The FCC appears to be dragging the TV industry, which is increasingly app- and Internet-based, into years of rulemakings, unnecessary standards development and oversight, and drawn-out lawsuits. The FCC hasn’t made a final decision but the general outline is pretty clear. T he FCC wants to use a 20 year-old piece of corporate welfare, calculated to help a now-dead electronics retailer, as authority to regulate today’s TV apps and their licensing terms. Perhaps they’ll succeed in expanding their authority over set top boxes and TV apps. But as TV is being revolutionized by the Internet the legacy providers are trying to stay ahead of the new players (Netflix, Amazon, Layer 3), regulating TV apps and boxes will likely impede the competitive process and distract the FCC from more pressing matters, like spectrum and infrastructure.

In the 1996 Telecom Act, a provision was added about set top boxes sold by cable and satellite companies. In the FCC’s words, Section 629 charges the FCC “to assure the commercial availability of devices that consumers use to access multichannel video programming.”  The law adds that such devices, boxes, and equipment must be from “manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not affiliated with any multichannel video programming distributor.” In English: Congress wants to ensure that consumers can gain access to TV programming via devices sold by parties other than cable and satellite TV companies.

The FCC’s major effort to effect this this law did not end well. To create a market for “non-affiliated equipment,” the FCC created rules in 1998 that established the CableCARD technology, a module designed to the FCC’s specifications that could be inserted into “nonaffiliated” set top boxes.

CableCARD was developed and released to consumers, but after years of complex lawsuits and technology dead ends, cable technology had advanced and few consumers demanded CableCARD devices. The results reveal the limits of lawmaker-designed “competition.” In 2010, 14 years after passage of the law and all those years of agency resources, fewer than 1% of pay-TV customers had “unaffiliated” set top boxes.

It’s a strangely specific statute with no analogues for other technology devices. Why was this law created? Multichannel News reporting in 1998, representative of other reports at the time, has some clues.

[Rep.] Bliley, whose district includes the headquarters of electronics retailer Circuit City, sponsored the provision that requires the FCC to adopt rules to promote the retail sale of cable set-top boxes and navigation devices. 

So it it was a small addition to the Act, presumably added at the behest of Circuit City, so that electronics retailers and device companies could sell more consumer devices.

The good news is that by the law’s straightforward terms and intent, mission: accomplished. Despite CableCARD’s failure, electronics retailers today are selling devices that give consumers access to TV programming. That’s because, increasingly, TV providers are letting their apps do much of the work that set top boxes do. Today, many consumers can watch TV programming by installing a provider’s streaming TV app on their device of their choice, manufactured and sold by dozens of companies, like Samsung, Apple, and Google, and retailers. Unfortunately, Circuit City shuttered its last stores in 2009 and wasn’t around to benefit.

But the new FCC proposal says, no, mission: not accomplished. There’s some interpretative gymnastics to reach this conclusion. The FCC says “devices” and “equipment” should be interpreted broadly in order to capture apps made by pay-TV providers. Yet, while “devices and equipment” is broad enough to capture software like apps, it is not broad enough to capture actual devices and equipment, like smartphones, smart TVs, tablets, computers, and Chromecasts that consumers use to access pay-TV programming.

This strained reading of statutory language will create a regulatory mess out of the evolving pay-TV industry, that already has labyrinthine regulations.

But if you look at the history of FCC regulation, and TV regulation in particular, it’s pretty unexceptional. Advocates for FCC regulation have long seen a competitive and vibrant TV marketplace as a threat to the agency’s authority.

As former FCC chairman Newton Minow warned in his 1995 book, Abandoned in the Wasteland, the FCC would lose its ability to regulate TV if it didn’t find new justifications:

A television system with hundreds or thousands of channels—especially channels that people pay to watch—not only destroys the notion of channel scarcity upon which the public-trustee theory rests but simultaneously breathes life and logic into the libertarian model.

Minow advocated, therefore, that the FCC needed to find alternative reasons to retain some control of the TV industry, including affordability, social inclusiveness, education of youth, and elimination of violence. Special interests have manufactured a crisis in TV–“monopoly control” [sic] of set top boxes by TV distributors. As Scott Wallsten and others have suggested, bundling a set top box with a TV subscription is likely not a competitive problem and the FCC’s remedies are unlikely to work. 

The FCC’s blinkered view of the TV industry is necessary because the US TV and media marketplace is blossoming. Consumers have never had more access to programming on more devices. More than 100 standalone streaming video-on-demand products launched in 2015 alone. T he major TV providers are going where consumers are and launching their own streaming apps. The market won’t develop perfectly to the Commissioners’ liking and there will be hiccups, but competition is vigorous, output and quality are high, and consumers are benefiting.

