The Second Circuit just threw out the FCC’s broadcast indecency rules—which had led to heavy fines for “fleeting expletives”—as “unconstitutionally vague, creating a chilling effect that goes far beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here.” What’s ultimately most important about this decision is not what the court did, but what it said: The Constitutional framework that has allowed broadcast censorship has been rendered obsolete by the rise of the Internet and parental empowerment tools for new and old media.

In short, the court utterly rejected the Supreme Court’s 1978 Pacifica decision —which gave the FCC great discretion in regulating indecency on broadcast radio and television in order to protect children who might be in the audience during daytime and early evening hours, citing the unique “pervasiveness” and “invasiveness” of broadcasting into the home.  The court fully embraced what we’ve been saying for years—neither rationale holds true anymore:

we face a media landscape that would have been almost unrecognizable in 1978. Cable television was still in its infancy. The Internet was a project run out of the Department of Defense with several hundred users. Not only did Youtube, Facebook,and Twitter not exist, but their founders were either still in diapers or not yet conceived. In this environment, broadcast television undoubtedly possessed a “uniquely pervasive presence in thelives of all Americans.” The same cannot be said today. The past thirty years has seen an explosion of media sources, and broadcast television has become only one voice in the chorus. Cable television is almost as pervasive as broadcast….  The internet, too, has become omnipresent, offering access to everything from viral videos to feature films and, yes, even broadcast television programs…. Moreover, technological changes have given parents the ability to decide which programs they will permit their children to watch. (15-16)

Thus, the Second Circuit all but begged the Supreme Court to throw out Pacifica completely, but quickly noted that it is “bound by Supreme Court precedent, regardless of whether it reflects today’s realities” (17). Fortunately, the court was able to reach the same result on vagueness grounds. It’s worth reading this key passage to see what a consistent approach to the First Amendment would look like:

Every television, 13 inches or larger, sold in the UnitedStates since January 2000 contains a V-chip, which allows parents to block programs based on a standardized rating system. 47 U.S.C. § 303(x). Moreover, since June 11, 2009, when theUnited States made the transition to digital television, anyone using a digital converter box alsohas access to a V-chip. CSVA Report, 24 F.C.C. Rcd. 11413, at ¶ 11. In short, there now exists a way to block programs that contain indecent speech in a way that was not possible in 1978. Infact, the existence of technology that allowed for household-by-household blocking of “unwanted” cable channels was one of the principle distinctions between cable television andbroadcast media drawn by the Supreme Court in [its 2000 decision striking down cable filtering mandates, U.S. v. Playboy]. The Court explained:

The option to block reduces the likelihood, so concerning to the Court in Pacifica,that traditional First Amendment scrutiny would deprive the Government of allauthority to address this sort of problem. The corollary, of course, is that targeted blocking enables the Government to support parental authority without affectingthe First Amendment interests of speakers and willing listeners – listeners forwhom, if the speech is unpopular or indecent, the privacy of their own homes maybe the optimal place of receipt.

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815 (internal citation omitted). We can think of no reason why thisrationale for applying strict scrutiny in the case of cable television would not apply with equalforce to broadcast television in light of the V-chip technology that is now available. (16-17).

Amen!

It’s pretty remarkable for a court to come out so strong against a longstanding precedent when they can resolve a case without doing so. Indeed, courts generally follow a strict canon of interpretation that says they should skip right to simpler issues that can resolve a case—vagueness, in this case. The fact that the Second Circuit felt it necessary to spend nearly three pages debunking Pacifica is the clearest statement yet that it’s time for us to apply the First Amendment consistently across all media.

I only hope the FCC is brash enough to appeal (knowing it might well lose the farm, to to speak), and that the Supreme Court is brave and principled enough to say what the Second Circuit has said so beautifully: There’s no justification for treating broadcasters as second class speakers. The First Amendment should apply equally across media!

