I have been covering telecom and Internet policy for almost 30 years now. During much of that time – which included a nine year stint at the Heritage Foundation — I have interacted with conservatives on various policy issues and often worked very closely with them to advance certain reforms.

If I divided my time in Tech Policy Land into two big chunks of time, I’d say the biggest tech-related policy issue for conservatives during the first 15 years I was in the business (roughly 1990 – 2005) was preventing the resurrection of the so-called Fairness Doctrine. And the biggest issue during the second 15-year period (roughly 2005 – present) was stopping the imposition of “Net neutrality” mandates on the Internet. In both cases, conservatives vociferously blasted the notion that unelected government bureaucrats should sit in judgment of what constituted “fairness” in media or “neutrality” online.

Many conservatives are suddenly changing their tune, however. President Trump and Sen. Ted Cruz, for example, have been increasingly critical of both traditional media and new tech companies in various public statements and suggested an openness to increased regulation. The President has gone after old and new media outlets alike, while Sen. Cruz (along with others like Sen. Lindsay Graham) has suggested during congressional hearings that increased oversight of social media platforms is needed, including potential antitrust action.

Meanwhile, during his short time in office, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) has become one of the most vocal Internet critics on the Right. In a shockingly-worded USA Today editorial in late May, Hawley said, “social media wastes our time and resources” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” He even referred to these sites as “parasites” and blamed them for a long list of social problems, leading him to suggest that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared” along with various other sites and services.

Hawley’s moral panic over social media has now bubbled over into a regulatory crusade that would unleash federal bureaucrats on the Internet in an attempt to dictate “fair” speech on the Internet. He has introduced an astonishing piece of legislation aimed at undoing the liability protections that Internet providers rely upon to provide open platforms for speech and commerce. If Hawley’s absurdly misnamed new “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” is implemented, it would essentially combine the core elements of the Fairness Doctrine and Net Neutrality to create a massive new regulatory regime for the Internet.

The bill would gut the immunities Internet companies enjoy under 47 USC 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency Act. Eric Goldman of the Santa Clara University School of Law has described Section 230 as the “best Internet law” and “a big part of the reason why the Internet has been such a massive success.” Indeed, as I pointed out in a Forbes column on the occasion of its 15^th anniversary, Section 230 is “the foundation of our Internet freedoms” because it gives online intermediaries generous leeway to determine what content and commerce travels over their systems without the fear that they will be overwhelmed by lawsuits if other parties object to some of that content.

The Hawley bill would overturn this important legal framework for Internet freedom and instead replace it with a new “permissioned” approach. In true “Mother-May-I” style, Internet companies would need to apply for an “immunity certification” from the FTC, which would undertake investigations to determine if the petitioning platform satisfied a “requirement of politically unbiased content moderation.”

The vague language of the measure is an open invitation to massive political abuse. The entirety of the bill hinges upon the ability of Federal Trade Commission officials to define and enforce “political neutrality” online. Let’s consider what this will mean in practice.

Under the bill, the FTC must evaluate whether platforms have engaged in “politically biased moderation,” which is defined as moderation practices that are supposedly, “designed to negatively affect” or “disproportionately restricts or promote access to … a political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint.” As Blake Reid of the University of Colorado Law School rightly asks, “How, exactly, is the FTC supposed to figure out what the baseline is for ‘disproportionately restricting or promoting’? How much access or availability to information about political parties, candidates, or viewpoints is enough, or not enough, or too much?”

There is no Goldilocks formula for getting things just right when it comes to content moderation. It’s a trial-and-error process that is nightmarishly difficult because of the endless eye-of-the-beholder problems associated with constructing acceptable use policies for large speech platforms. We struggled with the same issues in the broadcast and cable era, but they have been magnified a million-fold in the era of the global Internet with the endless tsunami of new content that hits our screens and devices every day. “Do we want less moderation?” asks Sec, 230 guru Jeff Kosseff. “I think we need to look at that question hard.  Because we’re seeing two competing criticisms of Section 230,” he notes. “Some argue that there is too much moderation, others argue that there is not enough.”

The Hawley bill seems to imagine that a handful of FTC officials will magically be able to strike the right balance through regulatory investigations. That’s a pipe dream, of course, but let’s imagine for a moment that regulators could somehow sort through all the content on message boards, tweets, video clips, live streams, gaming sites, and whatever else, and then somehow figure out what constituted a violation of “political neutrality” in any given context. That would actually be a horrible result because let’s be perfectly clear about what that would really be: It would be a censorship board. By empowering unelected bureaucrats to make decisions about what constitutes “neutral” or “fair” speech, the Hawley measure would, as Elizabeth Nolan Brown of Reason summarizes, “put Washington in charge of Internet speech.” Or, as Sen. Ron Wyden argues more bluntly, the bill “will turn the federal government into Speech Police.” “Perhaps a more accurate title for this bill would be ‘Creating Internet Censorship Act,'” Eric Goldman is forced to conclude.

The measure is creating other strange bedfellows. You won’t see Berin Szoka of TechFreedom and Harold Feld of Public Knowledge ever agreeing on much, but they both quickly and correctly labelled Hawley’s bill a “Fairness Doctrine for the Internet.” That is quite right, and much like the old Fairness Doctrine, Hawley’s new Internet speech control regime would be open to endless political shenanigans as parties, policymakers, companies, and the various complainants line up to have their various political beefs heard and acted upon. “That’s the kind of thing Republicans said was unconstitutional (and subject to FCC agency capture and political manipulation) for decades,” says Daphne Keller of the Stanford Center for Internet & Society. Moreover, during the Net Neutrality holy wars, GOP conservatives endlessly blasted the notion that bureaucrats should be determining what constitute “neutrality” online because it, too, would result in abuses of the regulatory process. Yet, Sen. Hawley’s bill would now mandate that exact same thing.

What is even worse is that, as law professor Josh Blackman observes, “the bill also makes it exceedingly difficult to obtain a certification” because applicants need a supermajority of 4 of the 5 FTC Commissioners. This is public choice fiasco waiting to happen. Anyone who has studied the long, sordid history of broadcast radio and television licensing understands the danger associated with politicizing certification processes. The lawyers and lobbyists in the DC “swamp” will benefit from all the petitioning and paperwork, but it is not clear how creating a regulatory certification regime for Internet speech really benefits the general public (or even conservatives, for that matter).

Former FTC Commissioner Josh Wright identifies another obvious problem with the Hawley Bill: it “offers the choice of death by bureaucratic board or the plaintiffs’ bar.” That’s because by weakening Sec. 230’s protections, Hawley’s bill could open the floodgates to waves of frivolous legal claims in the courts if companies can’t get (or lose) certification. The irony of that result, of course, is that this bill could become a massive gift to the tort bar that Republicans love to hate!

