At this week’s excellent State of the Net 2011 event, I participated in a panel discussion about the future of the online video marketplace.  Unsurprisingly, a great deal of time was spent discussing the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) recent approval of the proposed merger of Comcast and NBC Universal (NBCU). On Tuesday, the agency voted 4-1 to approve the deal with myriad conditions and “voluntary” concessions being attached.  The FCC voted on the matter and issued a short press release and late today issued its final 279-page order.

The Commission’s Comcast-NBCU order represents an unprecedented regulatory shakedown of a company that obviously would have done just about anything to gain approval of the deal.  I believe the conditions the FCC has imposed on the deal, which are to run for seven years, are tantamount to a death by a thousand cuts for the deal and, ultimately, could lead to its failure.  That’s because the requirements placed on the new entity make it practically impossible for Comcast to leverage the content it is acquiring from NBCU and profit from it such that they can recoup the significant costs associated with the deal.

In essence, Comcast-NBCU was forced to preemptively surrender much of its intellectual property rights by agreeing to share most of their content properties with others on terms someone else will determine.  That’s a recipe for disaster.  If Comcast-NBCU doesn’t have the right and ability to cut deals on terms that they find advantageous to the company and its shareholders, then why go through with this deal at all? Isn’t the whole point of such a deal with get some additional in-house content properties — something Comcast almost completely lacked previously — such that it would have some content gems to highlight and leverage in an attempt to attract new customers (or just keep old ones)? If someone else is constantly setting the terms of their deals, it will limit the inherent value of the IP owned by Comcast-NBCU and sap most of the value from the deal.

Particularly concerning in this regard is the language of the FCC’s order dealing with online video marketplace. As a condition of approval, the FCC’s plan requires that Comcast-NBCU:

• Provides to all MVPDs, at fair market value and non-discriminatory prices, terms, and conditions, any affiliated content that Comcast makes available online to its own subscribers or to other MVPD subscribers.
• Offers its video programming to legitimate OVDs [online video distributors] on the same terms and conditions that would be available to an MVPD.
• Makes comparable programming available on economically comparable prices, terms, and conditions to an OVD that has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of Comcast-NBCU’s peers.
• Offers standalone broadband Internet access services at reasonable prices and of sufficient bandwidth so that customers can access online video services without the need to purchase a cable television subscription from Comcast.
• Does not enter into agreements to unreasonably restrict online distribution of its own video programming or programming of other providers.
• Does not disadvantage rival online video distribution through its broadband Internet access services and/or set-top boxes.
• Does not exercise corporate control over or unreasonably withhold programming from Hulu.

The first thing to note about this language is that, through a merger proceeding, the FCC has just inserted itself into the online video marketplace in a major way and began regulating it.  Not so long ago, the idea of the FCC regulating the Net and online video would have been scoffed at and rejected as outlandish.  But here we are now with the FCC knee-deep into the daily workings of the online marketplace without Congress ever having passed a law authorizing such a thing.

The second thing to note about those online video provisions is that they potentially foreshadow the rise of a compulsory license for online video distribution.  In essence, to use antitrust parlance, Comcast-NBCU has a “duty to deal” its content to others on terms that regulators will police.  Of course, we already have many compulsory licenses in place in America, including one for traditional cable television, so it will be tempting for some to say, ‘why not one for online video, too?’  But it seems like this would have been a good time to give good ol’ fashion market competition and contractual negotiations a chance instead.  After all, where is the harm here?  If NBC’s content is supposedly so valuable that Comcast will exploit it in future online video negotiations, why hasn’t NBC been exploiting that content for years already?

Of course, this exposes the real irony of all this hand-wringing about the Comcast-NBCU deal: It’s a fight about supposedly “Must See TV” that not everyone feels they must see anymore!  Don’t get me wrong, NBCU does have some wonderful content in its stable of properties, and Comcast is no doubt happy to have something better than the Golf Channel under it’s corporate umbrella now.  But, seriously, would the Earth spin of its axis tomorrow if Comcast suddenly decided to try to lock up all its new NBC content and refuse to deal with anyone else on equal terms?  That would be highly unlikely, of course, since it would be economic suicide to restrict access to a single platform. But if they did, would anyone really care?   In the modern world of content abundance and distribution platform diversity, it’s hard to image most consumers would.  Comcast has bet the farm on the opposite theory — that NBCU content is still hotly demanded and will add real value to the company — and yet, even without the onerous conditions it has been forced to agree to here, the firm must know just how risky this move is for them and their shareholders.  Those who lost their shirts on the failed AOL-TimeWarner and NewsCorp-DirecTV deals can attest to how illusive those so-called “synergies” can be when two very different media operations and cultures are merged. [Read my old paper on “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria” for all the grim details on those deals and how they went south so quickly.]

