Here’s a new animated explainer video that I narrated for the Federalist Society’s Regulatory Transparency Project. The 3-minute video discusses how earlier “tech giants” rose and fell as technological innovation and new competition sent them off to what the New York Times once appropriately called “The Hall of Fallen Giants.” It’s a continuing testament to the power of “creative destruction” to upend and reorder markets, even as many pundits insist that there’s no possibility change can happen.

This is an important lesson for us to remember today, as I noted in the recent editorial for The Hill about why, “Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer“:

Those who worry about today’s largest tech giants becoming supposedly unassailable monopolies should consider how similar fears were expressed not so long ago about other tech titans, many of which we laugh about today. Just 14 years ago, headlines proclaimed that “MySpace Is a Natural Monopoly,” and asked, “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” We all know how that “monopoly” ceased to exist. At the same time, pundits insisted “Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone,” since “there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive.” The smartphone market of that era was viewed as completely under the control of BlackBerry, Palm, Motorola and Nokia. A few years prior to that, critics lambasted the merger of AOL and TimeWarner as a new corporate “Big Brother” that would decimate digital diversity and online competition.

Accordingly, policymakers should be humble and recognize that, “it’s better to let rivalry and innovation emerge organically,” and only bring in the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust regulation as a last resort, I argued. Technological change and entrepreneurialism has a way of upending and reordering markets when we least expect it. Just ask all those members of the Hall of Fallen Giants.

Mobile broadband is a tough business in the US. There are four national carriers–Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint–but since about 2011, mergers have been contemplated (and attempted, but blocked). Recently, the competition has gotten fiercer.  The higher data buckets and unlimited data plans have been great for consumers.

The FCC’s latest mobile competition report, citing UBS data, says that industry ARPU (basically, monthly revenue per subscriber), which had been pretty stable since 1998, declined significantly from 2013 to 2016 from about $46 to about $36. These revenue pressures seemed to fall hardest on Sprint, who in February, issued $1.5 billion of “junk bonds” to help fund its network investments. Analysts pointed out in 2016 that “Sprint has not reported full-year net profits since 2006.”  Further, mobile TV watching is becoming a bigger business. AT&T and Verizon both plan to offer a TV bundle to their wireless customers this year, and T-Mobile’s purchase of Layer3 indicates an interest in offering a mobile TV service.

It’s these trends that probably pushed T-Mobile and Sprint to announce yesterday their intention to merge. All eyes will be on the DOJ and the FCC as their competition divisions consider whether to approve the merger.

The Core Arguments

Merger opponents’ primary argument is what’s been raised several times since the 2011 AT&T-T-Mobile aborted merger: this “4 to 3” merger significantly raises the prospect of “tacit collusion.” After the merger, the story goes, the 3 remaining mobile carriers won’t work as hard to lower prices or improve services. While outright collusion on prices is illegal, they have a point that tacit collusion is more difficult for regulators to prove, to prevent, and to prosecute.

The counterargument, that T-Mobile and Sprint are already making, is that “mobile” is not a distinct market anymore–technologies and services are converging. Therefore, tacit collusion won’t be feasible because mobile broadband is increasingly competing with landline broadband providers (like Comcast and Charter), and possibly even media companies (like Netflix and Disney). Further, they claim, T-Mobile and Sprint going it alone will each struggle to deploy a capex-intensive 5G network that can compete with AT&T, Verizon, Comcast-NBCU, and the rest, but the merged company will be a formidable competitor in TV and in consumer and enterprise broadband.

Competitive Review

Any prediction about whether the deal will be approved or denied is premature. This is a horizontal merger in a highly-visible industry and it will receive an intense antitrust review. (Rachel Barkow and Peter Huber have an informative 2001 law journal article about telecom mergers at the DOJ and FCC.) The DOJ and FCC will seek years of emails and financial records from Sprint and T-Mobile executives and attempt to ascertain the “real” motivation for the merger and its likely consumer effects.

T-Mobile and Sprint will likely lean on evidence that consumers view (or soon will view) mobile broadband and TV as a substitute for landline broadband and TV. Much like phone and TV went from “local markets with one or two competitors” years ago to a “national market with several competitors,” their story seems to be, broadband is following a similar trajectory and viewing this as a 4 to 3 merger misreads industry trends.

There’s preliminary evidence that mobile broadband will put competitive pressure on conventional, landline broadband. Census surveys indicate that in 2013, 10% of Internet-using households were mobile Internet only (no landline Internet). By 2015, about 20% of households were mobile-only, and the proportion of Internet users who had landline broadband actually fell from 82% to 75%. But this is still preliminary and I haven’t seen economic evidence yet that mobile is putting pricing pressure on landline TV and broadband.

FCC Review

Antitrust review is only one step, however. The FCC transaction review process is typically longer and harder to predict. The FCC has concurrent  authority with the DOJ under the Clayton Act to review telecommunications mergers under Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act but it has never used that authority. Instead, the FCC uses its spectrum transfer review authority as a hook to evaluate mergers using the Communication Act’s (vague) “public interest standard.” Unlike antitrust standards, which generally put the burden on regulators to show consumer and competitive harm, the public interest standard as currently interpreted puts the burden on merging companies to show social and competitive benefits.

Hopefully the FCC will hew to a more rigorous antitrust inquiry and reform the open-ended public interest inquiry. As Chris Koopman and I wrote for the law journal a few years ago, these FCC  “public interest” reviews are sometimes excessively long and advocates use the vague standards to force the FCC into ancillary concerns, like TV programming decisions and “net neutrality” compliance.

Part of the public interest inquiry is a complex “spectrum screen” analysis. Basically, transacting companies can’t have too much “good” spectrum in a single regional market. I doubt the spectrum screen analysis would be dispositive (much of the analysis in the past seemed pretty ad hoc), but I do wonder if it will be an issue since this was a major issue raised in the AT&T-T-Mobile attempted merger.

In any case, that’s where I see the core issues, though we’ll learn much more as the merger reviews commence.

[Cross posted at Truthonthemarket]

As I have posted before, I was disappointed that the DOJ filed against AT&T in its bid to acquire T-Mobile.  The efficacious provision of mobile broadband service is a complicated business, but it has become even more so by government’s meddling.  Responses like this merger are both inevitable and essential.  And Sprint and Cellular South piling on doesn’t help — and, as Josh has pointed out, further suggests that the merger is actually pro-competitive.

Tomorrow, along with a great group of antitrust attorneys, I am going to pick up where I left off in that post during a roundtable discussion hosted by the American Bar Association.  If you are in the DC area you should attend in person, or you can call in to listen to the discussion–but either way, you will need to register here.  There should be a couple of people live tweeting the event, so keep up with the conversation by following #ABASAL.

Panelists: Richard Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, Boston Allen Grunes, Partner, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Washington Glenn Manishin, Partner, Duane Morris LLP, Washington Geoffrey Manne, Lecturer in Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland Patrick Pascarella, Partner, Tucker Ellis & West, Cleveland

Location:  Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. 1700 K St. N.W. Fifth Floor Washington, D.C. 20006

For more information, check out the flyer here.