Of course, if the law ever gets to court, it might be ruled unconstitutional. “The terms ‘politically biased’ and ‘moderation’ would have vagueness and overbreadth problems, as they can chill protected speech,” Josh Blackman argues. So it could, perhaps, be thrown out like earlier online censorship efforts. But a lot of harm could be done—both to online speech and competition—in the years leading up to a final determination about the law’s constitutionality by higher courts.

What is most outrageous about all this is that the core rationale behind Hawley’s effort—the idea that conservatives are somehow uniquely disadvantaged by large social media platforms—is utterly preposterous. In May, the Trump Administration launched a “tech bias” portal which “asked Americans to share their stories of suspected political bias.” The portal is already closed and it is unclear what, if anything, will come out of this effort. But this move and Hawley’s proposal point to the broader trend of conservatives getting more comfortable asking Big Government to redress imaginary grievances about supposed “bias” or “exclusion.”

In reality, today’s social media tools and platforms have been the greatest thing that ever happened to conservatives. Mr. Trump owes his presidency to his unparalleled ability to directly reach his audience through Twitter and other platforms. As recently as June 12, President Trump tweeted, “The Fake News has never been more dishonest than it is today. Thank goodness we can fight back on Social Media.” Well, there you have it!

Beyond the President, one need only peruse any social media site for a few minutes to find an endless stream of conservative perspectives on display. This isn’t exclusion; it’s amplification on steroids. Conservatives have more soapboxes to stand on and preach than ever before in the history of this nation.

Finally, if they were true to their philosophical priors, then conservatives also would not be insisting that they have any sort of “right” to be on any platform. These are private platforms, after all, and it is outrageous to suggest that conservatives (or any other person or group) are entitled to have a spot on any other them.

Some conservatives are fond of ridiculing liberals for being “snowflakes” when it comes to other free speech matters, such as free speech on college campuses. Many times they are right. But one has to ask who the real snowflakes are when conservative lawmakers are calling on regulatory bureaucracies to reorder speech on private platform based on the mythical fear of not getting “fair” treatment. One also cannot help but wonder if those conservatives have thought through how this new Internet regulatory regime will play out once a more liberal administration takes back the reins of power. Conservatives will only have themselves to blame when the Speech Police come for them.

Addendum: Several folks have pointed out another irony associated with Hawley’s bill is that it would greatly expand the powers of the administrative state, which conservatives already (correctly) feel has too much broad, unaccountable power. I should have said more on that point, but here’s a nice comment from David French of National Review, which alludes to that problem and then ties it back to my closing argument above: i.e., that this proposal will come back to haunt conservatives in the long-run:

when coercion locks in — especially when that coercion is tied to constitutionally suspect broad and vague policies that delegate immense powers to the federal government — conservatives should sound the alarm. One of the best ways to evaluate the merits of legislation is to ask yourself whether the bill would still seem wise if the power you give the government were to end up in the hands of your political opponents. Is Hawley striking a blow for freedom if he ends up handing oversight of Facebook’s political content to Bernie Sanders? I think not.

Additional thoughts on the Hawley bill:

Josh Wright

Daphne Keller

Blake Reid

TechFreedom

Josh Blackman

Sen. Ron Wyden

Jeff Kosseff

Eric Goldman

CCIA

NetChoice

Internet Association

David French at National Review

John Samples

The Internet’s greatest blessing — its general openness to all speech and speakers — is also sometimes its biggest curse. That is, you cannot expect to have the most widely accessible, unrestricted communications platform the world has ever known and not also have some imbeciles who use it to spew insulting, vile, and hateful comments.

It is important to put things in perspective, however. Hate speech is not the norm online. The louts who spew hatred represent a small minority of all online speakers. The vast majority of online speech is of a socially acceptable — even beneficial — nature.

Still, the problem of hate speech remains very real and a diverse array of strategies are needed to deal with it. The sensible path forward in this regard is charted by Abraham H. Foxman and Christopher Wolf in their new book, Viral Hate: Containing Its Spread on the Internet. Their book explains why the best approach to online hate is a combination of education, digital literacy, user empowerment, industry best practices and self-regulation, increased watchdog / press oversight, social pressure and, most importantly, counter-speech. Foxman and Wolf also explain why — no matter how well-intentioned — legal solutions aimed at eradicating online hate will not work and would raise serious unintended consequences if imposed.

In striking this sensible balance, Foxman and Wolf have penned the definitive book on how to constructively combat viral hate in an age of ubiquitous information flows.

Definitional Challenges & Free Speech Concerns

Defining “hate speech” is a classic eye-of-the-beholder problem: At what point does heated speech become hate speech and who should be in charge of drawing the line between the two? “The notion of a single definition of hate speech that everyone can agree on is probably illusory,” Foxman and Wolf note, especially because of “the continually evolving and morphing nature of online hate.” (p. 52, 103)  “Like every other form of human communication, bigoted or hateful speech is always evolving, changing its vocabulary and style, adjusting to social and demographic trends, and reaching out in new ways to potentially receptive new audiences.” (p. 92)

Many free speech advocates (including me) argue that the government should not be in the business of ensuring that people never have their feelings hurt. Censorial solutions are particularly problematic here in the United States since they would likely run afoul of the protections secured by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The clear trajectory of the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence over the past half-century has been in the direction of constantly expanding protection for freedom of expression, even of the most repugnant, hateful varieties. Most recently, in Snyder v. Phelps, for example, the Court ruled that the Westboro Baptist Church could engage in hateful protests near the funerals of soldiers. “[T]his Nation has chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that public debate is not stifled,” ruled Chief Justice John Roberts for the Court’s 8-1 majority. The Court has also recently held that the First Amendment protects lying about military honors (United States v. Alvarez, 2012), animal cruelty videos (United States v. Stevens, 2010), computer-generated depictions of child pornography (Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 2002), and the sale of violent video games to minors (Brown v. EMA, 2011). This comes on top of over 15 years of Internet-related jurisprudence in which courts have struck down every effort to regulate online expression.

Some will celebrate this jurisprudential revolution; others with lament it. Regardless, it is likely to remain the constitutional standard here in the U.S. As a result, there is almost no chance that courts here would allow restrictions on hate speech to stand. That means alternative approaches will continue to be relied upon to address it.

