Michelle Quinn of Politico was kind enough to call me a few days ago and ask for comment for her story about “California Driving Internet Privacy Policy.” Quinn’s article offers an excellent overview of how the Golden State is gradually taking on a greater regulatory role for the Net, at least as it pertains to matters of online privacy. She opens by noting that:

With the federal government and technology policy shut down in Washington, California is steaming ahead with a series of online privacy laws that will have broad implications for Internet companies and consumers.In recent weeks, Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown has signed a litany of privacy-related legislation, including measures to create an “eraser button” for teens, outlaw online “revenge porn” and make Internet companies explain how they respond to consumer Do Not Track requests. The burst of activity is another sign that the Golden State — home to Google, Facebook and many of the world’s largest tech companies — is setting the agenda for Internet regulation at a time when the White House and Congress are moving at a much more glacial pace.

When she asked me how I felt about this, I noted that: “California seems like it is willing to declare the Internet its own private fiefdom and rule it with its own privacy fist.”  And, no matter how well intentioned any of these new California policies may be, the ends most certainly do not justify the means.

As I noted in a January essay here on “The Perils of Parochial Privacy Policies,” such state-based meddling with the Internet and globally-interconnected networks and platforms raises profound constitutional issues. It threatens the free flow of commerce and speech. Even if it is the case that some of us may, at times, want some forms of commerce and speech limited by state action, I would very much hope that we could agree that having 50 states creating their own State Privacy Offices or State Data Protection Bureaus would probably not be a wise move. This is exactly the sort of thing that the Commerce Clause was put in place to protect against when interstate commerce is on the line. And it is also the sort of thing that might even be preemptable under the First Amendment since some speech issues are in play here. And I’m not even getting into the wisdom of some of the individual policies that California is pursing, many of which are highly impractical and likely extremely costly.

I hope that all those folks who say they really care about “Internet freedom” will make a stand against what California is doing here. But something leads me to believe that, once again, selective morality will enter the picture simply because of the sensitive and highly emotional nature of all online privacy and child safety issues. But, again, the ends do not justify the means. The Internet does not belong to California and they should not be allowed to make it their own regulatory fiefdom.

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my new white paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.” [PDF] I first presented a draft of this paper last November at a Michigan State University conference on “The Governance of Social Media.” [Video of my panel here.]

In this paper, I note that to the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Internet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered “essential facilities” or “natural monopolies” and regulated as public utilities. The debate over “net neutrality” regulation has been animated by such concerns.

While that debate still rages, the rhetoric of public utilities and essential facilities is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about other layers of the Internet, such as the search layer. More recently, there have been rumblings within academic and public policy circles regarding whether social media platforms, especially social networking sites, might also possess public utility characteristics. Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of those sites’ structures and business practices.

Proponents of treating social media platforms as public utilities offer a variety of justifications for regulation. Amorphous “fairness” concerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational concerns are also frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation. Proponents of regulation also sometimes invoke “social utility” or “social commons” arguments in defense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear definition.

Social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities, however, and there are good reasons why policymakers should avoid a rush to regulate them as such. Treating these nascent digital services as regulated utilities would harm consumer welfare because public utility regulation has traditionally been the archenemy of innovation and competition. Furthermore, treating today’s leading social media providers as digital essential facilities threatens to convert “natural monopoly” or “essential facility” claims into self-fulfilling prophecies. Related proposals to mandate “API neutrality” or enforce a “Separations Principle” on integrated information platforms would be particularly problematic. Such regulation also threatens innovation and investment. Marketplace experimentation in search of sustainable business models should not be made illegal.

Remedies less onerous than regulation are available. Transparency and data-portability policies would solve many of the problems that concern critics, and numerous private empowerment solutions exist for those users concerned about their privacy on social media sites.

Finally, because social media are fundamentally tied up with the production and dissemination of speech and expression, First Amendment values are at stake, warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny of proposals for regulation. Social media providers should possess the editorial discretion to determine how their platforms are configured and what can appear on them.

