Is code speech? That is one of the timeless questions that comes up again and again in the field of Internet law and policy. Many books and countless papers and essays have touched on this topic. Personally, I’ve always thought it was a bit silly that this is even a serious question. After all, if code isn’t speech, what the heck is it?

We humans express ourselves in many creative ways. We speak and write. We sing and dance. We paint and sculpt. And now we code. All these things are forms of human expression. Under American First Amendment jurisprudence, expression is basically synonymous with speech. We very tightly limit restrictions on speech and expression because it is a matter of personal autonomy and also because we believe that there is a profound danger of the proverbial slippery slope kicking in once we allow government officials to start censoring what they regard as offensive speech or dangerous expression.

Thus, we when creative people come up with creative thoughts and use computers and software to express them in code, that is speech. It is fundamentally no different than using a pencil and pad of paper to write a manifesto, or using a guitar and microphone to sing a protest song. The authorities might not like the resulting manifesto or protest song–in fact, they might feel quite threatened by it–but that fact also makes it clear why, in both cases, that expression is speech and that speech is worth defending. Moreover, the methods or mediums of speech production and dissemination–pencils, paper, guitars, microphones, etc.–are what Ithiel de Sola Pool referred to as “Technologies of Freedom.” They help people extend their voices and to communicate with the world, while also learning more about it.

Which brings us to the 3D printers and the code behind the open source blueprints that many people share to fabricate things with 3D printers.  Washington Post reporter Meagan Flynn was kind enough to call me last week and ask me to comment for a story she was putting together about the ongoing legal fights over 3D-printed firearms in generally and the efforts of Cody Wilson and Defense Distributed in particular. Wilson is a self-described crypto-anarchist who has landed in hot water with federal and state officials for making available open source blueprints for the 3D-printed firearms freely available to the public. Federal efforts aimed at stopping Wilson and Defense Distributed haven’t worked and now state attorneys general are seeking to impose legal restrictions on him.

Flynn’s WashPo article offered an outstanding overview of everything that is happening on this front, so I won’t rehash it all here. But I wanted to reproduce my portions of her story here and just add a few more thoughts. Here’s the block of the story that mentioned my thoughts:

Adam Thierer, who specializes in the intersection of free speech and technology at George Mason University’s Mercatus Center, said the debate over the computer code for the 3-D-printable guns is the same song he heard during the Crypto Wars — but more like a remix. Guns, of course, pose different risks than encryption technology. Thierer said he thinks the Defense Distributed code is almost certainly speech, but the question is whether the government can demonstrate a compelling interest to regulate it.

The problem with the states’ argument, he contended, is that it would be a “stretch” for the judge to decide that the computer code itself skirts the states’ gun laws, as those laws generally center on possession of actual guns. It would be easier for the states to regulate 3-D-printed guns themselves through new laws, he said, rather than seeking to regulate the code that creates them. “They would have to make the argument that the speech itself is essentially the device,” he said. “Nothing is stopping them from regulating firearms. But the underlying speech is not in their purview. There has to be a distinction made between the speech and the byproduct of speech.”

In our recent essay, “3D Printers, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Tech Regulation,” Andrea O’Sullivan and I offered more extensive discussion of the legal issues at play here. And in a 2016 law review article entitled, “Guns, Limbs, and Toys: What Future for 3D Printing?” my co-author Adam Marcus and I discussed several examples of how additive manufacturing and the “maker” revolution are making the governance of various emerging technologies quite challenging.

The key points my co-authors and I try to make in these articles is that:

1. These controversies aren’t going away; they are only going to expand as “evasive entrepreneurs” find new interesting ways to use 3D printers to express themselves.
2. Regardless of what is being produced with 3D printers, the code and blueprints behind them are speech and deserve protection. And under American free speech jurisprudence, such code will almost certainly win such protections from courts when legislators or regulators seek to censor or regulate them.
3. The better way to regulate 3D printing is to focus on the physical manifestations of speech/expression. That is, focus on the user and the use, not the speech behind it. As Marcus and I put it in our law review article, “the proper focus of regulation should remain on the user and uses of firearms, regardless of how they are manufactured.” The U.S. has an extensive array of federal and state firearm regulations, and they can and should continue to apply to 3D-printed weapons. Likewise, a 3D-printed prosthetic limb is still a medical device, and the Food and Drug Administration can regulate it according if it sees fit. But in neither case should the underlying speech (i.e., the code) behind such inventions be censored.

Faithful readers know of my geeky love for tech policy books. I read lots of ’em. There’s a steady stream of Amazon.com boxes that piles up on my doorstop some days because my mailman can’t fit them all in my mailbox.  But I go pretty hard on all the books I review. It’s rare for me pen a glowing review. Occasionally, however, a book will come along that I think is both worthy of your time and which demands a place on your bookshelf because it is such an indispensable resource.  Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace is one of those books.

Smartly organized and edited by Ronald J. Deibert, John G. Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain, Access Controlled is essential reading for anyone studying the methods governments are using globally to stifle online expression and dissent. As I noted of their previous edition, Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, there is simply no other resource out there like this; it should be required reading in every cyberlaw or information policy program.

