cyberlaw – Technology Liberation Front https://techliberation.com Keeping politicians' hands off the Net & everything else related to technology Mon, 23 Dec 2013 18:23:21 +0000 en-US hourly 1 6772528 Important Cyberlaw & Info-Tech Policy Books (2013 Edition) https://techliberation.com/2013/12/23/important-cyberlaw-info-tech-policy-books-2013-edition/ https://techliberation.com/2013/12/23/important-cyberlaw-info-tech-policy-books-2013-edition/#respond Mon, 23 Dec 2013 18:21:11 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=74026

I didn’t have nearly as much time this year to review the steadily growing stream of information policy books that were released. The end-of-year lists I put together in the past were fairly comprehensive (see 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012), but I got sidetracked this year with 7 law review articles and an eBook project and had almost no time for book reviews, or even general blogging for that matter.

So, I’ve just listed some of the more notable titles from 2013 even though I didn’t find the time to describe them all.  The first couple are the titles that I believe will have the most lasting influence on information technology policy debates. Needless to say, just because I believe that some of these titles will have an impact on policy going forward does not mean I endorse the perspectives or recommendations in any of them. And that would certainly be the case with my choice for most important Net policy book of the year, Ian Brown and Chris Marsden’s Regulating Code. Their book does a wonderful job mapping the unfolding universe of Internet “co-regulation” and “multi-stakeholderism,” but their defense of a more politicized information policy future leaves lovers of liberty like me utterly demoralized.

The same could be said of many other titles on the list. As I noted in concluding several reviews over the past year, liberty is increasingly a loser in Internet policy circles these days. And it’s not just neo-Marxist rants like McChesney’s Digital Disconnect or Lanier’s restatement of the Unibomber Manifesto, Who Owns the Future? The sad reality is that pretty much everybody these days has a pet peeve they want addressed through pure power politics because, you know, something must be done! The very term “Internet freedom” has already been grotesquely contorted into something akin to an open mandate for governments to meticulously plan virtually every facet of economic and social activity in the Information Age.

Anyway, despite that caveat, many interesting books were released in 2013 on an ever-expanding array of specific information policy topics.  Here’s the list of everything that landed on my desk over the past year.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2013/12/23/important-cyberlaw-info-tech-policy-books-2013-edition/feed/ 0 74026 Anupam Chander on free speech and cyberlaw https://techliberation.com/2013/11/12/anupam-chander-on-free-speech-and-cyberlaw/ https://techliberation.com/2013/11/12/anupam-chander-on-free-speech-and-cyberlaw/#respond Tue, 12 Nov 2013 11:00:03 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=73785

Anupam Chander, Director of the California International Law Center and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar at the UC Davis School of Law, discusses his recent paper with co-author Uyen P. Lee titled The Free Speech Foundations of Cyberlaw. Chander addresses how the first amendment promotes innovation on the Internet; how limitations to free speech vary between the US and Europe; the role of online intermediaries in promoting and protecting the first amendment; the Communications Decency Act; technology, piracy, and copyright protection; and the tension between privacy and free speech.

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]]> https://techliberation.com/2013/11/12/anupam-chander-on-free-speech-and-cyberlaw/feed/ 0 73785 Forthcoming 2013 Internet Policy Books https://techliberation.com/2013/01/31/forthcoming-2013-internet-policy-books/ https://techliberation.com/2013/01/31/forthcoming-2013-internet-policy-books/#comments Thu, 31 Jan 2013 17:29:10 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=43415

2013 is shaping up to be another big year for Internet and information technology policy books. Here’s a list of what’s coming out or already on the market.  As faithful readers know, I put together end-of-year lists of important info-tech policy books, and here are the lists for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and the most recent one for 2012. And here’s my compendium of all the major tech policy books from the 2000s. So I’ll do my best to get through all these books and whatever else follows throughout the year. Consider this my public service to the Internet policy community: I read nerdy Internet policy books so that you don’t have to!

Let me know what else I may have missed and I will add it to the list.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2013/01/31/forthcoming-2013-internet-policy-books/feed/ 2 43415 Important Cyberlaw & Info-Tech Policy Books (2012 Edition) https://techliberation.com/2012/12/17/important-cyberlaw-info-tech-policy-books-2012-edition/ https://techliberation.com/2012/12/17/important-cyberlaw-info-tech-policy-books-2012-edition/#comments Mon, 17 Dec 2012 19:23:44 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=39701

The number of major cyberlaw and information tech policy books being published annually continues to grow at an astonishing pace, so much so that I have lost the ability to read and review all of them. In past years, I put together end-of-year lists of important info-tech policy books (here are the lists for 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011) and I was fairly confident I had read just about everything of importance that was out there (at least that was available in the U.S.). But last year that became a real struggle for me and this year it became an impossibility. A decade ago, there was merely a trickle of Internet policy books coming out each year. Then the trickle turned into a steady stream. Now it has turned into a flood. Thus, I’ve had to become far more selective about what is on my reading list. (This is also because the volume of journal articles about info-tech policy matters has increased exponentially at the same time.)

So, here’s what I’m going to do. I’m going to discuss what I regard to be the five most important titles of 2012, briefly summarize a half dozen others that I’ve read, and then I’m just going to list the rest of the books out there. I’ve read most of them but I have placed an asterisk next to the ones I haven’t.  Please let me know what titles I have missed so that I can add them to the list. (Incidentally, here’s my compendium of all the major tech policy books from the 2000s and here’s the running list of all my book reviews.)

As I do each year, I need to repeat a few disclaimers.  First, what qualifies as an “important” info-tech policy book is highly subjective, but I would define it as a title that many people — especially scholars in the field — are currently discussing and that we will likely be referencing for many years to come.  But I “weight” books in the sense that narrowly-focused titles lose a few points. For example, books that deal mostly with privacy issues, copyright law, or antitrust policy are docked a few points relative to “big picture” info-tech policy books that offer a broader exploration of policy issues and which offer more wide-ranging recommendations.

Second, almost all of the books included have something profound to say about Internet policy (either directly or indirectly) and the more profound and clear the policy recommendations or implications, the higher the titles rank in terms of importance on my list.

Third, and most importantly: Just because a book appears on this list that does not necessarily mean I agree with everything in it.  In fact, as was the case in previous years, I found much with which to disagree in most of the books listed here. Simply put, the cyber-liberty I cherish is a real loser in both academic and public policy circles these days. It has very few defenders today. So, if this was simply a list of my personal favorite books, there would only be 2 or 3 titles on it. Instead, this is my effort to list important books in the field, regardless of whether I agree with the content and conclusions found in those titles.

OK, on to the list.

(1) Rebecca MacKinnon – Consent of the Network: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom

Rebecca MacKinnon’s book was the most important information technology policy book released in 2012 because it: (1) presented a splendid history of the ideas and forces shaping Internet policy debates globally; (2) offered policy insights that were extremely relevant to breaking developments in this field; and (3) set forth a call-to-arms to global Internet activists and gave them a new way of framing their issue advocacy.

MacKinnon is a former journalist and her outstanding reporting skills are on display throughout the text. Her coverage of China’s efforts to regulate the Net is outstanding. She also surveys some of the recent policy fights here and abroad over issues such as online privacy, Net neutrality regulation, free speech matters, and the copyright wars. The book demands attention for this historical work and analysis alone.

Even more importantly, however, MacKinnon makes a forceful argument for how to think about Internet freedom and democracy in new digital worlds. Her book is an attempt to take the Net freedom movement to the next level; to formalize it and to put in place a set of governance principles that will help us hold the “sovereigns of cyberspace” more accountable. Many of her proposals are quite sensible. But, as I noted in my much longer review of the book, I had a real problem with MacKinnon’s use of the term “digital sovereigns” or “sovereigns of cyberspace” and the loose definition of “sovereignty” that pervades her narrative. She too often blurs and equates private power and political power, and she sometimes leads us to believe that the problem of the dealing with the mythical nation-states of “Facebookistan” and “Googledom” is somehow on par with the problem of dealing with actual sovereign power — government power — over digital networks, online speech, and the world’s Netizenry.

Despite these nitpicks, MacKinnon has many other ideas about Net governance in the book that are less controversial and entirely sensible in my opinion. She wants to “expand the technical commons” by building and distributing more tools to help activists and make organizations more transparent and accountable. These would include circumvention and anonymization tools, software and programs that allow both greater data security and portability, and devices and network systems to expand the range of communication and participation, especially in more repressed countries. She would also like to see neitzens “devise more systematic and effective strategies for organizing, lobbying, and collective bargaining with the companies whose service we depend upon — to minimize the chances that terms of service, design choices, technical decisions, or market entry strategies could put people at risk or result in infringement of their rights.” This also makes sense as part of a broader push for improved corporate social responsibility.

Regarding the role of law, MacKinnon has a mixed view. She says: “There is a need for regulation and legislation based on solid data and research (as opposed to whatever gets handed to legislative staffers by lobbyists) as well as consultation with a genuinely broad cross-section of people and groups affected by the problem the legislation seeks to solve, along with those likely to be affected by the proposed solutions.” Of course, that’s a fairly ambiguous standard that could open the door to excessive political meddling with the Net if we’re not careful. Overall, though, she acknowledges how regulation so often lags far behind innovation. “A broader and more intractable problem with regulating technology companies is that legislation appears much too late in corporate innovation and business cycles,” she rightly notes.

MacKinnon’s book will be of great interest to Internet policy scholars and students, but it is also accessible to a broader audience interested in learning more about the debates and policies that will shape the future of the Internet and digital networks for many years to come. One other note: MacKinnon’s clearly-worded prose and cool-headed tone deserve praise and emulation. It serves as a model for how to write a thoughtful Internet policy book, even if you don’t agree with all her conclusions or recommendations.

My complete review of Consent of the Networked can be found here.

(2) Susan Crawford – Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age

Susan Crawford’s book was probably my least favorite title of 2012, but that doesn’t mean I can discount its significance within this field. Crawford has made herself a widely-recognized and highly-charged figure in the world of Internet policy through her work as an activist, an academic, and even a government official. In Captive Audience, she doesn’t even try to hide her self-described “radicalized” views on communications policy anymore and in the process she solidifies her role as the ringleader of the growing movement to impose centralized, top-down government control on America’s broadband infrastructure.

What is most astonishing about Captive Audience is the way Crawford so audaciously waxes nostalgic for the days of regulated monopoly. Simply put, Crawford doesn’t believe that capitalism or competition have any role to play in the provision of broadband networks and services. “No competitive pressure will force these companies to act [in the public interest],” she argues on the last page of the manifesto. “Americans,” she claims, “have allowed a naive belief in the power and beneficence of the free market to cloud their vision.” She suggests we should just give up our false hope that markets can deliver such an important service and get on with the task of converting broadband into a full-blown regulated public utility.

