liability – Technology Liberation Front https://techliberation.com Keeping politicians' hands off the Net & everything else related to technology Thu, 03 Apr 2025 23:20:10 +0000 en-US hourly 1 6772528 Gonzalez v Google, Section 230 & the Future of Permissionless Innovation https://techliberation.com/2022/12/09/gonzalez-v-google-section-230-the-future-of-permissionless-innovation/ https://techliberation.com/2022/12/09/gonzalez-v-google-section-230-the-future-of-permissionless-innovation/#comments Fri, 09 Dec 2022 13:15:15 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=77066

Over at Discourse magazine this week, my R Street colleague Jonathan Cannon and I have posted a new essay on how it has been “Quite a Fall for Digital Tech.” We mean that both in the sense that the last few months have witnessed serious market turmoil for some of America’s leading tech companies, but also that the political situation for digital tech more generally has become perilous. Plenty of people on the Left and the Right now want a pound of flesh from the info-tech sector, and the starting cut at the body involves Section 230, the 1996 law that shields digital platforms from liability for content posted by third parties.

With the Supreme Court recently announcing it will hear Gonzalez v. Google, a case that could significantly narrow the scope of Section 230, the stakes have grown higher. It was already the case that federal and state lawmakers were looking to chip away at Sec. 230’s protections through an endless variety of regulatory measures. But if the Court guts Sec. 230 in Gonzalez, then it will really be open season on tech companies, as lawsuits will fly at every juncture whenever someone does not like a particular content moderation decision. Cannon and I note in our new essay that,

if the court moves to weaken liability protections for digital platforms, the ramifications will be profoundly negative. While many critics today complain that the law’s liability protections have been too generous, the reality is that Section 230 has been the legal linchpin supporting the permissionless innovation model that fueled America’s commanding lead in the digital information revolution. Thanks to the law, digital entrepreneurs have been free to launch bold new ideas without fear of punishing lawsuits or regulatory shenanigans. This has boosted economic growth and dramatically broadened consumer information and communications options.

Many critics of Sec. 230 claim that reforms are needed to “rein in Big Tech.” But, ironically, gutting Sec. 230 would probably only make big tech companies even bigger because the smaller players in the market would struggle to deal with the mountains of regulations and lawsuits that would come about in its absence. Cannon and I continue on to explore what it means for the next generation of online innovators if these court cases go badly and Section 230 is scaled back or gutted:

Section 230 has been a legal cornerstone of the entire ecosystem. All the large-scale platforms we depend on for our online experience would never have gotten off the ground without its protection. […] More importantly, these platforms have relied on being able to host third-party content without fear of opening a Pandora’s box of private litigation and endless challenges from governments. By removing these protections, platforms will be forced to significantly increase their moderation practices to reduce risk of suits from zealous litigants. Besides the chilling effect this will have on speech, it also will put up a cost-prohibitive barrier for smaller entrants who lack the resources to have an army of content moderators to find and eliminate undesirable content.

The broader effect on market dynamism and the nation’s technological competitiveness will be profound as permissionless innovation is replaced by mountains of top-down permission slips. “If America’s digital sector gets kneecapped by the Supreme Court, or if new regulations or legislative proposals scale back Section 230 protections, it will be significantly more difficult for U.S. firms to continue to lead in the development and commercialization of new technologies,” we conclude.

Jump over to Discourse to read the entire piece.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2022/12/09/gonzalez-v-google-section-230-the-future-of-permissionless-innovation/feed/ 2 77066
Running List of My Research on AI, ML & Robotics Policy https://techliberation.com/2022/07/29/running-list-of-my-research-on-ai-ml-robotics-policy/ https://techliberation.com/2022/07/29/running-list-of-my-research-on-ai-ml-robotics-policy/#respond Fri, 29 Jul 2022 12:51:54 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=77020

[last updated 4/3/2025 – Check my Medium page for latest posts]

This a running list of all the essays and reports I’ve already rolled out on the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and robotics. Why have I decided to spend so much time on this issue? Because this will become the most important technological revolution of our lifetimes. Every segment of the economy will be touched in some fashion by AI, ML, robotics, and the power of computational science. It should be equally clear that public policy will be radically transformed along the way.

Eventually, all policy will involve AI policy and computational considerations. As AI “eats the world,” it eats the world of public policy along with it. The stakes here are profound for individuals, economies, and nations. As a result, AI policy will be the most important technology policy fight of the next decade, and perhaps next quarter century. Those who are passionate about the freedom to innovate need to prepare to meet the challenge as proposals to regulate AI proliferate.

There are many socio-technical concerns surrounding algorithmic systems that deserve serious consideration and appropriate governance steps to ensure that these systems are beneficial to society. However, there is an equally compelling public interest in ensuring that AI innovations are developed and made widely available to help improve human well-being across many dimensions. And that’s the case that I’ll be dedicating my life to making in coming years.

Here’s the list of what I’ve done so far. I will continue to update this as new material is released:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021 (and earlier)

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2022/07/29/running-list-of-my-research-on-ai-ml-robotics-policy/feed/ 0 77020
The End of Permissionless Innovation? https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/ https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/#comments Sun, 10 Jan 2021 21:24:12 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76823

Time magazine recently declared 2020 “The Worst Year Ever.” By historical standards that may be a bit of hyperbole. For America’s digital technology sector, however, that headline rings true. After a remarkable 25-year run that saw an explosion of innovation and the rapid ascent of a group of U.S. companies that became household names across the globe, politicians and pundits in 2020 declared the party over. “We now are on the cusp of a new era of tech policy, one in which the policy catches up with the technology,” says Darrell M. West of the Brookings Institution in a recent essay, “The End of Permissionless Innovation.” West cites the House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee’s October report on competition in digital markets—where it equates large tech firms with the “oil barons and railroad tycoons” of the Gilded Age—as the clearest sign that politicization of the internet and digital technology is accelerating. It is hardly the only indication that America is set to abandon permissionless innovation and revisit the era of heavy-handed regulation for information and communication technology (ICT) markets. Equally significant is the growing bipartisan crusade against Section 230, the provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that shields “interactive computer services” from liability for information posted or published on their systems by users. No single policy has been more important to the flourishing of online speech or commerce than Sec. 230 because, without it, online platforms would be overwhelmed by regulation and lawsuits. But now, long knives are coming out for the law, with plenty of politicians and academics calling for it to be gutted. Calls to reform or repeal Sec. 230 were once exclusively the province of left-leaning academics or policymakers, but this year it was conservatives in the White Houseon Capitol Hill and at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) who became the leading cheerleaders for scaling back or eliminating the law. President Trump railed against Sec. 230 repeatedly on Twitter, and most recently vetoed the annual National Defense Authorization Act in part because Congress did not include a repeal of the law in the measure. Meanwhile, conservative lawmakers in Congress such as Sens. Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz have used subpoenasangry letters and heated hearings to hammer digital tech executives about their content moderation practices. Allegations of anti-conservative bias have motivated many of these efforts. Even Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas questioned the law in a recent opinion. Other proposed regulatory interventions include calls for new national privacy laws, an “Algorithmic Accountability Act” to regulate artificial intelligence technologies, and a growing variety of industrial policy measures that would open the door to widespread meddling with various tech sectors. Some officials in the Trump administration even pushed for a nationalized 5G communications network in the name of competing with China. This growing “techlash” signals a bipartisan “Back to the Future” moment, with the possibility of the U.S. reviving a regulatory playbook that many believed had been discarded in history’s dustbin. Although plenty of politicians and pundits are taking victory laps and giving each other high-fives over the impending end of the permissionless innovation era, it is worth considering what America will be losing if we once again apply old top-down, permission slip-oriented policies to the technology sector.

Permissionless Innovation: The Basics

As an engineering principle, permissionless innovation represents the general freedom to tinker and develop new ideas and products in a relatively unconstrained fashion. As I noted in a recent book on the topic, permissionless innovation can also describe a governance disposition or regulatory default toward entrepreneurial activities. In this sense, permissionless innovation refers to the idea that experimentation with new technologies and innovations should generally be permitted by default and that prior restraints on creative activities should be avoided except in those cases where clear and immediate harm is evident. There is an obvious relationship between the narrow and broad definitions of permissionless innovation. When governments lean toward permissionless innovation as a policy default, it is likely to encourage freewheeling experimentation more generally. But permissionless innovation can sometimes occur in the wild, even when public policy instead tends toward its antithesis—the precautionary principle. As I noted in my latest book, tinkerers and innovators sometimes behave evasively and act to make permissionless innovation a reality even when public policy discourages it through precautionary restraints. To be clear, permissionless innovation as a policy default has not meant anarchy. Quite the opposite, in fact. In the United States, over the past 25 years, no major federal agencies that regulate technology or laws that do so were eliminated. Indeed, most agencies grew bigger. But in spite of this, entrepreneurs during this period got more green lights than red ones, and innovation was treated as innocent until proven guilty. This is how and why social media and the sharing economy developed and prospered here and not in other countries, where layers of permission slips prevented such innovations from ever getting off the drawing board. The question now is, how will the shift to end permissionless innovation as a policy default in the U.S. affect innovative activity here more generally? Economic historians Deirdre McCloskey and Joel Mokyr teach us that societal and political attitudes toward growth, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism have a powerful connection with the competitive standing of nations and the possibility of long-term prosperity. If America’s innovation culture sours on the idea of permissionless-ness and moves toward a precautionary principle-based model, creative minds will find it harder to experiment with bold new ideas that could help enrich the nation and improve the well-being of the citizenry—which is exactly why America discarded its old top-down regulatory model in the first place.

Why America Junked the Old Model

Perhaps the easiest way to put some rough bookends on the beginning and end of America’s permissionless innovation era is to date it to the birth and impending death of Sec. 230 itself. The enactment in 1996 of the Telecommunications Act was important, not only because it included Sec. 230, but also because the law created a sort of policy firewall between the old and new worlds of ICT regulation. The old ICT regime was rooted in a complex maze of federal, state and local regulatory permission slips. If you wanted to do anything truly innovative in the old days, you typically needed to get some regulator’s blessing first—sometimes multiple blessings. The exception was the print sector, which enjoyed robust First Amendment protection from the time of the nation’s founding. Newspapers, magazines and book publishers were left largely free of prior restraints regarding what they published or how they innovated. The electronic media of the 20th century were not so lucky. Telephony, radio, television, cable, satellite and other technologies were quickly encumbered with a crazy quilt of federal and state regulations. Those restraints include price controls, entry restrictions, speech restrictions and endless agency threats. ICT policy started turning the corner in the late 1980s after the old regulatory model failed to achieve its mission of more choice, higher quality and lower prices for media and communications. Almost everyone accepted that change was needed, and it came fast. The 1990s became a whirlwind of policy and technological change. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration decided to allow open commercialization of the internet, which, until then, had mostly been a plaything for government agencies and university researchers. But it was the enactment of the 1996 telecommunications law that sealed the deal. Not only did the new law largely avoid regulating the internet like analog-era ICT, but, more importantly, it included Sec. 230, which helped ensure that future regulators or overzealous tort lawyers would not undermine this wonderful new resource. A year later, the Clinton administration put a cherry on top with the release of its Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. This bold policy statement announced a clean break from the past, arguing that “the private sector should lead [and] the internet should develop as a market-driven arena, not a regulated industry.” Permissionless innovation had become the foundation of American tech policy.

The Results

Ideas have consequences, as they say, and that includes ramifications for domestic business formation and global competitiveness. While the U.S. was allowing the private sector to largely determine the shape of the internet, Europe was embarking on a very different policy path, one that would hobble its tech sector. America’s more flexible policy ecosystem proved to be fertile ground for digital startups. Consider the rise of “unicorns,” shorthand for companies valued at $1+ billion. “In terms of the global distribution of startup success,” notes the State of the Venture Capital Industry in 2019, “the number of private unicorns has grown from an initial list of 82 in 2015 to 356 in Q2 2019,” and fully half of them are U.S.-based. The United States is also home to the most innovative tech firms. Over the past decade, Strategy& (PricewaterhouseCooper’s strategy consulting business) has compiled a list of the world’s most innovative companies, based on R&D efforts and revenue. Each year that list is dominated by American tech companies. In 2013, 9 of the top 10 most innovative companies were based in the U.S., and most of them were involved in computing, software and digital technology. Global competition is intensifying, but in the most recent 2018 list, 15 of the top 25 companies are still U.S.-based giants, with Amazon, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Oracle and Cisco leading the way. Meanwhile, European digital tech companies cannot be found on any such list. While America’s tech companies are household names across the European continent, most people struggle to name a single digital innovator headquartered in the EU. Permissionless innovation crushed the precautionary principle in the trans-Atlantic policy wars. European policymakers have responded to the continent’s digital stagnation by doubling down on their aggressive regulatory efforts. The EU closed out 2020 with two comprehensive new measures (the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act), while the U.K. simultaneously pursued a new “online harms” law. Taken together, these proposals represent “the biggest potential expansion of global tech regulation in years,” according to The Wall Street Journal. The measures will greatly expand extraterritorial control over American tech companies. Having decimated their domestic technology base and driven away innovators and investors, EU officials are now resorting to plugging budget shortfalls with future antitrust fines on U.S.-based tech companies. It has essentially been a lost quarter century for Europe on the information technology front, and now American companies are expected to pay for it.

Republicans Revive ‘Regulation-By-Raised-Eyebrow’

In light of the failure of Europe’s precautionary principle-based policy paradigm, and considering the threat now posed by the growing importance of various Chinese tech companies, one might think U.S. policymakers would be celebrating the competitive advantages created by a quarter century of American tech dominance and contemplating how to apply this winning vision to other sectors of the economy. Alas, despite its amazing run, business and political leaders are now turning against permissionless innovation as America’s policy lodestar. What is most surprising is how this reversal is now being championed by conservative Republicans, who traditionally support deregulation. President Trump also called for tightening the screws on Big Tech. For example, in a May 2020 Executive Order on “Preventing Online Censorship,” he accused online platforms of “selective censorship that is harming our national discourse” and suggested that “these platforms function in many ways as a 21st century equivalent of the public square.” Trump and his supporters put Google, Facebook, Twitter and Amazon in their crosshairs, accusing them of discriminating against conservative viewpoints or values. The irony here is that no politician owes more to modern social media platforms than Donald Trump, who effectively used them to communicate his ideas directly to the American people. Moreover, conservative pundits now enjoy unparalleled opportunity to get their views out to the wider world thanks to all the digital soapboxes they now can stand on. YouTube and Twitter are chock-full of conservative punditry, and the daily list of top 10 search terms on Facebook is dominated consistently by conservative voices, where “the right wing has a massive advantage,” according to Politico. Nonetheless, conservatives insist they still don’t get a fair shake from the cornucopia of new communications platforms that earlier generations of conservatives could have only dreamed about having at their disposal. They think the deck is stacked against them by Silicon Valley liberals. This growing backlash culminated in a remarkable Senate Commerce Committee hearing on Oct. 28 in which congressional Republicans hounded tech CEOs and called for more favorable treatment of conservatives, and threatened social media companies with regulation if conservative content was taken down. Liberal lawmakers, by contrast, uniformly demanded the companies do more to remove content they felt was harmful or deceptive in some fashion. In many cases, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle were talking about the exact same content, putting the companies in the impossible position of having to devise a Goldilocks formula to get the content balance just right, even though it would be impossible to make both sides happy. In the broadcast era, this sort of political harassment was known as the “regulation-by-raised-eyebrow” approach, which allowed officials to get around First Amendment limitations on government content control. Congressional lawmakers and regulators at the FCC would set up show trial hearings and use political intimidation to gain programming concessions from licensed radio and television operators. These shakedown tactics didn’t always work, but they often resulted in forms of soft censorship, with media outlets editing content to make politicians happy. The same dynamic is at work today. Thus, when a firebrand politician like Sen. Josh Hawley suggests “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared,” or when Sohrab Ahmari, the conservative op-ed editor at the New York Postcalls for the nationalization of Twitter, they likely understand these extreme proposals won’t happen. But such jawboning represents an easy way to whip up your base while also indirectly putting intense pressure on companies to tweak their policies. Make us happy, or else! It is not always clear what that “or else” entails, but the accumulated threats probably have some effect on content decisions made by these firms. Whether all this means that Sec. 230 gets scrapped or not shouldn’t distract from the more pertinent fact: few on the political right are preaching the gospel of permissionless innovation anymore. Even tech companies and Silicon Valley-backed organizations now actively distance themselves from the term. Zachary Graves, head of policy at Lincoln Network, a tech advocacy organization, worries that permissionless innovation is little more than a “legitimizing facade for anarcho-capitalists, tech bros, and cynical corporate flacks.” He lines up with the growing cast of commentators on both the left and right who endorse a “Tech New Deal” without getting concrete about what that means in practice. What it likely means is a return to a well-worn regulatory playbook of the past that resulted in innovation stagnation and crony capitalism.

A More Political Future

Indeed, as was the case during past eras of permission slip-based policy, our new regulatory era will be a great boon to the largest tech companies. Many people advocate greater regulation in the name of promoting competition, choice, quality and lower prices. But merely because someone proclaims that they are looking to serve the public interest doesn’t mean the regulatory policies they implement will achieve those well-intentioned goals. The means to the end—new rules, regulations and bureaucracies—are messy, imprecise and often counterproductive. Fifty years ago, the Nobel prize-winning economist George Stigler taught us that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits.” In other words, new regulations often help to entrench existing players rather than fostering greater competition. Countless experts since then have documented the problem of regulatory capture in various contexts. If the past is prologue, we can expect many large tech firms to openly embrace regulation as they come to see it as a useful way of preserving market share and fending off pesky new rivals, most of whom will not be able to shoulder the compliance burdens and liability threats associated with permission slip-based regulatory regimes. True to form, in recent congressional hearings, Facebook head Mark Zuckerberg called on lawmakers to begin regulating social media markets. The company then rolled out a slick new website and advertising campaign inviting new rules on various matters. It is always easy for the king of the hill to call for more regulation when that hill is a mound of red tape of their own making—and which few others can ascend. It is a lesson we should have learned in the AT&T era, when a decidedly unnatural monopoly was formed through a partnership between company officials and the government.

Image Credit: Infrogmation/Wikimedia Commons

Many independent telephone companies existed across America before AT&T’s leaders cut sweetheart deals with policymakers that tilted the playing field in its favor and undermined competition. With rivals hobbled by entry restrictions and other rules, Ma Bell went on to enjoy more than a half century of stable market share and guaranteed rates of return. Consumers, by contrast, were expected to be content with plain-vanilla telephone services that barely changed. Some of us are old enough to remember when the biggest “innovation” in telephony involved the move from rotary-dial phones to the push-button Princess phone, which, we were thrilled to discover, came in multiple colors and had a longer cord. In a similar way, the impending close of the permissionless innovation era signals the twilight of technological creative destruction and its replacement by a new regime of political favor-seeking and logrolling, which could lead to innovation stagnation. The CEOs of the remaining large tech companies will be expected to make regular visits to the halls of Congress and regulatory agencies (and to all those fundraising parties, too) to get their marching orders, just as large telecom and broadcaster players did in the past. We will revert to the old historical trajectory, which saw communications and media companies securing marketplace advantages more through political machinations than marketplace merit.

Will Politics Really Catch Up?

While permissionless innovation may be falling out of favor with elites, America’s entrepreneurial spirit will be hard to snuff out, even when layers of red tape make it riskier to be creative. If for no other reason, permissionless innovation still has a fighting chance so long as Congress struggles to enact comprehensive technology measures. General legislative dysfunction and profound technological ignorance are two reasons that Congress has largely become a non-actor on tech policy in recent years. But the primary limitation on legislative meddling is the so-called pacing problem, which refers to the way technological innovation often outpaces the ability of laws and regulations to keep up. “I have said more than once that innovation moves at the speed of imagination and that government has traditionally moved at, well, the speed of government,” observed former Federal Aviation Administration head Michael Huerta in a 2016 speech.

DNA sequencing machine. Image Credit: Assembly/Getty Images

The same factors that drove the rise of the internet revolution—digitization, miniaturization, ubiquitous mobile connectivity and constantly increasing processing power—are spreading to many other sectors and challenging precautionary policies in the process. For example, just as “Moore’s Law” relentlessly powers the pace of change in ICT sectors, the “Carlson curve” now fuels genetic innovation. The curve refers to the fact that, over the past two decades, the cost of sequencing a human genome has plummeted from over $100 million to under $1,000, a rate nearly three times faster than Moore’s Law. Speed isn’t the only factor driving the pacing problem. Policymakers also struggle with metaphysical considerations about how to define the things they seek to regulate. It used to be easy to agree what a phone, television or medical tracking device was for regulatory purposes. But what do those terms really mean in the age of the smartphone, which incorporates all of them and much more? “‘Tech’ is a very diverse, widely-spread industry that touches on all sorts of different issues,” notes tech analyst Benedict Evans. “These issues generally need detailed analysis to understand, and they tend to change in months, not decades.” This makes regulating the industry significantly more challenging than it was in the past. It doesn’t mean the end of regulation—especially for sectors already encumbered by many layers of preexisting rules. But these new realities lead to a more interesting game of regulatory whack-a-mole: pushing down technological innovation in one way often means it simply pops up somewhere else. The continued rapid growth of what some call “the new technologies of freedom”—artificial intelligence, blockchain, the Internet of Things, etc.—should give us some reasons for optimism. It’s hard to put these genies back in their bottles now that they’re out. This is even more true thanks to the growth of innovation arbitrage—both globally and domestically. Creators and capital now move fluidly across borders in pursuit of more hospitable innovation and investment climates. Recently, some high-profile tech CEOs like Elon Musk and Joe Lonsdale have relocated from California to Texas, citing tax and regulatory burdens as key factors in their decisions. Oracle, America’s second-largest software company, also just announced it is moving its corporate headquarters from Silicon Valley to Austin, just over a week after Hewlett Packard Enterprise said it too is moving its headquarters from California to Texas—in this case, Houston. “Voting with your feet” might actually still mean something, especially when it is major tech companies and venture capitalists abandoning high-tax, over-regulated jurisdictions.

