At this week’s excellent State of the Net 2011 event, I participated in a panel discussion about the future of the online video marketplace.  Unsurprisingly, a great deal of time was spent discussing the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) recent approval of the proposed merger of Comcast and NBC Universal (NBCU). On Tuesday, the agency voted 4-1 to approve the deal with myriad conditions and “voluntary” concessions being attached.  The FCC voted on the matter and issued a short press release and late today issued its final 279-page order.

The Commission’s Comcast-NBCU order represents an unprecedented regulatory shakedown of a company that obviously would have done just about anything to gain approval of the deal.  I believe the conditions the FCC has imposed on the deal, which are to run for seven years, are tantamount to a death by a thousand cuts for the deal and, ultimately, could lead to its failure.  That’s because the requirements placed on the new entity make it practically impossible for Comcast to leverage the content it is acquiring from NBCU and profit from it such that they can recoup the significant costs associated with the deal.

In essence, Comcast-NBCU was forced to preemptively surrender much of its intellectual property rights by agreeing to share most of their content properties with others on terms someone else will determine.  That’s a recipe for disaster.  If Comcast-NBCU doesn’t have the right and ability to cut deals on terms that they find advantageous to the company and its shareholders, then why go through with this deal at all? Isn’t the whole point of such a deal with get some additional in-house content properties — something Comcast almost completely lacked previously — such that it would have some content gems to highlight and leverage in an attempt to attract new customers (or just keep old ones)? If someone else is constantly setting the terms of their deals, it will limit the inherent value of the IP owned by Comcast-NBCU and sap most of the value from the deal.

Particularly concerning in this regard is the language of the FCC’s order dealing with online video marketplace. As a condition of approval, the FCC’s plan requires that Comcast-NBCU:

• Provides to all MVPDs, at fair market value and non-discriminatory prices, terms, and conditions, any affiliated content that Comcast makes available online to its own subscribers or to other MVPD subscribers.
• Offers its video programming to legitimate OVDs [online video distributors] on the same terms and conditions that would be available to an MVPD.
• Makes comparable programming available on economically comparable prices, terms, and conditions to an OVD that has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of Comcast-NBCU’s peers.
• Offers standalone broadband Internet access services at reasonable prices and of sufficient bandwidth so that customers can access online video services without the need to purchase a cable television subscription from Comcast.
• Does not enter into agreements to unreasonably restrict online distribution of its own video programming or programming of other providers.
• Does not disadvantage rival online video distribution through its broadband Internet access services and/or set-top boxes.
• Does not exercise corporate control over or unreasonably withhold programming from Hulu.

The first thing to note about this language is that, through a merger proceeding, the FCC has just inserted itself into the online video marketplace in a major way and began regulating it.  Not so long ago, the idea of the FCC regulating the Net and online video would have been scoffed at and rejected as outlandish.  But here we are now with the FCC knee-deep into the daily workings of the online marketplace without Congress ever having passed a law authorizing such a thing.

The second thing to note about those online video provisions is that they potentially foreshadow the rise of a compulsory license for online video distribution.  In essence, to use antitrust parlance, Comcast-NBCU has a “duty to deal” its content to others on terms that regulators will police.  Of course, we already have many compulsory licenses in place in America, including one for traditional cable television, so it will be tempting for some to say, ‘why not one for online video, too?’  But it seems like this would have been a good time to give good ol’ fashion market competition and contractual negotiations a chance instead.  After all, where is the harm here?  If NBC’s content is supposedly so valuable that Comcast will exploit it in future online video negotiations, why hasn’t NBC been exploiting that content for years already?