Milton Mueller responded to my post Wednesday on the DOJ’s decision to halt the AT&T/T-Mobile merger by asserting that there was no evidence the merger would lead to “anything innovative and progressive” and claiming “[t]he spectrum argument fell apart months ago, as factual inquiries revealed that AT&T had more spectrum than Verizon and the mistakenly posted lawyer’s letter revealed that it would be much less expensive to expand its capacity than to acquire T-Mobile.”  With respect to Milton, I think he’s been suckered by the “big is bad” crowd at Public Knowledge and Free Press.  But he’s hardly alone and these claims — claims that may well have under-girded the DOJ’s decision to step in to some extent — merit thorough refutation.

To begin with, LTE is “progress” and “innovation” over 3G and other quasi-4G technologies.  AT&T is attempting to make an enormous (and risky) investment in deploying LTE technology reliably and to almost everyone in the US–something T-Mobile certainly couldn’t do on its own and something AT&T would have been able to do only partially and over a longer time horizon and, presumably, at greater expense.  Such investments are exactly the things that spur innovation across the ecosystem in the first place.  No doubt AT&T’s success here would help drive the next big thing–just as quashing it will make the next big thing merely the next medium-sized thing.

The “Spectrum Argument”

The spectrum argument that Milton claims “fell apart months ago” is the real story here, the real driver of this merger, and the reason why the DOJ’s action yesterday is, indeed, a blow to progress.  That argument, unfortunately, still stands firm.  Even more, the irony is that to a significant extent the spectrum shortfall is a product of the government’s own making–through mismanagement of spectrum by the FCC, political dithering by Congress, and local government intransigence on tower siting and co-location–and the notion of the government now intervening here to “fix” one of the most significant private efforts to make progress despite these government impediments is really troubling.

Anyway, here’s what we know about spectrum:  There isn’t enough of it in large enough blocks and in bands suitable for broadband deployment using available technology to fully satisfy  current–let alone future–demand.

Two incredibly detailed government sources for this conclusion are the FCC’s 15th Annual Wireless Competition Report and the National Broadband Plan.  Here’s FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski summarizing the current state of affairs (pdf):

The point deserves emphasis:  the clock is ticking on our mobile future. The FCC is an expert agency staffed with first-rate employees who have been working on spectrum allocation for decades – and let me tell you what the career engineers are telling me. Demand for spectrum is rapidly outstripping supply. The networks we have today won’t be able to handle consumer and business needs.

* * *

To avoid this crisis, the National Broadband Plan recommended reallocating 500 megahertz of spectrum for broadband, nearly double the amount that is currently available.

* * *

First, there are some who say that the spectrum crunch is greatly exaggerated – indeed, that there is no crunch coming. They also suggest that there are large blocks of spectrum just lying around – and that some licensees, such as cable and wireless companies, are just sitting on top of, or “hoarding,” unused spectrum that could readily solve that problem. That’s just not true.

* * *

The looming spectrum shortage is real – and it is the alleged hoarding that is illusory.

It is not hoarding if a company paid millions or billions of dollars for spectrum at auction and is complying with the FCC’s build-out rules. There is no evidence of non-compliance. . . . [T]he spectrum crunch will not be solved by the build-out of already allocated spectrum.

All of the evidence suggests that spectrum suitable for mobile broadband is scarce and growing scarcer.  Full stop.

It is troubling that critics–particularly those with little if any business experience–are so certain that even with no obvious source of additional spectrum suitable for LTE coming from the government any time soon, and even with exponential growth in broadband (including mobile) data use, AT&T’s current spectrum holdings are sufficient to satisfy its business plans (and its investors and stockholders).  You’d think AT&T would be delighted to hear this news–what we really need is a shareholder resolution to put Gigi Sohn on the board!

But seriously, put yourself in AT&T’s shoes for a moment.  Its long-term plans require the company to deploy significantly more spectrum than it currently holds in a reasonable time horizon (even granting Milton’s dubious premise that the company is squatting on scads of unused spectrum–remember that even if AT&T had all the spectrum sitting in its proverbial bank vault it would still be just about a third of the total amount of spectrum we’re predicted to need in just a few years).  Considering the various impediments of net neutrality regulation, congressional politics, presidential politics (think this had anything to do with claims about job losses from the merger, by chance?), reluctant broadcasters, the FCC, state PUCs, environmental groups and probably 10-12 others . . . the chances of being able to obtain the necessary spectrum and cell tower sitings in any other reasonable fashion were perhaps appropriately deemed . . . slim.

With the T-Mobile deal, on the other hand, “AT&T will gain cell sites equivalent to what would have taken on average five years to build without the transaction, and double that in some markets. AT&T’s network density will increase by approximately 30 percent in some of its most populated areas.” (Source).  I just don’t see how this jibes with the claim that the spectrum argument has fallen apart.

But there is a larger, “meta” point to make here, and it’s one that policy scolds and government regulators too often forget.  Even if none of that were true, as long as we don’t know for sure what is optimal and do know the DOJ is both a political organization made up of human beings operating not only under said ignorance but with incentives that don’t necessarily translate into “maximize social welfare” and also devoid of any actual “skin in the game,” I think the basic, simple, time-tested, logical and self-evident error cost principle counsels pretty firmly against intervention.  Humility, not hubris should rule the roost.

And that’s especially true since you know what will happen if the DOJ (or the FCC) succeeds in preventing AT&T from buying T-Mobile?  T-Mobile will still disappear and we’ll still be left with (according to the DOJ’s analysis) the terrifying prospect of only 3 national wireless telecom providers.  Only, in that case, everyone’s going to think a lot harder about investing in future developments that might warrant integration or cooperation or . . . well, the DOJ will challenge anything, so add to the list patent pools, too much success, not enough sharing, etc., etc.  And you wonder why I think this might constitute an assault on innovation?

Now, as for Milton’s specific claims, reminiscent of Public Knowledge’s and Free Press’ talking points, let me quote AT&T’s Public Interest Statement discussing its own particular spectrum holdings:

Because of the high demand for broadband service, AT&T already has had to deploy four carriers (for a total of 40 MHz of spectrum) for UMTS [3G] in some areas—and it will need to deploy more in the near future, even if doing so squeezes its GSM spectrum allocation and compromises GSM service quality . . . .  AT&T expects that, given the relative infancy of the LTE ecosystem and the time needed to migrate subscribers, it will need to continue to allocate spectrum to UMTS services for a substantial number of years—indeed, even longer than AT&T needs to continue allocating spectrum for GSM services.

* * *

AT&T has begun deployment of LTE services using its AWS and 700 MHz spectrum and currently plans to cover more than 250 million people by the end of 2013

* * *

AT&T projects it will need to use its 850 MHz and 1900 MHz spectrum holdings to support GSM and UMTS services for a number of years and, in the meantime, will not be able to re-deploy them for more spectrally efficient LTE services.

* * *

AT&T’s existing WCS spectrum holdings cannot be used for this purpose either, because the technical rules for the WCS band, such as limits on the power spectral density limits, make it infeasible to use that band for broadband service.

In other words, I don’t think AT&T has been (nor could it be, given the FCC’s detailed knowledge on the subject) hiding its spectrum holdings.  Instead, the company has been making quite clear that the spectrum it has is simply insufficient to meet anticipated demand.  And, well, duh!  Anyone who uses AT&T knows its network is overloaded.  Some of that’s because of tower-siting issues, some because it simply didn’t anticipate the extent of demand it would face.  I heard somewhere that no matter how hard they try to account for their perpetual under-accounting, every estimate by every mobile provider of anticipated spectrum needs in the past two decades or so has fallen short.  I’m quite sure that AT&T didn’t anticipate in 2007 that spectrum usage would increase by 8000% (yes, that’s thousand) by 2010.

