Corbin Barthold invited me on Tech Freedom’s “Tech Policy Podcast” to discuss the history of antitrust and competition policy over the past half century. We covered a huge range of cases and controversies, including: the DOJ’s mega cases against IBM & AT&T, Blockbuster and Hollywood Video’s derailed merger, the Sirius-XM deal, the hysteria over the AOL-Time Warner merger, the evolution of competition in mobile markets, and how we finally ended that dreaded old MySpace monopoly!

What does the future hold for Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix? Do antitrust regulators at the DOJ or FTC have enough to mount a case against these firms? Which case is most likely to have legs?

Corbin and I also talked about the of progress more generally and the troubling rise of more and more Luddite thinking on both the left and right. I encourage you to give it a listen:

Last week I attended the Section 230 cage match workshop at the DOJ. It was a packed house, likely because AG Bill Barr gave opening remarks. It was fortuitous timing for me: my article with Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation, was published 24 hours before the workshop by the Oklahoma Law Review.

These were my impressions of the event:

I thought it was pretty well balanced event and surprisingly civil for such a contentious topic. There were strong Section 230 defenders and strong Section 230 critics, and several who fell in between. There were a couple cheers after a few pointed statements from panelists, but the audience didn’t seem to fall on one side or the other. I’ll add that my friend and co-blogger Neil Chilson gave an impressive presentation about how Section 230 helped make the “long tail” of beneficial Internet-based communities possible.

AG Bob Barr gave the opening remarks, which are available online. A few things jumped out. He suggested that Section 230 had its place but Internet companies are not an infant industry anymore. In his view, the courts have expanded Section 230 beyond drafters’ intent, and the Reno decision “unbalanced” the protections, which were intended to protect minors. The gist of his statement was that the law needs to be “recalibrated.”

Each of these points were disputed by one or more panelists, but the message to the Internet industry was clear: the USDOJ is scrutinizing industry concentration and its relationship to illegal and antisocial online content.

The workshop signals that there is now a large, bipartisan coalition that would like to see Section 230 “recalibrated.” The problem for this coalition is that they don’t agree on what types of content providers should be liable for and they are often at cross-purposes. The problematic content ranges from sex trafficking, to stalkers, to opiate trafficking, to revenge porn, to unfair political ads. For conservatives, social media companies take down too much content, intentionally helping progressives. For progressives, social media companies leave up too much content, unwittingly helping conservatives.

I’ve yet to hear a convincing way to modify Section 230 that (a) satisfies this shaky coalition, (b) would be practical to comply with, and (c) would be constitutional.

Now, Section 230 critics are right: the law blurs the line between publisher and conduit. But this is not unique to Internet companies. The fact is, courts (and federal agencies) blurred the publisher-conduit dichotomy for fifty years for mass media distributors and common carriers as technology and social norms changed. Some cases that illustrate the phenomenon:

In Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, a 1991 federal district court decision, some Washington apple growers sued some local CBS affiliates for airing allegedly defamatory programming. The federal district court dismissed the case on the grounds that the affiliates are conduits of CBS programming. Critically, the court recognized that the CBS affiliates “had the power to” exercise editorial control over the broadcast and “in fact occasionally [did] censor programming . . . for one reason or another.” Still, case dismissed. The principle has been cited by other courts. Publishers can be conduits.

Conduits can also be publishers. In 1989, Congress passed a law requiring phone providers to restrict “dial-a-porn” services to minors. Dial-a-porn companies sued. In Information Providers Coalition v. FCC, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that regulated common carriers are “free under the Constitution to terminate service” to providers of indecent content. The Court relied on its decision a few years earlier in Carlin Communications noting that when a common carrier phone company is connecting thousands of subscribers simultaneously to the same content, the “phone company resembles less a common carrier than it does a small radio station.”

Many Section 230 reformers believe Section 230 mangled the common law would like to see the restoration of the publisher-conduit dichotomy. As our research shows, that dichotomy had already been blurred for decades. Until advocates and lawmakers acknowledge these legal trends and plan accordingly, the reformers risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Relevant research:
Brent Skorup & Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation (Oklahoma Law Review).

Brent Skorup & Joe Kane, The FCC and Quasi–Common Carriage: A Case Study of Agency Survival (Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology).

[first published at The Bridge on August 9, 2018]

What happens when technological innovation outpaces the ability of laws and regulations to keep up?

This phenomenon is known as “the pacing problem,” and it has profound ramifications for the governance of emerging technologies. Indeed, the pacing problem is becoming the great equalizer in debates over technological governance because it forces governments to rethink their approach to the regulation of many sectors and technologies.

The Innovation Cornucopia

Had Rip Van Winkle woken up his famous nap today, he’d be shocked by all the changes around him. At-home genetics tests, personal drones, driverless cars, lab-grown meats, and 3D-printed prosthetic limbs are just some of the amazing innovations that would boggle his mind. New devices and services are flying at us so rapidly that we sometimes forget that most did not even exist a short time ago. At this point, it feels like our smartphones have been in our lives forever, but even just a decade ago, very few of us had one. Likewise, plenty of people now regularly enjoy the benefits of the sharing economy, but ten years ago, Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb did not even exist. Most of the social networking platforms or online video and audio streaming services that we use today had not even been created 15 years ago. Back then, Netflix’s DVD mail subscription service seemed downright revolutionary.

With every innovation comes more questions about how the law should keep pace, or whether it even can. “There has always been a pacing problem,” observes Yale University bioethicist Wendell Wallach, author of  A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control. But what Wallach and many other scholars worry about today is that the pace of change has been kicked into overdrive, making it more difficult than ever for traditional legal schemes and regulatory mechanisms to stay relevant. Larry Downes refers to this as “The Law of Disruption.” In his 2009 book on this “law,” Downes showed how “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally” and that this law was becoming “a simple but unavoidable principle of modern life.”

Moore’s Law Quickens the Pace

There are three primary reasons the pacing problem is such a force in our modern world. The root cause lies in the power of “combinatorial innovation,” which is driven by “Moore’s Law.”  The Information Revolution spawned a stunning array of new technological capabilities that build on top of one another in a symbiotic fashion. Think about the shared foundational elements of most modern inventions: microchips, sensors, digital code, big data, cloud computing, remote data storage, wireless networking and geolocation capabilities, machine-learning, cryptography, and more. Each of these underlying capabilities is becoming faster, cheaper, smaller, more powerful, and easier to find and use. Innovators are combining them as part of their ongoing search for new and better ways of doing things.

Moore’s Law powers these developments. Moore’s Law is the principle named after Intel co-founder Gordon E. Moore, who first observed in 1965 that “computing would dramatically increase in power, and decrease in relative cost, at an exponential pace” in coming years. Indeed, it has continued to do so for the past half century for many information technologies. A recent Technology Policy Institute white paper noted that “data transit prices fell from about $1200 per Mbps in 1998 to $0.02 per Mbps in 2017.”

These forces are now revolutionizing other sectors as “software eats the world” and innovators utilize these new technologies to address nearly every conceivable need and want. In the field of genetics, the biological equivalent of Moore’s Law is known as the “Carlson curve.” The past two decades have seen the cost of sequencing a human genome fall from over $100 million to under $1,000, a rate nearly three times faster than Moore’s Law.

What the Public Wants, the Public Gets

The second reason the pacing problem is accelerating is that the public wants it to! It is true that many people say they are uneasy with many emerging technologies. When new gadgets and services first gain attention, a “technopanic” attitude often ensues. That is unsurprising because, as others have noted, “fear has gone hand in hand with technological advancements throughout history.”

But societal attitudes toward technological change often shift rapidly. They do so even faster today as citizens quickly assimilate new tools into their daily lives and then expect that even more and better tools will be delivered tomorrow. As more people begin to realize how new technologies improve our lives in meaningful ways, it becomes extremely hard for policymakers to take those innovations away or even tell us not to expect better ones. This relationship between technological change and societal expectations acts as an extraordinarily powerful check on the ability of regulators to “roll back the clock” on innovative activities.

Broken Government Exacerbates the Problem

Finally, the pacing problem is becoming more acute because “demosclerosis” and “kludgeocracy” have taken hold within American government. Jonathan Rauch coined the term demosclerosis in his 1999 book Government’s End: Why Washington Stopped Working to describe “government’s progressive loss of the ability to adapt.” “[A]s layer is dropped upon layer,” he argued, “the accumulated mass becomes gradually less rational and less flexible.”

Instead of cleaning up old legalistic messes and adapting to the times, government solutions are more often clumsily cobbled together to patch past problems and create temporary solutions. Steven Teles refers to this as kludgeocracy. “The complexity and incoherence of our government often make it difficult for us to understand just what that government is doing,” Teles says. Kludgeocracy creates serious costs for individual citizens, governments themselves, and to our democratic systems more generally, he argues. Taken together, demosclerosis and kludgeocracy breed highly dysfunctional governments and make it even easier for the pacing problem to speed ahead.

Can Policymakers Adapt?

Regulators are not oblivious to the challenges posed by the pacing problem. “I have said more than once that innovation moves at the speed of imagination and that government has traditionally moved at, well, the speed of government,” remarked Michael Heurta, head of the Federal Aviation Administration, in a 2016 speech regarding drones. Shortly after Huerta made those comments, the Department of Transportation released a report on the regulation of driverless car technology which noted that “The speed with which [driverless cars] are advancing, combined with the complexity and novelty of these innovations, threatens to outpace the Agency’s conventional regulatory processes and capabilities.”

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulators have increasingly referenced the pacing problem when discussing the challenge of keeping up with new medical innovations.  The New York Times recently asked Dr. Peter Marks, director of the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, how the agency planned to deal with hundreds of “rogue” stem cell treatment clinics. “There are hundreds and hundreds of these clinics,” he said. “We simply don’t have the bandwidth to go after all of them at once.”

The pacing problem has even crept into antitrust enforcement. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) sought to break up Microsoft in the late 1990s, but as the legal proceedings dragged on through the early 2000’s, the market moved and made the DOJ’s case moot. Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox emerged as legitimate competitors to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer without regulatory remedy. In the end, Microsoft reached a settlement with the DOJ that fell far short of the government’s original ambitions to bust up the firm, all because the market moved at a pace much faster than the regulator’s pace. More recent antitrust action in the US and EU also suffer from the pacing problem. Multi-year antitrust investigations reach conclusions that don’t reflect market trends in the intervening years and offer remedies that may be “too little, too late,” especially in the information technology sector.

Is the Pacing Problem Really the Pacing Benefit?

What should policymakers do in light of these new challenges? The extremes will not work. Lawmakers or regulators cannot simply double-down on the lethargic and unwieldy technocratic regulatory schemes of the past. Command-and-control tactics are not going to be effective in an age when technology evolves in a quicksilver fashion. In a world where “innovation arbitrage” is easier than ever, repressive crackdowns on new tech will often backfire. Evasive entrepreneurs will often move to those jurisdictions where their innovative acts are treated more hospitably. That, too, exacerbates the pacing problem.

From the perspective of many innovation advocates, this will make it seem like the pacing problem is more like the pacing  benefit. Generally speaking, that intuition is sound. Innovation is the fundamental driver of human betterment. We need more “moonshots”—“radical but feasible solutions to important problems”—to ensure that current and future generations enjoy more choices, greater mobility, increased wealth, better health, and longer lifespans. We don’t want archaic regulatory schemes and regimes holding that back.

Constructive Solutions

But policymakers will not abandon oversight of emerging technologies altogether, nor should we want them to. The potential harms associated with some new technologies could be significant enough that a certain degree of regulatory oversight will be required. But the pacing problem means the old, inflexible, top-down approaches will need to be discarded and that the administrative state itself must become more entrepreneurial.