Advocacy Remains Essential

But we shouldn’t imagine that technological change is inevitable or fall into the trap of thinking of it as a sort of liberation theology that will magically free us from repressive government controls. Policy advocacy still matters. Innovation defenders will need to continue to push back against the most burdensome precautionary policies, while also promoting reforms that protect entrepreneurial endeavors. The courts offer us great hope. Groups like the Institute for Justice, the Goldwater Institute, the Pacific Legal Foundation and others continue to litigate successfully in defense of the freedom to innovate. While the best we can hope for in the legislative arena may be perpetual stalemate, these and other public interest law firms are netting major victories in courtrooms across America. Sometimes court victories force positive legislative changes, too. For example, in 2015, the Supreme Court handed down North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, which held that local government cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws when it delegates power to nongovernmental bodies, such as licensing boards. This decision made much-needed occupational licensing reform an agenda item across America. Many states introduced or adopted bipartisan legislation aimed at reforming or sunsetting occupational licensing rules that undermine entrepreneurship. Even more exciting are proposals that would protect citizens’ “right to earn a living.” This right would allow individuals to bring suit if they believe a regulatory scheme or decision has unnecessarily infringed upon their ability to earn a living within a legally permissible line of work. Meanwhile, there have been ongoing state efforts to advance “right to try” legislation that would expand medical treatment options for Americans tired of overly paternalistic health regulations. Perhaps, then, it is too early to close the book on the permissionless innovation era. While dark political clouds loom over America’s technological landscape, there are still reasons to believe the entrepreneurial spirit can prevail.
]]>
https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/feed/ 2 76823
How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality https://techliberation.com/2019/06/19/how-conservatives-came-to-favor-the-fairness-doctrine-net-neutrality/ https://techliberation.com/2019/06/19/how-conservatives-came-to-favor-the-fairness-doctrine-net-neutrality/#comments Thu, 20 Jun 2019 01:09:52 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76507

I have been covering telecom and Internet policy for almost 30 years now. During much of that time – which included a nine year stint at the Heritage Foundation — I have interacted with conservatives on various policy issues and often worked very closely with them to advance certain reforms.

If I divided my time in Tech Policy Land into two big chunks of time, I’d say the biggest tech-related policy issue for conservatives during the first 15 years I was in the business (roughly 1990 – 2005) was preventing the resurrection of the so-called Fairness Doctrine. And the biggest issue during the second 15-year period (roughly 2005 – present) was stopping the imposition of “Net neutrality” mandates on the Internet. In both cases, conservatives vociferously blasted the notion that unelected government bureaucrats should sit in judgment of what constituted “fairness” in media or “neutrality” online.

Many conservatives are suddenly changing their tune, however. President Trump and Sen. Ted Cruz, for example, have been increasingly critical of both traditional media and new tech companies in various public statements and suggested an openness to increased regulation. The President has gone after old and new media outlets alike, while Sen. Cruz (along with others like Sen. Lindsay Graham) has suggested during congressional hearings that increased oversight of social media platforms is needed, including potential antitrust action.

Meanwhile, during his short time in office, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) has become one of the most vocal Internet critics on the Right. In a shockingly-worded USA Today editorial in late May, Hawley said, “social media wastes our time and resources” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” He even referred to these sites as “parasites” and blamed them for a long list of social problems, leading him to suggest that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared” along with various other sites and services.

Hawley’s moral panic over social media has now bubbled over into a regulatory crusade that would unleash federal bureaucrats on the Internet in an attempt to dictate “fair” speech on the Internet. He has introduced an astonishing piece of legislation aimed at undoing the liability protections that Internet providers rely upon to provide open platforms for speech and commerce. If Hawley’s absurdly misnamed new “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” is implemented, it would essentially combine the core elements of the Fairness Doctrine and Net Neutrality to create a massive new regulatory regime for the Internet.

The bill would gut the immunities Internet companies enjoy under 47 USC 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency Act. Eric Goldman of the Santa Clara University School of Law has described Section 230 as the “best Internet law” and “a big part of the reason why the Internet has been such a massive success.” Indeed, as I pointed out in a Forbes column on the occasion of its 15th anniversary, Section 230 is “the foundation of our Internet freedoms” because it gives online intermediaries generous leeway to determine what content and commerce travels over their systems without the fear that they will be overwhelmed by lawsuits if other parties object to some of that content.

The Hawley bill would overturn this important legal framework for Internet freedom and instead replace it with a new “permissioned” approach. In true “Mother-May-I” style, Internet companies would need to apply for an “immunity certification” from the FTC, which would undertake investigations to determine if the petitioning platform satisfied a “requirement of politically unbiased content moderation.”

The vague language of the measure is an open invitation to massive political abuse. The entirety of the bill hinges upon the ability of Federal Trade Commission officials to define and enforce “political neutrality” online. Let’s consider what this will mean in practice.

Under the bill, the FTC must evaluate whether platforms have engaged in “politically biased moderation,” which is defined as moderation practices that are supposedly, “designed to negatively affect” or “disproportionately restricts or promote access to … a political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint.” As Blake Reid of the University of Colorado Law School rightly asks, “How, exactly, is the FTC supposed to figure out what the baseline is for ‘disproportionately restricting or promoting’? How much access or availability to information about political parties, candidates, or viewpoints is enough, or not enough, or too much?”

There is no Goldilocks formula for getting things just right when it comes to content moderation. It’s a trial-and-error process that is nightmarishly difficult because of the endless eye-of-the-beholder problems associated with constructing acceptable use policies for large speech platforms. We struggled with the same issues in the broadcast and cable era, but they have been magnified a million-fold in the era of the global Internet with the endless tsunami of new content that hits our screens and devices every day. “Do we want less moderation?” asks Sec, 230 guru Jeff Kosseff. “I think we need to look at that question hard.  Because we’re seeing two competing criticisms of Section 230,” he notes. “Some argue that there is too much moderation, others argue that there is not enough.”

The Hawley bill seems to imagine that a handful of FTC officials will magically be able to strike the right balance through regulatory investigations. That’s a pipe dream, of course, but let’s imagine for a moment that regulators could somehow sort through all the content on message boards, tweets, video clips, live streams, gaming sites, and whatever else, and then somehow figure out what constituted a violation of “political neutrality” in any given context. That would actually be a horrible result because let’s be perfectly clear about what that would really be: It would be a censorship board. By empowering unelected bureaucrats to make decisions about what constitutes “neutral” or “fair” speech, the Hawley measure would, as Elizabeth Nolan Brown of Reason summarizes, “put Washington in charge of Internet speech.” Or, as Sen. Ron Wyden argues more bluntly, the bill “will turn the federal government into Speech Police.” “Perhaps a more accurate title for this bill would be ‘Creating Internet Censorship Act,'” Eric Goldman is forced to conclude.

The measure is creating other strange bedfellows. You won’t see Berin Szoka of TechFreedom and Harold Feld of Public Knowledge ever agreeing on much, but they both quickly and correctly labelled Hawley’s bill a “Fairness Doctrine for the Internet.” That is quite right, and much like the old Fairness Doctrine, Hawley’s new Internet speech control regime would be open to endless political shenanigans as parties, policymakers, companies, and the various complainants line up to have their various political beefs heard and acted upon. “That’s the kind of thing Republicans said was unconstitutional (and subject to FCC agency capture and political manipulation) for decades,” says Daphne Keller of the Stanford Center for Internet & Society. Moreover, during the Net Neutrality holy wars, GOP conservatives endlessly blasted the notion that bureaucrats should be determining what constitute “neutrality” online because it, too, would result in abuses of the regulatory process. Yet, Sen. Hawley’s bill would now mandate that exact same thing.

What is even worse is that, as law professor Josh Blackman observes, “the bill also makes it exceedingly difficult to obtain a certification” because applicants need a supermajority of 4 of the 5 FTC Commissioners. This is public choice fiasco waiting to happen. Anyone who has studied the long, sordid history of broadcast radio and television licensing understands the danger associated with politicizing certification processes. The lawyers and lobbyists in the DC “swamp” will benefit from all the petitioning and paperwork, but it is not clear how creating a regulatory certification regime for Internet speech really benefits the general public (or even conservatives, for that matter).

Former FTC Commissioner Josh Wright identifies another obvious problem with the Hawley Bill: it “offers the choice of death by bureaucratic board or the plaintiffs’ bar.” That’s because by weakening Sec. 230’s protections, Hawley’s bill could open the floodgates to waves of frivolous legal claims in the courts if companies can’t get (or lose) certification. The irony of that result, of course, is that this bill could become a massive gift to the tort bar that Republicans love to hate!

Of course, if the law ever gets to court, it might be ruled unconstitutional. “The terms ‘politically biased’ and ‘moderation’ would have vagueness and overbreadth problems, as they can chill protected speech,” Josh Blackman argues. So it could, perhaps, be thrown out like earlier online censorship efforts. But a lot of harm could be done—both to online speech and competition—in the years leading up to a final determination about the law’s constitutionality by higher courts.

What is most outrageous about all this is that the core rationale behind Hawley’s effort—the idea that conservatives are somehow uniquely disadvantaged by large social media platforms—is utterly preposterous. In May, the Trump Administration launched a “tech bias” portal which “asked Americans to share their stories of suspected political bias.” The portal is already closed and it is unclear what, if anything, will come out of this effort. But this move and Hawley’s proposal point to the broader trend of conservatives getting more comfortable asking Big Government to redress imaginary grievances about supposed “bias” or “exclusion.”

In reality, today’s social media tools and platforms have been the greatest thing that ever happened to conservatives. Mr. Trump owes his presidency to his unparalleled ability to directly reach his audience through Twitter and other platforms. As recently as June 12, President Trump tweeted, “The Fake News has never been more dishonest than it is today. Thank goodness we can fight back on Social Media.” Well, there you have it!

Beyond the President, one need only peruse any social media site for a few minutes to find an endless stream of conservative perspectives on display. This isn’t exclusion; it’s amplification on steroids. Conservatives have more soapboxes to stand on and preach than ever before in the history of this nation.

Finally, if they were true to their philosophical priors, then conservatives also would not be insisting that they have any sort of “right” to be on any platform. These are private platforms, after all, and it is outrageous to suggest that conservatives (or any other person or group) are entitled to have a spot on any other them.

Some conservatives are fond of ridiculing liberals for being “snowflakes” when it comes to other free speech matters, such as free speech on college campuses. Many times they are right. But one has to ask who the real snowflakes are when conservative lawmakers are calling on regulatory bureaucracies to reorder speech on private platform based on the mythical fear of not getting “fair” treatment. One also cannot help but wonder if those conservatives have thought through how this new Internet regulatory regime will play out once a more liberal administration takes back the reins of power. Conservatives will only have themselves to blame when the Speech Police come for them.


Addendum: Several folks have pointed out another irony associated with Hawley’s bill is that it would greatly expand the powers of the administrative state, which conservatives already (correctly) feel has too much broad, unaccountable power. I should have said more on that point, but here’s a nice comment from David French of National Review, which alludes to that problem and then ties it back to my closing argument above: i.e., that this proposal will come back to haunt conservatives in the long-run:

when coercion locks in — especially when that coercion is tied to constitutionally suspect broad and vague policies that delegate immense powers to the federal government — conservatives should sound the alarm. One of the best ways to evaluate the merits of legislation is to ask yourself whether the bill would still seem wise if the power you give the government were to end up in the hands of your political opponents. Is Hawley striking a blow for freedom if he ends up handing oversight of Facebook’s political content to Bernie Sanders? I think not.

Additional thoughts on the Hawley bill:

Josh Wright

Daphne Keller

Blake Reid

TechFreedom

Josh Blackman

Sen. Ron Wyden

Jeff Kosseff

Eric Goldman

CCIA

NetChoice

Internet Association

David French at National Review

John Samples

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2019/06/19/how-conservatives-came-to-favor-the-fairness-doctrine-net-neutrality/feed/ 2 76507
We Need More Driverless Cars on Public Roads, Not Fewer https://techliberation.com/2018/03/20/we-need-more-driverless-cars-on-public-roads-not-fewer/ https://techliberation.com/2018/03/20/we-need-more-driverless-cars-on-public-roads-not-fewer/#comments Tue, 20 Mar 2018 16:13:11 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76248

By Adam Thierer and Jennifer Huddleston Skees

There was horrible news from Tempe, Arizona this week as a pedestrian was struck and killed by a driverless car owned by Uber. This is the first fatality of its type and is drawing widespread media attention as a result. According to both police statements and Uber itself, the investigation into the accident is ongoing and Uber is assisting in the investigation. While this certainly is a tragic event, we cannot let it cost us the life-saving potential of autonomous vehicles.

While any fatal traffic accident involving a driverless car is certainly sad, we can’t ignore the fact that each and every day in the United States letting human beings drive on public roads is proving far more dangerous. This single event has led some critics to wonder why we were allowing driverless cars to be tested on public roads at all before they have been proven to be 100% safe. Driverless cars can help reverse a public health disaster decades in the making, but only if policymakers allow real-world experimentation to continue.

Let’s be more concrete about this: Each day, Americans take 1.1 billion trips driving 11 billion miles in vehicles that weigh on average between 1.5 and 2 tons. Sadly, about 100 people die  and over 6,000 are injured each day in car accidents. 94% of these accidents have been shown to be attributable to human error and this deadly trend has been increasing as we become more distracted while driving. Moreover, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, almost 6000 pedestrians were killed in traffic accidents in 2016, which means there was roughly one crash-related pedestrian death every 1.6 hours. In Arizona, the issue is even more pronounced with the state ranked 6th worst for pedestrians and the Phoenix area ranked the 16th worst metro for such accidents nationally.

No matter how concerned the public is about the idea of autonomous vehicles on our roadways, one thing should be abundantly clear: Automated technologies can be part of the solution to the harms of our almost 100 year experiment with human drivers behind the wheel of a car. The algorithms behind self-driving cars don’t get drunk, drowsy, or distracted. Unfortunately, humans do those things with great regularity and the only way for autonomous vehicles to truly understand how to deal with idiosyncrasies and irrationalities of human drivers is to interact with them in the “real world.” Every time a human driver gets behind a wheel for a drive, therefore, an “experiment” of sorts is underway and we’ve seen the results of our human driven “experiments” on public roads far too often have catastrophic results.

Because these human-caused accidents are so common, they don’t make headlines. While as high as 83% of people admit they are concerned about safety when driving, the aggregate death toll is so large that the numbers aren’t as easy to “humanize” when crashes occur unless they involve people or places we know. As a result, we don’t heed the warnings and continue to engage in risky behavior by choosing to drive every day.  But precisely because this week’s driverless car-related death in Arizona is so unique and rare, it is making major news. If we turn a blind eye to all the lives lost due to human error while focusing on the rare occurrence of this one driverless car fatality, we risk many more lives in the long run.

But what should be done when accidents or deaths occur and autonomous cars are involved?

First, we can dispense with the notion that driverless cars are completely unregulated. Anytime these vehicles are operating on public roadways, they still must comply with traffic and safety laws. Driverless cars are programmed to operate in compliance with those laws and will be far more likely to do so than human operators. In fact, the concern is not that the cars won’t follow the traffic laws, but how they will interact with humans’ lawlessness and our misguided reactions to them.

Second, when accidents, like the one in Arizona this week do occur, courts are equipped to handle legal claims. This is how we have handled human-created accidents for decades, and there is no reason to believe that the common law and courts can’t evolve to handle new technology-created problems, too. The courts have an existing toolkit for handling both defective products and individual liability or bad actors. Some manufacturers have even publicly stated they will accept liability if it is shown that the technology behind the autonomous vehicle caused the accident. Courts have been able to apportion fault and deal with the specifics of particular without the need to completely overhaul the common law for a variety of new technologies throughout history. It would be misguided to assume the courts could not determine the true cause of an accident when it involved an autonomous vehicle when the courts have been dealing with increasingly sophisticated products in a variety of fields for years.

Third, driverless car innovators are currently working together, and with government officials, to address the safety and security of these technologies. In both the Obama and current Trump Administrations, an open, collaborative effort has been underway to sketch out sensible safety and security policies while also making sure to keep the innovation moving forward in this field. These conversations have resulted in guidance from the Department of Transportation that is flexible enough to adapt to the emerging technology while still promoting safe development and deployment.  This flexible approach is the smart path forward insuring that we don’t let overly precautionary concerns prevent technology that could save many, many more lives.

The most effective way to achieve significant auto safety gains is to make sure experimentation with new and better automotive technologies continues. That cannot all happen in a closed lab setting that is stifled by heavy-handed regulation at every juncture. We need driverless cars on the roadways now more than ever precisely because those machines will need to learn to anticipate and correct for the many real-world scenarios that human drivers struggle with every day.

Any loss of human life is a tragedy. But we cannot let a rare incident cost us the long-term potential life-saving technology of autonomous vehicles. We also must not rush to conclusions that technology was at fault before knowing all the facts of any particular situation. While Uber has temporarily halted its technology trials, this tragic accident should be looked at as a rarity we can learn from rather than a reason to stop moving forward.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2018/03/20/we-need-more-driverless-cars-on-public-roads-not-fewer/feed/ 1 76248
Revised FOSTA is a big improvement over SESTA—but still not perfect https://techliberation.com/2017/12/15/revised-fosta-is-a-big-improvement-over-sesta-but-still-not-perfect/ https://techliberation.com/2017/12/15/revised-fosta-is-a-big-improvement-over-sesta-but-still-not-perfect/#comments Fri, 15 Dec 2017 16:47:14 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76213

The house version of the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act (SESTA), called the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), has undergone significant changes that appear to enable it to both truly address the scourge of online sex trafficking and maintain important internet liability protection that encourages a free and open internet. On Tuesday, this amended version passed the House Judiciary Committee. Like most legislation, this latest draft isn’t perfect. But it has made significant steps towards maintaining freedom online while addressing the misdeeds of a few.

The Good

First, the new version creates a new crime that targets online sex traffickers and those wrong-doers who intentionally promote or facilitate their actions. Earlier versions of the House and Senate sex trafficking bills created mens rea, or state of mind, issues whereby a website was compelled to engage in strict moderation for fear of something “falling through the cracks” while encouraging good behavior on the part of intermediaries. The new FOSTA proposal substitutes a higher standard, which largely obviates these concerns.

The revised bill also clearly focuses on sex trafficking and online prostitution rather than attacking potential “bad actions” online more generally. Even so, some are concerned about the impact this revised focus may have on consensual transactions or protected (even if objectionable) speech. However, combined with the creation of a new crime under the Mann Act, it appears to remove most of the early concerns that the new law could be applied too broadly and chip away at Section 230. Indeed, the language of the new bill makes it clear that Section 230 was “never intended to provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and contribute to sex trafficking.”

The revised bill creates civil liability only when a violation of the new criminal law has already occurred. This prevents someone from going after an intermediary merely because they have “deeper pockets” than the actual perpetrators. By requiring an intermediary also be guilty of a criminal violation, it limits the likelihood that individuals would be successful in such suits except in cases where the website had knowingly facilitated or actively encouraged such violations of the law.

Finally, the revised FOSTA relies on a national standard instead of a patchwork of state law claims. Given the truly global nature of the Internet, this provides greater certainty for intermediaries regarding under what standard they will be held liable.

The Remaining Questions/Concerns

The current version of the bill uses a standard of 5+ victims for the new criminal enhancement. But there is a problem with using a raw number of victims, as Eric Goldman points out.  He lays out a thought experiment: let’s say that a  larger website like Google or Facebook, has  0.01% of its usage dedicated to prostitution. That’s about 100,000 people. Goldman points out that even if these companies were 99.99% compliant in taking down this activity—a worthy feat, to be sure—some would surely still fall through the cracks. The 5+ standard could make the social platforms look like “hotbeds of prostitution activity” despite their best intentions. A simple solution would be to switch from a raw number of “victims” to a percentage of users or revenues before attaching criminal or civil liability.

Additionally, there are some concerns about whether the new law could still make things worse for victims. As one advocate wrote, putting victims on the street rather than online may make them much more likely to be subject to violence and may make it more difficult to identify and assist trafficking victims. Unfortunately, the dangers and harms associated with trafficking and sex work cannot be resolved by a single bill.

 

Like most legislation, FOSTA is not perfect, but the current version does avoid the most damaging elements of earlier iterations. The changes also show that legislators are becoming aware of the possible unintended consequences that broader legislation could lead to.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2017/12/15/revised-fosta-is-a-big-improvement-over-sesta-but-still-not-perfect/feed/ 1 76213
Amended SESTA Clears Committee: What’s Changed So Far and How It Impacts Section 230 https://techliberation.com/2017/11/08/amended-sesta-clears-committee-whats-changed-so-far-and-how-it-impacts-section-230/ https://techliberation.com/2017/11/08/amended-sesta-clears-committee-whats-changed-so-far-and-how-it-impacts-section-230/#comments Wed, 08 Nov 2017 19:09:14 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76205

As I have previously written about, a bill currently up for debate in Congress runs the risk of gutting critical liability protections for internet intermediaries. Earlier today the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act passed out of committee with an amendment attempted to remedy some of the most damaging changes to Section 230 in the original act. While this amendment has gained support from some industry groups, it does not fully address the concerns regarding changes to intermediary liability under Section 230. While the amended version shows increased awareness of the far reaching consequences of the act, it does not fully address issues that could have a chilling effect on speech on the internet and risk stifling future internet innovation.

  • Good Samaritan Provision

As Eric Goldman points out, the amended version expressly retains part the Good Samaritan provisions of Section 230 for removals, but it still enables new liability for user publication. As a result, the new amendment only partially preserves Good Samaritan mechanisms and does not fully address concerns about good faith attempts to avoid the new liability.

