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Broadband Baselines

by on April 1, 2010 · 0 comments

The national broadband plan drafted by Federal Communications Commission staff has a lot of goals in it. Goals for broadband infrastructure deployment include:

  1. Make broadband with 4 Mbps download speeds available to every American
  2. Over the long term, have broadband with 100 Mbps download and 50 Mbps upload speeds available to 100 million American homes, with 50 Mbps downloads available to 100 million homes by 2015
  3. Have the fastest and most extensive wireless broadband networks in the world
  4. Ensure that no state lags significantly behind in 3G wireless coverage
  5. Ensure that every community has access to 1 Gbps broadband service in institutions like schools, libraries, and hospitals

The plan also outlines a number of policy steps that the FCC and other federal agencies could take to help accomplish these goals.

So far, so good. But to truly hold federal agencies accountable for achieving these objectives, we need more than goals, measures, and a list of policy proposals. We also need a realistic baseline that tells us how the market is likely to progress toward these goals in the absence of new federal action, and some way to determine how much the specific policy initiatives affect the amount of the goal achieved.

Here’s what will happen in the absence of a well-defined baseline and analysis that shows how much improvement in the goals is actually caused by federal policies: The broadband plan announces goals. The government will take some actions. Measurement will show that broadband deployment improved, moving the nation closer to achieving the goals. The FCC and other decisionmakers will then claim that their chosen policies have succeeded, because broadband deployment improved.

But in the absence of proof that the policies cause a measurable change in outcomes, this is like the rooster claiming that his crowing makes the sun rise. Scientists call this the ” post hoc, ergo propter hoc” fallacy: “B happened after A, therefore A must have caused B.” (Brush up on your Latin a little more, and you’ll even find out what Mercatus means. But I digress.)

Enough abstractions. Let me give a few examples.

The first goal listed above is to ensure that all Americans have access to broadband with 4 Mbps download speeds. In his second comment on my March 17 “Broadband Funding Gap” post, James Riso notes that the plan acknowledges that 5 out of the 7 million households that currently lack access to 4 Mbps broadband will soon be covered by 4th generation wireless. That means coverage for 83 percent of the households that lack 4 Mbps broadband is already “baked into the cake.” 

Accurate accountability must avoid giving future policy changes credit for this increase in deployment, because it was going to happen anyway.  (Of course, policymakers need to avoid taking steps that would discourage this deployment, such as levying the 15 percent universal service fee on 4th generation wireless.) The relevant question for evaluating future policy changes is, “How do they affect deployment to the remaining 2 million households?”

Similarly, the goal of 50 Mbps to 100 million households by 2015 seems to have been chosen because cable and fiber broadband providers indicate that they plan to cover more than that many homes by 2013 with broadband capable of delivering those speeds (pp. 21-22). Future policy initiatives should get zero credit for contributing toward this goal unless analysis demonstrates that the initiatives increased deployment of very high speed broadband over and above what the companies were already planning.

If you think this point is so basic that it’s not worth mentioning, you haven’t read enough government reports. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc is endemic, and not just on technology-related topics. For example, both sides regularly display this fallacy whenever the unemployment figures get released: “Unemployment increased after Obama’s election, therefore his administration caused the unemployment.” “The recession started when Bush was president, therefore his administration caused the unemployment.” These are at best hypotheses whose truth, untruth, and quantititive significance needs to be established by analysis that controls for other factors affecting the results.

Just take this as an advance warning on reporting results of the national broadband plan: Tone down the triumphalism.  

Note: For those of you who just can’t get enough discussion of the national broadband plan, Jerry Brito and I will have a dialog on other aspects of the plan in a future podcast that will be available here on Surprisingilyfree.com.

Noting that the Telecom Act has become ” irrelevant to the ecosystem that has developed,” Verizon’s Executive Vice President Tom Tauke today called for Congress to overhaul the nation’s archaic communications laws and the regulatory regime that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is currently attempting to pigeonhole the Internet and entire Digital Economy into.  It’s an excellent speech, and I encourage you to read the entire thing (which I have embedded down below the fold in a Scribd reader).

“[T]he test for government intervention in the marketplace is to prevent either harm to users or anti-competitive activity,” he said. He rightly noted that, in an age of technological convergence and vigorous cross-platform competition, the old silo-based approach of the Telecom Act — with its various Titles for outmoded market definitions — no longer makes any sense. He noted:

by the very nature of the Internet Ecosystem, many are working together or competing in other company’s turf. Computer companies sell phones, and quite successfully. Search engines sell open operating systems. Network providers create their own apps stores. That means that the value proposition to the consumer is really a package created by many companies acting together with little, if any, regard to their previous corporate histories. So no set of companies should be immune from scrutiny.