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on. True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money. Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_GroupsStatement-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

I’ve been blathering on about this week’s big Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox, [See Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5], so I thought I would just wrap this series of essays up with a collection of other articles and views on the decision in case readers are looking for alternative perspectives:

Mainstream Media Stories

• Associated Press
• Reuters
• New York Times (+ more analysis)
• Washington Post
• Wall Street Journal
• Legal Times
• TV Week
• Variety
• Kansas City Star
• USA Today
• Ars Technica

Conservative, Religious, & “Family” Groups

• Parents Television Council
• Common Sense Media
• Concerned Women for America
• Town Hall.com

Free Speech Advocates or Other Views

• The SCOTUS Blog
• Free Expression Policy Project (Marjorie Heins)
• ACLU
• Media Access Project (Andy Schwartzman)
• Center for Creative Voices in Media (Jonathan Rintels)
• First Amendment Center (David Hudson)
• Free State Foundation (Randy May)
• Michael Dorf
• Marc Randazza
• Reason’s Hit and Run
• Volokh Conspiracy (Eugene Volokh)
• TechDirt

I’ve been commenting on yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox, and criticizing the logic of the majority’s decision the case, which was driven solely by procedural / admin law considerations. [See Part 3.]  I also discussed Justice Thomas’s very interesting concurring opinion, which took a serious look at the constitutional issues in play here and signaled his willingness to potentially overturn Red Lion and Pacifica. [See Part 4.]  In this fifth installment, I will briefly outline some of the dissenting arguments.

Justice Stephen Breyer penned a lengthy dissent and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.  Like the Scalia majority decision, the Breyer dissent also focused on the procedural / APA-related issues at stake in the case.  Breyer, however, was not buying the FCC’s assertion that it had adequately justified its significant expansion of indecency enforcement in recent years.  Whereas the majority deferred to the agency and found “no basis in the Act or this Court’s opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review,” the four dissenting justices saw things quite differently.  Breyer noted that while the “law grants those in charge of independent administrative agencies broad authority to determine relevant policy,” it “does not permit them to make policy choices for purely political reasons nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences.”  He goes on to appropriately note that:

Federal Communications Commissioners have fixed terms of office; they are not directly responsible to the voters; and they enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from “‘the exercise of political oversight.’” [citations omitted] That insulation helps to secure important governmental objectives, such as the constitutionally related objective of maintaining broadcast regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds. But that agency’s comparative freedom from ballot-box control makes it all the more important that courts review its decision making to assure compliance with applicable provisions of the law — including law requiring that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.

Breyer goes on to restate much of what is already clear from the APA and all that surrounds it. “[A]n agency must act consistently. The agency must follow its own rules,” he notes.  Moreover: 

“The law has also recognized that it is not so much a particular set of substantive commands but rather it is a process, a process of learning through reasoned argument, that is the antithesis of the “arbitrary.” This means agencies must follow a “logical and rational” decisionmaking “process.”

Finally, while admitting that agencies have generally been granted “generous leeway” to establish new policies, “this leeway is not absolute,” Breyer notes.  Breyer then finds that the FCC did not measure up to these standards when crafting and announcing changes to its indecency enforcement policies.  I will spare you all the details which you can read for yourself, but I think Breyer makes a very solid case that that the agency over-stepped its bounds and acted in a way that was “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion.”  Alas, Breyer could not find one more vote to make that the majority holding in this case.

Incidentally, in separate dissents, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens had some feisty things to say about the FCC’s actions and the majority decision.  Justice Ginsburg appropriately noted that “there is no way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the Commission has done. Today’s decision does nothing to diminish that shadow.”  On the question of the continuing wisdom of the Pacifica decision, which Justice Thomas hinted he was ready to revisit and potentially overturn, Justice Ginsburg had this to say:

The Pacifica decision, however it might fare on reassessment, was tightly cabined, and for good reason. In dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the Government should take care before enjoining the broadcast of words or expressions spoken by many “in our land of cultural pluralism.” 438 U. S., at 775.  That comment, fitting in the 1970’s, is even more potent today.  If the reserved constitutional question reaches this Court, see ante, at 26 (majority opinion), we should be mindful that words unpalatable to some may be “commonplace” for others, “the stuff of everyday conversations.” 438 U. S., at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

What a strange world we live in when Justices Ginsburg and Thomas are jointly leading a First Amendment revolution!