Finally, perhaps the most interesting provision in the FCC’s order is the requirement that Comcast-NBCU “makes comparable programming available on economically comparable prices, terms, and conditions to an [online video distributors] that has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of Comcast-NBCU’s peers.” As I read it, what this means is that when competing content companies — such as Disney, News Corp., Viacom, etc. — cut deals with an online video distributors, it establishes a precedent for what is expected of Comcast-NBCU when they go to strike terms and prices with OVDs.  How long will it be before this provision leads to accusations of collusion among major content companies?!  Moreover, this provision is somewhat insulting since it basically assumes all content is created equal when that is most definitely not the case.  When Disney is negotiating with an OVD to carry ESPN, should that deal really have any bearing on Comcast cutting a deal with someone for the Golf Channel or Versus?

There are many other provisions and conditions that I haven’t bothered detailing here, including program “localism” mandates, broadband deployment and pricing requirements, program “diversity” requirements, children’s television mandates, more “PEG” programming requirements, and more.  But wait, you ask: won’t all these provisions and the others discussed above benefit consumers?  It’d be nice to imagine that the FCC could work such magic by waving its regulatory wand and trying to mandate consumer benefits into existence by decree. And perhaps some of these requirements will help some consumers in a marginal way.  In reality, however, healthy companies are the better way to serve customers with new and better services.  Hamstringing merging entities with layers of red tape like this is particularly misguided in light of how much money is being spent to make the deal happen.  Finally, regulators should just be happy that someone out there wanted to take over NBC and help the struggling media operator rebound!  If regulators are really concerned about the future of  “localism” or the health of traditional media operators like NBC more generally, asking for a pound of flesh through a set of “voluntary” concessions like these isn’t a good way to achieve that goal.

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

The Wall Street Journal reports (see Financial Times, too) that “CBS Corp. and Walt Disney Co. are considering participating in Apple Inc.’s plan to offer television subscriptions over the Internet, according to people familiar with the matter, as Apple prepares a potential new competitor to cable and satellite TV.”

If Apple signs up enough networks to launch a viable service—still a very big if—it could ultimately alter the economics of the television business. The service could undermine the big bundles of channels that cable, satellite and telecommunications companies, including Comcast Corp. and DirecTV Inc., have traditionally sold in packages to subscribers.

And Brian Stelter of The New York Times says of the plan:

Broadband Internet subscriptions to TV networks could potentially destabilize the bedrock of the television business, which relies on subscribers paying for dozens of bundled channels.

As we have noted have noted here in our ongoing “Cutting the Video Cord” series, it’s just another sign that the video marketplace is vibrantly competitive and experiencing unprecedented innovation. So, why is Washington regulating this marketplace like we still live in the disco era?

The New York Times itself seems to be of two minds on this: Brian seems to recognize that the rise of Internet television means that cable providers no longer have any sort of special “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” control over the programming available to consumers, just as his colleague Nick Bilton at the Times‘ BITS blog recently declared that “Cable Freedom Is a Click Away.” And yet, as Berin recently noted, when the DC Circuit struck down the FCC’s outdated 30% cap on the number of homes a single cable provider could serve (based on “gatekeeper” concerns) back in September, the  Times editorial page bemoaned the decision and demanded further regulation of the cable industry—even as Internet TV is fundamentally changing the marketplace for video programming and rendering moot “gatekeeper” concerns far more effectively than any law could ever do.

“Right hand, meet Left hand. Howyadoinnicetameetcha!”