Foxman and Wolf acknowledge these constitutional hurdles but also point out that there are other reasons why “laws attempting to prohibit hate speech are probably one of the weakest tools we can use against bigotry.” (p. 171) Most notably, there is the scope and volume problem: “the sheer vastness of the challenge” (p. 103) which means “it’s simply impossible to monitor and police the vast proliferation of bigoted content being distributed through Web 2.0 technologies.” (p. 81) “The borderless nature of the Internet means that, like chasing cockroaches, squashing on offending website, page, or service provider does not solve the problem; there are many more waiting behind the walls — or across the border.” (p. 82) That’s exactly right and it also explains why solutions of a more technical nature aren’t likely to work very well either.

Foxman and Wolf also point out how hate speech laws could backfire and have profound unintended consequences. Beyond targeted laws that address true threats, harassment, and direct incitements to violence, Foxman and Wolf argue that “broader regulation of hate speech may send an ‘educational message’ that actually weakens rather than strengthens our system of democratic values.” (p. 171) That’s because such censorial laws and regulations undermine the very essence of deliberative democracy — robust exchange of potential controversial views — and leads to potential untrammeled majoritarianism. Worse yet, legalistic attempts to shut down hate speech can end up creating martyrs for fringe movements and, paradoxically, end up fueling conspiracy theories. (p. 80)

The Essential Role of Counter-speech & Education

Yet, “the challenge of defining hate speech shouldn’t lead us to give up on solving the problem,” argue Foxman and Woff. (p. 53) We must, they argue, refocus our efforts around “education as a bulwark of freedom.” (p. 170)  Digital literacy — teaching citizens respectful online behavior — is the key to those education efforts.

A vital part of digital literacy efforts is the encouragement of counter-speech solutions to online hate. “[T]he best anecdote to hate speech is counter-speech – exposing hate speech for its deceitful and false content, setting the record straight, and promoting the values of respect and diversity,” note Foxman and Wolf. (p. 129)  Or, as the old saying goes, the best response to bad speech is better speech. This principle has infused countless Supreme Court free speech decisions over the past century and it continues to make good sense. But we could do more through education and digital literacy efforts to encourage more and better forms of counter-speech going forward.

“Counter-speech isn’t only or even primarily about debating hate-mongers,” they note. “It’s about helping to create a climate of tolerance and openness for people of all kinds, not just on the Internet but in every aspect of local, community, and national life.” (p. 146) This is how digital literacy becomes digital citizenship. It’s about forming smart norms and personal best practices regarding beneficial online interactions.

Intermediary Policing

What more can be done beyond education and counter-speech efforts? Foxman and Wolf envision a broad and growing role for intermediaries to help to police viral hate. “We are convinced that if much of the time and energy spent advocating legal action against hate speech was used in collaborating and uniting with the online industry to fight the scourge of online hate, we would be making more gains in this fight,” they say. (p. 121) Among the steps they would like to see online operators take:

• Establishing clear hate speech policies in their Terms of Service and mechanisms for enforcing them;
• Making it easier for users to flag hate speech and to speak out against it;
• Facilitating industry-wide education and best practices via multi-stakeholder approaches; and
• Limiting anonymity and moving to “real-name” policies to identify speakers.

De-anonymization / Real-name policies

Most of these are imminently sensible solutions that should serve as best practices for online service providers and social media platform operators. But their last suggestion for sites to consider limiting anonymous speech will be controversial, especially at a time when many feel that privacy is already at serious risk online and when some critics argue that intermediaries already “censor” too much content as it is. (See, for example, this Jeff Rosen essay on “The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the New Global Battle over the Future of Free Speech” and this Evgeny Morozov editorial, “You Can’t Say That on the Internet”).

Anonymous online speech certainly facilitates plenty of nasty online comments. There’s plenty of evidence — both scholarly and anecdotal — that “deindividuation” occurs when people can post anonymously.  As Foxman and Wolf explain it: “People who are able to post anonymously (or pseudonymously) are far more likely to say awful things, sometimes with awful effects. Speaking from behind a blank wall that shields a person from responsibility encourages recklessness – it’s far easier to hit the ‘send’ button without a second thought under those circumstances.” (p. 114)

On the other hand, there needs to be a sense of balance here. We protect anonymous speech for the same reason we protect all other forms of speech, no matter how odious: With the bad comes a lot of good. Forcing all users to identify themselves to get at handful of troublemakers is overkill and it would result in the chilling of a huge amount of legitimate speech.

Nonetheless, many governments across the globe are pushing for restrictions on anonymous speech. As Cole Stryker noted in his recent book, Hacking the Future: Privacy, Identity, and Anonymity on the Web, “we are seeing is an all-out war on anonymity, and thus free speech, waged by a variety of armies with widely diverse motivations, often for compelling reasons.” (p. 229). Stryker is right. In fact, less than two weeks ago, a French court ordered Twitter to produce the names of the people behind anti-Semitic tweets that appeared on the site last year.  Meanwhile, plenty of academics, including many here in the U.S., have stepped up their efforts to ban or limit online anonymity. If you don’t believe me, I suggest you read a few of the chapters of The Offensive Internet: Speech, Privacy, and Reputation (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds.). It’s a veritable fusillade against anonymity as well as Section 230, the U.S. law that limits liability for intermediaries who post materials by others.

In Viral Hate, Foxman and Wolf stop short of suggesting legal restrictions on anonymity, preferring to stick with experimentation among private intermediaries. One of the book’s authors (Wolf) penned an essay in The New York Times last November (“Anonymity and Incivility on the Internet”) suggesting that while “this is not a matter for government… it is time for Internet intermediaries voluntarily to consider requiring either the use of real names (or registration with the online service) in circumstances, such as the comments section for news articles, where the benefits of anonymous posting are outweighed by the need for greater online civility.” Specifically, Wolf wants the rest of the Net to follow Facebook’s lead: “It is time to consider Facebook’s real-name policy as an Internet norm because online identification demonstrably leads to accountability and promotes civility.”

These proposals prompted strong responses from some academics and average readers who decried the implications of such a move for both privacy and free speech. But, again, it is worth reiterating that Foxman and Wolf do not call for government mandates to achieve this. “[T]his notion of promulgating a new standard of accountability online is not a matter for government intervention, given the strictures of the First Amendment,” they argue. (p. 117)

However, Foxman and Wolf do suggest one innovative alternative that merits attention: premium placement for registered commenters. The New York Times and some other major content providers have experimented with premium placement, whereby those registered on the site have their comments pushed up in the queue while other comments appear down below them. On the other hand, I don’t like the idea of having to register for every news or content site I visit, so I would hope such approaches are used selectively. Another useful approach involves letting users of various social media sites and content services to determine whether they wish to allow comments on their user-generated content at all. Of course, many sites and services (such as YouTube, Facebook, and most blogging services) already allow that.