Her proposed solutions read like the typical Big Government grab-bag of policy proposals: more government spending, more government ownership, and more government regulation (forced access regulation and rate controls) for any private carriers that are allowed to remain in operation as de facto handmaidens of the state. Crawford’s perfect world scenario would seem to be some sort of amalgam of the U.S. Postal Service and the federal highway program. While both programs have sought to provide an important service to the masses, it goes without saying that both are also an absolute basket case in terms of service management and economic viability. But, for the sake of argument, let’s say that Crawford is right and that public ownership and comprehensive government management is the way to go. Where will all this money come from for all the new government activity Crawford desires? Apparently it grows on trees because she isn’t ever willing to admit that we find ourselves in the midst of major fiscal crisis that likely constrains the ability of governments to make these investments themselves. Luckily, private wireline and wireless broadband providers have been investing tens of billions in infrastructural upgrades in recent years (don’t take my word for it, read what the Progressive Policy Institute has to say), a fact that Crawford conveniently ignores.

More importantly, Crawford never fully confronts the fact that the era of regulated monopoly she cherishes was an unmitigated croynist disaster for consumers. That era had nothing to do with the “public interest” and everything to do with protecting the private interests of regulated entities — namely, Ma Bell on the communications side and broadcasters on the media side. She also doesn’t address the lackluster state of innovation during the 70 or so years during which time communications and media markets were under the tight grip of federal and state regulators, who controlled rates, restricted new entry, and discouraged innovation at virtually every juncture. If one is going to recommend a return to the regulatory past, they had better grapple with that uncomfortable, anti-consumer, anti-innovation history. Crawford utterly fails to in Captive Audience.

While the book is nominally about broadband regulation, the bulk of it is actually dedicated to taking on one company — Comcast — and specifically picking apart its recent merger with NBC Universal. For Crawford, the Comcast-NBC deal represented something akin to the Mayan apocalypse of media policy. She wants us to believe that the deal has forever solidified Comcast’s grasp on both programming and broadband markets. Comcast chief Brian Roberts is presented as the nefarious villain of the narrative; Crawford paints him as a cross between Gordon Gecko and Mr. Burns from “The Simpsons.” Usually such neurotic narratives are reserved for Rupert Murdoch and how he is supposedly plotting mass media domination to brainwash the minds of the masses. But Crawford suggests that Roberts is the new Bond villain du jour and chapter after chapter are devoted to demonizing him, his father, and other execs at Comcast. She argues that “Comcast now owns the Internet in America” and that the company is “squeezing independent online video” providers out of the market.

Despite all this hand-wringing, the situation in the video marketplace has never looked brighter. Crawford fails to put things in historical perspective and examine consumer choices in this market today relative to the past — a point I made in this debate with her last year. Of course, she probably didn’t want to seriously examine that evidence because by every metric available — and I published an entire report called Media Metrics a few years ago proving this — Americans have more and better viewing options at their disposal than ever before in history. We have more channels and more content available over more platforms (cable, satellite, telco, online, DVD, mail, etc) and more devices than ever before. Consumers have an unprecedented ability to access, record, time-shift, interact with, and even manipulate and redistribute video content. Of course, all this choice and quality comes at a cost, as Crawford continuously complains throughout the text. Apparently, in her view, all these great new programming options and technologies should just fall to us like manna from heaven with no price tag attached.

If you want to see what the opposite of Internet freedom and digital capitalism looks like, look no further than this book. It is the definitive articulation of the cyber-planner’s ethos. Of course, that’s also what makes Captive Audience one of the most important books of 2012. But if you really must read such one-sided propaganda — since this book will, no doubt, be assigned in many cyberlaw and media studies classes across America — then I encourage you to also read Christopher Yoo’s Dynamic Internet and Randy May’s edited collection of essays on Communications Law and Policy in the Digital Age, both of which are mentioned below. Both of those books offer a refreshingly level-headed examination of the true state of this marketplace. I’d also recommend you check out these recent essays by Bret Swanson and Richard Bennett for a hard look at the shoddy numbers and assumptions underlying many of the broadband policy critiques you hear out there today from Crawford and others.

(3) John Palfrey & Urs Gasser – Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems

What makes Palfrey & Gasser’s book so important is that the authors aim to develop “a normative theory identifying what we want out of all this interconnectivity” that the information age has brought us. They correctly note “there is no single, agreed-upon definition of interoperability” and that “there are even many views about what interop is and how it should be achieved.” Generally speaking, they argue increased interoperability — especially among information networks and systems — is a good thing because it “provides consumers greater choice and autonomy,” “is generally good for competition and innovation,” and “can lead to systemic efficiencies.”

But they wisely acknowledge that there are trade-offs, too, noting that “this growing level of interconnectedness comes at an increasingly high price.” Whether we are talking about privacy, security, consumer choice, the state of competition, or anything else, Palfrey and Gasser argue that “the problems of too much interconnectivity present enormous challenges both for organizations and for society at large.” Their chapter and privacy and security offers many examples, but one need only look around at their own digital existence to realize the truth of this paradox. The more interconnected our information systems become, and the more intertwined our social and economic lives become with those systems, the greater the possibility of spam, viruses, data breaches, and various types of privacy or reputational problems. Interoperability giveth and it taketh away.

Ultimately, however, the authors fail to develop a clear standard for when interoperability is good and when governments should take steps to facilitate or mandate it. They argue that “there is no single form or optimal amount of interoperability that will suit every circumstance” and that “most of the specifics of how to bring interop about [must] be determined on a case-by-case basis. Yet, Palfrey and Gasser also make it clear they want government(s) to play an active role in ensuring optimal interoperability. They say they favor “blended approaches that draw upon the comparative advantages of the private and public sector,” but they argue that government should feel free to tip or nudge interoperability determinations in superior directions to satisfy “the public interest.” “If deployed with skill,” they argue, “the law can play a central role in ensuring that we get as close as possible to optimal levels of interoperability in complex systems.”

The fundamental problem this “public interest” approach to interoperability regulation is that it is no better than the “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” standard we sometimes at work in the realm of speech regulation. It’s an empty vessel, and if it is the lodestar by which policymakers make determinations about the optimal level of interoperability, then it leaves markets, innovators, and consumers subject to the arbitrary whims of what a handful of politicians or regulators think constitutes “optimal interoperability,” “appropriate standards,” and “best available technology.”

In my absurdly long review of their book, I offered an alternative framework that suggests patience, humility, and openness to ongoing marketplace experimentation as the primary public policy virtues that lawmakers should instead embrace. Ongoing marketplace experimentation with technical standards, modes of information production and dissemination, and interoperable information systems, is almost always preferable to the artificial foreclosure of this dynamic process through state action. The former allows for better learning and coping mechanisms to develop while also incentivizing the spontaneous, natural evolution of the market and market responses. The latter (regulatory foreclosure of experimentation) limits that potential.

Defining “optimal interoperability,” is not just difficult as Palfrey and Gasser suggest, but I would argue that it is a pipe dream. Sometimes consumers demanded a certain amount interoperability and they usually get it. But it seems equally obvious that consumers don’t always demand perfect interoperability. Just look at your iPhone or Xbox for proof. Quite often, a lack of interoperability helps firms finance important new products and services while simultaneously ensuring users a tailored and potentially more secure and satisfying experience. Importantly, however, non-interoperability also spurs new forms of innovation from rivals looking to leap-frog the old front-runners. Progress flows from this never-ending cycle of technological change and industrial churn.

In sum, we cannot define or determine “optimal interoperability” in an a priori fashion; only ongoing experimentation can help us determine what truly lies in “the public interest.” Despite my different approach and conclusions, Palfrey and Gasser’s book perfectly frames what should be a very interesting ongoing debate over these issues and for that reason will be required reading on this subject for years to come.

Again, my longer review of Palfrey and Gasser’s book can be found here, and listen to John Palfrey’s podcast discussion with Jerry Brito here.]

(4) Christopher Yoo – The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are Transforming the Network

Christopher Yoo’s book was my personal favorite of the year, but it won’t capture as much interest and recognition as some of the other titles on this list. The book offers a concise overview of how Internet architecture has evolved and a principled discussion of the public policies that should govern the Net going forward. Yoo makes two straight-forward arguments. First, the Internet is changing. In Part 1 of the book, Yoo offers a layman-friendly overview of the changing dynamics of Internet architecture and engineering. He documents the evolving nature of Internet standards, traffic management and congestion policies, spam and security control efforts, and peering and pricing policies. He also discusses the rise of peer-to-peer applications, the growth of mobile broadband, the emergence of the app store economy, and what the explosion of online video consumption means for ongoing bandwidth management efforts. Those are the supply-side issues. Yoo also outlines the implications of changes in the demand-side of the equation, such as changing user demographics and rapidly evolving demands from consumers. He notes that these new demand-side realities of Internet usage are resulting in changes to network management and engineering, further reinforcing changes already underway on the supply-side.

Yoo’s second point in the book flows logically from the first: as the Internet continues to evolve in such a highly dynamic fashion, public policy must as well. Yoo is particularly worried about calls to lock in standards, protocols, and policies from what he regards as a bygone era of Internet engineering, architecture, and policy. “The dramatic shift in Internet usage suggests that its founding architectural principles form the mid-1990s may no longer be appropriate today,” he argues. “[T]he optimal network architecture is unlikely to be static. Instead, it is likely to be dynamic over time, changing with the shifts in end-user demands,” he says. Thus, “the static, one-size-fits-all approach that dominates the current debate misses the mark.”

Yoo makes a particular powerful case for flexible network pricing policies. His outstanding chapter on “The Growing Complexity of Internet Pricing” offers an excellent overview of the changing dynamics of pricing in this arena and explains why experimentation with different pricing methods and business models must be allowed to continue. Getting pricing right is essential, Yoo notes, if we hope to ensure ongoing investment in new networks and services. He also notes how foolish it is to expect the government to come in and save the day thought massive infrastructure investment to cover the hundreds of billions of dollars needed to continue to build-out high-speed services.

Throughout the second half of his book, Yoo explains why it would be a disaster for consumers and high-tech innovation if policymakers limited pricing flexibility and experimentation with new business models and technological standards. He argues that public policy should generally seek to avoid ex ante forms of preemptive, prophylactic Internet regulation and instead rely on an ex post approach when and if things go wrong. Essentially, he wants policymakers to embrace “techno-agnosticism” toward ongoing debates over standards, protocols, business models, pricing methods, and so on. Lawmakers should not be preemptively tilting the balance in one direction or the other or, worse yet, restricting experimentation that can help us find superior solutions.

And even under that model of retrospective review, Yoo makes it clear throughout the book that there should be a very high bar established before any regulation is pursued. This is particularly true because of the First Amendment values at stake when the government attempts to regulate speech platforms. In Chapter 9 of the book, Yoo walks the reader through all the relevant case law on this front and makes it clear how “the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the editorial discretion exercised by intermediaries serves important free speech values.” Yoo also makes the case that a certain degree of intermediation helps serve consumer needs by helping them more easily find the content and services they desire. Law should not seek to constrain that and, under current Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence, it probably cannot.

