decades, hundreds of TV channels requiring the bundling of thousands of copyright licenses are distributed seamlessly and completely outside of the compulsory license regime.

So it’s a mystery to me why analysts still talk about the difficulty in acquiring copyright permission from hundreds or thousands of rights holders. TV distributors outside of the compulsory license scheme do these complex content acquisition deals routinely. Hundreds of non-broadcast channels–like ESPN, CNN, Bravo, HGTV, MTV, and Fox News–are distributed to tens of millions of households via private contractual agreements and without regulated compulsory licenses. TBS, uniquely, in the late 1990s went from a broadcast channel, subject to a compulsory license, to a cable channel distributed via direct licensing with no apparent ill effects. Analysts raising the transactions costs for keeping compulsory licenses, to my knowledge, never explain why the market failure they predict is absent for these hundreds of cable and satellite channels.

Further, while cable and satellite companies don’t need to negotiate broadcast TV copyrights because of the compulsory license, the FCC’s retransmission consent process, part of the 1992 Cable Act, requires these companies to negotiate payment to retransmit broadcast signals–signals that contain the underlying copyrighted content. This process, though bizarre and artificial, is essentially the same negotiation cable and satellite companies would need to enter into in a world without compulsory license.

Finally, online programming from distributors like Hulu, Netflix, and (potentially) Apple TV operate entirely outside of the retrans-compulsory copyright system and undermine the transaction costs objection. Netflix, for instance, doesn’t negotiate with every individual right holder like GAO and Congress imply is necessary in a non-compulsory license regime. Content aggregators and intermediaries, not regulation, streamline the rights acquisition process without the need for a compulsory license. The ostensibly burdensome transaction costs don’t stop Netflix from licensing over 10,000 titles worth around $9 billion.

Certainly, converting from compulsory licensing to direct licensing has issues. Changing legal regimes can be costly and there is a need to prevent anticompetitive withholding of content. Understandably, many cable and satellite distributors oppose repeal of compulsory licenses if the complex FCC system of retransmission consent and must carry are maintained. I tend to agree. Nevertheless, it’s time to strike the transaction cost argument from the policy discussion. The predicted market failure is overcome by market forces.

For more background on TV regulation, see Adam Thierer and Brent Skorup, Video Marketplace Regulation: A Primer on the History of Television Regulation and Current Legislative Proposals (Mercatus working paper).

Congress is considering reforming television laws and solicited comment from the public last month. On Friday, I submitted a letter encouraging the reform effort. I attached the paper Adam and I wrote last year about the current state of video regulations and the need for eliminating the complex rules for television providers.

As I say in the letter, excerpted below, pay TV (cable, satellite, and telco-provided) is quite competitive, as this chart of pay TV market share illustrates. In addition to pay TV there is broadcast, Netflix, Sling, and other providers. Consumers have many choices and the old industrial policy for mass media encourages rent-seeking and prevents markets from evolving.

Dear Chairman Upton and Chairman Walden:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s December 2014 questions on video regulation.

…The labyrinthine communications and copyright laws governing video distribution are now distorting the market and therefore should be made rational. Congress should avoid favoring some distributors at the expense of free competition. Instead, policy should encourage new entrants and consumer choice.

The focus of the committee’s white paper on how to “foster” various television distributors, while understandable, was nonetheless misguided. Such an inquiry will likely lead to harmful rules that favor some companies and programmers over others, based on political whims. Congress and the FCC should get out of “fostering” the video distribution markets completely. A light-touch regulatory approach will prevent the damaging effects of lobbying for privilege and will ensure the primacy of consumer choice.

Some of the white paper’s questions may actually lead policy astray. Question 4, for instance, asks how we should “balance consumer welfare and the rights of content creators” in video markets. Congress should not pursue this line of inquiry too far. Just consider an analogous question: how do we balance consumer welfare and the interests of content creators in literature and written content? The answer is plain: we don’t. It’s bizarre to even contemplate.

Congress does not currently regulate the distribution markets of literature and written news and entertainment. Congress simply gives content producers copyright protection, which is generally applicable. The content gets aggregated and distributed on various platforms through private ordering via contract. Congress does not, as in video, attempt to keep competitive parity between competing distributors of written material: the Internet, paperback publishers, magazine publishers, books on tape, newsstands, and the like. Likewise, Congress should forego any attempt at “balancing” in video content markets. Instead, eliminate top-down communications laws in favor of generally applicable copyright laws, antitrust laws, and consumer protection laws.

As our paper shows, the video distribution marketplace has changed drastically. From the 1950s to the 1990s, cable was essentially consumers’ only option for pay TV. Those days are long gone, and consumers now have several television distributors and substitutes to choose from. From close to 100 percent market share of the pay TV market in the early 1990s, cable now has about 50 percent of the market. Consumers can choose popular alternatives like satellite- and telco-provided television as well as smaller players like wireless carriers, online video distributors (such as Netflix and Sling), wireless Internet service providers (WISPs), and multichannel video and data distribution service (MVDDS or “wireless cable”). As many consumers find Internet over-the-top television adequate, and pay TV an unnecessary expense, “free” broadcast television is also finding new life as a distributor.

The New York Times reported this month that “[t]elevision executives said they could not remember a time when the competition for breakthrough concepts and creative talent was fiercer” (“Aiming to Break Out in a Crowded TV Landscape,” January 11, 2015). As media critics will attest, we are living in the golden age of television. Content is abundant and Congress should quietly exit the “fostering competition” game. Whether this competition in television markets came about because of FCC policy or in spite of it (likely both), the future of television looks bright, and the old classifications no longer apply. In fact, the old “silo” classifications stand in the way of new business models and consumer choice.

Therefore, Congress should (1) merge the FCC’s responsibilities with the Federal Trade Commission or (2) abolish the FCC’s authority over video markets entirely and rely on antitrust agencies and consumer protection laws in television markets. New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, and other countries have merged competition and telecommunications regulators. Agency merger streamlines competition analyses and prevents duplicative oversight.

Finally, instead of fostering favored distribution channels, Congress’ efforts are better spent on reforms that make it easier for new entrants to build distribution infrastructure. Such reforms increase jobs, increase competition, expand consumer choice, and lower consumer prices.