Of course, this exposes the real irony of all this hand-wringing about the Comcast-NBCU deal: It’s a fight about supposedly “Must See TV” that not everyone feels they must see anymore!  Don’t get me wrong, NBCU does have some wonderful content in its stable of properties, and Comcast is no doubt happy to have something better than the Golf Channel under it’s corporate umbrella now.  But, seriously, would the Earth spin of its axis tomorrow if Comcast suddenly decided to try to lock up all its new NBC content and refuse to deal with anyone else on equal terms?  That would be highly unlikely, of course, since it would be economic suicide to restrict access to a single platform. But if they did, would anyone really care?   In the modern world of content abundance and distribution platform diversity, it’s hard to image most consumers would.  Comcast has bet the farm on the opposite theory — that NBCU content is still hotly demanded and will add real value to the company — and yet, even without the onerous conditions it has been forced to agree to here, the firm must know just how risky this move is for them and their shareholders.  Those who lost their shirts on the failed AOL-TimeWarner and NewsCorp-DirecTV deals can attest to how illusive those so-called “synergies” can be when two very different media operations and cultures are merged. [Read my old paper on “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria” for all the grim details on those deals and how they went south so quickly.]

Finally, perhaps the most interesting provision in the FCC’s order is the requirement that Comcast-NBCU “makes comparable programming available on economically comparable prices, terms, and conditions to an [online video distributors] that has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of Comcast-NBCU’s peers.” As I read it, what this means is that when competing content companies — such as Disney, News Corp., Viacom, etc. — cut deals with an online video distributors, it establishes a precedent for what is expected of Comcast-NBCU when they go to strike terms and prices with OVDs.  How long will it be before this provision leads to accusations of collusion among major content companies?!  Moreover, this provision is somewhat insulting since it basically assumes all content is created equal when that is most definitely not the case.  When Disney is negotiating with an OVD to carry ESPN, should that deal really have any bearing on Comcast cutting a deal with someone for the Golf Channel or Versus?

There are many other provisions and conditions that I haven’t bothered detailing here, including program “localism” mandates, broadband deployment and pricing requirements, program “diversity” requirements, children’s television mandates, more “PEG” programming requirements, and more.  But wait, you ask: won’t all these provisions and the others discussed above benefit consumers?  It’d be nice to imagine that the FCC could work such magic by waving its regulatory wand and trying to mandate consumer benefits into existence by decree. And perhaps some of these requirements will help some consumers in a marginal way.  In reality, however, healthy companies are the better way to serve customers with new and better services.  Hamstringing merging entities with layers of red tape like this is particularly misguided in light of how much money is being spent to make the deal happen.  Finally, regulators should just be happy that someone out there wanted to take over NBC and help the struggling media operator rebound!  If regulators are really concerned about the future of  “localism” or the health of traditional media operators like NBC more generally, asking for a pound of flesh through a set of “voluntary” concessions like these isn’t a good way to achieve that goal.

As I noted in my recent paper, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC,” every time a media merger is proposed we hear all sorts of silly Chicken Little predictions of impending doom. Among the more entertaining claims we hear are conspiracy theories about supposed nefarious schemes to take over the media universe and control our minds,  predictions of the death of journalism or democracy, or just good ol’ fashion screw-the-consumer price hikes. But, as I showed in my paper, those predictions have always proven to be bunk once the historical record is in–which usually only takes a few years. While most media mergers do end in misery–it’s for the merging firms and their shareholders, not the public. Unforeseen technological innovations and expanding media marketplace options typically doom most media mergers, while the viewing and listening public enjoys the fruits of continued marketplace evolution.

But the critics never acknowledge any of this. And, sadly, history repeats. The media worrywarts just keep mouthing the same lines and conveniently avoid any reference to their past predictions. No one bothers looking back and trying to match up those past predictions with present day facts. I’m out to change that.  I am going to attempt to keep a running inventory all the Chicken Little predictions about the Comcast-NBC Universal deal so that, a few years from now, we can look back and see how well those predictions match up with reality.  I suspect that, as was true of those earlier case studies, reality will look quite different than the rhetoric we are hearing today.

To kick things off, here are some rather outlandish comments from someone who should know better — Dan Gillmor, author of the excellent 2006 book, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People, which I have cited quite favorably in much of my own work through the years.  But when it comes to the Comcast-NBCU deal, Gillmor has gone off the deep end in an essay entitled, “Comcast-NBC: The Road Toward Control Over What We Create.” He argues:

A Comcast-NBC combination is brazenly anti-competitve and anti-democratic. It would give one company far too much ownership over not just professionally produced media but also the ways media consumers can receive it. Worse, if approved, it could mark the tipping point in Big Media’s push to take control over the Internet itself. That’s where we need to focus our attention.