To me, Yoo’s approach strikes the right balance for Net governance and public policy in the information age. It all comes down to flexibility and freedom. If the Internet and all modern digital technologies are to thrive, we must reject the central planner’s mindset that dominated the analog era and forever bury all the static thinking it entailed.

My complete review of Yoo’s Dynamic Internet is here.

(5) Brett Frischmann – Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources

Frischmann’s book offers a nice contrast with Yoo’s in that it suggests a far more ambitious role for the state in shaping the future of digital networks and online platforms. Although not strictly a book about information technology infrastructure, Frischmann spends a great deal of time making the case for a greater government action in the realm of communications policy and for open access and Net neutrality regulation in particular. (There’s also a chapter on intellectual property issues that tech policy wonks will find of interest). The book is a veritable paean to open access regulation; Frischmann aims to persuade the reader that “society is better off sharing infrastructure openly” and devotes considerable energy to hammering that point home in one context after another.

In my review of the book, which was part of 2-day symposium on the book over at the Concurring Opinions blog, I took Frischmann’s book to task for its almost complete absence of public choice insights and his general disregard for thorny “supply-side” questions.  Frischmann is so single-mindedly focused on making the “demand-side” case for better appreciating how open infrastructures “generate spillovers that benefit society as a whole” and facilitate various “downstream productive activities,” that he short-changes the supply-side considerations regarding how infrastructure gets funded and managed to begin with.

The book also ignored the omnipresent threat of regulatory capture and the fact that any major infrastructure regulatory system big enough and important to be captured by special interests and affected parties often will be. Frischmann acknowledges the problem of capture in just a single footnote in the book and admits that “there are many ways in which government failures can be substantial,” but he asks the reader to quickly dispense with any worries about government failure since he believes “the claims rest on ideological and perhaps cultural beliefs rather than proven theory or empirical fact.”  I found that assertion outrageous and argued that, to the contrary, decades of scholarship has empirically documented the reality of government failure and its costs to society, as well as the plain old-fashioned inefficiency often associated with large-scale government programs. For infrastructure projects in particular, the combination of these public choice factors usually adds up to massive inefficiencies and cost overruns.

For those reasons, I argued in my review that society would be better off adopting a “3-P” approach to infrastructure management: privatize, property-tize, and price. But Frischmann is dead set against such thinking and makes it clear that everything must be subservient to the goal of “openness” and commons-based management. Unsurprisingly, therefore, this leads him to suggest that we need “a dramatic shift — perhaps a paradigm shift — away from the conventional position favoring market provisioning and markets ‘free’ from government intervention.” But the problem with that reasoning, as I pointed out in my review, is that most of the infrastructure that Frischmann cites as failing us today is already managed in the fashion he favors! Nonetheless, he wants to pile on still more commons-based government control / ownership solutions even though they are the primary cause of our infrastructure problems today. In this sense, Frischmann’s approach parallels Susan Crawford’s in her book Captive Audience, discussed above. They both seek to gloss over the ugly realities of traditional public infrastructure (mis-)management and they imply that we just need to build a better breed of bureaucrats who will somehow be immune to all the problems of the past. Needless to say, I don’t place much faith in such efforts.

Despite these serious deficiencies, students and scholars studying infrastructure theory will benefit from Frischmann’s excellent treatment of public goods and social goods; spillovers and externalities; proprietary versus commons systems management; common carriage policies and open access regulation; congestion pricing strategies; and the debate over price discrimination for infrastructural resources. He at least does a nice job outlining these concepts and controversies, even if he ultimately fails to make the case for radically expanding government control of infrastructural resources.

Again, you can read my entire review of Frischmann’s book here.

— Other Major Releases in 2012 —

Julie E. Cohen – Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice

Cohen’s book represents an effort to move “beyond the bounds of traditional liberal political theory” by transcending what she labels the traditional “information-as-freedom” versus “information-as-control” paradigms. Her aim is to promote “cultural environmentalism” and “the structural conditions of human flourishing.” She argues that “a commitment to human flourishing demands a more critical stance toward the market-driven evolution of network architectures.” In other words, don’t trust markets.

I didn’t find her case very convincing and it didn’t help that the book is filled with impenetrable prose that sometimes leaves the reader’s head a bit numb. (Two representative samples: “With respect to space, surveillance employs a twofold dynamic of containerization and affective modulation in order to pursue large-scale behavioral modification.” … and… “Here the performative impulse introduces static into the circuits of the surveillant assemblage; it seeks to reclaim bodies and reappropriate spaces.” Say what? Write in plain English, professor!)

The closing chapter also includes a strange reinterpretation of Ludditism. Cohen argues: “the tale of the Luddites poses an important challenge for scholars and policy makers in the emerging networked information society. If technologies do not have natural trajectories, it is our obligation to seek pathways of development that promote the well-being of situated, embodied users and communities. When our preferred policy prescriptions persistently produce information architectures and institutions that undermine human flourishing in critical ways, it is time to question them and to experiment with ways of doing better.”  Hmmm… I’m not sure I want to know what that would mean in practice!

Regardless, Cohen’s book has a lot to say about modern privacy and copyright battles and will be of great interest to scholars in those specific fields of study.  You can find all the chapters online here.

Cole Stryker – Hacking the Future: Privacy, Identity, and Anonymity on the Web

Stryker’s Hacking the Future provides a concise overview of the battles over online anonymity that have raged since the Net’s early days and he outlines the many new threats to it. “What we are seeing is an all-out war on anonymity, and thus free speech, waged by a variety of armies with widely diverse motivations, often for compelling reasons,” he says. The book will be a great use to those covering ongoing policy debates over cybersecurity, the “nymwars” and online authentication / identification debates, post-Arab Spring political activism & “hactivism,” encryption issues, social networking privacy, troll culture and cyberbullying, and much more. Stryker makes a strong case for the continuing importance of online anonymity but isn’t scared to ask hard questions about the trade-offs society faces when some can mask their online identities. But he also explores the question of whether anonymity can survive given recent technological and policy-related developments, both of which aim to make individuals more identifiable online. I particularly enjoyed Chapter 10’s breakdown of the “Faces of Anonymity,” in which Stryker crafts a detailed taxonomy of anonymous character types online.

He also offers a run-down of the tools and steps that people can take advantage of if they want to ensure their anonymity / privacy online, including: cookie blocking, private browsing tools, disabling HTML in email and limiting or disabling broswer extensions, clearing browser histories, and using encryption tools, proxy servers, and VPN tunneling. “The question we have to ask ourselves,” Stryker notes, is “Does the accessibility of these anonymizing technologies make the world a safer, more equitable place, better place?” He answers: “It’s difficult to measure, but their abolition certainly wouldn’t.” He also draws this interesting parallel with efforts to regulate firearms: “The logic here is not unlike that used by those who oppose gun control: if guns are made illegal, then only criminals will have guns, leaving well-meaning folks defenseless. The reasoning is compelling within the identity space,” he argues, “regardless of what you might think about the merits of gun control.”

Two other notes: First, Wide Open Privacy: Strategies For The Digital Life by J.R. Smith & Siobhan MacDermott makes a nice compliment to Hacking the Future. It also offers a breakdown of privacy-enhancing technologies and outlines other strategies to safeguard your online anonymity. Second, if you are interested in digging even deeper in the Luzsec side of this story, you should check out Parmy Olson’s W e are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker Wor ld of Lulzsec, Anonymous and the Global Cyber Insurgency. It’s a splendid history but doesn’t have as much to say about the various policy issues that Stryker tackles in Hacking the Future. Or just listen to Olson’s podcast discussion with Jerry Brito. Speaking of that Brito character…

Jerry Brito (ed.) – Copyright Unbalanced: From Incentive to Excess

My Mercatus Center colleague Jerry Brito put together this important collection of essays by various conservatives and libertarian authors to highlight growing concerns about copyright policy. Contributors include Tom W. Bell, David G. Post, Reihan Salam, Patrick Ruffini, Tim Lee, Christina Mulligan, and Eli Dourado (also of Mercatus). Their essays suggest that the tide may be turning against copyright among free market analysts. Their chapters explore the increasingly complexity of copyright law and the rising costs associated with its enforcement and make a powerful case for reform of, or at least restraints on, the current copyright system. The consensus seemed to revolve around a few key reforms: significantly shortened copyright terms, the reintroduction of formalities (i.e., registration), and limits on criminal prosecution and civil asset forfeiture. The authors also make a strong case that public choice problems pervade today’s copyright system and that we should be concerned that cronyism is increasing creeping into the politics of copyright law and its seemingly endless expansion.

If you interested in a different take on IP issues to balance out Brito’s collection, I’d recommend picking up the forthcoming Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas by Ronald A. Cass and Keith N. Hylton. It’s a 2013 release but it is already in stock. I’m reading an advance copy from the publisher right now and will likely have more to say about it in a forthcoming post.

Randolph J. May (ed.) – Communications Law and Policy in the Digital Age: The Next Five Years

My former colleague Randy May put together this nice collection of essays by some of America’s leading communications and media policy scholars, including Bruce Owen, Christopher Yoo, James Speta, Daniel Lyons and others. The authors offer a generally skeptical take on the expansion of communications and broadband regulation and the growing power of the Federal Communications Commission over these markets. In particular, many of the contributors take the FCC to task for sketchy assertions of jurisdiction and the agency’s efforts to expand its imperial regulatory ambitions without always having the clear statutory authority to do so. The chapters by James Speta and Seth Cooper are particularly good in that regard. Admin law geeks will eat them up.

Those analysts following the ongoing Net neutrality wars will also find the book informative, even if they disagree with the generally skeptical take on the issue from contributors. Spectrum and universal service policy wonks will also appreciate the excellent chapters on those two issues from Michele P. Connolly and Daniel A. Lyons, respectively. And the closing chapter by Bruce Owen is, like everything Bruce does, a masterpiece. Owen is probably the most respected media economist on the planet and his decades of experience in this field shines through in his powerful essay on “Communications Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative Capture.” He crafts a political economy of the regulatory state and points out that the explosion of rent-seeking and legislative/regulatory capture in this sector is unlikely to dissipate. “Therefore,” Owen argues, “communications policy likely will continue to be subject to welfare-suppressing regulation because such regulation is consistent with the interests of legislators,” who are often beholden to special interests and their campaign dollars.

Joshua Gans – Information Wants to Be Shared

I really enjoyed this book. It’s an insightful exploration of modern media economics filled with interesting questions and scenarios about how information markets will evolve in the future. What will sustain movies, music, book, local reporting, and so on in the future? Gans does a terrific job making these issues easy to understand and doesn’t try to evangelize as much as the many others who have written on these issues. If you’ve read and enjoyed Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian’s classic text, Information Rules, then you will find Gans’ book to be the perfect compliment.

Gans doesn’t have a lot to say about public policy, however. This is really more of a business book suited for industry analysts and business school students. Nonetheless, some of its implications for policy are clear since many of these business model debates boil over into the policy arena.

