I’m making the opening chapter of my new book, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance: How Innovation Improves Economies and Governments, available here. Also here’s the launch essay and the event launch video, which discuss how the themes discussed throughout the book have become even more visible during the coronavirus crisis.

Also, here are some lists of 10 major themes from the book; 13 key terms found in the book, and 5 innovation policy scholars who inspired my thinking. Reminder: this book is a sequel to my previous book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom.

I hope you will consider buying Evasive Entrepreneurs after reading this opening chapter.

[Originally published on the Cato Institute blog.]

Examples were everywhere. Distilleries started producing hand sanitizers to address shortages while average folks began sharing do‐​it‐​yourself sanitizer recipes online. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) looked to modify hand sanitizer guidelines quickly to allow for it, but few really cared because those rules weren’t going to stop them. Gray markets in face masks, medical face shields, and respirators developed. Some people and organizations worked together to make medical devices using off‐​the‐​shelf hardware and open source software. More simply, others just fired up sewing machines to make masks—and then, faced with an emerging public health consensus, the guidance from the federal government shifted dramatically: where formerly ordinary people were instructed not to buy or use masks, within a matter of days, the policy reversed, and all were encouraged to make and use cloth protective masks.

Meanwhile, doctors and nurses started “writing the playbook for treating coronavirus patients on the fly” by improvising treatments and then sharing them on social media. A few doctors even converted breathing machines to ventilators themselves using 3-D printed parts to address shortages for their patients even though the FDA had not yet authorized it.

Social media sites were also suddenly filled with discussions about how average people might come together to build tools or share information to assist with virus testing or treatments. A 17‐​year‐​old used his coding skills to build one of the most popular coronavirus‐​tracking websites in the world (ncov2019.live) after noticing how hard it was to use government sites. And two high school science teachers in Tennessee set up testing operations in their school lab to help reduce testing time in their area.

Meanwhile, journalists and columnists like the  Wall Street Journal’s Andy Kessler cheered on such activity, encouraging the public to “innovate from your couch.” Modern digital technologies and platforms that had been pariahs and the target of a regulatory‐​minded “techlash” just a few months earlier suddenly became essential public services that were showered with praise for helping people cope with social distancing and the solitude associated with shelter‐​in‐​place requirements. Headlines in major media outlets explained how “Facebook Is More Trustworthy than the President” and “Twitter Is Making the Coronavirus World a Better Place.”

Philanthropists like Bill Gates were also funding their own solutions. The former Microsoft founder and CEO pointed out that, in an effort to find testing solutions and vaccines, private groups like his Gates Foundation could likely mobilize faster than governments. Gates likely had grown frustrated with government responses after a Seattle‐​based lab that the Gates Foundation funded figured out an effective way to test for coronavirus, only to be blocked from expanding it by over‐​cautious federal bureaucrats. Frustrated by federal intransigence, that Seattle lab started testing for COVID-19 anyway to prove they indeed had an effective test. Commenting on the case study, the New York Times  expressed exasperation about “how existing regulations and red tape—sometimes designed to protect privacy and health—have impeded the rapid rollout of testing nationally.”

Wait, Isn’t All This Illegal?

What is interesting about all these examples of bottom‐​up innovation and evasive entrepreneurialism is that they are remarkably inspiring, but also mostly illegal. Almost all these activities butted up against longstanding regulations governing medical devices, practices, or therapies. Some of those rules are enforced by large and powerful federal bureaucracies like the FDA and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Others take the form of state‐​based occupational licensing limitations or certificate‐​of‐​need laws, which require healthcare providers to first obtain permission before they open or expand their facilities or services. This crazy quilt of medical laws and regulations accumulated steadily over time, creating what constitutional scholar Timothy Sandefur calls a “permission society,” which values proceduralism and conformity over practicality and common sense.

Eventually, however, the mountains of red tape that the permission society is built upon start to collapse under their own weight. Laws and agencies that previously commanded obedience are now viewed as an opaque, ossified, and confusing morass of one‐​size‐​fits‐​all mandates, prohibitions, and penalties that actually undermine the very health goals they were put in place to achieve. Suddenly, headlines in every major newspaper screamed of how, as it pertained to virus testing procedures, “The Government Failed” (Wall Street Journal) because of “Flawed Tests, Red Tape and Resistance” (Washington Post) and this resulted in “The Lost Month” (New York Times) in the United States.

Eventually, people take notice of how regulators and their rules encumber entrepreneurial activities, and they act to evade them when public welfare is undermined. Working around the system becomes inevitable when the permission society becomes so completely dysfunctional and counterproductive.

Technological Empowerment vs. the Status Quo

What’s going on here, and what lessons can we derive from it?

In a new Cato Institute book, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance, I document how the sort of behavior we have recently witnessed was growing rapidly even before the COVID-19 crisis. In many different contexts, evasive entrepreneurs—innovators who don’t always conform to social or legal norms—are using new technological capabilities to circumvent traditional regulatory systems. They at least want to put pressure on public policymakers to reform or selectively enforce laws and regulations that are outmoded, inefficient, or counterproductive.

Evasive entrepreneurs rely on a strategy of permissionless innovation in both the business world and the political arena. They push back against the permission society by creating exciting new products and services without always receiving the blessing of public officials before doing so. While evasive entrepreneurialism has always been with us to some extent, many of the responses to the pandemic would not have been possible even just a few decades ago. Recent advancements have supercharged in a more technologically empowered world of information abundance and decentralized, inexpensive tools.

As I show in the book, evasive entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the growth of what we might think of as technologies of freedom or resistance. These are devices and platforms that let citizens circumvent (or perhaps just ignore) public policies that limit their liberty or freedom to innovate or to enjoy the fruits of innovation. These can include common tools like smartphones, computers, and various new interactive platforms, as well as more specialized technologies like cryptocurrencies, private drones, immersive technologies (like virtual reality), 3D printers, the “Internet of Things,” and sharing economy platforms and services. But that list just scratches the surface. When the public uses tools such as these to explicitly evade public policies on moral grounds because they find then offensive, illogical, or perhaps just annoying, we can think of that as technological civil disobedience.

Common Sense Prevails

Evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience accelerated during the pandemic because both the practicality and morality of government policies came into question in stark fashion. The first month of the crisis witnessed “a torrent of governmental incompetence that is breathtaking in scale,” my Mercatus colleague Scott Sumner argues. “There are regulations so bizarre that if put in a novel no one would believe them,” he notes. “In contrast, the private sector has reacted fairly well, and has been far ahead of the government in most areas.”