The book, which is a project of the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book includes six chapters on “Theory and Analysis.”  They are terrifically informative essays, and the editors have made them all available online here (I’ve listed them down below with links embedded). The beefy second part of the book provides a whopping 480 pages(!) of detailed regional and country-by-country overviews of the global state of online speech controls and discuss the long-term ramifications of increasing government meddling with online networks.

In their interesting chapter on “Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace,” Deibert and Rohozinski create a useful taxonomy to illustrate the three general types of speech and information controls that states are deploying today. What I find most interesting is how, throughout the book, various authors document the increasing movement away from “first generation controls,” which are epitomized by “Great Firewall of China”-like filtering methods, and toward second- and third-generation controls, which are more refined and difficult to monitor. Here’s how Deibert and Rohozinski define those three classes (or “generations”) of controls:

• First-generation controls focus on denying access to specific Internet resources by directly blocking access to servers, domains, keywords, and IP addresses. This type of filtering is typically achieved by the use of specialized software or by implementing instructions manually into routers at key Internet choke points. First-generation filtering is found throughout the world, in particular among authoritarian countries, and is the phenomenon targeted for monitoring by the ONI’s methodology. In some countries, compliance with first-generation filtering is checked manually by security forces, who physically police cybercafes and ISPs. (p. 22)
• Second-generation controls aim to create a legal and normative environment and technical capabilities that enable state actors to deny access to information resources as and when needed, while reducing the possibility of blowback or discovery. Second-generation controls have an overt and a covert track. The overt track aims to legalize content controls by specifying the conditions under which access can be denied. Instruments here include the doctrine of information security as well as the application of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the online environment. The covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities that allow content controls to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being targeted has the highest value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to be applied in ways that assure plausible deniability. (p. 24)
• Unlike the first two generations of content controls, third-generation controls take a highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to enhancing state control over national cyberspace and building capabilities for competing in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. The key characteristic of third-generation controls is that the focus is less on denying access than successfully competing with potential threats through effective counter-information campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents. Third-generation controls also focus on the active use of surveillance and data mining as means to confuse and entrap opponents. (p. 27)

Again, the country-by-country discussions contained in Part 2 of the book document how several nations are moving toward those more sophisticated second- and third-generation information control efforts, although it appears that CIS states are on the cutting edge so far. As Deibert and Rohozinski note in their opening overview chapter: “the center of gravity of practices aimed at managing cyberspace has shifted subtly from policies and practices aimed at denying access to content to methods that seek to normalize control and the exercise of power in cyberspace through a variety of means.” (p. 6)  They also note that, just in the short time since their previous volume was published (in 2008):

a sea change has occurred in the policies and practices of Internet controls. States no longer fear pariah status by openly declaring their intent to regulate and control cyberspace. The convenient rubric of terrorism, child pornography, and cyber-security has contributed to a growing expectation that states should enforce order in cyberspace, including policing unwanted content. (p. 4)

I don’t agree with all the conclusions in the book, of course. In particular, I don’t share the somewhat lugubrious outlook most of the contributors seem to hold toward the long-term prospects for “technologies of freedom” relative to “technologies of control.” I think it’s vital to put things in some historical context in this regard. It’s important to recall that, as a communications medium, the Net is still quite young.  So, is the Net really more susceptible to State control and manipulation than previous communications technologies and platforms?  I’m not so sure, although it’s hard to find a metric to compare them in an analytically rigorous fashion. However, I’m still quite bullish on the prospect for the “technologies of freedom” that are already out there (and those yet to be developed) to help people evade many of the technologies of control being utilized by States across the globe today.

The contributors in Access Controlled don’t really come to any definitive conclusion on this issue, but some of them seem to imply that the Net is more easily manipulated than past technologies. For example, in Chapter 3, Hal Roberts and John Palfrey speak of the Internet as “surveillance-ready technology.” (p. 35).  It’s certainly true that the State has access to more data about its citizens than in the past, but it’s also true that we have more information about the State than ever before, too!  And, again, we also have access to more of those “technologies of freedom” than ever before to at least try to fight back. Compare, for example, the plight of a dissident in a Cold War-era Eastern Bloc communist state to a dissident in China or Iran today. Which one had a better chance of getting their words (or audio and video) out to the local or global community?  But let me be clear about something: I am not one of those quixotic utopians who thinks that the whole world is going to magically become more democratic and free overnight because of the existence of blogs, mobile phones, wireless networks, SMS, Twitter, YouTube, encryption, proxy servers, etc.  Nonetheless, aren’t we citizens of the modern world at least a little better off for having such technologies at our potential disposal?