P.S. I should mention that, even if you don’t pick up his new book, you should be following Gans’ “Digitopoly” blog. It is always worth reading.

Andrew Keen – Digital Vertigo: How Today’s Online Social Revolution Is Dividing, Diminishing, and Disorienting Us

If you’re into ‘the-whole-world-is-going-to-Hell-and-the-Internet-is-to-blame’ screeds, Andrew Keen will never disappoint. In Digital Vertigo as well as his earlier book, The Cult of the Amateur, Keen is grumpy about, well, just about everything under the sun. In the earlier book, it was the Web 2.0 world of blogging and “amateur” content creation — most notably Wikipedia and YouTube — that earned Keen’s wrath. In the new book, it is users themselves and the social sharing sites and technologies that they favor that Keen goes off on.

Specifically, Keen is worried that our increased reliance on new online and interactive technologies is spawning a “hypervisible age of great exhibitionism” that sacrifices privacy and individuality at the altar of sharing and social status-seeking. He also makes sweeping claims that we are now living in “a world in which many of us have forgotten what it means to be human,” or that “we are forgetting who we really are.” As I noted in my Forbes review of the book, it’s classic technopanic talk. Not only does Keen fail to substantiate such claims, but he also doesn’t bother to even offer the reader any sort of practical plan for how to achieve a more balanced digital life.

Bruce Schneier – Liars & Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive

Security expert Bruce Schneier’s latest book was a terrific read and easily one of my favorites of the year. It wasn’t a book about technology policy per se, but it certainly has important ramifications for it. Schneier explains four “societal pressures” combine to help create and preserve trust within society. Those pressures include: (1) Moral pressures; (2) Reputational pressures; (3) Institutional pressures; and (4) Security systems. By “dialing in” these societal pressures in varying degrees, trust is generated over time within groups. Of course, these societal pressures also fail on occasion, Schneier notes. He explores a host of scenarios — in organizations, corporations, and governments — when trust breaks down because defectors seek to evade the norms and rules the society lives by. These defectors are the “liars and outliers” in Schneier’s narrative and his book is an attempt to explain the complex array of incentives and trade-offs that are at work and which lead some humans to “game” systems or evade the norms and rules others follow.

Indeed, Schneier’s book serves as an excellent primer on game theory as he walks readers through complex scenarios such as prisoner’s dilemma, the hawk-dove game, the free-rider problem, the bad apple effect, principle-agent problems, the game of chicken, race to the bottom, capture theory, and more. These problems are all quite familiar to economists, psychologists, and political scientists, who have spent their lives attempting to work through these scenarios. Schneier has provided a great service here by making game theory more accessible to the masses and given it practical application to a host of real-world issues.

The most essential lesson Schneier teaches us is that perfect security is an illusion, and this is where the implications for tech policy come in. We can rely on those four societal pressures in varying mixes to mitigate problems like theft, terrorism, fraud, online harassment, and so on, but it would be foolish and dangerous to believe we can eradicate such problems completely. “There can be too much security,” Schneier explains, because, at some point, constantly expanding security systems and policies will result in rapidly diminishing returns. Trying to eradicate every social pathology would bankrupt us and, worse yet, “too much security system pressure lands you in a police state,” he correctly notes.

Despite these challenges, Schneier reminds us that there is cause for optimism. Humans adapt better to social change than they sometimes realize, usually by tweaking the four societal pressures Schneier identifies until a new balance emerges. While liars and outliers will always exist, society will march on.

See my longer review of Schneier’s excellent book over at Forbes. I highly recommend you pick up Liars & Outliers no matter what your field of study. It is outstanding.

… and still more titles from 2012 (* asterisk means I didn’t find time to finish them)…

… and, again, here are the lists of important books from 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/12/17/important-cyberlaw-info-tech-policy-books-2012-edition/feed/ 131 39701 The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy [slideshow] https://techliberation.com/2012/11/18/the-war-on-vertical-integration-in-the-digital-economy-slideshow/ https://techliberation.com/2012/11/18/the-war-on-vertical-integration-in-the-digital-economy-slideshow/#respond Sun, 18 Nov 2012 17:26:40 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=42817

Here’s a presentation I delivered on “The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy” at the latest meeting of the Southern Economic Association this weekend. It outlines concerns about vertical integration in the tech economy and specifically addresses regulatory proposals set forth by Tim Wu (arguing for a “separations principle” for the tech economy) & Jonathan Zittrain (arguing for “API neutrality” for social media and digital platforms). This presentation is based on two papers published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University: “Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy” (with Brent Skorup) & “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.”

]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/11/18/the-war-on-vertical-integration-in-the-digital-economy-slideshow/feed/ 0 42817 Scott Shackelford on cybersecurity and polycentric governance https://techliberation.com/2012/10/09/scott-shackelford/ https://techliberation.com/2012/10/09/scott-shackelford/#respond Tue, 09 Oct 2012 10:00:44 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=42549

Scott Shackelford, assistant professor of business law and ethics at Indiana University, and author of the soon-to-be-published book Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace, explains how polycentric governance could be the answer to modern cybersecurity concerns.

Shackelford  originally began researching collective action problems in physical commons, including Antarctica, the deep sea bed, and outer space, where he discovered the efficacy of polycentric governance in addressing these issues. Noting the similarities between these communally owned resources and the Internet, Shackelford was drawn to the idea of polycentric governance as a solution to the collective action problems he identified in the online realm, particularly when it came to cybersecurity.

Shackelford contrasts the bottom-up form of governance characterized by self-organization and networking regulations at multiple levels to the increasingly state-centric approach prevailing in forums like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).  Analyzing the debate between Internet sovereignty and Internet freedom through the lens of polycentric regulation, Shackelford reconceptualizes both cybersecurity and the future of Internet governance.


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]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/10/09/scott-shackelford/feed/ 0 42549 Video: How I Think about Privacy https://techliberation.com/2012/07/19/video-how-i-think-about-privacy/ https://techliberation.com/2012/07/19/video-how-i-think-about-privacy/#respond Thu, 19 Jul 2012 14:41:46 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=41747

Last month, it was my great privilege to be invited to deliver some remarks at the University of Maine’s Center for Law and Innovation (CLI) as part of their annual “Privacy in Practice” conference. Rita Heimes and Andrew Clearwater of the CLI put together a terrific program that also featured privacy gurus Harriet Pearson, Chris Wolf, Omer Tene, Kris Klein and Trevor Hughes. [Click on their names to watch their presentations.] In my remarks, I presented a wide-ranging (sometimes rambling) overview of how privacy policy is unfolding here in the U.S. as compared to the European Union, and also offered a full-throated defense of America’s approach to privacy as compared to the model from the other side of the Atlantic that many now want us to adopt here in the U.S.  I also identified the many interesting parallels between online child safety policy and privacy policy here in the U.S. and discussed how we can apply a similar toolbox of solutions to problems that arise in both contexts. If you’re interested, I’ve embedded my entire 20-minute speech below, but I encourage you to also check out the other speakers videos that the folks at the CLI have posted on their site here. And keep an eye on the Maine Center for Law and Innovation; it is an up and coming powerhouse in the field of cyberlaw and Internet policy.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/07/19/video-how-i-think-about-privacy/feed/ 0 41747 new paper: Technopanics, Threat Inflation & an Info-Tech Precautionary Principle https://techliberation.com/2012/02/28/new-paper-technopanics-threat-inflation-an-info-tech-precautionary-principle/ https://techliberation.com/2012/02/28/new-paper-technopanics-threat-inflation-an-info-tech-precautionary-principle/#comments Tue, 28 Feb 2012 16:22:16 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=40236

[UPDATE: 2/14/2013: As noted here, this paper was published by the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology in their Winter 2013 edition. Please refer to that post for more details and cite this final version of the paper going forward.]

I’m pleased to report that the Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my huge new white paper, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” I’ve been working on this paper for a long time and look forward to finding it a home in a law journal some time soon.  Here’s the summary of this 80-page paper:

Fear is an extremely powerful motivating force, especially in public policy debates where it is used in an attempt to sway opinion or bolster the case for action. Often, this action involves preemptive regulation based on false assumptions and evidence. Such fears are frequently on display in the Internet policy arena and take the form of full-blown “technopanic,” or real-world manifestations of this illogical fear. While it’s true that cyberspace has its fair share of troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society. This paper considers the structure of fear appeal arguments in technology policy debates and then outlines how those arguments can be deconstructed and refuted in both cultural and economic contexts. Several examples of fear appeal arguments are offered with a particular focus on online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. The  various  factors  contributing  to  “fear  cycles”  in these policy areas are documented. To the extent that these concerns are valid, they are best addressed by ongoing societal learning, experimentation, resiliency, and coping strategies rather than by regulation. If steps must be taken to address these concerns, education and empowerment-based solutions represent superior approaches to dealing with them compared to a precautionary principle approach, which would limit beneficial learning opportunities and retard technological progress.

The complete paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader.

Technopanics and Threat Inflation [Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center]

]]> https://techliberation.com/2012/02/28/new-paper-technopanics-threat-inflation-an-info-tech-precautionary-principle/feed/ 3 40236 What Explains the Decline in Internet Safety Legislation / Online Content Regulation? https://techliberation.com/2011/11/08/what-explains-the-decline-in-internet-safety-legislation-online-content-regulation/ https://techliberation.com/2011/11/08/what-explains-the-decline-in-internet-safety-legislation-online-content-regulation/#comments Tue, 08 Nov 2011 17:28:34 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=38947

This week I will again be attending the Family Online Safety Institute’s excellent annual summit. The 2-day affair brings together some of the world’s leading experts on online safety and privacy issues. It’s a great chance to learn about major developments in the field. As I was preparing for the session I am moderating on Thursday, I thought back to the first FOSI annual conference, which took place back in 2007. What is remarkable about that period compared to now is that there was a flurry of legislative and regulatory activity related to online child safety then that we simply do not see today.

In fact, just 3 1/2 years ago, John Morris of the Center for Democracy and Technology and I compile a legislative index [summary here] that cataloged the more than 30 legislative proposals that had been introduced in the the 110th session of Congress. There was also a great deal of interest in these issues within the regulatory community. Finally, countless state and local measures related to online safety and speech issues had been floated. Today, by contrast, it is hard for me to find any legislative measures focused on online safety regulation at the federal level, and I don’t see much activity at the agency level either. I haven’t surveyed state and local activity, but it seems like it has also died down.

Generally speaking, I think this is a good development since I am opposed to most proposals to regulate online speech, expression, or conduct. But let’s ignore the particular wisdom of such measures and ask a simple question: What explains the decline in Internet safety legislation and online content regulation? I believe there are three possible explanations:

1) The effectiveness of education and awareness-building strategies

I would like to believe that all the efforts made by various groups and individuals (including myself) to encourage policymakers to adopt  “Educate & Empower” approaches over “Legislative & Regulate” approaches are finally bearing fruit. The first instinct for many policymakers is to legislate immediately and then worry about the consequences later (if at all). But such approaches, no matter how well-intentioned, often backfire and have myriad unintended consequences (including the problem addressed next). So, perhaps it is the case that lawmakers and regulators are finally coming to realize that education and awareness approaches — married to empowerment-based efforts — are actually the more sensible approach compared to a flurry of legislative measures that ultimately accomplish very little.