Indeed, the pandemic has been a stress test for our institutions, and many of them have failed it. Confusing rules and inflexible agencies that should have been reformed years ago were suddenly exposed and judged harshly. Philip K. Howard, founder of Common Good, says that “Covid‐​19 is the canary in the bureaucratic mine.” Bloated bureaucracies and overbearing regulatory systems, he argues, have created a “toxic atmosphere that silenced common sense” and managed to “institutionalize failure.” Cato’s Paul Matzko has documented how the FDA has been particularly guilty of blocking sensible forms of progress on simple things like face mask production or distribution.

While countless others lambasted the practical failures of our institutions, the morality of government policies was also coming into focus. Why should citizens have their innovative efforts to help others stifled at seemingly every juncture? Must we really follow the law when it undercuts the basic human need to care for others and ourselves?

These are the issues addressed in my new book, which explains the practical reasons why evasive entrepreneurialism is on the rise and then provides a moral defense of it. When innovators and average citizens use tools and technological capabilities to pursue a living, enjoy new experiences, or improve the human condition, they often disrupt legal or social norms in the process. That is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, evasive entrepreneurialism can transform our society for the better because it can help expand the range of life‐​enriching (and often life‐​saving) innovations. Evasive entrepreneurialism can help citizens pursue lives of their own choosing—both as creators looking for the freedom to earn a living and as individuals looking to discover and enjoy important new goods and services.

Defending evasive entrepreneurialism is easy  after it occurs, but few defend it before or as it is happening. I argue in the book that the freedom to innovate is essential to human betterment—for each of us individually and for civilization as a whole—and that freedom deserves to be taken more seriously today. The COVID-19 pandemic has made this more apparent than ever before.

There are few things more human than acts of invention. At its root, innovation involves efforts to discover new and better ways of solving practical human needs and wants. People have a right to innovate and create technologies because they possess a more general right to take steps to improve their lot in life and the lives of others around them. When misguided or archaic government programs and policies blocked that potential during the pandemic, people began ignoring or evading them. That was both practically sensible and morally justifiable.

Innovation as the New Checks and Balances

By extension, the response to the pandemic has proven the second thesis set forth in my book: Evasive entrepreneurialism and technologically enabled civil disobedience can actually help us improve government by keeping public policies fresh, sensible, and in line with common sense and the consent of the governed. Evasiveness and technological disruption can act as a sort of relief valve or circuit breaker to counteract negative pressures in the system before things break down completely. By challenging legislators and regulators to reevaluate the wisdom of their policies, evasive entrepreneurs can help us break political logjams and force governments to become more adaptive and accountable.

The proof is in the pudding. As the crisis unfolded, agencies at the federal, state, and local levels were forced to suspend hundreds of regulations that were clearly undermining helpful responses. These “rule departures” would not have been necessary if governments had engaged in periodic spring cleanings earlier. When COVID-19 hit, it became essential to suspend or repeal hundreds of misguided old rules that clearly undermined public health. The only question now is whether those inefficient, counterproductive policies will be put back on the books to do harm again in the next crisis.

But even before the current crisis, rule departures by government actors were becoming more common because  even government officials could no longer understand their own rules. Just as private citizens have increasingly resorted to evasive techniques to get things done, many regulatory agencies have given up trying to “go by the book” themselves because endless regulatory accumulation has made it impossible to understand what the law means.

My book documents many cases of public officials essentially ignoring their own policies and making up governance solutions as they go along. This is another sign of profound institutional failure, yet it should also give us some hope that even policymakers themselves now realize that government cannot just grow forever without breaking down at some point. The need for comprehensive reform is now abundantly clear, and the pandemic has moved the so‐​called “Overton Window” (i.e., the acceptable range of possible policy reforms) on many fronts.

A New Approach to Governance

Policymakers need a new approach for technological governance that is more in line with modern realities. Flexibility and humility will be essential. Regulators do not need to throw out the old rulebooks altogether, though. Some precautionary rules still make sense, particularly in cases involving extreme risk. But why not embrace the entrepreneurial spirit of the citizenry and allow more experimental trials, flexible testing procedures, and perhaps even prizes for particularly innovative ideas?

When enforcing the rules that remain on the books, policymakers should also consider targeted waivers and ex post regulatory reviews as opposed to ex ante regulatory prohibitions on any and all evasive innovations. Liability rules can also be tweaked so innovators do not have to live in constant fear of getting sued for trying to make the world a better place. Finally, post‐​market monitoring and recall notices can also be used to ensure flexible experiments have some regulatory guardrails.

But shutting down creative solutions and unique thinking simply because they run counter to some crusty old rulebook is never the right response. We should view evasive entrepreneurialism as an important part of a broader discovery process that incorporates the profound importance of ongoing, decentralized, trial‐​and‐​error experimentation to the process of societal learning and improvement. Lawmakers should find a way to accommodate a little more outside‐​the‐​box thinking and innovating—and not just when our lives are on the line.

Additional Reading 

• read the opening chapter of the book
• watch the event launch video
• 10 Highlights from the Book
• 13 Key Terms from the Book
• 5 innovation policy scholars who inspired this book
• “Innovation & the Precautionary Principle” (AIER essay)
• “Congress as a Non-Actor in Tech Policy” (Medium essay)

[First published by AIER on April 20, 2020 as “Innovation and the Trouble with the Precautionary Principle.”]

In a much-circulated new essay (“It’s Time to Build”), Marc Andreessen has penned a powerful paean to the importance of building. He says the COVID crisis has awakened us to the reality that America is no longer the bastion of entrepreneurial creativity it once was. “Part of the problem is clearlyforesight, a failure of imagination,” he argues. “But the other part of the problem is what we didn’t do in advance, and what we’re failing to do now. And that is a failure of action, and specifically our widespread inability to build.”

Andreessen suggests that, somewhere along the line, something changed in the DNA of the American people and they essentially stopped having the desire to build as they once did. “You don’t just see this smug complacency, this satisfaction with the status quo and the unwillingness to build, in the pandemic, or in healthcare generally,” he says. “You see it throughout Western life, and specifically throughout American life.” He continues:

“The problem is desire. We need to want these things. The problem is inertia. We need to want these things more than we want to prevent these things. The problem is regulatory capture. We need to want new companies to build these things, even if incumbents don’t like it, even if only to force the incumbents to build these things.”