In a forthcoming law review article entitled, “Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future,” Jennifer Skees, Ryan Hagemann, and I discuss how “soft law” mechanisms—multi-stakeholder processes, industry best practices and standards, workshops, agency guidance, and more—can help fill the governance gap as the pacing problem accelerates. Many agencies are already tapping soft law tools to help guide the development of new technologies such as driverless cars, drones, the Internet of Things, mobile medical applications, artificial intelligence, and others. In fact, we argue that soft law has already become the dominant form of technological governance for emerging tech in the US.

Critics might decry soft law as either being too lax (and open to private abuse) or too informal (and open to government abuse), but the pacing problem makes both arguments increasingly irrelevant. We need a new governance vision for the technological age. Our new governance systems must be more flexible and adaptive than the heavy-handed regulatory regimes that preceded them.

___________________

Related Reading

• Adam Thierer, “Evasive Entrepreneurialism and Technological Civil Disobedience: Basic Definitions,” The Bridge, July 20, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Making the World Safe for More Moonshots,” The Bridge, February 5, 2018.
• Jennifer Skees, “Do You Need a License to Innovate?” The Bridge, June 29, 2018,
• Andrea O’Sullivan & Adam Thierer, “3D Printers, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Tech Regulation,” The Bridge, August 1, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Does “Permissionless Innovation” Even Mean Anything?” Technology Liberation Front, May 18, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “Wendell Wallach on the Challenge of Engineering Better Technology Ethics,” Technology Liberation Front,  April 20, 2016,

Mobile broadband is a tough business in the US. There are four national carriers–Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint–but since about 2011, mergers have been contemplated (and attempted, but blocked). Recently, the competition has gotten fiercer.  The higher data buckets and unlimited data plans have been great for consumers.

The FCC’s latest mobile competition report, citing UBS data, says that industry ARPU (basically, monthly revenue per subscriber), which had been pretty stable since 1998, declined significantly from 2013 to 2016 from about $46 to about $36. These revenue pressures seemed to fall hardest on Sprint, who in February, issued $1.5 billion of “junk bonds” to help fund its network investments. Analysts pointed out in 2016 that “Sprint has not reported full-year net profits since 2006.”  Further, mobile TV watching is becoming a bigger business. AT&T and Verizon both plan to offer a TV bundle to their wireless customers this year, and T-Mobile’s purchase of Layer3 indicates an interest in offering a mobile TV service.

It’s these trends that probably pushed T-Mobile and Sprint to announce yesterday their intention to merge. All eyes will be on the DOJ and the FCC as their competition divisions consider whether to approve the merger.

The Core Arguments

Merger opponents’ primary argument is what’s been raised several times since the 2011 AT&T-T-Mobile aborted merger: this “4 to 3” merger significantly raises the prospect of “tacit collusion.” After the merger, the story goes, the 3 remaining mobile carriers won’t work as hard to lower prices or improve services. While outright collusion on prices is illegal, they have a point that tacit collusion is more difficult for regulators to prove, to prevent, and to prosecute.

The counterargument, that T-Mobile and Sprint are already making, is that “mobile” is not a distinct market anymore–technologies and services are converging. Therefore, tacit collusion won’t be feasible because mobile broadband is increasingly competing with landline broadband providers (like Comcast and Charter), and possibly even media companies (like Netflix and Disney). Further, they claim, T-Mobile and Sprint going it alone will each struggle to deploy a capex-intensive 5G network that can compete with AT&T, Verizon, Comcast-NBCU, and the rest, but the merged company will be a formidable competitor in TV and in consumer and enterprise broadband.

Competitive Review

Any prediction about whether the deal will be approved or denied is premature. This is a horizontal merger in a highly-visible industry and it will receive an intense antitrust review. (Rachel Barkow and Peter Huber have an informative 2001 law journal article about telecom mergers at the DOJ and FCC.) The DOJ and FCC will seek years of emails and financial records from Sprint and T-Mobile executives and attempt to ascertain the “real” motivation for the merger and its likely consumer effects.

T-Mobile and Sprint will likely lean on evidence that consumers view (or soon will view) mobile broadband and TV as a substitute for landline broadband and TV. Much like phone and TV went from “local markets with one or two competitors” years ago to a “national market with several competitors,” their story seems to be, broadband is following a similar trajectory and viewing this as a 4 to 3 merger misreads industry trends.

There’s preliminary evidence that mobile broadband will put competitive pressure on conventional, landline broadband. Census surveys indicate that in 2013, 10% of Internet-using households were mobile Internet only (no landline Internet). By 2015, about 20% of households were mobile-only, and the proportion of Internet users who had landline broadband actually fell from 82% to 75%. But this is still preliminary and I haven’t seen economic evidence yet that mobile is putting pricing pressure on landline TV and broadband.

FCC Review

Antitrust review is only one step, however. The FCC transaction review process is typically longer and harder to predict. The FCC has concurrent  authority with the DOJ under the Clayton Act to review telecommunications mergers under Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act but it has never used that authority. Instead, the FCC uses its spectrum transfer review authority as a hook to evaluate mergers using the Communication Act’s (vague) “public interest standard.” Unlike antitrust standards, which generally put the burden on regulators to show consumer and competitive harm, the public interest standard as currently interpreted puts the burden on merging companies to show social and competitive benefits.

Hopefully the FCC will hew to a more rigorous antitrust inquiry and reform the open-ended public interest inquiry. As Chris Koopman and I wrote for the law journal a few years ago, these FCC  “public interest” reviews are sometimes excessively long and advocates use the vague standards to force the FCC into ancillary concerns, like TV programming decisions and “net neutrality” compliance.

Part of the public interest inquiry is a complex “spectrum screen” analysis. Basically, transacting companies can’t have too much “good” spectrum in a single regional market. I doubt the spectrum screen analysis would be dispositive (much of the analysis in the past seemed pretty ad hoc), but I do wonder if it will be an issue since this was a major issue raised in the AT&T-T-Mobile attempted merger.

In any case, that’s where I see the core issues, though we’ll learn much more as the merger reviews commence.

The Department of Justice has suddenly reversed course from its previous findings that mobile providers who lack spectrum below 1 GHz can become “strong competitors” in rural markets and are “well-positioned” to drive competition locally and nationally. Those supporting government intervention as a means of avoiding competition in the upcoming incentive auction attempt to avoid these findings by highlighting misleading FCC statistics, including the assertion that Verizon owns “approximately 45 percent of the licensed MHz-POPs of the combined [800 MHz] Cellular and 700 MHz band spectrum, while AT&T holds approximately 39 percent.”

Sprint Nextel Corporation (Sprint Nextel) recently sent a letter to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) signed by Dick Thornburgh, a former US Attorney General who is currently of counsel at K&L Gates, expressing his support for the ex parte submission of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that was recently filed in the FCC’s spectrum aggregation proceeding. The DOJ ex parte recommends that the FCC “ensure” Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile obtain a nationwide block of mobile spectrum in the upcoming broadcast incentive auction. In his letter of support on behalf of Sprint Nextel, Mr. Thornburgh states he believes the DOJ ex parte “is fully consistent with its longstanding approach to competition policy under Republican and Democratic administrations alike.”

Mr. Thornburgh is mistaken. The principle finding on which the DOJ’s new recommendation is based – that the FCC should adopt an inflexible, nationwide restriction on spectrum holdings below 1 GHz – is clearly  inconsistent with the DOJ’s previous approach to competition policy in the mobile marketplace. Both the FCC and the DOJ have traditionally found that there is no factual basis for making competitive distinctions among mobile spectrum bands in urban markets, and the DOJ has distinguished among mobile spectrum bands only in rural markets.

In its 2006 complaint against the merger of Alltel and Western Wireless, the DOJ found that, in rural markets with relatively low population densities, it cost more to achieve broad mobile coverage using 1.9 GHz PCS spectrum, which made it less likely that providers with PCS spectrum would deploy in those markets. Based on that finding, the DOJ concluded that additional mobile entry would be difficult in certain rural markets in which the combined firm would own all available 800 MHz Cellular spectrum – the only mobile spectrum below 1 GHz that was available on a nationwide basis at that time.

In that same merger proceeding (I was the FCC Chairman’s wireless advisor at the time), the FCC refused to adopt the DOJ’s rural market distinction and instead maintained its traditional view that spectrum bands above 1 GHz are suitable for the provision of competitive services in both urban and rural markets.

Although the DOJ continued to apply its rural market distinction in subsequent merger reviews ( i.e., Alltel/Midwest Wireless and AT&T/Dobson), it recognized that the distinction wasn’t reliably predictive in every rural market and was competitively irrelevant to nationwide competition. For example, in the 2008 Verizon/Alltel merger, the DOJ found that Verizon was a “strong competitor” in rural markets in which Verizon didn’t own any Cellular spectrum below 1 GHz, “because, unlike many other providers with PCS spectrum in rural areas, it has constructed a PCS network that covers a significant portion of the population.” Similarly, in its 2011 complaint against the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile, the DOJ concluded that “T-Mobile in particular” was “especially well-positioned to drive competition, at both a national and local level,” in the mobile market even though T-Mobile owned very little spectrum below 1 GHz at that time.

The DOJ’s new recommendation is a sudden reverse in course from its previous findings that mobile providers who lack spectrum below 1 GHz can become “strong competitors” in rural markets and are “well-positioned” to drive competition locally and nationally.

The DOJ’s sudden reversal is particularly surprising given that the amount of spectrum below 1 GHz has increased substantially since the DOJ adopted its rural distinction in 2006. At that time, the 800 MHz Cellular band was the  only spectrum band below 1 GHz that was broadband-capable and fully available on a nationwide basis. Since then, two additional sub-1 GHz spectrum bands capable of supporting mobile broadband services have become available on a nationwide basis – the 800 MHz SMR and 700 MHz bands. Sprint Nextel owns nearly all of the 800 MHz SMR band nationwide, T-Mobile acquired 700 MHz spectrum through its acquisition of MetroPCS this year, and many rural and regional mobile providers own 800 MHz Cellular and 700 MHz spectrum in rural areas across the country.

Those supporting government intervention as a means of avoiding competition in the upcoming incentive auction attempt to avoid these facts by highlighting misleading FCC statistics, including the assertion that Verizon owns “approximately 45 percent of the licensed MHz-POPs of the combined [800 MHz] Cellular and 700 MHz band spectrum, while AT&T holds approximately 39 percent.” This statistic is misleading in two respects.

First, this statistic  excludes the 800 MHz SMR band, which is owned almost exclusively by Sprint Nextel. Excluding an entire spectrum band below one gigahertz from the statistical calculation creates the misleading impression that Verizon and AT&T hold a higher percentage of mobile spectrum below 1 GHz than they actually do.

Second, the FCC’s “MHz-POPs” methodology is weighted by population, which skews the resulting percentage of spectrum ownership significantly higher for companies that own spectrum in densely populated urban areas. A hypothetical using this methodology to calculate the percentage of “MHz-POPs” in the Cellular Market Areas (CMAs) covering the State of New York demonstrates just how skewed this methodology can be in the spectrum aggregation context.

Assume that “Company A” and “Company B” both own spectrum “Block X” (i.e., both companies own the same amount of spectrum in absolute terms) in different geographic areas in New York State. Specifically, assume that “Company A” owns “Block X” in geographic license area CMA001 (covering New York City and Newark, New Jersey), and “Company B” owns the same spectrum block in the other sixteen CMAs, including all six rural license areas in the state. If their spectrum holdings are calculated using the FCC’s population-weighted “MHz-POPs” methodology, “Company A” holds 70 percent of the “Block X” spectrum and “Company B” holds only 30 percent. (For an explanation of this methodology, see the “Technical Appendix” at the bottom of this post.)