2) The deterrent effect of inevitable and lengthy constitutional challenges

Here are two things I know for certain: First, almost every Internet-related measure faces a constitutional challenge, typically on First Amendment grounds (but sometimes also on Sec. 230 grounds). Second, most of those challenges succeed. I don’t have hard stats to back up this assertion, but I’d bet that there are few areas of modern law that have witnessed a higher percentage of successful constitutional challenges in recent years than the field of cyberlaw.  Taking that as a given, one must assume that at some point it becomes a deterrent to additional state action in this field.  Why waste years legislating and regulating if it is all enjoined and then overturned a short time later?

3) Resurgence of privacy as major policy issue and the emergence of cybersecurity as a policy issue

It could also be that case that privacy policy crowds out congressional interest in online safety legislation. In fact, it seems like these issues often move in opposing waves. When a wave of online safety legislative and regulatory activity is cresting, interest in privacy policy seems to fall. That certainly seemed to be the case between roughly 2005 and 2008 when online safety dominated congressional debates and privacy was hardly on the radar.  Today the reverse is true. Privacy has been the dominant Internet policy issue of the past year or so. It is sucking all the oxygen out of the room — whether that room is a congressional hearing room, a regulatory agency event, or even academic conferences.

Importantly, cybersecurity has rapidly emerged as a major new fault line in Internet policy debates. It, too, is eating up a lot of the “attention bandwidth” available among policymakers today.  And intellectual property matters always seem to be percolating out there.

It is my belief that because some of these Net policy issues are so complicated, policymakers are sometimes discouraged from doing a “deep dive” on them. To the extent they do, it seems unlikely that lawmakers are willing to invest serious time in more than a couple of these arcane matters at one time. Also, don’t forget how busy the relevant committees (Commerce and Judiciary) are with other, not tech policy-related matters. On any given legislative day, they could be handling a wide range of other policy issues that crowd out the amount of attention they can devote to Net policy matters, which are often far down the list of legislative priorities. Again, I’m generally pretty happy about that fact! I’d rather lawmakers go slow on these issues, whether the slow pace of the action is intentional or not.

So, what do you think? Are there other possible explanations for why we’ve seen less activity on the online safety / Internet content regulation front in recent years?

]]> https://techliberation.com/2011/11/08/what-explains-the-decline-in-internet-safety-legislation-online-content-regulation/feed/ 2 38947 The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters https://techliberation.com/2011/02/01/the-case-for-internet-optimism-part-2-saving-the-net-from-its-supporters/ https://techliberation.com/2011/02/01/the-case-for-internet-optimism-part-2-saving-the-net-from-its-supporters/#comments Wed, 02 Feb 2011 00:07:57 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=34759

This is the second of two essays making “The Case for Internet Optimism.” This essay was included in the book, The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet (2011), which was edited by Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus of TechFreedom. In my previous essay, which I discussed here yesterday, I examined the first variant of Internet pessimism: “Net Skeptics,” who are pessimistic about the Internet improving the lot of mankind. In this second essay, I take on a very different breed of Net pessimists:  “Net Lovers” who, though they embrace the Net and digital technologies, argue that they are “dying” due to a lack of sufficient care or collective oversight.  In particular, they fear that the “open” Internet and “generative” digital systems are giving way to closed, proprietary systems, typically run by villainous corporations out to erect walled gardens and quash our digital liberties.  Thus, they are pessimistic about the long-term survival of the Internet that we currently know and love.

Leading exponents of this theory include noted cyberlaw scholars Lawrence Lessig, Jonathan Zittrain, and Tim Wu.  I argue that these scholars tend to significantly overstate the severity of this problem (the supposed decline of openness or generativity, that is) and seem to have very little faith in the ability of such systems to win out in a free market. Moreover, there’s nothing wrong with a hybrid world in which some “closed” devices and platforms remain (or even thrive) alongside “open” ones. Importantly, “openness” is a highly subjective term, and a constantly evolving one.  And many “open” systems or devices are as perfectly open as these advocates suggest.

Finally, I argue that it’s likely that the “openness” advocated by these advocates will devolve into expanded government control of cyberspace and digital systems than that unregulated systems will become subject to “perfect control” by the private sector, as they fear.  Indeed, the implicit message in the work of all these hyper-pessimistic critics is that markets must be steered in a more sensible direction by those technocratic philosopher kings (although the details of their blueprint for digital salvation are often scarce).   Thus, I conclude that the dour, depressing “the-Net-is-about-to-die” fear that seems to fuel this worldview is almost completely unfounded and should be rejected before serious damage is done to the evolutionary Internet through misguided government action.

I’ve embedded the entire essay down below in Scribd reader, but it can also be found on TechFreedom’s Next Digital Decade book website and SSRN.

The Case for Internet Optimism Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters (Adam Thierer) http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

]]> https://techliberation.com/2011/02/01/the-case-for-internet-optimism-part-2-saving-the-net-from-its-supporters/feed/ 19 34759 The Digital Decade’s Definitive Reading List: Internet & Info-Tech Policy Books of the 2000s https://techliberation.com/2009/12/29/the-digital-decades-definitive-reading-list-internet-info-tech-policy-books-of-the-2000s/ https://techliberation.com/2009/12/29/the-digital-decades-definitive-reading-list-internet-info-tech-policy-books-of-the-2000s/#comments Tue, 29 Dec 2009 16:08:08 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=24658

book stackSo, did the decade just end or do we have another year to go? Honestly, I’ve never understood when the cut-off is from one decade to the next. (My friend Larry Magid struggles with the same question in his recent column on “The Decade in Technology.”) Nonetheless, I’ve seen a lot of best-of-decade lists published recently, so I thought I would throw my own out there even though it is still a work in progress.

I have been attempting to compile the definitive bibliography for our digital decade—the definitive list of Internet policy books, that is. I started throwing this together two years ago when I was penning my list of “The Most Important Internet Policy Books of 2008” and continued to work on it as I was finishing up my 2009 installment as well. I grabbed every book off my shelf that dealt with the future of the Internet and the impact the Digital Revolution is having on our lives, culture, and economy and threw the title and a link onto this list. (I’m also using the list to help structure my thoughts for a forthcoming book of my own on Internet Optimists vs. Pessimists, something I’ve been writing a lot about here in recent years.)

Below you will find what I’ve got so far. There are around 80 90 books on the list. I’ve divided the list by year, but you may be wondering what determined the order the books appear in. In essence, I’ve listed what I feel are the 1 or 2 most important titles first and then just added others randomly. Eventually, I plan to post a “Most Important Internet Policy Books of the Decade” list outlining which titles I believe have been the most influential. I suspect I’ll name Benkler’s Wealth of Networks to the top slot followed closely by Zittrain’s The Future of the Internet, Lessig’s Free Culture, and Chris Anderson’s The Long Tail. Anyway, that’s for another day.

For now, I would just like to ask for reader suggestions regarding what other titles that should appear on this list. I will add titles as they come in. I want to stress, however, that I am trying to keep this list limited to books that have something to say about Internet policy (cyber-law, digital economics, information technology politics, etc).

I hope others find this useful.  And yes, I have read all most of the books on this list!  As I’ve noted here before, I’m a bit of book nerd.  (Now that I’ve received so many helpful additions to the list, there are some titles on the list I have not had a chance to read through yet).

2000

2001

 

2002

2003

 

2004

 

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

UPDATE (Dec. 2010): If you believe 2010 should be included in this list, here’s a list of the major books from that year.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/12/29/the-digital-decades-definitive-reading-list-internet-info-tech-policy-books-of-the-2000s/feed/ 63 24658 List of Recent of State Cyberbullying Measures https://techliberation.com/2009/09/14/list-recent-of-state-cyberbullying-measures/ https://techliberation.com/2009/09/14/list-recent-of-state-cyberbullying-measures/#comments Tue, 15 Sep 2009 01:19:26 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=21516

Cyberbullying constitutes one of the largest growth categories of recent cyberlaw legislative proposals, and many state legislatures have already enacted measures aimed at combating this problem using a variety of approaches.  Those attempting to monitor ongoing developments in this field might find it useful to examine this National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) compendium of recent state cyberbullying bills.

In June, Berin Szoka and I published a PFF white paper, “Cyberbullying Legislation: Why Education is Preferable to Regulation.”  That paper mostly address federal legislation and, in particular, we contrasted the approaches set forth in Rep. Linda Sánchez’s (D-CA) “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,” versus the “School and Family Education about the Internet (SAFE Internet) Act,” which was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and in the House by Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL).  Whereas the Sánchez bill would create a new federal felony to address these problems, the SAFE Internet Act proposes an education-based approach to the issue.

Generally speaking, Berin and I favor the latter approach, to the extent federal legislators feel the need to act. But we argued that state experimentation on this front may be the better way to go at this time.  As the NCSL survey suggests, states are pursing a variety of strategies and will continue to do so.  In light of that, I’m not sure why any federal legislation is needed at this time.  If the feds are really eager to push something at the national level, perhaps a generic public awareness / PSA campaign would make the most sense while more tailored state-based experimentation continues.  This is rare example of where state-based experimentation with a cyberlaw issue actually makes a lot of sense.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/09/14/list-recent-of-state-cyberbullying-measures/feed/ 10 21516 Eric Goldman’s “2008 Cyberlaw Year-in-Review” https://techliberation.com/2009/02/07/eric-goldmans-2008-cyberlaw-year-in-review/ https://techliberation.com/2009/02/07/eric-goldmans-2008-cyberlaw-year-in-review/#comments Sat, 07 Feb 2009 22:17:37 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=16445

Eric Goldman is the man.  His “Technology & Marketing Law Blog” is must-reading for cyberlaw geeks; packed with indispensable updates and insights about breaking development in the world of Internet law.

Anyway, he’s just published his “2008 Cyberlaw Year-in-Review,” which provides a comprehensive overview of the major developments and cases from the past year. This is the sort of compendium that I used to have to spend big bucks to get from DC law firms.  And Eric just gives it away as a public resource.  God bless him.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/02/07/eric-goldmans-2008-cyberlaw-year-in-review/feed/ 2 16445 Book Review: Post’s Jefferson’s Moose & the State of Cyberspace https://techliberation.com/2009/01/22/book-review-posts-jeffersons-moose-the-state-of-cybersapce/ https://techliberation.com/2009/01/22/book-review-posts-jeffersons-moose-the-state-of-cybersapce/#comments Thu, 22 Jan 2009 20:44:15 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=15460

Post Jeffersons MooseI used to have a (semi-crazy) uncle who typically began conversations with lame jokes or bad riddles. This sounds like one he might have used had he lived long enough: What do Thomas Jefferson, a moose, and cyberspace have in common?