Accordingly, Andreessen continues on to make the case to both the political right and left to change their thinking about building more generally. “It’s time for full-throated, unapologetic, uncompromised political support from the right for aggressive investment in new products, in new industries, in new factories, in new science, in big leaps forward.”

What’s missing in Andreessen’s manifesto is a concrete connection between America’s apparent dwindling desire to build these things and the political realities on the ground that contribute to that problem. Put simply, policy influences attitudes. More specifically, policies that frown upon entrepreneurial risk-taking actively disincentivize the building of new and better things. Thus, to correct the problem Andreessen identifies, it is essential that we must first remove political barriers to productive entrepreneurialism or else we will never get back to being the builders we once were.    

Attitudes about Progress Matter 

The economic historian Joel Mokyr has noted how, “technological progress requires above all tolerance toward the unfamiliar and the eccentric” and that the innovation that undergirds economic growth is best viewed as “a fragile and vulnerable plant” that “is highly sensitive to the social and economic environment and can easily be arrested by relatively small external changes.” Specifically, societal and political attitudes toward growth, risk-taking, and entrepreneurial activities (and failures) are important to the competitive standing of nations and the possibility of long-term prosperity. “How the citizens of any country think about economic growth, and what actions they take in consequence, are,” Benjamin Friedman observes, “a matter of far broader importance than we conventionally assume.”

Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and co-author Adrian Wooldridge have observed that “[t]he key to America’s success lies in its unique toleration for ‘creative destruction,’” and an “enduring preference for change over stability.” This is consistent with the findings of Deirdre McCloskey’s recent 3-volume trilogy about the history of modern economic growth. McCloskey meticulously documents how an embrace of “bourgeois virtues” (i.e., positive attitudes about markets and innovation) was the crucial factor propelling the invention and economic growth that resulted in the Industrial Revolution.The importance of positive attitudes toward innovation and risk-taking were equally important for the Information Revolution more recently. In turn, that also helps explain why so many US-based tech innovators became global powerhouses, while firms from other countries tend to flounder because their innovation culture was more precautionary in orientation.

There are limits to how much policymakers can do to influence the attitudes among citizens toward innovation, entrepreneurialism, and economic growth. When policymakers set the right tone with a positive attitude toward innovation, however, it inevitably infuses various institutions and creates powerful incentives for entrepreneurial efforts to be undertaken. This, in turn, influences broader societal attitudes and institutions toward innovation and creates a positive feedback loop. “If we learn anything from the history of economic development,” argued David Landes in his magisterial The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some Are So Poor, “it is that culture makes all the difference.” Research by other scholars finds that, “existing cultural conditions determine whether, when, how and in what form a new innovation will be adopted.”

Economists like Mancur Olson speak of the importance of a “structure of incentives” that helps explain why “the great differences in the wealth of nations are mainly due to differences in the quality of their institutions and economic policies.”In this sense, “institutions” include what Elhanan Helpman defines as “systems of rules, beliefs, and organizations,”including the rule of law and court systems,property rights,contracts, free trade policies and institutions, light-touch regulations and regulatory regimes, freedom to travel, and various other incentives to invest.

It is the freedom to invest, the freedom to work, and the freedom to build that particularly concerns Marc Andreessen. But he needs to draw the connection with the specific public policies that hold back our ability to exercise those freedoms. 

Policy Defaults toward Innovation Matter Even More

Unfortunately, a great many barriers exist to entrepreneurial efforts. Those barriers to building include inflexible health and safety regulation, occupational licensing rules, cronyist industrial protectionist schemes, inefficient (industry-rigged) tax schemes, rigid zoning ordinances, and many other layers of regulatory red tape at the federal, state, and local level.  

What unifies all these policies is risk aversion and the precautionary principle. As I argued in my last book, we have a choice when it comes to setting defaults for innovation policy. We can choose to set innovation defaults closer to the green light of “permissionless innovation,” generally allowing entrepreneurial acts unless a compelling case can be made not to. Alternatively, we can set our default closer to the red light of the precautionary principle, which disallows risk-taking or entrepreneurialism until some authority gives us permission to proceed. 

My book made the case for permissionless innovation as the superior default regime. My argument for rejecting the precautionary principle as the default came down to belief that, “living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy on them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning,” I argued, “it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.”  

Heavy-handed preemptive restraints on innovative acts have such deleterious effects because they raise barriers to entry, increase compliance costs, and create more risk and uncertainty for entrepreneurs and investors. Progress is impossible without constant trial-and-error experimentation and entrepreneurial risk-taking. Thus, it is the unseen costs of forgone innovation opportunities that make the precautionary principle so troubling as a policy default. Without risk, there can be no reward. Scientist Martin Rees refers to this truism about the precautionary principle as “the hidden cost of saying no.”  

More generally, risk analysts have noted that the precautionary principle “lacks a firm logical foundation” and is “literally incoherent” because it fails to specify a clear standard by which to judge which risks are most serious and worthy of preemptive control. Moreover, regulatory policy experts have criticized the fact that the precautionary principle, “may be misused for protectionist ends; it tends to undermine international regulatory cooperation; and it may have highly undesirable distributive consequences.” Specifically, large incumbent firms are almost always more likely able to deal with rigid, expensive regulatory regimes or, worse yet, can game those systems by “capturing” policymakers and using regulatory regimes to exclude new rivals.  

Precaution Suffocates Productive Entrepreneurialism 

The problem today is that a massive volume of precautionary policies exist that discourage “productive entrepreneurship” (i.e., building) and instead actively encourage “unproductive entrepreneurship” (i.e., preservation of the status quo). Andreessen identifies this problem when he speaks of “smug complacency, this satisfaction with the status quo and the unwillingness to build.” But he doesn’t fully connect the dots between how the attitudes came about and the public policy incentives that actively encourage such thinking. 

Why try to build when all the incentives are aligned against you? Andreessen wants to know “Where are the supersonic aircraft? Where are the millions of delivery drones? Where are the high speed trains, the soaring monorails, the hyperloops, and yes, the flying cars?” Well, I’ll tell you where they are at. They are trapped in the minds of inventive people who cannot bring them to fruition so long as an endless string of barriers makes it costly or impossible for them to realize those dreams. 