But wait, there’s more…

it will be in Comcast’s financial interest to clamp down as much as possible on Internet data use when it conflicts with its cable-TV business, which is to say on a constant basis.

Oh my. This is quite a scary story. A Hollywood script could be born of all this! But, then again, Comcast-NBCU would quash that script and forever bury it from our sight, right?

I fear Gillmor has been drinking up some of the “perfect control” fantasies bandied about by his Harvard Berkman Center colleagues Lawrence Lessig and Jonathan Zittrain, which I have documented here before. These guys have claimed that a variety of digital players–AOL in the ’90s and Apple today–would crush our digital liberties and snuff out competition and dissent.

These tales are all fiction, of course. In my paper, I document just how quickly the much-ballyhooed AOL-Time Warner merger fell apart. When AOL-Time Warner announced their mega-merger, critics forecast “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.” Just two years after the deal was announced, AOL-Time Warner had lost over $100 billion in shareholder value and Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether. And AOL is now being spun off altogether. So much for “perfect control.”

But what about Gillmor’s claim that Comcast will clamp down on all content that conflicts with its cable TV business model?  Rubbish. If they were going to do that, wouldn’t we have seen some evidence by now? And good luck trying even if they really wanted to do so.  It’s impossible for them to lock down content flows. There’s always another way for information and content to flow in our modern media marketplace. Indeed, Gillmor completely undercuts his own argument on this point when noting:

Keep in mind that Comcast wouldn’t be the first company to have this kind of vertical content and distribution structure. Time Warner owns some cable franchises along with CNN and other media properties; Cablevision has its own content business. Phone companies have some projects under way, too.

Yes, Dan, and what do those experiments tell us?!   Have you been subjected to some sort of sadistic mind control by the nefarious media overlords who own both content and conduit?  Or did you somehow just avoid the brain-washing because you have access to super-secret information sources outside their control? Please, do tell us. I am dying to know the “truth” that our wicked media overlords are keeping from us!

Sorry to be so snarky, but I am just really tired of this nonsense.  There has been no “takeover” over the media marketplace or our minds by these media companies.  Hell, these media companies can’t even figure out how to tie their own digital shoelaces most days of the week. They are scrambling to find something– anything–that works to counter to tsunami of digital devices, online options, and so on, that they were largely unprepared for. Mergers and alliances are one response to this storm, but there is no guarantee they will pan out. Most don’t. But, again, they typically don’t work out for the companies and their shareholders; the public largely ignores their pain and continues to benefit from a marketplace of rapidly expanding options and alternatives.

Anyway, please help me continue to document claims such as these so I can build a record and then match it up with reality later down the road.  It’s important that public policy be based on facts, not fanaticism.

Bidding has begun on Comcast’s acquisition of a majority stake in NBC Universal.  No, not the bidding between GE and Comcast over the terms of the sale.   That was the comparatively easy part.  The real bidding is over at the FCC, as various interests work to get concessions and pledges from Comcast as a condition of FCC approval of the deal.   The jostling may put post-Thanksgiving Black Friday sales to shame.   Everything from more kid’s shows to broadband open access mandates are potentially on the table.

And that’s if the sale is approved by the FCC at all.   Groups such as Free Press called for its rejection as soon as it was announced.   Commissioner Michael Copps underscored the alpine nature of the approval process, stating bluntly that the deal “faces a very steep climb with me.”

Amidst the din, however, one question has been drowned out:  Why is the FCC involved in this at all?

It’s not an idle question.   The FCC does not, and never has, had general authority to approve or deny mergers in the media world.   In fact, major major deals — such as News Corporation’s purchase of the Wall Street Journal — didn’t involve the FCC at all (to Mr. Copps’ dismay.)