Finally, in his separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued that, “The FCC’s shifting and impermissibly vague indecency policy only imperils these broadcasters and muddles the regulatory landscape. It therefore makes eminent sense to require the Commission to justify why its prior policy is no longer sound before allowing it to change course.”  He goes on to discuss semantic issues and the dangers of allowing the government to regulate speech and determine the context in which it is appropriate and when it is not.  It makes for some very entertaining reading that you just don’t see every day in a Supreme Court decision.  He states:

There is a critical distinction between the use of an expletive to describe a sexual or excretory function and the use of such a word for an entirely different purpose, such as to express an emotion. One rests at the core of indecency; the other stands miles apart. As any golfer who has watched his partner shank a short approach knows, it would be absurd to accept the suggestion that the resultant four-letter word uttered on the golf course describes sex or excrement and is therefore indecent. But that is the absurdity the FCC has embraced in its new approach to indecency.

Having spent many frustrating hours on the links attempting to master the (inappropriately-named) “gentleman’s game,” I can vouch for the level of vulgarity uttered during seemingly all moments of play, and I certainly can’t remember anyone thinking that sexual or excretory functions where the subject of discussion.  Anyway, Justice Stevens goes on to conclude that:

Even if the words that concern the Court in this case sometimes retain their sexual or excretory meaning, there are surely countless instances in which they are used in a manner unrelated to their origin. These words may not be polite, but that does not mean they are necessarily “indecent” under §1464.  By improperly equating the two, the Commission has adopted an interpretation of “indecency” that bears no resemblance to what Pacifica contemplated. Most distressingly, the Commission appears to be entirely unaware of this fact, see Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd., at 13308 (erroneously referencing Pacifica in support of its new policy), and today’s majority seems untroubled by this significant oversight. Because the FCC has failed to demonstrate an awareness that it has ventured far beyond Pacifica’s reading of §1464, its policy choice must be declared arbitrary and set aside as unlawful.

Again, regrettably, this logic did not carry the day.

With today’s historic Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox, I have been commenting on the logic and implications of the decision. Part 3 dealt with the majority’s decision in the case, which was driven solely by procedural / admin law considerations.  This installment will discuss the very interesting concurring opinion penned by Justice Thomas, which is the only one that takes a serious look at the constitutional foundations of the FCC’s current regulatory regime.  While I was sad to see Justice Thomas join the majority’s decision upholding the FCC’s radical expansion of speech regulation in recent years, he joined that majority only on straightforward procedural grounds.   On the underlying constitutional issues at stake here, it is clear from his concurring statement that he is ready for the Court to hear a challenge to the previous court precedents and traditional regulatory doctrines that have long supported FCC speech and media controls.

“I write separately,” Justice Thomas says “to note the questionable viability of the two precedents that support the FCC’s assertion of constitutional authority to regulate the programming at issue in this case.”  Specifically, he addresses the two key cases upon which almost all FCC speech regulation rests: Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). Thomas continues: “Red Lion and Pacifica were unconvincing when they were issued, and the passage of time has only increased doubt regarding their continued validity.”

BOOM!  With those words, Justice Thomas has dropped the hammer and taken what will hopefully be the first swing at toppling the house of cards that is modern FCC speech regulation.  Justice Thomas goes on to itemize the many problems with what I have referred to as “America’s Jurisprudential Twilight Zone” when it comes to how we apply the First Amendment to media platforms in this country.  He states:

This deep intrusion into the First Amendment rights of broadcasters, which the Court has justified based only on the nature of the medium, is problematic on two levels. […]  First, instead of looking to first principles to evaluate the constitutional question, the Court relied on a set of transitory facts, e.g., the ‘scarcity of radio frequencies’… to determine the applicable First Amendment standard. But the original meaning of the Constitution cannot turn on modern necessity…  Second, even if this Court’s disfavored treatment of broadcasters under the First Amendment could have been justified at the time of Red Lion and Pacifica, dramatic technological advances have eviscerated the factual assumptions underlying those decisions. […]

Moreover, traditional broadcast television and radio are no longer the ‘uniquely pervasive’ media forms they once were. For most consumers, traditional broadcast media programming is now bundled with cable or satellite services. Broadcast and other video programming is also widely available over the Internet. And like radio and television broadcasts, Internet access is now often freely available over the airwaves and can be accessed by portable computer, cell phones, and other wireless devices.