Thank you for initiating the discussion about updating the Communications Act. Reform can give America’s innovative telecommunications and mass-media sectors a predictable and technology neutral legal framework. When Congress replaces industrial planning in video with market forces, consumers will be the primary beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

Brent Skorup Research Fellow, Technology Policy Program Mercatus Center at George Mason University

The outrage over the FCC’s attempt to write new open Internet rules has caught many by surprise, and probably Chairman Wheeler as well. The rumored possibility of the FCC authorizing broadband “fast lanes” draws most complaints and animus. Gus Hurwitz points out that the FCC’s actions this week have nothing to do with fast lanes and Larry Downes reminds us that this week’s rules don’t authorize anything. There’s a tremendous amount of misinformation because few understand how administrative law works. Yet many net neutrality proponents fear the worst from the proposed rules because Wheeler takes the consensus position that broadband provision is a two-sided market and prioritized traffic could be pro-consumer.

Fast lanes have been permitted by the FCC for years and they can benefit consumers. Some broadband services–like video and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)–need to be transmitted faster or with better quality than static webpages, email, and file syncs. Don’t take my word for it. The 2010 Open Internet NPRM, which led to the recently struck-down rules, stated,

As rapid innovation in Internet-related services continues, we recognize that there are and will continue to be Internet-Protocol-based offerings (including voice and subscription video services, and certain business services provided to enterprise customers), often provided over the same networks used for broadband Internet access service, that have not been classified by the Commission. We use the term “managed” or “specialized” services to describe these types of offerings. The existence of these services may provide consumer benefits, including greater competition among voice and subscription video providers, and may lead to increased deployment of broadband networks.

I have no special knowledge about what ISPs will or won’t do. I wouldn’t predict in the short term the widespread development of prioritized traffic under even minimal regulation. I think the carriers haven’t looked too closely at additional services because net neutrality regulations have precariously hung over them for a decade. But some of net neutrality proponents’ talking points (like insinuating or predicting ISPs will block political speech they disagree with) are not based in reality.

We run a serious risk of derailing research and development into broadband services if the FCC is cowed by uninformed and extreme net neutrality views. As Adam eloquently said, “Living in constant fear of hypothetical worst-case scenarios — and premising public policy upon them — means that best-case scenarios will never come about.” Many net neutrality proponents would like to smear all priority traffic as unjust and exploitative. This is unfortunate and a bit ironic because one of the most transformative communications developments, cable VoIP, is a prioritized IP service.

There are other IP services that are only economically feasible if jitter, latency, and slow speed are minimized. Prioritized traffic takes several forms, but it could enhance these services:

VoIP. This prioritized service has actually been around for several years and has completely revolutionized the phone industry. Something unthinkable for decades–facilities-based local telephone service–became commonplace in the last few years and undermined much of the careful industrial planning in the 1996 Telecom Act. If you subscribe to voice service from your cable provider, you are benefiting from fast lane treatment. Your “phone” service is carried over your broadband cable, segregated from your television and Internet streams. Smaller ISPs could conceivably make their phone service more attractive by pairing up with a Skype- or Vonage-type voice provider, and there are other possibilities that make local phone service more competitive.

Cloud-hosted virtual desktops. This is not a new idea, but it’s possible to have most or all of your computing done in a secure cloud, not on your PC, via a prioritized data stream. With a virtual desktop, your laptop or desktop PC functions mainly as a dumb portal. No more annoying software updates. Fewer security risks. IT and security departments everywhere would rejoice. Google Chromebooks are a stripped-down version of this but truly functional virtual desktops would be valued by corporations, reporters, or government agencies that don’t want sensitive data saved on a bunch of laptops in their organization that they can’t constantly monitor. Virtual desktops could also transform the device market, putting the focus on a great cloud and (priority) broadband service and less on the power and speed of the device. Unfortunately, at present, virtual desktops are not in widespread use because even small lag frustrates users.

TV. The future of TV is IP-based and the distinction between “TV” and “the Internet” is increasingly blurring, with Netflix leading the way. In a fast lane future, you could imagine ISPs launching pared-down TV bundles–say, Netflix, HBO Go, and some sports channels–over a broadband connection. Most ISPs wouldn’t do it, but an over-the-top package might interest smaller ISPs who find acquiring TV content and bundling their own cable packages time-consuming and expensive.

Gaming. Computer gamers hate jitter and latency. (My experience with a roommate who had unprintable outbursts when Diablo III or World of Warcraft lagged is not uncommon.) Game lag means you die quite frequently because of your data connection and this depresses your interest in a game. There might be gaming companies out there who would like to partner with ISPs and other network operators to ensure smooth gameplay. Priority gaming services could also lead the way to more realistic, beautiful, and graphics-intensive games.

Teleconferencing, telemedicine, teleteaching, etc. Any real-time, video-based service could reach critical mass of subscribers and become economical with priority treatment. Any lag absolutely kills consumer interest in these video-based applications. By favoring applications like telemedicine, providing remote services could become attractive to enough people for ISPS to offer stand-alone broadband products.

This is just a sampling of the possible consumer benefits of pay-for-priority IP services we possibly sacrifice in the name of strict neutrality enforcement. There are other services we can’t even conceive of yet that will never develop. Generally, net neutrality proponents don’t admit these possible benefits and are trying to poison the well against all priority deals, including many of these services.

Most troubling, net neutrality turns the regulatory process on its head. Rather than identify a market failure and then take steps to correct the failure, the FCC may prevent commercial agreements that would be unobjectionable in nearly any other industry. The FCC has many experts who are familiar with the possible benefits of broadband fast lanes, which is why the FCC has consistently blessed priority treatment in some circumstances.

Unfortunately, the orchestrated reaction in recent weeks might leave us with onerous rules, delaying or making impossible new broadband services. Hopefully, in the ensuing months, reason wins out and FCC staff are persuaded by competitive analysis and possible innovations, not t-shirt slogans.

My friend Tim Lee has an article at Vox that argues that interconnection is the new frontier on which the battle for the future of the Internet is being waged. I think the article doesn’t really consider how interconnection has worked in the last few years, and consequently, it makes a big deal out of something that is pretty harmless.

How the Internet used to work

The Internet is a network of networks. Your ISP is a network. It connects to the other ISPs and exchanges traffic with them. Since connections between ISPs are about equally valuable to each other, this often happens through “settlement-free peering,” in which networks exchange traffic on an unpriced basis. The arrangement is equally valuable to both partners.

Not every ISP connects directly to every other ISP. For example, a local ISP in California probably doesn’t connect directly to a local ISP in New York. If you’re an ISP that wants to be sure your customer can reach every other network on the Internet, you have to purchase “transit” services from a bigger or more specialized ISP. This would allow ISPs to transmit data along what used to be called “the backbone” of the Internet. Transit providers that exchange roughly equally valued traffic with other networks themselves have settlement-free peering arrangements with those networks.