Of course, a regulatory regime already exists that accomplishes this goal: antitrust law. But Tauke’s proposal isn’t quite that sweeping. He doesn’t call for the FCC to be dynamited the ground and to just shift everything into the antitrust bucket, which some of us would prefer. Instead, he speaks generically about the need for a more sensible process — most likely still enforced by the FCC — that would work as follows:

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The FCC today released an executive summary of its National Broadband Plan, which is supposed to be delivered to Congress tomorrow.  Of course, executive summaries by their nature are brief and usually don’t explain the underlying logic and evidence supporting the conclusions. Here are a few highlights, some possible interpretations, and things to look for when the full plan gets released tomorrow:

Recommendation: “Undertake a comprehensive review of wholesale competition rules to help ensure competition in fixed and mobile broadband.” This could signal that the FCC plans to re-impose “unbundling” or “line sharing” regulations, which would require broadband companies to let competitors use their lines and other facilities at regulated rates. Such initiatives would likely undermine broadband deployment and investment.  Economic research by my GMU colleague Tom Hazlett and others finds that broadband investment, competition, deployment in the US took off only after the FCC eliminated line-sharing requirements. Christina Forsberg and I summarized a lot of this research here.

Recommendation: “Make 500 Mhz of spectrum available for broadband within ten years … Enable incentives and mechanisms to repurpose spectrum.” This is a fantastic recommendation. A Mercatus Center review of the costs of federal telecommunications regulations found that federal spectrum allocation, which prevents spectrum from being reallocated to uses that consumers value highly (like broadband), is by far the costliest federal regulation affecting telecom and the Internet. This recommendation indicates the FCC leadership would like to auction a lot more spectrum and share the proceeds with existing users (like broadcasters) in order to overcome resistance to reallocation. It’s not quite a market in spectrum, but it might be the closest the FCC can come.

Recommendation: “Broaden the USF contribution base to ensure USF remains sustainable over time.” Uh-oh. I’m not sure what this means, but if means that broadband subscribers will have to start payng into the FCC’s universal service fund (USF), watch out! Most economic studies find that consumer demand for broadband is very price-sensitive. That means if the FCC slaps broadband with universal service fees (which currently exceed 10 percent), we’ll see a big drop in broadband subscribership — maybe by 4-7 million subscribers. This is , of course, precisely the opposite of what the FCC wants to accomplish!

Recommendation: “Reform intercarrier compensation, which provides implicit subsidies to telephone companies by eliminating per minute charges over the next ten years…” Another excellent idea.  “Intercarrier compensation” refers to payments phone companies make when they hand traffic off to each other. Small, rural phone companies usually receive the highest per minute payments — as much as 15-30 cents per minute! This is a huge markup on long-distance phone service — another price-sensitive service!

Recommendation: Provide subsidies so that rural areas can have broadband with download speeds of 4 MB.  It will be interesting to read in the full plan where this 4 MB figure came from. Does it reflect the speed of service that a lot of Americans currently have, so these subsidies are just supposed to help equalize opportunities for rural residents? Or does it reflect some balancing of the costs and benefits of subsidizing broadband in rural areas?  Or is this a magic number experts believe subscribers need, regardless of the choices consumers actually make in the marketplace and regardless of what it costs?

The executive summary also lists a set of goals, such as ensuring that every American has the ability to subscribe to “robust” broadband service, having 100 million households with access to 100 MB broadband, and ensuring that the US has the fastest and most extensive wireless networks of any nation.  When the full plan comes out, look carefully at whether or how the FCC plans to measure accomplishment of these goals.  More importantly, look to see whether the FCC explains how it will quantify how much its own policies actually contribute to these goals over time. The FCC is famous for NOT doing these kinds of things, so let’s see if the broadband plan signals a new era in accountability.

I was slow to adopt broadband. So maybe it’s also appropriate that I was slow to read John Horrigan’s highly informative survey on broadband adoption released by the Federal Communications Commission on February 23. Or maybe it’s fortuitous, because the delay let me take a look to see what messages the news media took away from this survey.

Two clear messages appear in the news coverage.  The first is a variant of the screaming headline the FCC put on its own press release: “93 Million Americans Disconnected from Broadband Opportunities.” You’ll find this as the headline or lead paragraph in coverage by the New York Times and AFP.