This 63-page paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader. Eventually, a shorter version of this paper will appear as a chapter in a MIT Press book.

Social Networks as Public Utilities [Adam Thierer]

Reps. Jackie Speier (D-Calif.) and Steve Womack (R-Ark.) have introduced “The Marketplace Equity Act,” which would open the floodgates to anything-goes State-based taxation of the Internet and interstate commerce. The bill essentially sacrifices constitutional fairness at the alter of “tax fairness.” Building on concerns raised by state and local officials as well as “bricks-and-mortar” retailers, Speier and Womack claim that, as “a matter of states’ rights” and “leveling the playing field,” Congress should bless state efforts to impose sales tax collection obligation on interstate (“remote”) companies.The measure would allow States to do so using one of three rate structures: (1) a single blended state/local rate; (2) a single maximum State rate; or (3) the actual local jurisdiction destination rate + the State rate (so long as the State “make(s) available adequate software to remote sellers that substantially eases the burden of collecting at multiple rates within the State.”)

This builds on a long-standing effort by some States to devise a multistate sales tax compact to collude and impose taxes on interstate transactions. In the Senate, Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL) has floated legislation (“The Main Street Fairness Act”) that would bless such a state-based de facto national sales tax regime for the Internet.

There is a better way to achieve fairness without sacrificing tax competition or opening the doors to unjust, unconstitutional, and burdensome state-based taxation of interstate sales. In a new Mercatus Center essay,”The Internet, Sales Taxes, and Tax Competition,” Veronique de Rugy and I argue that:

Apart from getting chronic state overspending under control, a better solution to the states’ fiscal problems than a tax cartel that imposes burdensome tax collection obligations on outof-state vendors would be tax competition.  Congress should adopt an “origin-based” sourcing rule for any states seeking to impose sales tax collection obligations on interstate vendors. This rule would be in line with Constitutional protections for interstate commerce, allow for the continued growth of the digital economy, and ensure excessive, inefficient taxes do not burden companies and consumers.

Vero and I have detailed this alternative plan in much greater detail in this 2003 Cato white paper, “The Internet Tax Solution: Tax Competition, Not Tax Collusion.” As we explain in our new paper:

In this system, states would tax all sales inside their borders equally, regardless of the buyer’s residence or the ultimate location of consumption. Under that model, all sales would be “sourced” to the seller’s principal place of business and taxed accordingly. This is, after all, how sales taxes have traditionally worked. A Washington, DC, resident who buys a television in Virginia, for instance, is taxed at the origin of sale in Virginia regardless of whether he brings the television back into the District. Each day in America, there are millions of cross-border transactions that are taxed only at the origin of the sale; no questions are asked about where the buyer will consume the good. Policy makers should extend the same principle to crossborder sales involving mail order and the Internet. Under this approach, Internet shoppers would pay the sales tax of the state where the online retailer is based.

An origin-based sourcing rule has several advantages over the destination-based system States favor.

1. It would eliminate constitutional concerns because only companies within a state or local government’s borders would be taxed.
2. An origin-based system would do away with the need for prohibitively complex multistate collection arrangements because states would tax transactions at the source, not at the final point of consumption.
3. An origin-based system also would protect buyers’ privacy rights, eliminating the need to collect any special or unique information about a buyer and to use third-party tax collectors to gather such information.
4. It would also preserve local jurisdictional tax authority whereas a harmonization proposal would create a de facto national sales tax system that would exclude local governments.
5. Finally, because it is more politically and constitutionally feasible, an origin tax may actually maximize the amount of tax collected for states by making compliance easier and incorporating currently untaxed activities.

In closing, it is important to address the misguided claim at the heart of the Speier-Womack bill that this is a “states’ rights” issue. Let’s be clear what real federalism is all about. Federalism is not about “states’ rights.” States have powers and responsibilities, and under the Constitution — at least the proper interpretation of it — they have wide-ranging flexibility to purse different governance approaches. But that power is not unlimited. America abandoned its first constitution, The Articles of Confedertion, after just 14 years in part because untrammeled state authority was discouraging interstate trade and commerce. In their wisdom, the authors or our present Constitution made sure to include Article 1, Sec. 8, Clause 3 — the so-called “Commerce Clause” — which created and protected what might best be thought of as the world’s first free trade zone – The United States of America. It remains one of the greatest achievements in constitutional and commercial history.