Indeed, along with my friends as the Center for Democracy & Technology, I documented these trends in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in this case and pointed out that, at some point, these facts must impact the constitutional equation when it comes to the way the FCC continues to regulate broadcast programming uniquely.  Justice Thomas appears to agree:

The extant facts that drove this Court to subject broadcasters to unique disfavor under the First Amendment simply do not exist today. […] These dramatic changes in factual circumstances might well support a departure from precedent under the prevailing approach to stare decisis. […] For all these reasons, I am open to reconsideration of Red Lion and Pacifica in the proper case.

Unfortunately, this case apparently was not “the proper case” for Justice Thomas and so he joined the majority’s APA-driven decision and left the thorny constitutional issues for another day.  Eventually, however, the Court is going to have to come to grips with the issues that Justice Thomas has put front and center in his concurring opinion today.

Finally, in his otherwise outstanding statement, I was disappointed that Justice Thomas made no mention of the Court’s recent Internet jurisprudence, which has all gone squarely in favor of robust First Amendment protection for the Net and online speakers.  In particular, the “least restrictive means” test that has developed in those cases (i.e., deferring to user self-help tools before allowing state regulation) is equally applicable to programming television programming.  Just as parents have been empowered to take control of the online content that comes into their homes using filters and other tools, so too have parents been empowered to restrict or tailor television program to their tastes and values. How, then, is it the case that the Court upholds this logic in cases like Reno (the CDA case), Ashcroft (the COPA case), & Playboy (the cable TV signal scrambling case), but not in the case of broadcast TV programming, which is easier to control than ever before?  It makes zero sense.

Regardless, I hope other judges are listening to what Justice Thomas had to say today and taking these arguments seriously.

As I noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court today handed down a historical First Amendment decision in the case of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations.  The Court ruled in the FCC’s favor by a 5-4 margin.  My initial general thoughts are here. In this piece, I’ll talk a bit more about the majority’s decision in the case.

The most important thing to realize about the Court’s 5-4 decision in FCC v. Fox is that the Court has intentionally dodged all the serious constitutional issues in play here and instead decided the case solely on procedural grounds. “We decline to address the constitutional questions at this time,” the majority says. (p. 26) Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia says:

There is… no basis in the Act or this Court’s opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. Although an agency must ordinarily display awareness that it is changing position… and may sometimes need to account for prior fact finding or certain reliance interests created by a prior policy, it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one. It suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change adequately indicates.

Of course, it’s not entirely unusual for the Court to decide important regulatory cases by sticking to administrative law / APA issues, but what’s different in this case is that we’re not talking about the regulation of widgets here. We are talking about the regulation of freedom of speech and expression. Shouldn’t the administrative law analysis change a bit when the issues at stake implicate profound constitutional imperatives? I think so, but the majority doesn’t address that. Moreover, because they dispense with all constitutional considerations, the majority never gets around to answering how much continuing sense this broadcast speech regulatory regime makes in an age of media and technological convergence. I discussed the illogical “First Amendment Jurisprudential Twilight Zone” that has developed in this field in this essay, this law review article, and a video presentation.  Sadly, today’s decision just makes matters more confusing and unfair.  After all, those children that the Court thinks the FCC might be protecting with these regulations are currently over on YouTube and Hulu watching all those same shows!

On a related note, the majority also never mentions its recent Internet jurisprudence, which has all gone squarely in favor of robust First Amendment protection for the Net and online speakers. In particular, the “least restrictive means” test that has developed in those cases (i.e., deferring to user self-help tools before allowing state regulation) is completely ignored by the majority in this case.  Again, welcome to the jurisprudential Twilight Zone.

Finally, I must address the stunning assertion that Justice Scalia sets forth in the last paragraph of his decision, which is the only one that addresses Pacifica and the constitutional issues at stake here. In that paragraph, Scalia adopts the shocking logic set forth by Solicitor General Gregory Garre during oral arguments for this case.  As I pointed out in my summary of the oral arguments, during questioning from the justices, Garre suggested that the government actually had a stronger case today when it regulates broadcast platforms differently than all other forms of media. His reasoning: Precisely because there are so many other unregulated platforms where kids might see or hear objectionable media, it was vital for the government to quarantine one platform and make sure it is safe from objectionable programming. This is an astonishing argument for the government to set forth as a rationale for regulation as it essentially turns the old “scarcity” and “pervasiveness” rationales for regulation on their heads. Back in the old days, we were told broadcasting had to be regulated because it was scarce or because it was pervasive in our lives. Today, by contrast, the government tells us we have to regulate broadcast platforms because of media abundance. In other words, it’s ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ for broadcasters! There is no escape from regulation under this logic.