As this example demonstrates, analyzing the percentage of spectrum mobile providers hold on a nationwide basis using the FCC’s “MHz-POPs” methodology is particularly misleading given the DOJ’s determination that spectrum below 1 GHz is competitively relevant only in sparsely populated rural areas. For example, if the FCC were to adopt a rule prohibiting any one mobile provider from holding 50% or more of the spectrum below 1 GHz in New York State on a “MHz-POPs” basis, “Company A” would be in violation of the rule even though it holds spectrum in  only 1 market and doesn’t hold any spectrum in rural markets.

When the 800 MHz SMR band is included and spectrum holdings are evaluated on a market-by-market basis, at least four different mobile providers hold spectrum below 1 GHz in most markets – a result that wasn’t even possible in 2006 (absent nationwide spectrum disaggregation on the secondary market) when the DOJ adopted its rural distinction.

Mr. Thornburgh’s broad statements about the DOJ’s past approach to competition policy generally and the FCC’s skewed statistics are not legitimate, data-based substitutes for a detailed analysis of DOJ precedent and current spectrum holdings below 1 GHz in both urban and rural markets. A detailed analysis indicates that the DOJ’s new recommendation is  not “fully consistent” with its previous approach to competition in the mobile marketplace, though it is consistent with a desire to rig the spectrum auction to favor certain competitors.

Technical Appendix

The FCC calculates “MHz-POPs” by multiplying the megahertz of spectrum held by a mobile provider in a given area by the population of that area.

The FCC also weights spectrum holdings by population using a “population-weighted average megahertz” calculation. The FCC calculates the nationwide “population-weighted average megahertz” of a mobile provider by dividing that provider’s “MHz-POPs” (as calculated above) by the US population.

The calculations for the New York State example in this blog post use “Cellular Market Areas,” which consist of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and Rural Service Area (RSA) licenses as defined by the FCC in Public Notice Report No. CL-92-40, “Common Carrier Public Mobile Services Information, Cellular MSA/RSA Markets and Counties,” DA 92-109, 7 FCC Rcd. 742 (1992). The population figures are from the 2000 U.S. Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

This week at CTIA 2013, FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel presented ten ideas for spectrum policy. Though I don’t agree with all of them, she articulated a reasonable vision for spectrum policy that prioritizes consumer demand, incorporates market-oriented solutions, and establishes transparent goals and timelines. Commissioner Rosenworcel’s principled approach stands in stark contrast to the intellectually bankrupt incentive auction recommendation offered by the Department of Justice last month.

Commissioner Rosenworcel clearly defines three simple goals for a successful incentive auction:

• Raising enough revenue to support the nation’s first interoperable, wireless broadband public safety network;
• Making more broadband spectrum available through policies that are attractive to broadcasters; and
• Providing fair treatment to those broadcasters who do not wish to participate in the auction.

All three goals are consistent with consumer demand for wireless broadband services, the market-oriented reassignment of broadcast spectrum envisioned by the National Broadband Plan, and the will of Congress.

In comparison, the DOJ’s recommendation focuses on only one goal: Subsidizing two particular companies – Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile – to ensure they obtain spectrum in the auction. The DOJ claims these subsidies are necessary to promote competition. But, there is a substantial difference between fair government policies that promote competition generally and a policy of favoring foreign-owned companies over their domestic competitors.

Unfortunately, the DOJ is not alone in its belief that bestowing government benefits on favored companies is a legitimate goal in a free society. Some members of the House Commerce Committee believe the DOJ’s past merger reviews provide “a solid factual and analytical basis” for its current recommendation to the FCC.

The fatal flaw in this theory is that the DOJ’s recommendation to the FCC is inconsistent with the factual findings and analysis of the DOJ in its past merger reviews. As I’ve noted previously, in its complaint against the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, the DOJ found that, “due to the advantages arising from their scope and scale of coverage,” Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile are “especially well-positioned to drive competition” in the wireless industry. That finding doesn’t provide any factual or analytical basis whatsoever to conclude that Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile require special government treatment in the incentive auction in order to compete with Verizon and AT&T.

That’s why the DOJ recommendation relies on an irrational and discriminatory presumption that Verizon and AT&T are using spectrum less efficiently than Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile. A speculative presumption doesn’t require the DOJ to admit its own deceit. It merely requires audacity.

In an era when government officials routinely revise the facts to suit their preferred outcomes and disclaim responsibility for the actions of the agencies they’re charged with leading, Commissioner Rosenworcel’s speech required intellectual bravery and political courage. Her ideas deserve a fair hearing.

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

So, the Department of Justice has formally filed suit against Apple and several major book publishers claiming collusion over eBook pricing. Let’s say Apple and the publishers are guilty as charged and in violation of our nation’s antitrust laws. Here’s my opinion on that: So what? What Apple and the publishers are doing here is trying to find a way to sustain creative works in an era when copyright law is slowly dying. As I noted here in a post yesterday, I take no joy in reporting the fact that property rights for intellectual creations no longer function effectively. I wish they did still work, but they are failing rather miserably in an age of highly decentralized digital dissemination. Moreover, I am not prepared to see government go to absurd enforcement extremes in an attempt to make intellectual property rights work. But, that being said, something needs to sustain and cross-subsidize cultural creations in an age of mass piracy. I have increasingly come to believe that consolidation of content and conduit (or devices) is a big part of the answer. Alternatively, some sort of informal collusion among cultural creators and information distributors may be the answer.

Apple and the publishers have figured that out and come up with a plan that keeps intellectual works flowing while making sure that the creators behind them get paid. At a time when copyright critics always say “just find a better business model” Apple and the publishers did just that. But now Department of Justice officials say that business model should be forbidden. That’s crazy.  If we’re going to let copyright die, we should at least grant more pricing and deal-making flexibility to the creative community to structure business arrangements that might give them a lifeline.

But won’t such deals give publishers and other creative artists and industries more pricing power that will help them keep prices up artificially? Yes, of course! That is the whole point! God forbid we actually have to pay something to cultural creators. Ain’t that a scandal. But here’s a news flash: That’s what copyright law was all about, too. It was about helping creators put some fences around their “property” to help them maintain some degree of pricing power for goods with zero marginal cost. The scheme worked brilliantly for many years. It spawned a vibrant marketplace of ideas and helped America become the leading exporter of expressive works on the planet. But now the effectiveness of traditional copyright is fading rapidly. Industry consolidation, cross-promotions, pricing deals, and so on, will increasingly be the “better business model” some will turn to.  So, are we going to allow it? Or will critics just keep mouthing “go find a better business model” and have the government step in every time they don’t like the one industry chooses?  I say let experimentation continue.

Milton Mueller responded to my post Wednesday on the DOJ’s decision to halt the AT&T/T-Mobile merger by asserting that there was no evidence the merger would lead to “anything innovative and progressive” and claiming “[t]he spectrum argument fell apart months ago, as factual inquiries revealed that AT&T had more spectrum than Verizon and the mistakenly posted lawyer’s letter revealed that it would be much less expensive to expand its capacity than to acquire T-Mobile.”  With respect to Milton, I think he’s been suckered by the “big is bad” crowd at Public Knowledge and Free Press.  But he’s hardly alone and these claims — claims that may well have under-girded the DOJ’s decision to step in to some extent — merit thorough refutation.

To begin with, LTE is “progress” and “innovation” over 3G and other quasi-4G technologies.  AT&T is attempting to make an enormous (and risky) investment in deploying LTE technology reliably and to almost everyone in the US–something T-Mobile certainly couldn’t do on its own and something AT&T would have been able to do only partially and over a longer time horizon and, presumably, at greater expense.  Such investments are exactly the things that spur innovation across the ecosystem in the first place.  No doubt AT&T’s success here would help drive the next big thing–just as quashing it will make the next big thing merely the next medium-sized thing.

The “Spectrum Argument”

The spectrum argument that Milton claims “fell apart months ago” is the real story here, the real driver of this merger, and the reason why the DOJ’s action yesterday is, indeed, a blow to progress.  That argument, unfortunately, still stands firm.  Even more, the irony is that to a significant extent the spectrum shortfall is a product of the government’s own making–through mismanagement of spectrum by the FCC, political dithering by Congress, and local government intransigence on tower siting and co-location–and the notion of the government now intervening here to “fix” one of the most significant private efforts to make progress despite these government impediments is really troubling.

Anyway, here’s what we know about spectrum:  There isn’t enough of it in large enough blocks and in bands suitable for broadband deployment using available technology to fully satisfy  current–let alone future–demand.

Two incredibly detailed government sources for this conclusion are the FCC’s 15th Annual Wireless Competition Report and the National Broadband Plan.  Here’s FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski summarizing the current state of affairs (pdf):

The point deserves emphasis:  the clock is ticking on our mobile future. The FCC is an expert agency staffed with first-rate employees who have been working on spectrum allocation for decades – and let me tell you what the career engineers are telling me. Demand for spectrum is rapidly outstripping supply. The networks we have today won’t be able to handle consumer and business needs.

* * *

To avoid this crisis, the National Broadband Plan recommended reallocating 500 megahertz of spectrum for broadband, nearly double the amount that is currently available.

* * *

First, there are some who say that the spectrum crunch is greatly exaggerated – indeed, that there is no crunch coming. They also suggest that there are large blocks of spectrum just lying around – and that some licensees, such as cable and wireless companies, are just sitting on top of, or “hoarding,” unused spectrum that could readily solve that problem. That’s just not true.

* * *

The looming spectrum shortage is real – and it is the alleged hoarding that is illusory.

It is not hoarding if a company paid millions or billions of dollars for spectrum at auction and is complying with the FCC’s build-out rules. There is no evidence of non-compliance. . . . [T]he spectrum crunch will not be solved by the build-out of already allocated spectrum.

All of the evidence suggests that spectrum suitable for mobile broadband is scarce and growing scarcer.  Full stop.

It is troubling that critics–particularly those with little if any business experience–are so certain that even with no obvious source of additional spectrum suitable for LTE coming from the government any time soon, and even with exponential growth in broadband (including mobile) data use, AT&T’s current spectrum holdings are sufficient to satisfy its business plans (and its investors and stockholders).  You’d think AT&T would be delighted to hear this news–what we really need is a shareholder resolution to put Gigi Sohn on the board!

But seriously, put yourself in AT&T’s shoes for a moment.  Its long-term plans require the company to deploy significantly more spectrum than it currently holds in a reasonable time horizon (even granting Milton’s dubious premise that the company is squatting on scads of unused spectrum–remember that even if AT&T had all the spectrum sitting in its proverbial bank vault it would still be just about a third of the total amount of spectrum we’re predicted to need in just a few years).  Considering the various impediments of net neutrality regulation, congressional politics, presidential politics (think this had anything to do with claims about job losses from the merger, by chance?), reluctant broadcasters, the FCC, state PUCs, environmental groups and probably 10-12 others . . . the chances of being able to obtain the necessary spectrum and cell tower sitings in any other reasonable fashion were perhaps appropriately deemed . . . slim.

With the T-Mobile deal, on the other hand, “AT&T will gain cell sites equivalent to what would have taken on average five years to build without the transaction, and double that in some markets. AT&T’s network density will increase by approximately 30 percent in some of its most populated areas.” (Source).  I just don’t see how this jibes with the claim that the spectrum argument has fallen apart.

But there is a larger, “meta” point to make here, and it’s one that policy scolds and government regulators too often forget.  Even if none of that were true, as long as we don’t know for sure what is optimal and do know the DOJ is both a political organization made up of human beings operating not only under said ignorance but with incentives that don’t necessarily translate into “maximize social welfare” and also devoid of any actual “skin in the game,” I think the basic, simple, time-tested, logical and self-evident error cost principle counsels pretty firmly against intervention.  Humility, not hubris should rule the roost.