Moreover, what about the scale and volume problem that would-be censors increasingly face?  Again, let’s remember how young the Net is and how many people aren’t using it aggressively (or at all) yet. The challenge of bottling-up information — or even tracking / monitoring it — is going to grow exponentially more difficult as more people get online, networks expand, digital technologies fall in cost and grow more ubiquitous, and the overall volume of data flows continues to expand.  What sort of armies of censors and surveillance officers are going to be needed going forward to keep up with this pace of change?  Ethan Zuckerman’s chapter on “Intermediary Censorship” in Access Controlled discusses one answer that many nation-states are turning to in an effort to solve that problem: Make the middleman do it. Deputizing the middleman has been used in many contexts before, of course, but the problem for the State is that (a) the middlemen typically resent doing that sort of censoring / surveillance and (b) it is only going to grow more costly and convoluted for those middlemen to carry out the will of the State as the scale and volume problems identified above manifest themselves.

Of course, one could argue that the censoring & surveillance technologies are going to continue to grow more robust, too, and that the middlemen will always fall in line with the State’s desires if the penalties for non-compliance are steep enough.  But I can’t believe that’s how it will play out over the long haul.  At some point, something’s got to give. The technological arms race between the State and its citizens will continue to escalate, but I remain optimistic that we will live not in an “access controlled” world, but more like a “access-sorta-controlled-but-with-lots-of-holes-in-it” kind of world.

Anyway, these are not major reservations that should keep you from reading Access Controlled. Indeed, it may have been for the best that the editors and contributors chose not to go down this line of inquiry since it would have made a long book even longer and forced the contributors to divert from their generally objective positions.

I have only two other little nitpicks with the Access Controlled. First, I do not understand why the editors decided to dump the excellent old chapter from Access Denied on “Tools and Technologies of Net Filtering,” which contained some very useful schematics explaining how technologies of control work. [You can see what I mean here.]  I used to recommend that chapter to students and journalists all the time as the first stop in their investigation of online censorship issues. I hope the editors decide to update that chapter and include it in the next version of the book.  Second, I was quite surprised there wasn’t more discussion of HerdictWeb in the book. Herdict, which I have praised here in the past, “seeks to present a real-time picture of Web site accessibility and inaccessibility… by crowdsourcing data from individuals around the world.”  I think I only saw one mention of Herdict in Access Controlled.  I thought it would figure more prominently in this version of the book.

Those small quibbles aside, I want to congratulate all the editors and contributors to the marvelous volume.  Access Controlled is an indispensable resource that I can wholeheartedly endorse as a “must-have” for your info-tech policy bookshelf.  Buy it now.

Chapter 1

• Beyond Denial: Introducing Next Generation Information Access Controls Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski

Chapter 2

• Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski

Chapter 3

• The EU Data Retention Directive in an Era of Internet Surveillance Hal Roberts and John Palfrey

Chapter 4

• Barriers to cooperation: An analysis of the origins of international efforts to protect children online Nart Villeneuve

Chapter 5

• Intermediary Censorship Ethan Zuckerman

Chapter 6

• Protecting Privacy and Expression Online: Can the Global Network Initiative embrace the character of the Net? Colin Maclay

This morning at the Newseum in Washington, DC, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered remarks on Internet freedom and the future of global free speech and expression. [Transcript is here + video.] It will go down as a historic speech in the field of Internet policy since she drew a bold line in the cyber-sand regarding exactly where the United States stands on global online freedom. Clinton’s answer was unequivocal: “Both the American people and nations that censor the Internet should understand that our government is committed to helping promote Internet freedom.” “The Internet can serve as a great equalizer,” she argued. “By providing people with access to knowledge and potential markets, networks can create opportunities where none exist.”

Unfortunately, however, “the same networks that help organize movements for freedom… can also be hijacked by governments to crush dissent and deny human rights.”  Echoing Winston Churchill’s famous “iron curtain” speech, Sec. Clinton argued that “With the spread of these restrictive practices, a new information curtain is descending across much of the world.”  She noted that virtual walls are replacing traditional walls in many nations as repressive regimes seek to squash the liberties of their citizenry.  That’s why the Administration’s bold stand in favor of online freedom is so essential.

Importantly, Sec. Clinton made it clear that the Obama Administration is ready to commit significant resources to this effort. She said that, over the next year, the State Department plans to work with others to establish a standing effort to promote technology and will invite technologists to help advance the cause through a new “innovation competition” that will promote circumvention technologies and other technologies of freedom. Sec. Clinton also challenged private companies to stand up to censorship globally and challenge foreign governments when they demand controls on the free flow of information or digital technology.

That is particularly important because Secretary Clinton’s speech comes on the heels of the recent news that Google and at least 30 other Internet companies were the victims of cyberattacks in China, which raises profound questions about the future of online freedom and cybersecurity. Sec. Clinton’s remarks will make it clear to online operators that the U.S. government stands prepared to back them up when they challenge the censorial policies of repressive foreign regimes.

It’s also worth noting that, back in October, Secretary Clinton took a bold stand on global religious defamation policies, which are becoming a growing international concern from a free speech perspective. I praised her for that speech here and noted how important it was that Administration officials put issues such as freedom of religious worship and freedom of speech and expression front and center in future foreign diplomacy efforts. With today’s speech, Sec. Clinton and the Obama Administration have again risen to that challenge by making it clear that these issues will now be part of future diplomatic efforts and discussions.