The answer to that question can be found in a new book, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace, by David G. Post, a Professor of Law at Temple University. Post, who teaches IP and cyberspace law at Temple, is widely regarded as one of the intellectual fathers of the “Internet exceptionalist” school of thinking about cyberlaw.  Basically, Post sees this place we call “cyberspace” as something truly new, unique, and potentially worthy of some special consideration, or even somewhat different ground rules than we apply in meatspace. More on that in a bit.

[ Full disclosure: Post’s work was quite influential on my own thinking during the late 1990s, so much so that when I joined the Cato Institute in 2000, one of the first things I did was invite David to become an adjunct scholar with Cato. He graciously accepted and remains a Cato adjunct scholar today. Incidentally, Cato is hosting a book forum for him on February 4th that I encourage you to attend or watch online. Anyway, it’s always difficult to be perfectly objective when you know and admire someone, but I will try to do so here.]

Post’s book is essentially an extended love letter — to both cyberspace and Jefferson. Problem is, as Post even admits at the end, it’s tough to know which subject this book is suppose to teach us more about. The book loses focus at times — especially in the first 100 pages — as Post meanders between historical tidbits of Jefferson’s life and thinking and what it all means for cyberspace. But the early focus is on TJ.  Thus, those who pick up the book expecting to be immediately immersed in cyber-policy discussions may be a bit disappointed at first.  As a fellow Jefferson fanatic, however, I found all this history terrifically entertaining, whether it was the story of Jefferson’s Plow and his other agricultural inventions and insights, TJ’s unique interest in science (including cryptography), or that big moose of his.

OK, so what’s the deal with the moose? When TJ was serving as a minister to France in in the late 1780s, at considerable expense to himself, he had the complete skeleton, skin and horns of a massive American moose shipped to the lobby of his Paris hotel. Basically, Jefferson wanted to make a bold statement to his French hosts about this New World he came from and wake them up to the fact that some very exciting things were happening over there that they should be paying attention to. That’s one hell of way to make a statement!

Questions about Frontiers, Both Old and New

Now you see the connection to Post’s investigation into the state of cyberspace. Like Jefferson, Post is very excited about a new frontier and he wants to alert people to it. Importantly, however, Post isn’t at all ashamed to admit when he doesn’t understand why some things are the way they are in this new world.  And so Post begins asking questions — lots and lots of questions — to guide our investigation.

Thus, in much the same way that Jefferson penned Notes on the State of Virginia as guidebook for newcomers to the strange new world of his time, David Post has penned this slender volume as a guidebook to our modern cyber-frontier. If you’re looking for a book with concrete positions on all of cyberspace’s pressing policy problems, this book is not it. Instead, it is meant to help us frame the issues and questions properly and consider how this new frontier is unfolding in the early years of its existence. As Post puts it:

We are at the very beginning of what will become a centuries-long conversation about these questions, and my goal here was not to put anything to rest but to put everything in play, not to conclude any part of that conversation but to help you get started. We need, more than answers to today’s questions about law and policy on the network, new ways of thinking about the questions themselves, new vocabularies, new visions of the possible, new ways of identifying and organizing what we know and what we don’t know about the new place. (p. 209)

Post does a very nice job of giving us “new ways of thinking about questions” in his book. These questions generally fall into two categories.  First, Post wants to know why cyberspace works the way it does, or more profoundly, why it works at all. How did this little experiment with networking protocols turn into the most revolutionary global communications and information distribution system of modern times?  Second, Post wants to know “Who makes the rules ‘there’… and what should they be? What does the law look like there? How does it get made, and by whom? Who governs? By what means, and by what right?” (p. 4)

What Jefferson (and Hamilton) Can Teach Us

Post brings Jefferson into the story in the hope that TJ’s profound thinking on the issues of his time might help us getter a better handle on the cyber-controversies of our own time. After all, Jefferson was a man who spent much of his life thinking about uncharted subjects and frontiers. And law, of course!

Using this approach to help us explore cyberspace and cyberlaw works quite well in many cases. It works particularly well when Post brings TJ’s leading intellectual nemesis into the drama — Alexander Hamilton.  “Their feud the longest-running in American political history,” Post correctly notes, “for they stood on opposite shores of the great intellectual divide, a divide that encapsulates something fundamental in the way we think about society and government.” (p. 107). Jefferson desired liberty above all else; Hamilton stressed order and authority. Whereas Jefferson trusted decentralization and wanted diffuse communities making political decisions, Hamilton looked to a strong central authority to guide the nation.

Many modern cyberspace disputes, Post suggests, can be viewed through this same Jeffersonian vs. Hamiltonian philosophical dichotomy. Post continues:

Cyberspace is not the American West of 1787, of course. But like the American West of 1787, cyberspace is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian kind of place. Jeffersonians always predominate in new places, because new places attract people who find new places attractive and retell people who do not. […] Hamiltonians, though, inevitably make their way to Jeffersonian places (certainly once gold is discovered there!), claims of order and authority and power assert themselves, and struggles over the shape of the place begin in earnest. And like the West of 1787, cyberspace poses some hard questions, and could use some new ideas, about governance, and law, and order, and scale. The engineers have bequeathed to us a remarkable instrument, one that has managed to solve prodigious technical problems associated with communication on a global scale. The problem is the one that Jefferson and his contemporaries faced: How do you build “republican” institutions — institutions that respect the equal worth of all individuals and their right to participate in the formation of the rules under which they live — that scale? (p. 116-117)

Will Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian thinking prevail as this process unfolds? That remains to be seen, and although Post clearly falls in the Jeffersonian camp on these issues, he doesn’t really place odds on the outcome. Moreover, I would have liked to see Post offer a more full-throated defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism and Interent exceptionalism, or at least better explain to the reader how the debate between exceptionalism and unexceptionalism — or Jeffersonianism vs. Hamiltonianism — has progressed since the mid-1990s.

I think it’s clear that the cyber-Hamiltonians (i.e., the Internet unexceptionalists) are in the midst of a major “Empire Strikes Back” moment today as cyberspace is coming under increasing political pressure from many corners, and calls for more centralized authority abound — whether we are talking about domain name regulation, net neutrality mandates, speech controls, or whatever else. I just wish Post would have spent more time developing a “Return of the Jedi” defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism in this book.

Central Planning vs. Self-Governing Communities

Incidentally, Post has put forward such a defense elsewhere. Along with my former Cato colleague Wayne Crews, I co-edited a beefy book on Net governance issues back in 2003 entitled Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction. It contained some truly wonderful essays and they are all still quite relevant today. Jonathan Zittrain’s essay on “Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law” remains one of the best primers on the subject you can find. But the exchange about Internet governance between David Post and Jack Goldsmith in that book is really a classic Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian debate about cyberlaw. [You can read their chapters at the link above.]

In Jefferson’s Moose, Post comes closest to developing a fuller theory of Internet exceptionalism in his excellent chapter “Governing Cyberspace III: Law.” In that chapter, he takes the unexceptionalists to task for their troubling logic, which “leads inexorably to the conclusion that (just about) everything you do on the Web may be subject to (just about) everybody’s law.” (p. 167). Indeed, the unexceptionalist vision is quite a miserable one when you get right down to it; one that treats this new frontier as a plaything in an endless power struggle between competing political bodies. Meanwhile, as Post points out, the rule of law loses its meaning and becomes less about the consent of the governed and more like a game of “Jurisdictional Whack-a-Mole,” with countless “sovereigns” asserting authority and trying to beat cyberspace and digital denizens into submission in one way or another.

Because Post believes that the unexceptionalists are wrong in their assertion that the Internet is merely the “functional equivalent of mail, or telephone, or smoke signals,” he offers — but does not fully develop — an alternative framework based on Jefferson’s vision for how to settle the Western frontier: Give settlers maximum flexibility to create free, independent, self-governing communities. In Jefferson’s words, “an empire of liberty.. built not on conquest, but on principles of compact and equality.” And this empire of liberty would be, in Post’s words, “held together by consensual bonds and adherence to republican principles, not coercive power, an ever-expanding union of self-governing commonwealths joined together as peers.”

Now that is a beautiful vision for cyberspace!  And, in many ways, it partially explains why cyberspace has been such a special place — at least so far in its early history. But as more and more Hamiltonians assert the need for greater “order,” all that could change. Again, I wish Post would have put some more meat on the bones of his beautiful cyber-Jeffersonian framework to counter the increasing calls we hear for more cyber-Hamiltonianism.  Specifically, Post needs to better address the accusation made by the Digital Age Hamiltonians that Internet exceptionalism is little more than cyber-anarchism. In reality, Internet exceptionalism is essentially something akin to decentralized federalism for the Internet; a federalism that the Founders — or at least Jefferson — would have likely strongly supported.  As I wrote here recently, I like to think of Internet exceptionalism as a variation on Robert Nozick’s “utopia of utopias” vision of an ideal society: “a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others.” (Nozick, 1974)

Post begins a sketch of that Nozickian vision for cyberspace in Jefferson’s Moose, but he doesn’t really finish painting his masterpiece. To be fair, however, Post did make it clear right from the start of the book that it was going to be about asking the right questions, not necessarily providing all the answers.

Two Big Issues, Both Then and Now

Incidentally, using Jefferson as a guide to understanding modern cyberlaw controversies also works well when it comes to “the two issues [that] have been featured in virtually all of the Internet’s Big Cases” — free speech and intellectual property. As Post reminds us, Jefferson had a bit to say about those issues during his own lifetime.

“Jefferson was America’s first, and probably its greatest, First Amendment absolutist”  Post says, (p. 188), because Jefferson viewed free speech as part of a greater “interconnected whole”:

republican self-government, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and freedom of speech. You couldn’t have any without the others; they were inextricably bound together into a single system, and they would stand, or fall, together. (p. 189-190)

Consequently:

To a Jeffersonian, then, free speech questions are always simultaneously (a) of supreme importance and (b) pretty easy. The answer to free speech questions is always (or almost always) simple:  The more protection for, and the fewer the restrictions on, speech, the better. (p. 194)

And Jefferson held true to that principle throughout his life, most notably with his strenuous opposition to the horrendous Sedition Act of 1798.

But intellectual property is a far thornier issue — for both Jefferson and modern cyberlaw. Jefferson was a great inventor himself and keenly interested in the topic. But he also saw IP rights in a different light than speech rights.  Post explains Jefferson’s position:

Unlike free speech rights, intellectual property… cannot, in nature, be a subject of property; they do derive from the “social law,” from the laws of England, or Virginia, or whatever; they’re not antecedent to the law, but entirely dependent on it. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have intellectual property rights. It only means that we get to decide (and we have to decide) whether to have them or not, and how much of them to have. (p. 198) […] Intellectual property law in a Jeffersonian world, then, is always a matter of degree, of finding that balance, of drawing the line… Protection for intellectual property shouldn’t be too weak (or it won’t give creators enough of an incentive to create) or too strong (or it will choke off future creativity), but just right. We’ll never get it exactly right, but it is what we are always aiming for — in a Jeffersonian world, at least. (p. 201)

Of course, finding that “balance” is easier said than done and efforts to strike it engender even more controversy today in the digital world than they did during Jefferson’s time.