And that’s especially true since you know what will happen if the DOJ (or the FCC) succeeds in preventing AT&T from buying T-Mobile?  T-Mobile will still disappear and we’ll still be left with (according to the DOJ’s analysis) the terrifying prospect of only 3 national wireless telecom providers.  Only, in that case, everyone’s going to think a lot harder about investing in future developments that might warrant integration or cooperation or . . . well, the DOJ will challenge anything, so add to the list patent pools, too much success, not enough sharing, etc., etc.  And you wonder why I think this might constitute an assault on innovation?

Now, as for Milton’s specific claims, reminiscent of Public Knowledge’s and Free Press’ talking points, let me quote AT&T’s Public Interest Statement discussing its own particular spectrum holdings:

Because of the high demand for broadband service, AT&T already has had to deploy four carriers (for a total of 40 MHz of spectrum) for UMTS [3G] in some areas—and it will need to deploy more in the near future, even if doing so squeezes its GSM spectrum allocation and compromises GSM service quality . . . .  AT&T expects that, given the relative infancy of the LTE ecosystem and the time needed to migrate subscribers, it will need to continue to allocate spectrum to UMTS services for a substantial number of years—indeed, even longer than AT&T needs to continue allocating spectrum for GSM services.

* * *

AT&T has begun deployment of LTE services using its AWS and 700 MHz spectrum and currently plans to cover more than 250 million people by the end of 2013

* * *

AT&T projects it will need to use its 850 MHz and 1900 MHz spectrum holdings to support GSM and UMTS services for a number of years and, in the meantime, will not be able to re-deploy them for more spectrally efficient LTE services.

* * *

AT&T’s existing WCS spectrum holdings cannot be used for this purpose either, because the technical rules for the WCS band, such as limits on the power spectral density limits, make it infeasible to use that band for broadband service.

In other words, I don’t think AT&T has been (nor could it be, given the FCC’s detailed knowledge on the subject) hiding its spectrum holdings.  Instead, the company has been making quite clear that the spectrum it has is simply insufficient to meet anticipated demand.  And, well, duh!  Anyone who uses AT&T knows its network is overloaded.  Some of that’s because of tower-siting issues, some because it simply didn’t anticipate the extent of demand it would face.  I heard somewhere that no matter how hard they try to account for their perpetual under-accounting, every estimate by every mobile provider of anticipated spectrum needs in the past two decades or so has fallen short.  I’m quite sure that AT&T didn’t anticipate in 2007 that spectrum usage would increase by 8000% (yes, that’s thousand) by 2010.

Moreover, there will always (in any sensible system) be excess capacity at times–as it happens, at (conveniently) the times when spectrum usage is often counted–in order to deal with peak loads.  It is no more sensible to deploy capacity sufficient to handle the maximum load 100% of the time than it is to deploy capacity to handle only the minimum load 100% of the time.  Does that mean the often-unused spectrum is “excess”?  Clearly not.

Moreover (again), not all spectrum is in contiguous blocks sufficient to deploy LTE.  AT&T (at least) claims that is the case with much of its existing spectrum.  Spectrum isn’t simply fungible, and un-nuanced claims that “AT&T has X megahertz of spectrum and it is plenty” are just meaningless.  Again, just because Free Press says otherwise does not make it so.  You can simply discount AT&T’s claims if you like–I’m sure it’s possible they’re just lying; but you should probably be careful whose “information” you believe instead.

But, no, Milton, the spectrum argument did not “fall apart months ago.”  Gigi Sohn, Harold Feld and Sprint just said it did.  There’s a difference.

“Letter-Gate”

As for the infamous letter alleged to show that AT&T could expand LTE service from its previously-planned 80% of the country to the 97% it promises if the merger goes through for significantly less than it would cost to buy T-Mobile:  I don’t know exactly what its import is—but no one outside AT&T and, maybe, the FCC really does, either.  But I think a little sensible skepticism is in order.

First, for those who haven’t read it, the letter says, in relevant part:

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss AT&T’s current LTE deployment plans to reach 80 percent of the U.S. population by the end of 2013…; the estimated [Begin Confidential Information] $3.8 billion [End Confidential Information] in additional capital expenditures to expand LTE coverage from 80 to 97 percent of the U.S. population; and AT&T’s commitment to expand LTE to over 97 percent of the U.S. population as a result of this transaction.

That part, “$3.8 billion,” between the words “Begin Confidential Information” and “End Confidential Information” was supposed to be redacted, but apparently wasn’t when the letter was first posted to the FCC’s website.

While Public Knowledge and other critics of the deal would have you believe that this proves AT&T could roll-out nationwide LTE service for 1/10 of the cost of the T-Mobile deal, it’s basically impossible to tell what this number really means–except it certainly doesn’t mean that.

Claims about its meaning are actually largely content-less; nothing I’ve seen asks (or can possibly answer) whether the number in the letter was full cost, partial cost, annualized cost, based off of what baseline, etc., etc.  Moreover, unless I’m mistaken, nothing in the letter said anything at all about $3.8 billion being used to relieve congestion, meet future demand, increase speeds, reduce latency, expand coverage in urban areas, etc.  It seems to me that it’s referring to “additional” (additional to what?) capital expense to build infrastructure to make it even possible to offer LTE coverage to 97% of the U.S. population following the merger.  AT&T has from the outset said (bragged, more like it, because it’s supposed to bring lots of jobs and that’s what the politicians care about) that it planned to spend an “additional” $8 billion–additional to the $39 billion required to buy T-Mobile, that is–to build out its infrastructure as part of the deal.  But neither this letter nor any of AT&T’s statements (nor anyone with any familiarity with the relevant facts) has ever said it could or would have full-speed, LTE service available and up and running to 97% of the country for $3.8 billion or even $8 billion–or even merely $39 billion.  In fact, AT&T seemed to be saying that it was going to cost at least $47 billion to make that happen (and I can assure you that doesn’t begin to account for all the costs associated with integrating T-Mobile with AT&T once the $39 billion is out the door).

As I’ve alluded to above, deploying LTE service to rural areas is probably not as important for AT&T as increasing its network’s capacity in urban areas. The T-Mobile deal allows AT&T to alleviate the congestion problems experienced by its existing customers in urban areas more quickly than any other option–and because T-Mobile’s network is already up and running, that’s still true even if the federal government was somehow able to make tons of spectrum immediately available.  Moreover, with respect to the $3.8 billion, as I’ve discussed at length above, without T-Mobile’s–or someone’s!–additional spectrum and the miraculous removal of local government impediments to tower construction, pretty much no amount of money would enable AT&T to actually deliver LTE service to 97% of the country.  Is that what it would cost to build the extra pieces of hardware necessary to support such an offering?  That sounds plausible.  But actually deliver it? Hardly.

And just to play this out, let’s say the letter did mean just that — that AT&T could deliver real, fine LTE service to 97% of the country for a mere $3.8 billion direct, marginal outlay, even without T-Mobile.  It is still the case that none of us outsiders knows what such a claim would assume about where the necessary spectrum would come from and what, absent the merger, the effect would be on existing 3G coverage, congestion, pricing, etc., and what the expected ROI for such a project would be.  Elsewhere in the letter its author states that AT&T considered whether making this investment (without the T-Mobile merger) was prudent, and repeatedly rejected it.  In other words, all those armchair CEOs are organizing AT&T’s business and spending its money without the foggiest clue as to what the real consequences would be of doing so–and then claiming that, although, unlike them, actually in possession of the data relevant to such an assessment, AT&T must be lying, and could only justify spending $39 billion to buy T-Mobile as a means of securing its monopoly power.

And I think it’s important to gut check that claim, as well, as it’s what critics claim to fear (The Ma Bell from the Black Lagoon).  Unpacked, it goes something like this:

Given that:

1.  AT&T is going to spend $39 billion to buy T-Mobile;
2. It is going to spend $8 billion to build additional infrastructure;
3. Having bought T-Mobile, it is going to incur some ungodly amount of expense integrating T-Mobile’s assets and employees with its own;
4. It is going to incur huge, ongoing additional costs to govern a now-larger, more-complex organization;
5. It is going to continue to be regulated by the FCC and watched carefully by the DOJ and its unofficial consumer watchdog minions;
6. It will continue to face competition from its current largest and second-largest competitor;
7. It will continue to face entry threats from the likes of Dish and Lightsquared;
8. It will continue to face competition from fixed broadband offered by the likes of Comcast and Time Warner;
9. It will do all this quite publicly, under the watchful eyes of Congress and its union to whom it has made all manner of politically-expedient promises;

 Then it follows that:

1. Although it can’t muster the gumption to risk $3.8 billion to legitimately (it is claimed) extend full LTE coverage to 97% of the U.S. population, it nevertheless thinks it’s a sure bet that it will be able to recoup all of these expenditures, in this competitive and regulatory environment, by virtue of having thus taken out not its largest, not even its second-largest, but its smallest “national” competitor, and thereby having converted itself into an unfettered monopolist. QED.

The mind boggles.

So.  Back to Milton and his suggestion that I was wrong to claim that the DOJ’s action here is a threat to innovation and progress and his assertion that AT&T’s claims surrounding the benefits of the transaction fail to stand up to scrutiny:  C’mon, Miltons of the world!  Where’s your normally healthy skepticism?  I know you don’t like big infrastructure providers.  I know you’re angry your iPhone isn’t as functional as it is beautiful.  I know capitalists are only slightly more trustworthy than regulators (or is it the other way around?).  But why give in so credulously to the claims of the professional critics?  Isn’t it more likely that the deal’s critics are just blowing smoke here because they don’t like any consolidation?  It doesn’t take much research to understand (to the extent anyone can understand something so complex) the current state of the U.S. broadband market and its discontents–and why something like this merger is a plausible response.  And you don’t have to like, trust, or even stand the sight of any business executive to know that, however stupid or evil, he is still constrained by powerful market forces beyond his ken.  And “Letter-Gate” is just another pseudo-scandal contrived to suit an agenda of aggressive government meddling.

We all ought to be more wary of such claims, less quick to join anyone in condemning big as bad, and far less quick to, implicitly or explicitly, substitute the known depredations of the government for the possible ones of the market without a hell of a lot better evidence to do so.

[Cross-Posted at Truthonthemarket.com]

There has been, as is to be expected, plenty of casual analysis of the AT&T / T-Mobile merger to go around.  As I mentioned, I think there are a number of interesting issues to be resolved in an investigation with access to the facts necessary to conduct the appropriate analysis.  Annie Lowrey’s piece in Slate is one of the more egregious violators of the liberal application of “folk economics” to the merger while reaching some very confident conclusions concerning the competitive effects of the merger:

Merging AT&T and T-Mobile would reduce competition further, creating a wireless behemoth with more than 125 million customers and nudging the existing oligopoly closer to a duopoly. The new company would have more customers than Verizon, and three times as many as Sprint Nextel. It would control about 42 percent of the U.S. cell-phone market. That means higher prices, full stop. The proposed deal is, in finance-speak, a “horizontal acquisition.” AT&T is not attempting to buy a company that makes software or runs network improvements or streamlines back-end systems. AT&T is buying a company that has the broadband it needs and cutting out a competitor to boot—a competitor that had, of late, pushed hard to compete on price. Perhaps it’s telling that AT&T has made no indications as of yet that it will keep T-Mobile’s lower rates.

Full stop?  I don’t think so.  Nothing in economic theory says so.  And by the way, 42 percent simply isn’t high enough to tell a merger to monopoly story here; and Lowrey concedes some efficiencies from the merger (“buying a company that has the broadband it needs” is an efficiency!).  To be clear, the merger may or may not pose competitive problems as a matter of fact.  The point is that serious analysis must be done in order to evaluate its likely competitive effects.  And of course, Lowrey (H/T: Yglesias) has no obligation to conduct serious analysis in a column — nor do I in a blog post. But this idea that the market concentration is an incredibly useful and — in her case, perfectly accurate — predictor of price effects is devoid of analytical content and also misleads on the relevant economics.