Thus, properly understood, federalism is about a healthy tension among competing units of government. Each has a different role and set of responsibilities, and this tension bolsters the checks and balances at the heart of our constitutional republic. [I outline all this in far more detail my 1999 book, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age.]

In the context of Internet tax policy, this means that the tax power of the States can be legitimately constrained by the federal government to ensure that the interstate market is not unduly burdened with unjust levies. States certainly retain the power to impose whatever levies they wish on those actors who have a substantial physical presence in their geographic confines. That is, they can tax their own exports. Taxing imports from another State, however, is an entirely different matter, and one the necessarily requires some degree of federal oversight to ensure America’s free trade zone is preserved and protected.

An origin-based sourcing rule accomplishes that goal while also leaving States the discretion to impose taxes on their own exports if they so choose. The fact that this system would lead to heated tax competition among the States is a feature, not a bug.

The debate over the imposition of sales tax collection obligations on interstate vendors is heating up again at the federal level with the introduction of S. 1452, “The Main Street Fairness Act.” [pdf]  The measure would give congressional blessing to a multistate compact that would let states impose sales taxes on interstate commerce, something usually blocked by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced the bill in the Senate along with Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Jack Reed (D-RI).  The measure is being sponsored in the House of Representatives by John Conyers (D-MI) and Peter Welch (D-VT). At this time, there are no Republican co-sponsors even though Sen. Mike Enzi was rumored to be a considered co-sponsoring the measure before introduction.

Without any Republicans on board the effort, the measure may not advance very far in Congress. Nonetheless, to the extent the measure gets any traction, it is worth itemizing a few of the problems with this approach. My Mercatus Center colleague Veronique de Rugy and I have done some work on this issue together in the past and we are planning a short new paper on the topic. It will build on this lengthy Cato Institute paper we authored together in 2003, “The Internet Tax Solution: Tax Competition, Not Tax Collusion.” The key principle we set forth was this: “Congress must.. take an affirmative stand against efforts by state and local governments to create a collusive multistate tax compact to tax interstate sales.” “It would be wrong,” we argued, “for members of Congress to abdicate their responsibility to safeguard the national marketplace by giving the states carte blanche to tax interstate commercial activities through a tax compact. The guiding ethic of this debate must remain tax competition, not tax collusion.”

Proponents of simply extending current sales tax collection obligations to interstate sales will claim that the so-called “Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement” (SSTUA) they want Congress to bless has solved the compliance cost and complexity problem associated with taxing “remote” interstate sales. Yet, as I pointed out in my recent Forbes essay, “The Internet Taxman Cometh,” this 200-page “simplification” effort remains a Swiss cheese tax system, however, riddled with loopholes and complexities that could burden vendors, especially mom-and-pop operators. America’s estimated 7,400 local jurisdictions still have many different definitions and exemptions that complicate the sales tax code. For example, is a cookie a “candy,” (which is taxed in most jurisdictions) or a “baked good,” (which is typically tax-exempt)? Thus, forcing online vendors to collect local taxes would create significant burdens on interstate commerce.

This is not to say there aren’t some legitimate tax “fairness” arguments in play here. It really is unfair that “Main Street” vendors are burdened with significant tax collection responsibilities while others are not. But “fairness” cuts many ways. It’s also unfair and unconstitutional to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales taxes on behalf of a jurisdiction where they have no physical presence. After all, at least in theory, those who are taxed should expect to receive some benefit for it. Interstate vendors receive no benefit but bear all the cost.

To the extent we want to “level the playing field,” therefore, one approach is to cut or eliminate sales taxes on in-state vendors. Of course, that’s a tough pill for many states and localities to swallow. If they got their profligate spending habits under control, however, that might be easier.