  • Knowledge Standard

The amended version that cleared committee clarifies the knowledge standard of the earlier bill by stating that for liability to attach the intermediary the intermediary must have participated by “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation.” This improves but does not fully mitigate the damage that establishing new liability could do to internet free speech. As EFF writes, facilitates legally means “to make easier or less difficult” and would include a huge swath of innocuous products, websites, and activities.

This standard is particularly dangerous for online dating and messaging services. For example, if a traffickers used a messaging service to communicate this could be seen as facilitating because it made it easier to communicate. Dating services which set up meetings could also be seen as facilitators if a bad actor used their service to conduct human trafficking. As Mike Masnick at TechDirt argues, there is little certainty in the amended version of what “knowingly” means and it may be as low a standard as general knowledge or media reports that your website was at some point used (or allegedly used) by sex traffickers.

  • The Retroactivity Provision

The new version does not clear up concerns about retroactivity. In both the amended and original versions, the bill states that it applies “regardless of whether the conduct alleged occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, before, on or after such date of enactment.”  As a result companies are open to civil and criminal liability for conduct that did not have such liability when it occurred.

 

While the amended SESTA signals a recognition that the bill needs to more narrowly tailored,  it leaves internet intermediaries with the same two choices if enacted.

The first option for intermediaries would be to engage in an aggressive takedown process like they do for copyright claims under the DMCA. This reaction is to take down questioned content first and ask whether it should have been taken down later.  As Masnick notes, however, the DMCA has much clearer provisions for when content must be taken, but still there are seemingly rampant issues with false claims. Such a situation would only be worse under SESTA especially for social media, search engines, and dating websites. Some websites might choose to quit operating rather than engage in the high level of moderation that would be necessary. Because the bill applies to all sizes of companies without any limitations for the amount staff or users, this is more likely to have a negative impact on smaller or more innovative services that might one day become the next Facebook or Google. These companies do not have the same manpower to engage in an aggressive monitoring for their user base and as a result may have more difficulty entering the market if there are greater compliance burdens. Those that did continue would only be those who could afford to devote large number of staff and legal resources to monitoring and determining the accuracy of claims.

The second option is to avoid the cooperation and self-monitoring that websites engage in now.  In a recent interview regarding Russian election ads, Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell stated that tech should be “more interested in cooperating with law enforcement.” SESTA, however, provides the opposite incentive. Cooperation in investigations would show knowledge and open the intermediary up to further civil liability. As a result, intermediaries might be discouraged from future cooperation.

The amended version will now head to the Senate floor for debate. The bill has a noble goal of making sex trafficking more difficult and this revised version shows progress towards protecting intermediary liability. Still, it addresses the issue more broadly than needed and risks fundamentally changing the internet.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2017/11/08/amended-sesta-clears-committee-whats-changed-so-far-and-how-it-impacts-section-230/feed/ 2 76205
new Mercatus paper on “Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy” https://techliberation.com/2017/08/23/new-mercatus-paper-on-artificial-intelligence-and-public-policy/ https://techliberation.com/2017/08/23/new-mercatus-paper-on-artificial-intelligence-and-public-policy/#comments Wed, 23 Aug 2017 15:03:10 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76180

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper on, “Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy,” which I co-authored with Andrea Castillo O’Sullivan and Raymond Russell. This 54-page paper can be downloaded via the Mercatus website, SSRN, or ResearchGate. Here is the abstract:

There is growing interest in the market potential of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and applications as well as in the potential risks that these technologies might pose. As a result, questions are being raised about the legal and regulatory governance of AI, machine learning, “autonomous” systems, and related robotic and data technologies. Fearing concerns about labor market effects, social inequality, and even physical harm, some have called for precautionary regulations that could have the effect of limiting AI development and deployment. In this paper, we recommend a different policy framework for AI technologies. At this nascent stage of AI technology development, we think a better case can be made for prudence, patience, and a continuing embrace of “permissionless innovation” as it pertains to modern digital technologies. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated, and problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed later.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2017/08/23/new-mercatus-paper-on-artificial-intelligence-and-public-policy/feed/ 2 76180
Celebrating 20 Years of Internet Free Speech & Free Exchange https://techliberation.com/2017/06/22/celebrating-20-years-of-internet-free-speech-free-exchange/ https://techliberation.com/2017/06/22/celebrating-20-years-of-internet-free-speech-free-exchange/#comments Thu, 22 Jun 2017 14:47:15 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76149

[originally published on Plaintext on June 21, 2017.]

This summer, we celebrate the 20th anniversary of two developments that gave us the modern Internet as we know it. One was a court case that guaranteed online speech would flow freely, without government prior restraints or censorship threats. The other was an official White House framework for digital markets that ensured the free movement of goods and services online.

The result of these two vital policy decisions was an unprecedented explosion of speech freedoms and commercial opportunities that we continue to enjoy the benefits of twenty years later.

While it is easy to take all this for granted today, it is worth remembering that, in the long arc of human history, no technology or medium has more rapidly expanded the range of human liberties — both speech and commercial liberties — than the Internet and digital technologies. But things could have turned out much differently if not for the crucially important policy choices the United States made for the Internet two decades ago.

First, on June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Reno v. ACLU, which struck down the Communications Decency Act’s provisions seeking to regulate online content under the old broadcast media standard. The Court concluded that there was “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium” and rejected the congressional effort to pigeonhole this exciting new medium into the archaic censorship regimes of the past.

The Reno decision was tremendously important in protecting online speakers from the chilling effect of government “indecency” regulations. The decision also set a strong legal precedent and was cited in countless subsequent decisions involving not only online speech, but also efforts to regulate video game content.

Second, in July 1997, the Clinton Administration released The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a document that outlined the US government’s new policy approach toward the Internet and the emerging digital economy. The Framework was a bold vision statement that endorsed comprehensive online freedom of exchange, saying that “the private sector should lead [and] the Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry.” The Administration rejected a restrictive regulatory regime for commercial activities and instead recommended reliance on civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and industry self-regulation.

To “avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce,” the vision statement recommended that “parties should be able to enter into legitimate agreements to buy and sell products and services across the Internet with minimal government involvement or intervention.” But, “[w]here governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.”

Taken together, the Reno decision and the Clinton Administration’s Framework acted as a Magna Carta moment for the Internet and digital technologies. It signaled that “permissionless innovation” would become America’s governance stance toward online speech and commerce.

As I defined it in a book on the subject, permissionless innovation, “refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if any develop, can be addressed later.” The primary advantage of permissionless innovation as a governance disposition is that it sends a clear green light to citizens telling them they are at liberty to pursue their own interests and passions, free from the suffocating grip of prior restraints on free speech and free exchange.

But the Reno decision and the Clinton Administration’s Framework are not the only critical policy decisions that helped enshrine permissionless innovation as the lodestar of online policy in the US. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton Administration made the decision to allow open commercialization of the Internet, which was previously just the domain of government agencies and university researchers. Even more crucially, when Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996, lawmakers made it clear that traditional analog-era communications and media regulatory regimes would generally not be applied to the Internet.

The Telecom Act also included an obscure provision known as “Section 230,” which immunized online intermediaries from onerous liability for the content and communications that traveled over their networks. Section 230 was hugely important in that it let online speech and commerce flourish without the constant threat of frivolous lawsuits looming overhead. Internet scholar David Post has argued that “it is impossible to imagine what the Internet ecosystem would look like today without [Section 230]. Virtually every successful online venture that emerged after 1996 — including all the usual suspects, viz. Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, Reddit, Craigslist, YouTube, Instagram, eBay, Amazon — relies in large part (or entirely) on content provided by their users, who number in the hundreds of millions, or billions,” he notes. It is unlikely that the vibrant marketplace of online speech and commerce we enjoy today could have existed without the protections afforded by Section 230.

Finally, in 1998, another important legislative development occurred when Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which blocked all levels of government in the US from imposing discriminatory taxes on the Internet. That made it clear that the Net would not be milked as a “cash cow” the way previous communications systems had been.

So, let’s recap how policymakers generally got policy right for the Internet in the mid-1990s by enshrining permissionless innovation as the law of the land:

  • The Executive Branch set the tone for online freedom by fully privatizing the underlying network and then establishing a governance vision based upon minimal government interference with online speech and exchange.
  • The Legislative Branch generally endorsed the Clinton Administration’s vision for the Internet and digital technologies by ensuring that new policies would not be based upon the failed regulatory and tax policies of the past.
  • The Judicial Branch upheld the centrality of the First Amendment in the Information Age and made it clear that this new medium for speech would be granted the strongest protection against government encroachments on freedom of speech and expression.

The combined effect of these wise, bipartisan policy decisions was that the Net and digital tech were “born free” instead of being born into regulatory captivity. We continue to enjoy the fruits of these freedoms today as citizens here in the US and across the world take advantage of the unprecedented ability to connect and communicate to pursue their passions and interests as they see fit.

There’s still more work to be done, however. Online platforms and digital technologies continue to come under attack from regulatory activists both here and abroad. Many governments continue to push back against these online speech and commercial freedoms, meaning we’ll need to redouble our efforts to highlight and defend the benefits of preserving these important victories.

Finally, as the underlying drivers of the Digital Revolution continue to spread into other segments of the economy, these freedoms will come into conflict with older top-down regulatory regimes for automobiles, aviation, medical technology, finance, and much more. This will create an epic conflict of governance visions between the Internet’s permissionless innovation model versus the precautionary, command-and-control regulatory regimes of the industrial age. We already see tension at work in policy deliberations over the Internet of Things, “big data,” driverless cars, commercial drones, robotics, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, virtual reality, the sharing economy, and others.

If policymakers hope to preserve and extend the benefits of the hard-fought victories of the Internet’s past twenty years, they will need to restate and reinvigorate their commitment to permissionless innovation to help spur the next great technological revolutions in these and other fields.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2017/06/22/celebrating-20-years-of-internet-free-speech-free-exchange/feed/ 1 76149
Wendell Wallach on the Challenge of Engineering Better Technology Ethics https://techliberation.com/2016/04/20/wendell-wallach-on-the-challenge-of-engineering-better-technology-ethics/ https://techliberation.com/2016/04/20/wendell-wallach-on-the-challenge-of-engineering-better-technology-ethics/#respond Wed, 20 Apr 2016 19:08:57 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76026

DM cover
On May 3rd, I’m excited to be participating in a discussion with Yale University bioethicist Wendell Wallach at the Microsoft Innovation & Policy Center in Washington, DC. (RSVP here.) Wallach and I will be discussing issues we write about in our new books, both of which focus on possible governance models for emerging technologies and the question of how much preemptive control society should exercise over new innovations.

Wallach’s latest book is entitled, A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control. And, as I’ve noted here recently, the greatly expanded second edition of my latest book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, has just been released.

Of all the books of technological criticism or skepticism that I’ve read in recent years—and I have read stacks of them!— A Dangerous Master is by far the most thoughtful and interesting. I have grown accustomed to major works of technological criticism being caustic, angry affairs. Most of them are just dripping with dystopian dread and a sense of utter exasperation and outright disgust at the pace of modern technological change.

Although he is certainly concerned about a wide variety of modern technologies—drones, robotics, nanotech, and more—Wallach isn’t a purveyor of the politics of panic. There are some moments in the book when he resorts to some hyperbolic rhetoric, such as when he frets about an impending “techstorm” and the potential, as the book’s title suggests, for technology to become a “dangerous master” of humanity. For the most part, however, his approach is deeper and more dispassionate than what is found in the leading tracts of other modern techno-critics.

Many Questions, Few Clear Answers

Wallach does a particularly good job framing the major questions about emerging technologies and their effect on society. “Navigating the future of technological possibilities is a hazardous venture,” he observes. “It begins with learning to ask the right questions—questions that reveal the pitfalls of inaction, and more importantly, the passageways available for plotting a course to a safe harbor.” (p. 7) Wallach then embarks on a 260+ page inquiry that bombards the reader with an astonishing litany of questions about the wisdom of various forms of technological innovation—both large and small. While I wasn’t about to start an exact count, I would say that the number of questions Wallach poses in the book runs well into the hundreds. In fact, many paragraphs of the book are nothing but an endless string of questions.

Thus, if there is a primary weakness with A Dangerous Master, it’s that Wallach spends so much time formulating such a long list of smart and nuanced questions that some readers may come away disappointed when they do not find equally satisfying answers. On the other hand, the lack of clear answers is also completely understandable because, as Wallach notes, there really are no simple answers to most of these questions.

Just Slow Down!

Moving on to substance, let me make clear where Wallach and I generally see eye-to-eye and where we part ways.

Generally speaking, we agree about the need to come up with better “soft governance” systems for emerging technologies, which might include multistakeholder process, developer codes of conduct, sectoral self-regulation, sensible liability rules, and so on. (More on those strategies in a moment.)

But while we both believe it is wise to consider how we might “bake-in” better ethics and norms into the process of technological development, Wallach seems much more inclined than me to expect that we will be able to pre-ordain (or potentially require?) all this happens before much of this experimentation and innovation actually moves forward. Wallach opens by asking:

Determining when to bow to the judgment of experts and whether to intervene in the deployment of a new technology is certainly not easy. How can government leaders or informed citizens effectively discern which fields of research are truly promising and which pose serious risks? Do we have the intelligence and means to mitigate the serious risks that can be anticipated? How should we prepare for unanticipated risks? (p. 6)

Again, many good questions here! But this really gets to the primary difference between Wallach’s preferred approach and my own: I tend to believe that many of these things can only be worked out through ongoing trial and error, the constant reformulation of the various norms that govern the process of innovation, and the development of sensible ex post solutions to some of the most difficult problems posed by turbulent technological change.

By contrast, Wallach’s generally attitude toward technological evolution is probably best summarized by the phrases: “Slow down!” and, “Let’s have a conversation about it first!” As he puts it in his own words: “Slowing down the accelerating adoption of technology should be done as a responsible means to ensure basic human safety and to support broadly shared values.” (p. 13)

But I tend to believe that it’s not always possible to preemptively determine which innovations to slow down, or even how to determine what those “shared values” are that will help us make this determination. More importantly, I worry that there are very serious potential risks and unintended consequences associated with slowing down many forms of technological innovation, which could improve human welfare in important ways. There can be no prosperity, after all, without a certain degree of risk-taking and disruption.

Getting Out Ahead of the Pacing Problem

WW
It’s not that Wallach is completely hostile to new forms of technological innovation or blind to the many ways those innovations might improve our lives. To the contrary, he does a nice job throughout the book highlighting the many benefits associated with various new technologies, or he is at least willing to acknowledge that there can be many downsides associated with efforts aimed at limiting research and experimentation with new technological capabilities.

Yet, what concerns Wallach most is the much-discussed issue from the field of the philosophy of technology, the so-called “pacing problem.” Wallach concisely defines the pacing problem as “the gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.” (p. 251) “There has always been a pacing problem,” he notes, but he is concerned that technological innovation—especially highly disruptive and potentially uncontrollable forms of innovation—is now accelerating at an absolutely unprecedented pace.

(Just as an aside for all the philosophy nerds out there…  Such a rigid belief in the “pacing problem” represents a techno-deterministic viewpoint that is, ironically, sometimes shared by technological skeptics like Wallach as well as technological optimists like Larry Downes and even many in the middle of this debate, like Vivek Wadhwa. See, for example, The Laws of Disruption by Downes and “Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology” by Wadhwa. Although these scholars approach technology ethics and politics quite differently, they all seem to believe that the pace of modern technological change is so relentless as to almost be an unstoppable force of nature. I guess the moral of the story is that, to some extent, we’re all technological determinists now!)

Despite his repeated assertions that modern technologies are accelerating at such a potentially uncontrollable pace, Wallach nonetheless hopes we can achieve some semblance of control over emerging technologies before they reach a critical “inflection point.” In the study of history and science, an inflection point generally represents a moment when a situation and trend suddenly changes in a significant way and things begin moving rapidly in a new direction. These inflections points can sometimes develop quite abruptly, ushering in major changes by creating new social, economic, or political paradigms. As it relates to technology in particular, inflection points can refer to the moment with a particular technology achieves critical mass in terms of adoption or, more generally, to the time when that technology begins to profoundly transform the way individuals and institutions act.

Another related concept that Wallach discusses is the so-called “Collingridge dilemma,” which refers to the notion that it is difficult to put the genie back in the bottle once a given technology has reached a critical mass of public adoption or acceptance. The concept is named after David Collingridge, who wrote about this in his 1980 book, The Social Control of Technology. “The social consequences of a technology cannot be predicated early in the life of the technology,” Collingridge argued. “By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the technology is often so much part of the whole economics and social fabric that its control is extremely difficult.”

On “Having a Discussion” & Coming Up with “a Broad Plan”

These related concepts of inflection points and the Collingridge dilemma constitute the operational baseline of Wallach’s worldview. “In weighing speedy development against long-term risks, speedy development wins,” he worries. “This is particularly true when the risks are uncertain and the perceived benefits great.” (p. 85)

Consequently, throughout his book, Wallach pleads with us to take what I will call Technological Time Outs. He says we need to pause at times so that we can have “a full public discussion” (p. 13) and make sure there is a “broad plan in place to manage our deployment of new technologies” (p. 19) to make sure that innovation happens only at “a humanly manageable pace” (p. 261) “to fortify the safety of people affected by unpredictable disruptions.” (p. 262) Wallach’s call for Technological Time Outs is rooted in his belief that “the accelerating pace [of modern technological innovation] undermines the quality of each of our lives.” (p. 263)

That is Wallach’s weakest assertion in the book and he doesn’t really offer much evidence to prove that the velocity of modern technological is hurting us rather than helping us, as many of us believe. Rather, he treats it as a widely accepted truism that necessitates some sort of collective effort to slow things down if the proverbial genie is about to exit the bottle, or to make sure those genies don’t get out of their bottles without a lot of preemptive planning regarding how they are to be released into the world. In the following passage on pg. 72, Wallach very succinctly summarizes his approach recommended throughout A Dangerous Master:

this book will champion the need for more upstream governance: more control over the way that potentially harmful technologies are developed or introduced into the larger society. Upstream management is certainly better than introducing regulations downstream, after a technology is deeply entrenched or something major has already gone wrong. Yet, even when we can access risks, there remain difficulties in recognizing when or determining how much control should be introduced. When does being precautionary make sense, and when is precaution an over-reaction to the risks? (p. 72)

Those who have read my Permissionless Innovation book will recall that I open by framing innovation policy debates in almost exactly the same way as Wallach suggests in that last line above. I argue in the first lines of my book that:

The central fault line in innovation policy debates today can be thought of as ‘the permission question.’  The permission question asks: Must the creators of new technologies seek the blessing of public officials before they develop and deploy their innovations? How that question is answered depends on the disposition one adopts toward new inventions and risk-taking, more generally.  Two conflicting attitudes are evident. One disposition is known as the ‘precautionary principle.’ Generally speaking, it refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harm to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions. The other vision can be labeled ‘permissionless innovation.’ It refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if any develop, can be addressed later.

So, by contrasting these passages, you can see what I am setting up here is a clash of visions between what appears to be Wallach’s precautionary principle-based approach versus my own permissionless innovation-focused worldview.

How Much Formal Precaution?

But that would be a tad bit too simplistic because just a few paragraphs after Wallach makes the statement just above about “upstream management” being superior to ex post solutions formulated “after a technology is deeply entrenched,” Wallach begins slowly backing away from an overly-rigid approach to precautionary principle-based governance of technological processes and systems.

He admits, for example, that “precautionary measures in the form of regulations and governmental oversight can slow the development of research whose overall society impact will be beneficial,” (p. 26) and that can “be costly” and “slow innovation.” For countries, Wallach admits, this can have real consequences because “Countries with more stringent precautionary policies are at a competitive disadvantage to being the first to introduce a new tool or process.” (p. 74)

So, he’s willing to admit that what we might call a hard precautionary principle usually won’t be sensible or effective in practice, but he is far more open to soft precaution. But this is where real problems begin to develop with Wallach’s approach, and it presents us with a chance to turn the tables on him a bit and begin posing some serious questions about his vision for governing technology.

Much of what follows below are my miscellaneous ramblings about the current state of the intellectual dialogue about tech ethics and technological control efforts. I have discussed these issues at greater length in my new book as well as a series of essays here in past years, most notably: “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy; “What Does It Mean to “Have a Conversation” about a New Technology?”; and, “Making Sure the “Trolley Problem” Doesn’t Derail Life-Saving Innovation.”

As I’ve argued in those and other essays, my biggest problem with modern technological criticism is that specifics are in scandalously short supply in this field! Indeed, I often find the lack of details in this arena to be utterly exasperating. Most modern technological criticism follows a simple formula:

TECHNOLOGY –>> POTENTIAL PROBLEMS –>> DO SOMETHING!

But almost all the details come in the discussion about the nature of the technology in question and the apparent many problems associated with it. Far, far less thought goes into the “DO SOMETHING!” part of the critics’ work. One reason for that is probably self-evident: There are no easy solutions. Wallach admits as much at many junctures throughout the book. But that doesn’t excuse the need for the critics to give us a more concrete blueprint for identifying and then potentially rectifying the supposed problems.

Of course, the other reason that many critics are short of specifics is because what they really mean when they quip how much we need to “have a conversation” about a new disruptive technology is that we need to have a conversation about stopping that technology.

Where Shall We Draw the Line between Hard and Soft Law?

But this is what I found most peculiar about Wallach’s book: He never really gives us a good standard by which to determine when we should look to hard governance (traditional top-down regulation) versus soft governance (more informal, bottom-up and non-regulatory approaches).

On one hand, he very much wants society to exercise greatly restraint and precaution when it comes to many of the technologies he and others worry about today. Again, he’s particularly concerned about the potential runaway development and use of drones, genetic editing, nanotech, robotics, and artificial intelligence. For at least one class of robotics—autonomous military robots—Wallach does call for immediate policy action in the form of an Executive Order to ban “killer” autonomous systems. (Incidentally, there’s also a major effort underway called the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” that aims to make such a ban part of international law through a multinational treaty.)