Quite the contrary, so undermined has been the confidence in the traditional concentration-price notions of horizontal merger analysis that the antitrust agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are premised in large part upon the notion that modern merger analysis considers shares to be an inherently unreliable predictor of competitive effects!!  (For what its worth, a recent The Wall Street Journal column discussing merger analysis makes the same mistake — that is, suggests that the merger analysis comes down to shares and HHIs.  It doesn’t.)

To be sure, the merger of large firms with relatively large shares may attract significant attention, may suggest that the analysis drags on for a longer period of time, and likely will provide an opportunity for the FCC to extract some concessions.  But what I’m talking about is the antitrust economics here, not the political economy.  That is, will the merger increase prices and harm consumers?  With respect to the substantive merits, there is a fact-intensive economic analysis that must be done before anybody makes strong predictions about competitive effects.  The antitrust agencies will conduct that analysis.  So will the parties.  Indeed, the reported $3 billion termination fee suggests that AT&T is fairly confident it will get this through; and it clearly thought of this in advance.  It is not as if the parties’ efficiencies contentions are facially implausible.  The idea that the merger could alleviate spectrum exhaustion, that there are efficiencies in spectrum holdings, and that this will facilitate expansion of LTE are worth investigating on the facts; just as the potentially anticompetitive theories are.   I don’t have strong opinions on the way that analysis will come out without doing it myself or at least having access to more data.

I’m only reacting to, and rejecting, the idea that we should simplify merger analysis to the dual propositions — that: (1) an increase in concentration leads to higher prices, and (2) when data doesn’t comport with (1) we can dismiss it by asserting without evidence that prices would have fallen even more.  This approach is, let’s just say, problematic.

In the meantime, the Sprint CEO has publicly criticized the deal.  As I’ve discussed previously, economic theory and evidence suggest that when rivals complain about a merger, it is likely to increase competition rather than reduce it.  This is, of course, a rule of thumb.  But it is one that generates much more reliable inferences than the simple view — rejected by both theory and evidence — that a reduction in the number of firms allows leads to higher prices.  Yglesias points out, on the other hand, that rival Verizon prices increased post-merger (but did it experience abnormal returns?  What about other rivals?), suggesting the market expects the merger to create market power.  At least there we are in the world of casual empiricism rather than misusing theory.

Adam Thierer here at TLF provides some insightful analysis as to the political economy of deal approval.   Karl Smith makes a similar point here.

That’s basically what FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz told the Association of National Advertisers when he spoke to their “Advertising Law & Public Policy” conference last Thursday. As I noted last week, there’s intense pressure in Congress to pass a financial regulatory overhaul and, unfortunately, the version passed by the House in December—Rep. Barney Frank’s “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009” (H.R. 4173)—would also grant the Federal Trade Commission vast new powers for all its regulations, not just those relating to the non-bank financial institutions it currently regulates. In particular, HR 4173 would:

• Make it far easier (and not just faster) for the FTC to issue all kinds of new regulations on its own, without a specific Congressional mandate to do so and instead of relying on case-by-case enforcement to punish “unfair” or “deceptive” acts and practices;
• Reduce public input into those regulations;
• Impose heavy civil penalties on companies before notifying them that a practice might be “unfair” or “deceptive”;
• Prosecute those who merely provided “substantial assistance” to someone engaged in “unfair” or “deceptive” acts or practices; and
• Sue on its own authority, instead of through DOJ (as now).

I summarized my concerns about this bill in this short interview with PFF’s new communications director, Mike Wendy, last week: [display_podcast]

Leibowitz has lobbied hard to have his agency put on steroids (as former FTC Chairman Jim Miller put it), asking for all these things, as well as more funding, at the first Senate hearing on Hr 4173 back in February. (Conveniently, he was the only witness!) He repeated his calls for these powers on Thursday but tried to allay fears about how they’d be used. As Communications Daily reports:

The FTC would use expanded authority only where consumers suffer “significant harm,” bad behavior is common in the industry, standards would improve practices and the expected burdens are “reasonable,” Leibowitz said. “We’d be really stupid if we try to solve every problem in American society with a rule,” he said, so the commission will use any new authority “very judiciously….”  Where business practices and consumer expectations are “evolving,” self-regulation is working and First Amendment issues are involved, the FTC would hold back, he said… [including] behavioral advertising and marketing to children. It would show “enormously bad judgment to pursue those matters, Leibowitz said. “We do believe in self-regulation.”

I’m glad to hear Commission Leibowitz say all this but… well, I fear these soothing promises of regulatory restraint will ultimately prove hollow, if not under this FTC Chairman, then under his successors (just as I am not comforted by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s similar promises not to regulate the Internet, no matter how sincere he may be). Strangely, Leibowitz promises the FTC will regulate only when “bad behavior is common in the industry”—and yet HR 4173 would eliminate the requirement of the FTC’s current Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures that a regulated practice must be “prevalent.” (The Direct Marketing Association’s Linda Wooley discussed this critical issue in detail in her testimony.) This illustrates a broader point: the whole point of restraining our regulatory agencies by statute is that we all know better than to trust a regulator when he says, “Oh, don’t worry, we’re not really going to use all that power—and if we do, we’ll be sure to use it carefully!”

The FTC May Need New Focused Mandates, But Not More Broad Powers

Leibowitz singled out “negative-option marketing (where marketers presume consumers want a certain product and charge them for it unless they opt-out) as an example of the kinds of scams the FTC would use its new powers to punish. Perhaps he’s right that the FTC may not be able to adequately address such unfair and deceptive practices today. But it does not follow that this requires increasing the FTC’s powers across the board. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison hit the nail on the head in her remarks at last week’s Senate Commerce Committee hearing on HR 4173:

In evaluating whether, and how, to change the scope and extent of FTC regulatory authority, I believe we must first ask whether there is a particular exigency, or area of consumer harm, that is so pervasive that the FTC’s existing enforcement capabilities and rulemaking processes are not sufficient to address the issue.  Second, if there is such an exigency, is the proposed legislative change broadly applied, resulting in greater regulatory burdens across a wide range of industries, or is it appropriately narrow to provide the FTC greater ability to develop rules and carry out enforcement actions directly relevant to that exigency.  Third, we need to consider whether the FTC has sufficient personnel in key areas of its responsibility to carry out its enforcement and consumer protection mandates.

In written testimony, FTC Commissioner William Kovacic supported retaining Moss-Magnuson’s additional procedural safeguards because:

While many other agencies do have the authority to issue rules following notice and comment procedures [under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)], the Commission’s rulemaking is unique due to the range of subject matter (unfair or deceptive acts or practices) and sectors (reaching broadly across the economy, except for specific carve-outs). Except where Congress has given the FTC a more focused mandate to address particular problems, beyond the FTC Act’s broad prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices, I believe that it is prudent to retain procedures beyond those encompassed in the APA.

Congress has already enacted several such statutes, such as COPPA, telemarketing, the CAN-SPAM Act and mortgages, and if the FTC could identify particular problems that require a new mandate to issue rules under the APA. Yet, as Linda Wooley noted in her testimony, when Commissioner Leibowitz was asked at last month’s hearing to enumerate areas in which APA rulemaking authority would be helpful, he could only respond that, “…we’d really want to […] think for a while if we got this authority about what we wanted to do and what we wouldn’t want to do…”

William Allen Rogers's 1904 cartoon recreates an episode in Gulliver's Travels, with T.R. as Gulliver

In other words, Leibowitz wants Congress to write his agency a blank check to do whatever it deems necessary in the future. Specifically, the FTC would get to decide which issues were appropriate for preemptive regulation, as well as achieving much the same effect of aggressive regulation through litigation designed to intimidate—imitating Teddy Roosevelt’s approach to foreign policy: “Speak softly and carry a big stick!“

We’ve been down this road before. In the 1970s, the FTC so thoroughly abused its uniquely vast jurisdiction by issuing rules to, among other things, ban advertising to children, that it was dubbed the “National Nanny” by the Washington Post—hardly a Thatcherite bastion. This experience led Congress in 1980 to impose the procedural safeguards that would be repealed by HR 4173. Congress was so angry it actually briefly shut down the agency to make it clear that it had not dubbed the agency a regulatory knight errant, free to tilt its steely lance at imagined windmills of “unfairness” or “deception.”

The Dodd Bill: A Welcome Alternative to HR 4173

HR 4173 was sent to the Senate in December, and in January, the bill was referred to the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by Sen. Chris Dodd. The Senate Commerce Committee, which held the two hearings discussed above, has jurisdiction only over the bill’s implications for non-financial regulation. So the two committees will have to work out some kind of compromise before the Senate can pass a bill—which will probably have to be reconciled with what the House passed. That procedural posture is important because it means the Senate has the opportunity to do what the House did not: Pause and consider whether financial overhaul really requires reinventing the FTC as the “National Nanny” it was well on its way to becoming back in the 1970s—and, in particular, what such a radical change to the FTC’s powers would mean for the Internet and other media regulated by the agency.

The good news is that Sen. Dodd’s draft 1336-page legislation seems to do precisely what Sen. Hutchinson and others have suggested: Change the FTC’s authority only with regards to a particular problem—in this case, financial regulation. (Dodd’s bill differs in a number of other respects from HR 4173). In a nutshell, Dodd’s bill would transfer the FTC’s consumer financial protection functions to the newly created Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Reserve, but the FTC could also punish violations of the bill’s financial protections on its own under Section 5 of the FTC act.  Further, the Fed’s BCP would have to consult with the Federal Trade Commission before imposing any regulations. The FTC could impose civil penalties, but only for “knowing violations” of the CFPA Act—i.e., only for financial offenses. In an important recognition of the dangers of unbridled agency discretion, the Dodd bill also imports the FTC’s existing definition of “unfairness” as requiring that an act or practice be “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers” and which is “not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”

The bad news is that Dodd’s bill is unlikely to be the final word on the FTC’s authority, as Sen. Rockefeller’s Commerce Committee may insist on some or all of the provisions of HR 4173 that expand the FTC’s powers across the board among a flurry of other amendments. Still, whatever its other shortcomings or advantages, Dodd’s bill offers a path forward for financial overhaul that does not require remaking the FTC—and thus transforming regulation of the Internet, other media, advertising, cyber-security and privacy—among many other things. And for that, the Dodd bill deserves careful consideration as an alternative to just giving the FTC all the power it could ever want, and then just hoping the agency doesn’t abuse it—which is essentially what Chairman Leibowitz, much like the FCC’s Chairman Genachowski, is suggesting we do.

Microsoft and Yahoo’s proposed deal faces a tough antitrust gauntlet. In today’s The Seattle Times, Jonathan Hillel and I have an op-ed in which we argue that trustbusters should let the deal go through:

MICROSOFT and Yahoo want to join forces in Internet search to better compete against Google. But first, they need the blessing of government antitrust enforcers. Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Chairman Herb Kohl, D-Wis., already has threatened “careful scrutiny” of the deal. But trustbusters should not go fishing for problems in the Internet search market. In the relentlessly fast-moving digital economy, government intervention contorts the market and ultimately harms consumers. Under their proposed decade-long pact, Yahoo searches will be powered by Microsoft’s Bing search engine, which launched this June. The two search firms will maintain separate Web sites, but Microsoft will administer the technical side of both. Microsoft will also gain access to Yahoo’s vast volume of searches and query data. In exchange, Yahoo will receive 88 percent of ad revenues from searches performed on its own site.