The FCC’s hook into such deals is in fact quite narrow:  the transfer of spectrum licenses.    And such transfers are a surprisingly small aspect of the deal.   None of the  key assets being purchased, Universal Studios, MSNBC or the other cable channels, or even the NBC network itself, is FCC-licensed (though some units may hold stray licenses for ancillary purposes).

In fact, the only significant licenses among NBC’ Universal’s assets may  be the broadcast licenses owned by NBC’s 10 owned-and-operated local stations.  And these are hardly the crown jewels of the transaction.    While Comcast may value the content provided by Universal or CNBC, why would it want broadcast stations?   After investing billions in a digital cable network, what earthly use does it have for towers and antennas?   It would be like American Airlines buying a stagecoach line to supplement its transportation network. 

Yet, based on this thin reed, the FCC has gained approval authority over the entire NBC Universal transaction.   It is of course, not the only agency that must approve — the the Federal Trade Commission or Department of Justice must also review it (which of the two is still to be decided).   These agencies are not pushovers, and their OK should be sufficient to answer any concerns about harm to competition from the deal.  

It would be bad enough if the FCC merely duplicated the FTC or DOJ reviews.   The additional delays alone could kill many deals — famously, it took the Commission 505 days to approve the merger of Sirius and XM Radio.   But the harm goes beyond that.   Unlike the antitrust authorities, who base their review upon established law, the FCC uses a free-roaming and undefined “public interest” test.   As a result, the FCC’s reviews are largely unconstrained, and approval or rejection can be based upon virtually any factor that three of five commissioners find to be plausible.   The result is a highly unpredictable, and political, process in which anybody can propose their own wish list of conditions and rationales.

It makes one wonder why Comcast didn’t just say “no thank you” to the local broadcast albatrosses.   But the bigger problem is with the law that gives the FCC such unneccessary and unconstrained power in the first place.   Its unlikely for the moment, however, that Congress will be inclined to take away that power, or that the FCC will not use it.   So it looks like the bidding will continue.

Stay tuned.

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on. True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money. Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_GroupsStatement-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

In her latest column, Media Post media market guru Diane Mermigas wonders how long it will be before we see a traditional over-the-air (OTA) broadcast TV network (like ABC, NBC, CBS, or Fox) dump their old broadcast business altogether and just move all their properties to cable and satellite TV. And, in response to Mermigas, Cory Bergman of Lost Remote argues, as I did last week, “the real future of TV is not linear cable, but non-linear video delivered seamlessly via IP to multiple devices, including your TV set. But mass adoption of this approach is still several years away.”

Bergman is right. It would be foolish to think any traditional network is going to rely exclusively on IP-based distribution any time soon; they see it as more of a compliment (or another product window). But Mermigas may be on to something in predicting that broadcast networks may soon be looking to get out of the OTA television business altogether and essentially become “a glorified general entertainment cable network.”

The strain on their dysfunctional paradigm is emanating from a devastating recession and the ongoing digital revolution. Both are permanently altering the rules of play for the networks. A case can be made for at least one of the Big 4 broadcast networks emerging as a glorified general entertainment cable network within the next several years. The economic advantages: more steady ad revenues and consistent subscriber fees as content is distributed cross-platform. It would be a bold move that a free-spirited company such as News Corp. might already be contemplating for its Fox Broadcast TV Network, or NBC Universal for its peacock network. Industry analysts increasingly wonder how an independent CBS can prattle on under the crumbling old rules. In a world of exploding access and choices, the prime-time ratings (even with Live plus 3 configurations) spell diminishing returns. For Disney, ABC’s general entertainment status is on par with ESPN in sports; the new multi-platform model is in place except for formally moving the ABC TV Network to the cable side of the ledger.