The second type of message highlights the main reasons one-third of the population does not subscribe to broadband. “FCC Survey Shows Need to Teach Broadband Basics,” notes the headline on an Associated Press story. According to the survey, the three main obstacles to broadband adoption are cost, lack of digital literacy, and non-adopters’ perception that broadband is not sufficiently relevant to their lives.  (I got a chuckle when I saw that non-adopters said they would be willing to pay $25, on average, for broadband; that’s the magic price that finally induced me to give in and sign up!)

But whoa, what’s missing here?  Our old friend Availability. Broadband was supposed to be some kind of noveau public works project that would take hundreds of billions of dollars to bring to fruition, because many Americans lack access to broadband. “Build it and they will come!” “Pour that concrete information superhighway!” “Stimulate the economy!”

The FCC survey tells an interesting story about availability:

Of the … non-adopters, 12 percent say they cannot get broadband where they live. This translates into a 4 percent share of Americans—on the basis of their reports on infrastructure availability in their neighborhood—who say they are unable to obtain broadband because it is not available. This means that 31 percent of all Americans can get service but do not. (p. 5)

The survey also notes that 10 percent of rural respondents say broadband is not available where they live.  I don’t mean to sound insensitive, but that’s all?  Heck, I’d have guessed a higher percentage than that.   

To put the numbers in perspective: 4 percent of Americans say they don’t have broadband because it isn’t available, while almost three times as many — 10 percent — lack broadband because they think the Internet is irrelevant to their lives.

Is availability a problem in some places?  Sure. But the FCC survey shows it isn’t nearly the size of problem we’d been led to believe. So let’s hope the National Broadband Plan’s discussion of availability is similary circumscribed and appropriately targeted.

Debate over the regulatory status of broadband heated up this week as trade associations and major broadband companies sent a letter to the Federal Communications Commission arguing strenuously against reclassification of broadband as “telecommunications service” subject to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. One implication of Title II regulation is that broadband could be regulated like a public utility. Comparisons of broadband to services like electricity or railroads, which I discussed last week, also raise the prospect of public utility regulation. 

Classic public utility regulation restricts entry and regulates prices to prevent firms from charging excessive prices.  It’s typically used in situations where competition is believed to be impossible (or, where pre-existing policy decisions have created monopolies that aren’t going to go away very soon).

Broadband is not a monopoly; it is an oligopoly. Contrary to popular perception, that is not synonymous with “evil.” Although both monopoly and oligopoly end in “-opoly,” that doesn’t mean broadband competitors will charge monopoly prices, or even somewhat excessive prices.  The only firm conclusion that emerges from economic literature on oligopoly is, “anything’s possible, depending on the specific facts and circumstances.”

But there are also firm conclusions that emerge from economic literature on public utility regulation.  Just about every time the federal government has tried to impose public utility regulation on an oligopoly, it has ended up enforcing a cartel.  This is what happened in the past with railroads, trucking, airlines, and brokerage firms. There are a few times federal price regulation did not enforce cartels in oligopolistic or competitive industries. In those cases, it usually created shortages  — most notably gasoline and natural gas in the 1970s.

Title II regulation is not necessarily synonymous with public utility regulation. Title II could be used to impose some “nondiscrimination” requirements, without necessarily directly regulating broadband providers’ prices or profits.

But anyone who actually wants the FCC to regulate broadband providers’ prices and profits needs to read the peer-reviewed economics literature on the actual effects of public utility regulation in practice on the federal level. (More literature is cited here.) Then they need to explain why the results in broadband would be different.  And the explanation needs to be better than “We know better now, we’re smart, and we promise.”

The Federal Communications Commission released its 102-page fiscal year 2011 budget request to Congress this week.  Here are some fascinating factoids about the agency that I’ll pass on without commentary, beyond saying that they caught my attention:

  • The FCC has hired “close to 54 data experts, statisticians, econometricians, economists, and other expertise” to help with the National Broadband Plan mandated under the Recovery Act. These are “term employees,” meaning they’re not permanent, but the FCC says it needs more permanent hires to work on broadband after the plan is done. (p. 2)
  • The commission asks for a “budget” of $352.5 million. (p. 1) But its total requested spending actually tops $440 million, because it also asks for authority to spend $85 million of spectrum auction proceeds to cover the cost of auctions. (p. 5)
  • The administration proposes to give the FCC authority to charge user fees for unauctioned spectrum licenses, with projected revenues totaling $4.8 billion through 2020. (p. 6)
  • The FCC commits to 24 “outcome-focused performance goals.”  (pp. 16-29) Most of these goals are phrased as activities, not accomplishments, with lots of verbs like “enact,” “encourage,” “facilitate,” “enforce,” “promote,” “work to,” “foster,” advocate,” and “maintain.” In some cases, one can identify the actual concrete outcome by looking at additional wording or performance targets. It’s clear, for example, that the FCC wants to make sure that all Americans have access to broadband. In other cases, the concrete outcome, or how we would know if it is accomplished, is not clear.  For example, the only targets listed under the goal “Promote access to telecommunications services to all Americans” are targets for enforcement actions rather than measures of whether the FCC has actually accomplished the desired outcome.
  • The FCC has been supported almost entirely by regulatory fees assessed on regulated companies, with virtually no direct appropriations of tax dollars since fiscal year 2003 (p. 31).
  • Spectrum auctions have generated more than  $51.9 billion for the US Ttreasury. (p. 33)

Congress and the Federal Communications Commission periodically get upset over wireless phone early termination fees. The latest uproar has occurred during the past couple months in response to Verizon’s doubling of the early termination fee on “smart” devices. The fee falls by $10 per month, leaving s $120 early termination fee in the last month of a two-year contract.

Policymakers still have not gotten the message that they cannot really do much about this “problem” unless they comprehensively regulate wireless rates and terms of service. (I would not recommend this, since a competitive wireless market has brought us rate reductions that even perfectly-functioning regulation would be unlikely to achieve. ) Attempts to poke and prod early termination fees are like the carnival game “whack-a-mole.”  As soon as you whack one mole with a stick, another one pops up out of another hole.

Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) is taking another whack.  In 2007, she introduced legislation requiring wireless companies to prorate early termination fees “in a manner that reasonably links the fee to recovery of the cost of the device or other legitimate business expenses.”  Coincidentally, the major carriers promised to prorate their fees at about the same time her bill got a hearing.  Then last November, up popped a mole from Verizon’s hole. Early termination fees for smart devices are prorated, but doubled. Now the good senator is whacking away at that mole with legislation that requires wireless companies to prorate early termination fees AND mandates that the early termination fee cannot exceed the size of the subsidy the carrier is giving the consumer on the phone.

Smart whack, huh?  Doesn’t cost-based regulation of early termination fees eliminate the loophole (oops, mole-hole)?

Not necessarily. In the first place, the legislation could create an accounting nightmare with plenty of opportunities for companies to game the system, especially if they offer different subsidies on different phones. Recall that the original impetus for breaking up the old AT&T landline monopoly was that AT&T was gouging consumers by charging them inflated prices to lease equipment manufactured by its subsidiary, Western Electric. With the AT&T breakup, the government essentially gave up on managing that problem and completely prohibited the monopoly local phone companies from manufacuring equipment. I think George Santayana just left me a voice mail. Even if the game board is restricted to early termination fees, we’ll soon see uglier, nastier moles emerge from uglier, nastier holes.

But the wireless phone contract is about more than early termination fees. Even if policymakers succeed in imposing effective,  cost-based regualtion on early termination fees, wireless companies can still change other terms of the contract to compensate for any revenue losses. The law must have a truly long arm to reach the diverse array of rodents that will scurry forth from diverse orifices.

Stay tuned for the next whack.

… in receiving support from the Federal Communications Commission’s Universal Service Fund.

In case you missed it, on December 31 the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service issued its 2009 Universal Service Monitoring Report. This 568 page report compiles a massive number of statistics on the Federal Communications Commission’s $7.6 billion Universal Service Fund.  This fund subsidizes phone service in high-cost areas, phone subscriptions for low-income households, Internet service for schools and libraries, and Internet connections for rural health care facilities. About 60 percent of the money — $4.4 billion — goes to “high cost” (usually rural) phone companies.

U Service fun facts 2009

The money comes from the universal service charge on your wired, wireline, or VOIP phone bill. (That’s why the phone companies put the FCC’s phone number on the bill, so you can call the FCC if you have questions about this charge. Isn’t that thoughtful!)

Virtually every table in the Monitoring Report is fascinating. But check out some of the statistics to the right, which came from Table 1.12.  After substracting the universal service charges paid by its citizens, Mississippi received the highest net amount from the Universal Service Fund — $258 million. Alaska, Puerto Rico, Kansas, and Oklahoma round out the top five net recipients.

Some states are net payers. Florida paid $304 million more into the Universal Service Fund than its phone companies, low-income consumers, schools, libraries, and rural health facilities received back. Not surprisingly, other big, high-income states with large urban areas are also big net payers.