How the Internet works now

A few things have changed in the last several years. One major change is that most major ISPs have very large, geographically-dispersed networks. For example, Comcast serves customers in 40 states, and other networks can peer with them in 18 different locations across the US. These 18 locations are connected to each other through very fast cables that Comcast owns. In other words, Comcast is not just a residential ISP anymore. They are part of what used to be called “the backbone,” although it no longer makes sense to call it that since there are so many big pipes that cross the country and so much traffic is transmitted directly through ISP interconnection.

Another thing that has changed is that content providers are increasingly delivering a lot of a) traffic-intensive and b) time-sensitive content across the Internet. This has created the incentive to use what are known as content-delivery networks (CDNs). CDNs are specialized ISPs that locate servers right on the edge of all terminating ISPs’ networks. There are a lot of CDNs—here is one list.

By locating on the edge of each consumer ISP, CDNs are able to deliver content to end users with very low latency and at very fast speeds. For this service, they charge money to their customers. However, they also have to pay consumer ISPs for access to their networks, because the traffic flow is all going in one direction and otherwise CDNs would be making money by using up resources on the consumer ISP’s network.

CDNs’ payments to consumer ISPs are also a matter of equity between the ISP’s customers. Let’s suppose that Vox hires Amazon CloudFront to serve traffic to Comcast customers (they do). If the 50 percent of Comcast customers who wanted to read Vox suddenly started using up so many network resources that Comcast and CloudFront needed to upgrade their connection, who should pay for the upgrade? The naïve answer is to say that Comcast should, because that is what customers are paying them for. But the efficient answer is that the 50 percent who want to access Vox should pay for it, and the 50 percent who don’t want to access it shouldn’t. By Comcast charging CloudFront to access the Comcast network, and CloudFront passing along those costs to Vox, and Vox passing along those costs to customers in the form of advertising, the resource costs of using the network are being paid by those who are using them and not by those who aren’t.

What happened with the Netflix/Comcast dust-up?

Netflix used multiple CDNs to serve its content to subscribers. For example, it used a CDN provided by Cogent to serve content to Comcast customers. Cogent ran out of capacity and refused to upgrade its link to Comcast. As a result, some of Comcast’s customers experienced a decline in quality of Netflix streaming. However, Comcast customers who accessed Netflix with an Apple TV, which is served by CDNs from Level 3 and Limelight, never had any problems. Cogent has had peering disputes in the past with many other networks.

To solve the congestion problem, Netflix and Comcast negotiated a direct interconnection. Instead of Netflix paying Cogent and Cogent paying Comcast, Netflix is now paying Comcast directly. They signed a multi-year deal that is reported to  reduce Netflix’s costs relative to what they would have paid through Cogent. Essentially, Netflix is vertically integrating into the CDN business. This makes sense. High-quality CDN service is essential to Netflix’s business; they can’t afford to experience the kind of incident that Cogent caused with Comcast. When a service is strategically important to your business, it’s often a good idea to vertically integrate.

It should be noted that what Comcast and Netflix negotiated was  not a “fast lane”—Comcast is prohibited from offering prioritized traffic as a condition of its merger with NBC/Universal.

What about Comcast’s market power?

I think that one of Tim’s hangups is that Comcast has a lot of local market power. There are lots of barriers to creating a competing local ISP in Comcast’s territories. Doesn’t this mean that Comcast will abuse its market power and try to gouge CDNs?

Let’s suppose that Comcast is a pure monopolist in a two-sided market. It’s already extracting the maximum amount of rent that it can on the consumer side. Now it turns to the upstream market and tries to extract rent. The problem with this is that it can only extract rents from upstream content producers insofar as it lowers the value of the rent it can collect from consumers. If customers have to pay higher Netflix bills, then they will be less willing to pay Comcast. The fact that the market is two-sided does not significantly increase the amount of monopoly rent that Comcast can collect.

Interconnection fees that are being paid to Comcast (and virtually all other major ISPs) have virtually nothing to do with Comcast’s market power and everything to do with the fact that the Internet has changed, both in structure and content. This is simply how the Internet works. I use CloudFront, the same CDN that Vox uses, to serve even a small site like my Bitcoin Volatility Index. CloudFront negotiates payments to Comcast and other ISPs on my and Vox’s behalf. There is nothing unseemly about Netflix making similar payments to Comcast, whether indirectly through Cogent or directly, nor is there anything about this arrangement that harms “the little guy” (like me!).

For more reading material on the Netflix/Comcast arrangement, I recommend Dan Rayburn’s posts here, here, and here. Interconnection is a very technical subject, and someone with very specialized expertise like Dan is invaluable in understanding this issue.

It seems to me that a lot of the angst about the Comcast-Netflix paid transit deal results from a general discomfort with two-sided markets rather than any specific harm caused by the deal. But is there any reason to be suspicious of two-sided markets per se?

Consider a (straight) singles bar. Men and women come to the singles bar to meet each other. On some nights, it’s ladies’ night, and women get in free and get a free drink. On other nights, it’s not ladies’ night, and both men and women have to pay to get in and buy drinks.

There is no a priori reason to believe that ladies’ night is more just or efficient than other nights. The owner of the bar will benefit if the bar is a good place for social congress, and she will price accordingly. If men in the area are particularly shy, she may have to institute a “mens’ night” to get them to come out. If women start demanding too many free drinks, she may have to put an end to ladies’ night (even if some men benefit from the presence of tipsy women, they may not be as willing as the women to pay the full cost of all of the drinks). Whether a market should be two-sided or one-sided is an empirical question, and the answer can change over time depending on circumstances.

Some commentators seem to be arguing that two-sided markets are fine as long as the market is competitive. Well, OK, suppose the singles bar is the only singles bar in a 100-mile radius? How does that change the analysis above? Not at all, I say.

Analysis of two-sided markets can get very complex, but we shouldn’t let that complexity turn into reflexive opposition.

“Net neutrality is a dead man walking,” Marvin Ammori stated in Wired last week, citing the probable demise of the FCC’s Open Internet rules in court. I’d agree for a different reason. Net neutrality has been dead ever since the FCC released its net neutrality order in December 2010. (This is not to say the damaging rules should be upheld by the DC Circuit. For many reasons, the Order should be struck down.) I agree with Ammori because we already have the Internet “fast lane” many net neutrality proponents wanted to prevent. Since that goal is precluded, all the rules do is hang Damocles’ Sword over ISPs regarding traffic management.