Moreover, there will always (in any sensible system) be excess capacity at times–as it happens, at (conveniently) the times when spectrum usage is often counted–in order to deal with peak loads.  It is no more sensible to deploy capacity sufficient to handle the maximum load 100% of the time than it is to deploy capacity to handle only the minimum load 100% of the time.  Does that mean the often-unused spectrum is “excess”?  Clearly not.

Moreover (again), not all spectrum is in contiguous blocks sufficient to deploy LTE.  AT&T (at least) claims that is the case with much of its existing spectrum.  Spectrum isn’t simply fungible, and un-nuanced claims that “AT&T has X megahertz of spectrum and it is plenty” are just meaningless.  Again, just because Free Press says otherwise does not make it so.  You can simply discount AT&T’s claims if you like–I’m sure it’s possible they’re just lying; but you should probably be careful whose “information” you believe instead.

But, no, Milton, the spectrum argument did not “fall apart months ago.”  Gigi Sohn, Harold Feld and Sprint just said it did.  There’s a difference.

“Letter-Gate”

As for the infamous letter alleged to show that AT&T could expand LTE service from its previously-planned 80% of the country to the 97% it promises if the merger goes through for significantly less than it would cost to buy T-Mobile:  I don’t know exactly what its import is—but no one outside AT&T and, maybe, the FCC really does, either.  But I think a little sensible skepticism is in order.

First, for those who haven’t read it, the letter says, in relevant part:

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss AT&T’s current LTE deployment plans to reach 80 percent of the U.S. population by the end of 2013…; the estimated [Begin Confidential Information] $3.8 billion [End Confidential Information] in additional capital expenditures to expand LTE coverage from 80 to 97 percent of the U.S. population; and AT&T’s commitment to expand LTE to over 97 percent of the U.S. population as a result of this transaction.

That part, “$3.8 billion,” between the words “Begin Confidential Information” and “End Confidential Information” was supposed to be redacted, but apparently wasn’t when the letter was first posted to the FCC’s website.

While Public Knowledge and other critics of the deal would have you believe that this proves AT&T could roll-out nationwide LTE service for 1/10 of the cost of the T-Mobile deal, it’s basically impossible to tell what this number really means–except it certainly doesn’t mean that.

Claims about its meaning are actually largely content-less; nothing I’ve seen asks (or can possibly answer) whether the number in the letter was full cost, partial cost, annualized cost, based off of what baseline, etc., etc.  Moreover, unless I’m mistaken, nothing in the letter said anything at all about $3.8 billion being used to relieve congestion, meet future demand, increase speeds, reduce latency, expand coverage in urban areas, etc.  It seems to me that it’s referring to “additional” (additional to what?) capital expense to build infrastructure to make it even possible to offer LTE coverage to 97% of the U.S. population following the merger.  AT&T has from the outset said (bragged, more like it, because it’s supposed to bring lots of jobs and that’s what the politicians care about) that it planned to spend an “additional” $8 billion–additional to the $39 billion required to buy T-Mobile, that is–to build out its infrastructure as part of the deal.  But neither this letter nor any of AT&T’s statements (nor anyone with any familiarity with the relevant facts) has ever said it could or would have full-speed, LTE service available and up and running to 97% of the country for $3.8 billion or even $8 billion–or even merely $39 billion.  In fact, AT&T seemed to be saying that it was going to cost at least $47 billion to make that happen (and I can assure you that doesn’t begin to account for all the costs associated with integrating T-Mobile with AT&T once the $39 billion is out the door).

As I’ve alluded to above, deploying LTE service to rural areas is probably not as important for AT&T as increasing its network’s capacity in urban areas. The T-Mobile deal allows AT&T to alleviate the congestion problems experienced by its existing customers in urban areas more quickly than any other option–and because T-Mobile’s network is already up and running, that’s still true even if the federal government was somehow able to make tons of spectrum immediately available.  Moreover, with respect to the $3.8 billion, as I’ve discussed at length above, without T-Mobile’s–or someone’s!–additional spectrum and the miraculous removal of local government impediments to tower construction, pretty much no amount of money would enable AT&T to actually deliver LTE service to 97% of the country.  Is that what it would cost to build the extra pieces of hardware necessary to support such an offering?  That sounds plausible.  But actually deliver it? Hardly.

And just to play this out, let’s say the letter did mean just that — that AT&T could deliver real, fine LTE service to 97% of the country for a mere $3.8 billion direct, marginal outlay, even without T-Mobile.  It is still the case that none of us outsiders knows what such a claim would assume about where the necessary spectrum would come from and what, absent the merger, the effect would be on existing 3G coverage, congestion, pricing, etc., and what the expected ROI for such a project would be.  Elsewhere in the letter its author states that AT&T considered whether making this investment (without the T-Mobile merger) was prudent, and repeatedly rejected it.  In other words, all those armchair CEOs are organizing AT&T’s business and spending its money without the foggiest clue as to what the real consequences would be of doing so–and then claiming that, although, unlike them, actually in possession of the data relevant to such an assessment, AT&T must be lying, and could only justify spending $39 billion to buy T-Mobile as a means of securing its monopoly power.

And I think it’s important to gut check that claim, as well, as it’s what critics claim to fear (The Ma Bell from the Black Lagoon).  Unpacked, it goes something like this:

Given that:

1.  AT&T is going to spend $39 billion to buy T-Mobile;
2. It is going to spend $8 billion to build additional infrastructure;
3. Having bought T-Mobile, it is going to incur some ungodly amount of expense integrating T-Mobile’s assets and employees with its own;
4. It is going to incur huge, ongoing additional costs to govern a now-larger, more-complex organization;
5. It is going to continue to be regulated by the FCC and watched carefully by the DOJ and its unofficial consumer watchdog minions;
6. It will continue to face competition from its current largest and second-largest competitor;
7. It will continue to face entry threats from the likes of Dish and Lightsquared;
8. It will continue to face competition from fixed broadband offered by the likes of Comcast and Time Warner;
9. It will do all this quite publicly, under the watchful eyes of Congress and its union to whom it has made all manner of politically-expedient promises;

 Then it follows that:

1. Although it can’t muster the gumption to risk $3.8 billion to legitimately (it is claimed) extend full LTE coverage to 97% of the U.S. population, it nevertheless thinks it’s a sure bet that it will be able to recoup all of these expenditures, in this competitive and regulatory environment, by virtue of having thus taken out not its largest, not even its second-largest, but its smallest “national” competitor, and thereby having converted itself into an unfettered monopolist. QED.

The mind boggles.

So.  Back to Milton and his suggestion that I was wrong to claim that the DOJ’s action here is a threat to innovation and progress and his assertion that AT&T’s claims surrounding the benefits of the transaction fail to stand up to scrutiny:  C’mon, Miltons of the world!  Where’s your normally healthy skepticism?  I know you don’t like big infrastructure providers.  I know you’re angry your iPhone isn’t as functional as it is beautiful.  I know capitalists are only slightly more trustworthy than regulators (or is it the other way around?).  But why give in so credulously to the claims of the professional critics?  Isn’t it more likely that the deal’s critics are just blowing smoke here because they don’t like any consolidation?  It doesn’t take much research to understand (to the extent anyone can understand something so complex) the current state of the U.S. broadband market and its discontents–and why something like this merger is a plausible response.  And you don’t have to like, trust, or even stand the sight of any business executive to know that, however stupid or evil, he is still constrained by powerful market forces beyond his ken.  And “Letter-Gate” is just another pseudo-scandal contrived to suit an agenda of aggressive government meddling.

