Here’s a new animated explainer video that I narrated for the Federalist Society’s Regulatory Transparency Project. The 3-minute video discusses how earlier “tech giants” rose and fell as technological innovation and new competition sent them off to what the New York Times once appropriately called “The Hall of Fallen Giants.” It’s a continuing testament to the power of “creative destruction” to upend and reorder markets, even as many pundits insist that there’s no possibility change can happen.

This is an important lesson for us to remember today, as I noted in the recent editorial for The Hill about why, “Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer“:

Those who worry about today’s largest tech giants becoming supposedly unassailable monopolies should consider how similar fears were expressed not so long ago about other tech titans, many of which we laugh about today. Just 14 years ago, headlines proclaimed that “MySpace Is a Natural Monopoly,” and asked, “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” We all know how that “monopoly” ceased to exist. At the same time, pundits insisted “Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone,” since “there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive.” The smartphone market of that era was viewed as completely under the control of BlackBerry, Palm, Motorola and Nokia. A few years prior to that, critics lambasted the merger of AOL and TimeWarner as a new corporate “Big Brother” that would decimate digital diversity and online competition.

Accordingly, policymakers should be humble and recognize that, “it’s better to let rivalry and innovation emerge organically,” and only bring in the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust regulation as a last resort, I argued. Technological change and entrepreneurialism has a way of upending and reordering markets when we least expect it. Just ask all those members of the Hall of Fallen Giants.

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

This morning I spoke at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce event on “Responsible Data Uses: Benefits to Consumers, Businesses and the Economy.” In preparing for the event, I dusted off some old working notes for speeches I had delivered at other events about privacy policy and “big data” and expanded them a bit to account for recent policy developments. For what it’s worth, I figured I would post those notes here.  (I apologize about the informality but I never write out my speeches, I just work from bullet points.)

—————–

Benefits of “Big Data”

• “big data” has numerous micro- and macroeconomic benefits
• Micro benefits:
  • data aggregation of all varieties has powerful social and economic benefits that are sometimes invisible to consumers and citizens but are nonetheless enjoyed by them
  • big data can positively impact the 3 key micro variables – quality, quantity & price – and benefit consumers / citizens in the process

• Macro benefits:
  • Data is the lifeblood of the information economy and it has an increasing bearing on the global competitiveness of companies and countries
  • In the old days, when we talked about comparative and competitive advantage, the focus was on natural resources, labor, and capital.
  • Today, we increasingly talk about another variable: information
  • Data is increasing one of the most important resources that can benefit economic growth, innovation, and the competitive advantage of firms and nations.

Privacy Concerns

• of course, “big data” also raises big privacy concerns for many groups and individuals
• this has led to calls for regulatory action and virtually all levels of government – federal, state, local, and international – are considering expanded controls on data collection and aggregation

America’s Privacy Regime

• I want to address what I regard as the most powerful myth that governs this debate
• namely, I speak of the myth that America doesn’t have a privacy framework that can balance these goals and concerns about “big data” and data collection in general
• we hear various advocates say that America needs a new privacy regime, and many of these advocates suggest that that regime should more like Europe’s

Europe’s Regime

• first, what is that European regime?
  • a more preemptive top-down approach / data “directives” / stringent requirements on data use
  • basically, under the EU regime, privacy trumps almost all other considerations, regardless of cost or complexity.
  • It’s more of a “Mother, May I” regime in which innovation needs to be “permissioned”

• what’s wrong with European approach?
  • We can relate this back to the question of competitive advantage
  • The European approach leaves less room for innovative uses of data and ongoing marketplace experimentation
  • There’s also some evidence that this regime might influence industry structure and competitiveness as well as the quality and quantity of choices for the consumer
  • Anecdotally-speaking, we can ask ourselves this simple question: Can any of us name a global leader in the modern digital economy that was born in Europe?
  • I suppose there are a few, but I struggle to name them
  • Now, why is that?
  • It could be high taxes and the lack of healthy market for venture capital.
  • But it also must have something to do with regulatory structure that Europe has adopted.