Read Eli Dourado’s important essay on “How Do We Move the Needle on Progress?” to get a more concrete feel for the specific barriers to building in the fields where productive entrepreneurialism is most needed: health, housing, energy, and transportation.

The bottom line, as Dustin Chambers and Jonathan Munemo noted in a 2017 Mercatus Center report on the impact of regulation on entrepreneurial activity, is that “If a nation wishes to promote higher levels of domestic entrepreneurship in both the short and long run, top priority should be given to reducing barriers to entry for new firms and to improving overall institutional quality (especially political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability).” 

This doesn’t mean there is no role for government in helping to promote “building” and entrepreneurialism. A healthy debate continues to rage about “state capacity” as it pertains to government investments in research and development, for example. While I am skeptical, there may very well be some steps governments can take to encourage more and better investments in the sectors and technologies we desperately need. But all the “state capacity” in the world isn’t going to help until we first clear away the barriers that hold back the productive spirit of the people. 

Oiling the Wheels of Novelty

My new book, which is due out next week, discusses how innovation improves economies and government institutions. It builds on the fundamental insight of Calestous Juma, who concluded his masterwork Innovation and Its Enemies by reminding us of the continued importance of “oiling the wheels of novelty,” to constantly replenish the well of important ideas and innovations. “The biggest risk that society faces by adopting approaches that suppress innovation,” Juma said, “is that they amplify the activities of those who want to preserve the status quo by silencing those arguing for a more open future.”

The openness Juma had in mind represents a tolerance of new ideas, inventions, and unknown futures. It can and should also represent an openness to new, more flexible methods of governance. For, if it doesn’t, the builder movement that Andreessen and others long for will remain just a distant dream, incapable of ever being realized so long as the wheels of novelty are gummed up by decades of inefficient, archaic, counterproductive public policies.

_________

P.S. I highly recommend this excellent essay by Jerry Brito, “We don’t want to build? Maybe we should build anyway.” It touches on many of the same themes I discuss in my response essay as well as in my new book, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance: How Innovation Improves Economies and Governments.

by Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell

[originally published on The Bridge on August 30, 2018.]

What is an entrepreneur?

While it may seem straightforward, this question is deceptively complex. The term can be used in many different ways to describe a variety of individuals who engage in economic, political, or even social activities. Entrepreneurs affect almost every aspect of modern society. While most people probably have a general sense of what is meant when they hear the term entrepreneur, it can be difficult to provide a precise definition. This is due in no small part to the fact that some of the primary thinkers who have given substance to the term have placed their focus on different aspects of entrepreneurialism.

How Economists Talk About Entrepreneurs

Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter thought that the purpose of an entrepreneur was “to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention.”  Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are highly creative, disruptive innovators who challenge the status quo in order to bring about new economic opportunities. American economist Israel Kirzner viewed the defining characteristic of entrepreneurs as “alertness.” Kirznerian entrepreneurs are individuals who are able to identify the ways in which a market could be moved closer to its equilibrium, such as recognizing a gap in knowledge between different economic actors.

In the time since Schumpeter and Kirzner helped lay the groundwork, a number of George Mason University-affiliated scholars have made major contributions to our understanding of entrepreneurialism. Don Boudreaux, Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin, and Virgil Storr, Stefanie Haeffele and Laura Grube, have offered a merged view of Schumpeterian and Kirznerian entrepreneurialism, showing the significant overlap between the two approaches.

In this new way of looking at the issue, entrepreneurs are crucial to innovation, economic growth, and societal change. They are dynamic actors who respond to incentives and market signals. “Greater discovery and innovation are the benchmarks of dynamic competition,” note Ellig and Lin, “not the driving down of price to marginal cost.”

Productive and Unproductive Entrepreneurs

But are all of these dynamic entrepreneurs good for society? Among modern economists and political scientists, there is a general consensus that Schumpeterian-Kirznerian entrepreneurs are individuals who either find or create value within society. In recent decades, therefore, scholars have focused on applying those insights more broadly and developing a more robust way to categorize different types of entrepreneurial activity.

Another American economist, William Baumol, drew an important distinction between  productive and unproductive entrepreneurs. He described productive entrepreneurs as people engaged in enterprising activity that generates value within society, such as the creation of new and innovative technologies. However, he also found that entrepreneurs could be unproductive if they did not create value or actively harmful if they destroyed value. “Indeed, at times the entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical existence that is actually damaging to the economy.” For Baumol, entrepreneurs are not defined as individuals who develop new methods of creating value but rather “persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige.”

Entrepreneurs in the Political Arena

An individual who is highly skilled at lobbying a particular governmental agency might be considered an entrepreneur, but that does not mean they are necessarily contributing value to society overall. Some scholars refer to this as political entrepreneurialism. Economists Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne define political entrepreneurs as, “individuals who operate in political institutions and who are alert to profit opportunities created by those institutions.” Utah State University professors Randy Simmons, Ryan Yonk and Diana Thomas observe how such entrepreneurs seek specific rewards or privileges from political institutions and interactions through “alertness to previously unnoticed rent-seeking opportunities.” ‘Rent-seeking’ is an economic concept where one person or group is able to derive certain benefits from a particular institutional arrangement without actually creating value for others.

Our Mercatus Center colleague Matthew Mitchell has documented the “long list of privileges that governments occasionally bestow upon particular firms or particular industries.” Mitchell offers a taxonomy of the sort of privileges that political entrepreneurs seek. They include: “monopoly status, favorable regulations, subsidies, bailouts, loan guarantees, targeted tax breaks, protection from foreign competition, and noncompetitive contracts.”

All of these privileges could qualify as a form of Baumol’s “unproductive entrepreneurship” or, in the extreme, what he called destructive entrepreneurialism. Professors Sameeksha Desai, Zoltan Acs and Utz Weitzel define destructive entrepreneurship as “wealth-destroying (such as the destruction of inputs for production activities).” Whereas unproductive entrepreneurship “seeks to redistribute from one individual to another individual,” Boettke and Coyne note, “destructive entrepreneurship reduces the total surplus in an attempt by the entrepreneur to increase his own wealth.” Outright theft and violent conflict over resources are examples of destructive entrepreneurship.

When policymakers reward political destructive or unproductive entrepreneurs, it has profound effects on the well-being of ordinary people and entire nations.