We all ought to be more wary of such claims, less quick to join anyone in condemning big as bad, and far less quick to, implicitly or explicitly, substitute the known depredations of the government for the possible ones of the market without a hell of a lot better evidence to do so.

As a rule of thumb, when I have to spend a given amount of time straightening out a company’s poor service or unscrupulous practices, I’ll spend an equivalent amount of time giving that company some payback. Today’s victim: T-Mobile. Fear the blog post.

A letter from Asurion Warranty Services arrived in my mail today thanking me for signing up for their “Premium Handset Protection Bundle” for T-Mobile phones.

Oh no I didn’t. It costs $5.99 a month for repair and replacement of my newly upgraded phone. That’s pretty much the price of a phone per year for such protections. Bad deal. I haven’t lost or damaged a phone in a decade, and I didn’t agree to get have this charge added to my phone bill.

I am on hold right now, trying to learn just how this got onto my bill. Friendly, helpful T-Mobile customer service people have told me that I should go down to the T-Mobile store where I upgraded in order to straighten this out. No I shouldn’t. T-Mobile should be straightening this out right now over the phone, with an apology and a thank you.

I am done with my 40-minute phone call, in which friendly customer service supervisor Kassidy K. (#1204178) tried to assign me the task Monday of calling the store where I upgraded my phone to get this straightened out. I explained to Kassidy K. that I’ve made the only call I need to—that’s the call we were on. Her next work-day is Wednesday, and I told her I expected to hear from her about this being cleared up.

If I have to make another call, it’s just as likely to be about returning my phone and canceling my service as getting this charge removed from my bill.

You people can argue all you want about top-down—whether the government should allow the AT&T-T-Mobile merger. I’ll do bottom-up—whether T-Mobile should get my business.

Is it “insane” for free market oriented thinkers to support the AT&T/T-Mobile merger?  Although AT&T says there are five choices of wireless providers to choose from in 18 of 20 major markets, Milton Mueller argues that 93 percent of wireless subscribers prefer a seamless, nationwide provider.  If the merger is approved, there would only be three such providers.

A market dominated by three major providers is neither competitive nor noncompetitive as a definitional matter.  Factual analysis is necessary to determine competitiveness.

And it may be premature to conclude that there is no competitive significance either to the fact there are over a hundred providers currently delivering nationwide service on the basis of voluntary roaming agreements that are common in the industry, or to assume that the possibility the FCC will double the amount of spectrum available for wireless services will not impact the structure of the industry.

The trouble with antitrust generally is the possibility that government will choose to protect weak or inefficient competitors, thus preventing meaningful competition that attracts private investment which leads to innovation, better services and lower prices.  Antitrust is supposed to protect consumers, not politically influential producers.  Although this sounds simple in theory, it can get confusing in practice.  As free market oriented thinkers, we do not want government picking winners and losers.

As Larry Downes correctly points out, if concentration leads to higher prices there will be more profits for competitors and more competition.  Schumpeter teaches that short-run monopolies come and go, while long-run monopolies are exceedingly rare – unless “buttressed by public authority.”

Mueller makes a couple other important points that reflect the thinking of a lot of people.  One is AT&T’s customer satisfaction ratings, prices and network performance.   This merger would provide extra spectrum the carrier needs to address each of these issues, however.

Although there are other ways to increase network capacity, they won’t be enough.  The National Broadband Plan notes that data traffic on AT&T’s mobile network increased 5,000% between 2006 and 2009.  According to the chairman of the FCC, “We need to tackle the looming spectrum crunch by dramatically increasing the new spectrum available for mobile broadband, and the efficiency of its use.”  That’s why the broadband plan is proposing to double the amount of spectrum available for wireless, a process that could take several years.  Historically, it has taken 6-13 years to reallocate spectrum.

Mueller also points out that AT&T cited network capacity issues when it opposed microwave-based competition in long-distance (in the 1960s).  AT&T has been criticized for the advocacy it used in those days.  The real problem the company faced then was being saddled with a pricing structure that was incompatible with competition, but policymakers were not about to change that.  Regulation mandated that AT&T charge high prices for long-distance to subsidize “affordable” ( i.e., at-or-below cost) local service.  That set up an attractive cream-skimming opportunity for potential competitors such as MCI.  The new entrant’s business plan was to compete for the fat long-distance profits and not get stuck with money-losing local service obligations.  That was a real problem.

Finally, Mueller suggests limited government intervention as a preventative for excessive government intervention.

If you support a competitive industry where one can reasonably expect the public and legislators to rely on market forces as the primary industry regulator, this merger has to be stopped. On the other hand, if you welcome the growing pressures for regulating carriers and making them the policemen and chokepoints for network control, a bigger AT&T is just what the doctor ordered.

A similar argument was made in the early 1980s with regard to local and long-distance service.  Regulate local so long-distance can be free.  This is so defeatist.  As free market thinkers, we need to stand for principle.  Unwarranted government intervention in the free market should be opposed.

If the FTC, Department of Justice and/or FCC do find that such a merger would substantially lessen competition, they could also impose specific conditions to ameliorate the impact – making it unnecessary to block a merger outright.  Minimum intervention ought to be the first choice for free market thinkers.

At this week’s excellent State of the Net 2011 event, I participated in a panel discussion about the future of the online video marketplace.  Unsurprisingly, a great deal of time was spent discussing the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) recent approval of the proposed merger of Comcast and NBC Universal (NBCU). On Tuesday, the agency voted 4-1 to approve the deal with myriad conditions and “voluntary” concessions being attached.  The FCC voted on the matter and issued a short press release and late today issued its final 279-page order.

The Commission’s Comcast-NBCU order represents an unprecedented regulatory shakedown of a company that obviously would have done just about anything to gain approval of the deal.  I believe the conditions the FCC has imposed on the deal, which are to run for seven years, are tantamount to a death by a thousand cuts for the deal and, ultimately, could lead to its failure.  That’s because the requirements placed on the new entity make it practically impossible for Comcast to leverage the content it is acquiring from NBCU and profit from it such that they can recoup the significant costs associated with the deal.

In essence, Comcast-NBCU was forced to preemptively surrender much of its intellectual property rights by agreeing to share most of their content properties with others on terms someone else will determine.  That’s a recipe for disaster.  If Comcast-NBCU doesn’t have the right and ability to cut deals on terms that they find advantageous to the company and its shareholders, then why go through with this deal at all? Isn’t the whole point of such a deal with get some additional in-house content properties — something Comcast almost completely lacked previously — such that it would have some content gems to highlight and leverage in an attempt to attract new customers (or just keep old ones)? If someone else is constantly setting the terms of their deals, it will limit the inherent value of the IP owned by Comcast-NBCU and sap most of the value from the deal.