Another alternative would be the creation of a national Internet sales tax that would avoid the complexity problem by imposing a single rate and set of definitions on all vendors. But that just opens the door to a new federal tax base, which would grow to be burdensome in other ways at a time when American consumers and companies are already over-taxed. I doubt the idea would get much traction in Congress, anyway.

Perhaps the best alternative would be to switch the sourcing methodology for state sales tax collection obligations from destination-based to “origin-based.”  Stated differently, the rule would be “you can tax your own exports, not the imports from other states.” Here’s how Veronique and I summarized an origin-based solution in our old Cato paper:

under an origin-based sourcing rule—also referred to as a “seller state,” “vendor-state,” or “source-based” rule by some scholars—all interstate sales through all channels (traditional stores or cyber-retailers) would be taxed at the point of sale (meaning the company’s “principal place of business”) instead of at the point of destination, if the state or locality chooses to impose a tax. All goods within a given state or locality would be taxed at the locally applicable rate no matter how they were purchased and no matter where they were consumed.  This option would take care of most of the problems posed by the destination-based methodology that is favored by most state and local policymakers today.

Specifically, an origin-based sourcing rule would have the following advantages:

• Minimize the burden on sellers by requiring sellers to know and abide by the tax rates and regulations within their principal place of business instead of the rates and definitions of thousands of different taxing jurisdiction.
• Ensure tax parity between Main Street vendors and interstate sellers.
• Do away with the need for a multistate collection arrangement such as the SSTUA by eliminating any need to trace interstate transactions to the final point of consumption.
• Remove nexus uncertainties and constitutional concerns, because only companies within a state or local government’s borders would be taxed.
• Largely remove any need for continued reliance on the use tax because all transactions would henceforth be sourced to the origin of sale and collected immediately by the vendor at that point.
• Respect buyers’ privacy rights by eliminating the need to collect any special or unique information about a buyer, and  by not using third-party tax collectors to gather information about buyers.
• Respect federalism principles and enhance jurisdictional tax competition  by permitting each state to determine its  own tax policies and encouraging healthy state-by-state tax rivalry.
• Preserve local jurisdictional tax authority where a harmonization proposal like the SSTUA plans would create a de facto national sales tax system and run roughshod over local governments.
• Because it is more politically / constitutionally feasible it may maximize the amount of tax collected for states by making compliance easier and incorporating activities that are currently untaxed.

Please see the old Cato paper for more details and answers to potential objections, but I hope it’s clear why an “origin-based” solution offers a sensible way to break the current logjam and achieve tax “fairness” in the process.

Some states officials will object to the vigorous tax competition spawned by an origin-based sourcing rule. But that’s a feature, not a bug! Tax competition is good for consumers and the continued vitality of American federalism. A multistate tax compact, by contrast, would encourage tax collusion and let states too easily raise rates on interstate sales.

Moreover, I think it bears repeating that state officials have been at this for 15 years and still not found a way to truly simplify their sales taxes and get around constitutional limitations on the taxation of interstate activity. An origin-based system, therefore, may offer them the only way for them to finally tax the Internet and interstate sales.  I’d prefer they scale back their taxing ways, of course, but to the extent they insist on pushing out the boundaries of their tax authority, an origin-based solution — not the “Main Street Tax Fairness Act” — is the only sensible, constitutional way for them to do so.

A favorite PR maven pitched me (and probably many of you) Senator Al Franken’s (D-MN) email suggesting that WiFi is threatened by the Google-Verizon “deal.”

“The Google-Verizon ‘framework’ was written so as not to apply to wireless Internet services,” says Franken. “If you use wi-fi or access the Internet on your phone, this is a serious problem.”

Kindamaybenotsomuch. WiFi is wireless, yes, but it’s not what they’re talking about when they say “wireless.”

But what caught my eye is Senator Franken’s somewhat inverted take on power arrangements in the federal government: “This evening, I’ll be speaking at an FCC hearing in Minneapolis. I’ll urge the commissioners to reject the Google-Verizon framework, stop the Comcast/NBC merger, and take action to keep the Internet free and open.”