But Wallach also acknowledges the many trade-offs associated with efforts to preemptively controls on robotics and other technology. Perhaps for that reason, Wallach doesn’t develop a clear test for when the Precautionary Principle should be applied to new forms of innovation.

Clearly there are times when it is appropriate, although I believe it is only in an extremely narrow subset of cases. In the 2 nd Edition of my Permissionless Innovation book, I tried to offer a rough framework for when formal precautionary regulation (i.e., highly-restrictive policy defaults are necessary, such as operational restrictions, licensing requirements, research limitations, or even formal bans) might be necessary. I do not want to interrupt the flow of this review of Wallach’s book too much, so I have decided to just cut-and-paste that portion of Chapter 3 of my book (“When Does Precaution Make Sense?”) down below as an appendix to this essay.

The key takeaway of that passage from my book is that all of us who study innovation policy and the philosophy of technology—Wallach, myself, the whole darn movement—have done a remarkably poor job being specific about precisely when formal policy precaution is warranted. What is the test? All too often, we get lazy and apply what we might call an “I-Know-It-When-I-See-It” standard. Consider the possession of bazookas, tanks, and uranium. Almost all of us would agree that citizens should not be allowed to possess or use such things. Why? Well, it seems obvious, right? They just shouldn’t! But what is the exact standard we use to make that determination.

In coming years, I plan on spending a lot more time articulating a better test by which Precautionary Principle-based policies could be reasonably applied. Those who know me may be taken aback by what I just said. After all, I’ve spend many years explaining why Precautionary Principle-based thinking threatens human prosperity and should be rejected in the vast majority of cases. But that doesn’t excuse the lack of a serious and detailed exploration of the exact standard by which we determine when we should impose some limits on technological innovation.

Generally speaking, while I strongly believe that “permissionless innovation” should remain the policy default for most technologies, there certainly exists some scenarios where the threat of harm associated with a new innovation might be highly probable, tangible, immediate, irreversible, and catastrophic in nature. If so, that could qualify it for at least a light version of the Precautionary Principle. In a future paper or book chapter I’m just now starting to research, I hope to fuller develop those qualifiers and formulate a more robust test around them.

I would have very much liked to see Wallach articulate and defend a test of his own for when formal precaution would make sense. And, by extension, when should we default to soft precaution, or soft law and informal governance mechanisms for emerging technologies.

We turn to that issue next.

Toward Soft Governance & the Engineering of Better Technological Ethics

Even though Wallach doesn’t provide us with a test for determining when precaution makes sense or when we should instead default to soft governance, he does a much better job explaining the various models of soft law or informal governance that might help us deal with the potential negative ramifications of highly disruptive forms of technological change.

What Wallach proposes, in essence, is that we bake a dose of precautionary directly into the innovation process through a wide variety of informal governance/oversight mechanisms. “By embedding shared values in the very design of new tools and techniques, engineers improve the prospect of a positive outcome,” he claims. “The upstream embedding of shared values during the design process can ease the need for major course adjustments when it’s often too late.” (p. 261)

Wallach’s favored instrument of soft governance is what he refers to as “Governance Coordinating Committees” (GCCs). These Committees would coordinate “the separate initiatives by the various government agencies, advocacy groups, and representatives of industry” who would serve as “issue managers for the comprehensive oversight of each field of research.” (p. 250) He elaborates and details the function of GCCs as follows:

These committees, led by accomplished elders who have already achieved wide respect, are meant to work together with all the interested stakeholders to monitor technological development and formulate solutions to perceived problems. Rather than overlap with or function as a regulatory body, the committee would work together with existing institutions. (p. 250-51)

Wallach discussed the GCC idea in much greater detail in a 2013 book chapter he penned with Gary E. Marchant for a collected volume of essays on Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies. (I highly recommend you pick up that book if you can afford it! Many terrific essays in that book on these issues.) In their chapter, Marchant and Wallach specify some of the soft law mechanisms we might use to instill a bit of precaution preemptively. These mechanisms include: “codes of conduct, statements of principles, partnership programs, voluntary programs and standards, certification programs and private industry initiatives.”

If done properly, GCCs could provide exactly the sort of wise counsel and smart recommendations that Wallach desires. In my book and many law review articles on various disruptive technologies, I have endorsed many of the ideas and strategies Wallach identifies. I’ve also stressed the importance of many other mechanisms, such as education and empowerment-based strategies that could help the public learn to cope with new innovations or use them appropriately. In addition, I’ve highlighted the many flexible, adaptive ex post remedies that can help when things go wrong. Those mechanisms include common law remedies such as product defects law, various torts, contract law, property law, and even class action lawsuits. Finally, I have written extensively about the very active role played by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other consumer protection agencies, which have broad discretion to police “unfair and deceptive practices” by innovators.

Moreover, we already have a quasi-GCC model developing today with the so-called “multistakeholder governance” model that is often used in both informal and formal ways to handle many emerging technology policy issues.  The Department of Commerce (the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in particular) and the FTC have already developed many industry codes of conduct and best practices for technologies such as biometrics, big data, the Internet of Things, online advertising, and much more. Those agencies and others (such as the FDA and FAA) are continuing to investigate other codes or guidelines for things like advanced medical devices and drones, respectively. Meanwhile, I’ve heard other policymakers and academics float the idea of “digital ombudsmen,” “data ethicists,” and “private IRBs” (institutional review boards) as other potential soft law solutions that technology companies might consider. Perhaps going forward, many tech firms will have Chief Ethical Officers just as many of them today have Chief Privacy Officers or Chief Security Officers.

In other words, there’s already a lot of “soft law” activities going on in this space. And I haven’t even begun an inventory of the many other bodies or groups that already exist in each sector today that has set forth their own industry self-regulatory codes, but they exist in almost every field that Wallach worries about.

So, I’m not sure how much his GCC idea will add to this existing mix, but I would not be opposed to them playing the sort of coordinating “issue manager” role he describes. But I still have many questions about GCC’s, including:

  • How many of them are needed and how we will know which one is the definitive GCC for each sector or technology?
  • If they are overly formal in character and dominated by the most vociferous opponents of any particular technology, a real danger exists that a GCC could end up granting a small cabal a “heckler’s veto” over particular forms of innovation.
  • Alternatively, the possibility of “regulatory capture” could be a problem for some GCCs if incumbent companies come to dominate their membership.
  • Even if everything went fairly smoothly and the GCCs produced balanced reports and recommendations, future developers might wonder if and why they are to be bound by older guidelines.
  • And if those future developers choose not to play by the same set of guidelines, what’s the penalty for non-compliance?
  • And how are such guidelines enforced in a world where what I’ve called “global innovation arbitrage” is an increasing reality?

Challenging Questions for Both Hard and Soft Law

To summarize, whether we are speaking of “hard” or “soft” law approaches to technological governance, I am just not nearly as optimistic as Wallach seems to be that we will be able to find consensus on these three things:

(1) what constitutes “harm” in many of these circumstances;

(2) which “shared values” should prevail when “society” debates the shaping of ethics or guiding norms for emerging technologies but has highly contradictory opinions about those values (consider online privacy as a good example, where many people enjoy hyper-sharing while other demand hyper-privacy); and,

(3) that we can create a legitimate “governing body” (or bodies) that will be responsible for formulating these guidelines in a fair way without completely derailing the benefits of innovation in new fields and also remaining relevant for very long.

Nonetheless, as he and others have suggested, the benefit of adopting a soft law/informal governance approach to these issues is that it at least seeks to address these questions in more flexible and adaptive fashion. As I noted in my book, traditional regulatory systems “tend to be overly rigid, bureaucratic, inflexible, and slow to adapt to new realities. They focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. Worse yet, administrative regulation generally preempts or prohibits the beneficial experiments that yield new and better ways of doing things.” ( Permissionless Innovation, p. 120)

So, despite the questions I have raised here, I welcome the more flexible soft law approach that Wallach sets forth in his book. I think it represents a far more constructive way forward when compared to the opposite “top-down” or “command-and-control” regulatory systems of the past. But I very much want to make sure that even these new and more flexible soft law approaches leave plenty of breathing room for ongoing trial-and-error experimentation with new technologies and systems.

Conclusion

In closing, I want to reiterate that not only did I appreciate the excellent questions raised by Wendell Wallach in A Dangerous Master, but I take them very seriously. When I sat down to revise and expand my Permissionless Innovation book last year, I decided to include this warning from Wallach in my revised preface: “The promoters of new technologies need to speak directly to the disquiet over the trajectory of emerging fields of research. They should not ignore, avoid, or superficially dampen criticism to protect scientific research.” (p. 28–9)

As I noted, in response to Wallach: “I take this charge seriously, as should others who herald the benefits of permissionless innovation as the optimal default for technology policy. We must be willing to take on the hard questions raised by critics and then also offer constructive strategies for dealing with a world of turbulent technological change.”

Serious questions deserve serious answers. Of course, sometimes those posing those questions fail to provide many answers of their own! Perhaps it is because they believe the questions answer themselves. Other times, it’s because they are willing to admit that easy answers to these questions typically prove quite elusive. In Wallach’s case, I believe it’s more the latter.

To wrap up, I’ll just reiterated that both Wallach and I share a common desire to find solutions to the hard questions about technological innovation. But the crucial question that probably separates his worldview and my own is this: Whether we are talking about hard or soft governance, how much faith should we place in preemptive planning vs. ongoing trial and error experimentation to solve technological challenges? Wallach is more inclined to believe we can divine these things with the sagacious foresight of “accomplished elders” and technocratic “issue managers,” who will help us slow things down until we figure out how to properly ease a new technology into society (if at all). But I believe that the only way we will find many of the answers we are searching for is by allowing still more experimentation with the very technologies that he and others seek to control the development of. We humans are outstanding problem-solvers and have the uncanny ability among all mammals to adapt to changing circumstances. We roll with the punches, learn from them, and become more resilient in the process. As I noted in my 2014 essay, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change”:

we modern pragmatic optimists must continuously point to the unappreciated but unambiguous benefits of technological innovation and dynamic change. But we should also continue to remind the skeptics of the amazing adaptability of the human species in the face of adversity. [. . .] Humans have consistently responded to technological change in creative, and sometimes completely unexpected ways. There’s no reason to think we can’t get through modern technological disruptions using similar coping and adaptation strategies.

Will the technologies that Wallach fears bring about a “techstorm” that overwhelms our culture, our economy, and even our very humanity? It’s certainly possible, and we should continue to seriously discuss the issues that he and other skeptics raise about our expanding technological capabilities and the potential for many of them to do great harm. Because some of them truly could.

But it is equally plausible—in fact, some of us would say, highly probable—that instead of overwhelming us, we learn how to bend these new technological capabilities to our will and make them work for our collective benefit. Instead of technology becoming “a dangerous master,” we will instead make it our helpful servant, just as we have so many times before.


APPENDIX: When Does Precaution Make Sense?

[excerpt from chapter 3 of Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. Footnotes omitted. See book for all references.]

But aren’t there times when a certain degree of precautionary policymaking makes good sense? Indeed, there are, and it is important to not dismiss every argument in favor of precautionary principle–based policymaking, even though it should not be the default policy rule in debates over technological innovation.

The challenge of determining when precautionary policies make sense comes down to weighing the (often limited) evidence about any given technology and its impact and then deciding whether the potential downsides of unrestricted use are so potentially catastrophic that trial-and-error experimentation simply cannot be allowed to continue. There certainly are some circumstances when such a precautionary rule might make sense. Governments restrict the possession of uranium and bazookas, to name just two obvious examples.

Generally speaking, permissionless innovation should remain the norm in the vast majority of cases, but there will be some scenarios where the threat of tangible, immediate, irreversible, catastrophic harm associated with new innovations could require at least a light version of the precautionary principle to be applied.  In these cases, we might be better suited to think about when an “anti-catastrophe principle” is needed, which narrows the scope of the precautionary principle and focuses it more appropriately on the most unambiguously worst-case scenarios that meet those criteria.

Precaution might make sense when harm is … Precaution generally doesn’t make sense for asserted harms that are …
Highly probable Highly improbable
Tangible (physical) Intangible (psychic)
Immediate Distant / unclear timeline
Irreversible Reversible / changeable
Catastrophic Mundane / trivial

 

But most cases don’t fall into this category. Instead, we generally allow innovators and consumers to freely experiment with technologies, and even engage in risky behaviors, unless a compelling case can be made that precautionary regulation is absolutely necessary.  How is the determination made regarding when precaution makes sense? This is where the role of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and regulatory impact analysis is essential to getting policy right.  BCA represents an effort to formally identify the tradeoffs associated with regulatory proposals and, to the maximum extent feasible, quantify those benefits and costs.  BCA generally cautions against preemptive, precautionary regulation unless all other options have been exhausted—thus allowing trial-and-error experimentation and “learning by doing” to continue. (The mechanics of BCA are discussed in more detail in section VII.)

This is not the end of the evaluation, however. Policymakers also need to consider the complexities associated with traditional regulatory remedies in a world where technological control is increasingly challenging and quite costly. It is not feasible to throw unlimited resources at every problem, because society’s resources are finite.  We must balance risk probabilities and carefully weigh the likelihood that any given intervention has a chance of creating positive change in a cost-effective fashion.  And it is also essential to take into account the potential unintended consequences and long-term costs of any given solution because, as Harvard law professor Cass Sunstein notes, “it makes no sense to take steps to avert catastrophe if those very steps would create catastrophic risks of their own.”  “The precautionary principle rests upon an illusion that actions have no consequences beyond their intended ends,” observes Frank B. Cross of the University of Texas. But “there is no such thing as a risk-free lunch. Efforts to eliminate any given risk will create some new risks,” he says.

Oftentimes, after working through all these considerations about whether to regulate new technologies or technological processes, the best solution will be to do nothing because, as noted throughout this book, we should never underestimate the amazing ingenuity and resiliency of humans to find creative solutions to the problems posed by technological change.  (Section V discusses the importance of individual and social adaptation and resiliency in greater detail.) Other times we might find that, while some solutions are needed to address the potential risks associated with new technologies, nonregulatory alternatives are also available and should be given a chance before top-down precautionary regulations are imposed. (Section VII considers those alternative solutions in more detail.)

Finally, it is again essential to reiterate that we are talking here about the dangers of precautionary thinking as a public policy prerogative—that is, precautionary regulations that are mandated and enforced by government officials. By contrast, precautionary steps may be far more wise when undertaken in a more decentralized manner by individuals, families, businesses, groups, and other organizations. In other words, as I have noted elsewhere in much longer articles on the topic, “there is a different choice architecture at work when risk is managed in a localized manner as opposed to a society-wide fashion,” and risk-mitigation strategies that might make a great deal of sense for individuals, households, or organizations, might not be nearly as effective if imposed on the entire population as a legal or regulatory directive.

Finally, at times, more morally significant issues may exist that demand an even more exhaustive exploration of the impact of technological change on humanity. Perhaps the most notable examples arise in the field of advance medical treatments and biotechnology. Genetic experimentation and human cloning, for example, raise profound questions about altering human nature or abilities as well as the relationship between generations.

The case for policy prudence in these matters is easier to make because we are quite literally talking about the future of what it means to be human.  Controversies have raged for decades over the question of when life begins and how it should end. But these debates will be greatly magnified and extended in coming years to include equally thorny philosophical questions.  Should parents be allowed to use advanced genetic technologies to select the specific attributes they desire in their children? Or should parents at least be able to take advantage of genetic screening and genome modification technologies that ensure their children won’t suffer from specific diseases or ailments once born?

Outside the realm of technologically enhanced procreation, profound questions are already being raised about the sort of technological enhancements adults might make to their own bodies. How much of the human body can be replaced with robotic or bionic technologies before we cease to be human and become cyborgs?  As another example, “biohacking”—efforts by average citizens working together to enhance various human capabilities, typically by experimenting on their own bodies —could become more prevalent in coming years.  Collaborative forums, such as Biohack.Me, already exist where individuals can share information and collaborate on various projects of this sort.  Advocates of such amateur biohacking sometimes refer to themselves as “grinders,” which Ben Popper of the Verge defines as “homebrew biohackers [who are] obsessed with the idea of human enhancement [and] who are looking for new ways to put machines into their bodies.”

These technologies and capabilities will raise thorny ethical and legal issues as they advance. Ethically, they will raise questions of what it means to be human and the limits of what people should be allowed to do to their own bodies. In the field of law, they will challenge existing health and safety regulations imposed by the FDA and other government bodies.

Again, most innovation policy debates—including most of the technologies discussed throughout this book—do not involve such morally weighty questions. In the abstract, of course, philosophers might argue that every debate about technological innovation has an impact on the future of humanity and “what it means to be human.” But few have much of a direct influence on that question, and even fewer involve the sort of potentially immediate, irreversible, or catastrophic outcomes that should concern policymakers.

In most cases, therefore, we should let trial-and-error experimentation continue because “experimentation is part and parcel of innovation” and the key to social learning and economic prosperity.  If we froze all forms of technological innovation in place while we sorted through every possible outcome, no progress would ever occur. “Experimentation matters,” notes Harvard Business School professor Stefan H. Thomke, “because it fuels the discovery and creation of knowledge and thereby leads to the development and improvement of products, processes, systems, and organizations.”

Of course, ongoing experimentation with new technologies always entails certain risks and potential downsides, but the central argument of this book is that (a) the upsides of technological innovation almost always outweigh those downsides and that (b) humans have proven remarkably resilient in the face of uncertain, ever-changing futures.

In sum, when it comes to managing or coping with the risks associated with technological change, flexibility and patience is essential. One size most certainly does not fit all. And one-size-fits-all approaches to regulating technological risk are particularly misguided when the benefits associated with technological change are so profound. Indeed, “[t]echnology is widely considered the main source of economic progress”; therefore, nothing could be more important for raising long-term living standards than creating a policy environment conducive to ongoing technological change and the freedom to innovate.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2016/04/20/wendell-wallach-on-the-challenge-of-engineering-better-technology-ethics/feed/ 0 76026
A Section 230 for the “Makers” Movement https://techliberation.com/2016/03/01/a-section-230-for-the-makers-movement/ https://techliberation.com/2016/03/01/a-section-230-for-the-makers-movement/#respond Tue, 01 Mar 2016 22:33:36 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76001

The success of the Internet and the modern digital economy was due to its open, generative nature, driven by the ethos of “permissionless innovation.” A “light-touch” policy regime helped make this possible. Of particular legal importance was the immunization of online intermediaries from punishing forms of liability associated with the actions of third parties.

As “software eats the world” and the digital revolution extends its reach to the physical world, policymakers should extend similar legal protections to other “generative” tools and platforms, such as robotics, 3D printing, and virtual reality.

In other words, we need a Section 230 for the “maker” movement.

The Internet’s Most Important Law

Today’s vibrant Internet ecosystem likely would not exist without “Section 230” (47 U.S.C. § 230) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. That law, which recently celebrated its 20th anniversary, immunized online intermediaries from onerous civil liability for the content and communications that travelled over their electronic networks.

The immunities granted by Section 230 let online speech and commerce flow freely, without the constant threat of legal action or onerous liability looming overhead for digital platforms. Without the law, many of today’s most popular online sites and services might have been hit with huge lawsuits for the content and commerce that some didn’t approve of on their platforms. It is unlikely that as many of them would have survived if not for Section 230’s protections.

For example, sites such as eBay, Facebook, Wikipedia, Angie’s List, Yelp, and YouTube all depend on Section 230 immunities to shield them from potentially punishing liability for the content that average Americans post to those sites. But Section 230 protects countless small sites and services just as much as those larger platforms and it has been an extraordinary boon to online commerce and speech.

Extending Immunities to Other General-Purpose Technologies: 3 Models

To foster generativity and permissionless innovation for the next wave of tech entrepreneurs, it may be necessary to immunize some intermediaries (i.e., platform providers or device manufacturers) from punishing forms of liability, or at least to limit liability in some fashion to avoid the chilling effect that excessive litigation can have on life-enriching innovation. Specifically, they should be immunized from liability associated with the ways third-parties use their platforms or devices to speak, experiment, or innovate.

“The past ten years have been about discovering new ways to create, invent, and work together on the Web,” noted Chris Anderson in his book Makers: The New Industrial Revolution. “The next ten years will be about applying those lessons to the real world.” But that can only happen if we get public policy right.

Thus, the creators of newer general-purpose technologies may need to receive certain limited immunizations from liability for the ways third-parties use their devices. If troublemakers use general-purpose technologies to do harm—i.e., cybersecurity violations, privacy invasions, copyright infringement, etc.—it is almost always more sensible to hold those problematic users directly accountable for their actions.

The other approach—holding those intermediaries accountable for the actions of third parties—will discourage innovators from creating vibrant, open platforms and devices that could facilitate new types of speech and commerce. Therefore, an embrace of permissionless innovation requires a rejection of such middleman deputization schemes.

There are three different existing immunity models we might consider applying to emerging general-purpose technologies.

Model #1: Section 230 & online services

The first model, of course, is Section 230 itself.  Section 230 stipulated that it is the policy of the United States “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media,” and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” To accomplish that, the law made it clear that, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”

Since implementation of Section 230 two decades ago, courts have generally read this immunity fairly broadly, so much so that some critics have argued that 230’s scope has been enlarged well beyond congressional intent. Even if that is true, I believe that has been a net positive (excuse the pun) and that it is not only wise to preserve that sweeping immunity but extend it to other technologies and sectors.

Model #2: Firearm manufacturing

Another immunization model can be found in the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095). Although “lawsuits alleging negligent distribution plagued the firearm industry until 2005,” the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act “effectively ended the ‘gun tort’ era,” notes Peter Jensen-Haxel. The law did so by granting gun manufacturers immunities for such legal actions. (It would seem that, by extension, those who use 3D printers to create firearms will also be immunized from civil actions.)