Particularly concerning in this regard is the language of the FCC’s order dealing with online video marketplace. As a condition of approval, the FCC’s plan requires that Comcast-NBCU:

• Provides to all MVPDs, at fair market value and non-discriminatory prices, terms, and conditions, any affiliated content that Comcast makes available online to its own subscribers or to other MVPD subscribers.
• Offers its video programming to legitimate OVDs [online video distributors] on the same terms and conditions that would be available to an MVPD.
• Makes comparable programming available on economically comparable prices, terms, and conditions to an OVD that has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of Comcast-NBCU’s peers.
• Offers standalone broadband Internet access services at reasonable prices and of sufficient bandwidth so that customers can access online video services without the need to purchase a cable television subscription from Comcast.
• Does not enter into agreements to unreasonably restrict online distribution of its own video programming or programming of other providers.
• Does not disadvantage rival online video distribution through its broadband Internet access services and/or set-top boxes.
• Does not exercise corporate control over or unreasonably withhold programming from Hulu.

The first thing to note about this language is that, through a merger proceeding, the FCC has just inserted itself into the online video marketplace in a major way and began regulating it.  Not so long ago, the idea of the FCC regulating the Net and online video would have been scoffed at and rejected as outlandish.  But here we are now with the FCC knee-deep into the daily workings of the online marketplace without Congress ever having passed a law authorizing such a thing.

The second thing to note about those online video provisions is that they potentially foreshadow the rise of a compulsory license for online video distribution.  In essence, to use antitrust parlance, Comcast-NBCU has a “duty to deal” its content to others on terms that regulators will police.  Of course, we already have many compulsory licenses in place in America, including one for traditional cable television, so it will be tempting for some to say, ‘why not one for online video, too?’  But it seems like this would have been a good time to give good ol’ fashion market competition and contractual negotiations a chance instead.  After all, where is the harm here?  If NBC’s content is supposedly so valuable that Comcast will exploit it in future online video negotiations, why hasn’t NBC been exploiting that content for years already?

Of course, this exposes the real irony of all this hand-wringing about the Comcast-NBCU deal: It’s a fight about supposedly “Must See TV” that not everyone feels they must see anymore!  Don’t get me wrong, NBCU does have some wonderful content in its stable of properties, and Comcast is no doubt happy to have something better than the Golf Channel under it’s corporate umbrella now.  But, seriously, would the Earth spin of its axis tomorrow if Comcast suddenly decided to try to lock up all its new NBC content and refuse to deal with anyone else on equal terms?  That would be highly unlikely, of course, since it would be economic suicide to restrict access to a single platform. But if they did, would anyone really care?   In the modern world of content abundance and distribution platform diversity, it’s hard to image most consumers would.  Comcast has bet the farm on the opposite theory — that NBCU content is still hotly demanded and will add real value to the company — and yet, even without the onerous conditions it has been forced to agree to here, the firm must know just how risky this move is for them and their shareholders.  Those who lost their shirts on the failed AOL-TimeWarner and NewsCorp-DirecTV deals can attest to how illusive those so-called “synergies” can be when two very different media operations and cultures are merged. [Read my old paper on “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria” for all the grim details on those deals and how they went south so quickly.]

Finally, perhaps the most interesting provision in the FCC’s order is the requirement that Comcast-NBCU “makes comparable programming available on economically comparable prices, terms, and conditions to an [online video distributors] that has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of Comcast-NBCU’s peers.” As I read it, what this means is that when competing content companies — such as Disney, News Corp., Viacom, etc. — cut deals with an online video distributors, it establishes a precedent for what is expected of Comcast-NBCU when they go to strike terms and prices with OVDs.  How long will it be before this provision leads to accusations of collusion among major content companies?!  Moreover, this provision is somewhat insulting since it basically assumes all content is created equal when that is most definitely not the case.  When Disney is negotiating with an OVD to carry ESPN, should that deal really have any bearing on Comcast cutting a deal with someone for the Golf Channel or Versus?

There are many other provisions and conditions that I haven’t bothered detailing here, including program “localism” mandates, broadband deployment and pricing requirements, program “diversity” requirements, children’s television mandates, more “PEG” programming requirements, and more.  But wait, you ask: won’t all these provisions and the others discussed above benefit consumers?  It’d be nice to imagine that the FCC could work such magic by waving its regulatory wand and trying to mandate consumer benefits into existence by decree. And perhaps some of these requirements will help some consumers in a marginal way.  In reality, however, healthy companies are the better way to serve customers with new and better services.  Hamstringing merging entities with layers of red tape like this is particularly misguided in light of how much money is being spent to make the deal happen.  Finally, regulators should just be happy that someone out there wanted to take over NBC and help the struggling media operator rebound!  If regulators are really concerned about the future of  “localism” or the health of traditional media operators like NBC more generally, asking for a pound of flesh through a set of “voluntary” concessions like these isn’t a good way to achieve that goal.

I testified this morning in the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet at a hearing titled, “An Examination of the Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC Universal.” Among those testifying were Comcast Chairman and CEO Brian L. Roberts, and NBC Universal President and CEO Jeff Zucker.  Down below I have attached my brief remarks (we only had 5 minutes), but see the Scribd doc at the very bottom to also see the embedded charts. I also wrote a paper about the proposed deal back in December entitled, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC” as well as this editorial for Forbes.

____________

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Adam Thierer and I am the President of The Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF).

Although we are still early in this process, there has already been a great deal of hand-wringing and even some dire predictions about the pending merger of Comcast and NBC Universal. I hope to put this proposed marriage in some historical context and explain why the deal certainly won’t have the detrimental impact some critics fear, and also explain why it might even be one potential model for how to sustain traditional media going forward.

Beware Media Merger Hysteria

First, let’s remember that we’ve been here before. Paranoid predictions of a media apocalypse have accompanied the announcements of many previous media mergers, from AOL-Time Warner to News Corp.-DirecTV to XM-Sirius.[i] In these cases and almost all others, however, the “sky is falling” claims proved to be greatly overstated.[ii] The only “harm” that one could reasonably claim came from those mergers was not to consumers or content providers, but to the merging firms themselves and their shareholders. That’s because many mergers simply fail to create the sort of synergies and benefits originally hoped for and consequently die of natural causes over time.

Other firms, however, have found ways to make deals work and deliver important new services that previously were unimaginable or simply too expensive to offer alone.[iii] Regardless, the point here is that we’ll never know what works unless we permit marketplace experimentation with new and innovative business models.

“Gatekeeper” Myths: Why Restricting Content Options is Economic Suicide

Second, the fear that Comcast-NBCU will act as a “gatekeeper” over video content is also largely overblown—especially in light of the preemptive concessions they have already made on program access and carriage. But it’s important to realize that the merger will only marginally affect vertical integration in the cable marketplace. Currently, the percentage of cable channels owned by video distributors is in the single digits, and even after this merger it will only be in the teens.[iv] (See Exhibit 1) Stated differently, the vast majority of cable channels will be independent of Comcast-NBCU control.

More importantly, it’s hard to believe the new firm would restrict its content to just Comcast-owned distribution networks since they would be losing the eyeballs, advertisers, and revenues that would accompany the carriage of their content on other video platforms. Likewise, it would make little sense for the firm to block new or competing channels on their own platform since they would incur the wrath of the programmers and the viewing public alike. And those channels will likely quickly find a home elsewhere, which could incentivize subscribers to switch video service providers. (See Exhibits 2-6)

Indeed, the great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find what they want. Comcast faces increasingly robust competition in the video programming marketplace from satellite and telco providers, as well as from Internet-based video providers.^[v] (See Exhibit 7) And NBC Universal’s stable of programming, while impressive, is a mere trickle in an ocean of content that consumers can choose from.^[vi]

Meanwhile, many consumers are increasingly “cutting the cable cord” altogether and instead getting the video they want from a bewildering array of online video services.[vii] Netflix, Hulu, Joost, Roku, Apple, the Sony PlayStation Store, the Microsoft Xbox store, and others offer traditional TV fare while sites like YouTube, Vimeo and Justin.TV offer a mix of professional and amateur content.