Folks, Article I, section 1 of the United States Constitution creates the United States Senate, with section 3 describing the Senate’s makeup and some procedures.

The Federal Communications Commission is not a constitutional body. The best view is that Congress has no authority to establish an FCC like we have today. The better view is that Congress should not maintain the sprawling FCC we have today. And the only correct view is that FCC is a creation of Congress, beneath it in every relevant respect.

Senator Franken is supposed to be the boss of the FCC, not a supplicant “urging” the FCC to do x, y, and z.

Does it matter a lot? No. Senator Franken is mostly making a symbolic appeal to gin up constituent support. But he’s also symbolizing the abasement of the legislative branch to an independent agency that has no constitutional pedigree.

Wine (and beer) lovers who want to order hard-to-get vintages online have benefited greatly from federal court decisions that say state alcohol laws cannot discriminate against out-of-state sellers. Federal legislation introduced last week could threaten electronic commerce as it further entrenches middlemen who normally profit from every bottle of alcohol that passes from producers to consumers.

To understand what’s going on, you have to know something about Commerce Clause litigation. I’m not a lawyer, though I once played the teetotaling William Jennings Bryan character in a high school production of Inherit the Wind.  This proves my motives are pure. And since a lot of lawyers practice economics without a license, I figure I’ll return the favor.

The Commerce Clause of the US Constitution says that Congress, not the states, can regulate interstate commerce. A longstanding judicial interpretation, the “dormant” Commerce Clause, holds that if Congress has not chosen to regulate some aspect of interstate commerce, that means Congress doesn’t want the states to regulate it either.  So, normally a state can regulate interstate commerce only if Congress has given explicit permission.

If state law discriminates against out-of-state sellers who compete with in-state sellers, the state is regulating interstate commerce.  A state is not allowed to do this unless it can prove the discrimination is necessary to accomplish some clear state purpose that cannot be accomplished in some other way. States have to present evidence that proves these points, not just make arguments. 

The 21st Amendment, which repealed Prohibition, gave states the right to regulate alcohol.  Recent court cases involving direct wine shipment clarified that when states regulate alcohol, they must still obey the Commerce Clause. This makes good sense. Imagine if the 21st Amendment freed states from the rest of the Constitution when they regulate alcohol. The police could break into your house without warning if they imagined you might give your 20-year-old a beer, but they’d still need a search warrant if they thought you were cooking meth. 

In Granholm v. Heald (2005), the Surpeme Court said that states could either allow in-state and out-of-state sellers to ship wine directly to consumers, or prohibit it for both, but states couldn’t ban direct shipment for out-of-state sellers and allow it for in-state sellers. In response, most states have liberalized their direct shipment laws rather than making them more restrictive. In Family Wine Makers of California v. Jenkins (2008), federal courts said that an ostensibly neutral law that had a discriminatory effect on out-of-state sellers was also unconstitutional. Massachusetts had enacted a law that allowed only wineries producing 30,000 gallons or less to ship directly to consumers; the production cap was large enough to allow all in-state wineries to direct ship but small enough to exclude 637 larger out-of-state wineries that produce 98 percent of all wine in the United States.  The judge’s opinion essentially said, “By their fruits you shall know them,” and it reserved special grapes of wrath for the blatantly protectionist motives voiced by advocates of the law. Massachusetts appealed this decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, lost, and on April 12 decided not to appeal to the Supreme Court.