Importantly, unlike Section 230, which provided broad immunity by default to all online platforms, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act applied to manufactures/sellers that fit into the certain qualifications (i.e., they get immunity if they comply with certain licensing rules, record keeping requirements, etc.). This tension between broad versus targeted immunity will become the subject of debate for emerging general-purpose technologies as scholars and policymakers contemplate optimal default liability rules.

Model #3: Vaccines

A final legal immunization model comes, ironically, from the world of medical immunizations. As part of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34), Congress created The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, “after lawsuits against vaccine companies and health care providers threatened to cause vaccine shortages and reduce U.S. vaccination rates, which could have caused a resurgence of vaccine preventable diseases.”

As described by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the program, “is a no-fault alternative to the traditional legal system for resolving vaccine injury petitions.” Thus, those suffering injuries from vaccines are able to seek compensation from this program instead of having to sue vaccine companies.

As Avery Johnson of the Wall Street Journal noted in 2009 article about the program, “A spate of lawsuits against vaccine makers in the 1970s and 1980s had caused dozens of companies to get out of the low-profit business, creating a public-health scare. The strategy worked and the public health implications have been sizable. Vaccines have driven huge reductions — and in the case of smallpox, for instance, complete eradications — of major childhood diseases.”

This model is obviously very different than Section 230 and the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in that it includes a government-created compensation fund provided as an alternative to civil lawsuit remedies. In all likelihood, such a compensation fund would not be necessary for new general-purpose “maker” technologies or sectors.

Nonetheless, this model could, perhaps, have some relevance for certain narrow classes of those technologies. For example, 3D-printed medical devices might be one area where it would make sense to exempt from liability the creators of 3D printers and the platforms over which 3D printer blueprints are distributed. But if there is significant resulting harm from some of those devices or plans, it remains unclear how compensation would work and who would be picking up the tab for it. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program offers one potential answer, although it may not be wise to craft such a consumer-funded or taxpayer-supported program for other reasons. Even if creating a government-run compensation fund was eventually seen as a good idea, we cannot determine how big the fund should be until some actual harms occur.

Three Sectors to Cover

Next, we should consider which sectors or technologies should be eligible for such immunities.

I wish it was possible to craft some sort of “General-Purpose Technology Immunization Act” that would shield such platforms and technologies from onerous liability associated with third-party uses. Realistically, however, it is not likely such a broad-based regime could achieve political traction. There would just be too many opposing forces. Moreover, there may be some unique distinctions between technologies and sectors which necessitate specialized legal regimes.

In any event, I believe a good case can be made for adopting some sort of legal immunity regime for three specific technologies: Robotics, 3D printing, and immersive technology (i.e., virtual reality and augmented reality).

Robotics

Ryan Calo, professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law, has done important work on the law of robotics and he has suggested that such legal immunities may need to be extended to this field. In his 2011 Maryland Law Review article on “Open Robotics,” Calo made his case as follows:

To preempt a clampdown on robot functionality, Congress should consider immunizing manufacturers of open robotic platforms from lawsuits for the repercussions of leaving robots open.  Specifically, consumers and other injured parties should not be able to sue roboticists, much less recover damages, where the injury resulted from one of the following: (1) the use to which the consumer decided to put the robot, no matter how tame or mundane; (2) the nonproprietary software the consumer decided to run on the robot; or (3) the consumer’s decision to alter the robot physically by adding or changing hardware. This immunity would include lawful and unlawful uses of the robot. (p. 134) . . . The immunity I propose is selective: Manufacturers of open robots would not escape liability altogether. For instance, if the consumer runs the manufacturer’s software and the hardware remains unmodified, or if it can be shown that the damage at issue was caused entirely by negligent platform design, then recovery should be possible. The immunity I propose only applies in those instances where it is clear that the robot was under the control of the consumer, a third party software, or otherwise the result of end-user modification. Because this issue will not always be easy to prove, we should expect litigation at the margins. I am thus arguing for a compromise position: A presumption against suit unless the plaintiff can show the problem was clearly related to the platform’s design. (p. 136)

I find this entirely convincing and I also believe Calo is wise to begin with robotics as the first target for such legal immunization because such technologies are already being widely manufactured and deployed today.

These liability questions are already being widely debated, for example, in the field of autonomous systems and driverless cars in particular. I’d like to believe that the common law would sort out these things fairly quickly and that an efficient liability regime would emerge from autonomous technologies in short order.

Alas, because America lacks a “loser pays” rule, a perverse incentive exists for overly-zealous trial lawyers to file an avalanche of lawsuits at the first sign of any problem. This could significantly hamper the development of autonomous technologies, which have the potential to immediately decrease the staggering death toll associated with human error behind the wheel. Therefore, it may be necessary for Congress to craft some sort of limited immunity regime for autonomous technology makers to ensure that the development of these potential life-saving technologies is not discouraged by the looming threat of perpetual litigation.

3D Printing

3D printing would be my second choice for a general-purpose technology that should be covered by some sort of intermediary immunity model.

In a forthcoming law review article for the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Adam Marcus and I argue that “the manufacturers of 3D printing devices and the website operators hosting blueprints for 3D-printed objects may need to be protected from liability to avoid chilling innovation. In this sense, a ‘Section 230 for 3D printing’ might be needed.”

We discuss three specific ways that 3D printers could be used by third-parties in such a way that existing laws or regulations are implicated and someone might seek to bring action against the manufacturers of 3D printers or 3D printing marketplaces, like Shapeways or Thingiverse. These cases involve things like 3D-printed prosthetics, which could raise policy concerns at the Food and Drug Administration, and 3D-printed toys or sculptures, which could present intellectual property issues.

But perhaps the most interesting case study for liability purposes will be 3D-printed firearms, which are already raising a great deal of controversy. Marcus and I argue, once again, that “the proper focus of regulation should remain on the user and uses of firearms, regardless of how they are manufactured.” And because, as already noted, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act immunizes gun manufacturers from legal liability for third-party actions, it would seem logical that the law’s protections would extend to 3D-printed firearms. Moreover, Section 230 itself (and perhaps also the First Amendment) might also apply to 3D printing design schematics that appear on various websites or 3D printing marketplaces.

Generally speaking, Marcus and I argue, “imposing liability on third parties—sites hosting schematics, search engines, and manufacturers of devices—seems neither workable nor wise. There exists a broad spectrum of general-purpose technologies that can be used to facilitate criminal activity,” we note, such as cars, computers, or paper printers. But we don’t blame those intermediaries when those technologies are used by third parties in criminal acts. The same principle should apply to 3D printers.

Things get more complicated when intellectual property issues are brought into the debate. In an important 2014 article, “Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things,” Deven R. Desai and Gerard N. Magliocca sketched out the potential case for some sort of limited immunity as it pertains to patent infringement and 3D printing. “An obstacle to the growth of 3D printing that Congress should consider addressing is that individuals who engage in that activity are strictly liable if they infringe a patent,” they note, but they continue on to add that:

Exempting personal 3D printing from patent infringement without undermining other aspects of the regulatory scheme will not be easy. It would not be a good idea for Congress to create a fair use exception for all patents or make infringement an intentional tort, as those changes would sweep too far. Targeting 3D printing itself is a possibility, but in that case the legislation would have to distinguish between personal and commercial activity, as there is no rationale for saying that all 3D printing leading to patent infringement, including what Fortune 500 firms do, should be permitted. Drawing that kind of line with a substantive legal standard, though, will generate years of litigation and may not effectively separate the good from the bad. One alternative, should Congress opt to give personal 3D printing some immunity, would be to set a relatively high minimum amount-in-controversy for federal jurisdiction over any [patent] infringement claims involving this technology. (p. 1717)

Getting this balance right will be tricky, yet essential. “Patent law and industries that rely on patents will have to adapt to this new environment or face potential obsolescence,” Desai and Magliocca correctly conclude.

Immersive Technology

A final sector we might eventually want to apply some sort of intermediary immunity model to is immersive technology. “Immersive technology” refers to services that currently utilize wearable devices (such as a head-mounted display or headset) to let users explore virtual worlds, virtual objects, or hologram-like projections. Immersive technology can be separated into two different, but related groups: virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR).

These technologies are still in the cradle, but many companies are already developing VR and AR technologies for both entertainment and professional uses. As they gain more widespread usage, immersive technologies could raise some policy issues, including concerns about privacy, intellectual property (ex: who owns certain “experiences”), and potentially even worries about distraction and addiction.

It would not be surprising, therefore, if some critics begin advocating greater regulation of, or liability for, VR and AR intermediaries. If that happens, policymakers will need to consider immunizing them from the threat of lawsuits or else innovation will die in these sectors.

Conclusion

Following the general logic of permissionless innovation, and understanding the importance of keeping intermediaries free of punishing liability for what others might do with their general-purpose technologies and platforms, the proper focus of regulation should remain on the user and uses of those technologies.

Accordingly, policymakers should craft a “Section 230 for the maker movement” by adopting legal protections for robotics, 3D printing, and immersive technology. At the same time, we should seek out better solutions—legal and otherwise—to the old problems that might persist or new ones that might come about due to the use of these new devices and platforms. But we should not let hypothetical worst-case scenarios and concerns about future technologies lead us down a path where intermediaries are “deputized” or hit with punishing liability for downstream actions by third parties.


 

Note#1 : This is a preliminary sketch of a law review article I would eventually like to write entitled, “A Section 230 for the “Makers” Movement: Extending Section 230 Immunities to Robotics, 3D Printing & Virtual Reality.” Toward that end, I welcome suggestions for (a) which general-purpose technologies deserve some sort of immunization, and also (b) what other legal immunity regimes exist that we could learn from. Please forward any ideas you might have along to me.

Note #2: My thanks to Adam Marcus and Christopher Koopman for their helpful suggestions on this essay.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2016/03/01/a-section-230-for-the-makers-movement/feed/ 0 76001
New Paper on Privacy & Security Implications of the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology https://techliberation.com/2014/11/21/new-paper-on-privacy-security-implications-of-the-internet-of-things-wearable-technology/ https://techliberation.com/2014/11/21/new-paper-on-privacy-security-implications-of-the-internet-of-things-wearable-technology/#comments Fri, 21 Nov 2014 15:23:31 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=74973

IoT paperThe Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my latest working paper, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation.” The “Internet of Things” (IoT) generally refers to “smart” devices that are connected to both the Internet and other devices. Wearable technologies are IoT devices that are worn somewhere on the body and which gather data about us for various purposes. These technologies promise to usher in the next wave of Internet-enabled services and data-driven innovation. Basically, the Internet will be “baked in” to almost everything that consumers own and come into contact with.

Some critics are worried about the privacy and security implications of the Internet of Things and wearable technology, however, and are proposing regulation to address these concerns. In my new 93-page article, I explain why preemptive, top-down regulation would derail the many life-enriching innovations that could come from these new IoT technologies. Building on a recent book of mine, I argue that “permissionless innovation,” which allows new technology to flourish and develop in a relatively unabated fashion, is the superior approach to the Internet of Things.

As I note in the paper and my earlier book, if we spend all our time living in fear of the worst-case scenarios — and basing public policies on them — then best-case scenarios can never come about. As the old saying goes: nothing ventured, nothing gained. Precautionary principle-based regulation paralyzes progress and must be avoided.  We instead need to find constructive, “bottom-up” solutions to the privacy and security risks accompanying these new IoT technologies instead of top-down controls that would limit the development of life-enriching IoT innovations.

The better alternative is to deal with concerns creatively as they develop, using a balanced, layered approach  involving many different solutions, including: educational efforts, technological empowerment tools, social norms, public and watchdog pressure, industry best practices and self-regulation, transparency, torts and products liability law, and targeted enforcement of existing legal standards as needed.

Generally speaking, patience, humility, and forbearance by policymakers is crucial to allowing greater innovation and consumer choice in this arena. Importantly, policymakers should not forget that societal and individual adaptation will play a role here, just as it has during so many other turbulent technological transformations.

This article can be downloaded on my Mercatus Center page, on SSRN, or at Research Gate. I am hoping to find a law or policy journal interested in publishing this paper soon. If you with a journal and are interested, please contact me. [UPDATE 12/3/14: This paper has been accepted for publication in the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 21, Issue 6 (2015).]

Finally, if you are interested in this topic, you might want to flip through these slides I prepared for a presentation on this topic that I made at the Federal Communications Commission in September:

Additional reading:
]]>
https://techliberation.com/2014/11/21/new-paper-on-privacy-security-implications-of-the-internet-of-things-wearable-technology/feed/ 5 74973
Problems with Precautionary Principle-Minded Tech Regulation & a Federal Robotics Commission https://techliberation.com/2014/09/22/problems-with-precautionary-principle-minded-tech-regulation-a-federal-robotics-commission/ https://techliberation.com/2014/09/22/problems-with-precautionary-principle-minded-tech-regulation-a-federal-robotics-commission/#comments Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:55:03 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=74760

If there are two general principles that unify my recent work on technology policy and innovation issues, they would be as follows. To the maximum extent possible:

  1. We should avoid preemptive and precautionary-based regulatory regimes for new innovation. Instead, our policy default should be innovation allowed (or “permissionless innovation”) and innovators should be considered “innocent until proven guilty” (unless, that is, a thorough benefit-cost analysis has been conducted that documents the clear need for immediate preemptive restraints).
  2. We should avoid rigid, “top-down” technology-specific or sector-specific regulatory regimes and/or regulatory agencies and instead opt for a broader array of more flexible, “bottom-up” solutions (education, empowerment, social norms, self-regulation, public pressure, etc.) as well as reliance on existing legal systems and standards (torts, product liability, contracts, property rights, etc.).

I was very interested, therefore, to come across two new essays that make opposing arguments and proposals. The first is this recent Slate oped by John Frank Weaver, “We Need to Pass Legislation on Artificial Intelligence Early and Often.” The second is Ryan Calo’s new Brookings Institution white paper, “The Case for a Federal Robotics Commission.”

Weaver argues that new robot technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” In order to preemptively address concerns about new technologies such as driverless cars or commercial drones, “we need to legislate early and often,” Weaver says. Stated differently, Weaver is proposing “precautionary principle”-based regulation of these technologies. The precautionary principle generally refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.

Calo argues that we need “the establishment of a new federal agency to deal with the novel experiences and harms robotics enables” since there exists “distinct but related challenges that would benefit from being examined and treated together.” These issues, he says, “require special expertise to understand and may require investment and coordination to thrive.

I’ll address both Weaver and Calo’s proposals in turn.

Problems with Precautionary Regulation

Let’s begin with Weaver proposed approach to regulating robotics and autonomous systems.

What Weaver seems to ignore—and which I discuss at greater length in my latest book—is that “precautionary” policy-making typically results in technological stasis and lost opportunities for economic and social progress. As I noted in my book, if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon such fears—it means that best-case scenarios will never come about. Wisdom and progress are born from experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures. As the old adage goes, “nothing ventured, nothing gained.”

More concretely, the problem with “permissioning” innovation is that traditional regulatory policies and systems tend to be overly-rigid, bureaucratic, costly, and slow to adapt to new realities. Precautionary-based policies and regulatory systems focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. As a result, preemptive bans or highly restrictive regulatory prescriptions can limit innovations that yield new and better ways of doing things.

Weaver doesn’t bother addressing these issues. He instead advocates regulating “early and often” without stopping to think through the potential costs of doing so. Yet, all regulation has trade-offs and opportunity costs. Before we rush to adopt rules based on knee-jerk negative reactions to new technology, we should conduct comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of the proposals and think carefully about what alternative approaches exist to address whatever problems we have identified.

Incidentally, Weaver also does not acknowledge the contradiction inherent in his thinking when he says robotic technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” Well, if robotic technology is truly developing “faster than we can legislate it,” then “getting out ahead of it” would be seemingly impossible! Unless, that is, he envisions regulating robotic technologies so stringently as to effectively bring new innovation to a grinding halt (or banning altogether).

To be clear, my criticisms should not be read to suggest that zero regulation is the best option. There are plenty of thorny issues that deserve serious policy consideration and perhaps even some preemptive rules. But how potential harms are addressed matters deeply. We should exhaust all other potential nonregulatory remedies first — education, empowerment, transparency, etc. — before resorting to preemptive controls on new forms of innovation. In other words, ex post (or after the fact) solutions should generally trump ex ante (preemptive) controls.

I’ll say more on this point in the conclusion since my response addresses general failings in Ryan Calo’s Federal Robotics Commission proposal, to which we now turn.

Problems with a Federal Robotics Commission

Moving on to Calo, it is important to clarify what he is proposing because he is careful not to overstate his case in favor of a new agency for robotics. He elaborates as follows:

“The institution I have in mind would not “regulate” robotics in the sense of fashioning rules regarding their use, at least not in any initial incarnation. Rather, the agency would advise on issues at all levels—state and federal, domestic and foreign, civil and criminal—that touch upon the unique aspects of robotics and artificial intelligence and the novel human experiences these technologies generate. The alternative, I fear, is that we will continue to address robotics policy questions piecemeal, perhaps indefinitely, with increasingly poor outcomes and slow accrual of knowledge. Meanwhile, other nations that are investing more heavily in robotics and, specifically, in developing a legal and policy infrastructure for emerging technology, will leapfrog the U.S. in innovation for the first time since the creation of steam power.”

Here are some of my concerns with Calo’s proposed Federal Robotics Commission.

Will It Really Just Be an Advisory Body?

First, Calo claims he doesn’t want a formal regulatory agency, but something more akin to a super-advisory body. He does, however, sneak in that disclaimer that he doesn’t envision it to be regulatory “at least not in any initial incarnation.” Perhaps, then, he is suggesting that more formal regulatory controls would be in the cards down the road. It remains unclear.

Regardless, I think it is a bit disingenuous to propose the formation of a new governmental body like this and pretend that it will not someday very soon come to possess sweeping regulatory powers over these technologies. Now, you may well feel that that is a good thing. But I fear that Calo is playing a bit of game here by asking the reader to imagine his new creation would merely stick to an advisory role.

Regulatory creep is real. There just aren’t too many examples of agencies being created solely for their advisory expertise and then not also getting into the business of regulating the technology or topic that is included in that agency’s name. And in light of some of Calo’s past writing and advocacy, I can’t help but think he is actually hoping that the agency comes to take on a greater regulatory role over time. Regardless, I think we can bank on that happening and I that there are reasons to worry about it for reasons noted above and which I will elaborate on below.

Incidentally, if Calo is really more interested in furthering just this expert advisory capacity, there are plenty of other entities (including non-governmental bodies) that could play that role. How about the National Science Foundation, for example? Or how about a multi-stakeholder body consisting of many different experts and institutions? I could go on, but you get the point. A single point of action is also a single point of failure. I don’t want just one big robotics bureaucracy making policy or even advising. I’d prefer a more decentralized approach, and one that doesn’t carry a (potential) big regulatory club in its hand.

Public Choice / Regulatory Capture Problems

Second, Calo underestimates the public choice problems of creating a sector-specific or technology-specific agency just for robotics. To his credit, he does admit that, “agencies have their problems, of course. They can be inefficient and are subject to capture by those they regulate or other special interests.” He also notes he has criticized other agencies for various failings. But he does not say anything more on this point.

Let’s be clear. There exists a long and lamentable history of sector-specific regulators being “captured” by the entities they regulate. To read the ugly reality, see my compendium, “Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found.” That piece documents what leading academics of all political stripes have had to say about this problem over the past century. No one ever summarized the nature and gravity of this problem better than the great Alfred Kahn in his masterpiece, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (1971):

“When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. [. . . ] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.” (pgs. 12, 46)

The history of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is highly instructive in this regard and was documented in a 66-page law review article I penned with Brent Skorup entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector,” (Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Vol. 18, 2013). Again, it doesn’t make for pleasant reading. Time and time again, instead of serving the “public interest,” the FCC served private interests. The entire history of video marketplace regulation is one of the most sickening examples to consider since there have almost eight decades worth of case studies of the broadcast industry using regulation as a club to beat back new entry, competition, and innovation. [Skorup and I have another paper discussing that specific history and how to go about reversing it.] This history is important because, in the early days of the Commission, many proponents thought the FCC would be exactly the sort of “expert” independent agency that Calo envisions his Federal Robotics Commission would be. Needless to say, things did not turn out so well.

But the FCC isn’t the only guilty offender in this regard. Go read the history about how airlines so effectively cartelized their industry following World War II with the help of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Thankfully, President Jimmy Carter appointed Alfred Kahn to clean things up in the 1970s. Kahn, a life-long Democrat, came to realize that the problem of capture was so insidious and inescapable that abolition of the agency was the only realistic solution to make sure consumer welfare would improve. As a result, he and various other Democrats in the Carter Administration and in Congress worked together to sunset the agency and its hideously protectionist, anti-consumer policies. (Also, please read this amazing 1973 law review article on “Economic Regulation vs. Competition,” by Mark Green and Ralph Nader if you need even more proof of why this is a such a problem.)

In other words, the problem of regulatory capture is not something one can casually dismiss. The problem is still very real and deserves more consideration before we casually propose creating new agencies, even “advisory” agencies. At a minimum, when proposing new agencies, you need to get serious about what sort of institutional constraints you might consider putting in place to make sure that history does not repeat itself. Because if you don’t, various large, well-heeled, and politically-connected robotics companies could come to capture any new “Federal Robotics Commission” in very short order.

Can We Clean Up Old Messes Before Building More Bureaucracies?

Third, speaking of agencies, if it is the case that the alphabet soup collection of regulatory agencies we already have in place are not capable of handling “robotics policy” right now, can we talk about reforming them (or perhaps even getting rid of a few of them) first? Why must we just pile yet another sector-specific or technology-specific regulator on top of the many that already exist? That’s just a recipe for more red tape and potential regulatory capture. Unless you believe there is value in creating bureaucracy for the sake of creating bureaucracy, there is no excuse for not phasing out agencies that failed in their original mission, or whose mission is now obsolete, for whatever reason. This is a fundamental “good government” issue that politicians and academics of all stripes should agree on.