In sum, there has never been so much competition for our eyes and ears, and audiences and advertising dollars have become increasingly fragmented as a result.[viii] (See Exhibits 8-10)

What Future for Broadcasting & Local News in Turbulent Times?

Finally, we need to realize that the ongoing digital revolution is upending many traditional media business models—especially advertising supported over-the-air broadcasting—and that alliances like Comcast-NBCU may be one blueprint for how traditional media operators can evolve and compete going forward.  With both the FCC and FTC currently investigating whether journalism is in trouble and what it might take to “save the news,” many media economists and industry analysts seem to agree that at least some degree of consolidation or collaboration might be necessary.

Consider last week’s news that NBC Universal saw quarterly profits plunge by a whopping 30% in the fourth quarter of 2009.[ix] This is indicative of the general downturn the entire media sector has been experiencing as of late.  Why not then let Comcast help NBCU try to get back on track rather than force them to make it on their own in a radically uncertain future?  And it goes without saying that Comcast might be better positioned to protect NBC Universal’s copyrighted content from digital piracy, at least over its own pipes.

Those who are concerned about the future of broadcasting and local news should remember that news—and local broadcast news in particular—isn’t cheap. Unless we want to embark on a massive government subsidization scheme to bailout traditional media providers, Congress and regulatory officials must be willing to grant private media operators the flexibility to restructure their business affairs so they can continue to provide important public needs while also turning a profit.[x] That can’t happen unless we allow media markets to evolve and let operators experiment with new business models and ownership structures.[xi] Although there are no guarantees, creator/distributor alliances like Comcast-NBCU may be one model that helps firms create, extend, and then also monetize their media content.  But, again, regulatory flexibility is crucial so we can figure out what works and what doesn’t.

Thank you again for inviting me here to testify.

[ii] Adam Thierer, A Media Morality Play, Forbes, Dec. 15, 2009, www.forbes.com/2009/12/14/media-merger-antitrust-opinions-contributors-adam-thierer.html

[iii] A good example: Disney’s seamless and successful integration of ABC Television Group (ABC + Disney cable properties), Walt Disney Studios, the Walt Disney Internet Group, its many ESPN properties, and its parks and resorts.

[iv] 2006 is the last for which the FCC has made data available, but as of that time the overall number of national programming networks available in America stood at 565 channels. That is up from just 70 channels in 1990, an astonishing increase in program choices.  The FCC noted that, “Of the 565 networks, 84 (14.9 percent) were vertically integrated, or affiliated, with at least one cable operator.” Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adopts 13^th Annual Report to Congress on Video Competition and Notice of Inquiry for the 14^thAnnual Report, Nov. 27, 2007, at 4, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A1.pdf What that summary fails to mention, however, is that vertical integration has fallen steadily since the FCC’s first Annual Video Competition Report was issued, when over 50 percent of all channels were affiliated with a cable operator. Indeed, the video marketplace exhibits less vertical integration than ever before. As far as vertically integrated industries go, no impartial observer would conclude that this industry is being controlled by “gatekeeper,” pay TV platforms, as some critics suggest. Most new pay TV channels today are independently owned and offer an unprecedented diversity of programming options. This trend is a strong sign of how healthy and vibrantly competitive this marketplace is today. Finally, these numbers do not take into account the split between Time Warner Entertainment and Time Warner Cable, which represented a significant portion of the 15% of vertically owned channels before 2006. That is the percentage of cable channels owned by video distributors is in the single digits today.

[v] Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Competition in a Digital Age, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet, U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Oct. 22, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2009/10-22-09-thierer-testimony-video-competition-digital-age.pdf

[vi] Adam Thierer, The Media Cornucopia, City Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 2007, at 84-89, www.city-journal.org/html/17_2_media.html

[vii] See generally The Progress & Freedom Foundation, “Cutting the Video Cord,” PFF Blog Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/cutting_the_video_cord/

[viii] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, PFF Special Report, Summer 2008), www.pff.org/mediametrics

[ix] David B. Wilkerson, NBC Quarterly Profit Plunges 30%, MarketWatch, Jan. 22, 2010.

[x] W. Kenneth Ferree, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Another Naïve Proposal for Government Entanglement with the Fourth Estate, PFF Blog, Feb. 1, 2010, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2010/02/another_naive_proposal_for_government_entanglement.html;  Adam Thierer, Socializing Media in Order to Save It, City Journal, March 27, 2009, www.city-journal.org/2009/eon0327at.html; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Public Option for Press Should Get the Red Pen, Progress Snapshot 6.4, Jan. 25, 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2010/ps6.4-OP-ED-for-Daily-Caller-A-Public-Option-for-the-Press.html

[xi] W. Kenneth Ferree, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Ownership Proceedings, Testimony before the Federal Communications Commission, Nov. 3, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2009/11-03-09-ferree-media-ownership-testimony.pdf; Adam Thierer, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (The Progress & Freedom Foundation, 2005), www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf

Testimony of Adam Thierer – House Hearing about Comcast-NBC Merger 2-4-10 http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

“It was then, and is now, the largest merger in American business history,” notes Tim Arango of the New York Times about the AOL-Time Warner mega-merger, which happen ten years this month. And yet, as he points out in his essay, “How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong,” things didn’t end up going so well for this marriage:

The trail of despair in subsequent years included countless job losses, the decimation of retirement accounts, investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department, and countless executive upheavals. Today, the combined values of the companies, which have been separated, is about one-seventh of their worth on the day of the merger. To call the transaction the worst in history, as it is now taught in business schools, does not begin to tell the story of how some of the brightest minds in technology and media collaborated to produce a deal now regarded by many as a colossal mistake.

Arango goes on to interview several of the principals involved in the deal to get their take on why things unfolded so miserably and, ultimately, came to an end this year. I highly recommend the essay because it should serve as a cautionary tale to those worrywarts who are constantly predicting that the sky is going to fall if we allow a truly free media marketplace–including freedom for firms to structure themselves as they wish.  Reality usually plays out quite differently.  As I argued in my recent paper, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC,”

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed.. mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders. But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence… Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy.

As I pointed out here before (see, “And so the Comcast-NBC Merger Hysteria Begins: Help Me Document It!“), every time a media merger is proposed we hear all sorts of silly Chicken Little predictions of impending doom as well as preposterous conspiracy theories about supposed nefarious schemes to take over the media universe and control our minds. For good measure, there’s also plenty of talk of “the death of deliberative democracy,” or efforts to weed out one sort of perspective or another.

As history has shown, it’s all complete bunk. But that doesn’t stop critics from concocting asinine theories about media providers seeking to “silence critics.”  Here’s two bits of Chicken Little-ism that I missed in my previous essay documenting this silliness.  First, over at Huffington Post, Marvin Ammori tells us that America is about to become Italy or Argentina because of the deal:

Putting so much power in the hands of one company–and, specifically, its executives–is dangerous for a democracy. There is a reason why autocratic regimes control the media–media shape public opinion and define what is “possible” in politics. We have seen the problem of private media consolidation in many countries. In Italy, Silvio Berlusconi used his massive media empire to win elections and is now Prime Minister (Italy’s longest serving ever). In Argentina, the government had to pass a media consolidation law because of the power of one media company that happens to be far smaller than a combined Comcast-NBCU.