The 2010 rules managed to make both sides unhappy. The ISPs face severe penalties if three FCC commissioners believe ISP network management practices “unreasonably discriminate” against certain traffic. Public interest groups, on the other hand, were dissatisfied because they wanted ISPs reclassified as common carriers to prevent deep-pocketed content creators from allying with ISPs to create an Internet “fast lane” for some companies, relegating most other websites to the so-called “winding dirt road” of the public Internet.

Proponents emphasize different goals of net neutrality (to the point–many argue–it’s hard to discern what the term means). But if preventing the creation of a fast lane is the main goal of net neutrality, it’s dead already. Consider two popularly-cited net neutrality “violations” that do not violate the Open Internet Order: Netflix’ Open Connect program and Comcast not counting its Xfinity video-on-demand (VOD) service against customers’ data limits

Both cases involve the creation of a fast lane for certain content and activists rail against them. Both cases also involve network practices expressly exempted from net neutrality regulations. The FCC exempted these sorts of services because they are important, benefit the public, and should be encouraged. With Open Connect, Netflix scatters its many servers across the country closer to households, which allows its content to stream at a higher quality than most other video sites. Comcast gives its Xfinity VOD fast-lane treatment as well, which is completely legal since VOD from a cable company is a “specialized service” exempt from the rules.

“Specialized service” needs some explanation since it’s a novel concept from the FCC order. The net neutrality rules distinguish between “broadband Internet access service” (BIAS)–to which the regulations apply–and specialized (or managed) services–to which they don’t apply. The exemption of specialized services opens up a dangerous loophole in the view of proponents.

BIAS is what most consider “the Internet.” It’s the everyday websites we access on our computers and smartphones. What are specialized services? In the sleepy month of August the FCC’s Open Internet Advisory Committee released its report on what criteria specialized service needs to meet to be exempt from net neutrality scrutiny (these are influential and advisory, but not binding):

1. The service doesn’t reach large parts of the Internet, and
2. The service is an “application level” service.

The Advisory Committee also thought that “capacity isolation” is a good indicator that a service should be exempt. With capacity isolation, the ISP has one broadband connection going to the home but is separating the service’s data stream from the conventional Internet stream consumers use to visit Facebook, YouTube, and the like. This is how Comcast’s streaming of Xfinity to Xboxes is exempt–it is a proprietary network going into the home. As long as carriers don’t divert BIAS capacity for the application, the FCC will likely turn a blind eye.

What are some examples? Specialized service is marked by higher-quality streams that typically don’t suffer from jitter and latency. If you have “digital voice” from Comcast, for example, you are receiving a specialized service–proprietary VoIP. Specialized service can also include data streams like VOD, e-reader downloads, heart monitor data, and gaming services. The FCC exempted these because some are important enough that they shouldn’t compete with BIAS Internet. It would be obviously damaging to have digital phone service or health monitors getting disrupted because others are checking up on their fantasy football team. The FCC also wanted to spur investment in specialized services and video companies like Netflix are considering pairing up with ISPs to deliver a better experience to customers.

That is to say, the net neutrality effort has failed even worse than most realize. The FCC essentially prohibited innovative business models in BIAS, freezing that service into common-carrier-like status. Further, we have an Internet fast lane (which I consider a significant public benefit, though net neutrality proponents often do not). As business models evolve and the costs of server networks fall, our two-tier system will become more apparent.

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

Gina Keating, author of Netflixed: The Epic Battle for America’s Eyeballs, discusses the startup of Netflix and their competition with Blockbuster.

Keating begins with the history of the company and their innovative improvements to the movie rental experience. She discusses their use of new technology and marketing strategies in DVD rental, which inspired Blockbuster to adapt to the changing market.

Keating goes on to describe Netflix’s transition to internet streaming and Blockbuster’s attempts to retain their market share.

Download

Related Links

• Netflixed: The Epic Battle for America’s Eyeballs, Keating
• Gina Keating’s New Book about the Rise of Netflix, Babayan
• ‘Netflixed,’ Book by Gina Keating, Describes CEO Reed Hastings As a Nasty Boss’ Liedtke

Of all the shockingly naive and shamelessly self-serving editorials I’ve read by businesspeople in recent years, today’s Wall Street Journal oped by Netflix general counsel David Hyman really takes the cake. It’s an implicit plea to policymakers for broadband price controls. Hyman doesn’t like the idea of broadband operators potentially pricing bandwidth according to usage /demand and he wants action taken to stop it. Of course, why wouldn’t he say that? It’s in Netflix’s best interest to ensure that somebody else besides them picks up the tab for increased broadband consumption!

But Hyman tries to pull a fast one on the reader and suggest that scarcity is an economic illusion and that any effort by broadband operators to migrate to usage-based pricing schemes is simply a nefarious, anti-consumer plot that must be foiled. “Consumers and regulators need to take heed of what is happening and avoid winding up like the proverbial frog in a pot of boiling water,” Hyman warns. “It’s time to jump before it’s too late.”

Rubbish! The only thing policymakers need to do is avoid myopic, misguided advice like Hyman’s, which isn’t based on one iota of economic theory or evidence.

Hyman’s economic illiteracy is evident from the get-go. He tries to spook people with the headline, “Why Bandwidth Pricing Is Anti-Competitive.” No it isn’t. Usage-based pricing is used in countless economic sectors every day and it is overwhelming viewed by economists as a sensible way to calibrate supply and demand while ensuring costs are covered. But Hyman says the laws of economics don’t apply to broadband!  No seriously, he says:

Cable and telecom companies argue that bandwidth is a scarce resource and that imposing caps and overage fees will relieve pressure on high-speed networks. Families pay more when they use more electricity, these companies point out, so why shouldn’t households pay more if they use more bandwidth?  The analogy is a false one. Wireline bandwidth is an almost unlimited resource due to advances in Internet architecture. Adding more capacity is easy. The marginal cost of providing an extra gigabyte of data—enough to deliver one episode of “30 Rock” from Netflix—is less than one cent, and falling. […] Consumer access to unlimited bandwidth is good for society. It fosters innovation, drives commerce, and advances political and social discourse. Given that bandwidth is cheap and plentiful and will only grow more so with time, there is no good reason for bandwidth caps and fees to take root.