Conclusion

There are times in the book when Foxman and Wolf push their cause with a bit too much rhetorical flair, as when they claim that “Hitler and the Nazis could never have dreamed of such an engine of hate (as the Internet”). (p. 10)  Perhaps there is something to that, but it is also true that Hitler and the Nazis could have never of dreamed of a platform for individual empowerment, transparency, and counter-speech such as the Internet. It was precisely because they were able to control the very limited media and communications platforms of their age that the Nazis were about to exert total control over the information systems and create a propaganda hate machine that had no serious challenge from the public or other nations. Just ask Arab dictators which age they’d prefer to rule in! It is certainly much harder for today’s totalitarian thugs to keep secrets bottled up and it is equally hard for them to spread lies and hateful propaganda without being met with a forceful response from the general citizenry as well as those in other nations. So the “Hitler-would-have-loved-the-Net” talk is unwarranted.

I’m also a bit skeptical of some of the metrics used to measure this problem. While there is clearly plenty of online hate to be found across the Net today, efforts to quantify it inevitably run right back into the same subjective definition problems that Foxman and Wolf do such a nice job explaining throughout the text. So, if we have such a profound ‘eye-of-the-beholder’ problem at work here, how is it that we can be sure that quantitative counts are accurate?  That doesn’t mean I’m opposed to efforts to quantify online hate, rather, we just need to take such measures with a grain of salt.

Finally, I wish the authors would have developed more detailed case studies of how companies outside the mainstream are dealing with these issues today. Foxman and Wolf focus on big players like Google, Facebook, and Twitter for obvious reasons, but plenty of other online providers and social media operators have policies and procedures in place today to deal with online hate speech. A more thorough survey of those differing approaches might have helped us gain a better understanding of which policies make the most sense going forward.

Despite those small nitpicks, Foxman and Wolf have done a great service here by offering us a penetrating examination of the problem of online hate speech while simultaneously explaining the practical solutions necessary to combat it. Some will be dissatisfied with their pragmatic approach to the issue, feeling on one hand that the authors have not gone far enough in bringing in the law to solve these problems, while others will desire a more forceful call for freedom of speech and just growing a thicker skin in response to viral hate.  But I believe Foxman and Wolf have struck exactly the right balance here and given us a constructive blueprint for addressing these vexing issues going forward.

This week I will be attending two terrific conferences on Sec. 230 and Internet intermediary liability issues. On Thursday, the Stanford Technology Law Review hosts an all-day event on “Secondary and Intermediary Liability on the Internet” at the Stanford Law School. It includes 3 major panels on intermediary liability as it pertains to copyright, trademark, and privacy. On Friday, the amazing Eric Goldman and his colleagues at the Santa Clara Law School’s High Tech Law Institute host an all-star event on “47 U.S.C. § 230: a 15 Year Retrospective.”  Berin Szoka and Jim Harper will also be attending both events (Harper is speaking at Stanford event) and Larry Downes will be at the Santa Clara event.  So if you also plan to attend, come say ‘Hi’ to us.  We don’t bite! (We have, however, been known to snarl.)

In the meantime, down below, I just thought I would post a few links to the many things we have said about Section 230 and online intermediary liability issues here on the TLF in the past as well as this graphic depicting some of the emerging threats to Sec. 230 from various proposals to “deputize the online middleman.”  As we’ve noted here many times before, Sec. 230 is the “cornerstone of Internet freedom” that has allowed a “utopia of utopias” to develop online.  It would be a shame if lawmakers rolled back its protections and opted for an onerous new legal/regulatory approach to handling online concerns. Generally speaking, education and empowerment should trump regulation and punishing liability.

Deputization of the Middleman http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Further Reading from the TLF

• Web 2.0, Section 230, and Nozick’s “Utopia of Utopias” – 1/13/09
• The AutoAdmit Case and the Future of Sec. 230 – 2/16/09
• The Future of Sec. 230 and Online Immunity: My Debate with Harvard’s John Palfrey – 5/6/2009
• Emerging Threats to Section 230 – 5/14/09
• Great Summary of Section 230 – 6/28/09
• Section 230: The Cornerstone of Internet Freedom – 8/18/09
• Cyberbullying Hearing Yesterday: Education, not Criminalization or Intermediary Deputization – 10/1/09
• Eric Goldman on New Threats to Sec. 230 – 3/27/10
• GetUnvarnished.com: Should We Allow User Feedback about Personal Reputation? – 4/6/10

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

Short but very important essay here from Santa Clara University Law School Prof. Eric Goldman about calls to alter Sec. 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) to address concerns about online harassment. Generally speaking, Sec. 230 immunizes online intermediaries from punishing liability for the content that travels over their networks / services. Specifically, Sec. 230 stipulates that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In other words: Don’t shoot the messenger!

As we’ve noted here before, it is probably not an overstatement to think of Sec. 230 as the very cornerstone of Internet Freedom, since it makes possible an online “utopia for utopias,” to borrow a phrase from our favorite modern political philosopher, the late Robert Nozick. Without Sec. 230, intermediaries would likely be forced to shut down many avenues of communication and would have to become deputized conduct and morality police for every cyber-street corner.

Goldman, America’s leading expert on Sec. 230-related jurisprudence, correctly notes that, “Frequently, § 230’s critics do not attack the immunization generally, but instead advocate a new limited exception for their pet concern.” He’s got that right. Indeed, we are increasingly hearing calls from numerous quarters these days to “tweak 230” for one pet concern after another. We’ve illustrated some of those concerns in this exhibit.

Deputization of the Middleman http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf Regulatory advocates can be found for each of these issues who like to see the protections afforded by Sec. 230 scaled back by Congress or he courts. But Goldman rightly warns:

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka — (Ver. 1.0 — Summer 2009)

We are attempting to articulate the core principles of cyber-libertarianism to provide the public and policymakers with a better understanding of this alternative vision for ordering the affairs of cyberspace. We invite comments and suggestions regarding how we should refine and build-out this outline. We hope this outline serves as the foundation of a book we eventually want to pen defending what we regard as “Real Internet Freedom.” [Note:  Here’s a printer-friendly version, which we also have embedded down below as a Scribd document.]

I. What is Cyber-Libertarianism?

Cyber-libertarianism refers to the belief that individuals—acting in whatever capacity they choose (as citizens, consumers, companies, or collectives)—should be at liberty to pursue their own tastes and interests online.

Generally speaking, the cyber-libertarian’s motto is “Live & Let Live” and “Hands Off the Internet!”  The cyber-libertarian aims to minimize the scope of state coercion in solving social and economic problems and looks instead to voluntary solutions and mutual consent-based arrangements.

Cyber-libertarians believe true “Internet freedom” is freedom from state action; not freedom for the State to reorder our affairs to supposedly make certain people or groups better off or to improve some amorphous “public interest”—an all-to convenient facade behind which unaccountable elites can impose their will on the rest of us.