On April 15, Massachusetts Rep. Bill Delahunt introduced federal legislation that would turn alcoholic Commerce Clause litigation sideways. The legislation makes four big changes in the rules of the game:

1. It says that states may not “facially discriminate without justification.” This standard might reverse Granholm, because the state laws were clearly discriminatory but the states offered justifications. It would likely reverse Family Wine Makers, because the law was “facially” neutral but had discriminatory effects. (Of course, if this thing passes, I’d be delighted to see a consumer or winery plaintiff prove me wrong.)
2. It repeals the “dormant” Commerce Clause for alcohol by stating that congressional silence on interstate commerce in alcohol should not be interpreted as a prohibition on state regulation of interstate commerce in alcohol.
3. It shifts the burden of proof by requiring that anyone challenging a state alcohol law must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that the law is invalid. Normally, states have the obligation to present evidence that a discriminatory law accomplishes a state purpose and is no more discriminatory than necessary.  
4. Any state law that burdens interstate commerce or contradicts any other federal law (!) would be upheld unless the person challenging it proves that the state law has no effect on temperance, orderly markets, tax collection, the structure of the distribution system, or underage drinking.  Since there’s plenty of economic evidence that state alcohol laws increase prices, a state could argue its laws reduce consumption and promote temperance, and the law would be upheld.  In other words, any state alcohol law that harms consumers by increasing prices would automatically be OK, even if it blatantly conflicted with other federal laws (such as antitrust laws, which are intended to protect consumers from the high prices associated with monopoly) or the Commerce Clause.

Word on the street is that the biggest pushers of this legislation are the beer wholesalers. Since most of this litigation has involved wine, what’s going on here?

The real goal of this legislation is not harrassing wineries that want to ship a few bottles to out-of-state customers. The real goal is to preserve anti-competitive state laws that force brewers, wine makers, and distillers to market most of their product through beer, wine, and spirits wholesalers, instead of marketing directly to retailers and restaurants. The proposed legislation would effectively insulate these state laws from challenge under the Commerce Clause, federal antitrust laws, or any other federal laws that might give alcohol producers and consumers some leverage to break the wholesalers’ lock on the market.

Call it states’ rights kool-aid with a chaser of economic protectionism.  A strange brew indeed.

On July 27th, The Progress & Freedom Foundation hosted a Capitol Hill panel discussion entitled “Online Child Safety, Privacy, and Free Speech: An Overview of Challenges in Congress & the States.” The event featured remarks from:

• Parry Aftab, Executive Director, WiredSafety.org
• Todd Haiken, Senior Manager of Policy, Common Sense Media
• Jim Halpert, Partner, DLA Piper
• Berin Szoka, Senior Fellow, The Progress & Freedom Foundation

We’ve just released the transcript of the event, which I have also pasted down below the fold in a Scribd document reader. Also, the audio for this event can be heard by clicking below:

Download mp3

Here is the full event description:

Online child safety, privacy, and free speech remain hotly debated issues at both the federal and state level. Bills introduced in Congress to address cyberbullying concerns propose either educational initiatives or a criminalization approach. Access to objectionable content also remains a concern and a new, government-mandated task force is looking into those issues. Meanwhile, state officials, including many state attorneys general, continue to explore age verification mandates for social networking sites and some have considered building on the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) to expand “parental notification” mandates. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently announced an expedited review of COPPA to see if it is keeping up with new developments. The FTC is also exploring child safety in virtual worlds. New concerns about “sexting,” or the sending of sexual explicit images over mobile devices, has also raised new concerns led some lawmakers to ponder penalties.

How serious are these concerns? Is legislation or regulation needed to address them? What free speech issues are at stake? Should Congress take the lead or leave it to the States to experiment with different models? These and other issues were discussed by a panel of leading experts in the field of online safety and privacy policy.

Transcript PFF Online Child Safety Privacy Hill Event (7-27-2009) http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=18756666&access_key=key-1blb7az1ag406howibuk&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Adam Thierer & I have just released a detailed examination (PDF) of brewing efforts to expand the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 to cover adolescents and potentially all social networking sites—an approach we call “COPPA 2.0.”

As Adam explained on Larry Magid’s CNET podcast, COPPA mandates certain online privacy protections for children under 13, most importantly that websites obtain the “verifiable consent” of a child’s parent before collecting personal information about that child or giving that child access to interactive functionality that might allow the child to share their personal information with others. The law was intended primarily to “enhance parental involvement in a child’s online activities” as a means of protecting the online privacy and safety of children.