Evasive and Regulatory Entrepreneurs

Not all political entrepreneurs are necessarily out to gain privileges from government at the expense of others, however. Some entrepreneurs are more interested in simply gaining greater freedom to innovate. Scholars have used the terms evasive entrepreneurs or regulatory entrepreneurs to describe such actors. Researchers Niklas Elert and Magnus Henrekson define evasive entrepreneurialism as “profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework.” GMU economists Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson argue that “[e]vasive activities include the expenditure of resources and efforts in evading the legal system or in avoiding the unproductive activities of other agents.” Regulatory entrepreneurs, according to legal scholars Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry, are innovators who “are in the business of trying to change or shape the law” and are “strategically operating in a zone of questionable legality or breaking the law until they can (hopefully) change it.”  Evasive or regulatory entrepreneurs generally adopt a “permissionless innovation” approach to both business and political activities.

Generally speaking, evasive and regulatory entrepreneurs are synonymous, although regulatory entrepreneurialism implies a more active intent to change policy through entrepreneurial acts. Evasive entrepreneurs might also be ignorant of what the law says, whereas regulatory entrepreneurs, by definition, understand how the law negatively affects their efforts and seek to change policy through their actions.

However, both evasive and regulatory entrepreneurs are distinct from what economists Alexandre Padilla and Nicolas Cachanosky call indirectly productive entrepreneurs. They argue that regulation often creates unintended consequences which lead to new entrepreneurial opportunities. Indirectly productive entrepreneurs seize upon these opportunities by finding ways to mitigate the costs associated with specific regulations. Unlike regulatory entrepreneurs, who desire to change policy, or evasive entrepreneurs, who seek to avoid it, indirectly productive entrepreneurs create value by reducing the harm caused by policies. For example, the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) has a policy prohibiting passengers from bringing liquids on an airplane unless they are kept in a container that is smaller than 3.4 ounces. As a response, several indirectly productive entrepreneurs have created “TSA Approved” containers for shampoo, mouthwash, and other toiletries that make it easier for passengers to comply with the regulation.

Social Entrepreneurs

There is also a growing acknowledgment that entrepreneurial behavior can transcend economic or political activities. Mercatus scholars have defined social entrepreneurs as individuals who engage in “innovative, social value-creating activity that can occur within or across the nonprofit, business, or government sectors.”  Social entrepreneurial activities are not typically in pursuit of compensation or profit, but that need not always be the case and “the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurship is not dichotomous, but… a continuum ranging from purely social to purely economic,” they note.

Some sort of social mission drives this type of entrepreneurship, and social entrepreneurialism will often incorporate what MIT economist Eric von Hippel refers to as “free innovation.” He defines a free innovation as “a functionally novel product, service, or process that (1) was developed by consumers at private cost during their unpaid discretionary time (that is, no one paid them to do it) and (2) is not protected by its developers, and so is potentially acquirable by anyone without payment—for free.”  A good example of free innovation would be social entrepreneurs using 3D printers and open source designs to voluntarily create prosthetics for children with limb deficiencies.

Conclusion

As this brief survey reveals, there are many different forms of entrepreneurialism. Individuals can act in an entrepreneurial fashion in pursuit of many different objectives: profits, fame, social or legal change, or even personal or organizational privileges that come at the expense of others. Clearly, not all forms of entrepreneurialism produce socially beneficial outcomes. Policymakers should seek to foster and reward Schumpeterian-Kirznerian entrepreneurs given the positive implications for innovation and economic growth and avoid falling into the trap of rewarding political entrepreneurs, who instead seek to game laws and regulations to their own advantage.

Given the extensive research and academic literature inherent to this subject, we’ve curated a list of selected readings below.

Further Reading

Austin, J., Stevenson, H., & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both?  Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(1), 370-384. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2006.00107.x

Baumol, W. (1968). Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory.  The American Economic Review,58(2), 64-71. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831798?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Baumol, W. (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive.  Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 893-921. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2937617?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Boettke, P. J., & Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context Matters: Institutions and Entrepreneurship.  Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship, 5(3), 135-209. Retrieved from https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/ENT-018.

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I’ve been working on a new book that explores the rise of evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience in our modern world. Following the publication of my last book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, people started bringing examples of evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience to my attention and asked how they were related to the concept of permissionless innovation. As I started exploring and cataloging these cases studies, I realized I could probably write an entire book about these developments and their consequences.

Hopefully that book will be wrapped up shortly. In the meantime, I am going to start rolling out some short essays based on content from the book. To begin, I will state the general purpose of the book and define the key concepts discussed therein. In coming weeks and months, I’ll build on these themes, explain why they are on the rise, explore the effect they are having on society and technological governance efforts, and more fully develop some relevant case studies.

Key Concepts Defined

• Evasive entrepreneurs – Innovators who don’t always conform to social or legal norms.
• Regulatory entrepreneurs – Innovators who “are in the business of trying to change or shape the law” and are “strategically operating in a zone of questionable legality or breaking the law until they can (hopefully) change it.” (Pollman & Barry)
• Technologies of freedom – Devices and platforms that let citizens openly defy (or perhaps just ignore) public policies that limit their liberty or freedom to innovate.
• The “pacing problem” – The gap between the ever-expanding frontier of technological possibilities and the ability of governments to keep up with the pace of those changes.
• Technological civil disobedience – The technologically-enabled refusal of individuals, groups, or businesses to obey certain laws or regulations because they find them offensive, confusing, time-consuming, expensive, or perhaps just annoying and irrelevant.
• Innovation arbitrage – The movement of ideas, innovations, or operations to those jurisdictions that provide a legal and regulatory environment more hospitable to entrepreneurial activity. It can also be thought of as a form of “jurisdictional shopping” and can be facilitated by “competitive federalism.”
• Permissionless innovation – As a general concept, it refers to Rear Admiral Grace Hopper’s notion that quite often, “It’s easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.” As a policy vision, it refers to the idea that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Permissionless innovation comes down to a general acceptance of change and risk-taking.

Themes of the Book

The book documents how evasive entrepreneurs are using new technological capabilities to circumvent traditional regulatory systems, or at least put pressure on public policymakers to reform or selectively enforce laws and regulation that are outmoded, inefficient, or illogical. Evasive entrepreneurs pursue a strategy of “permissionless innovation” in both the business world and the political arena.  In essence, they live out the adage that, “it is easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission” by creating new products and services without necessarily receiving the blessing of public officials before doing so.