Some states receive close to what they pay in. Although Texas is a big Universal Service Fund recipient ($511 million in 2008), Texas telephone customers also pay a lot into the fund ($508 million in 2008). Thus, Texas received a net $3 million from the Universal Service Fund. Other states close to breakeven are Arizona, Missouri, Oregon, and South Carolina.

For 2008, I counted 22 states that are net recipients of $15 million or more, and 23 states that are net payers of $23 million or more.

And you thought you had fun on New Year’s Eve!

Good ideas, supported by evidence, eventually matter.

That’s the conclusion I reached after reviewing the outline the FCC’s broadband task force presented to the commission yesterday. Here are some ideas perceptive scholars have been discussing for a long time that are apparently going to be part of the National Broadband Plan:

  • “Private sector investment is essential; new funding is limited.” So I guess the Interstate Highway System won’t be the funding model for universal broadband. Whew!
  • “Policy changes require the consideration of unintended consequences.”
  • “Competition drives innovation and better choices for consumers.”
  • Wireless broadband needs a big new chunk of spectrum, and policymakers need to consider reallocating broadcast TV spectrum and spectrum reserved for use by the federal government.
  • “Market forces should be applied to all [spectrum] bands, though other policy objectives should play a role in allocation decisions.”
  • Fundamental reform of the Universal Service Fund, which subsidizes phone service very inefficiently, should actually be done, not just talked about.
  • Universal service reform should include reform of “intercarrier compensation,” the charges phone companies pay each other when they hand off traffic.
  • “USF policies should be designed to achieve measurable outcomes with transparency, oversight, and accountability.”

Most of these ideas were considered wacky, ideological, politically unrealistic, or just not relevant a few decades (or even a few years) ago.  Now they are the mainstream.

That doesn’t mean everything is wonderful with the National Broadband Plan. The FCC is supposed to plan how broadband will be used to promote consumer welfare, civic participation, public safety, education, health care, energy independence, community development, worker training, and a host of other legislative goals. In many cases there may be a fundamental tension between consumer welfare — a term of art in economics that means resources are allocated so that consumers get the selection of goods and services they are most willing to pay for, with the quality attributes they most prefer, at the best possible prices — and the other goals, which often involve planners deciding what consumers should want. Similarly, FCC Chairman Genachowski’s comments illustrate some decisionmakers’ disturbing tendency to conflate access (the service is available to those who want it) with adoption (everybody actually chooses to use it). Technophiles sometimes have an annoying habit of assuming that those of us who fail to adopt the latest info tech gadget or service must be ignorant rubes who don’t understand the glories of being hooked up to a fat information pipe 24/7 — rather than careful shoppers who have better things to do with our time than read Yahoo OMG! while driving. For this reason I fully expect to be annoyed by the National Broadband Plan, as well as gratified to see that some good ideas have finally made it from the Ivory Tower to real-world policy application.

But there’s enough good stuff in there to stick with “gratified” for at least one day.

Robert Corn-RevereAs I noted here a few days ago, the Federal Communications Commission held a workshop on Tuesday about “Speech, Democratic Engagement, and the Open Internet.”  It was a shockingly one-sided affair with the deck being stacked almost entirely in favor of advocates of Net neutrality regulation. Worse yet, those advocates shamelessly made up spooky stories about a future of “private censorship” that could only be remedied by using the First Amendment as a club to beat private players into submission. The token opposition at this Chicken Little circus was Robert Corn-Revere, a Partner at the law firm of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Washington, D.C.   Bob set the record straight–both in terms of baseless accusations that were flying that day as well as the revisionist histories of the First Amendment that were being put forward. I’m happy to report that Bob allowed PFF to reprint his remarks as a new white paper entitled, “The First Amendment, the Internet & Net Neutrality: Be Careful What You Wish For.”

In his essay, Corn-Revere discusses the relationship between the First Amendment and regulatory policy, particularly the treatment of new communications technologies, and he warns that government regulation of broadband networks could “provide the vehicle for advancing new First Amendment theories for media regulation” and online speech and expression more generally.  “It should not be forgotten,” he argues, “that the federal government’s initial impulse was to censor the Internet and to subject it to a far lower level of First Amendment protection. It pursued this agenda for more than a decade but was blocked by a series of First Amendment rulings.”  The Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act are just two notable examples. Luckily, the courts determined that “the open Internet would be at great risk if the government is allowed to exercise such power,” he notes, and they struck down such laws.

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