Yet advocates of expanding COPPA—or “COPPA 2.0″—see COPPA’s verifiable parental consent framework as a means for imposing broad regulatory mandates in the name of online child safety and concerns about social networking, cyber-harassment, etc. Two COPPA 2.0 bills are currently pending in New Jersey and Illinois. The accelerated review of COPPA to be conducted by the FTC next year (five years ahead of schedule) is likely to bring to Washington serious talk of expanding COPPA—even though Congress clearly rejected covering adolescents age 13-16 when COPPA was first proposed back in 1998.

We’ll discuss some of the key points of our paper in a series of blog posts, but here are the top nine reasons for rejecting COPPA 2.0, in that such an approach would:

• Burden the free speech rights of adults by imposing age verification mandates on many sites used by adults, thus restricting anonymous speech and essentially converging—in terms of practical consequences—with the unconstitutional Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA), another 1998 law sometimes confused with COPPA;
• Burden the free speech rights of adolescents to speak freely on—or gather information from—legal and socially beneficial websites;
• Hamper routine and socially beneficial communication between adolescents and adults;
• Reduce, rather than enhance, the privacy of adolescents, parents and other adults because of the massive volume of personal information that would have to be collected about users for authentication purposes (likely including credit card data);

• Would likely be the subject of massive fraud or evasion since it is not always possible to definitively verify the parent-child relationship, or because the system could be “gamed” in other ways by determined adolescents;
• Do nothing to prevent offshore sites and services from operating outside these rules;
• Present major practical challenges for law enforcement officials in the face of such evasion by both domestic users and offshore sites;
• Could destroy opportunities for new or smaller website operators to break into the market and offer competing services and innovations, thus contributing to consolidation of online content and services by erecting barriers to entry; and
• Violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, since Internet activity clearly represents interstate commerce that states have no authority to regulate.

There’s a movement afoot in Congress to advance legislation that would eviscerate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, empower a state-based tax cartel, and potentially decimate the Internet economy in the process.  Business Week has the details:

In the next week, legislators are expected to introduce bills in the House and Senate promising to do away with the “physical presence” requirement. If a bill passes — and that’s a big “if” — it would require all online retailers, except for the tiniest companies, to collect sales taxes in the 23 states that are part of the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. The states would compensate the retailers for the trouble, while promising not to sue them for tax collection mistakes that are made.

The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, or “SSTP”, sounds good in theory but would be disastrous in practice.   Michael Graham of the Boston Herald penned an editorial about the SSTP today and he does a nice job pointing out why, when it comes to “tax simplification,” the devil is always in the details and those details are typically anything but “simple” (or taxpayer-friendly for that matter).

The real danger of the SSTP, however, is what it means for the Constitution and tax competition among the states.  In this 2003 paper I penned with Veronique de Rugy for the Cato Institute, we showed why the SSTP would not only fail to simplify the sales tax code, but would actually cede dangerous taxing powers to state and local governments over the interstate marketplace.  In the process, Veronique and I argued, a multi-state sales tax cartel would be spawned:

Bringing greater uniformity to the current system may have some positive benefits, such as more straightforward tax administration, but it would come at the expense of tax competition between the states and localities. Moreover, when supporters of the [SSTP] argue for greater uniformity in the sales tax system, they may just be making a covert effort to sustain higher tax rates and expand the current system to incorporate remote vendors on interstate goods and services. But at what cost? The states are essentially proposing to abandon true federalism and jurisdictional tax competition in exchange for the power to potentially recoup a small amount of tax revenue from interstate sales through a uniform system of third-party tax collection. Sadly, it appears that state and local officials would prefer to create a cozy tax cartel instead of relying on a “laboratories of democracy” model of competition between the states. Many analysts have labeled the SSTP proposal “collusive federalism” or “cartel federalism,” because it runs counter to America’s true federalist structure of government and has very little to do with protecting states’ rights. In fact, if a state wants to simplify its sales tax base, it can do so and does not need to reach an agreement with other states.  Federalism is about state independence, not state collusion.