Oh my goodness. Really? Hyman appears to be suffering from a rather serious case of marginal cost fallacy: the belief that prices should, as a rule, equal marginal costs. The problem with such thinking is that it leaves zero room for investment, innovation, and other real-world dynamics that get conveniently forgotten as “fixed costs.”  Of course, if you begin with the truly outrageous claim that “bandwidth is an almost unlimited resource,” and “bandwidth is cheap and plentiful and will only grow more so with time,” then it’s only logical that you’d fall prey to this fallacy!

Meanwhile, back in the real world, economists and financial analysts will explain to you that high fixed-cost goods like broadband networks don’t just grow on trees or fall like manna from heaven. Yes, of course it is true that “consumer access to unlimited bandwidth is good for society.”  But the same is true of countless other goods that we’d all like to have access to at zero cost. But that doesn’t invalidate the fundamental laws of economics. Someone financed and built those networks and someone has to keep building and improving them. You’d never get anything built if you adopted the view that scarcity was a myth and that prices must equal marginal cost.

On that point, I was tickled to see in the online comments to Hyman’s piece that one gentleman asked, “what happens when you allow unlimited access at.. marginal cost?” and for another to say in response, “Answer: You turn into Greece.”   Quite right. There is no free lunch. Something has to pay the bills, including the broadband bills. You can’t just free-ride on the future forever by pretending that bandwidth is an abundant good and holding prices at or below marginal cost.

Once you understand these facts you can point out what’s really wrong with Mr. Hyman’s reasoning: He basically wants average costs for all consumers to go up so that his costs (or the costs of any high-bandwidth use or user) will never go up. Shameful!  Indeed, let’s just call Mr. Hyman’s editorial what it is: a blatant attempt to get government to impose price controls on broadband providers to favor his company. End of story.  He could have spared us all the sloppy economic sophistry and just told us that. It would have made it a bit easier to take him seriously.

P.S. Incidentally, Mr. Hyman’s one and only suggestion for how to deal with network demand/congestion is this: “If Internet service providers really wanted to manage traffic efficiently, they would limit speeds at peak times.” Interesting. I wonder how the Net neutrality crowd feels about Netflix’s new-found love of broadband throttling!

Three months ago, when the DC Circuit struck down the FCC’s “Cable Cap”—which prevented any one cable company from serving more than 30% of US households out of fear that he larger cable companies would use their “gatekeeper” power to restrict programming—the New York Times bemoaned the decision:

The problem with the cap is not that it is too onerous, but that it is not demanding enough. Even with the cap — and satellite television — there is a disturbing lack of price competition. The cable companies have resisted letting customers choose, a la carte, the channels they actually watch…. [The FCC] needs to ensure that customers have an array of choices among cable providers, and that there is real competition on price and program offerings.

Perhaps the Times‘ editors should have consulted with the Lead Technology Writer of their excellent BITS blog.  Nick Bilton might have told him the truth: “Cable Freedom Is a Click Away.”  That’s the title of his excellent survey of devices and services (Hulu, Boxee, iTunes, Joost, YouTube, etc.) that allow users to get cable television programming without a cable subscription.

Nick explains that consumers can “cut the video cord” and still find much, if not all, their favorite cable programming—as well as the vast offerings of online video—without a hefty monthly subscription.  (Adam recently described how Clicker.com is essentially TV guide for the increasing cornucopia of Internet video.)  This makes the 1992 Cable Act’s requirement that the FCC impose a cable cap nothing more than the vestige of a bygone era of platform scarcity, predating not just the Internet, but also competing subscription services offered by satellite and telcos over fiber.  That’s precisely what we argued in PFF’s amicus brief to the DC Circuit a year ago, and largely why the court ultimately struck down the cap.

Bilton notes that “this isn’t as easy as just plugging a computer into a monitor, sitting back and watching a movie. There’s definitely a slight learning curve.”  But, as he describes, cutting the cord isn’t rocket science.  If getting used to using a wireless mouse is the thing that most keeps consumers “enslaved” to the cable “gatekeepers” the FCC frets so much about, what’s the big deal?  Does government really need to set aside the property and free speech rights of cable operators to run their own networks just because some people may not be as quick to dump cable as Bilton?  Is the lag time between early adopters and mainstream really such a problem that we would risk maintaining outdated systems of architectural censorship (Chris Yoo’s brilliant term) that give government control over speech in countless subtle and indirect ways?

If we were talking about just another subscription video service like satellite and telco fiber, the demise of cable as a unique “bottleneck” for programming might not be so obvious to the layperson (although MVPD competition is quite stunning, and means that “subscription service freedom is just a phone call or click away”).  But in the case of Internet video, the programming is à la carte by show and often free  (i.e., ad-supported), so consumers have a huge incentive to switch or can simply “put their toe in the water” before finally taking the plunge altogether.  As Bilton notes, he’s saving a fortune ($1,600/year):

Although the initial investment was costly, totaling $550, it took only a few months to recoup the money. Back in the olden days of cable we were forced to shell out a relatively standard $140 a month, for television service alone. This cost gave us access to a digital video recorder and hundreds of unwatched TV channels. Contrast this with today, where our only expense is $9 a month to stream Netflix videos from the Web and the $30 a month that we always spent on an Internet connection. O.K., maybe that’s not completely accurate. When the wireless keyboard died a few weeks ago I was forced to spend another $4 for two new AA batteries. We’ve not yet recovered from that financial loss… Tunes can get expensive. If you watch premium-cable television shows, you can pay more than $40 for the season of a single show. But even that is less than one month of cable. Since there are so many other entertainment options online, we just skip “Dexter” and “Weeds.” Trust me, there is a lot of great free or ad-supported content out there.

The experience isn’t that different, but it is richer:

We still come home from work and watch any number of shows, just like the people who continue to pay for cable. We just do it a little differently, starting the computer and then using services like Hulu, Boxee, iTunes and Joost. Another interesting twist to this experience is that we’re no longer limited to consuming traditional programming. With these applications we can spend an entire evening flicking through videos from YouTube, CollegeHumor or Web-only programs.

Mark my words: stories like this one will become increasingly representative of the mainstream, just as huge numbers of consumers have “cut the landline cord” in favor of cell phones.  By the time the FCC gets around to coming up with a new cable cap—using some inventively”fresh approach,” as the Times suggests, no doubt—stories like this one will be passé, and today’s world of cable TV subscriptions will have gone the way of the landline, rabbit ears, the fax machine, the mimeograph and the stereoscope.  The FCC, the Times’ editorialists, and all the other media reformista groups that keep screaming for regulation to slay phantoms of a bygone era will look mighty foolish, indeed.