Thanks to comments on my earlier post, Copyright Duration and the Mickey Mouse Curve, I’ve been encouraged to reflect on what would happen if, in fact, Steamboat Willie had fallen into the public domain. Could we then reuse Mickey Mouse, the star of that show, without facing any liability to the Walt Disney Company? I drafted this answer for my book, Intellectual Privilege (here edited for blogging):

Scholars have made surprisingly strong arguments that Steamboat Willie, a cartoon that the Walt Disney Company cites as establishing its copyright rights in Mickey Mouse, has fallen into the public domain. As a thought experiment, let us assume the truth of that claim. What would happen if Walt Disney Company—if, indeed, nobody—held a copyright in Steamboat Willie? Certainly, each of use would by default enjoy complete freedom to copy, distribute, display, or perform the cartoon, because the expiration of the work’s copyright would also end the exclusive rights of the Walt Disney Company and its assigns the exercise those statutory privileges. So, too, would we escape copyright’s limitations on making derivative versions of Steamboat Willie—versions that might show Mickey standing at a lectern rather than at a pilot’s wheel, for instance, or have him expounding on copyright law.

The Walt Disney Company would retain its copyrights in later, plumper versions of the Mickey Mouse, of course. Contemporary artists wanting to reinterpret the character free from the company’s veto would thus have to draw inspiration primarily from the earlier, skinnier, version. Given that the characters would share a common ancestor, however, even mice derived solely from Steamboat Willie would often strongly resemble the modern-day Mickey Mouse.

Would Walt Disney Company object to those unauthorized reuses of Steamboat Willie? It might, indeed. Some such uses might substitute for sales of the company’s wares, after all, or cast its most prominent spokes-mouse in an unsavory light. But copyright law would, per the assumption behind our thought experiment, offer the company no solace. The Walt Disney Company could not plausibly claim that patent or trade secret law gives it the power to limit free use of Steamboat Willie, either. Nor could it invoke the right of publicity, which though sometimes shockingly effective in limiting speech about celebrities, has thus far not stretched to cover cartoon characters.

Trademark and unfair competition law would probably offer the Walt Disney Company its most potent weapon against any movement to emancipate Steamboat Willie. Generally speaking, that area of law allows the holder of a name, symbol, or other mark to prevent latecomers from using in commerce marks likely to confuse consumers about the source or affiliation of a particular good or service. Thus, for instance, can Nike bar someone from putting its famous “swoop” on non-Nike clothes. The Walt Disney Company uses Mickey Mouse as a mark designating its goods and services. If a consumer did not know (ex hypothesis) that the image and voice of Mickey Mouse, qua the character Willie, had fallen into the public domain, and that consumer saw a cartoon of a substantially similar Mickey Mouse in a new context, the consumer might naturally, yet wrongly, assume that the newer Mickey Mouse had issued from the same source as so many other cartoons featuring the character: The Walt Disney Company. On that argument, consumer ignorance would give the company cause to censor derivative versions of the copyright-free Mickey Mouse.

Perhaps the addition of disclaimers, such as noting, “Not a Walt Disney Company production!” in a cartoon’s margin, would suffice to dispel consumer confusion. That would ward off only a “passing off” claim—one where a mark’s holder accuses another of selling bogus wares under that mark—however. The same disclaimer would set the defendant up for a ” reverse passing off” claim—one where Disney would charge that cartoonist wrongly sold Disney’s product (intellectual creations about Mickey Mouse) under another’s name. Disney could thereby damn those who use Steamboat Willie both if they do use disclaimers and if they do not. Happily for anyone who wants to free Willie, however, the Supreme Court has cut through that Gordian knot of liability.

The Supreme Court held in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation that, once a work has fallen into the public domain, its former copyright holder cannot use federal unfair competition law to demand credit from those who reuse the work. Still more broadly, the Court flatly excluded copyrighted works from the scope of section § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, the federal law barring passing off, whether direct or reverse. The Court explained the policy reasons for thus limiting unfair competition law:

Assuming for the sake of argument that [defendant] Dastar’s representation of itself as the “Producer” of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s “federal right to ‘copy and to use,'” expired copyrights.

Dastar voiced broad concerns, and lower courts have read it accordingly. They have extended it to bar state law claims of unfair competition, a result the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause would apparently mandate. Lower courts have also extended Dastar to bar unfair competition claims arising out of the use of uncopyrighted and uncopyrightable works. Plainly, the case has done a great deal to ensure that copyright’s privileges go no farther than copyright itself.