Amazing, Justice Scalia, endorses this logic in today’s decision:

The Second Circuit believed that children today “likely hear this language far more often from other sources than they did in the 1970’s when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech,” and that this cuts against more stringent regulation of broadcasts. Assuming the premise is true (for this point the Second Circuit did not demand empirical evidence) the conclusion does not necessarily follow. The Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their children. [p. 26]

What is Justice Scalia — a strict constitutionalist — doing endorsing these inventions and reinventions of contorted theories of the First Amendment? It’s bad enough that he is allowing a constitutional abomination like Pacifica to stand, but here we have him rubber-stamping its reinvention by a creative-minded solicitor.  This is judicial activism with a vengeance!!

[Next up… I will discuss the very interesting concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.]

Breaking news: The Supreme Court as just ruled in the important First Amendment case of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations and held in the government’s favor by a 5-4 vote. Decision is here.

My background info about the case is here and will publish some essays throughout the day as I digest the decision. Importantly, the case was decided squarely on procedural grounds, not constitutional grounds. However, Justice Thomas has some very important and interesting things to say about those constitutional issues in his separate concurrence. Coverage from AP, Reuters, and UPI.

The full decision can be viewed below in a Scribd reader:

[Supreme Court Decision] FCC v. Fox 07-582 http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=14715905&access_key=key-21fh1qa1sk7qthfi40is&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

My new article on “FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment” has just been published in the February 2009 edition of Engage, the journal of the Federalist Society. Here’s how it begins:

On November 4th, 2008, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the potentially historic free speech case of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. This case, which originated in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, deals with the FCC’s new policy for “fleeting expletives” on broadcast television. The FCC lost and appealed to the Supreme Court. By contrast, the so-called “Janet Jackson case” — CBS v. FCC — was heard in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The FCC also lost that case and has also petitioned the Supreme Court to review the lower court’s ruling. These two cases reflect an old and odd tension in American media policy and First Amendment jurisprudence. Words and images presented over one medium-in this case broadcast television-are regulated differently than when transmitted through any other media platform (such as newspapers, cable TV, DVDs, or the Internet). Various rationales have been put forward in support of this asymmetrical regulatory standard. Those rationales have always been weak, however. Worse yet, they have opened the door to an array of other regulatory shenanigans, such as the so-called Fairness Doctrine, and many other media marketplace restrictions. Whatever sense this arrangement made in the past, technological and marketplace developments are now calling into question the wisdom and efficacy of the traditional broadcast industry regulatory paradigm. This article will explore both the old and new rationales for differential First Amendment treatment of broadcast television and radio operators and conclude that those rationales: (1) have never been justified, and (2) cannot, and should not, survive in our new era of media abundance and technological convergence.

I go on in the piece to make the case against the those rationales and the call for the Supreme Court to use the Fox and CBS cases to end this historical First Amendment anomaly of differential treatment of broadcast platforms relative to all other media providers.

This article can be downloaded as a PDF here, or viewed down below the fold in the Scribd reader.

FCC v Fox and Future of First Amendment (Thierer-PFF) http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=12683998&access_key=key-epitk15wtp38l34jow7&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list

In her latest column, Media Post media market guru Diane Mermigas wonders how long it will be before we see a traditional over-the-air (OTA) broadcast TV network (like ABC, NBC, CBS, or Fox) dump their old broadcast business altogether and just move all their properties to cable and satellite TV. And, in response to Mermigas, Cory Bergman of Lost Remote argues, as I did last week, “the real future of TV is not linear cable, but non-linear video delivered seamlessly via IP to multiple devices, including your TV set. But mass adoption of this approach is still several years away.”

Bergman is right. It would be foolish to think any traditional network is going to rely exclusively on IP-based distribution any time soon; they see it as more of a compliment (or another product window). But Mermigas may be on to something in predicting that broadcast networks may soon be looking to get out of the OTA television business altogether and essentially become “a glorified general entertainment cable network.”