B.  Application in Social & Economic Contexts

The cyber-libertarian draws no distinction between social and economic freedom when applying this vision:

• Social Freedom: Individuals should be granted liberty of conscience, thought, opinion, speech, and expression in online environments.
• Economic Freedom: Individuals should be granted liberty of contract, innovation, and exchange in online environments.

Cyber-libertarians also argue that social and economic freedoms are inextricably intertwined:  It is not enough to support liberty of action in one sphere; foreclosing freedom in one sphere will eventually affect freedom in the other.

C.  How “Code Failures” Are to Be Addressed

The cyber-libertarian believes that “code failures” (the digital equivalent of so-called “market failures”) are better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions.   From a practical perspective, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those responses.  Stated differently, cyber-libertarians have a strong aversion to the politicization of technology issues and efforts to replace market processes with bureaucratic processes.

Importantly, the cyber-libertarian defines “markets” broadly to include monetary and non-monetary transactions as well as proprietary and non-proprietary modes of production.  To be clear, collaborative, non-proprietary technologies and efforts ( e.g., Wikipedia and open source software) are not at odds with cyber-libertarianism.  But the cyber-libertarian does reject the notion these models are the only acceptable model or that they should be imposed on us by law.  The proper policy position with regards to the “open vs. closed” or “proprietary vs. non-proprietary” debate should be one of techno-agnosticism.  Lawmakers and courts should not be tilting the balance in one direction or the other.

More generally speaking, instead of seeking to define or impose a single utopian vision, the cyber-libertarian seeks to enable what libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick called a “Utopia of Utopias:” a framework within which many different models of organizing commerce and community can flourish alongside, and in competition with, each other.

D.  General Relationship to “Internet Exceptionalism”

Internet exceptionalists are first cousins to cyber-libertarians:  They believe that the Internet has changed culture and history profoundly and is deserving of special care before governments intervene.  [See Section IV for an expanded discussion.]

II. The Intellectual Foundations of Cyber-Libertarianism

A.  Traditional Libertarian Philosophy

• Natural Rights philosophers –John Locke, Ayn Rand, The Founders
• Utilitarian philosophers – John Stuart Mill (On Liberty), Herbert Spencer
• “Austrian School” of Economics – Ludwig von Mises, F.A.  Hayek, Murray Rothbard
• Milton Friedman (Free to Choose)
• Robert Nozick – argument for a minimalist state; “utopia of utopias” notion
• Thomas Sowell – critique of “The Vision of the Anointed”
• Richard Epstein – vision of “Simple Rules for a Complex World

B.  Modern Cyber-Libertarian Theorists

• Ithiel de Sola Pool (Technologies of Freedom)
• Alvin Toffler (The Third Wave , Future Shock)
• George Gilder (Microcosm , Telecosm)
• Peter Huber (Law & Disorder in Cyberspace)
• Tom W.  Bell
• Technology Liberation Front bloggers

C.  Internet Exceptionalists[see Sec.  IV below]

• Nicholas Negroponte (Being Digital)
• John Perry Barlow (“Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”)
• David Post
• Eric Goldman
• H.  Brian Holland

III. The Contrast with Cyber-Collectivism

A.  Cyber-Collectivism Defined

Cyber-collectivism is the opposite of cyber-libertarianism.  Cyber-collectivism refers to the general belief that cyber-choices should be guided by the State or an elite class according to some amorphous “general will” or “public interest.”  The distant influence of Plato, Rousseau, and Marx can often been seen in the work of cyber-collectivists.

Cyber-collectivism comes in many flavors, however.  “Left”-leaning cyber-collectivists, for example, are more focused on social concerns than economic ones.  Some “Right”-leaning cyber-collectivists are focused on controlling the impact of the Internet on culture or security.  In other words, cyber-collectivism is not as philosophically coherent as cyber-libertarianism—which, though it comes in many flavors, shares a larger core of common agreement

B.  General Relationship to “Information Commons” Movement

There is a close relationship between the Leftist variant of cyber-collectivism and the “digital commons” or “information commons” movement, which generally refers to the belief that digital resources should be shared or perhaps commonly owned instead of held privately—both because cyber-collectivists think this is more equitable and because they generally think such arrangements will ultimately work better.

Cyber-collectivists are typically not Marxists; few of them call for state ownership of the information means of production.  Rather, cyber-collectivists might better be thought of a “cyber social Democrats” (in a European sense) or “Digital New Dealers” (in the American tradition).  They advocate a generous role for law and regulation in many online matters, but do not typically resort to full-blown nationalization.

C. Exponents of Cyber-Collectivism

Some notable cyber-collectivists or information commons adherents (and their key works):

• Lawrence Lessig (Code , Free Culture)
• Tim Wu (Who Controls the Internet?)
• Yochai Benkler (The Wealth of Networks)
• Jonathan Zittrain (The Future of the Internet & How to Stop It)
• David Bollier (Viral Spiral)
• Harvard Berkman Center*
• New America Foundation*
• Public Knowledge*

(*We are, of course, generalizing a bit here. Not everyone in these institutions is a cyber-collectivist and, again, there are many flavors of cyber-collectivism, just as there are many flavors of cyber-libertarianism. Individuals in some of these organizations diverge significantly in attitudes towards technological change and the proper scope of government influence throughout the high-tech sector.)

IV. Relationship Between Cyber-Libertarianism & Internet Exceptionalism

Some non-libertarians occasionally join ranks with cyber-libertarians out of a belief that the Internet is different and deserving of special consideration and care. This is commonly referred to as “Cyber-Exceptionalism” or “Internet Exceptionalism.” John Perry Barlow’s 1996 “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” was probably the earliest (and most extreme) articulation of “Internet Exceptionalism”:

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions. You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.

Similarly, in 1994, The Progress & Freedom Foundation brought together four leading technology visionaries (Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin Toffler) to pen A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age. In that manifesto, the authors argued:

Cyberspace is the land of knowledge, and the exploration of that land can be a civilization’s truest, highest calling. The opportunity is now before us to empower every person to pursue that calling in his or her own way. The challenge is as daunting as the opportunity is great. The Third Wave has profound implications for the nature and meaning of property, of the marketplace, of community and of individual freedom. As it emerges, it shapes new codes of behavior that move each organism and institution—family, neighborhood, church group, company, government, nation—inexorably beyond standardization and centralization, as well as beyond the materialist’s obsession with energy, money and control. Turning the economics of mass-production inside out, new information technologies are driving the financial costs of diversity—both product and personal—down toward zero, “demassifying” our institutions and our culture. Accelerating demassification creates the potential for vastly increased human freedom. It also spells the death of the central institutional paradigm of modern life, the bureaucratic organization. (Governments, including the American government, are the last great redoubt of bureaucratic power on the face of the planet, and for them the coming change will be profound and probably traumatic.)