At one point she joked that somewhere in the world a foreign government official was trying to censor her speech as she delivered it! But she’s right: Plenty of foreign government are still aggressively attempting to censor the Net and to repress digital technologies every second of the day. To put things in perspective, just yesterday, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) reported that more than half a billion Internet users are being filtered worldwide. And if you want a country-by-country synopsis of just how bad things are, check out the amazing report, Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, which is compiled by several scholars involved in the ONI project.

To understand the profound (and somewhat ironical) historical significance of Sec. Clinton’s speech today, you need to remember that less than 15 years ago in this country we had a heated debate over whether American citizens should even be allowed to use encryption technology, or if the government should “hold the keys” to such technologies. Luckily, the “Clipper Chip” wars ended when Hillary’s husband and his Administration basically gave up in its efforts to pursue it further. Moreover, I can’t help but recall what Mrs. Clinton said after the White House sex scandal erupted back in 1998 and the details spread rapidly across the Internet: “We are all going to have to rethink how we deal with [the Internet], because there are all these competing values,” she said. “Without any kind of editing function or gatekeeping function, what does it mean to have the right to defend your reputation?”  It seems like Mrs. Clinton has come a long way, so much so that she is now defending technologies — and is apparently willing to even subsidize technologies — that will allow citizens to evade “gatekeepers” of all sorts.

I also appreciated Sec. Clinton’s quip that “once you’re on the internet, you don’t need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society.”  She repeatedly argued in her speech that the Internet has empowered every man, woman, and child to be heard and to make a difference in this world.  Amen.  But those opportunities for each of us to make a difference can only be realized if governments worldwide are willing to let them happen. I’ve always generally agreed with John Gilmore’s famous quip that “the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”  Nonetheless, I’m not a quixotic utopian when it comes to these things. I’m enough of a realist to understand that if governments put enough effort into the task, they can quash networks and silence a great deal of expression.  However, it’s a far more difficult undertaking today than it was in the past. The sheer volume and scope of online activity alone makes it an enormous undertaking.

Could we be on the verge of “the end of censorship” as I have wondered here before? Probably not any time soon, but thanks to the bold vision and steps that Secretary Clinton and Obama Administration announced today, we are a little bit closer.

Additional Reading / Listening:

• an NPR report about the issue this morning featuring Alec Ross, Sec. Clinton’s Senior Advisor for Innovation at the U.S. Department of State
• 21st Century Statecraft – Diplomacy in the Age of Facebook and Twitter – also w/ Alec Ross
• Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media (Freedom House Publication)
• 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom
• Global Network Initiative Statement on U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s Address on Internet Freedom
• Larry Magid (CNet.com) podcast on the speech
• thoughts from Craig Mundie, Chief Research and Strategy Officer at Microsoft
• more about the speech from New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Reuters, Ars Technica, Huffington Post,

One of the more troubling aspects of the contentious debate over Net neutrality regulation is the way some proponents have sought to cast Net neutrality as “the Internet’s First Amendment.” As a die-hard free speech advocate, I find this truly outrageous and a complete contortion of the true purpose of the First Amendment.  As I have argued here before, it is incredibly dangerous thinking that puts our real First Amendment liberties at stake by empowering a regulatory agency with more means of controlling online speech and expression. Simply stated, the Internet’s First Amendment is the First Amendment, not some new, top-down, heavy-handed regulatory regime that puts the Federal Communications Commission in control of the Digital Economy.

On this point, I wanted to bring two things to your attention. The first is an outstanding address delivered today by Kyle McSlarrow, President & CEO of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, at a Media Institute event here in Washington, DC.  And the second is this new paper by my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin.

McSlarrow’s speech was entitled, “Net Neutrality: First Amendment Rhetoric in Search of the Constitution” and it squarely addressed the fundamental fallacy set forth by the Net neutralitistas when it comes to the First Amendment. “Whatever our present-day policy disagreements about net neutrality, or even differing politics, let’s not forget that the First Amendment is framed as a shield for citizens, not a sword for government,” he argued. “By its plain terms and history, the First Amendment is a limitation on government power, not an empowerment of government,” McSlarrow said. “And… if there’s one thing the Supreme Court has made clear, it’s that rules that directly restrict protected speech cannot be justified by a government interest that is merely hypothetical.”

Absolutely correct. And these views are buttressed by the comments of Barbara Esbin in her new paper, in which she argues that “Net Neutrality is not the First Amendment for the Internet.”  She continues:

Today we live in a world with no FCC-imposed network neutrality rules. Can anyone seriously maintain that the Internet’s potential for commercial, political, artistic, and social expression has been hobbled in this country? Or that diversity is lacking? It is far more likely that the Internet has thrived, as Congress has stated, in the absence of federal or state regulation.

“Nor has the evidence, amassed after years of trying, painted a picture of persistent market failure or consumer harms,” she argues.

Turning the First Amendment on Its Head

Both she and McSlarrow note that twisted rationales for Net neutrality “turn First Amendment protections on their head” by making private platforms and actors in the enemies of speech instead of the government, which has traditionally acted to curtail speech liberties and freedom of expression. And it has succeeded at times because the government has the coercive ability to imprison, fine or otherwise punish speakers in ways that no private media or communications platform can.