Conclusion

David Post has given us an enlightening map to help us navigate the new frontier of cyberspace and cyberlaw. I’m confident Jefferson’s Moose will be on my next end-of-year list of important tech policy books. And I hope my handful of small nitpicks here about the lack of details or answers regarding Post’s beautiful Jeffersonian vision for cyberspace will inspire him to pen yet another book on the subject! We need more friends of true cyber-freedom like David Post.

P.S. David Post is also the co-author of an outstanding treatise on cyberlaw with Patricia L. Bellia and Paul Schiff Berman: Cyberlaw: Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age. The text sits on top of my desk at all times, never far from reach when I need to a quick refresher on some arcane aspect of early Internet jurisprudence. A highly recommended resource.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2009/01/22/book-review-posts-jeffersons-moose-the-state-of-cybersapce/feed/ 29 15460 Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy https://techliberation.com/2008/11/08/book-review-soloves-understanding-privacy/ https://techliberation.com/2008/11/08/book-review-soloves-understanding-privacy/#comments Sun, 09 Nov 2008 01:45:44 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=13456

Solove Understanding Privacy book coverWith the publication of Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008), George Washington University Law School professor Daniel J. Solove has firmly established himself as one of America’s leading intellectuals in the field of information policy and cyberlaw.  Solove had already made himself a force to be reckoned with in this field with the publication of important books like The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University Press 2007), The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (NYU Press 2004) and his treatise on Information Privacy Law with Paul M. Schwartz of the Berkeley School of Law (Aspen Publishing, 2d ed. 2006).  But with Understanding Privacy, Solove has now elevated himself to that rarefied air of “people worth watching” in the cyberlaw field; an intellectual — like Lawrence Lessig or Jonathan Zittrain — whose every publication becomes something of an event in the field to which all eyes turn upon release.

Like those other intellectuals, however, my respect for their stature should not be confused with agreement with their positions.  In fact, my disagreements with Lessig and Zittrain are frequently on display here and, we have been critical of Solove here in the past as well. [Here’s Jim Harper’s review of Solove’s last book, with which I am in wholehearted agreement.]  In a similar vein, although I greatly appreciate what Prof. Solove attempts to accomplish in Understanding Privacy — and I am sure it will change the way we conceptualize and debate privacy policy in the future — I found his approach and conclusions highly problematic.

Let me begin by summarizing Solove’s bold objective in Understanding Privacy. In the book, he attempts “to set forth a theory of privacy that will guide our understanding of privacy issues and the crafting of effective laws and policies to address them.” (p. 2) Solove’s “pragmatic” proposal to rethink privacy requires us to abandon the ways we have traditional thought about it. He begins by rightly noting that privacy has long been a “conceptual jungle” (p. 196) and a “concept in disarray.” (p. 1) “[T]he attempt to locate the ‘essential’ or ‘core’ characteristics of privacy has led to failure,” he says. (pg. 8 )

Consequently — and this is what make’s his approach so unique and important — Solove’s proposal to rethink privacy begins with a call to abandon the entire philosophical exercise of trying to tie privacy rights to some “common denominator” (pg. 8 ) since “Nobody can articulate what it means.” (p. 1) Actually, what he really means to say is that plenty of theorists can articulate what it means, it’s just that there is rarely any strong consensus about what justifies a particular theory of privacy. Indeed, in Chapter 2, he walks the reader through a half-dozen “conceptions of privacy” and illustrates how each has intellectual weaknesses and suffers from over- and under-breadth problems in terms of what it types of privacy it protects.

More importantly, according to Solove, not only has the effort “to locate the ‘essence’ of privacy” failed, but there is never any hope of it succeeding. Instead of continuing the futile search for such a grand, unified theory of privacy, Solove says we should tackle privacy issues from the “bottom up” by looking to “solve certain problems” (p. 75) The key to making it all work, he says, is “balancing”:

Because privacy conflicts with other fundamental values, such as free speech, security, curiosity, and transparency, we should engage in a candid and direct analysis of why privacy interests are important and how they ought to be reconciled with other interests. We cannot ascribe a value to privacy in the abstract. The value of privacy is not uniform across all contexts. We determine the value of privacy when we seek to reconcile privacy with opposing interests in the particular situations. (p. 87)

It is tempting to applaud Solove’s attempt to unhinge privacy from any “common denominator” and instead get more concrete about how to work through the details of practical privacy problems. After all, it is easy to get frustrated with some modern theories of privacy that have been tied up with amorphous, warm-and-fuzzy terms like “personhood” and “intimacy.” The inherent subjectivity of some of those terms makes it challenging to derive bright-line principles and tests to help craft law or resolve privacy disputes when they come before the courts.

But I believe there are serious problems with any attempt to completely divorce privacy policy from a theory of rights or justice. In my opinion, you can’t just dynamite all conceptual frameworks to the ground; value judgments will persist and references to rights theory will always be required. Even Solove’s pragmatic, bottom-up approach is value-laden; he just doesn’t acknowledge it. The majority of privacy controversies he attempts to work through in Chapter 5’s ambitious 16-part “Taxonomy of Privacy” mostly end up coming down in favor of taking stronger steps (i.e., rules, regulations, lawsuits, etc) to enhance privacy rights. He clearly has a bias in favor of enhancing and extending privacy rights relative to many other rights, but he doesn’t bother grounding it in any substantive theory of rights or justice.

Simply stated, even though Solove claims he can construct a new paradigm based strictly on a “pragmatic,” utilitarian, “problem-solving” approach, there is just no getting around the fact that, at some point, you are going to have to provide a more robust theory of rights or justice to explain why one right trumps another.

For example, let’s consider the frequent clash between privacy and free speech rights. As any casual reader of this blog knows, I feel quite passionately about the First Amendment and free speech rights. And, in all but the most extreme cases or circumstances, I will argue that speech rights should trump privacy rights. When would speech rights not trump privacy rights? For me, that would only occur when a clear, quantifiable harm resulted from the speech. But what is “clear, quantifiable harm”?  Reputation, for example, is not something one can easily quantify the loss of. When a company or a government agency loses or sells your personal health records without permission, however, that privacy violation gets a little more quantifiable. And in the case of someone stealing your personal information to engage in identity theft, the harm becomes still more quantifiable. But those cases often involve monetary damages, whereas something like defamation is much more difficult to quantify. However, when considering privacy-vs.-free speech trade-offs, I would first look to identify and quantify to concrete harm to an individual before allowing the state to curtain freedom of speech.

Solove acknowledges these privacy-speech trade-offs and cites the work of scholars like Eugene Volokh, Fred Cate, Virginia Postrel, and Solveig Singleton, who have all discussed these problems in their work. Volokh, for example, wrote an incredibly important 2000 law review article entitled, “Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You.” As he pointed out in that piece:

The difficulty is that the right to information privacy — the right to control other people’s communication of personally identifiable information about you — is a right to have the government stop people from speaking about you. And the First Amendment (which is already our basic code of “fair information practices”) generally bars the government from “control[ling the communication] of information,” either by direct regulation or through the authorization of private lawsuits.

Without reference to some higher set of first principles or theory of rights / justice, I believe it is very difficult to sort through thorny problems like these. We need to know how and when one right trumps another. A theory of rights that focuses on avoiding direct, tangible harm to others — but largely leaves individuals otherwise free to do what they wish — would generally place speech rights above many privacy “rights” (some of which perhaps should not quality be rights at all). Of course, this more libertarian construction of rights remains quite controversial in our modern society, and there are other theories of rights and justice that would minimize the importance of speech rights relative to privacy.

Importantly, there also needs to be some recognition of the qualitative difference between government threats to privacy versus private threats. The harm that can come from government violations of privacy are generally far more troubling (surveillance, taxation, fines, imprisonment, etc) than potential private harms. I don’t think Solove’s framework appreciates that distinction.

Regardless of which approach one adopts — reasoning from first principles, or working from the “bottom up” (a la Solove) — there will always be fair degree of “balancing” undertaken by legislatures and the courts when crafting privacy policies. Indeed, in many ways, I see Solove’s more “pragmatic” approach often getting us to the same point we would find ourselves in if we took a more philosophical, first principles-based approach. It’s just that under his approach, he would often give the nod to privacy concerns over other rights whereas others (like me) would first look to enhance other values, especially free speech.

In sum, I believe that if one attempts to divorce the exercise of “understanding privacy” from any theory of rights, inevitably, you end right back in the same “conceptual jungle” you were in before. In that sense, I regret to say that Solove’s approach in Understanding Privacy ultimately fails. There’s just no escaping a fight over first principles.

But make no doubt about it, Daniel Solove’s book — and his approach to classifying and dealing with privacy problems — will have a profound impact on all future privacy debates. In that sense, it is a vital text; a must read for all who follow, or engage in, privacy debates.

P.S. Prof. Solove contributed an article to this month’s big Scientific American special issue on “The Future of Privacy.” Many articles in that issue worth reading.

]]> https://techliberation.com/2008/11/08/book-review-soloves-understanding-privacy/feed/ 24 13456 review of Zittrain’s “Future of the Internet” https://techliberation.com/2008/03/23/review-of-zittrains-future-of-the-internet/ https://techliberation.com/2008/03/23/review-of-zittrains-future-of-the-internet/#comments Mon, 24 Mar 2008 04:27:31 +0000 http://techliberation.com/2008/03/23/review-of-zittrains-future-of-the-internet/

Jonathan Zittrain, who is affiliated with Oxford University and Harvard’s Berkman Center, recently released a provocatively titled book: The Future of the Internet–And How to Stop It. It’s an interesting read and I recommend you pick it up despite what I’ll say about it in a moment. (Incidentally, if you ever have a chance to hear Jonathan speak, I highly recommend you do so. He is, bar none, the most entertaining tech policy geek in the world. Imagine Dennis Miller with a cyberlaw degree.) Zittrain Future of the Net cover

Jonathan’s book contrasts two different paradigms that he argues could define the Net’s future: The “generative” Net versus what he refers to as a world of “tethered, sterile appliances.” By “generative” he means technologies or networks that invite or allow tinkering and all sorts of creative uses. Think general-purpose personal computers and the traditional “best efforts” Internet. “Tethered, sterile appliances” by contrast, are technologies or networks that discourage or disallow tinkering. Basically, “take it or leave it” proprietary devices like Apple’s iPhone or the TiVo, or online walled gardens like the old AOL and current cell phone networks.