[…]

Scale may make Microsoft and Yahoo more competitive, but it hardly guarantees them success. Indeed, history tells us that innovation, not scale, is the one true silver bullet in Internet search. Google earned its crown nearly a decade ago by revolutionizing search technology, devising the revolutionary PageRank system for indexing the Web and toppling AltaVista in the process. More recently, Microsoft’s Bing has made inroads by combining a clever cataloging system with alluring design.

Read the rest here.

Great piece in Wired by Fred Vogelstein asking “Why Is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?” It paints a pretty good picture of the coming antitrust ordeal that Google is likely to be subjected to by the Obama Administration. And, as usual, I couldn’t agree more with the skepticism that Eric Goldman of Santa Clara University Law School articulates when he notes: “The problem for antitrust in high tech is that the environment changes so rapidly. Someone who looks strong today won’t necessarily be strong tomorrow.”  More importantly, as Vogelstein’s article notes, we’ve been down this path before with less than stellar results when you look at the IBM investigation in the 70s and the Microsoft case from the 90s (a fiasco that is still going on today):

After the government initiated its case against IBM, the company spent two decades scrupulously avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. By the time the suit was dropped in the early 1980s, company lawyers were weighing in on practically every meeting and scrutinizing every innovation, guarding against anything that could be seen as anticompetitive behavior. A decade later, innovation at Big Blue had all but ceased, and it had no choice but to shrink its mainframe business. (It has since reinvented itself as a services company.) Microsoft took the opposite approach. Gates and company were defiant, to the point of stonewalling regulators and refusing to take the charges seriously. “Once we accept even self-imposed regulation, the culture of the company will change in bad ways,” one former Microsoft executive told Wired at the time. “It would crush our competitive spirit.” Gates put it even more directly: “The minute we start worrying too much about antitrust, we become IBM.” Microsoft’s hostility to the very idea of regulation resulted in several avoidable missteps—including remarkably antagonistic deposition testimony from Gates—that ultimately helped the DOJ rally support for its ongoing antitrust suit against the company. Although Microsoft ultimately settled, the public beating appears to have taken a toll on the company, which has been unable to maintain its reputation for innovation and industry leadership.

Read the whole article for all the gory details.  This is going to be the biggest antitrust case of all-time once it is finally launched and I feel confident predicting that it will make many lawyers and consultants very, very rich while doing absolutely nothing to help consumer welfare.  But perhaps those DOJ lawyers can at least get Google to lower the prices for all those services they offer. Oh, wait, they’re all free.  But don’t worry, I’m sure Beltway bureaucrats will do a great job of running something as complex as search algorithms and online advertising markets.  Right.

Lori Drew was convicted late last year on charges related to her role in a cruel hoax that led to the tragic suicide of thirteen-year old Megan Meier in Missouri in 2006. But today, at her sentencing, the judge threw out her convictions. Millions around the world were horrified by Megan’s fate, and many will probably be upset that Drew might go unpunished. But we need to separate three questions in this case:

1. Should the federal anti-hacking law under which she was convicted really be applied in such cases?
2. What, precisely, was Drew’s involvement?
3. The key question: What should be done about the general problems of cyberbullying and cyberharassment?

Misuse of the Anti-Hacking Statute

Judge Wu has yet to issue his written opinion but seems to have agreed with the various experts on Internet law who argued that, however tragic the Meier case was, the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA) should not have been applied to Drew. Most notably, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an Amicus Brief in support of Drew’s motion to dismiss the charges against her—summarized by Groklaw and the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology. Orin Kerr, a leading Internet law professor, felt so strongly about the consequences of using the CFAA to criminalize violations of privately written terms of service that he joined Drew’s defense team. Kerr demonstrated the problems of essentially allowing private parties to create the grounds for criminal offenses (if violated by users) by suggesting obviously ridiculous new terms of service for the Volokh Conspiracy, the group blog he writes on.

Hard as it may be for those who want to “see justice done” in this case, the CFAA just isn’t the right law to apply—which raises the question of whether new laws are needed, discussed below.

Uncertainty About Drew’s Role

The judge may also have been influenced by uncertainty as to Drew’s actual role in the case. Initial coverage of the story suggested that Drew created the fake MySpace persona of a teen boy (“Josh Evans”), then used that profile to woo Meier, a classmate of Drew’s daughter, only to deliberately—and cruelly—break her heart. After Missouri prosecutors and the FBI declined to press charges against Drew, federal prosecutors in California decided to do so, but Drew consistently maintained that it was not her idea to create the account.

When she finally went to trial, Ashley Grills, an 18-year-old friend of the Drew family, changed her story: Grills had initially claimed that creating the account was Ms. Drew’s idea, but admitted at trial that she (not Drew) created the fake “Josh Evans” account and that most of the conversations between Meier were with Grills, not Lori Drew. In particular, the final blow that seems to have driven the emotionally fragile Meier to suicide apparently came from Grils, not Drew:”You are a bad person and everybody hates you. Have a shitty rest of your life. The world would be a better place without you.”

We’ll probably never know exactly what actually happened, but it does appear that Drew was not the prime instigator behind the hoax, as she first appeared to be, but played more the role of a facilitator. Unconscionable as its for any adult, especially a parent to encourage, promote or even allow such behavior, it may not create legal liability.

Cyberbullying: What’s Next?

The real question here is how we should deal such cases more generally. Adam Thierer and I released a major study of these issues a few weeks ago: Cyberbullying Legislation: Why Education is Preferable to Regulation—which Adam recently dicussed at a Capitol Hill briefing. We distinguish among three problems that have been conflated in coverage of this issue:

1. Cyberbullying: kid-on-kid abuse online
2. Cyberharassment generally: people of all ages using the Internet to harass each other
3. Adult-on-kid cyberharassment: the Megan Meier case

Confusion of these three issues has resulted in some very inappropriate responses to the problem. Most notably, Rep. Linda Sánchez has proposed the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,” which would make it a federal felony with a sentence of up to two years to transmit “any communication… with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior.” While Sánchez claims uses the word “cyberbullying” (Problem #1), her rhetoric (and the title of the bill) is really focused on adult-on kid cyberharassment (Problem #3). Punishing that special kind of abuse by adults of children, who are particularly vulnerable, might well be something federal law should address. But Sánchez’s bill doesn’t do that; instead, it seeks to punish all cyberharassment (Problem #2). Sánchez’s fails in several other respects to clearly define its terms and scope, thus raising serious constitutional concerns about the bill’s effect on chilling constitutionally protected free speech, as well as about the due process rights of those who might be prosecuted under the bill.

In our paper, we highlight a number of substantial changes that would need to be made to create a narrowly-tailored bill appropriate to the problem of adult-on-kid cyberharassment. But we also explain why it’s probably not possible to craft a law consistent with the Constitution to address the general issue of cyberharassment: While state laws generally apply to cyberstalking (where a threat of physical harm is made or felt), it’s profoundly difficult to distinguish between “harassment” and simple online conversations.

We do think something can and should be done about the very real problem of kid-on-kid cyberbullying (Problem #1). But rather than treat kids as felons (the Sánchez approach), lawmakers could get serious about supporting online safety education, awareness-building efforts, prevention, and intervention. Such an approach would avoid thorny constitutional problems and has recently been floated in both chambers of Congress. In mid-May, the “School and Family Education about the Internet (SAFE Internet) Act” (S. 1047) was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and in the House by Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL). The measure proposes an Internet safety education grant program that will be administered by the Department of Justice, in concurrence with the Department of Education, and the Department of Health & Human Services. These agencies will also work in consultation with education, Internet safety, and other relevant experts to administer a five-year grant program, under which each grant will be awarded for a two-year period. Eligible non-profits may use the grants to:

(1) identify, develop, and implement Internet safety education programs, including educational technology, multimedia and interactive applications, online resources, and lesson plans; (2) provide professional training to elementary and secondary teachers, administrators, and other staff on Internet safety and new media literacy; (3) develop online-risk prevention programs for children; (4) train and support peer-driven Internet safety education initiatives; (5) coordinate and fund research initiatives that investigate online risks to children and Internet safety education; (6) develop and implement public education campaigns to promote awareness of online risks to children and Internet safety education; (7) educate parents about teaching their children how to use the Internet and new media safely, responsibly, and ethically and help parents identify and protect their children from risks relating to use of the Internet and new media

This is exactly the right approach. This bill truly deserves the name “Cyberbullying Prevention Act,” while the Sánchez bill might more accurately be called the “Cyberharassment (of all kinds) Punishment Act.” Rather than pursuing regulation through criminal sanctions that would chill protected speech, education is the better approach—something the federal government can help to support. As Adam and I conclude in our paper:

Again, real online safety and proper netiquette begin at home. We need to teach our kids to be good cyber-citizens. We shouldn’t expect the government (or even schools) to do it all for us. But to the extent government can do something constructive about this problem, it is education and awareness-building that will have the most profound, lasting results. Although more substantive penalties cannot be ruled out entirely, creating new classes of crimes to deal with this problem is unlikely to solve the scourge of cyberbullying. Clearly, based on the emerging research, the young people who are involved in cyberbullying incidents—both as perpetrators and targets—have many problems. Addressing these painfully real issues will require applying effective risk prevention and intervention strategies. Instead of promoting such education, prevention, and intervention solutions, the Sánchez bill would simply create a new federal felony to address this problem. But criminalizing kid-on-kid behavior in whatever form will likely not solve the age-old problem of kids mistreating each other. Indeed, this problem has traditionally been dealt through counseling and rehabilitation at the local level. By contrast, the federal justice system generally works through criminal penalties. If federal criminal law has a role to play, it is in punishing clear cases of harassment of minors by adults in ways that do not chill free speech protected by the First Amendment and that are consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantees. Unlike the Sánchez bill, the Menendez bill is grounded in the need to implement such counseling and rehabilitation approaches in schools and communities. If members of Congress want to enact legislation that has a chance of effectively reducing truly harmful behavior—and which avoids constitutional pitfalls and subsequent court challenges—the Menendez bill provides the best avenue to accomplish that important goal at this time.

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

We’ve just released a new PFF white paper (PDF) entitled, “Cyberbullying Legislation: Why Education is Preferable to Regulation.” In this 24-page study we note that, compared to previous fears about online predation, which have been greatly overblown, concerns about cyberbullying are more well-founded. Evidence suggests the cyberbullying is on the rise and that it can have profoundly damaging consequences for children.

Unsurprisingly, in the wake of a handful of high-profile cyberbullying incidents that resulted in teen/tween suicides, some state lawmakers began floating legislation to address the issue. More recently, two very different federal approaches have been proposed. One approach is focused on the creation of a new federal crime to punish cyberbullying, which would include fines and jail time for violators. In April 2008, Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) introduced H.R. 1966 (originally H.R. 6123), the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,” a bill that would create a new federal felony:

“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”

The other legislative approach is education-based and would create an Internet safety education grant program to address the issue in schools and communities. In mid-May, the “School and Family Education about the Internet (SAFE Internet) Act” (S. 1047) was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and in the House by Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL). The measure proposes an Internet safety education grant program that will be administered by the Department of Justice, in concurrence with the Department of Education, and the Department of Health & Human Services. These agencies will also work in consultation with education, Internet safety, and other relevant experts to administer a five-year grant program, under which each grant will be awarded for a two-year period.

In our paper, we argue that criminalizing what is mostly kid-on-kid behavior—and especially creating a new federal felony, as the Sánchez bill proposes—will not likely solve the age-old problem of kids mistreating each other.  Moreover, this approach could raise thorny free speech and due process issues related to how the law defines harassing or intimidating speech. To the extent criminal sanctions are pursued as a solution, it may be preferable to allow state experimentation with varying models.

By contrast, education and awareness-based approaches have a chance of effectively reducing truly harmful behavior, especially over the long-haul. Such approaches would have the added benefit of avoiding constitutional pitfalls and subsequent court challenges. Thus, if lawmakers feel the need to address cyberbullying concerns at this time, it is clear that regulation is, at best, premature and that education is the better approach.