On a final note, savvy observers will notice the similarity between Bilton’s slogan (“Cable Freedom Is a Click Away”) and Google’s mantra about its various services (“Competition is just one click away“).  Both run contrary to the prevailing assumption behind so much communications/Internet policymaking that users are too lazy, ignorant, stupid and/or helpless to find, explore, try, or even understand new tools, products, services or models.  One could raise legitimate questions about how competition plays out on the other side of these two-sided markets (advertising in the case of search and programming in the case of cable television), but to deny that consumers are capable of “clicking away” is to assume that they are mindless sheep.

The New York Times, to their credit and despite their editorial position on cable regulation, certainly seems to have a higher opinion of our intelligence—or they wouldn’t have bothered with Bilton’s excellent do-it-yourself guide.  In the case of television programming, the “sheep”  have begun overrunning  whatever “gates” once contained them and flooding into the verdant pastures of Internet video programming abundance.  More will soon follow in droves, and cable operators will do everything they can to keep their “grass” (programming choices) as “green” (abundant and diverse) as possible, just to compete.  The FCC’s continued meddling is simply unnecessary, counterproductive and dangerous as a precedent for outdated regulatory controls.

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

This ongoing series has explored the increasing ability of consumers to “cut the cord” to traditional video distributors (cable, satellite, etc.) and instead receive a mix of “television” programming and other forms of video programming over the Internet.  As I’ve argued, this change not only means lower monthly bills for those “early adopter” consumers who actually do “cut the cord”, but, in the coming years, a total revolution in the traditional system of content creation and distribution on which the FCC’s existing media regulatory regime is premised.   

This revolution has two key parts:

1. Conduits: The growing inventory—and  popularity—of sites such as Hulu, Amazon Unboxed and the XBox 360 Marketplace (or software such as Apple’s iTunes store), that allow users to view or download video content.  Drawing an analogy to the FCC’s term “Multichannel Video Programming Distibutor” or MVPD (cable, direct broadcast satellite, telco fiber, etc.), I’ve dubbed these sites “Internet Video Programming Distributors” or IVPDs.
2. Interface:  The hardware and software that allows users to display that content easily on a device of their choice, especially their home televisions.

While much of the conversation about “interface” has focused on special hardware that brings IVPD content to televisions through set-top boxes such as the Roku box or game consoles like the XBox 360, at least one company is making waves with a software solution.  From the NYT:

Boxee bills its software as a simple way to access multiple Internet video and music sites, and to bring them to a large monitor or television that one might be watching from a sofa across the room. Some of Boxee’s fans also think it is much more: a way to euthanize that costly $100-a-month cable or satellite connection. “Boxee has allowed me to replace cable with no remorse,” said Jef Holbrook, a 27-year-old actor in Columbus, Ga., who recently downloaded the Boxee software to the $600 Mac Mini he has connected to his television. “Most people my age would like to just pay for the channels they want, but cable refuses to give us that option. Services like Boxee, that allow users choice, are the future of television.” …. Boxee gives users a single interface to access all the photos, video and music on their hard drives, along with a wide range of television shows, movies and songs from sites like Hulu,Netflix, YouTube, CNN.com and CBS.com.

With 200,000 users thus far, Boxee is quickly taking off and made a big splash at CES this year.  Boxee may be a scrappy start-up but is founder realizes the revolutionary implications of his product:

Mr. Ronen also shared what he called his “politically incorrect” vision of how the Internet would upset the television business by giving people on-demand access to the array of Web content. “The challenge for the cable industry is how they grapple with the fact that this is in some way a substitution for some of the things they do,” he said.

The NYT rightly observes that, whether Boxee really takes off as the Next Big Thing, its success thus far is at least driving other “consumer electronics companies to move faster to bring the Internet to their devices.”  I suspect that what we’re seeing now is a “tipping point” on both sides of the business:  As IVPDs gain popularity and larger inventories, “interface” developers like Boxee (or others on the hardware side) will proliferate rapidly.

Continuing the “Cutting the (Video) Cord” series started by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer:  The WSJ had two great pieces yesterday about the increasing competitive relevance of television distributed by Internet—a trend that was at the heart of an amicus brief PFF recently filed in support of C omcast’s challenge of the FCC’s 30% cap on cable ownership.  The first WSJ piece declares that:

After more than a decade of disappointment, the goal of marrying television and the Internet seems finally to be picking up steam. A key factor in the push are new TV sets that have networking connections built directly into them, requiring no additional set-top boxes for getting online. Meanwhile, many consumers are finding more attractive entertainment and information choices on the Internet — and have already set up data networks for their PCs and laptops that can also help move that content to their TV sets.

The easier it is for consumers to receive traditional television programming (in addition to other kinds of video content) distributed over the Internet on their television, the less “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” power cable distributors have over programming.  So the Netflix-capable and Yahoo-widget-capable televisions described by the WSJ piece go a long way to increasing the substitutability of what we call Internet Video Programming Distributors (IVPDs) for Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs), such as cable, satellite television and fiber services offered by telcos such as Verizon’s FiOS.  

While such televisions are only expected to reach 14% of all TV sales by 2012, one must remember that a growing number of set-top boxes ( e.g., the Roku Digitial Video Player, game consoles like the Microsoft XBox 360 and Sony PlayStation 3, and TiVo DVRs) allow users to users to receive IVPD programming on their existing televisions.  

As we argued in our amicus brief, the immense competitive importance of IVPDs lies not in the potential for some users to “cut the cord” to cable and other MVPDs (though that will surely happen), but in the immediate impact IVPDs have as an alternative distribution channel for programmers.  In the pending D.C. Circuit case, we argue that both the FCC’s 30% cap, issued in December 2007, and the underlying portions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing such a cap should be struck down as unconstitutional because the ready availability of IVPDs as an alternative distribution channel means that cable no longer has the “special characteristic” of gatekeeper/bottleneck power that would justify imposing such a unique burden on the audience size of cable operators.  (Of course, Direct Broadcast Satellite and Telco Fiber are also eating away at cable’s share of the MVPD marketplace.)

The second WSJ piece, an op/ed, illustrates beautifully how cable operators are already losing “market power” (or at least negotiating leverage) in a very tangible way:  they’re having to pay more for programming.  Specifically, the Journal describes how Viacom plaid chicken with Time Warner—and won.  