Calo indirectly addresses this point by noting that “we have agencies devoted to technologies already and it would be odd and anomalous to think we are done creating them.” Curiously, however, he spends no time talking about those agencies or asking whether they have done a good job. Again, the heart of Calo’s argument comes down the assertion that another specialized, technology-specific “expert” agency is needed because there are “novel” issues associated with robotics. Well, if it is true, as Calo suggests, that we have been down this path before (and we have), and if you believe our economy or society has been made better off for it, then you need to prove it. Because the objection to creating another regulatory bureaucracy is not simply based on distaste for Big Government; it comes down to the simple questions: (1) Do these things work; and (2) Is there a better alternative?

This is where Calo’s proposal falls short. There is no effort to prove that technocratic or “scientific” bureaucracies, on net, are worth their expense (to taxpayers) or cost (to society, innovation, etc.) when compared to alternatives. Of course, I suspect this is where Calo and I might part ways regarding what metrics we would use to gauge success. I’ll save that discussion for another day and shift to what I regard as the far more serious deficiency of Calo’s proposal.

Do We Become Global Innovation Leaders Through Bureaucratic Direction?

Fourth, and most importantly, Calo does not offer any evidence to prove his contention that we need a sector-specific or technology-specific agency for robotics in order to develop or maintain America’s competitive edge in this field. Moreover, he does not acknowledge how his proposal might have the exact opposite result. Let me spend some time on this point because this is what I find most problematic about his proposal.

In his latest Brookings essay and his earlier writing about robotics, Calo keeps suggesting that we need a specialized federal agency for robotics to avoid “poor outcomes” due to the lack of “a legal and policy infrastructure for emerging technology.” He even warns us that other countries who are looking into robotics policy and regulation more seriously “will leapfrog the U.S. in innovation for the first time since the creation of steam power.”

Well, on that point, I must ask: Did America need a Federal Steam Agency to become a leader in that field? Because unless I missed something in history class, steam power developed fairly rapidly in this country without any centralized bureaucratic direction. Or how about a more recent example: Did America need a Federal Computer Commission or Federal Internet Commission to obtain or maintain a global edge in computing, the Internet, or the Digital Economy?

To the contrary, we took the EXACT OPPOSITE approach. It’s not just that no new agencies were formed to guide the development of computing or the Internet in this country. It’s that our government made a clear policy choice to break with the past by rejecting top-down, command-and-control regulation by unelected bureaucrats in some shadowy Beltway agency.

Incidentally, it was Democrats who accomplished this. While many Republicans today love to crack wise-ass comments about Al Gore and the Internet while simultaneously imagining themselves to be the great defenders of Internet freedom, the reality is that we have the Clinton Administration and one its most liberal members—Ira Magaziner—to thank for the most blessedly “light-touch,” market-oriented innovation policy that the world has ever seen.

What did Magaziner and the Clinton Administration do? They crafted the amazing 1997 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a statement of the Administration’s principles and policy objectives toward the Internet and the emerging digital economy. It recommended reliance upon civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and ongoing marketplace experiments to solve information age problems. First, “the private sector should lead. The Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry,” the Framework recommended. “Even where collective action is necessary, governments should encourage industry self-regulation and private sector leadership where possible.” Second, “governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce” and “parties should be able to enter into legitimate agreements to buy and sell products and services across the Internet with minimal government involvement or intervention.”

I’ve argued elsewhere that the Clinton Administration’s Framework, “remains the most succinct articulation of a pro-freedom, innovation-oriented vision for cyberspace ever penned.” Of course, this followed the Administration’s earlier move to allow the full commercialization of the Internet, which was even more important. The policy disposition they established with these decisions resulted in an unambiguous green light for a rising generation of creative minds who were eager to explore this new frontier for commerce and communications. And to reiterate,they did it without any new bureaucracy.

If You Regulate “Robotics,” You End Up Regulating Computing & Networking

Incidentally, I do not see how we could create a new Federal Robotics Commission without it also becoming a de facto Federal Computing Commission. Robotics and the many technologies and industries it already includes — driverless cars, commercial drones, Internet of Things, etc. — is becoming a hot policy topic, and proposals for regulation are already flying. These robotic technologies are developing on top of the building blocks of the Information Revolution: microprocessors, wireless networks, sensors, “big data,” etc.

Thus, I share Cory Doctorow’s skepticism about how one could logically separate “robotics” from these other technologies and sectors for regulatory purposes:

I am skeptical that “robot law” can be effectively separated from software law in general. … For the life of me, I can’t figure out a legal principle that would apply to the robot that wouldn’t be useful for the computer (and vice versa).

In his Brookings paper, Calo responded to Doctorow’s concern as follows:

the difference between a computer and a robot has largely to do with the latter’s embodiment. Robots do not just sense, process, and relay data. Robots are organized to act upon the world physically, or at least directly. This turns out to have strong repercussions at law, and to pose unique challenges to law and to legal institutions that computers and the Internet did not.

I find this fairly unconvincing. Just because robotic technologies have a physical embodiment does not mean their impact on society is all that more profound than computing, the Internet, and digital technologies. Consider all the hand-wringing going on today in cybersecurity circles about how hacking, malware, or various other types of digital attacks could take down entire systems or economies. I’m not saying I buy all that “technopanic” talk (and here are about three dozens of my essays arguing the contrary), but the theoretical ramifications are nonetheless on par with dystopian scenarios about robotics.

The Alternative Approach

Of course, it certainly may be the case that some worst-case scenarios are worth worrying about in both cases—for robotics and computing, that is. Still, is a Federal Robotics Commission or a Federal Computing Commission really the sensible way to address those issues?

To the contrary, this is why we have a Legislative Branch! So many of the problems of our modern era of dysfunctional government are rooted in an unwise delegation of authority to administrative agencies. Far too often, congressional lawmakers delegate broad, ambiguous authority to agencies instead of facing up to the hard issues themselves. This results in waste, bloat, inefficiencies, and an endless passing of the buck.

There may very well be some serious issues raised by robotics and AI that we cannot ignore, and which may even require a little preemptive, precautionary policy. And the same goes for general computing and the Internet. But that is not a good reason to just create new bureaucracies in the hope that some set of mythical technocratic philosopher kings will ride in to save the day with their supposed greater “expertise” about these matters. Either you believe in democracy or you don’t. Running around calling for agencies and unelected bureaucrats to make all the hard choices means that “the people” have even less of a say in these matters.

Moreover, there are many other methods of dealing with robotics and the potential problems robotics might create than through the creation of new bureaucracy. The common law already handles many of the problems that both Calo and Weaver are worried about. To the extent robotic systems are involved in accidents that harm individuals or their property, product liability law will kick in.

On this point, I strongly recommend another new Brookings publication. John Villasenor’s outstanding April white paper, “Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for Legislation,” correctly argues that,

“when confronted with new, often complex, questions involving products liability, courts have generally gotten things right. … Products liability law has been highly adaptive to the many new technologies that have emerged in recent decades, and it will be quite capable of adapting to emerging autonomous vehicle technologies as the need arises.”

Thus, instead of trying to micro-manage the development of robotic technologies in an attempt to plan for every hypothetical risk scenario, policymakers should be patient while the common law evolves and liability norms adjust. Traditionally, the common law has dealt with products liability and accident compensation in an evolutionary way through a variety of mechanisms, including strict liability, negligence, design defects law, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and so on. There is no reason to think the common law will not adapt to new technological realities, including robotic technologies. (I address these and other “bottom-up” solutions in my new book.)

In the meantime, let’s exercise some humility and restraint here and avoid heavy-handed precautionary regulatory regimes or the creation of new technocratic bureaucracies. And let’s not forget that many solutions to the problems created by new robotic technologies will develop spontaneously and organically over time as individuals and institutions learn to cope and “muddle through,” as they have many times before.


Additional Reading

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2014/09/22/problems-with-precautionary-principle-minded-tech-regulation-a-federal-robotics-commission/feed/ 2 74760
New Paper: “Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars” https://techliberation.com/2014/09/17/new-paper-removing-roadblocks-to-intelligent-vehicles-and-driverless-cars/ https://techliberation.com/2014/09/17/new-paper-removing-roadblocks-to-intelligent-vehicles-and-driverless-cars/#comments Wed, 17 Sep 2014 15:03:42 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=74730

Driverless CarI’m pleased to announce that the Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my latest working paper, “Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars.” This paper, which was co-authored with Ryan Hagemann, has been accepted for publication in a forthcoming edition of the Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy.

In the paper, Hagemann and I explore the growing market for both “connected car” technologies as well as autonomous (or “driverless”) vehicle technology. We argue that intelligent-vehicle technology will produce significant benefits. Most notably, these technologies could save many lives. In 2012, 33,561 people were killed and 2,362,000 injured in traffic crashes, largely as a result of human error. Reducing the number of accidents by allowing intelligent vehicle technology to flourish would constitute a major public policy success. As Philip E. Ross noted recently at IEEE Spectrum, thanks to these technologies, “eventually it will be positively hard to use a car to hurt yourself or others.” The sooner that day arrives, the better.

These technologies could also have positive environmental impacts in the form of improved fuel economy, reduced traffic congestion, and reduced parking needs. They might also open up new mobility options for those who are unable to drive, for whatever reason. Any way you cut it, these are exciting technologies that promise to substantially improve human welfare.

Of course, as with any new disruptive technology, connected cars and driverless vehicles raise a variety of economic, social, and ethical concerns. Hagemann and I address some of the early policy concerns about these technologies (safety, security, privacy, liability, etc.) and we outline a variety of “bottom-up” solutions to ensure that innovation continues to flourish in this space. Importantly, we also argue that policymakers should keep in mind that individuals have gradually adapted to similar disruptions in the past and, therefore, patience and humility are needed when considering policy for intelligent-vehicle systems.

More generally, we note that the debate over intelligent vehicle technologies foreshadows many other tech policy debates to come in that it raises the larger question of what principle will guide the future of technological progress. Will “permissionless innovation” be our lodestar, allowing individuals to pursue a world of which they can, as of now, only dream? Or will “precautionary principle”-based reasoning prevail instead, driven by a desire to preserve the status quo?

To the maximum extent possible, we argue, policymakers should embrace permissionless innovation for intelligent vehicles. Creative minds–especially those most vociferously opposed to technological change–will always be able to concoct horrific-sounding scenarios about the future. Best-case scenarios will never develop if we are gripped by fear of the worst-case scenarios and try to preemptively plan for all of them with policy interventions.

This 55-page (double-spaced) working paper is available on the Mercatus Center website as well as SSRN, Research Gate, and Scribd. In coming weeks and months, we’ll be writing more about the themes addressed in this paper. Stay tuned, things are unfolding rapidly in this highly innovative arena.

 

Additional Reading

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2014/09/17/new-paper-removing-roadblocks-to-intelligent-vehicles-and-driverless-cars/feed/ 2 74730
Slide Presentation: Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology https://techliberation.com/2014/09/12/slide-presentation-policy-issues-surrounding-the-internet-of-things-wearable-technology/ https://techliberation.com/2014/09/12/slide-presentation-policy-issues-surrounding-the-internet-of-things-wearable-technology/#comments Fri, 12 Sep 2014 16:04:09 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=74721

On Thursday, it was my great pleasure to present a draft of my forthcoming paper, “The Internet of Things & Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy & Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” at a conference that took place at the Federal Communications Commission on “Regulating the Evolving Broadband Ecosystem.” The 3-day event was co-sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the University of Nebraska College of Law.

The 65-page working paper I presented is still going through final peer review and copyediting, but I posted a very rough first draft on SSRN for conference participants. I expect the paper to be released as a Mercatus Center working paper in October and then I hope to find a home for it in a law review. I will post the final version once it is released. [UPDATE:The final version of this working paper was released on November 19, 2014.]

In the meantime, however, I thought I would post the 46 slides I presented at the conference, which offer an overview of the nature of the Internet of Things and wearable technology, the potential economic opportunities that exist in this space, and the various privacy and security challenges that could hold this technological revolution back. I also outlined some constructive solutions to those concerns. I plan to be very active on these issues in coming months.

Additional Reading

 

 

 

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2014/09/12/slide-presentation-policy-issues-surrounding-the-internet-of-things-wearable-technology/feed/ 3 74721
Celebrating Section 230 https://techliberation.com/2011/05/14/celebrating-section-230/ https://techliberation.com/2011/05/14/celebrating-section-230/#comments Sat, 14 May 2011 04:54:18 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=36688

My latest Forbes column is a celebration of 47 U.S.C. §230, otherwise known as “Section 230.” Sec. 230 turns 15 years old this year and I argue that this important law has “helped foster the abundance of informational riches that lies at our fingertips today” and has served as “the foundation of our Internet freedoms.”  Sadly, however, few people have even heard of it. Worse yet, as I note in my essay, this important law is under attack from various academics and organizations who want it modified to address a variety of online problems. But, as I note:

If the threat of punishing liability is increased, the chilling effect on the free exchange of views and information would likely be quite profound. Many site administrators would immediately start removing massive amounts of content to avoid liability. More simply, they might just shut down any interactive features on their sites or limit service in other ways.

Head over to Forbes to read the rest. And here’s a graphic I put together illustrating all the new fault lines in the war against Sec. 230. It will be included in a new paper on the issue that I am wrapping up right now.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2011/05/14/celebrating-section-230/feed/ 2 36688
TLFers Attending Two Important Sec. 230 / Net Liability Events in CA This Week https://techliberation.com/2011/03/01/tlfers-attending-two-important-sec-230-net-liability-events-in-ca-this-week/ https://techliberation.com/2011/03/01/tlfers-attending-two-important-sec-230-net-liability-events-in-ca-this-week/#respond Wed, 02 Mar 2011 02:33:56 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=35387

This week I will be attending two terrific conferences on Sec. 230 and Internet intermediary liability issues. On Thursday, the Stanford Technology Law Review hosts an all-day event on “Secondary and Intermediary Liability on the Internet” at the Stanford Law School. It includes 3 major panels on intermediary liability as it pertains to copyright, trademark, and privacy. On Friday, the amazing Eric Goldman and his colleagues at the Santa Clara Law School’s High Tech Law Institute host an all-star event on “47 U.S.C. § 230: a 15 Year Retrospective.”  Berin Szoka and Jim Harper will also be attending both events (Harper is speaking at Stanford event) and Larry Downes will be at the Santa Clara event.  So if you also plan to attend, come say ‘Hi’ to us.  We don’t bite! (We have, however, been known to snarl.)

In the meantime, down below, I just thought I would post a few links to the many things we have said about Section 230 and online intermediary liability issues here on the TLF in the past as well as this graphic depicting some of the emerging threats to Sec. 230 from various proposals to “deputize the online middleman.”  As we’ve noted here many times before, Sec. 230 is the “cornerstone of Internet freedom” that has allowed a “utopia of utopias” to develop online.  It would be a shame if lawmakers rolled back its protections and opted for an onerous new legal/regulatory approach to handling online concerns. Generally speaking, education and empowerment should trump regulation and punishing liability.

Deputization of the Middleman http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Further Reading from the TLF

 

 

 

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2011/03/01/tlfers-attending-two-important-sec-230-net-liability-events-in-ca-this-week/feed/ 0 35387
Eric Goldman on New Threats to Sec. 230 https://techliberation.com/2010/03/27/eric-goldman-on-new-threats-to-sec-230/ https://techliberation.com/2010/03/27/eric-goldman-on-new-threats-to-sec-230/#comments Sat, 27 Mar 2010 15:57:34 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=27513

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

Short but very important essay here from Santa Clara University Law School Prof. Eric Goldman about calls to alter Sec. 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) to address concerns about online harassment. Generally speaking, Sec. 230 immunizes online intermediaries from punishing liability for the content that travels over their networks / services. Specifically, Sec. 230 stipulates that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In other words: Don’t shoot the messenger!

As we’ve noted here before, it is probably not an overstatement to think of Sec. 230 as the very cornerstone of Internet Freedom, since it makes possible an online “utopia for utopias,” to borrow a phrase from our favorite modern political philosopher, the late Robert Nozick. Without Sec. 230, intermediaries would likely be forced to shut down many avenues of communication and would have to become deputized conduct and morality police for every cyber-street corner.

Goldman, America’s leading expert on Sec. 230-related jurisprudence, correctly notes that, “Frequently, § 230’s critics do not attack the immunization generally, but instead advocate a new limited exception for their pet concern.” He’s got that right. Indeed, we are increasingly hearing calls from numerous quarters these days to “tweak 230” for one pet concern after another. We’ve illustrated some of those concerns in this exhibit.

Deputization of the Middleman http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf Regulatory advocates can be found for each of these issues who like to see the protections afforded by Sec. 230 scaled back by Congress or he courts. But Goldman rightly warns:

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2010/03/27/eric-goldman-on-new-threats-to-sec-230/feed/ 8 27513
ICANN’s Implementation Recommendation Team for New gTLDs: Safeguards Needed https://techliberation.com/2009/03/24/icann%e2%80%99s-implementation-recommendation-team-for-new-gtlds-safeguards-needed/ https://techliberation.com/2009/03/24/icann%e2%80%99s-implementation-recommendation-team-for-new-gtlds-safeguards-needed/#comments Tue, 24 Mar 2009 23:15:40 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=17625

I’ve been working closely with PFF Adjunct Fellow & former ICANN Board member Michael D. Palage on ICANN issues.  Michael had this to say about the ongoing saga of ICANN’s attempt to create new gTLDs.

During the recent ICANN Board meeting in Mexico City, the Board authorized the creation and funding of an Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT).  This team was to be comprised of “an internationally diverse group of persons with knowledge, expertise, and experience in the fields of trademark, consumer protection, or competition law, and the interplay of trademarks and the domain name system to develop and propose solutions to the overarching issue of trademark protection in connection with the introduction of new gTLDs.” This IRT is tasked to produce a report for consideration by the ICANN community at the Sydney meeting.

The IRT consists of 24 members:

  • Chairwoman Caroline G. Chicoine; and
  • Seventeen members; and
  • Six ex officio members:  Four IPC-elected officers and two-GNSO elected Board Directors (Bruce Tonkin and Rita Rodin Johnston).  

I have a number of friends and colleagues serving on this team and I wish them well in their important endeavor.

I’ve previously proposed a number of rights-protection mechanisms that IRT should consider.  Today, I offer a few suggestions that I hope will guide IRT as they embark on their important work tomorrow.  In particular, I hope they’ll implement some of my suggestions intended to make the IRT process more transparent-so the rest of the global Internet can follow along with their important work and provide constructive input where possible.

http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=13617694&access_key=key-j1h1znpez1dwv2o1z4j&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list
Progress on Point Volume 16, Issue 10 March 2009 ICANN’s Implementation Recommendation Team for New gTLDs: Safeguards Needed by Michael D. Palage1 Significant concerns have been raised2 about ICANN’s proposal3 for processing large numbers of applications for new generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs) such as .BLOG. ICANN’s goal is to expand the domain name space and thus increase competition and innovation. But the global business community has expressed strong concern that, without greater protections for trademark holders, the effect of ICANN’s proposal would be not so much to expand the domain name space as to duplicate it by requiring large numbers of defensive registrations for every new gTLD created. It is Internet users who ultimately bear the dead-weight costs to business of defensive registrations and who really suffer from increased domain name confusion and vulnerability to phishing scams. ICANN deserves credit for responding to these concerns by creating an Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT) responsible for proposing procedural and substantive safeguards for the new gTLD process.4 I offer four recommendations to ensure the IRT’s success: • The IRT should conduct all its deliberations in an open and transparent manner. Michael D. Palage is an Adjunct Fellow with The Progress & Freedom Foundation’s (PFF) Center for Internet Freedom (CIF). He served on the ICANN Board from 2003 to 2006. The views expressed in this report are the author’s own, and are not necessarily the views of the PFF board, fellows or staff. 1. In the interest of openness and transparency, it is important to disclose that I actively pursued a membership on the IRT. While ultimately not selected, I look forward to monitoring the group’s activities through the mechanisms proposed in this article and making constructive comments accordingly. See Michael Palage, “ICANN’s ‘Go/ No-Go’ Decision Concerning New gTLDs,” The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point Volume 16, Issue 3 (Feb 2009), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.3gTLDgonogo.pdf. ICANN, “Draft Applicant Guidebook, Version 2,” Feb. 18, 2009, available at http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-clean-18feb09-en.pdf. ICANN, “Adopted Board Resolutions, Mexico,” March 6, 2009, available at http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-06mar09.htm. 2. 3. 4. 1444 EYE STREET, NW SUITE 500 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 202-289-8928 mail@pff.org www.pff.org 
]]>
https://techliberation.com/2009/03/24/icann%e2%80%99s-implementation-recommendation-team-for-new-gtlds-safeguards-needed/feed/ 11 17625
The Future of Sec. 230 and Online Immunity: My Debate with Harvard’s John Palfrey https://techliberation.com/2009/03/06/the-future-of-sec-230-and-online-immunity-my-debate-with-harvards-john-palfrey/ https://techliberation.com/2009/03/06/the-future-of-sec-230-and-online-immunity-my-debate-with-harvards-john-palfrey/#comments Fri, 06 Mar 2009 10:07:33 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=17288

Ars Technica has just posted the transcript of a friendly debate I recently engaged in with Harvard University law professor John Palfrey about the future of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and online liability more generally.  Our debate got started last fall, shortly after I penned a favorable review of John’s excellent new book (with Urs Gasser), Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives.  [Listen to my podcast with John about it here.]  Although I enjoyed John’s book, I also raised some concerns about his call in the book to reopen and revise Section 230, specifically to address child safety concerns.  At the time, John and I were working together on the Berkman Center’s “Internet Safety Technical Task Force” and we decided to begin an e-mail exchange about the future of 230 and online liability norms more generally.  The result was the debate that Ars has just published.