There’s also the question of whether Net neutrality regulation might constitute a form of “compelled speech.” As Barbara notes, “Under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, the government compelling a speaker to speak or transmit a message that it does not wish to transmit is just as much a free speech infringement as it is to prevent a speaker from transmitting or posting messages it wishes to transmit or post.” She cites remarks delivered at a 2007 Progress & Freedom Foundation event by noted First Amendment scholar Lawrence Tribe on this issue, in response to a question about broadband ISP control of content delivered over their networks:

The general question that raises is the extent to which the government can, in effect, force media to act as common carriers, to be transparent, to force them simply to convey whatever content comes along. To the extent that someone, or an entity, is a content provider engaging in discretion is not simply an empty pipeline. It has the fundamental right of editorial discretion. For the government to tell that entity that it cannot exercise that right in a certain way, that it must allow the projection of what it doesn’t want to include, is a violation of its First Amendment rights.

The Madness of “Media Access” Theory

All this should seem logical to anyone who has taken a look at the plain language of the First Amendment. It could not be more clear when it says, “Congress shall make no law…”  There aren’t any caveats or footnotes. And the First Amendment most certainly was not intended as a tool for government to control the editorial discretion of private individuals or institutions. It was about restricting the power of the government to curtail speech and expression.

So how did this twisted theory of the First Amendment gain currency in Net neutrality circles? To answer that you need to go back to the 1960’s when a handful of liberal legal scholars began concocting a new theory of the First Amendment that eventually came to be known as the “media access” school of thinking. George Washington University law professor Jerome A. Barron’s 1967 Harvard Law Review article, “Access to the Press — a New First Amendment Right,” as well as the work of Yale University law professor Owen Fiss, gave rise to this new intellectual movement. Its goal, in essence, was to convert the First Amendment into a club to beat demands out of private media providers. Basically, these theorists wanted to expand “Fairness Doctrine”-like right-of-reply notions to newspapers, and simultaneously grant the government more leeway to use the First Amendment to alter media structures and outputs. As Fiss argued in a 1986 law review article, under the “media access” approach, a proper reading of the First Amendment requires “a change in our attitude about the state” such that we learn “to recognize the state not only as an enemy, but also as a friend of speech… [that should act] to enhance the quality of public debate.” (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 71, 1986, p. 1416).

Other left-leaning intellectuals and activists groups would come to integrate that logic into their work and public policy proposals. Now you know, for example, where the Media Access Project gets their name!  But many other regulatory-minded groups — Free Press, Public Knowledge, the Center for Digital Democracy, MoveOn.org, New America Foundation, and others — trace much of their intellectual heritage back to Barron, Fiss, and the other media access theorists. [Read my lengthy debunking of media access theory here.]

And now we have books being written with titles like Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age, by Dawn Nunziato of George Washington University. I’ll have a review of Nunziato’s disturbing new book up shortly, but suffice it to say, she has taken media access theory, put it on steroids, and brought it into the Information Age.  At least the media access old-timers could more reasonably use “media scarcity” as an excuse for their regulatory machinations. But Nunziato just dispenses with all that and instead conditions all the new regulation on “democratic participation” and other amorphous theories.

Will the Real Big Brother Please Stand Up

Indeed, with Nunziato’s book, we see how the seeds of misguided intellectual thinking sometimes spring into wild gardens in which the weeds slowly take over everything in sight.  This twisted conception of the First Amendment is so thoroughly ingrained in leftist media policy thinking today that even an abundant medium like the Internet is not exempt from potential regulations based on it despite the death of media scarcity. And that’s how we got to the point we are at today in the net neutrality regulatory debate, with many policymakers and activists groups painting private broadband operators as the supposed real Big Brother problem that the First Amendment must address.

Consider, for example, the comments then-Sen. Hillary Clinton made in 2006 regarding why she supports net neutrality regulation: “Each day on the Internet views are discussed and debated in an open forum without fear of censorship or reprisal.” As I noted at the time, when I read her statement I practically fell off my chair. It’s not just that Mrs. Clinton was asking us to believe in some asinine conspiracy theory about how broadband companies are supposedly out to censor our thoughts or engage in reprisals. (”Reprisals”? For what?) No, what really blew my mind here was the fact that Sen. Clinton had the chutzpah to declare that the private sector was somehow the real threat to online speech. After all, as I inventoried in that old essay, Sen. Clinton has led several notable efforts over the past decade to expand government regulation of television, video games, and even the Internet.

Where’s the Evidence? And How Would They Even Do It?

And yet Clinton and many other Net neutrality advocates continue to insist that it is the private sector, not the government, that is the real threat to our free speech rights. Practically speaking, these advocates of Net neutrality regulation have little to fear in this regard. It is almost impossible to believe that any Internet operator could limit speech or expression in the ways these regulatory advocates fear.  Unlike the government, which possesses the coercive power to completely foreclose all speech under threat of fine or imprisonment, the private sector lacks the ability to use force to bottle up speech or speakers. And even if private operators tried it, there would be hell for them to pay with the press, industry watchdogs, and their even subscribers. More importantly, there’s just no good business angle to censorship; they make more money by delivering more bits, not fewer. Finally, any attempt by one actor to stifle something becomes a prime incentive for another to offer it.