The exact scope of Dastar‘s preemptive effect remains as yet uncertain, granted. Even if it suffered the uncopyrighting of Steamboat Willie we’ve hypothecated here, for instance, the Walt Disney Company would perhaps still have the right to bring suit under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act against those using liberated versions of Mickey Mouse to deceptively market their wares, such as by falsely advertising a new Spaceship Willie as a Disney original. The Dastar Court left that question open. Lower courts have, however, read the case to bar § 43(a)(1)(B) claims alleging no more than false marketing about whether permission was granted for an uncopyrighted work. Under that reasoning, the Walt Disney Company could not even stop the authors of Spaceship Willie from selling it as, “A wholly original take on Mickey Mouse,” or, conversely, as “Mickey Mouse in the finest tradition of Walt Disney.” Thus might Dastar and its progeny help Mickey Mouse, when and if he escapes copyright, from achieving the status of a great cultural icon, akin to Santa Claus or Uncle Sam.

[Crossposted at Agoraphilia, TechLiberation Front.]

Herewith another recent addition to my draft book, Intellectual Privilege: A Libertarian View of Copyright, (inspired, in part, by Berin Szoka’s recent claim, “I just don’t know what the right balance [for copyright] is! I’m glad there are others patient enough to try to figure it out. This is why we have economists and… yes, even lawyers!”):

As an illustration of the public choice pressures that drive copyright policy, consider the fate of the copyright in Steamboat Willie, a 1928 cartoon that the Walt Disney Company cites as establishing its copyright claim in Mickey Mouse. Scholars have made a surprisingly strong case that, because the requisite formalities of the 1909 Copyright Act were not satisfied, Steamboat Willie has fallen into the public domain. The Walt Disney Company has responded to such claims by threatening to bring suit for “slander of title,” demonstrating how seriously it takes its copyright in Steamboat Willie. Let us take that copyright seriously, too, then, so that we might better understand the public choice effects of the Walt Disney Company’s interests.

This is just a listing of the installments of my ongoing “Media Deconsolidation Series.” I needed to create a single repository of all the essays so I could point back to them in future articles and papers. For those not familiar with it, this series represents an effort to set the record straight regarding the many myths surrounding the media marketplace. These myths are usually propagated by a group of radical anti-media regulatory activists who I call the “media reformistas.” Sadly, however, many policymakers, journalists, and members of the public are buying into some of these myths, too.

In particular, I have spent much time here debunking the notion that rampant consolidation is taking place and that media operators are only growing larger and devouring more and more companies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Over the past several years, traditional media operators and sectors have been coming apart at the seams in the face of unprecedented innovation and competition. The volume of divestiture activity has been quite intense, and most traditional media operators have been getting smaller, not bigger. As a result, America’s media marketplace is growing more fragmented and atomistic with each passing day.

Anyway, here’s the series so far…

• Media Deconsolidation (Part 24): I Read the News Today, Oh Boy
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 23): Cox Selling Most of its Newspapers
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 22): TW spin-off of cable unit
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 21): TW spin-off of AOL
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 20): News Corp spins off 8 TV stations
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 19): IAC/Interactive Corp. divides by 5
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 18): Scripps Splits
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 17): Clear Channel Station Sell-off
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 16): Clear Channel Crackup
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 15): AOL-TW Divorce Near?
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 14: Time Warner Without Time?
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 13: Tribune Considering Major Downsizing
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 12: Time Warner President Calls Synergy “Bull—t”
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 11: Knight Ridder’s Coming Crackup
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 10: Viacom’s Breakup Official
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 9: Viacom’s Split
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 8: Time Warner Spin Off of AOL Likely
• Media Deconsolidation, Parts 6 & 7: Emmis & Disney Divestitures
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 5: “Clear Channel to Dismantle Media Empire”
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 4: Is News Corp. Next to Downsize?
• Still More on Media Deconsolidation
• More on Media (De)Consolidation
• Stop This Insane Media De-Consolidation!

Related reading:

• What the Media Reformistas Really Want
• Your Soapbox is My Soapbox! Thoughts on the Media Access Movement
• BOOK: Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005)
• SPECIAL REPORT: Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace (2008)
• BOOK:  A Manifesto for Media Freedom (with Brian Anderson, 2008).