As that last paragraph suggests, this “Magna Carta” for cyberspace contained some hints of cyber-libertarian thinking, but the general thrust of the document was more generally of the Internet Exceptionalist school of thought.

Internet Exceptionalists are sometime critiqued for sounding like techno-utopians, but it is a mistake to conflate the two. There are not always synonymous.

V. Cyber-Libertarianism’s Early Legal Foundations & Victories

• Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 is probably the best example of cyber-exceptionalism in practice. It grants broad immunity to online intermediaries for third party content except for criminal and IP law—breaking with traditional tort liability standards. Specifically, Sec. 230 rejected the “deputization of the middleman” model of liability.
• Overturning of the Communications Decency Act’s indecency & obscenity provisions in Reno v. ACLU decision
• Various court decisions blocking enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1999
• The encryption wars & the defeat of the “Clipper Chip”
• The Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998

VI. Applications: How Cyber-Libertarians Think about Various Policy Issues

• Free speech & online child safety: Favor parental empowerment and industry self-regulation over censorship. “Household standards” should trump “community standards.”
• Privacy policy & online advertising: Privacy is a subjective condition and efforts to regulate to “protect privacy” could have unintended consequences for freedom of speech and the growth of online content and commerce. User empowerment and industry self-regulation represent the superior way to address privacy concerns.
• Net neutrality / infrastructure regulation: “Open access” regulation is nothing more the infrastructure socialism. Network operators should be free to own, operate, and price their systems and services as they see fit, subject only to enforcement of their terms of service and other voluntary disclosures as contracts with their users. New entry and innovation are better alternative to regulating yesterday’s networks and technologies.
• Internet taxation: No special taxes should be imposed on online services or Internet access. To the extent the Net disrupts traditional tax bases that should be seen as an opportunity to reform those tax systems.
• Online gambling: People should be free to do what they want with their money and Internet gambling is likely impossible to shut down entirely anyway, given the nature of the Internet.
• Antitrust: “Market power” and “code failures” are best dealt with by spontaneous evolution of markets and new entry, not bureaucratic micro-management of old technologies or market structures. Regulation often creates, or tends to foster, most monopolies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool once noted, “The force that preserves most monopoly privilege is law… most would vanish in the absence of enforcement.”
• IP issues: Cyber-libertarians are deeply divided over IP issues (especially copyright) and this reflects a long-standing division within libertarian ranks on these issues more generally. Some believe IP rights are a natural extension of traditional property rights and/or a sensible way to incentivize scientific and artistic creativity. Others believe no one has a right to “property-tize” intangible creations or that copyright is simply industrial protectionism. And there are many views in between.

VII. Prospects for Cyber-Libertarianism

A. The Pessimistic View

• Government’s will quash online freedom and bring the Internet under their thumbs.
• Regulatory efforts are expanding at a breathtaking pace and will not slow anytime soon.

B. The Optimistic View

• “Technologies of Freedom” (tools and methods to avoid online regulation, censorship and control) will ultimately triumph.
• Technology is evolving faster than government’s ability to regulate it.

VIII. Related Reading on Cyber-Libertarianism & Internet Exceptionalism

• John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996).
• Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence , 87 U. Minn. L. Rev. 743 (2003).
• Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, & Alvin Toffler, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age (1994).
• Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, Santa Clara Magazine (Winter 2008).
• H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, Kansas L. Rev. (2007).
• Peter Huber, Law & Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm (1997).
• Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (1983).
• David Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace (2009).
• Adam Thierer, The Pragmatic Internet Optimist’s Creed, Technology Liberation Front Blog (Nov. 11, 2008).
• Technology Liberation Front Blog, About the Technology Liberation Front (August 2004, revised 2008).

Cyber-Libertarianism: The Case for Real Internet Freedom [Ver 1.0 – Thierer & Szoka] http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=18490847&access_key=key-14tt6eb4f2cdcil8wnf2&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

If you’re a cyberlaw geek or tech policy wonk who needs to keep close tabs on Sec. 230 developments, here’s a terrific resource from the Citizen Media Law Project up at the Harvard Berkman Center.  The site offers a wealth of background info, including legislative history, all the relevant case law surrounding 230, and breaking news on this front.  Just a phenomenal resource; a big THANK YOU! to the folks at CMLP who put this together.

If you’re interested in these issues, you might also want to check out this friendly debate that Harvard’s John Palfrey and I engaged in over at Ars recently as well as my essay on how Sec. 230 has spawned a “utopia of utopias” online.

The Progress & Freedom Foundation has just launched the new Center for Internet Freedom.  CIF offers an alternative to the proliferation of advocacy groups calling for government intervention online by offering timely analyses and critiques of proposals that diminish the vital role of free markets, free speech and property rights.  We aim to drive the Internet policy debate in new directions by emphasizing a layered approach of technological innovation, user education, user self-help, industry self-regulation, and the enforcement of existing laws consistent with the First Amendment.  Such an approach is a less restrictive—and generally more effective—alternative to increased regulation.  

Here are some of the issues I’ll be working on as CIF’s Director in conjunction with my esteemed colleagues Adam Thierer, Adam Marcus, and adjunct fellows: 

• Defending online advertising as the lifeblood of online content & services, especially in the “Long Tail”;
• Emphasizing market solutions to problems of privacy protection, especially regarding the use of cookies and packet inspection data;
• Protecting online speech and expression both in the U.S. and abroad;
• Defending Section 230 immunity for Internet intermediaries;
• Opposing online taxation and legal barriers to e-commerce and digital payments, especially at the state and local levels; and
• Ensuring that Internet governance remains transparent and accountable without hampering the evolution of the Internet.

Anyone interested in the long-running debate over how to balance online privacy with anonymity and free speech, whether Section 230‘s broad immunity for Internet intermediaries should be revised, and whether we need new privacy legislation must read the important and enthralling NYT Magazine piece  “The Trolls Among Us” by Mattathias Schwartz about the very real problem of Internet “trolls“–a term dating to the 1980s and defined as “someone who intentionally disrupts online communities.”

While all trolls “do it for the lulz” (“for kicks” in Web-speak) they range from the merely puckish to the truly “malwebolent.”  For some, trolling is essentially senseless web-harassment or “violence” (e.g., griefers), while for others it is intended to make a narrow point or even as part of a broader movement.  These purposeful trolls might be thought of as the Yippies of the Internet, whose generally harmless anti-war counter-cutural antics in the late 1960s were the subject of the star-crossed Vice President Spiro T. Agnew‘s witticism:

And if the hippies and the yippies and the disrupters of the systems that Washington and Lincoln as presidents brought forth in this country will shut up and work within our free system of government, I will lower my voice.