Tim Lee nailed all these points in an excellent paper from last year, “The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality without Regulation.” Tim noted:

Concerns that network owners will undermine free speech online are particularly misguided. Network owners have neither the technology nor the manpower to effectively filter online content based on the viewpoints being expressed, nor do profit-making businesses have any real incentive to do so. Should a network owner be foolish enough to attempt large-scale censorship of its customers, it would not only fail to suppress the disfavored speech, but the network would actually increase the visibility of the content as the effort at censorship attracted additional coverage of the material being censored.

I think that’s exactly right and, later in his paper (between pgs 22-3), Tim nicely elaborates about the “Herculean task” associated with any attempt by a broadband provider to “manipulate human communication.” Not only is it true, as Tim argues, that “no widescale manipulation would go unnoticed for very long,” but he is also correct in noting that the public and press backlash would be enormous.

Shield from Government or Sword for the Government?

But let’s get back to the principle of the matter at stake here because, for those of us who cherish the real First Amendment and seek to protect it, it is essential we not let regulatory advocates get away with their effort to convert it into something it isn’t and was never meant to be.  Jonathan Emord, author of the brilliant 1991 book, Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment, put his thumb on the real threat here: “In short, the [media] access advocates have transformed the marketplace of ideas from a laissez-faire model to a state-control model.” The ultimate danger of this twisted conception of the First Amendment, he noted, is that, “It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private, unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.”  Or as Kyle McSlarrow noted in his speech today, these regulatory advocates are essentially saying that the First Amendment “a sword for government” instead of “a shield for citizens” from coercive government actions that would infringe our legitimate rights of free speech and expression.

In sum, “media access” philosophy and the regulatory approach its adherents counsel  is completely at odds with a proper understanding of the First Amendment.  Government — not the private sector — remains the true threat to our liberties.  And, most horrifyingly of all, empowering the state to use the First Amendment to regulate private actors will almost certainly backfire and result in more, not less, regulation of speech online.

Well, I don’t often get a chance to sing the praises of Hillary Clinton, so let me take the opportunity to loudly applaud her stand on religious defamation policies, which are becoming a growing international concern. According to The Washington Post, while unveiling the State Department’s 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom:

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton criticized on Monday an attempt by Islamic countries to prohibit defamation of religions, saying such policies would restrict free speech. … While unnamed in Clinton’s speech, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a group of 56 Islamic nations, has been pushing hard for the U.N. Human Rights Council to adopt resolutions that broadly bar the defamation of religion. The effort has raised concerns that such resolutions could be used to justify crackdowns on free speech in Muslim countries.

Here’s specifically what Secretary Clinton had to say:

some claim that the best way to protect the freedom of religion is to implement so-called anti-defamation policies that would restrict freedom of expression and the freedom of religion. I strongly disagree. The United States will always seek to counter negative stereotypes of individuals based on their religion and will stand against discrimination and persecution.  But an individual’s ability to practice his or her religion has no bearing on others’ freedom of speech. The protection of speech about religion is particularly important since persons of different faiths will inevitably hold divergent views on religious questions. These differences should be met with tolerance, not with the suppression of discourse.

Quite right.  Thank you, Secretary Clinton, for this bold stand.  Freedom of religious worship and expression — including the criticism of religion — is essential.  Now, can we talk about your old positions on video game regulation?!

John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty turns 150 this year. Published in 1859, this slender manifesto for human liberty went on to become a classic of modern philosophy and political science.  It remains a beautiful articulation of the core principles of human liberty and a just society.

Anyone familiar with the book recognizes the importance of the opening chapter and Mill’s “one very simple principle” for “the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion”:

That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

Mill went on to outline “the appropriate region of human liberty,” and divided it into:

1. “liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.”
2. “liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong”
3. “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others”

Bringing it altogether, he argued:

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

To this day, I do not believe there has been a more eloquent or concise summation of the central principles of libertarianism than those passages from Chapter 1 of the book. But what many fail to remember or appreciate is the equally powerful second chapter of Mill’s treatise, “On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion.” It was a bold defense of freedom of speech and expression that was many decades ahead of its time. And it still has lessons and warnings worth heeding in our modern Information Age.

Mill opened that chapter by noting that:

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the “liberty of the press” as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear.

Alas, Mill knew that we weren’t quite there yet in 1859. Efforts to suppress speech and expression were alive and well. And so he marshaled all his intellectual forces to construct a powerful critique of censorship in all its forms:

The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. … We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

Mill went on to show how, at root, censorship is based on arrogance and elitism:

Those who desire to suppress [an opinion], of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

More profoundly, Mill taught us that the right to freedom of thought and expression was a core right upon which almost all our other rights depended:

Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.

In other words, if you care about any other rights and wish to exercise them to their fullest, you must first have the right to express opinions and, importantly, have them subjected to the opinions of others. This is how truth is discovered.

[Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning.