Such a suggestion would have been considered outlandish even just a few years ago, but now it seems like it’s only a matter of time before one of the majors makes the jump to being a cable-exclusive “super-station.” It’s another sign of the radical metamorphosis underway in our modern media marketplace. Mermigas notes that “The most compelling argument for the Big 4 surviving as cable networks is economic”:

Digital distribution is a long way from yielding the financial returns needed to offset the dilution of old-line mainstream revenues. The vulnerability of the broadcast networks’ $9 billion in upfront ad revenues will be starkly evident next spring amid the protracted recession. Major ad categories–such as autos, financials, real estate and retail–will be markedly altered in their spending as well as structure. The Big 3 U.S. automakers account for 6% of the Big 3 broadcast networks’ ad revenues (9% for Fox) and 2.5% of cable networks’ overall advertising (7% for ESPN). On the cost side, less than 30% of core expenses can be eliminated from program production budgets and legacy operations, which means that the entire broadcast network dynamic must be reengineered. Despite all the complications, the easiest, most efficient business model conversion would be to reset broadcast networks as general entertainment cable networks. […]

While the most competitive cable networks have closed the ratings gaps with broadcast networks, they still fail to command similar ad unit prices. Prices have failed to reflect changed value propositions; that dilemma will be resolved in a digital marketplace. Bottom line: the alignment of broadcast and cable networks is already in place. Cable’s niche appeal, parallel to the Internet’s special interest “long tail,” will continue to nudge advertisers, consumers and content providers toward a more fully monetized online business model.

It is my belief that this migration would have already been occurring had broadcast spectrum holders been granted flexible use and resale rights for their spectrum long ago. Unfortunately, the same old command-and-control system of spectrum regulation that the FCC put in place seven decades is still haunts us today. That system literally makes it a crime for television broadcasters to sell their existing spectrum for anything other than broadcast television. They can’t repurpose their spectrum for an alternative purpose. Nor can they sell it to someone else who might put it to different use (say, high-speed wireless broadband). Just think, if they would have had unambiguous property rights in their allocation, they might have had the incentive to already have thrown the switch on the plan to migrate their content from OTA to cable and satellite entirely.

Of course, that now may happen anyway for the reasons Mermigas suggests. And the migration of more and more content to the Internet will only speed that process along. It’s just a shame that regulation prevents markets from reallocating spectrum efficiently.

Finally, if the networks begin to make this jump, it raises another interesting question: What about the local broadcast television operators who are not owned by a major network? What’s going to happen to them?

Interesting days ahead.

Over at DrewClark.com, earlier today I reported today that television networks – which in recent years have had a strained relationship with local broadcasters on a variety of fronts – joined with the National Association of Broadcasters in calling for a time out on the politically simmering issue of “white spaces.” Here’s the start of the story, and you can read the full post at DrewClark.com

WASHINGTON, October 23 – The top executives of the four major broadcast networks on Thursday urged the head of the Federal Communications Commission to delay a vote on a politically simmering issue that pits broadcasters against Google and high-tech executives.

In the letter, the CEOs of CBS Corp., NBC Universal and Walt Disney, and the chief operating officer of News Corp., urge that the FCC exercise caution before taking irreparable action with regard to the vacant television channels known as “white spaces.”

Google and the other technology executives, including Microsoft, Motorola, Philips and others, want the FCC to authorize electronic devices that capable of transmitting internet signals over vacant television bands.

The network executives – CBS’s Leslie Moonves, Disney’s Robert Iger, NBC’s Jeffrey Zucker and Peter Chernin of News Corp. – want a time out.

They join their local broadcasting colleagues, as well as manufacturers and users of wireless microphones, like the National Football League and Boadway theater owners, who have been actively lobbying the issue.

[…]

Read the rest of the story at my blog, DrewClark.com – The Politics of Telecom, Media and Technology

Lately I’ve been writing about potentially historic upcoming First Amendment case of FCC v. Fox Television Stations. The Supreme Court will hear the case on Tuesday, November 4th. All the briefs in the case are in and can be found on the ABA website here. But I’ve pasted the links for all of them below as well. In coming days and weeks I might be highlighting some of the comments from the briefs. [The docket number for the case is 07-582]. The amicus brief I filed with my friends at CDT can be found here, and I wrote about it last week here on the TLF.