And then we have Wade Norris writing about the deal over at the Daily Kos, saying: “If you don’t want to see the progressive voices on MSNBC silenced, then join the ‘no merger’ petition.”  Ah yes, another automated “stuff-the-online-complaint-ballot-box” petition.  I love those gimmicks.  But ignore fake complaints for a moment and focus on the accusations at hand here. The Ammori-Norris theory is: If Comcast and NBCU are allowed to marry (a) progressive voices will be driven off their platforms and (b) Silvio Berlusconi will take over America democracy will somehow suffer.  Is there really any truth to this?

I find both claims pretty outlandish. I mean, seriously, why would Comcast or NBC silence Rachel Maddow or Keith Olbermann , as Norris suggests in the title of his essay? What possible reason would they have to take two of their MSNBC superstars off the air?  Is that really good business? Would they win a new base of fans with that move? Are Fox News-loving conservatives suddenly going to jump ship and run over to MSNBC because of it?  Finally, can you imagine what a PR nightmare it would be for company?

Moreover, the thing that really kills me about this ‘Comcast-is-out-to-stifle-liberal-voices’ theory is that, for the last couple of years, I’ve heard conservatives whining about how Comcast is supposedly just another big backer of liberal causes. Well, which is it?  The truth it: neither.  Comcast is in the business of … business. They are not ideological puppet-masters hell-bent on steering our opinions one direction or the other.

It’s reminds me of the blather we sometimes hear about how Rupert Murdoch wants to brainwash citizens into subscribing to conservative causes. Whenever I hear that I always ask the accuser who made the movie “The Day After Tomorrow” — a piece of global warming propaganda that must even make the people at Greenpeace blush in embarrassment. Oh, that’s right… Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation financed and distributed that movie!  So, which does that prove: (A) Rupert Murdoch is hell-bent on programming our minds to accept the fact that global warming would result in a global freeze (how’s that work again?) and leave kids scurrying for the safety of New York City libraries (seriously, have you see that movie? That’s the plot!); or (B) Rupert Murdoch is out to entertain people and make money? If you answered B, congratulations for being a sensible person.  If you answered A, then click here now to start giving money to the Free Press!

By the way, if all these conspiracies had any credence and the mass media and online providers in America really were engaged in a Vast Right Wing Conspiracy to silence liberal voices, then someone needs to explain to me how Obama absolutely crushed the Right in the last election. Seriously, let’s hear your theory. How did he circumvent “the man” and get himself elected?

I’m sorry, but the asinine horror stories that currently dominate public policy discussions about media policy ( and net neutrality regulation , for that matter) have just gotten completely out of control. Sadly, we’ve been here before.  It reminds me of the entertaining debates that took place in Congress back in 2003, following the FCC’s announced plan to tweak media ownership rules.  I documented all the hysteria in this book, but here are some choice gems you may have missed:

• During the debate on the House floor over an amendment that would have overturned one element of the new FCC rules, Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif.) said the FCC’s tweaking of the rules was an attempt to impose a centralized “Saddam-style information system in the United States.”
• Rep. Maurice Hinchey (D-N.Y.) argued that media ownership deregulation amounted to “mind control” by Republicans who were trying to “dumb down” the public. “It’s a well thought out and planned effort to control the political process,” he argued and, “It will wipe out our democracy.” [Quoted in Terry Lane, “Hinchey Pushes Fairness Doctrine Bill to CWA,” Communications Daily, March 31, 2004, p. 9.]
• Rep. Markey jokingly introduced an amendment that would have deemed the new FCC cross-ownership rules to be “indecent” and require Commissioners who supported the rule to watch the movie Citizen Kane over and over again “until they flinch at the word ‘Rosebud.’” [Quoted in Terry Lane, “House Commerce Committee Raise ‘Indecency’ Fines to $500,000,” Communications Daily, March 4, 2004, p. 2.]
• Another lawmaker likened the FCC’s new rules to Soviet Union-esque control of the media.

I have come to believe that rational debate about media policy is simply impossible in this country. Facts have become utterly irrelevant.  It’s all about emotion and who can wear more of it on their sleeve.  And the Chicken Littles are really good at shouting louder than everyone else.

Some further reading:

• “A Media Morality Play”  [recent editorial I penned for Forbes about how Comcast-NBC deal and the fight over the future of media in this country]
• “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC” [recent PFF white paper documenting the reality about media mergers]
• “Should Consumers Fear the Comcast Deal? [a New York Times debate about the deal that Jim Harper and I took part in]
• The Media Cornucopia [an essay I penned for the City Journal a few years ago about the future of media policy]

As I noted in my recent paper, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC,” every time a media merger is proposed we hear all sorts of silly Chicken Little predictions of impending doom. Among the more entertaining claims we hear are conspiracy theories about supposed nefarious schemes to take over the media universe and control our minds,  predictions of the death of journalism or democracy, or just good ol’ fashion screw-the-consumer price hikes. But, as I showed in my paper, those predictions have always proven to be bunk once the historical record is in–which usually only takes a few years. While most media mergers do end in misery–it’s for the merging firms and their shareholders, not the public. Unforeseen technological innovations and expanding media marketplace options typically doom most media mergers, while the viewing and listening public enjoys the fruits of continued marketplace evolution.

But the critics never acknowledge any of this. And, sadly, history repeats. The media worrywarts just keep mouthing the same lines and conveniently avoid any reference to their past predictions. No one bothers looking back and trying to match up those past predictions with present day facts. I’m out to change that.  I am going to attempt to keep a running inventory all the Chicken Little predictions about the Comcast-NBC Universal deal so that, a few years from now, we can look back and see how well those predictions match up with reality.  I suspect that, as was true of those earlier case studies, reality will look quite different than the rhetoric we are hearing today.

To kick things off, here are some rather outlandish comments from someone who should know better — Dan Gillmor, author of the excellent 2006 book, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People, which I have cited quite favorably in much of my own work through the years.  But when it comes to the Comcast-NBCU deal, Gillmor has gone off the deep end in an essay entitled, “Comcast-NBC: The Road Toward Control Over What We Create.” He argues:

A Comcast-NBC combination is brazenly anti-competitve and anti-democratic. It would give one company far too much ownership over not just professionally produced media but also the ways media consumers can receive it. Worse, if approved, it could mark the tipping point in Big Media’s push to take control over the Internet itself. That’s where we need to focus our attention.

But wait, there’s more…

it will be in Comcast’s financial interest to clamp down as much as possible on Internet data use when it conflicts with its cable-TV business, which is to say on a constant basis.

Oh my. This is quite a scary story. A Hollywood script could be born of all this! But, then again, Comcast-NBCU would quash that script and forever bury it from our sight, right?

I fear Gillmor has been drinking up some of the “perfect control” fantasies bandied about by his Harvard Berkman Center colleagues Lawrence Lessig and Jonathan Zittrain, which I have documented here before. These guys have claimed that a variety of digital players–AOL in the ’90s and Apple today–would crush our digital liberties and snuff out competition and dissent.

These tales are all fiction, of course. In my paper, I document just how quickly the much-ballyhooed AOL-Time Warner merger fell apart. When AOL-Time Warner announced their mega-merger, critics forecast “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.” Just two years after the deal was announced, AOL-Time Warner had lost over $100 billion in shareholder value and Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether. And AOL is now being spun off altogether. So much for “perfect control.”