And Mill taught us that it is essential we be vigilant in defending our rights of speech and expression because, sadly, “the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution,” he correctly noted.

Mill’s words are every bit as relevant in 2009 as they were 1859. While we enjoy significant speech and press freedoms here in the United States today, censorial threats persist.  Just a few years ago, the House of Representatives passed the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on all social networking sites in public schools and libraries.  DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a remarkably lopsided 410-15 vote, but luckily failed to get through the Senate. However, Congress did pass several other online censorship measures in the 1990s, including the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998, which luckily were both struck down by the courts.

Of course, we have it pretty good here in the States thanks the existence of the First Amendment to our Constitution. Most speech-restricting enactments get struck down today because they cannot withstand strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. But think about all those less fortunate in other countries who struggle on a regular basis to express themselves and learn the truth about the world and culture around them without interference from above.

Anyway, go give On Liberty another read if you haven’t done so in some time. It’s a timeless statement of the principles that should guide a just society. I’ll close with this apt warning from Mill about how history will remember those who fail to appreciate the importance of openness to new ideas:

And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity.

Update: A colleague of mine just brought to my attention this essay of “150 Years of On Liberty” by Jonathan M. Riley that appeared in this month’s edition of TPM: The Philosopher’s Magazine.

With today’s historic Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox, I have been commenting on the logic and implications of the decision. Part 3 dealt with the majority’s decision in the case, which was driven solely by procedural / admin law considerations.  This installment will discuss the very interesting concurring opinion penned by Justice Thomas, which is the only one that takes a serious look at the constitutional foundations of the FCC’s current regulatory regime.  While I was sad to see Justice Thomas join the majority’s decision upholding the FCC’s radical expansion of speech regulation in recent years, he joined that majority only on straightforward procedural grounds.   On the underlying constitutional issues at stake here, it is clear from his concurring statement that he is ready for the Court to hear a challenge to the previous court precedents and traditional regulatory doctrines that have long supported FCC speech and media controls.

“I write separately,” Justice Thomas says “to note the questionable viability of the two precedents that support the FCC’s assertion of constitutional authority to regulate the programming at issue in this case.”  Specifically, he addresses the two key cases upon which almost all FCC speech regulation rests: Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). Thomas continues: “Red Lion and Pacifica were unconvincing when they were issued, and the passage of time has only increased doubt regarding their continued validity.”

BOOM!  With those words, Justice Thomas has dropped the hammer and taken what will hopefully be the first swing at toppling the house of cards that is modern FCC speech regulation.  Justice Thomas goes on to itemize the many problems with what I have referred to as “America’s Jurisprudential Twilight Zone” when it comes to how we apply the First Amendment to media platforms in this country.  He states:

This deep intrusion into the First Amendment rights of broadcasters, which the Court has justified based only on the nature of the medium, is problematic on two levels. […]  First, instead of looking to first principles to evaluate the constitutional question, the Court relied on a set of transitory facts, e.g., the ‘scarcity of radio frequencies’… to determine the applicable First Amendment standard. But the original meaning of the Constitution cannot turn on modern necessity…  Second, even if this Court’s disfavored treatment of broadcasters under the First Amendment could have been justified at the time of Red Lion and Pacifica, dramatic technological advances have eviscerated the factual assumptions underlying those decisions. […]

Moreover, traditional broadcast television and radio are no longer the ‘uniquely pervasive’ media forms they once were. For most consumers, traditional broadcast media programming is now bundled with cable or satellite services. Broadcast and other video programming is also widely available over the Internet. And like radio and television broadcasts, Internet access is now often freely available over the airwaves and can be accessed by portable computer, cell phones, and other wireless devices.

Indeed, along with my friends as the Center for Democracy & Technology, I documented these trends in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in this case and pointed out that, at some point, these facts must impact the constitutional equation when it comes to the way the FCC continues to regulate broadcast programming uniquely.  Justice Thomas appears to agree:

The extant facts that drove this Court to subject broadcasters to unique disfavor under the First Amendment simply do not exist today. […] These dramatic changes in factual circumstances might well support a departure from precedent under the prevailing approach to stare decisis. […] For all these reasons, I am open to reconsideration of Red Lion and Pacifica in the proper case.

Unfortunately, this case apparently was not “the proper case” for Justice Thomas and so he joined the majority’s APA-driven decision and left the thorny constitutional issues for another day.  Eventually, however, the Court is going to have to come to grips with the issues that Justice Thomas has put front and center in his concurring opinion today.

Finally, in his otherwise outstanding statement, I was disappointed that Justice Thomas made no mention of the Court’s recent Internet jurisprudence, which has all gone squarely in favor of robust First Amendment protection for the Net and online speakers.  In particular, the “least restrictive means” test that has developed in those cases (i.e., deferring to user self-help tools before allowing state regulation) is equally applicable to programming television programming.  Just as parents have been empowered to take control of the online content that comes into their homes using filters and other tools, so too have parents been empowered to restrict or tailor television program to their tastes and values. How, then, is it the case that the Court upholds this logic in cases like Reno (the CDA case), Ashcroft (the COPA case), & Playboy (the cable TV signal scrambling case), but not in the case of broadcast TV programming, which is easier to control than ever before?  It makes zero sense.