The FCC v. Fox case is the indecency case involving the FCC’s new policy for “fleeting expletives.” I wrote about the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision here. The full decision is here. The FCC v. Fox case could become the most important First Amendment-related Supreme Court case since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, which just turned 30 years old last month. Anyway, here are all the briefs in the case, starting with the merit briefs by the lead parties:

Merit briefs

• Brief for Petitioner Federal Communications Commission, et al.
• Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.
• Brief for Respondent Center for Creative Voices in Media, Inc.
• Brief for Respondent NBC Universal, Inc., NBC Telemundo License Co., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., and ABC, Inc.

Amicus briefs

• Brief for National Religious Broadcasters in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for Morality in Media, Inc., in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for Alliance Defense Fund and Family Research Council in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for the Parents Television Council in Support of Petitioner
• Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief for the Decency Enforcement Center for Television in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for the American Center for Law and Justice and United States Representatives Charles Pickering, Roscoe Bartlett, Kevin Brady, Paul Broun, Danny Davis, John Doolittle, Mary Fallin, Trent Franks, Wally Herger, Jim Jordan, Doug Lamborn, Kenny Marchant, Jeff Miller, Marilyn Musgrave, Joe Pitts, Mark Souder, Tim Walberg and Dave Weldon in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Liberties Union, American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Directors Guild of America, First Amendment Project, Minnesota Public Radio/American Public Media, the National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture, the National Coalition Against Censorship, the National Federation of Community Broadcasters, Pen American Center, and Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts in Support of Respondent
• Brief for Time Warner, Inc., in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the ABC Television Affiliates in Support of Respondent
• Brief for Public Broadasters in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the National Association of Broadcasters and Radio-Television News Directors Association in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology and Adam Thierer, Senior Fellow with the Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF) and the Director of PFF’s Center for Digital Media Freedom in Support of Respondent
• Brief for Former FCC Commissioners and Officials in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and the Media Institute in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the American Academy of Pediatrics, Benton Foundation, Children Now, National Institute On Media and the Family, Parent Teacher Association, and United Church of Christ, Office of Communications, Inc., in Support of Neither Party
• Brief for Free Press, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, New America Foundation, Participatory Culture Foundation, Cuwin Foundation, Ethos Group, ACORN Active Media Foundation, Freenetworks.Org, Monroe Price, Susan Crawford in Support of Neither Party

Along with my friends John Morris and Sophia Cope of the Center for Democracy & Technology, I have just submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the potentially historic free speech case FCC v. Fox, which will be heard in November.

[Reminder: The FCC v. Fox case is the indecency case involving the FCC’s new policy for “fleeting expletives.” I wrote about the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision here. The full decision is here. By contrast, the so-called “Janet Jackson case” — CBS v. FCC — took place in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and that court recently handed down a decision that also went against the FCC. I wrote about the Third Circuit’s decision here.]

The FCC v. Fox case could become the most important First Amendment-related Supreme Court case since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, which just turned 30 years old last month. Of course, it could be that the Supreme Court simply sticks to the procedural questions regarding whether the FCC moved too far, too fast in reversing it’s long-standing policy of restraint regarding “fleeting expletives.” That’s essentially what the Second Circuit did. On the other hand, the Supremes might reach the substantive First Amendment issues tied up in the Pacifica case. We just won’t know for sure until the case is handed down.

Regardless, in the joint CDT-PFF amicus brief filed today, we argue that the FCC has both gone too far procedurally and that “the time is rapidly approaching for this Court to find that broadcast, like the Internet and other means of mass communication, ‘is entitled to the highest protection from government intrusion’ and that there is no longer a factual ‘basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.'” Citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 863, 870.”

A more detailed summary of our argument follows below. Our brief contends that the “pervasiveness rationale,” which is the basis of the FCC’s authority to regulate broadcast programming, is being challenged by technological convergence, the proliferation of new media platforms, and the widespread availability of parental control technologies. Video content available over broadcast television is available over a variety of other platforms, such as the Internet and mobile devices, and an increasing number of households subscribe to satellite or cable video services. “With broadcast television being just one of the myriad of ways that people can access lawful content (including indecent content), it no longer makes sense from a constitutional or policy perspective to give broadcast speech less First Amendment protection,” we argue.