 The Viacom network had threatened to pull its 19 channels, including Nickelodeon with its “Dora the Explorer” and “SpongeBob SquarePants” cartoons, from the 13 million subscribers to the Time Warner Cable system…. The game of chicken included Viacom advertisements that unless Time Warner Cable agreed to pay more, it would pull the channels, encouraging viewers to call to say they wanted their MTV and other Viacom channels. One ad asked, “Why is Dora crying?” Time Warner countered that consumers would pay more if its costs rose. Bernstein Research analyst Michael Nathanson noted that neither party could afford “mutually assured destruction.” Viacom needs to find more subscription revenue as advertising revenues soften, while Time Warner Cable has to worry about satellite and telecom competitors. New media was the new factor. Many popular Viacom shows are widely available on the Web, including on its own sites. When it looked as if Comedy Central would be pulled, Wired magazine helpfully posted a guide for accessing the shows on the Web, pointing out that Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show” can be accessed on Hulu and that “South Park” episodes are on Fancast. The best parts of “The Colbert Report” are often viewed as email attachments or as snippets on mobile phones.

So, in a nutshell, the fact that consumers could get Viacom programming available through IVPDs gave Viacom more leverage against MVPD Time Warner because it increased the credibility of Viacom’s threat to simply shut off programming to Time Warner if the cable giant didn’t cough up more cash.  While this fact seems to have carried the day for Viacom, the availability of Viacom’s content through IVPDs did have some secondary effects that also are worth noting:

During the negotiations, Time Warner Cable threatened to make it easier for its subscribers to connect laptop computers to their televisions so that Viacom shows could stream directly onto subscribers’ televisions.

This is essentially a reversal of the tactic often employed by local broadcasters in their battles with cable operators:  give your customers a set of rabbit ears so they can still get your signal if you actually take your programming off the local cable network.  While this tactic doesn’t seem to have helped Time Warner here, it does point to a long-term trend that could fundamentally change the programming marketplace:

The cable company also argued that it shouldn’t have to pay more to distribute shows that Viacom made available free in other media.

I suspect that, as IVPDs further erode the viewership of cable and other MVPDs, the MVPDs will become more desperate for content—and therefore willing to pay more for it.  But it seems likely that both of the key revenue sources for MVPDs—subscriptions and advertising—will, at some point, begin to decline as Americans spend more time watching IVPD content and become less willing to pay for expensive MVPD plans.  As this happens, cable may have less revenue to share with programmers per subscriber, even as their need for that programming grows.

So how will this all end?  I doubt anyone really knows.  But I feel reasonably comfortable making two predictions.  

First, the overall health of the video programming content market will become increasingly dependent on the profitability of advertising—for MVPDs, IVPDs as well as programmers.  This will require technological innovation to produce smarter advertising.  The better advertising is targeted to a specific consumer’s interests, the more revenue it will produce for all concerned.  But if the government short-circuits this process by hindering the evolution of targeted advertising in the name of protecting consumers’ privacy (or simply to protect them from the supposed inherent unfairness of advertising—an old Marxist shibboleth), the total amount of funding available for content could plummet.  The dynamics described so well by Chris Anderson in “Free! Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business” could drive video programmers to make their content available online for “free” (i.e., at no charge to the user) even if that content ends up producing (via advertising, etc.) significantly less revenue than it currently does on MVPDs (primarily from subscription revenue).  Plenty of smart people have explored this question and have far more intelligent things to say about it than I do.  But since the long-term trend seems to be that consumers are increasingly unwilling to pay even small sums for content, I just don’t see any alternative to increasing advertising revenues—other than public financing, which will necessarily bring with it government control and censorship.

Second, the other part of the solution to this problem will be business model innovation:  If individual consumers won’t pay for online video content, and if future ad revenues for online video content  don’t replace existing revenue streams, programmers are going to look for other sources of funding.  This dynamic seems to be on a collision course with net neutrality mandates.  The WSJ reported:

At one point, it looked as if Viacom might have escalated by trying to block Time Warner Cable broadband subscribers from accessing its Web sites to see its shows.

Whatever actually happened here, one can easily imagine a programmer like Viacom at some point in the future trying to get ISPs to start paying money per broadband subscriber for video content just as MVPDs currently pay per subscriber.  This is really the inverse of the fear generally expressed by net neutrality advocates that ISPs would try to charge programmers for the bandwidth used to transmit their content to an ISP’s subscribers.  If it’s true that programmers (the Viacoms of the world) and not distributors (Time Warner Cable the MVPD or Time Warner Cable the ISP) really have the market power, as this story suggests, then such arrangements might well be the economic salvation of content creators.  As with regulation of advertising, I only hope that government mandates against such innovation in the name of abstract “neutrality” principles don’t end up dooming us to a future where, with free market solutions (better advertising, revenue sharing with ISPs) rendered ineffective by government, government itself seems to be the only option left.

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC’s December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap http://documents.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=8630011&access_key=key-2obr4z2ohtozi1gabbay&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

In an essay I posted here back in October called “Cutting the (Video) Cord: The Shift to Online Video Continues” (part of an ongoing series), I reflected on an interesting piece by the Wall Street Journal’s Nick Wingfield’s entitled “Turn On, Tune Out, Click Here.” Wingfield’s article illustrated how rapidly the online video marketplace is growing and noted that so many shows are now available online that many people are cutting the cord entirely by canceling their cable or satellite subscriptions and just downloading everything they want to watch via sites like Hulu and supplmenting that with services like Netflix. In today’s Washington Post, Mike Musgrove writes about these same trends and developments in a column entitled, “TV Breaks Out of the Box.” Musgrove notes:

This has been a big year for both Netflix and online video services like Hulu.com, where people can watch episodes of popular shows such as “The Office” for free, though users do have to sit through a few commercials. When Tina Fey debuted her impression of Sarah Palin on “Saturday Night Live” last month, more people watched the comedy sketch online at NBC.com or Hulu.com than during the show’s broadcast. Last week, YouTube announced that it would start carrying old TV shows and movies from the film studio MGM. As for Netflix, it seems that somebody there has been busy this year. While most customers still use the online video rental site mainly for movie deliveries by mail, the company now has a library of online content available for viewing on your TV through a variety of devices. A $99 appliance from Roku that plugs into your TV set and connects to the Web has been popular among some folks dropping their cable subscriptions. A couple of new, Web-connected Blu-ray players from Samsung and LG Electronics also allow Netflix subscribers to instantly watch titles from the company’s online collection.