In her latest column, Media Post media market guru Diane Mermigas wonders how long it will be before we see a traditional over-the-air (OTA) broadcast TV network (like ABC, NBC, CBS, or Fox) dump their old broadcast business altogether and just move all their properties to cable and satellite TV. And, in response to Mermigas, Cory Bergman of Lost Remote argues, as I did last week, “the real future of TV is not linear cable, but non-linear video delivered seamlessly via IP to multiple devices, including your TV set. But mass adoption of this approach is still several years away.”

Bergman is right. It would be foolish to think any traditional network is going to rely exclusively on IP-based distribution any time soon; they see it as more of a compliment (or another product window). But Mermigas may be on to something in predicting that broadcast networks may soon be looking to get out of the OTA television business altogether and essentially become “a glorified general entertainment cable network.”

The strain on their dysfunctional paradigm is emanating from a devastating recession and the ongoing digital revolution. Both are permanently altering the rules of play for the networks. A case can be made for at least one of the Big 4 broadcast networks emerging as a glorified general entertainment cable network within the next several years. The economic advantages: more steady ad revenues and consistent subscriber fees as content is distributed cross-platform. It would be a bold move that a free-spirited company such as News Corp. might already be contemplating for its Fox Broadcast TV Network, or NBC Universal for its peacock network. Industry analysts increasingly wonder how an independent CBS can prattle on under the crumbling old rules. In a world of exploding access and choices, the prime-time ratings (even with Live plus 3 configurations) spell diminishing returns. For Disney, ABC’s general entertainment status is on par with ESPN in sports; the new multi-platform model is in place except for formally moving the ABC TV Network to the cable side of the ledger.

Such a suggestion would have been considered outlandish even just a few years ago, but now it seems like it’s only a matter of time before one of the majors makes the jump to being a cable-exclusive “super-station.” It’s another sign of the radical metamorphosis underway in our modern media marketplace. Mermigas notes that “The most compelling argument for the Big 4 surviving as cable networks is economic”:

Digital distribution is a long way from yielding the financial returns needed to offset the dilution of old-line mainstream revenues. The vulnerability of the broadcast networks’ $9 billion in upfront ad revenues will be starkly evident next spring amid the protracted recession. Major ad categories–such as autos, financials, real estate and retail–will be markedly altered in their spending as well as structure. The Big 3 U.S. automakers account for 6% of the Big 3 broadcast networks’ ad revenues (9% for Fox) and 2.5% of cable networks’ overall advertising (7% for ESPN). On the cost side, less than 30% of core expenses can be eliminated from program production budgets and legacy operations, which means that the entire broadcast network dynamic must be reengineered. Despite all the complications, the easiest, most efficient business model conversion would be to reset broadcast networks as general entertainment cable networks. […]

While the most competitive cable networks have closed the ratings gaps with broadcast networks, they still fail to command similar ad unit prices. Prices have failed to reflect changed value propositions; that dilemma will be resolved in a digital marketplace. Bottom line: the alignment of broadcast and cable networks is already in place. Cable’s niche appeal, parallel to the Internet’s special interest “long tail,” will continue to nudge advertisers, consumers and content providers toward a more fully monetized online business model.

It is my belief that this migration would have already been occurring had broadcast spectrum holders been granted flexible use and resale rights for their spectrum long ago. Unfortunately, the same old command-and-control system of spectrum regulation that the FCC put in place seven decades is still haunts us today. That system literally makes it a crime for television broadcasters to sell their existing spectrum for anything other than broadcast television. They can’t repurpose their spectrum for an alternative purpose. Nor can they sell it to someone else who might put it to different use (say, high-speed wireless broadband). Just think, if they would have had unambiguous property rights in their allocation, they might have had the incentive to already have thrown the switch on the plan to migrate their content from OTA to cable and satellite entirely.

Of course, that now may happen anyway for the reasons Mermigas suggests. And the migration of more and more content to the Internet will only speed that process along. It’s just a shame that regulation prevents markets from reallocating spectrum efficiently.

Finally, if the networks begin to make this jump, it raises another interesting question: What about the local broadcast television operators who are not owned by a major network? What’s going to happen to them?

Interesting days ahead.

Over at Ars, Ben Kuchera has a review of Ask.com’s redesign of its web portal for kids, AskKids.com. It’s a great new addition to the growing list of safe seach tools and web portals geared toward younger surfers.