The strain on their dysfunctional paradigm is emanating from a devastating recession and the ongoing digital revolution. Both are permanently altering the rules of play for the networks. A case can be made for at least one of the Big 4 broadcast networks emerging as a glorified general entertainment cable network within the next several years. The economic advantages: more steady ad revenues and consistent subscriber fees as content is distributed cross-platform. It would be a bold move that a free-spirited company such as News Corp. might already be contemplating for its Fox Broadcast TV Network, or NBC Universal for its peacock network. Industry analysts increasingly wonder how an independent CBS can prattle on under the crumbling old rules. In a world of exploding access and choices, the prime-time ratings (even with Live plus 3 configurations) spell diminishing returns. For Disney, ABC’s general entertainment status is on par with ESPN in sports; the new multi-platform model is in place except for formally moving the ABC TV Network to the cable side of the ledger.

Such a suggestion would have been considered outlandish even just a few years ago, but now it seems like it’s only a matter of time before one of the majors makes the jump to being a cable-exclusive “super-station.” It’s another sign of the radical metamorphosis underway in our modern media marketplace. Mermigas notes that “The most compelling argument for the Big 4 surviving as cable networks is economic”:

Digital distribution is a long way from yielding the financial returns needed to offset the dilution of old-line mainstream revenues. The vulnerability of the broadcast networks’ $9 billion in upfront ad revenues will be starkly evident next spring amid the protracted recession. Major ad categories–such as autos, financials, real estate and retail–will be markedly altered in their spending as well as structure. The Big 3 U.S. automakers account for 6% of the Big 3 broadcast networks’ ad revenues (9% for Fox) and 2.5% of cable networks’ overall advertising (7% for ESPN). On the cost side, less than 30% of core expenses can be eliminated from program production budgets and legacy operations, which means that the entire broadcast network dynamic must be reengineered. Despite all the complications, the easiest, most efficient business model conversion would be to reset broadcast networks as general entertainment cable networks. […]

While the most competitive cable networks have closed the ratings gaps with broadcast networks, they still fail to command similar ad unit prices. Prices have failed to reflect changed value propositions; that dilemma will be resolved in a digital marketplace. Bottom line: the alignment of broadcast and cable networks is already in place. Cable’s niche appeal, parallel to the Internet’s special interest “long tail,” will continue to nudge advertisers, consumers and content providers toward a more fully monetized online business model.

It is my belief that this migration would have already been occurring had broadcast spectrum holders been granted flexible use and resale rights for their spectrum long ago. Unfortunately, the same old command-and-control system of spectrum regulation that the FCC put in place seven decades is still haunts us today. That system literally makes it a crime for television broadcasters to sell their existing spectrum for anything other than broadcast television. They can’t repurpose their spectrum for an alternative purpose. Nor can they sell it to someone else who might put it to different use (say, high-speed wireless broadband). Just think, if they would have had unambiguous property rights in their allocation, they might have had the incentive to already have thrown the switch on the plan to migrate their content from OTA to cable and satellite entirely.

Of course, that now may happen anyway for the reasons Mermigas suggests. And the migration of more and more content to the Internet will only speed that process along. It’s just a shame that regulation prevents markets from reallocating spectrum efficiently.

Finally, if the networks begin to make this jump, it raises another interesting question: What about the local broadcast television operators who are not owned by a major network? What’s going to happen to them?

Interesting days ahead.

Lately I’ve been writing about potentially historic upcoming First Amendment case of FCC v. Fox Television Stations. The Supreme Court will hear the case on Tuesday, November 4th. All the briefs in the case are in and can be found on the ABA website here. But I’ve pasted the links for all of them below as well. In coming days and weeks I might be highlighting some of the comments from the briefs. [The docket number for the case is 07-582]. The amicus brief I filed with my friends at CDT can be found here, and I wrote about it last week here on the TLF.

The FCC v. Fox case is the indecency case involving the FCC’s new policy for “fleeting expletives.” I wrote about the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision here. The full decision is here. The FCC v. Fox case could become the most important First Amendment-related Supreme Court case since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, which just turned 30 years old last month. Anyway, here are all the briefs in the case, starting with the merit briefs by the lead parties:

Merit briefs

• Brief for Petitioner Federal Communications Commission, et al.
• Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.
• Brief for Respondent Center for Creative Voices in Media, Inc.
• Brief for Respondent NBC Universal, Inc., NBC Telemundo License Co., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., and ABC, Inc.