Evasive entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the growth of various technologies of freedom and the corresponding “pacing problem” to create new goods and services or just decide how to live a life of their own choosing. We can think of this phenomenon as “technological civil disobedience.” The technologies of freedom that facilitate this sort of civil disobedience include common tools like smartphones, ubiquitous computing, and various new media platforms, as well as more specialized technologies like cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based services, private drones, immersive tech (like virtual reality), 3D printers, the “Internet of Things,” and sharing economy platforms and services. But that list just scratches the surface.

When innovators and consumers use new tools and technological capabilities to pursue a living, enjoy new experiences, or enhance their lives and the lives of others, they often disrupt legal or social norms in the process. While that can raise serious legal and ethical concerns, evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience can have positive upsides for society by:

• expanding the range of life-enriching—and even life-saving—innovations available to society;
• helping citizens pursue a life of their own choosing—both as creators looking for the freedom to earn a living, and as consumers looking to discover and enjoy important new goods and services; and,
• providing a meaningful, ongoing check on government policies and programs that all too often have outlived their usefulness or simply defy common sense.

For those reasons, my book will argue that we should accept—and often even embrace—a certain amount of evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience. I am particularly excited by the last point. In an age when many of the constitutional limitations on government power are being ignored or unenforced, innovation itself can act as a powerful check on the power of the state and help serve as a protector of important human liberties. Over the past century, both legislative and judicial “checks and balances” in the United States have been eroded to the point where they now exist mostly in name only. While we should never abandon efforts to use democratic and constitutional means of limiting state power—especially in the courts, where meaningful reforms are still possible—the ongoing evolution of technology can provide another way of keeping governments in line by forcing public officials to constrain their worse tendencies and undo past mistakes. If they fail to, they risk losing the allegiance of their more technologically-empowered citizenry.

But evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience can have serious downsides, too. We should explore how to address the challenges associated with this more turbulent and sometimes dangerous world. In doing so, however, technological critics and public policymakers should also appreciate how once any particular innovation genie is out of its bottle, it will be increasingly difficult to stuff it back in. Worse yet, attempts to do so can often result in a “compliance paradox,” in which tighter rules lead to increased legal evasion and intractable enforcement challenges. Thus, more flexible and adaptive technological governance mechanisms will be needed.

In coming essays, I will discuss some prominent examples of these trends that are developed at length in my book, I will also do a deeper dive into some of the interesting ways governments are responding to these developments using what Phil Weiser refers to as “entrepreneurial administration,” or what others call “soft law” mechanisms. As Weiser notes, “[t]he traditional model of regulation is coming under strain in the face of increasing globalization and technological change,” and, therefore, governments must think and act differently than they did in the past. And they are already doing so. Even in an age of expanding evasive entrepreneurialism and technological civil disobedience, governments can shape the evolution of technology. But that cannot be done using the previous era’s technocratic, overly-bureaucratic, and top-down regulatory playbook. New policies and procedures will be needed for a new era.

Written with Christopher Koopman and Brent Skorup (originally published on Medium on 4/10/17)

Innovation isn’t just about the latest gee-whiz gizmos and gadgets. That’s all nice, but something far more profound is at stake: Innovation is the single most important determinant of long-term human well-being. There exists widespread consensus among historians, economists, political scientists and other scholars that technological innovation is the linchpin of expanded economic growth, opportunity, choice, mobility, and human flourishing more generally. It is the ongoing search for new and better ways of doing things that drives human learning and prosperity in every sense — economic, social, and cultural.

The United States is uniquely positioned to lead the world into the next era of global technological advancement and wealth creation. That’s why we and our colleagues at the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University devote so much time and energy to defending the importance of innovation and countering threats to it. Unfortunately, those threats continue to multiply as fast as new technologies emerge.

Indeed, it isn’t easy keeping on top of all of these issues and threats because the only constant in the world of innovation policy — the study of technological change and its impact on social, economic, and political systems — is constant change. You go to sleep one night thinking you’ve got the world figured out, only to awake the next morning to see that another tectonic shift has reshaped the landscape.

In the industrial era, it was hard enough mapping the contours of this field of academic study. This task has grown far more challenging. Computing and Internet-enabled innovations have fundamentally reshaped society and have also helped spawn other technological revolutions in diverse fields such as: robotics, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, big data, the Sharing Economy, 3D printing, virtual reality, aviation, advanced medical technology, blockchain and Bitcoin, and the so-called the Internet of Things.

The short-term social and economic disruptions caused by these and other new technologies often lead to backlashes and even occasional “techno-panics.” When those panics bubble over into the political arena, the risk is that misguided regulatory policies will short-circuit opportunities for creators and entrepreneurs to pursue life-enriching innovations.

At the Mercatus Center, where we study these and other topics, our goal is to bring greater focus to these emerging technologies and the many different facets of innovation policy surrounding them. How we accomplish these goals is as challenging as it is exciting. As more and more industries and business are affected by these emerging technologies, the decisions that policymakers make about them will have profound effects on large parts of our economy and society.

Specifically, as we place ourselves at the forefront of these debates, our aim is to:

• Explore how innovation policy affects economic growth and mobility, consumer welfare, and global competitive advantage;
• Identify barriers to entrepreneurial endeavors and devise a roadmap for how to remove them;
• Push back against technopanics and overly-broad theories of “technological harm” that could limit innovation opportunities and greater consumer choice; and
• Confront the legal and ethical concerns surrounding emerging technologies and craft constructive solutions to those problems to avoid solutions of the top-down, “command-and-control” variety.

Overall, our vision is simple: Permissionless innovation must become the norm rather than the exception. This means innovation and innovators are protected against efforts to preemptively control ongoing trial-and-error experimentation. We should let creative minds and empowered entrepreneurs experiment with new and better ways of doing things. It also means that the future if public policy should be rooted in fact-based analysis and not shaped by outlandish fears of hypothetical worst-case scenarios.

Going forward, you will continue to see Mercatus producing research applying permissionless innovation across a host of areas. You can also expect us to begin pursuing big questions about the future.

What if we could reduce the number of deaths on US roadways from 96 people per day to zero? What if we could double life expectancy? Triple it? Wouldn’t it be nice if we could travel from New York to London in three hours? New York to Los Angeles in 2.5 hours? What if we welcomed automation instead of fearing its effects on the workforce? What if we could remove the technical and political barriers keeping us from going to Mars and then beyond it? And so on.