Our paper can be found on the PFF website or SSRN, and the Scribd version of the document is embedded down below. We welcome your comments on our conclusions.

[In a follow-up post, we will address why the criminalization approach to addressing cyberbullying raises free speech concerns and other constitutional issues.]

Unlike with wiretaps, law enforcement agents are not required by federal statutes to obtain search warrants before employing pen registers or trap and trace devices. These devices record non-content information regarding telephone calls and Internet communications. (Of course, “non-content information” has quite a bit of content – who is talking to whom, how often, and for how long.)

The Electronic Privacy Information Center points out in a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) that the Department of Justice has consistently failed to report on the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices as required by law:

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act requires the Attorney General to “annually report to Congress on the number of pen register orders and orders for trap and trace devices applied for by law enforcement agencies of the Department of Justice.” However, between 1999 and 2003, the Department of Justice failed to comply with this requirement. Instead, 1999-2003 data was provided to Congress in a single “document dump,” which submitted five years of reports in November 2004. In addition, when the 1999-2003 reports were finally provided to Congress, the documents failed to include all of the information that the Pen Register Act requires to be shared with lawmakers. The documents do not detail the offenses for which the pen register and trap and trace orders were obtained, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3126(2). Furthermore, the documents do not identify the district or branch office of the agencies that submitted the pen register requests, information required by 18 U.S.C. § 3126(8).

EPIC has found no evidence that the Department of Justice provided annual pen register reports to Congress for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, or 2008. “This failure would demonstrate ongoing, repeated breaches of the DOJ’s statutory obligations to inform the public and the Congress about the use of electronic surveillance authority,” they say.

It’s a good bet, when government powers are used without oversight, that they will be abused. Kudos to EPIC for pressing this issue. Senator Leahy’s Judiciary Committee should ensure that DoJ completes reporting on past years and that it reports regularly, in full, from here forward.

And so begins another fight over data retention. As Declan summarizes:

Republican politicians on Thursday called for a sweeping new federal law that would require all Internet providers and operators of millions of Wi-Fi access points, even hotels, local coffee shops, and home users, to keep records about users for two years to aid police investigations. The legislation, which echoes a measure proposed by one of their Democratic colleagues three years ago, would impose unprecedented data retention requirements on a broad swath of Internet access providers and is certain to draw fire from businesses and privacy advocates. […] Two bills have been introduced so far — S.436 in the Senate and H.R.1076 in the House. Each of the companion bills is titled “Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today’s Youth Act,” or Internet Safety Act.

Julian also has coverage over at Ars and quotes CDT’s Greg Nojeim who says the data retention language is “invasive, risky, unnecessary, and likely to be ineffective.”  I think that’s generally correct.  Moreover, I find it ironic that at a time when so many in Congress seemingly want online providers to collect and retain LESS data about users, this bill proposes that ISPs be required to collect and retain MORE data. One wonders how those two legislative priorities will be reconciled!!

Don’t get me wrong. It’s good that Congress is taking steps to address the scourge of child pornography — especially with stiffer sentences for offenders and greater resources for law enforcement officials. Extensive data retention mandates, however, would be unlikely to help much given the ease with which bad guys will likely circumvent those requirements using alternative access points or proxies.  Finally, retention mandates pose a threat to the privacy of average law-abiding citizens and impose expensive burdens of online intermediaries.

We’ve had more to say about data retention here at the TLF over the years.  Here’s a few things to read:

• Yahoo! Data-Retention Policy vs. The New Justice Department, by Cord Blomquist
• Another Reason to Be Wary of Age Verification & Data Retention Mandates, by Adam Thierer, October 30, 2006.
• Mandatory Data Retention: How Much is Appropriate? by Adam Thierer, June 26, 2006.
• Internet Data Storage Is The Wrong Way To Combat Child Sexual Exploitation, by Hance Haney, Sept. 20, 2006.
• Data Retention on the Move, by Jim Harper, June 1, 2006.

I finally got around to reading Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know, by Randall Stross. It’s very well done. Stross is a frequently contributor to the New York Times and the author of several other interesting books on the technology industry. He knows how to weave a story together, and it helps that Google’s story is a pretty amazing one.

Each chapter discusses a different part of Google’s growing family of services — GMail, Google Maps, Google Earth, Book Search, and YouTube. Of course, it all started with search and Stross does a good job explaining how the ingenious Google search algorithm has grown from dorm room project to the greatest aggregator of human knowledge that the world has ever known. This, in turn, has powered Google’s hugely successful online advertising system. The real secret of their success with online advertising, Stross argues, is that “Google’s impersonal, mathematical approach search also provides you with the ability to serve advertisements that are tailored to a search, rather than to the person submitting the search request, whose identity would have to be known.”

Despite the benefits of such generally anonymous searching, as Google has grown and added new services and capabilities, concerns about the sheer volume of data that the company collects have led to heightened privacy concerns. Indeed, privacy is a core theme that Stross uses in the book to tie many of the chapters and issues together. Google is constantly struggling to strike the right balance between providing more access to the world’s information while also being careful not to raise privacy concerns. But it’s unclear exactly how much more information collection that users (or public officials) will tolerate before advocating stricter limits on Google’s reach.  As Stross points out:

Guided by its founding mission, to organize all the world’s information, Google has created storage capacity that allows it to gain control of what its users are you doing in a comprehensive way that no other company has done, and to preserve those records indefinitely, without the need to clear out old records to make way for new ones. Moreover, Google differentiates its service by refining its own proprietary software formula to mine and massage the data, technology that it zealously protects from the sight of rivals. This sets up a conflict between Google’s wish to operate a “black box” (completely opaque to the outside) and its users’ wish for transparency.

At the very least, users would like Google to disclose what protections are in place to safeguard their privacy. It is also natural that users would be curious about the machines that hold their personal data, as well as about which employees within Google have access to that data, and about the risks that it might be leaked, stolen, or transferred, for example, to a government agency that requests it. (p. 62)

Personally, I think most of these privacy fears are overblown. The mundane, trivial aspects of our daily lives aren’t really of much interest to Google. And to the extent users are concerned about their privacy, there are plenty of ways they can take steps to better protect their personal information or web-surfing habits.  Blocking ads, rejecting cookies, and using encryption are three steps that privacy-sensitive users can take to better shield the personal info or surfing habits. Finally, the concern about government access to data is best remedied by limits on what government can access in the first place. We shouldn’t be regulating Google or other companies to limit information collection based on a fear of government access; we just need to tightly limit the government’s ability to enlist private companies as agents of the state.

Still, as Stross points out, privacy concerns persist:

How can users be certain that their personal information won’t be put to uses to which an individual would never willingly consent? Privacy concerns extend across all Internet companies, but those concerns of our greatest where personal information is gathered in the largest pool. This makes the stewardship of Google’s machine a subject of public interest. Whatever is behind a door that is intentionally kept closed will appear sinister, whether deservedly so or not. For the sake of improving its public image, it’s possible that Google may relent and open its doors, at least enough to afford a peek inside. (p. 62)

I think that’s a fair point and this is something Google is really going to struggle with in coming years, especially as its search algorithm and other applications grow more powerful and comprehensive.  A good example of that is already seen with Google’s amazing “Street View” technology, which provides panoramic street-level views of maps searched via Google Maps. “What neither Google nor its critics realized,” Stross says, “was that our anonymity while walking about in public space in the predigital age was protected not by law but by the crude state of technology–we felt invisible only because cameras were not in place to capture our images.” (p. 145)

As a society, we had better get used to this because Street View is just the beginning of what will eventually grow into a far more sophisticated set of technologies as geo-mapping, geo-location, and image retrieval are married to virtual reality technologies. We’re really not that far away from Star Trek “holodecks” being projected into our living rooms, and once those holodecks let us walk down any street in the world, things are going to get both really exciting and a little bit creepy at the same time. But even if Google abandoned Street View tomorrow, somebody else would pick it up and run with it. Innovation in this space cannot be frozen. (Microsoft’s recent launch of Photosynth shows us that).  Google has already taken steps to protect privacy on Street View by blurring facial images and letting users flag “inappropriate or sensitive imagery for blurring or removal.”  That’s about all we can ask for.

Another theme that Stross develops nicely in the book is the ongoing war between Google and Microsoft. He argues that “Google’s ascendance has been accompanied by Microsoft’s decline.” (p. 195)  But that does not mean Google will be able to hold their current lead. As Stross rightly points out:

No computer company has ever been able to enjoy pre-eminence that spans two successive technological eras. IBM in the mainframe era could not head off the ascent of Digital Equipment Corporation in the minicomputer era, which, in turn, could not head off the ascent of Microsoft in the personal computer era.

And now Google has “succeeded in pushing Microsoft into a defensive crouch” and made life very difficult for that supposed “monopolist” of the PC era.  As a result, some Google critics claim this latest King of the Tech Hill cannot be toppled and that Google is the new “monopoly” we need to worry about.  But these fears are also overblown. Google faces threats today from many different providers and doesn’t really even have its act together in other areas. For example, Stross points out how Facebook and other social networking sites have been a real pain for Google. Facebook, in particular, is creating a massive walled garden that is largely outside Google’s search and information retrieval capabilities. “In a twinkling,” Stross argues, “Facebook became a miniature Web universe–behind a wall, inaccessible to Google.” (p. 30)  Meanwhile, in recent months, Google has annouced layoffs and has scuttled a variety of programs and projects which haven’t panned out, including experiments in social networking, virtual worlds, and a Twitter competitor.

But it is tomorrow’s providers and technologies that will pose the most serious challenge to Google’s current hegemony. No one can predict what big application(s) or competitor(s) will emerge next, but it all could happen faster than you think.  After all, let’s not forget that most of us hadn’t even conducted our first Google search 10 years ago, and no one considered Google a serious threat to Microsoft back in 1999.  Just a decade later, Google has Microsoft wondering if they have a future at all. Things can change that rapidly in the digital world and it should make us question the wisdom of government intervention into such a fast-moving field.

Moreover, government micromanagement of the services Google provides–especially search–is troubling to imagine. I don’t even want to think about how a DOJ consent decree would seek to control Google’s algorithm or the search business in general. But some critics are already speaking of “Googleopoly” and calling for a “Federal Search Commission,” foreshadowing the fight to come.  Google’s rapid growth and sheer size may end up tilting both policymakers and public opinion against them more and more in coming years as such “Googlephobia” increases. Stross notes that:

Google’s future will be determined to no small degree by the view that its users hold of the company itself. Google has enjoyed mostly favorable public notice in its first ten years, but maintaining a cuddly, anticorporate image when it stands among the U.S. companies with the largest market capitalization may pose an increasingly difficult challenge. (p. 18)

Indeed, Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” motto is already wearing a little thin in some quarters. And some of us still aren’t even sure what it means. As Google grows bigger and makes buckets more money in coming years–and they likely will–I think Stross is correct in arguing that Google’s honeymoon with the public and policymakers will likely come to an end. That doesn’t mean they won’t still be a great company doing great things, it’s just that they’ll be antagonizing even more competitors, lawmakers, and other groups than they already do today. And that will likely spell serious trouble for them. It’s never good to have so many enemies. Just ask Microsoft!

In the meantime, we shouldn’t lose sight of what an amazing capitalist success story Google has been and how lucky we are that they have been at least a little bit successful in their mission “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”  It’s an incredible story, and Planet Google is a fine early history of the company and the new era of computing it has ushered in.

Over the past year, I have been monitoring a very interesting trend with important ramifications for the future of Internet policy. State Attorneys General (AGs) — often in league with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) — have been striking a variety of “voluntary” agreements with various Internet companies that deal with child safety concerns or other online issues. These agreements require the companies involved to take various steps to alter site architecture and functionality, commit to stop certain practices, or take steps to block certain users (ex: predators; escort services) or types of content (ex: child porn; online “discrimination”) altogether.