Regardless, I hope other judges are listening to what Justice Thomas had to say today and taking these arguments seriously.

Doug Feaver, a former Washington Post reporter and editor, has published a very interesting editorial today entitled “Listening to the Dot-Commenters.”  In the piece, Feaver discusses his personal change of heart about “the anonymous, unmoderated, often appallingly inaccurate, sometimes profane, frequently off point and occasionally racist reader comments that washingtonpost.com allows to be published at the end of articles and blogs.” When he worked at the Post, he fought to keep anonymous and unmoderated comments off the WP.com site entirely because it was too difficult to pre-screen them all and “the bigger problem with The Post’s comment policy, many in the newsroom have told me, is that the comments are anonymous. Anonymity is what gives cover to racists, sexists and others to say inappropriate things without having to say who they are.”

But Feaver now believes those anonymous, unmoderated comment have value because:

I believe that it is useful to be reminded bluntly that the dark forces are out there and that it is too easy to forget that truth by imposing rules that obscure it.  As Oscar Wilde wrote in a different context, “Man is least in himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.”   Too many of us like to think that we have made great progress in human relations and that little remains to be done. Unmoderated comments provide an antidote to such ridiculous conclusions. It’s not like the rest of us don’t know those words and hear them occasionally, depending on where we choose to tread, but most of us don’t want to have to confront them.

It seems a bit depressing that the best argument in favor of allowing unmoderated, anonymous comments is that it allows us to see the dark underbelly of mankind, but the good news, Feaver points out, is that:

But I am heartened by the fact that such comments do not go unchallenged by readers. In fact, comment strings are often self-correcting and provide informative exchanges. If somebody says something ridiculous, somebody else will challenge it. And there is wit.

He goes on to provide some good examples.  And he also notes how unmoderated comments let readers provide their heartfelt views on the substance of sensitive issues and let journalists and editorialists know how they feel about what is being reported or how it is being reported. “We journalists need to pay attention to what our readers say, even if we don’t like it,” he argues. “There are things to learn.”

I applaud Mr. Feaver for this.  This is a struggle not just for journalists at major media outlets but also for bloggers like us here at the TLF.  There are times when very annoying, even hurtful things are said by anonymous commenters here at the TLF. Our policy, however, has generally been to allow a vibrant exchange of views, except in the rare circumstances where the commenter utters racial epithets or starts issuing death threats. Or, if a specific commenter goes into “stalker mode” and does nothing but post harassing, irrelevant comments all day, then those will occasionally be discarded. But, generally speaking, it’s “anything goes” here. (We even allow spam!)  Each author, however, is free to decide for themselves where to draw the line, but we all generally err on the side of completely unmoderated exchange for the reasons Feaver lists.  We know it is far more likely that we’ll get hostile anonymous comments rather than nice ones, but it’s good to get feedback of all varieties, even when it’s nasty.

From a policy perspective, however, this issue is taking on greater weight because some folks believe that unmoderated, anonymous user comments result in harassment, hate speech, defamation, or privacy violations.  As a result, there has been a growing chorus of critics who claim something must be done to remedy this problem.  Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, for example, have advocated a Civility Check that “can accurately tell whether the email you’re about to send is angry and caution you, “warning: this appears to be an uncivil email. do you really and truly want to send it?”” The state of Kentucky has considered legislation that would ban online anonymity, even though that would be clearly unconstitutional. Respected law school professors such as Mark Lemley and Daniel Solove have toyed with the idea of DMCA-like “notice-and-takedown” regime for potentially defamatory comments online.  I once even heard Cal-Western law school professor Nancy S. Kim suggest that blogs, social networking sites, and other interactive sites should institute a “cooling off period” to address cyber-harassment. By requiring all those seeking to comment to wait a certain length of time before a message or image is posted to a website, she hoped that some commenters might choose to tone down or even remove the potentially offending messages or images.

Of course, it is more likely that readers would just choose not to comment at all if any of these proposals where enshrined into law.  And that gets to the heart of what’s wrong with any potential legal response to this “problem” of online anonymous, unmoderated speech and user comments:  It will massively chill free speech and expression.  Sure, that would get rid of the hecklers and the jackasses who cause grief for some, but it would also deprive us of the many constructive user comments and criticisms that make the online experience — for better or worse — the most open, vibrant exchange of views ever known to man.

Finally, it goes without saying that this debate is fundamentally tied up with the future of Section 230 and the question of intermediary liability.  Currently, online service providers of all flavors are generally not required to police or screen user comments or force users to be authenticated and reveal their identities before posting comments.  Section. 230 has been the key to protecting intermediaries from punishing liability that would otherwise force them to severely curtail online expression, or run the risk of being driven under by the weight of endless lawsuits.  This is why I have argued that Sec. 230  is “the cornerstone of ‘Internet freedom’ in its truest and best sense of the term.”  But, again, all this could change if we are not vigilant in defending Sec. 230.

OK, now that I’ve made this impassioned defense of unmoderated and completly anonymous online exchange, let the hateful comments fly!