Amicus briefs

• Brief for National Religious Broadcasters in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for Morality in Media, Inc., in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for Alliance Defense Fund and Family Research Council in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for the Parents Television Council in Support of Petitioner
• Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief for the Decency Enforcement Center for Television in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for the American Center for Law and Justice and United States Representatives Charles Pickering, Roscoe Bartlett, Kevin Brady, Paul Broun, Danny Davis, John Doolittle, Mary Fallin, Trent Franks, Wally Herger, Jim Jordan, Doug Lamborn, Kenny Marchant, Jeff Miller, Marilyn Musgrave, Joe Pitts, Mark Souder, Tim Walberg and Dave Weldon in Support of Petitioner
• Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Liberties Union, American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Directors Guild of America, First Amendment Project, Minnesota Public Radio/American Public Media, the National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture, the National Coalition Against Censorship, the National Federation of Community Broadcasters, Pen American Center, and Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts in Support of Respondent
• Brief for Time Warner, Inc., in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the ABC Television Affiliates in Support of Respondent
• Brief for Public Broadasters in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the National Association of Broadcasters and Radio-Television News Directors Association in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology and Adam Thierer, Senior Fellow with the Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF) and the Director of PFF’s Center for Digital Media Freedom in Support of Respondent
• Brief for Former FCC Commissioners and Officials in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and the Media Institute in Support of Respondent
• Brief for the American Academy of Pediatrics, Benton Foundation, Children Now, National Institute On Media and the Family, Parent Teacher Association, and United Church of Christ, Office of Communications, Inc., in Support of Neither Party
• Brief for Free Press, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, New America Foundation, Participatory Culture Foundation, Cuwin Foundation, Ethos Group, ACORN Active Media Foundation, Freenetworks.Org, Monroe Price, Susan Crawford in Support of Neither Party

Faithful readers will recall that, several months ago, I penned a 7-part “Media Metrics” series that took a hard look at the health of the media marketplace. Today, the Progress & Freedom Foundation is releasing a greatly expanded version of these essays that I have put together with my PFF colleague Grant Eskelsen. In this 100-page special report, “Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace,” we begin by noting that heated debates about the state of the media marketplace continue to rage in Washington, and opinions seem to range from grim to outright apocalyptic. As we note on pg. 1:

Many people—including a large number of legislators and regulators—argue that America’s media marketplace is in a miserable state. Some claim that citizens lack choice in media outlets and that options are just as scarce as ever. Others believe that media “localism” is dead or that many groups or niches go underserved because of a lack of true “diversity” in media. Others argue that the market is hopelessly over-concentrated in the hands of a few evil media barons who are hell-bent on force-feeding us corporate propaganda. And still others say that the quality of news and entertainment in our society has deteriorated because of a combination of all of the above. It all sounds quite troubling, but is any of it true?

After taking an objective look at the true state of America’s media marketplace, we conclude that such pessimism is unwarranted. Indeed, a careful review of the facts reveals that—contrary to what those media critics suggest—we have more media choice, more media competition, and more media diversity than ever before. Indeed, to the extent there was ever a “golden age” of media in America, we are living in it today. The media sky has never been brighter and it is getting brighter with each passing year. We come to this conclusion by looking beyond the rhetoric that has for too long governed debates about media in American and providing a comprehensive look at a variety of media sectors such as audio, video, print and online media. Our survey contains over 70 charts and exhibits illustrating facts and figures on such diverse topics as advertising revenue, company market share, audience trends, and areas of growth in the sector. We will also aim to periodically updated the report to reflect the rapidly evolving media industry.

We encourage readers to provider input about how to improve and expand the report going forward in an attempt to refine and improve the metrics. And we look forward to future debates on this subject–debates that we hope will be guided by facts instead of fanaticism and by evidence instead of emotion. The hyperbolic rhetoric, shameless fear-mongering, and unsubstantiated claims that have driven policy debates in recent years have no foundation in reality and should be rejected as the debate over media policy continues.

This and future installments of “Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace” will be available on the PFF website at www.pff.org/mediametrics. I have also embedded the entire document below as a Scribd file so that those interested in the topic can peruse the report immediately.