I’m also a big fan of KidZui, the new browser for kids that provides access to over 800,000 kid-friendly websites, videos, and pictures that have been pre-screened by over 200 trained teachers and parents. The company employs a rigorous 5-step “content selection process” to determine if it is acceptable for kids between 3-12 years of age. My kids, both under the age of 7, just love it, but I can’t see many kids older than 10 enjoying it because it is mostly geared toward the youngest web surfers.

Last year, as part of my 10-part series coinciding with “Internet Safety Month,” I wrote about the market for safe search tools and web portals for kids. I generally divide these sites and services into two groups:

(1) “Safe Search” Tools and Portals for Kids (2) Child- and Teen-Oriented Websites

Below I will describe each group and list the many sites and services currently available. I encourage readers to offer additional suggestions for sites that belong on the list. (I keep a running list of these sites and services in my book, “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.”)

(1) “Safe Search” Tools and Portals for Kids: These sites help direct children to sites and information that are educational and enriching. Most major search engine providers offer “safe search” tools that provide filtered search results.

ALA’s Great Web Sites for Kids ( www.ala.org/greatsites)

AOL for Kids (U.S.) (http://kids.aol.com)

AOL for Kids (Canada) (http://canada.aol.com/aolforkids)

Ask Kids (www.askkids.com)

Awesome Library for Kids (www.awesomelibrary.org)

Diddabdoo ( www.dibdabdoo.com)

Education World ( www.education-world.com)

Fact Monster ( www.factmonster.com)

FirstGov for Kids ( www.kids.gov)

KidsClick (www.kidsclick.org)

Kid Zui (www.kidzui.com)

Noodle Net (www.noodlenet.com)

NetTrekker (www.nettrekker.com)

SearchEdu.com ( www.searchedu.com)

Surfing the Net with Kids (www.surfnetkids.com)

Surf Safely.com (www.surfsafely.com)

TekMom’s Search Tools for Students ( www.tekmom.com/search)

ThinkQuest Library ( www.thinkquest.org/library)

Yahoo! Kids (http://kids.yahoo.com)

(2) Child- and Teen-Oriented Websites: The child-friendly web portals discussed above generally direct children to informational and educational sites and resources. But there exist many other ways to tailor the web-surfing experience to a family’s specific needs and values. The Internet is full of wonderful sites dedicated to kids and teens. Many have an educational focus, whereas others offer enjoyable games and activities for children. Table 2 highlights some of the best of these websites, but this list just scratches the surface. If parents wanted, they could configure their web browsers to access only sites such as these and then block access to all other webpages.

Table 2: Child- and Teen-Oriented Websites

Candy Stand (www.candystand.com)

Clever Island (www.cleverisland.com)

Club Penguin (www.clubpenguin.com)

Disney’s Club Blast (http://disney.go.com/blast)

Disney’s DGamer (http://disney.go.com/dxd2/index.html?channel=68447)

Disney’s Playhouse (http://disney.go.com/playhouse/today/index.html)

Disney Toontown Online (http://play.toontown.com)

Habbo (www.habbo.com)

HBO Family XE “ HBO Family” Games (www.hbofamily.com/games)

Imbee (www.imbee.com)

Iland5 (www.iland5.com)

JuniorNet (www.juniornet.com)

Kaboose Family Network (www.kaboose.com)

Kaboose FunSchool (http://funschool.kaboose.com)

KidsClick (www.kidsclick.org)

KidsFirst (www.kidsfirst.org)

Microsoft At School (www.microsoft.com/education/atschool.mspx)

Net Smartz Kids (www.netsmartzkids.org)

Nickelodeon Games (www.nick.com/games)

Nick Jr. Games (www.nickjr.com)

Nicktropolis (www.nicktropolis.com)

Noggin XE “ Noggin” Games (www.noggin.com/games)

PBS Kids (http://pbskids.org/go)

Surfing the Net with Kids (www.surfnetkids.com)

Webkinz (www.webkinz.com)

Yahoo! Kids (http://kids.yahoo.com)

YoKidsYo (www.yokidsyo.com)

Zeeks (www.zeeks.com)

ZoeysRoom.com (www.zoeysroom.com)

Zoey’s Room and Club Penguin are two of the most popular of these sites. Here’s some screenshots:

Again, please let me know if you have suggested updates to these lists.