Jonathan’s thesis is that, for a variety of reasons [viruses, Spam, identify theft, etc], we run the risk of seeing the glorious days of the generative, open Net give way to more tethered devices and closed networks. He states:

“Today, the same qualities that led to [the success of the Internet and general-purpose PCs] are causing [them] to falter. As ubiquitous as Internet technologies are today, the pieces are in place for a wholesale shift away from the original chaotic design that has given rise to the modern information revolution. This counterrevolution would push mainstream users away from the generative Internet that fosters innovation and disruption, to an appliancized network that incorporates some of the most powerful features of today’s Internet while greatly limiting its innovative capacity—and, for better or worse, heightening its regulability. A seductive and more powerful generation of proprietary networks and information appliances is waiting for round two. If the problems associated with the Internet and PC are not addressed, a set of blunt solutions will likely be applied to solves problems at the expense of much of what we love about today’s information ecosystem.” [p. 8].

In other words, Jonathan fears that many people will flock to tethered appliances in a search for stability or security. That’s bad, in his opinion, because those tethered appliances are less “open” and more likely to be “regulable,” either by large corporate intermediaries or government officials. Thus, the “future of the Internet” he is hoping to “stop” is a world dominated by tethered digital appliances because it is too limiting and too easy for others to control.

My primary objection to Jonathan’s thesis is that (1) he seems to be over-stating things quite a bit; and in doing so, (2) he creates a false choice of possible futures from which we must choose. What I mean by false choice is that Jonathan doesn’t seem to believe a hybrid future is possible or desirable. I see no reason why we can’t have the best of both worlds–a world full of plenty of tethered appliances, but also plenty of generativity and openness.

Importantly–and Jonathan acknowledges this point to some extent–the boundaries between “generative” and “tethered appliances” are growing increasingly murky. Social networking sites, for example, allow a great deal of generative activity, but they also impose some limitations on what can be posted, or limit the porting of profiles / information over to other sites. Similarly, the iPhone—which Jonathan calls a “sterile” technology—was completely closed at first, but is now growing more open to tinkering with the SDK rollout. But it’s unlikely it will ever be perfectly open. Finally, the TiVo, which Jonathan also throws into the “sterile” bucket, is a tightly controlled technology in some ways, but allows consumers to do some truly wonderful things with it within certain confines.

And there’s a good reason for all of this: Hybrid solutions often make a great deal of sense. They offer creative opportunities within certain confines in an attempt to balance openness and stability. And this brings us back to how Jonathan is over-stating his thesis, in my opinion; he just doesn’t convince me that the old order—of open networks & general-purpose PCs—is dying. It’s still around and always will be. It’s just that a new crop of characters—let’s call them “mere mortals”—have joined us in cyberspace and are increasingly part of the ongoing digital experience. But those of us who are true-blue tech geeks and tinker-happy gadgeteers still have plenty of generative toys at our disposal even though the mere mortals now walk among us.

For example, like many other tech geeks, I have an outrageously expensive mobile phone that allows me to add just about any application I want to it. Problem is, the more I muck with it, the slower and less reliable it gets in some ways, which is precisely why some mere mortals just want a good old-fashion “sterile” phone that won’t give them any hassles. Regardless, on the “generative-vs.-sterile appliance” spectrum, the range of mobile devices just continues to grow and grow in both directions. You can decide what type of device you want. I want something more generative—warts and all. My wife—a true mere mortal if there ever was one—just wants something that works, even if has far fewer options in terms of generative capabilities. (Of course, she’s not trying to compose blog posts like this on her phone like I am! She just wants to check e-mail on occasion and make phone calls. Imagine that: using a phone just to make calls. Crazy!)

So, my question to Jonathan is—to quote the great philosopher Rodney King—Why can’t we all just get along? Isn’t it a sign of progress that we now have different models that appeal to different types of users? After all, those supposedly “sterile” applications like the iPhone and Tivo are loved by millions. Even calling them “sterile” seems a bit silly to me. After all, those devices have “fostered innovation and disruption” just like PCs and the Net have, just in a different way. Regardless, does Jonathan think all those people would really be better off if they were forced to fend for themselves with completely open iPhones and TiVos? Should the iPhone be shipped to market with no apps loaded on the main screen, forcing everyone to get them for on their own? Should TiVos have no interactive menus out-of-the-box, forcing you to go online and find some homebrew that someone whipped up to give you an open source guide in all its blocky ugliness?

Again, before you answer that question for yourself, put yourself in the shoes of a mere mortal. It’s easy for many us who are tech geeks to look down our noses at those who seem to want to have the hand held through cyberspace or digital experiences. But there’s nothing wrong with those people who seek stability and security in digital devices and their networking experiences—even if they find those solutions in the form of “tethered appliances.” Not everyone wants to have the same cyber-experiences we do. Not everyone wants to reprogram their mobile phones, hack their consoles, write their own code, or even just write a blog or join a social networking site. Millions upon millions of people live perfectly normal lives without ever doing any of these things! (It’s true, I’ve even met a couple of these people… They are called my parents!) Still, many of those mere mortals WILL want to use many of the same toys we tech geeks use, or take cautious steps into the occasional cold pool called cyberspace—one tippy toe at a time. Why shouldn’t those folks be accommodated with “lesser” devices?

I fear that Jonathan has spent a little too much time in the ivory tower surrounded by countless people like me who are almost part cyborg in that they use so much technology that they are practically at one with their devices. (If I don’t have a laptop in my backpack and a mobile phone in my pocket I start to experience phantom pains, like I am missing appendages). If one finds themselves stuck in an echo chamber with enough of these other cyborg-humans, they can start to fear the consequences of what might happen when the mere mortals start walking in the front door and asking asinine questions about how to boot up their devices or log on to certain websites. But we have nothing to fear from these aliens. They can have their closed systems and we can have our open systems. We can tinker; they can just play with what they are given. We can be highly interactive cyber-goobers; they can be utterly passive couch potatoes. And so on.

Moreover, a big part of the gap here is simply generational and will pass with time. Once today’s tech geeks are grandparents, most of our kids and grandkids will largely demand the same sort of systems we do because they will be more accustomed to the occasional downsides that accompany the Wild West that cyberspace can sometimes be. But there will always be a crowd who demands some hand-holding and added security.

Jonathan’s short-term concern about how the desire for more stable and secure systems will lead to a more “regulable” world, is understandable. Concerns about privacy, child safety, defamation, identity theft and so on, will continue to lead to calls for more intervention. At the corporate level, however, some of that potential intervention makes a great deal of sense. For example, if ISPs are in a position to help do something to help alleviate some of these problems—especially Spam and viruses—what’s wrong with that? Of course, it gets a lot trickier with things like child safety and copyright issues. That’s where excessive intervention by ISPs could create serious speech and privacy problems—namely in the form of a forced surrender of anonymity.

But, again, I think there is a happy balance here. Bruce Owen, one of my intellectual heroes, really nails it in his response to Jonathan’s thesis:

“Why does Zittrain think that overreaction is likely, and that its costs will be unusually large? Neither prediction is self-evident. Faced with the risk of infection or mishap, many users already restrain their own taste for PC-mediated adventure, or install protective software with similar effect. For the most risk-averse PC users, it may be reasonable to welcome “tethered” PCs whose suppliers compete to offer the most popular combinations of freedom and safety. Such risk-averse users are reacting, in part, to negative externalities from the poor hygiene of other users, but such users in turn create positive externalities by limiting the population of PCs vulnerable to contagion or hijacking. As far as one can tell, this can as easily produce balance or under reaction as overreaction—it is an empirical question. But, as long as flexibility has value to users, suppliers of hardware and interconnection services will have incentives to offer it, in measured ways, or as options.”

That’s exactly right. We can find happy middle-ground solutions. By contrast, Jonathan’s alternative solutions to these problems are quite amorphous. He speaks of the need for a “latter-day Manhattan project, not to build a bomb but to design the tools and conventions by which to continuously defuse one.” (p. 173). That seems like a strange metaphor or paradigm for him to choose since the Manhattan project was highly secretive and centrally planned, the exact opposite of what he seems to desire. But, again, what he desires remains very murky. It seems he wants to solve the problems brought about by openness with more openness—primarily in the form of collective intelligence and action. If we all just find smart ways to work together, we can improve open systems, he argues. Well, sure we can.. sorta. But it will never work perfectly on its own. Some people are going to want more safety and security. They should get it, even if comes in the form of “sterile appliances and tethered devices.” Because, again, the rest of us always have the option to choose something else.

One proposed solution that Jonathan does spell out in a bit more detail troubles me greatly. When discussing the future of Net neutrality, he makes some interesting arguments similar to those we often make here about how unlikely it is that network intermediaries will really be able to stifle the free flow of bits. But then Jonathan goes on to say:

“If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.” (p. 181)

He then blasts cable and satellite boxes as being “walled gardens” and creating “mediated experiences” and goes on to ask: “So when should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for appliancized systems?” I would have hoped the answer would be NEVER, since we don’t want pesky FCC bureaucrats making those sort of calls for us and stifling device innovation as a result. Alas, Jonathan seems to feel differently, and responds to his own question as follows:

“The answer lies in that subset of appliancized systems that seeks to gain the benefits of third-party contributions while reserving the right to exclude it later. … Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms.” (p. 184)

I have many problems with that logic. First, most developers who offer open APIs aren’t likely to close them later precisely because they don’t want to incur the wrath of “those who built on top of their interface.” But, second, for the sake of argument, let’s say they did want to abandoned previously open APIs and move to some sort of walled garden. So what? Isn’t that called marketplace experimentation? Are we really going to make that illegal? Finally, if they were so foolish as to engage in such games, it might be the best thing that ever happened to the market and consumers since it could encourage more entry and innovation as people seek out more open, pro-generative alternatives.

Consider this example: Now that Apple has opened to door to third-party iPhone development a bit with the SDK, does that mean that under Jonathan’s proposed paradigm we should treat the iPhone as the equivalent of commoditized common carriage device? That seems incredibly misguided to me. If Steve Jobs opens the development door just a little bit only to slam it shut a short time later, he will pay dearly for that mistake in the marketplace. For God’s sake, just spend a few minutes over on the Howard Forums or the PPC Geeks forum if you want to get a taste for the insane amount of tinkering going on out there in the mobile world right now on other systems. If Apple tries to roll back the clock, Microsoft and others will be all too happy to take their business by offering a wealth of devices that allow you to tinker to your heart’s content. We should let such experiments continue and let the future of the Internet be determined by market choices, not regulatory choices such as forced API neutrality.

Anyway, read Jonathan’s book. I’ve probably gone a bit too hard on him here, but it’s an important and enlightening book about one possible vision of the Net’s future. In the end, I guess my outlook is just a little rosier than his.

( Update: Following this review, I discussed my reservations in a series of follow-up essays. (Part 2, 3, 4, 5).  We’ve also debated his book on the an NPR-Boston [audio is here] and we debated in person at New America Foundation in early November [video is here]. Finally, I named Jonathan’s book the “most important tech policy book of 2008” on my end-of-year Top 10 list.)

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