We pose these questions not merely because they are intellectually interesting and important, but also because we hope to make the case for embracing the future with a sense of wonder and optimism about how technological advancement can radically improve human well-being in both the short- and long-run.

It isn’t enough to simply point out where innovators and entrepreneurs are being hindered. It isn’t enough to simply tell people that the future will be bright. We must explain, in real terms, how hindering innovation opportunities undermines our collective ability to constantly improve the human condition.

And because there is a symbiotic relationship between freedom and progress, we must defend our collective ability as a society to achieve very concrete, widely-shared advances in well-being through a general freedom to experiment with new technologies and better ways of doing things.

That is our vision for the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center and we hope it is one that the public and public policymakers will embrace going forward.

“Why hasn’t Europe fostered the kind of innovation that has spawned hugely successful technology companies?” asks James B. Stewart in an important new column for the New York Times (“A Fearless Culture Fuels U.S. Tech Giants“).

That’s a great question, and one that I have tried to answer in a series of recent essays. (See, for example, “Europe’s Choice on Innovation” and “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation.”) What I have suggested in those essays is that the starkly different outcomes on either side of the Atlantic in terms of recent economic growth and innovation can primarily be explained by cultural attitudes toward risk-taking and failure. “For innovation and growth to blossom, entrepreneurs need a clear green light from policymakers that signals a general acceptance of risk-taking—especially risk-taking that challenges existing business models and traditional ways of doing things,” I have argued. And the most powerful proof of this is to examine the amazing natural experiment that has played out on either side of the Atlantic over the past two decades with the Internet and the digital economy.

For example, an annual Booz & Company report on the world’s most innovative companies revealed that 9 of the top 10 most innovative companies are based in the U.S. and that most of them are involved in computing and digital technology. None of them are based in Europe, however. Another recent survey revealed that the world’s 15 most valuable Internet companies (based on market capitalizations) have a combined market value of nearly $2.5 trillion, but none of them are European while 11 of them are U.S. firms. Again, it is America’s tech innovators that dominate that list.

Many European officials and business leaders are waking up to this grim reality and are wondering how to reverse this situation. In his  Times essay, Stewart quotes Danish economist Jacob Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who notes that Europeans “all want a Silicon Valley. . . . But none of them can match the scale and focus on the new and truly innovative technologies you have in the United States. Europe and the rest of the world are playing catch-up, to the great frustration of policy makers there.”

OK, but why is that? Again, it comes down to those different cultural attitudes about risk and the stark differences over the potential lessons to be gained from allowing firms, business models, and entire professions to fail and/or be significantly disrupted.

Stewart quotes German economist Petra Moser on this point. He noted that “Europeans are worried. . . . They’re trying to recreate Silicon Valley in places like Munich, so far with little success,” she said. “The institutional and cultural differences are still too great.” In Europe, stability is prized,” she says. Here’s the key passage from the Stewart piece elaborating on this point:

Often overlooked in the success of American start-ups is the even greater number of failures. “Fail fast, fail often” is a Silicon Valley mantra, and the freedom to innovate is inextricably linked to the freedom to fail. In Europe, failure carries a much greater stigma than it does in the United States. Bankruptcy codes are far more punitive, in contrast to the United States, where bankruptcy is simply a rite of passage for many successful entrepreneurs.

Moreover, he notes, “Europeans are also much less receptive to the kind of truly disruptive innovation represented by a Google or a Facebook.”

And that remains the heart of the problem for Europe. What many leaders there fail to appreciate, as I noted in my earlier essays, is that:

Innovation is more likely in systems that maximize breathing room for ongoing economic and social experimentation, evolution, and adaptation. Societies that appreciate those values—and allow them to influence both social norms and policy decisions—are likely to experience greater economic growth. By contrast, those that deride such values and adopt a more precautionary policy approach are more likely to discourage innovation and languish economically.

The remarkable aversion to failure and its affect on deterring entrepreneurialism and long-term growth in Europe and elsewhere cannot be overstated. As I will argue in a forthcoming book chapter on this topic, we can conclude, paradoxically, that individuals, institutions, and countries that over-zealously seek to avoid the possibility of certain short-term failures are actually far more prone to potentially far more dangerous and systemic failures in the long-term. Put more simply: the more you try to avoid all the little failures, the harder you fail more generally. This is Europe’s fundamental predicament circa 2015.

Of course, changing long-entrenched cultural attitudes toward risk and failure can be challenging and take many years, even decades. But the path forward–at least in terms of legal policy and regulatory reforms–has been charted by Larry Downes in his new Harvard Business Review essay, “How Europe Can Create Its Own Silicon Valley.” EU policymakers, he correctly observes, will “have to learn to appreciate in the first place the profound role regulation (or the lack of it) plays in the creation of economic value in the Internet economy.” Downes then continues on to itemize some of the policy changes that would help put Europe on the right track to unlock the amazing entrepreneurial spirit that lies dormant across the continent.

Whether or not the Europeans are willing to take those steps remains to be seen. Regardless, the lesson for U.S. policymakers should be clear: If you want to continue to produce world-beating tech innovators, you must avoid Europe’s overly precautionary and highly risk-averse approach to policy. “Permissionless innovation” remains the better default policy position toward new entrepreneurs and technologies, no matter how disruptive they may be in the short-term.

Yesterday afternoon, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) finally released its much-delayed rules for private drone operations. As The Wall Street Journal  points out, the rules “are about four years behind schedule,” but now the agency is asking for expedited public comments over the next 60 days on the whopping 200-page order. (You have to love the irony in that!) I’m still going through all the details in the FAA’s new order — and here’s a summary of what the major provisions — but here are some high-level thoughts about what the agency has proposed.

Opening the Skies…

• The good news is that, after a long delay, the FAA is finally taking some baby steps toward freeing up the market for private drone operations.
• Innovators will no longer have to operate entirely outside the law in a sort of drone black market. There’s now a path to legal operation. Specifically, small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operators (for drones under 55 lbs.) will be able to go through a formal certification process and, after passing a test, get to operate their systems.