But what about Gillmor’s claim that Comcast will clamp down on all content that conflicts with its cable TV business model?  Rubbish. If they were going to do that, wouldn’t we have seen some evidence by now? And good luck trying even if they really wanted to do so.  It’s impossible for them to lock down content flows. There’s always another way for information and content to flow in our modern media marketplace. Indeed, Gillmor completely undercuts his own argument on this point when noting:

Keep in mind that Comcast wouldn’t be the first company to have this kind of vertical content and distribution structure. Time Warner owns some cable franchises along with CNN and other media properties; Cablevision has its own content business. Phone companies have some projects under way, too.

Yes, Dan, and what do those experiments tell us?!   Have you been subjected to some sort of sadistic mind control by the nefarious media overlords who own both content and conduit?  Or did you somehow just avoid the brain-washing because you have access to super-secret information sources outside their control? Please, do tell us. I am dying to know the “truth” that our wicked media overlords are keeping from us!

Sorry to be so snarky, but I am just really tired of this nonsense.  There has been no “takeover” over the media marketplace or our minds by these media companies.  Hell, these media companies can’t even figure out how to tie their own digital shoelaces most days of the week. They are scrambling to find something– anything–that works to counter to tsunami of digital devices, online options, and so on, that they were largely unprepared for. Mergers and alliances are one response to this storm, but there is no guarantee they will pan out. Most don’t. But, again, they typically don’t work out for the companies and their shareholders; the public largely ignores their pain and continues to benefit from a marketplace of rapidly expanding options and alternatives.

Anyway, please help me continue to document claims such as these so I can build a record and then match it up with reality later down the road.  It’s important that public policy be based on facts, not fanaticism.

Bidding has begun on Comcast’s acquisition of a majority stake in NBC Universal.  No, not the bidding between GE and Comcast over the terms of the sale.   That was the comparatively easy part.  The real bidding is over at the FCC, as various interests work to get concessions and pledges from Comcast as a condition of FCC approval of the deal.   The jostling may put post-Thanksgiving Black Friday sales to shame.   Everything from more kid’s shows to broadband open access mandates are potentially on the table.

And that’s if the sale is approved by the FCC at all.   Groups such as Free Press called for its rejection as soon as it was announced.   Commissioner Michael Copps underscored the alpine nature of the approval process, stating bluntly that the deal “faces a very steep climb with me.”

Amidst the din, however, one question has been drowned out:  Why is the FCC involved in this at all?

It’s not an idle question.   The FCC does not, and never has, had general authority to approve or deny mergers in the media world.   In fact, major major deals — such as News Corporation’s purchase of the Wall Street Journal — didn’t involve the FCC at all (to Mr. Copps’ dismay.)

The FCC’s hook into such deals is in fact quite narrow:  the transfer of spectrum licenses.    And such transfers are a surprisingly small aspect of the deal.   None of the  key assets being purchased, Universal Studios, MSNBC or the other cable channels, or even the NBC network itself, is FCC-licensed (though some units may hold stray licenses for ancillary purposes).

In fact, the only significant licenses among NBC’ Universal’s assets may  be the broadcast licenses owned by NBC’s 10 owned-and-operated local stations.  And these are hardly the crown jewels of the transaction.    While Comcast may value the content provided by Universal or CNBC, why would it want broadcast stations?   After investing billions in a digital cable network, what earthly use does it have for towers and antennas?   It would be like American Airlines buying a stagecoach line to supplement its transportation network. 

Yet, based on this thin reed, the FCC has gained approval authority over the entire NBC Universal transaction.   It is of course, not the only agency that must approve — the the Federal Trade Commission or Department of Justice must also review it (which of the two is still to be decided).   These agencies are not pushovers, and their OK should be sufficient to answer any concerns about harm to competition from the deal.  

It would be bad enough if the FCC merely duplicated the FTC or DOJ reviews.   The additional delays alone could kill many deals — famously, it took the Commission 505 days to approve the merger of Sirius and XM Radio.   But the harm goes beyond that.   Unlike the antitrust authorities, who base their review upon established law, the FCC uses a free-roaming and undefined “public interest” test.   As a result, the FCC’s reviews are largely unconstrained, and approval or rejection can be based upon virtually any factor that three of five commissioners find to be plausible.   The result is a highly unpredictable, and political, process in which anybody can propose their own wish list of conditions and rationales.

It makes one wonder why Comcast didn’t just say “no thank you” to the local broadcast albatrosses.   But the bigger problem is with the law that gives the FCC such unneccessary and unconstrained power in the first place.   Its unlikely for the moment, however, that Congress will be inclined to take away that power, or that the FCC will not use it.   So it looks like the bidding will continue.

Stay tuned.

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on. True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money. Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_GroupsStatement-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

It’s over.   The FCC, which voted to approve the merger between satellite radio firms XM and Sirius two weeks ago, finally released its formal report on the case on Tuesday, ending the drama 505 days after the firms submitted their application to the Commission.

The episode was not the FCC’s finest hour.  The agencies once-vaunted “shot clock” — by which the FCC pledged to decide on mergers within 180 was left in shreds, with the counter going around almost three times before the circus finally ended.   Even at that, XM and Sirius managed to claw their way to approval only by making an (ever-longer) series of “voluntary” commitments:  including offering “a la carte” programming, capping prices for 36 months, making 8% of its capacity available to others to non-commercial and other entities, and extending service to Puerto Rico.   Even more was being considered when the music stopped, including a proposal to require all satellite radio receivers to have built-in HD broadcast tuners as well. (Apparently, there was concern that broadcasters would be frozen out of the audio market, in which they hold a market share of about 96 percent).

This regulatory free-for-all contrasts with the approach taken by the Department of Justice, which — after a fact-specific inquiry, approved the merger –  without conditions – five months ago.

This difference is more than a one-off burp, some momentarily loss of focus, over at the FCC.  The difference is a long-standing  one.  The statutory changes, and institutional culture, of the two agencies is vastly different.  The DOJ, is charged with enforcing competition laws, using a fairly well-accepted set of guidelines and economic principles.  And, for all its faults, its considerations  tend to be economic and factual in nature.   The FCC, by contrast, is a political animal, besieged – and often co-opted – by competing industries and interests.   And its statute allows it to go beyond questions of competition and consumer choice to open-ended and undefined inquiries as to what is in the “public interest.”

The problem is not a new one.   Former Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth has long railed against what he has called the FCC’s “policy exploits masquerading as merger reviews.”

Rather than another round of reform of the FCC’s merger processes, the answer is to scrap the FCC’s merger review authority entirely.   The effects of mergers on consumers and competition are sufficiently, and best, weighed by the competition authorities.  Broader public interest factors — if those can ever be defined — are better addressed in a broader policy context, not in the hothouse atmosphere of a merger review.

Don’t expect the FCC to be stripped of its role anytime soon, however.   The sad reality is that, while most everyone who has seen an FCC merger review up close knows the problems, after it’s over no one has an interest in fixing it.   The newly-christened Xm Sirius certainly has no dog in that fight.  CEO Mel Karmazin no doubt hopes he will never go through an FCC merger review again.  Moreover, for most firms, FCC merger authority may be just as likely to be a useful weapon against competitors as a threat to their own plans.

So despite the XM Sirius debacle, expect the circuses to go on.  And on.   And on.