The FCC decision to devote its highly-educated agency staff and resources (which will balloon when challenged in court or during the app specification proceedings) to an arcane consumer issue with such cynical origins is a lamentable waste of agency resources.

This an agency that for decades has done a hundred things poorly. In an increasingly competitive telecom and media marketplace, it should instead do a handful of things well. (Commissioner Pai has proposed useful infrastructure reforms and Commissioner Rosenworcel has an interesting proposal, that I’ve written about, to deploy federal spectrum into commercial markets). Let’s hope the agency leadership reassesses the necessity the this proceeding before dragging the TV industry into another wild goose chase.

Related research: This week Mercatus released a paper by MA Economics Fellow Joe Kane and me about the FCC’s reinvention as a social and cultural regulator: “The FCC and Quasi–Common Carriage A Case Study of Agency Survival.”

The D.C. Circuit has struck down as arbitrary and capricious the FCC’s “cable cap.”  The cap prevented a single cable operator from serving more than 30% of U.S. homes—precisely the same percentage limit struck down by the court in 2001.  The court ruled that the FCC had failed to demonstrate that “allowing a cable operator to serve more than 30% of all cable subscribers would threaten to reduce either competition or diversity in programming.”

The court’s decision rested on the two critical charts (both generated by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer in his excellent Media Metrics special report) at the heart of the PFF amicus brief I wrote with our president, Ken Ferree:

First, the record is replete with evidence of ever increasing competition among video providers: Satellite and fiber optic video providers have entered the market and grown in market share since the Congress passed the 1992 Act, and particularly in recent years. Cable operators, therefore, no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that concerned the Congress in 1992.

Second, over the same period there has been a dramatic increase both in the number of cable networks and in the programming available to subscribers.

Our chart shows the explosion in the number of programmers (though not the total amount of programming), as well as the falling rate of affiliation between cable operators and programmers, which was among the prime factors motivating Congress when it authorized a cable cap in the 1992 Cable Act:

These two charts show how much less defensible the FCC’s 30% cap is now than it was back in 2001. If the Court had needed still more evidence, it could have cited the broader trend towards “Cutting the Video Cord.” As we explained in our amicus brief, viewers are shifting away from cable, satellite and fiber (“Multichannel Video Programming Distributors,” in FCC-speak) towards sites like Hulu and Netflix (which we dubbed “Internet Video Programming Distributors” in the hopes that a familiar-sounding acronym might resonate inside a regulatory agency that can’t even figure out how to stream its own meetings properly). Nothing better demonstrates how the Internet is revolutionizing video distribution than the fact that Hulu.com has actually overtaken TimeWarner cable in viewership:

There was a hearing today in the House Energy and Commerce Committee on “Reauthorization of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act,” which got into the sticky of issue of whether must carry mandates should be applied to satellite television (DBS) operators. My boss, Ken Ferree, president of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, testified in opposition to that notion. Here’s what he had to say about proposals that would require satellite operators to carry local broadcast TV stations from even the smallest markets:

Because Congress cannot repeal the laws of physics, there are only two ways in which a satellite company might comply with such a mandate: 1) it may add capacity (i.e., launch new satellites and build associated ground equipment), or 2) it may convert capacity currently used for other purposes to local television carriage in the most sparsely populated parts of the country. Neither approach makes economic sense. That is, these proposals, if they were to become law, would impose considerable costs on satellite operators while generating no appreciable revenue.

Building and launching new satellites in order to carry local television stations in the smallest markets would of course cost hundreds of millions of dollars, while the return on such an investment, without any doubt, would be negligible. On the other hand, satellite television operators make capacity decisions in order to maximize net revenue. If they are required to delete program services that are profitable to make room for those that are less so, they necessarily lose in the transaction. Indeed, if delivering local television signals in the smallest markets made sound business sense, the satellite companies would be doing so already and no legal mandate would be necessary. Moreover, and fatally for any such proposal, requiring DBS companies to provide local signals (effectively adopting a satellite must-carry requirement) would almost certainly be unconstitutional. Cable must-carry was upheld by the Supreme Court by a bare majority only because there was a voluminous record suggesting that weaker broadcast stations would fail absent a cable must-carry requirement, thus depriving over-the-air viewers of additional video programming choices. There is no similar record, nor any reason to believe that one might be assembled, suggesting that the same would hold true absent some enhanced satellite carriage rule. Carriage requirements impose significant burdens on the commercial and First Amendment rights of those bound by them. In the current environment, imposing enhanced carriage mandates on DBS operators would be unwarranted, economically indefensible, and unconstitutional.

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC’s December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap http://documents.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=8630011&access_key=key-2obr4z2ohtozi1gabbay&page=1&version=1&viewMode=