But the more extreme of these “disrupters of systems” might also be compared to the plainly terroristic Weathermen or even the more familiar Al-Qaeda.  While Schwartz himself does not explicitly draw such comparisons, the scenario he paints of human cruelty is truly nightmarish:  After reading his article before heading to bed last night, I myself had Kafka-esque dreams about complete strangers invading my own privacy for no intelligible reason.  So I can certainly appreciate how terrifying Schwartz’s story will be to many readers, especially those less familiar with the Internet or simply less comfortable with the increasing readiness of so many younger Internet users to broadcast their lives online.

But Schwartz leaves unanswered two important questions.  The first question he does not ask:  Just how widespread is trolling? However real and tragic for its victims, without having some sense of the scale of the problem, it is difficult to answer the second question Schwartz raises but, wisely, does not presume to answer:  What should be done about it? The policy implications of Schwartz’s article might be summed up as follows:  Do we need new laws or should we focus on some combination of enforcing existing laws, user education and technological solutions?  While Schwartz focuses on trolling, the same questions can be asked about other forms of malwebolence–best exemplified by the high-profile online defamation Autoadmit.com case, which demonstrates the effectiveness of existing legal tools to deal with such problems.

Schwartz begins by noting that:

Many trolling practices … violate existing laws against harassment and threats. The difficulty is tracking down the perpetrators. In order to prosecute, investigators must subpoena sites and Internet service providers to learn the original author’s IP address, and from there, his legal identity. Local police departments generally don’t have the means to follow this digital trail, and federal investigators have their hands full with spam, terrorism, fraud and child pornography.

He then asks, quite fairly, what the consequences of more aggressive enforcement might be:

But even if we had the resources to aggressively prosecute trolls, would we want to? Are we ready for an Internet where law enforcement keeps watch over every vituperative blog and backbiting comments section, ready to spring at the first hint of violence? Probably not. All vigorous debates shade into trolling at the perimeter; it is next to impossible to excise the trolling without snuffing out the debate.

Certainly, proposals to ban online anonymity would seriously threaten legitimate anonymous speech, as my TLF colleagues Ryan Radia and Adam Thierer have pointed out.  Schwartz is probably correct that part of the answer to the problem of trolling and other serious malwebolences lies in equipping law enforcement at all levels with, and training them to use, the basic tools already available to “pierce the veil” of online anonymity and prosecute truly bad actors under existing laws.  But Schwartz is also right to highlight the danger of relying on government to enforce even existing laws, and to take on responsibility for monitoring online activity.

But like most commentators, Schwartz seems to assume that the enforcement of existing laws is solely the province of the “law enforcement” community (police, prosecutors and government investigators).  To be sure, there are a variety of state and federal laws criminalizing certain acts of “malwebolence.”  But those who find themselves victimized online generally have recourse to bring a lawsuit on their own (a “private right of enforcement”) under well-established causes of action under tort law–a crucial part of the “free system of government” lauded by Agnew.

Specifically, such a plaintiff may bring a defamation claim (“libel” if written, “slander” if oral) or one of the four categories of privacy claims that have emerged since 1890, defined by the magisterial Second Restatement of Torts as follows:

(a)  unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
(b)  appropriation of the other’s name or likeness;
(c)  unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or
(d)  publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.

If the defendant is known, pursuing such claims is common-place.  The obstacle facing plaintiffs who do not know the legal identity of those who may have defamed them or intruded upon their privacy is the same facing law enforcement:  to “subpoena sites and Internet service providers [and other intermediaries] to learn the original author’s IP address, and from there, his legal identity.”  Such “third party subpoenas” are a vital part of the solution to the problem of malwebolence:  By enabling lawsuits under established causes of action against even anonymous defendants, they provide a real remedy to true victims.  The use of such subpoenas does not require finding new appropriations for “law enforcement,” new privacy laws or re-thinking Section 230’s grant of broad immunity to online intermediaries–a policy prescription that has gathered momentum in recent years.

For example, Daniel Solove has argued in his book The Future of Reputation that Section 230 should be re-interpreted:

to grant immunity only before the operator of a website is alerted that something posted there by another violates somebody’s privacy or defames her.  If the operator of a website becomes aware of the problematic material on the site, yet doesn’t remove it, then the operator could be liable.

Frank Pasquale has argued that we ought to require Internet search engines to provide a “right of reply”–allowing someone to post a “reply” that would appear on a search engine next to content concerning them that they consider inaccurate or defamatory (essentially the “fairness doctrine” applied online).   Others (one example) have argued for replacing Section 230 with something akin to the notice-and-takedown regime of copyright so that publishers’ immunity would be contingent on compliance with takedown notices.  But Mark Lemley, an internet law guru who is representing the plaintiffs in the Autoadmit case, has argued that Section 230 should instead be “rationalized” along with other Internet safe harbors under a unified safe harbor drawn from current trademark law:  “innocent infringers” would have immunity and would not be required to take down allegedly defamatory content, but plaintiffs could get courts to issue injunctions requiring intermediaries to take down content.  What unites advocates of all these proposals is that, like Schwartz, they downplay or ignore the effectiveness of existing tort remedies and third-party subpoenas.

Indeed, if the public is aware of third party subpoenas at all, it is probably only because of their use by copyright-holders in attempting to identify those caught using peer-to-peer software to share copyright materials.  Whatever one’s opinions on copyright and of the recording industry’s enforcement strategy, it is safe to say that the overall impression created by such lawsuits against users has been less than favorable.  Regardless, these lawsuits have established an effective legal process for identifying anonymous defendants.  While we can expect that this process–and the safeguards that accompany it–will continue to evolve, it is critical to appreciate the basics of how the third party subpoena process works if one is to evaluate the policy arguments raised by articles like Schwartz’s.

The infamous Autoadmit.com case provides a clear illustration of how this proces works and the evolving safeguards for anonymous speech.  As summarizes the case–and its most recent development:

“Women named Jill and Hillary should be raped.” Those are the words of “AK-47” — a poster to the college-admissions web forum AutoAdmit.com. AK-47 was one of a handful of students heaping misogynist scorn on women attending the nations’ top law schools in 2007, in posts so vile they spurred a national debate on the limits of online anonymity, and an unprecedented federal lawsuit aimed at unmasking and punishing the posters. Now lawyers for two female Yale Law School students have ascertained AK-47’s real identity, along with the identities of other AutoAdmit posters, who all now face the likely publication of their names in court records — potentially marking a death sentence for the comment trolls’ budding legal careers even before the case has gone to trial.