Parental controls, such as the V-Chip and set-top box controls, allow parents to block content they deem offensive or inappropriate. Better yet, the rise of VCRs, DVD recorders, video on demand, and digital video recorders means that parents can tailor media consumption to their specific needs and values. Those tools are widely available and provide a less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As a result, the FCC can no longer justify broadcast television content censorship on “pervasiveness” grounds. [I have written much more about that point here, here and here.]

Our joint brief also states that complaint data the FCC cites as justification for the expansion of indecency enforcement, has been inflated through accounting changes. These changes in the way the complaints are counted, which were only instituted for indecency complaints, are in violation of the APA. These complaints, mostly generated by a single advocacy group, cannot be a substitute for an analysis of “community standards” and essentially represent a “heckler’s veto” that violates the First Amendment rights of other viewers.

The brief also cites the Commission’s inconsistent analysis of what it deems “indecent” as a violation of both the First Amendment rights of broadcasters and the APA. The inconsistency in what the FCC finds as indecent has a chilling effect on the free expression of content providers and provides inadequate guidance to broadcasters, which is required under FCC statutes.

The CDT-PFF brief can be found online here and I have also embedded the document below via the Scribd reader. [And those interested in this case might also be interested my recent law review article: “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age.”]

Incidentally, other briefs that have been filed in the matter can be found here. And, last month, I wrote about how personally troubled I was about the lack of support from liberals who have already filed in this case. See: “Liberals Abandoning the First Amendment, Part 3: The Fox Case.”

Faithful readers will recall that, several months ago, I penned a 7-part “Media Metrics” series that took a hard look at the health of the media marketplace. Today, the Progress & Freedom Foundation is releasing a greatly expanded version of these essays that I have put together with my PFF colleague Grant Eskelsen. In this 100-page special report, “Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace,” we begin by noting that heated debates about the state of the media marketplace continue to rage in Washington, and opinions seem to range from grim to outright apocalyptic. As we note on pg. 1:

Many people—including a large number of legislators and regulators—argue that America’s media marketplace is in a miserable state. Some claim that citizens lack choice in media outlets and that options are just as scarce as ever. Others believe that media “localism” is dead or that many groups or niches go underserved because of a lack of true “diversity” in media. Others argue that the market is hopelessly over-concentrated in the hands of a few evil media barons who are hell-bent on force-feeding us corporate propaganda. And still others say that the quality of news and entertainment in our society has deteriorated because of a combination of all of the above. It all sounds quite troubling, but is any of it true?

After taking an objective look at the true state of America’s media marketplace, we conclude that such pessimism is unwarranted. Indeed, a careful review of the facts reveals that—contrary to what those media critics suggest—we have more media choice, more media competition, and more media diversity than ever before. Indeed, to the extent there was ever a “golden age” of media in America, we are living in it today. The media sky has never been brighter and it is getting brighter with each passing year. We come to this conclusion by looking beyond the rhetoric that has for too long governed debates about media in American and providing a comprehensive look at a variety of media sectors such as audio, video, print and online media. Our survey contains over 70 charts and exhibits illustrating facts and figures on such diverse topics as advertising revenue, company market share, audience trends, and areas of growth in the sector. We will also aim to periodically updated the report to reflect the rapidly evolving media industry.

We encourage readers to provider input about how to improve and expand the report going forward in an attempt to refine and improve the metrics. And we look forward to future debates on this subject–debates that we hope will be guided by facts instead of fanaticism and by evidence instead of emotion. The hyperbolic rhetoric, shameless fear-mongering, and unsubstantiated claims that have driven policy debates in recent years have no foundation in reality and should be rejected as the debate over media policy continues.

This and future installments of “Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace” will be available on the PFF website at www.pff.org/mediametrics. I have also embedded the entire document below as a Scribd file so that those interested in the topic can peruse the report immediately.