In our exchange, I begin by asking John to more fully develop some statements and proposals he sets forth in Born Digital.  Specifically, he and co-author Urs Gasser argue that: “The scope of the immunity the CDA provides for online service providers is too broad” and that the law “should not preclude parents from bringing a claim of negligence against [a social networking site] for failing to protect the safety of its users.” They also suggest that “There is no reason why a social network should be protected from liability related to the safety of young people simply because its business operates online.” Specifically, the call for “strengthening private causes of action by clarifying that tort claims may be brought against online service providers when safety is at stake,” although they do not define those instances.

Using those proposals as a launching point for our discussion, I challenge John as follows:

I’m troubled by your proposals because I believe Section 230 has been crucial to the success of the Internet and the robust marketplace of online freedom of speech and expression. In many ways — whether intentional or not — Section 230 was the legal cornerstone that gave rise to many of the online freedoms we enjoy today. I fear that the proposal you have set forth could reverse that. It could lead to crushing liability for many online operators-and not just giants like MySpace or Facebook-that might not be able to absorb the litigation costs. Could you elaborate a bit more about your proposal and explain why you think the time has come to alter Section 230 and online liability norms?

And John does and then we go back-and-forth from there.  Again, you can read the whole exchange over at Ars.

It was a great pleasure to engage in this exchange with Prof. Palfrey and I look forward to what others have to say in response to our debate.  I am working on a longer paper looking broadly at the rising threats to Sec. 230 and the increasing calls for expanded online liability and middleman deputization.  I will use whatever feedback I get from this exchange to refine my paper and proposals.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2009/03/06/the-future-of-sec-230-and-online-immunity-my-debate-with-harvards-john-palfrey/feed/ 11 17288
The AutoAdmit Case and the Future of Sec. 230 https://techliberation.com/2009/02/16/the-autoadmit-case-and-the-future-of-sec-230/ https://techliberation.com/2009/02/16/the-autoadmit-case-and-the-future-of-sec-230/#comments Mon, 16 Feb 2009 18:46:26 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=16726

David Margolick has penned a lengthy piece for Portfolio.com about the AutoAdmit case, which has important ramifications for the future of Section 230 and online speech in general. Very brief background: AutoAdmit is a discussion board for students looking to enter, or just discuss, law schools. Some threads on the site have included ugly — insanely ugly — insults about some women.  A couple of those women sued to reveal the identities of their attackers and hold them liable for supposedly wronging them.  The case has been slowly moving through the courts ever since. Again, read Margolick’s article for all the details.  The important point here is that the women could not sue AutoAdmit directly for defamation or harassment because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 immunizes websites from liability for the actions of their users.  Consequently, those looking to sue must go after the actual individuals behind the comments which (supposedly) caused the harm in question.

I am big defender of Section 230 and have argued that it has been the cornerstone of Internet freedom. Keeping online intermediaries free from burdensome policing requirements and liability threats has created the vibrant marketplace of expression and commerce that we enjoy today. If not for Sec. 230, we would likely live in a very different world today.

Sec. 230 has come under attack, however, from those who believe online intermediaries should “do more” to address various concerns, including cyber-bullying, defamation, or other problems.  For those of us who believe passionately in the importance of Sec. 230, the better approach is to preserve immunity for intermediaries and instead encourage more voluntary policing and self-regulation by intermediaries, increased public pressure on those sites that turn a blind eye to such behavior to encourage them to change their ways, more efforts to establish “community policing” by users such that they can report or counter abusive language, and so on.

Of course, those efforts will never be fool proof and a handful of bad apples will still be able to cause a lot of grief for some users on certain discussion boards, blogs, and so on.  In those extreme cases where legal action is necessary, it would be optimal if every effort was exhausted to go after the actual end-user who is causing the problem before tossing Sec. 230 and current online immunity norms to the wind in an effort to force the intermediaries to police speech.  After all, how do the intermediaries know what is defamatory?  Why should they be forced to sit in judgment of such things?  If, under threat of lawsuit, they are petitioned by countless users to remove content or comments that those individuals find objectionable, the result will be a massive chilling effect on online free speech since those intermediaries would likely play is safe most of the time and just take everything down.

Which brings up back to the danger of a 230 backlash following the AutoAdmit case. As Margolick notes of the case:

By any standard, the plaintiffs’ catch has been meager. Even with one of the country’s top intellectual-property lawyers, backed by a super-elite law firm, going after them, most of the worst offenders got off scot-free. The fact that so few prey were netted could prompt calls to modify Section 230(c), if only to give victims of internet abuse more of a chance. Brian Leiter, the professor and vocal critic of AutoAdmit, sees it coming. He calls the free pass enjoyed by Google and other carriers “a disaster” and says change is inevitable. “The point at which some senator’s daughter becomes the target of this kind of campaign of online vilification and harassment on the next iteration of AutoAdmit — something’s going to happen,” predicted Leiter, who now teaches at the University of Chicago Law School.

Unfortunately, although I obviously don’t agree with Prof. Leiter about Sec. 230 being “a disaster,” I think he’s right to assume that one particularly visible and sensitive case could end up bringing 230 back up for political reconsideration.  Commenting on this on the Info/Law blog, William McGeveran of the University of Minnesota Law School summarizes my own feelings regarding the potential danger we face going forward:

the response will be a dramatic evisceration or even elimination of Section 230 immunity. We might end up with some kind of notice-and-takedown regime that could be abused just as it is in the DMCA setting, allowing anyone to effectively force the elimination of web content they dislike with the mere untested allegation that it was tortious. Worse, we might see an effort to repeal section 230 altogether, making it impossible to run an open online forum for user-generated content without risking significant liability.

Indeed, there have already been calls for variants of a notice-and-takedown regime for speech put forward by law professors such as Mark Lemley and Daniel Solove. And the rising calls at the state level for legislation to address cyber-bullying could become another pressure point in the movement to deputize the middleman.

Importantly, however, the “[AutoAdmit] case has already made a difference,” Margolick notes:

Things have calmed down on AutoAdmit, where, Cohen says, he’s driven away the worst actors and enlisted volunteer moderators. Some post­ers, moreover, have announced their “retirement”; any further self-expression, they’ve concluded, is clearly not worth the risk. Thanks to the case, casual defamers — those who take potshots for sport — may now refrain out of empathy for the plaintiffs, while the more malicious may have been intimidated into silence. The case may also have helped Heller and Iravani [the plantiffs in the case] cleanse their Google pages, as the old slurs have fallen farther down the screen. And last spring, Cohen quietly removed the offending threads. He’d have done so sooner, he says, had he been asked more nicely.

This gets back to my point about how self-regulation, social norms, and public pressure can be an effective way to counter online harassment without resorting to major changes in law or liability norms. Again, I think Sec. 230 is worth preserving and the efforts to tinker with it are likely to open a Pandora’s Box of problems for intermediaries and average users alike.  The question going forward is, do we let the presence of a few bad apples online justify the complete upending of a legal standard that has made the Internet the most vibrant platform for free speech that the world has ever known?  I certainly hope not.


Some additional reading on the case:

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2009/02/16/the-autoadmit-case-and-the-future-of-sec-230/feed/ 27 16726
Web 2.0, Section 230, and Nozick’s “Utopia of Utopias” https://techliberation.com/2009/01/13/web-20-section-230-and-nozicks-utopia-of-utopias/ https://techliberation.com/2009/01/13/web-20-section-230-and-nozicks-utopia-of-utopias/#comments Tue, 13 Jan 2009 04:32:44 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=15369

NozickI haven’t been blogging much lately because, along with my PFF colleagues Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus, I’m working on a lengthy paper about the importance of Section 230 to Internet freedom. Section 230 is the sometimes-forgotten portion of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 that shielded Internet Service Providers (ISP) from liability for information posted or published on their systems by users or other third parties. It was enshrined into law with the passage of the historic Telecommunications Act of 1996. Importantly, even though the provisions of the CDA seeking to regulate “indecent” speech on the Internet were struck down as unconstitutional, Sec. 230 was left untouched.

Section 230 of the CDA may be the most important and lasting legacy of the Telecom Act and it is indisputable that it has been remarkably important to the development of the Internet and online free speech and expression in particular. In many ways, Section 230 is the cornerstone of “Internet freedom” in its truest and best sense of the term.

In recent years, however, Sec. 230 has come under fire from some academics, judges, and other lawmakers. Critics raise a variety of complaints — all of which we will be cataloging and addressing in our forthcoming PFF paper. But what unifies most of the criticisms of Sec. 230 is the belief that Internet “middlemen” (which increasingly includes almost any online intermediary, from ISPs, to social networking sites, to search engines, to blogs) should do more to police their networks for potentially “objectionable” or “offensive” content. That could include many things, of course: cyberbullying, online defamation, harassment, privacy concerns, pornography, etc. If the online intermediaries failed to engage in that increased policing role, they would open themselves up to lawsuits and increased liability for the actions of their users.

The common response to such criticisms — and it remains a very good one — is that the alternative approach of strict secondary liability on ISPs and other online intermediaries would have a profound “chilling effect” on online free speech and expression. Indeed, we should not lose sight of what Section 230 has already done to create vibrant, diverse online communities. Brian Holland, a visiting professor at Penn State University’s Dickinson School of Law, has written a brilliant paper that does a wonderful job of doing just that. It’s entitled “In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism” and it can be found on SSRN here. I cannot recommend it highly enough. It is a masterpiece. In the paper, Holland argues that Section 230 has helped give rise to our modern Web 2.0 world and that it “plays a vital role in [the] process of building heterogeneous communities that encourage collaborative production and communication.” Specifically, Holland argues that Sec. 230 immunity allows an online community:

to evolve and structure itself in the most efficient manner. To a limited extent, §230 immunity permits uncoordinated and uncoerced individual choice among different values and among different embodiments of those values. It further allows the intermediary to play an active role in facilitating the market in social norms and in creating enforcement mechanisms as a tool of self-governance. Those enforcement mechanisms can then themselves adapt. This allows not only for the development of distinct community values, but also for a means of tapping into incentives, adapting to evolving norms and conditions, and reducing costs associated with disputes. Within this framework, greater variations in community norms are possible. As communities grow, niche communities are formed at low cost. It… functions as a laboratory for testing social norms and values.

I think that is exactly right. Moreover, reading Professor Holland’s article got me thinking about something my favorite modern political philosopher, the late Harvard University philosophy professor Robert Nozick, said in his brilliant 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. In a sense, Section 230 and existing online liability norms have helped foster what Nozick called “a utopia of utopias.”

Because people are all complex and quite different from one another, Nozick argued that, “There is no reason to think that there is one community which will serve as ideal for all people and much reason to think there is not.” Consequently, as a normative matter, it would be preferable for government to allow spontaneous community formation such that individuals can pursue their own interests. Nozick elaborated in the closing chapter of his book as follows:

The conclusion to draw is that there will not be one kind of community existing and one kind of life led in utopia. Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions. Some kinds of communities will be more attractive to most than others; communities will wax and wane. People will leave some for others or spend their whole lives in one. Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others.

That last line almost perfectly encapsulates everything that is so wonderful about our modern Web 2.0 world. Netizens are free to pursue their own vision of a good life in a community of their choosing, free from centralized or coerced visions of what “a good life” should entail.

Web 2.0 is Nozick’s utopia of utopias, and Section 230 has been instrumental in fostering and protecting it. We shouldn’t forget that.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2009/01/13/web-20-section-230-and-nozicks-utopia-of-utopias/feed/ 592 15369
Latest Lichtman podcast on privacy, Sec. 230, online liability https://techliberation.com/2008/12/02/latest-lichtman-podcast-on-privacy-sec-230-online-liability/ https://techliberation.com/2008/12/02/latest-lichtman-podcast-on-privacy-sec-230-online-liability/#comments Tue, 02 Dec 2008 21:34:28 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=14636

Last month, I noted that UCLA Law School professor Doug Lichtman has a wonderful new monthly podcast called the “Intellectual Property Colloquium.” This month’s show features two giants in the field of tech policy — George Washington Law Professor Daniel Solove and Santa Clara Law Professor Eric Goldman –- discussing online privacy, defamation, and intermediary liability. More specifically, in separate conversations, Solove and Goldman both consider the scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which shields Internet intermediaries from liability for the speech and expression of their users. Sec. 230 is the subject of hot debate these days and Solove and Goldman provide two very different perspectives about the law and its impact.

Goldman calls Sec. 230 “pure cyberspace exceptionalism” in the sense that it breaks from traditional tort norms governing intermediary liability. But he argues that this new online version of intermediary liability (which is extremely limited in scope) encourages more robust speech and expression than the older, offline version of liability (which was far more strict). I completely agree with Eric Goldman, but I respect the arguments that Lichtman and Solove raise about the privacy and defamation problems raised by the purist approach that Goldman and I favor.

Goldman also does a nice job dissecting the Roomates.com and Craigslist.com cases. And Lichtman brings up the JuicyCampus.com case during the conclusion. These are important cases for the future of Sec. 230 and online liability. Incidentally, there’s also an interesting conversation between Lichtman and Solove (around the 32:00 mark) about an issue that Alex Harris and Tim Lee have been raising here about the nature of online contracts and the perils of messy EULAs / Terms of Service (TOS).

These are two absolutely terrific conversations. Very in-depth and very highly recommended. Listen here.

[Note: I recently reviewed Daniel Solove’s important new book, Understanding Privacy, here.]

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2008/12/02/latest-lichtman-podcast-on-privacy-sec-230-online-liability/feed/ 2 14636
Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy https://techliberation.com/2008/11/08/book-review-soloves-understanding-privacy/ https://techliberation.com/2008/11/08/book-review-soloves-understanding-privacy/#comments Sun, 09 Nov 2008 01:45:44 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=13456

Solove Understanding Privacy book coverWith the publication of Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008), George Washington University Law School professor Daniel J. Solove has firmly established himself as one of America’s leading intellectuals in the field of information policy and cyberlaw.  Solove had already made himself a force to be reckoned with in this field with the publication of important books like The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University Press 2007), The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (NYU Press 2004) and his treatise on Information Privacy Law with Paul M. Schwartz of the Berkeley School of Law (Aspen Publishing, 2d ed. 2006).  But with Understanding Privacy, Solove has now elevated himself to that rarefied air of “people worth watching” in the cyberlaw field; an intellectual — like Lawrence Lessig or Jonathan Zittrain — whose every publication becomes something of an event in the field to which all eyes turn upon release.

Like those other intellectuals, however, my respect for their stature should not be confused with agreement with their positions.  In fact, my disagreements with Lessig and Zittrain are frequently on display here and, we have been critical of Solove here in the past as well. [Here’s Jim Harper’s review of Solove’s last book, with which I am in wholehearted agreement.]  In a similar vein, although I greatly appreciate what Prof. Solove attempts to accomplish in Understanding Privacy — and I am sure it will change the way we conceptualize and debate privacy policy in the future — I found his approach and conclusions highly problematic.

Let me begin by summarizing Solove’s bold objective in Understanding Privacy. In the book, he attempts “to set forth a theory of privacy that will guide our understanding of privacy issues and the crafting of effective laws and policies to address them.” (p. 2) Solove’s “pragmatic” proposal to rethink privacy requires us to abandon the ways we have traditional thought about it. He begins by rightly noting that privacy has long been a “conceptual jungle” (p. 196) and a “concept in disarray.” (p. 1) “[T]he attempt to locate the ‘essential’ or ‘core’ characteristics of privacy has led to failure,” he says. (pg. 8 )

Consequently — and this is what make’s his approach so unique and important — Solove’s proposal to rethink privacy begins with a call to abandon the entire philosophical exercise of trying to tie privacy rights to some “common denominator” (pg. 8 ) since “Nobody can articulate what it means.” (p. 1) Actually, what he really means to say is that plenty of theorists can articulate what it means, it’s just that there is rarely any strong consensus about what justifies a particular theory of privacy. Indeed, in Chapter 2, he walks the reader through a half-dozen “conceptions of privacy” and illustrates how each has intellectual weaknesses and suffers from over- and under-breadth problems in terms of what it types of privacy it protects.

More importantly, according to Solove, not only has the effort “to locate the ‘essence’ of privacy” failed, but there is never any hope of it succeeding. Instead of continuing the futile search for such a grand, unified theory of privacy, Solove says we should tackle privacy issues from the “bottom up” by looking to “solve certain problems” (p. 75) The key to making it all work, he says, is “balancing”:

Because privacy conflicts with other fundamental values, such as free speech, security, curiosity, and transparency, we should engage in a candid and direct analysis of why privacy interests are important and how they ought to be reconciled with other interests. We cannot ascribe a value to privacy in the abstract. The value of privacy is not uniform across all contexts. We determine the value of privacy when we seek to reconcile privacy with opposing interests in the particular situations. (p. 87)

It is tempting to applaud Solove’s attempt to unhinge privacy from any “common denominator” and instead get more concrete about how to work through the details of practical privacy problems. After all, it is easy to get frustrated with some modern theories of privacy that have been tied up with amorphous, warm-and-fuzzy terms like “personhood” and “intimacy.” The inherent subjectivity of some of those terms makes it challenging to derive bright-line principles and tests to help craft law or resolve privacy disputes when they come before the courts.

But I believe there are serious problems with any attempt to completely divorce privacy policy from a theory of rights or justice. In my opinion, you can’t just dynamite all conceptual frameworks to the ground; value judgments will persist and references to rights theory will always be required. Even Solove’s pragmatic, bottom-up approach is value-laden; he just doesn’t acknowledge it. The majority of privacy controversies he attempts to work through in Chapter 5’s ambitious 16-part “Taxonomy of Privacy” mostly end up coming down in favor of taking stronger steps (i.e., rules, regulations, lawsuits, etc) to enhance privacy rights. He clearly has a bias in favor of enhancing and extending privacy rights relative to many other rights, but he doesn’t bother grounding it in any substantive theory of rights or justice.

Simply stated, even though Solove claims he can construct a new paradigm based strictly on a “pragmatic,” utilitarian, “problem-solving” approach, there is just no getting around the fact that, at some point, you are going to have to provide a more robust theory of rights or justice to explain why one right trumps another.

For example, let’s consider the frequent clash between privacy and free speech rights. As any casual reader of this blog knows, I feel quite passionately about the First Amendment and free speech rights. And, in all but the most extreme cases or circumstances, I will argue that speech rights should trump privacy rights. When would speech rights not trump privacy rights? For me, that would only occur when a clear, quantifiable harm resulted from the speech. But what is “clear, quantifiable harm”?  Reputation, for example, is not something one can easily quantify the loss of. When a company or a government agency loses or sells your personal health records without permission, however, that privacy violation gets a little more quantifiable. And in the case of someone stealing your personal information to engage in identity theft, the harm becomes still more quantifiable. But those cases often involve monetary damages, whereas something like defamation is much more difficult to quantify. However, when considering privacy-vs.-free speech trade-offs, I would first look to identify and quantify to concrete harm to an individual before allowing the state to curtain freedom of speech.

Solove acknowledges these privacy-speech trade-offs and cites the work of scholars like Eugene Volokh, Fred Cate, Virginia Postrel, and Solveig Singleton, who have all discussed these problems in their work. Volokh, for example, wrote an incredibly important 2000 law review article entitled, “Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You.” As he pointed out in that piece:

The difficulty is that the right to information privacy — the right to control other people’s communication of personally identifiable information about you — is a right to have the government stop people from speaking about you. And the First Amendment (which is already our basic code of “fair information practices”) generally bars the government from “control[ling the communication] of information,” either by direct regulation or through the authorization of private lawsuits.

Without reference to some higher set of first principles or theory of rights / justice, I believe it is very difficult to sort through thorny problems like these. We need to know how and when one right trumps another. A theory of rights that focuses on avoiding direct, tangible harm to others — but largely leaves individuals otherwise free to do what they wish — would generally place speech rights above many privacy “rights” (some of which perhaps should not quality be rights at all). Of course, this more libertarian construction of rights remains quite controversial in our modern society, and there are other theories of rights and justice that would minimize the importance of speech rights relative to privacy.

Importantly, there also needs to be some recognition of the qualitative difference between government threats to privacy versus private threats. The harm that can come from government violations of privacy are generally far more troubling (surveillance, taxation, fines, imprisonment, etc) than potential private harms. I don’t think Solove’s framework appreciates that distinction.

Regardless of which approach one adopts — reasoning from first principles, or working from the “bottom up” (a la Solove) — there will always be fair degree of “balancing” undertaken by legislatures and the courts when crafting privacy policies. Indeed, in many ways, I see Solove’s more “pragmatic” approach often getting us to the same point we would find ourselves in if we took a more philosophical, first principles-based approach. It’s just that under his approach, he would often give the nod to privacy concerns over other rights whereas others (like me) would first look to enhance other values, especially free speech.

In sum, I believe that if one attempts to divorce the exercise of “understanding privacy” from any theory of rights, inevitably, you end right back in the same “conceptual jungle” you were in before. In that sense, I regret to say that Solove’s approach in Understanding Privacy ultimately fails. There’s just no escaping a fight over first principles.

But make no doubt about it, Daniel Solove’s book — and his approach to classifying and dealing with privacy problems — will have a profound impact on all future privacy debates. In that sense, it is a vital text; a must read for all who follow, or engage in, privacy debates.


P.S. Prof. Solove contributed an article to this month’s big Scientific American special issue on “The Future of Privacy.” Many articles in that issue worth reading.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2008/11/08/book-review-soloves-understanding-privacy/feed/ 24 13456
PFF Launches Center for Internet Freedom https://techliberation.com/2008/10/24/pff-launches-center-for-internet-freedom/ https://techliberation.com/2008/10/24/pff-launches-center-for-internet-freedom/#comments Fri, 24 Oct 2008 15:46:02 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=13445

The Progress & Freedom Foundation has just launched the new Center for Internet Freedom.  CIF offers an alternative to the proliferation of advocacy groups calling for government intervention online by offering timely analyses and critiques of proposals that diminish the vital role of free markets, free speech and property rights.  We aim to drive the Internet policy debate in new directions by emphasizing a layered approach of technological innovation, user education, user self-help, industry self-regulation, and the enforcement of existing laws consistent with the First Amendment.  Such an approach is a less restrictive—and generally more effective—alternative to increased regulation.  