Musgrove continues and notes that it’s about more than just Hulu and Netflix:

During a visit to The Washington Post this past summer, Microsoft chief executive Steve Ballmer mentioned that his favorite TV show is “Lost” and that he watches the show online, not on cable and not through a purchase on Apple‘s iTunes service. “I have to admit I’m annoyed by the [ads], but not enough to pay a buck,” he said. Ever have a billionaire make you feel dumb for leading an overly extravagant lifestyle? Ballmer didn’t mention the show’s availability on Microsoft’s Xbox Live service. That’s where I’d been buying and downloading episodes of the show, on an a la carte basis. But starting this week, a major revamp of the Xbox interface makes it possible for owners like me to access the Netflix library without shelling out on a per-title basis. The day after CSI airs, for example, I’ll be able to watch it with a few clicks on the device’s controller. This is available only for people paying for a Netflix subscription, but I’ve already heard some gadget fans, the ones who don’t care about video games very much, wondering if the new feature might make the console a worthwhile purchase. For those interested in checking out some TV on the Web, some networks, like NBC, put almost all of their programming online; others, like HBO, have little content online. One Web site, Cancelcable.com, has a page that tracks where Web surfers can find their favorite shows online.

I was not aware of that CancelCable.com site until I read Musgrove’s article, but it really does show how this migration to alternative video distribution / consumption is picking up steam.

Unfortunately, as I noted in my previous essay, someone forgot to tell the folks in Washington about all this. They’re still busy obsessively regulating broadcast TV and radio as if the 1950s never ended. And they’ve increasingly expanded their regulatory coverage to include cable and satellite even though they are now struggling to keep people from moving to the completely unbundled, a la carte world of online video.

It’s an old story, really: Technology advances; regulation stands still.

Back in the mid- and even late 1990s, I was engaged in a lot of dreadfully boring telecom policy debates in which the proponents of regulation flatly refused to accept the argument that the hegemony of wireline communications systems would ever be seriously challenged by wireless networks. Well, we all know how that story is playing out today. People are increasingly “cutting the cord” and opting to live a wireless-only existence. For example, this recent Nielsen Mobile study on wireless substitution reports that, although only 4.2% of homes were wireless-only at the end of 2003…

At the end of 2007, 16.4 percent of U.S. households had abandoned their landline phone for their wireless phone, but by the end of June 2008, just 6 months later, that number had increased to 17.1 percent. Overall, this percentage has grown by 3-4 percentage points per year, and the trend doesn’t seem to be slowing. In fact, a Q4 2007 study by Nielsen Mobile showed that an additional 5 percent of households indicated that they were “likely” to disconnect their landline service in the next 12 months, potentially increasing the overall percentage of wireless-only households to nearly 1 in 5 by year’s end.

And one wonders about how many homes are like mine — we just keep the landline for emergency purposes or to redirect phone spam to that number instead of giving out our mobile numbers.  Beyond that, my wife and I are pretty much wireless-only people and I’m sure there’s a lot of others like us out there.

Anyway, I’ve been having a strange feeling of deva vu lately as I’ve been engaging in policy debates about the future of the video marketplace.  Like those old telecom debates of the last decade, we are now witnessing a similar debate — and set of denials — playing out in the video arena.  Many lawmakers and regulatory advocates (and even some industry folks) are acting as if the old ways of doing business are the only ways that still count.  In reality, things are changing rapidly as video content continues to migrate online.

I was reminded of that again this weekend when I was reading Nick Wingfield’s brilliant piece in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Turn On, Tune Out, Click Here.”  It is must-reading for anyone following development in this field.  As Wingfield notes:

In the past two years, nearly every major network show and many of the biggest cable programs have become available on the Internet. The virtual library of content includes everything from “Desperate Housewives” and “CSI” to “The Colbert Report” and “Mad Men.” Some of the biggest hits online are memorable TV moments. More than half of the people who saw recent “Saturday Night Live” skits featuring comedian Tina Fey as vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin watched the skits over the Internet, according to a survey of 500 viewers on Monday by Solutions Research Group. Nearly a quarter saw them on YouTube and 21% saw them on NBC.com or Hulu.com. Many shows can be viewed for free and are accompanied by a dollop of ads that’s small when compared with the number of commercial breaks on television. As a result, some cost-conscious consumers are ditching their cable subscriptions altogether.

And the migration of video online is really picking up speed as a result.  According to Wingfield, “Complete episodes of about 90% of prime-time network television shows and roughly 20% of cable shows are now available online, according to Forrester Research analyst James McQuivey.”  However, Wingfield points out that “the number of people watching all of their programs online is still small; some estimates put the number at just 1% of the total television audience. In part, that’s because watching online isn’t as easy as channel surfing on the couch, TV remote in hand. Viewers must either watch shows on their personal computers, or use a device like Apple TV, which allows them to download shows from the Internet onto their television sets.”  That being said, he goes on to note that:

Within the next several years, however, media and technology executives say that a host of new technologies will make television access to online video a mainstream phenomenon. Vudu Inc. already sells a $299 set-top box with a remote control that allows users to download television shows for $1.99 per episode. Microsoft and Sony both sell television shows that users of their Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 videogame consoles can download over the Internet for viewing on television sets. Netflix subscribers can buy a $99 set-top box from Roku Inc. that streams videos on their television sets. The service is included at no extra charge in the monthly Netflix fee for renting DVDs.

And that’s just what’s happening today.  There will be a lot more options coming online soon.  Remember, most of these changes have all taken place in just the past couple of years.  If you look at the FCC’s last “Annual Video Competition Report” from two years ago, you won’t find much discussion of these new developments. But, if the FCC ever gets around to releasing another annual report, the regulators won’t be able to ignore these trends and developments any longer.

OK, so the point is clear: The video marketplace is changing rapidly. Meanwhile, however, back in the surreal regulatory la-la land of Washington, DC, it remains business as usual.  As Brian Anderson and I point out in our new book, A Manifesto for Media Freedom, policymakers are still trying applying a host of unique regulations to “old media” providers, including: various censorship rules, educational programming mandates, special campaign finance advertising laws, must carry regs, media ownership caps, broadcast “localism” requirements and various other “public interest” obligations, and much more.

At what point does this charade end?  When do we realize that substitution is occuring and giving people alternative places to camp their eyeballs?  Or doesn’t that make any difference?  Should we just continue to regulate the old platforms and players the same was as always?  Or, worse yet, should we “level the playing field” by regulating the Internet and online video providers the same way?  I hope most people would understand what a disaster that would be in practice.  The Internet and digital video delivery is offerning society an unprecedented abundance of media riches.  They last thing we need to do is screw it up by laying on reams of regulation.