To begin, let me be very clear about one thing: Some of these activities or types of content warrant a law enforcement response. That is certainly the case with child pornography or predation, for example. However, as I will note down below, there is a legitimate question about whether state officials and a non-profit private organization should be crafting legal or regulatory policies to address such concerns for a global medium like the Internet. Regardless, these agreements are creating a new layer of Internet regulation (almost extra-legal in character) that is worthy of exploration.

First, let me itemize some of these recent “voluntary” agreements between Internet companies and the AGs and/or NCMEC:

• MySpace, Facebook & 49 state AGs: On January 14th, 2008, social networking website operator MySpace.com announced an agreement with 49 state Attorneys General (AGs) aimed at better protecting children online. As part their “Joint Statement on Key Principles of Social Networking Safety,” MySpace promised the AGs it would expand online safety tools, improve education efforts, and expand its cooperation with law enforcement. Facebook entered into a similar agreement with the AGs in May. These agreements came after AGs had relentlessly pushed these social networking sites for over a year to adopt age verification techniques to screen site users. Although mandatory age verification was not part of the final agreements, an Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF) was formed to study online safety tools, including a review of online identity authentication technology. It was clear when the announcements were made that the AGs were very interested in seeing online age verification pursued.
• Various ISPs and New York AG + NCMEC: In June 2008, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo pushed several major ISPs to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NCMEC to address the dissemination of child pornography online.  Under the MOU, the ISPs must use a NCMEC-provided list of URLs supposedly containing child pornographic images to blacklist and block all access to those sites for their users. The agreement also closed off access to Usenet discussion boards on those ISP’s networks.
• Craigslist & California AG + NCMEC: In early November, Craigslist struck an agreement with 40 state AGs as well as NCMEC in which the online classifies operator agreed to take steps to root out certain sexually-themed or “erotic services” listings. See this Ars Technica article for additional details.
• eHarmony & New Jersey AG: Just this past week, the online dating service company eHarmony announced it had struck an agreement with the Attorney General of New Jersey to settle a complaint that a New Jersey resident filed with the state in 2005 alleging that eHarmony violated his rights by not offering a same-sex matching service. The agreement creates some interesting questions, as George Mason University law professor David Bernstein told the Wall Street Journal. The discrimination claim “seems like quite a stretch,” he said, and he said that he is worried it might encourage similar claims. “If you start a dating service for African Americans, do you need one for whites and Latinos? If you have one for Jews, do you need one for Christians and Muslims?” According to the Journal, eHarmony faces a similar discrimination claim in a California court, so we might get answers soon enough.

There are a number of interesting legal and practical questions raised by these agreements:

• “Voluntary” Agreements & the Law: Although typically billed as “voluntary” in nature, it seems highly unlikely that any of the companies involved would have made these concessions without  pressure from the state AGs (and sometimes NCMEC) to do so. How binding are these agreements in light of that? Of course, it is unlikely any of the companies involved would (or could) later challenge the validity or scope of these agreements after they had already signed onto them. But what if a free speech or civil liberties group challenged these agreements in court because of their impact on the Internet, online speech, or a certain group of citizens? Would they have a case? Would they even have standing? Where do they have it?
• Precedent & Applicability: Do such agreements constitute precedents that could be applied in other cases or contexts? Could parties not involved in the original agreements — either because they refused or did not yet exist — eventually be covered by them in some fashion? Do these agreements cover services available in the American but hosted entirely overseas?
• Commerce Clause Issues: Do state Attorneys General have the right to impose such quasi-regulatory regimes on an interstate medium like the Internet? Can 50 state AGs impose uniform laws on the Net without any congressional oversight, as was the case in the MySpace and Craigslist agreements? Conversely, what will the impact be of individual state AGs going their own way, as was the case with the eHarmony agreement? If Congress remains silent on the agreements but a group (ex: a civil liberties group) brings a dormant Commerce Clause case, what are their chances of prevailing in court?
• Accountability & Effectiveness: Will anyone in Congress or a federal agency oversee these agreements? How transparent are these agreements when they are brokered behind closed doors or with NCMEC? Does the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) apply such that records and information can be made public?  What is the benchmark of success when different states adopt different legal regimes for the Net?

I’m not saying I have any good answers here; I’m just trying to get the questions on the table and get a discussion going. I would appreciate any input on the matter, especially of the legal variety. It strikes me that we are in somewhat uncharted waters here, at least for the Internet. On the other hand, I’m sure there have been state AG-related “voluntary” agreements struck in other industries and contexts in the past that might provide some insight into what, if anything, happens next.

What I find most interesting about these developments is that the state AGs appear to be gradually accomplishing what Congress has not been able to do over the past dozen years: To impose a comprehensive regulatory structure on the Internet. But that emerging regulatory structure is highly fractured and piecemeal in nature, and that troubles me. I am particularly concerned about the long-term impact of a 50-state patchwork approach to online regulation — both for speech and commerce. It’s not like we’re talking about the regulation of a corner newsstand here, after all. This is the Internet, and localized regulation of this national — actually global — platform makes me more than a bit nervous.

In closing, I want to again reiterate that I do not necessarily oppose intervention in any of these cases. However, to the extent such regulations do need to be imposed and enforced, it may make more sense for the process to be federalized and NCMEC’s role nationalized and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or some branch of the Department of Justice. There needs to be greater transparency and accountability when matters of child pornography or predation are at issue, and NCMEC’s lack of FOIA-ability in this regard is problematic. I think NCMEC is a fine organization that does very important work to help protect children, but it is work that involves criminal activities and the collection of evidence that could be used in criminal court proceedings. In light of that — and in light of the expanded law enforcement powers being granted to NCMEC — I believe the time has come to have a serious conversation about whether those powers should continue to be housed in a private, non-profit organization, or if they should be transfered to a federal law enforcement agency. Of course, there could be serious downsides associated with the nationalization of those powers, which also should be considered.

So, while the rest of you are still watching your Saturday morning cartoons this weekend, I’ll be working hard to defend the First Amendment at the Federal Society’s 2008 “National Lawyers Convention.” I am speaking on a panel there on Saturday morning entitled “The FCC and the First Amendment” and will be going up against Federal Communications Commission Chairman Kevin Martin and Gregory Garre, the Solicitor General of the United States. The primary focus of our discussion will be the FCC v. Fox case that was recently heard by the Supreme Court. It should be an interesting conversation.

It looks like registration for the event is now closed, but I’ll try to blog about it afterwords. Not sure if they are taping it or not, but if I find a video or transcript I’ll post it later.

“The FCC and the First Amendment”

Saturday, November 22nd / 10:45 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. / East Room

• Mr. Miguel A. Estrada, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and Former Assistant to the United States Solicitior General
• Hon. Gregory G. Garre, United States Solicitor General
• Hon. Kevin J. Martin, Federal Communications Commission
• Mr. Adam D. Thierer, The Progress and Freedom Foundation
• Moderator: Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia

There’s news today that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is imposing fines on three leading electronics manufacturers — LG Display Co. Ltd., Sharp Corp. and Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd. — “for their roles in conspiracies to fix prices in the sale of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels.” According to the DOJ’s press release, of the $585 million in fines, LG will pay $400 million, the second highest criminal fine ever imposed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division.

Regardless of the merits of the DOJ’s case, I have to ask: Has there ever been a worse attempt at fixing prices in the entire history of price fixing? After all, have you looked at flat-screen prices lately? They do nothing but fall, fall, fall — fast! Here are some numbers from Steve Lohr’s New York Times article about the DOJ case:

The LCD business is a $100-billion-a-year market and growing, but prices are falling relentlessly. Recently, panel prices have often been cut in half each year, a downward trajectory even steeper than in other technology markets known for steady price pressure, like those for computer chips and hard drives. In the last six months alone, the price of a 15.4-inch panel for a notebook PC has dropped to $63, from $97, and a 32-inch LCD for a television has gone to $223, from $321, according to iSuppli, a market research firm. The price-fixing conspiracy, industry analysts said, was an effort to slow the speed of price declines. “These companies were trying to get a toehold to protect profits in a very difficult market,” said Richard Doherty, director of research at Envisioneering, a technology consulting firm.

Yeah, well, that “toehold” didn’t protect squat. And how could it; it’s not like these are the only three companies in the LCD business.  And you’ll forgive those of us who only have plasmas or projectors in our homes for wondering what the big deal is (although I am certainly aware that LCDs are the primary technology for smaller flat screen displays in computer monitors, cell phones, and other handhelds).

But hey, I’m sure the DOJ’s effort was worth it at some level. Some lucky handful of consumers will probably get a check for 65 cents once the class action dust settles on this one. In the meantime, if there is some sort of Antitrust Hall of Fame out there, I hearby nominate LG, Sharp, and Chunghwa for the “Worst Price Fixers in History” award.

And so the series continues.  The Washington Post reports that the Department of Justice has just released “a scathing report” finding that over a 5-year period the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) “lost dozens of weapons and hundreds of laptops that contained sensitive information.” The DOJ’s Inspector General Glenn A. Fine found that 418 laptop computers and 76 weapons were lost. According to the report:

Yesterday’s report showed that ATF, a much smaller agency than the FBI, had lost proportionately many more firearms and laptops. “It is especially troubling that that ATF’s rate of loss for weapons was nearly double that of the FBI and [Drug Enforcement Administration], and that ATF did not even know whether most of its lost, stolen, or missing laptop computers contained sensitive or classified information,” Fine wrote.  […] Many of the missing laptops contained sensitive or classified material, according to the report. ATF began installing encryption software only in May 2007. ATF did not know what information was on 398 of the 418 lost or stolen laptops. The report called the lack of such knowledge a “significant deficiency.” Of the 20 missing laptops for which information was available, ATF indicated that seven — 35 percent — held sensitive information. One missing laptop, for example, held “300-500 names with dates of birth and Social Security numbers of targets of criminal investigations, including their bank records with financial transactions.” Another held “employee evaluations, including Social Security numbers and other [personal information].” Neither laptop was encrypted.

The findings regarding lost weapons were equally troubling, if not a bit humorous:

Two weapons were subsequently used to commit crimes. In one incident, a gun stolen from the home of a special agent was fired through the window of another home. Ten firearms were “left in a public place.” One of them was left on an airplane, three in bathrooms, one in a shopping cart and two on the top of cars as ATF employees drove away. A laptop also fell off the top of a car as an agent drove off. Another weapon “fell into the water while an agent was fishing,” according to the report.

Now I know the private sector actors lose things too, but as I’ve pointed out before, if any of this happened in the private sector, trial lawyers would be salivating and lawsuits would be flying. By contrast, when the government loses personal information—information that his usually more sensitive than that which private actors collect—about the most that ever comes out of it is another report calling for “more accountability.” Few ever are actually held accountable (i.e., lose their jobs or get sued.)

Declan has got it exactly right here in commenting about the antitrust circus taking place between Google and Microsoft right now as the rhetorical war between them heats up and the feds—both in Congress and at the DOJ—get more and more involved in monitoring this market:

The underlying problem is that antitrust law is so malleable that it can be bent into virtually any shape that its practitioners desire. Given nearly any set of hard-nose business practices, some economist can be hired to claim that “predatory” prices are illegally low (hurting competitors) or illegally high (hurting consumers). No wonder Lester Thurow, the former dean of MIT’s business school, concluded that “the time has come to recognize that the antitrust approach has been a failure. The costs it imposes far exceed any benefits it brings.” And no wonder that some state attorneys general are now sniffing around to see if there’s a way for them to join the antitrust hunt.

And things are only going to get worse–far, far worse–in coming months.