The plaintiff law students in this case originally sued Autoadmit.com and its operator in a Connecticut Federal District Court, but eventually removed them as plaintiffs in recognition of the fact that Section 230 immunizes them from liability.  But Section 230 did not stop them from suing those who had defamed them anonymously on Autoadmit.com.  And third party subpoenas have since made it possible for the plaintiffs to uncover the identity of most of those defendants.

The Process.  The procedure, made possible by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, is relatively straight-forward:  A plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a John or Jane Doe(s), a pseuodymous defendant whose identify is as yet unknown.  The lawsuit must clearly state the facts, cause(s) of action and remedy sought–just as with any lawsuit (see the Autoadmit complaint, for example).

Having filed such a lawsuit, the plaintiffs may then have a court issue subpoenas (subject to certain limitations) under FRCP 45 to parties who may have identifying information about the identity of the defendants.  For example, if the plaintiff has the IP address associated with a defamatory blog comment, one can subpoena the ISP for further identifying information about that user.  There may be several steps to the process:  for example, Autoadmit might disclose under subpoena an email address, leading to a subpoena to a webmail provider and ultimately a subpoena to an ISP.  Once the John/Jane Doe has been identified, the lawsuit can proceed.

The Safeguards.  In the Autoadmit case, one of the John Does did indeed file under FRCP 45 a “motion to quash” a subpoena to AT&T by which the plaintiffs sought the disclosure of identifying information about the John Doe.  Plaintiffs, of course, opposed the motion, and the Court ultimately denied the motion.  The Court’s discussion (pp 6-13) is instructive for those wondering just how the First Amendment would protect anonymity when a plaintiff seeks to force an Internet intermediary to disclose identifying information about an anonymous speaker.

At least since the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the First Amendment has limited the ability of courts to order the disclosure of identifying information (in that case, the NAACP’s membership list).  Since then, U.S. courts have developed a two-part balancing test that” ensures that:

the First Amendment rights of anonymous Internet speakers are not lost unnecessarily, and that plaintiffs do not use discovery to “harass, intimidate or silence critics in the public forum opportunities presented by the Internet.”

Understanding the way in which the Autoadmit.com court applied that test is critical to understanding how courts might balance privacy with free speech in the future:

First, the Court should consider whether the plaintiff has undertaken efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena and withheld action to afford the fictitiously named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the In this case, the plaintiffs have satisfied this factor by posting notice regarding the subpoenas on AutoAdmit … which allowed the posters ample time to respond, as evidenced by Doe 21’s [motion to quash]. Second, the Court should consider whether the plaintiff has identified and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that the plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech.  Doe II has identified the allegedly actionable statements by AK47/Doe 21: the first such statement is “Alex Atkind, Stephen Reynolds, [Doe II], and me: GAY LOVERS;” and the second such statement is ““Women named Jill and Doe II should be raped….” The Court should also consider the specificity of the discovery request and whether there is an alternative means of obtaining the information called for in the subpoena.  Here, the subpoena sought, and AT&T provided, only the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the person believed to have posted defamatory or otherwise tortious content about Doe II on AutoAdmit, and is thus sufficiently specific. Furthermore, there are no other adequate means of obtaining the information because AT&T’s subscriber data is the plaintiffs’ only source regarding the identity of AK47. Similarly, the Court should consider whether there is a central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the plaintiffs’ claims.   Here, clearly the defendant’s identity is central to Doe II’s pursuit of her claims against him. Next, the Court should consider the subpoenaed party’s expectation of privacy at the time the online material was posted.  Doe 21’s expectation of privacy here was minimal because AT&T’s Internet Services Privacy Policy states, in pertinent part: “We may, where permitted or required by law, provide personal identifying information to third parties. . . without your consent. . . To comply  with court orders, subpoenas, or other legal or regulatory requirements.” Thus, Doe 21 has little expectation of privacy in using AT&T’s service to engage in tortious conduct that would subject him to discovery under the federal rules. Finally, and most importantly, the Court must consider whether the plaintiffs have made an adequate showing as to their claims against the anonymous defendant.

The court noted that there is a range of competing standards for this last prong, but dismissed those standards most deferential to the plaintiff–requiring only that the plaintiff show a “good faith basis” to contend it may have an actionable cause or that there is “probable cause” for a claim–as “set[ting] the threshold for disclosure too low to adequately protect the First Amendment rights of anonymous defendants.”  The court also dismissed other standards very favorable to the defendant, such as requiring plaintiffs to show their claims could withstand a motion for summary judgment, noting the obvious point that “it would be impossible to meet this standard for any cause of action which required evidence within the control of the defendant.”  Ultimately, the court settled on the standard requiring the plaintiffs to “make a concrete showing as to each element of a prima facie case against the defendant” as striking, “the most appropriate balance between the First Amendment rights of the defendant and the interest in the plaintiffs of pursuing their claims, ensuring that the plaintiff is not merely seeking to harass or embarrass the speaker or stifle legitimate criticism.”

While Solove, Pasquale and others would make it far easier for a victim to require an online intermediary to take down content that truly defames them or invades their privacy–or to rein in a troll posting such content–relying on existing tort law of course requires that a victim actually file a website and third-party subpoenas.  Those who demand changes to Section 230 will likely argue that this is too burdensome and costly to be an effective remedy for a widespread problem.  But, again, one must ask how widespread that problem really is before leaping to conclusions about what kind of remedies are required.  As UCLA law professor and Internet law guru Eugene Volokh noted in the Yale Daily News’ coverage of this story, even a small number of lawsuits like Autoadmit “might remind some potential would-be defamers that their anonymity may not be secure.”  One wonders whether the trolls described by Schwartz would really be so brazen if more of their coven were unmasked and sued.

One obvious advantage of relying on the combination of tort law and third party subpoenas is that requiring the actual filing of a lawsuit minimizes the problem of Internet users attempting to squelch legitimate speech–for example, by sending frivolous take-down notices to intermediaries, a serious problem in the copyright context.  Those truly concerned with protecting anonymous speech should take a far greater interest in the balancing test chosen by courts following in Autoadmit‘s footsteps.  Marc Randazza, former counsel for Autoadmit administrator Anthony Ciolli, summarized the the balance struck by the court as follows:  “If you’re doing right, the First Amendment will protect you,” Randazza said. “If you’re doing wrong, it won’t.”

Much more could be said about third-party subpoenas, but it cannot be said that the law does not already provide every American with a remedy against the trolls identified by Schwartz, the villains of the Autoadmit case or other “disrupters of the systems.”  Any inquiry into whether we need new laws or regulations should begin by looking at the processes described above.