… but Not Without Some Serious Constraints

• The problem is that the rules only open the skies incrementally for drone innovation.
• You can’t read through these 200 pages of regulations without getting sense that the FAA still wishes that private drones would just go away.
• For example, the FAA still wants to keep a bit of a leash around drones by (1) limiting their use to being daylight-only flights (2) that are in the visual line-of-sight of the operators at all times. And (3) the agency also says that drones cannot be flown over people.
• Those three limitations will hinder some obvious innovations, such as same-day drone delivery for small packages, which Amazon has suggested they are interested in pursuing. (Amazon isn’t happy about these restrictions.)

Impact on Small Innovators?

• But what I worry about more are all the small ‘Mom-and-Pop’ drone entrepreneur, who want to use airspace as a platform for open, creative innovation. These folks are out there but they don’t have the name or the resources to weather these restrictions the way that Amazon can. After all, if Amazon has to abandon same-day drone delivery because of the FAA rules, the company will still have a thriving commercial operation to fall back on. But all those small, nameless drone innovators currently experimenting with new, unforeseeable innovations may not be so lucky.
• As a result, there’s a real threat here of drone entrepreneurs bolting the U.S. and offering their services in more hospitable environments if the FAA doesn’t take a more flexible approach.
• [For more discussion of this problem, see my recent essay on “global innovation arbitrage.”]

Impact on News-Gathering?

• It’s also worth asking how these rules might limit legitimate news-gathering operations by both journalistic enterprises and average citizens. If we can never fly a drone over a crowd of people, as the rules stipulate, that places some rather serious constraints on our ability to capture real-time images and video from events of societal importance (such as political protests or even just major events like sporting events or concerts).
• [For more discussion about this, see this September 2014 Mercatus Center working paper, “News from Above: First Amendment Implications of the Federal Aviation Administration Ban on Commercial Drones.”]

Still Time to Reconsider More Flexible Rules

• Of course, these aren’t final rules and the agency still has time to relax some of these restrictions to free the skies for less fettered private drone operation.
• I suspect that drone innovators will protest the three specific limitations I identified above and ask for a more flexible approach to enforcing those rules.
• But it’s good that the FAA has finally taken the first step toward decriminalizing private drone operations in the United States.

___________________________

Additional  Reading

• Permissionless Innovation & Commercial Drones, February 4, 2015.
• DRM for Drones Will Fail, January 28, 2015.
• Regulatory Capture: FAA and Commercial Drones Edition, January 16, 2015.
• Global Innovation Arbitrage: Commercial Drones & Sharing Economy Edition, December 9, 2014.
• How to Destroy American Innovation: The FAA & Commercial Drones, October 6, 2014.
• Filing to FAA on Drones & “Model Aircraft”, Sept. 23, 2014.
• Private Drones & the First Amendment, Sept. 19, 2014.
• [TV interview] The Beneficial Uses of Private Drones, March 28, 2014.
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FAA on integration of drones into the nation’s airspace, April 23, 2o13.
• Eli Dourado, Deregulate the Skies: Why We Can’t Afford to Fear Drones, Wired, April 23, 2013.
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014).
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014).

A few gems from George Gilder’s 1990 masterpiece Microcosm: the Quantum Revolution in Economics & Technology as I work my way through the book:

Predatory Pricing. Gilder details how early microchip manufacturers created wholly new markets put Say’s law into action: supply creating its own demand.  Not only did these companies introduce new technologies, but they created demand by slashing the prices of those technologies by multiple orders of magnitude (10-10,000x) even before they figured out how to lower production costs enough to make even a small profit. While such practices would later give rise to charges of “predatory pricing” and “dumping,” Gilder explains:

Selling below cost is the crux of all enterprise.  It regularly transforms expensive and cumbersome luxuries into elegant mass products.  It has been the genius of American industry since the era when Rockefeller and Carnegie radically reduced the prices of oil and steel. (122)

The Learning Curve: Gilder explains the dynamic by which prices drop so consistently in innovative new industries:

Early in the life of a product, uncertainty afflicts every part of the process. An unstable process means energy use per unit will be at its height. Both fuels and materials are wasted. High informational entropy in the process also produces high physical entropy. The benefits of the learning curve largely reflect the replacement of uncertainty with knowledge. The result can be a production process using less materials, less fuel, less reworks, narrower tolerances, and less supervision, overcoming entropy of all forms with information. This curve, in all its implications, is the fundamental law of economic growth and progress. (125)

The Curve of the Mind: Gilder explains the broader implications of the Learning Curve to the competitiveness of the market economy, and how easily yesterday’s giants can become tomorrow’s easy prey:

Firms that win by the curve of mind often abandon it when they establish themselves in the world of matter. They tight to preserve the value of their material investments in plant and equipment that embody the ideas and experience or their early years of success. They begin to exalt expertise and old knowledge, rights and reputation, over the constant learning and experience of innovative capitalism. They get fat. A fat cat drifting off the curve, however, is a sitting duck for new nations and companies getting on it. The curve of mind thus tends to favor outsiders over establishments of all kinds. At the capitalist ball, the blood is seldom blue or the money rarely seasoned. Microcosmic technologies are no exception. Capitalism’s most lavish display, the microcosm, is no respecter of persons. (113)

Socioeconomic Empowerment. As Gilder explains, the revolution of the Microcosm drew on, and empowered, the a diverse array of the downtrodden, both native-born and foreign:

The United States did nor enter the microcosm through the portals of the Ivy League, with Brooks Brothers suits, gentleman Cs, and warbling society wives. Few people who think they arc in already can summon the energies to break in. From immigrants and outcasts, street toughs and science wonks, nerds and boffins, the bearded and the beer-bellied, the tacks’ and uptight, and sometimes weird, the born again and born yesterday, with Adam’s apples bobbing, psyches throbbing, and acne galore, the fraternity of the pizza breakfast, the Ferrari dream, the silicon truth, the midnight modem, and the seventy-hour week, from dirt farms and redneck shanties, trailer parks and Levittowns, in a rainbow parade of all colors and wavelengths, of the hyperneat and the sty high, the crewcut and khaki, the pony-railed and punk, accented from Britain and Madras, from Israel and Malaya, from Paris and Parris Island, from Iowa and Havana, from Brooklyn and Boise and Belgrade and Vienna and Vietnam, from the coarse fanaticism and desperation, ambition and hunger, genius and sweat of the outsider, the downtrodden, the banished, and the bullied come most of the progress in the world and in Silicon Valey. (114).