Here are some of the issues I’ll be working on as CIF’s Director in conjunction with my esteemed colleagues Adam Thierer, Adam Marcus, and adjunct fellows: 

  • Defending online advertising as the lifeblood of online content & services, especially in the “Long Tail”;
  • Emphasizing market solutions to problems of privacy protection, especially regarding the use of cookies and packet inspection data;
  • Protecting online speech and expression both in the U.S. and abroad;
  • Defending Section 230 immunity for Internet intermediaries;
  • Opposing online taxation and legal barriers to e-commerce and digital payments, especially at the state and local levels; and
  • Ensuring that Internet governance remains transparent and accountable without hampering the evolution of the Internet.
]]>
https://techliberation.com/2008/10/24/pff-launches-center-for-internet-freedom/feed/ 12 13445
book review: Palfrey & Gasser’s “Born Digital” https://techliberation.com/2008/10/10/book-review-palfrey-gassers-born-digital/ https://techliberation.com/2008/10/10/book-review-palfrey-gassers-born-digital/#comments Fri, 10 Oct 2008 20:13:44 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=13301

Born Digital coverEarlier this year, I mentioned an outstanding book that John Palfrey of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School co-edited entitled Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering.  It’s an excellent resource for anyone studying the methods governments are (unfortunately) using to stifle online expression across the globe.  It’s one of the most important technology policy books of the year.

Well, it looks like John Palfrey will have a second title on this year’s “Best Tech Books” list.  I’ve just finished his new book with his Berkman Center colleague Urs Gasser, Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives, and it is definitely worthy of your attention. In my book review posted today on the City Journal’s website, I argue that “Palfrey and Gasser’s fine early history of this generation serves as a starting point for any conversation about how to mentor the children of the Web.”  It’s a comprehensive and very even-handed discussion about a variety of concerns or Internet pathologies, including: online safety, personal privacy, copyright piracy, offensive content, classroom learning, and much more.

My City Journal review is down below, but in coming weeks I will be posting some additional thoughts about some specific things in the book worthy of more attention (including a few things I disagreed with).  Overall, I’d say Born Digital is a close runner-up in the race for “Tech Book of the Year,” closely trailing Jonathan Zittrain’s Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (which I have reviewed multiple times) and Nick Carr’s The Big Switch.  But I found far more to agree with in Born Digital than I did in those two books.  Highly recommended.


Understanding Our Digital Kids A new book offers a guide for mentoring the children of the Web.

a book review by Adam D. Thierer of

Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives, by John Palfrey and Urs Gasser (Basic Books, 288 pp., $25.95)

City Journal 10 October 2008

You can’t blame parents today if they think that their children have been assimilated into the Borg or are living in the Matrix. Members of the “always on, always connected” generation have surrounded themselves with digital devices and networks and colonized cyberspace in the process. Meanwhile, back in “meatspace,” many Analog Era parents scratch their heads, trying to make sense of these momentous changes and what they mean for their kids and society.

Answers are available in Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives, by John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, both of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. Each chapter in the book addresses a different parental concern or Internet pathology: online safety, personal privacy, copyright piracy, offensive content, classroom learning, and more. Palfrey and Gasser aim “to separate what we need to worry about from what’s not so scary, (and) what we ought to resist from what we ought to embrace.”

The authors offer a balanced treatment of these issues—almost to a fault, in that they occasionally fail to develop fully their own positions. Of course, as they repeatedly—and correctly—note, often these thorny questions have no easy answers. “The hard problem,” they point out, “is how to balance caution with encouragement: How do we take effective steps to protect our children, as well as the interests of others, while allowing those same kids enough room to figure things out on their own?”

If there is a single solution, they argue, it’s education. The authors want parents, educators, and lawmakers to do more to engage the digital generation in a dialogue, instead of leaving it to fend for itself. “The traditional values and common sense that have served us well in the past will be relevant in this new world, too,” they maintain. But Palfrey and Gasser don’t rule out additional tools and methods, including technical controls, industry self-regulation, social norms, and even government action.

Consider online privacy concerns. “Never before has so much information about average citizens been so easily accessible to so many,” they note—and particularly when it comes to our kids. Despite the growing amount of online information about our kids (“digital dossiers”) and other potential threats to privacy, Palfrey and Gasser counsel prudence: “The answer . . . is not to avoid the networked publics in which so many people—especially Digital Natives—are leading their lives. Instead, we need to develop more nuanced ways to navigate these new publics.” Though “there is no single, simple answer,” they argue that “parents, peers, teachers, and mentors [all] have a role to play” to encourage youngsters to protect their information and identities. Most importantly, the digital natives must learn to use common sense when sharing information online.

The authors advocate the same reasoned approach when it comes to online child safety. The safety risks have often been greatly overstated—or at least largely misunderstood—by parents and policymakers. “The data do not suggest that the world is a more dangerous place for young people” because of the Internet, the authors contend. Most of the problems we see online today—cyber-bullying, for example—are really just old problems playing out on new platforms. “Involved parenting” and “open and honest conversations” are the most sensible responses, but intervention strategies by others—including kids’ peers—may be another part of the solution. Parental empowerment tools and industry self-regulation can help, too.

Palfrey and Gasser are open to government playing a role in some cases. They believe “governments should restrict the production and dissemination of certain types of violent content in combination with instituting mandatory, government-based ratings of these materials.” They also call for greater liability for online service providers and social networking sites to encourage them to crack down on potential dangers to children. Given their vagueness, however, both proposals would likely smash into serious First Amendment roadblocks that the authors fail to explore fully.

Palfrey and Gasser view government action less favorably when it comes to combating copyright piracy. “Creativity is the upside of this brave new world of digital media,” they suggest, but “the downside is law-breaking. The vast majority of Digital Natives are currently breaking copyright laws on a regular basis.” But what should we do about piracy? Palfrey and Gasser sidestep some of the underlying ethical issues and bluntly declare that “the goal should be for copyright holders, technologists, and their customers to exchange royalty checks with one another instead of legal complaints.” Yes, but what happens when many refuse to pay even one penny for copyrighted content, as often happens today? Education can encourage youngsters to obey the law, but difficult questions remain about how to deal with those who won’t play by the rules.

In chapters debating the Internet’s impact on learning and culture, the authors worry about shortening attention spans and the rise of a “cut-and-paste culture,” due to the immediate gratification provided by Google searches, Wikipedia, blogs, and instant messaging. On the other hand, they rightly underscore how “Digital Natives are quite sophisticated in the ways that they gather information” and are learning “sophisticated information-gathering and information-processing skills,” while also creating content and sharing information with peers in ways unimaginable just a generation ago.

It will be fascinating to see what impact these changes have on digital natives as they get older and become parents themselves. Regardless, Palfrey and Gasser’s fine early history of this generation serves as a starting point for any conversation about how to mentor the children of the Web.


Update Feb. 2009: I hosted a TLF podcast featuring Prof. Palfrey and discussed this book with him. Listen here.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2008/10/10/book-review-palfrey-gassers-born-digital/feed/ 150 13301
Under-Appreciated Existing Legal Remedies for Trolling, Defamation and Other “Malwebolent” Invasions of Privacy https://techliberation.com/2008/08/03/under-appreciated-existing-legal-remedies-for-trolling-defamation-and-other-malwebolent-invasions-of-privacy/ https://techliberation.com/2008/08/03/under-appreciated-existing-legal-remedies-for-trolling-defamation-and-other-malwebolent-invasions-of-privacy/#comments Sun, 03 Aug 2008 23:24:24 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=11585

Anyone interested in the long-running debate over how to balance online privacy with anonymity and free speech, whether Section 230‘s broad immunity for Internet intermediaries should be revised, and whether we need new privacy legislation must read the important and enthralling NYT Magazine piece  “The Trolls Among Us” by Mattathias Schwartz about the very real problem of Internet “trolls“–a term dating to the 1980s and defined as “someone who intentionally disrupts online communities.”

While all trolls “do it for the lulz” (“for kicks” in Web-speak) they range from the merely puckish to the truly “malwebolent.”  For some, trolling is essentially senseless web-harassment or “violence” (e.g., griefers), while for others it is intended to make a narrow point or even as part of a broader movement.  These purposeful trolls might be thought of as the Yippies of the Internet, whose generally harmless anti-war counter-cutural antics in the late 1960s were the subject of the star-crossed Vice President Spiro T. Agnew‘s witticism:

And if the hippies and the yippies and the disrupters of the systems that Washington and Lincoln as presidents brought forth in this country will shut up and work within our free system of government, I will lower my voice.

But the more extreme of these “disrupters of systems” might also be compared to the plainly terroristic Weathermen or even the more familiar Al-Qaeda.  While Schwartz himself does not explicitly draw such comparisons, the scenario he paints of human cruelty is truly nightmarish:  After reading his article before heading to bed last night, I myself had Kafka-esque dreams about complete strangers invading my own privacy for no intelligible reason.  So I can certainly appreciate how terrifying Schwartz’s story will be to many readers, especially those less familiar with the Internet or simply less comfortable with the increasing readiness of so many younger Internet users to broadcast their lives online.

But Schwartz leaves unanswered two important questions.  The first question he does not ask:  Just how widespread is trolling? However real and tragic for its victims, without having some sense of the scale of the problem, it is difficult to answer the second question Schwartz raises but, wisely, does not presume to answer:  What should be done about it? The policy implications of Schwartz’s article might be summed up as follows:  Do we need new laws or should we focus on some combination of enforcing existing laws, user education and technological solutions?  While Schwartz focuses on trolling, the same questions can be asked about other forms of malwebolence–best exemplified by the high-profile online defamation Autoadmit.com case, which demonstrates the effectiveness of existing legal tools to deal with such problems.

Schwartz begins by noting that:

Many trolling practices … violate existing laws against harassment and threats. The difficulty is tracking down the perpetrators. In order to prosecute, investigators must subpoena sites and Internet service providers to learn the original author’s IP address, and from there, his legal identity. Local police departments generally don’t have the means to follow this digital trail, and federal investigators have their hands full with spam, terrorism, fraud and child pornography.

He then asks, quite fairly, what the consequences of more aggressive enforcement might be:

But even if we had the resources to aggressively prosecute trolls, would we want to? Are we ready for an Internet where law enforcement keeps watch over every vituperative blog and backbiting comments section, ready to spring at the first hint of violence? Probably not. All vigorous debates shade into trolling at the perimeter; it is next to impossible to excise the trolling without snuffing out the debate.

Certainly, proposals to ban online anonymity would seriously threaten legitimate anonymous speech, as my TLF colleagues Ryan Radia and Adam Thierer have pointed out.  Schwartz is probably correct that part of the answer to the problem of trolling and other serious malwebolences lies in equipping law enforcement at all levels with, and training them to use, the basic tools already available to “pierce the veil” of online anonymity and prosecute truly bad actors under existing laws.  But Schwartz is also right to highlight the danger of relying on government to enforce even existing laws, and to take on responsibility for monitoring online activity.

But like most commentators, Schwartz seems to assume that the enforcement of existing laws is solely the province of the “law enforcement” community (police, prosecutors and government investigators).  To be sure, there are a variety of state and federal laws criminalizing certain acts of “malwebolence.”  But those who find themselves victimized online generally have recourse to bring a lawsuit on their own (a “private right of enforcement”) under well-established causes of action under tort law–a crucial part of the “free system of government” lauded by Agnew.

Specifically, such a plaintiff may bring a defamation claim (“libel” if written, “slander” if oral) or one of the four categories of privacy claims that have emerged since 1890, defined by the magisterial Second Restatement of Torts as follows:

    (a)  unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
    (b)  appropriation of the other’s name or likeness;
    (c)  unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or
    (d)  publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.

If the defendant is known, pursuing such claims is common-place.  The obstacle facing plaintiffs who do not know the legal identity of those who may have defamed them or intruded upon their privacy is the same facing law enforcement:  to “subpoena sites and Internet service providers [and other intermediaries] to learn the original author’s IP address, and from there, his legal identity.”  Such “third party subpoenas” are a vital part of the solution to the problem of malwebolence:  By enabling lawsuits under established causes of action against even anonymous defendants, they provide a real remedy to true victims.  The use of such subpoenas does not require finding new appropriations for “law enforcement,” new privacy laws or re-thinking Section 230’s grant of broad immunity to online intermediaries–a policy prescription that has gathered momentum in recent years.

For example, Daniel Solove has argued in his book The Future of Reputation that Section 230 should be re-interpreted:

to grant immunity only before the operator of a website is alerted that something posted there by another violates somebody’s privacy or defames her.  If the operator of a website becomes aware of the problematic material on the site, yet doesn’t remove it, then the operator could be liable.

Frank Pasquale has argued that we ought to require Internet search engines to provide a “right of reply”–allowing someone to post a “reply” that would appear on a search engine next to content concerning them that they consider inaccurate or defamatory (essentially the “fairness doctrine” applied online).   Others (one example) have argued for replacing Section 230 with something akin to the notice-and-takedown regime of copyright so that publishers’ immunity would be contingent on compliance with takedown notices.  But Mark Lemley, an internet law guru who is representing the plaintiffs in the Autoadmit case, has argued that Section 230 should instead be “rationalized” along with other Internet safe harbors under a unified safe harbor drawn from current trademark law:  “innocent infringers” would have immunity and would not be required to take down allegedly defamatory content, but plaintiffs could get courts to issue injunctions requiring intermediaries to take down content.  What unites advocates of all these proposals is that, like Schwartz, they downplay or ignore the effectiveness of existing tort remedies and third-party subpoenas.

Indeed, if the public is aware of third party subpoenas at all, it is probably only because of their use by copyright-holders in attempting to identify those caught using peer-to-peer software to share copyright materials.  Whatever one’s opinions on copyright and of the recording industry’s enforcement strategy, it is safe to say that the overall impression created by such lawsuits against users has been less than favorable.  Regardless, these lawsuits have established an effective legal process for identifying anonymous defendants.  While we can expect that this process–and the safeguards that accompany it–will continue to evolve, it is critical to appreciate the basics of how the third party subpoena process works if one is to evaluate the policy arguments raised by articles like Schwartz’s.

The infamous Autoadmit.com case provides a clear illustration of how this proces works and the evolving safeguards for anonymous speech.  As summarizes the case–and its most recent development:

“Women named Jill and Hillary should be raped.” Those are the words of “AK-47” — a poster to the college-admissions web forum AutoAdmit.com. AK-47 was one of a handful of students heaping misogynist scorn on women attending the nations’ top law schools in 2007, in posts so vile they spurred a national debate on the limits of online anonymity, and an unprecedented federal lawsuit aimed at unmasking and punishing the posters. Now lawyers for two female Yale Law School students have ascertained AK-47’s real identity, along with the identities of other AutoAdmit posters, who all now face the likely publication of their names in court records — potentially marking a death sentence for the comment trolls’ budding legal careers even before the case has gone to trial.

The plaintiff law students in this case originally sued Autoadmit.com and its operator in a Connecticut Federal District Court, but eventually removed them as plaintiffs in recognition of the fact that Section 230 immunizes them from liability.  But Section 230 did not stop them from suing those who had defamed them anonymously on Autoadmit.com.  And third party subpoenas have since made it possible for the plaintiffs to uncover the identity of most of those defendants.

The Process.  The procedure, made possible by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, is relatively straight-forward:  A plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a John or Jane Doe(s), a pseuodymous defendant whose identify is as yet unknown.  The lawsuit must clearly state the facts, cause(s) of action and remedy sought–just as with any lawsuit (see the Autoadmit complaint, for example).

Having filed such a lawsuit, the plaintiffs may then have a court issue subpoenas (subject to certain limitations) under FRCP 45 to parties who may have identifying information about the identity of the defendants.  For example, if the plaintiff has the IP address associated with a defamatory blog comment, one can subpoena the ISP for further identifying information about that user.  There may be several steps to the process:  for example, Autoadmit might disclose under subpoena an email address, leading to a subpoena to a webmail provider and ultimately a subpoena to an ISP.  Once the John/Jane Doe has been identified, the lawsuit can proceed.

The Safeguards.  In the Autoadmit case, one of the John Does did indeed file under FRCP 45 a “motion to quash” a subpoena to AT&T by which the plaintiffs sought the disclosure of identifying information about the John Doe.  Plaintiffs, of course, opposed the motion, and the Court ultimately denied the motion.  The Court’s discussion (pp 6-13) is instructive for those wondering just how the First Amendment would protect anonymity when a plaintiff seeks to force an Internet intermediary to disclose identifying information about an anonymous speaker.

At least since the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the First Amendment has limited the ability of courts to order the disclosure of identifying information (in that case, the NAACP’s membership list).  Since then, U.S. courts have developed a two-part balancing test that” ensures that:

the First Amendment rights of anonymous Internet speakers are not lost unnecessarily, and that plaintiffs do not use discovery to “harass, intimidate or silence critics in the public forum opportunities presented by the Internet.”

Understanding the way in which the Autoadmit.com court applied that test is critical to understanding how courts might balance privacy with free speech in the future:

First, the Court should consider whether the plaintiff has undertaken efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena and withheld action to afford the fictitiously named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the In this case, the plaintiffs have satisfied this factor by posting notice regarding the subpoenas on AutoAdmit … which allowed the posters ample time to respond, as evidenced by Doe 21’s [motion to quash]. Second, the Court should consider whether the plaintiff has identified and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that the plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech.  Doe II has identified the allegedly actionable statements by AK47/Doe 21: the first such statement is “Alex Atkind, Stephen Reynolds, [Doe II], and me: GAY LOVERS;” and the second such statement is ““Women named Jill and Doe II should be raped….” The Court should also consider the specificity of the discovery request and whether there is an alternative means of obtaining the information called for in the subpoena.  Here, the subpoena sought, and AT&T provided, only the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the person believed to have posted defamatory or otherwise tortious content about Doe II on AutoAdmit, and is thus sufficiently specific. Furthermore, there are no other adequate means of obtaining the information because AT&T’s subscriber data is the plaintiffs’ only source regarding the identity of AK47. Similarly, the Court should consider whether there is a central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the plaintiffs’ claims.   Here, clearly the defendant’s identity is central to Doe II’s pursuit of her claims against him. Next, the Court should consider the subpoenaed party’s expectation of privacy at the time the online material was posted.  Doe 21’s expectation of privacy here was minimal because AT&T’s Internet Services Privacy Policy states, in pertinent part: “We may, where permitted or required by law, provide personal identifying information to third parties. . . without your consent. . . To comply  with court orders, subpoenas, or other legal or regulatory requirements.” Thus, Doe 21 has little expectation of privacy in using AT&T’s service to engage in tortious conduct that would subject him to discovery under the federal rules. Finally, and most importantly, the Court must consider whether the plaintiffs have made an adequate showing as to their claims against the anonymous defendant.

The court noted that there is a range of competing standards for this last prong, but dismissed those standards most deferential to the plaintiff–requiring only that the plaintiff show a “good faith basis” to contend it may have an actionable cause or that there is “probable cause” for a claim–as “set[ting] the threshold for disclosure too low to adequately protect the First Amendment rights of anonymous defendants.”  The court also dismissed other standards very favorable to the defendant, such as requiring plaintiffs to show their claims could withstand a motion for summary judgment, noting the obvious point that “it would be impossible to meet this standard for any cause of action which required evidence within the control of the defendant.”  Ultimately, the court settled on the standard requiring the plaintiffs to “make a concrete showing as to each element of a prima facie case against the defendant” as striking, “the most appropriate balance between the First Amendment rights of the defendant and the interest in the plaintiffs of pursuing their claims, ensuring that the plaintiff is not merely seeking to harass or embarrass the speaker or stifle legitimate criticism.”

While Solove, Pasquale and others would make it far easier for a victim to require an online intermediary to take down content that truly defames them or invades their privacy–or to rein in a troll posting such content–relying on existing tort law of course requires that a victim actually file a website and third-party subpoenas.  Those who demand changes to Section 230 will likely argue that this is too burdensome and costly to be an effective remedy for a widespread problem.  But, again, one must ask how widespread that problem really is before leaping to conclusions about what kind of remedies are required.  As UCLA law professor and Internet law guru Eugene Volokh noted in the Yale Daily News’ coverage of this story, even a small number of lawsuits like Autoadmit “might remind some potential would-be defamers that their anonymity may not be secure.”  One wonders whether the trolls described by Schwartz would really be so brazen if more of their coven were unmasked and sued.

One obvious advantage of relying on the combination of tort law and third party subpoenas is that requiring the actual filing of a lawsuit minimizes the problem of Internet users attempting to squelch legitimate speech–for example, by sending frivolous take-down notices to intermediaries, a serious problem in the copyright context.  Those truly concerned with protecting anonymous speech should take a far greater interest in the balancing test chosen by courts following in Autoadmit‘s footsteps.  Marc Randazza, former counsel for Autoadmit administrator Anthony Ciolli, summarized the the balance struck by the court as follows:  “If you’re doing right, the First Amendment will protect you,” Randazza said. “If you’re doing wrong, it won’t.”

Much more could be said about third-party subpoenas, but it cannot be said that the law does not already provide every American with a remedy against the trolls identified by Schwartz, the villains of the Autoadmit case or other “disrupters of the systems.”  Any inquiry into whether we need new laws or regulations should begin by looking at the processes described above.

]]>
https://techliberation.com/2008/08/03/under-appreciated-existing-legal-remedies-for-trolling-defamation-and-other-malwebolent-invasions-of-privacy/feed/ 10 11585