That’s why Congress should never cede taxing authority over interstate commerce to state or local governments. Of course, the Founders taught us this years ago when the tossed out the Articles of Confederation in favor of our current Constitution. They realized federalism was a two-sided coin, and while the states should be left with broad discretion to craft their own tax policies, that authority must end at the state border.  It must so that a free-trade pact among the states can work and interstate commerce can flow freely.  The SSTP would sabotage that.

That doesn’t mean that there is no way for states to constitutionally tax online sales.  As Michael Graham notes, there is an easier solution that would be pro-constitutional and pro-tax competition: An “origin-based” taxing rule:

The fair and obvious solution is to treat every Internet purchase like an ice cream cone on Hampton Beach. The Ben and Jerry’s guy there doesn’t ask where you’re from. For every dollar of ice cream he sells, he collects the same sales tax, period. Why not have Internet retailers do the same? If a business in New Hampshire sells a product, online or at the drive-thru, it always collects the local sales tax. It’s fair — after all, that business and its workers use services the taxes support. And it’s easy — every business already knows how much to collect.

Here’s how Aaron Lukas and I described an origin-based taxing system in a 2001 Cato article:

Most people don’t realize it, but nothing is stopping states from “leveling the playing field” on sales taxes. Each state has the legal authority to tax all transactions that originate within its borders (i.e., an “origin-based” tax). But no state chooses to tax sales that in-state businesses make to out-of-state buyers. In other words, states purposefully exempt their exports from sales taxes. So why don’t states treat all merchants the same by having them collect the local sales tax regardless of where the buyer lives? When you walk into Wal-Mart, checkout clerks don’t ask you where you live; they collect the taxes due where the store is located. We could treat Internet sellers that way. But states fear that a few low- and no-tax rogue states might lure businesses away. Politicians call that a “race to the bottom.”  But it’s really just healthy tax competition.

An origin-based taxing methodology would also have the important added benefit of protecting buyer / taxpayer privacy.  There’s no need for extensive data-collection and reporting requirements that would have to accompany a destination-based taxing rule, as required under the SSTP.

Federal lawmakers should reject the SSTP proposal as an anti-competitive, unconsitutitonal nightmare for our Republic.  If states want to “simplify” their sales tax codes, then by all means, go for it.  But there is no need for Congress to grant them power to extend those taxes outside their borders or, worse yet, do it in unison with other tax officials as part of an interstate tax cartel.   Tax competition must trump tax collusion.

Today, it was my great privilege to guest lecture at Princeton University’s Center for Information Technology Policy. Under the leadership of Ed Felten, who also runs the excellent “Freedom to Tinker” blog, the CITP has quickly become one of America’s premier institutions in the field of IT policy matters. David Robinson, who some of you will remember from his days as an editor at The American, serves as associate director of the CITP program and was kind enough to invite me to speak.  And our own Tim Lee is currently studying there as well.  I wish I was smart enough to get into that program!

The topic of my talk was “The Future of the First Amendment in an Age of Technological Convergence” and I used the opportunity to create a narrated video of this presentation, which I have made to several other groups through the years. In this presentation, I talk about “America’s First Amendment Twilight Zone,” which refers to the fact that identical words and images are being regulated in completely different ways today depending on the mode of transmission. This illogical and unfair situation could eventually threaten the Internet, video games, and all new media with many of the misguided regulations that have long been imposed on broadcast television and radio operators. In my presentation, which you can watch below, I make the case for changing our First Amendment regime to ensure “bit equality”; all speech and media platforms should be accorded the gold standard of First Amendment protection.

The presentation is based upon several other essays, court filings, and law review articles I have written on the topic, including:

• “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age,” by Adam Thierer, 7/10/07.
• “FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age,” by Adam Thierer, 1/20/09.
• Joint Amicus Brief of The Center for Democracy & Technology and The Progress & Freedom Foundation, U.S. Supreme Court in the matter of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, by Adam Thierer, John B. Morris, Jr., and Sophia Cope, August 8, 2008

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC’s December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap http://documents.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=8630011&access_key=key-2obr4z2ohtozi1gabbay&page=1&version=1&viewMode=