America’s Current Advantages

• Regardless, here’s what we do know: America’s digital economy innovators and social media operators are household names across the globe. Our firms are the envy of the world
• Moreover, while many sectors of the U.S. economy are struggling, I bet if you stopped the average Joe in the street and asked them to name one sector of America’s economy that is currently thriving and an example of innovation that others should emulate, most of them would probably mention information technology and the digital economy.
• Again, many factors may contribute to our current success relative to Europe but certainly our “light-touch” legal and regulatory approach must have had some bearing on that outcome

America’s Privacy Regime

• So, what exactly is America’s privacy regime?
• Again, some say we don’t have one and that regulation is, therefore, needed
• I beg to differ
• America does have a privacy regime; it is one that is:
  • governed by a set of evolutionary norms,
  • ongoing online marketplace interactions and experiments, contractual negotiations,
  • public and press pressures,
  • self-regulatory systems,
  • educational efforts and user empowerment,
  • personal responsibility,
  • and targeted legal enforcement and the use of state torts when true harms can be demonstrated.

•   compared with Europe, our legal regime:
• More bottom-up enforcement
• Issue-specific / Sectoral approach to addressing
• Relies on common law / case law / torts
• States have role; often more stringent than fed law
• evolving industry Self-regulation

• That’s been the uniquely American approach to privacy protection and we should not abandon it lightly.

It’s the Same Regime We’ve Used to Address Online Safety

• Importantly, it’s largely the same approach we have taken in this country toward online speech and child safety matters.
• There, too, we have focused on what I call the “3-E” approach:
  • Education
  • Empowerment, and
  • Enforcement against particularly bad apples

• Thus, in both the online child safety space as well as the privacy policy space, we have made great strides in pushing both personal responsibility and corporate responsibility as the first line of defense, not the last.
• Now, it has always been true, and will always be the case, that “more can be done.”
• Consumers could do more: We need to constantly encourage consumers to take more care to protect the personal data they care most about and to take steps to safeguard that which they do not want collected in the first place
• Companies could do more: And we also need to constantly encourage companies who collect data to take greater steps to:
  • first consider asking permission to collect and use that data
  • second, to be transparent about what data they are collection and what they are using it for
  • and third, to ensure adequate safeguards are in place to guard against unauthorized use of that data

The Difference between the Traditional American Model & the Emerging “Co-Regulatory” Model

• in a sense, this vision tracks the Obama Administration’s proposed model for privacy and data collection
• but here’s the difference: the Obama Administration wants to force this process in a more heavy-handed way by involving various federal agencies in the day-to-day management of how all these decisions get made
• in essence, it’s a small but certain step toward the European model of “co-regulation”
  • government steers, industry rows
  • “multi-stakeholder process”
  • Everyone has a “seat at the table”
  • But we don’t need “a table” if the table is being set by government
  • there’s nothing wrong with truly voluntary “multi-stakeholder” processes, but when the government is the one setting the “seats at the table” and talking about enforcing the “codes” that the committee comes up with, it opens the door to a co-regulation model  that has some real dangers:
    • If every decision about how information is used or aggregated becomes the equivalent of a committee decision — with everyone “at the table” getting a vote or a veto – then it will almost certainly be the case that less innovation occurs
    • The process could lack traditional democratic accountability / due process if more of an “agency threats” model evolves out of this.  After all, if certain officials are in charge of who gets a “seat at the table” and also responsible for enforcing whatever is decided “at the table,” it raises the question of how much pressure they can bring to bear on the process. (File this under “regulation by raised eyebrow”).
    • Any way you cut it, regulation by committee (in this case, the “multistakeholder” process) could become the equivalent of a tax on innovation and have detrimental impacts on the quality and price of online services

Conclusion

• For these reasons, we should instead continue to rely on the uniquely American model of privacy policy that balances diverse goals and values in a more spontaneous, evolutionary, and voluntary way without incessant government oversight and intervention.
• Again, the traditional American model isn’t perfect and sometimes we will need targeted statutes, torts, and even FTC (Sec. 5) enforcement to handle the bad apples out there who cause the most serious problems in terms of privacy violations or data breeches.
• But that more targeted approach to enforcement, along with the education and empowerment-based approaches I have outlined, can adapt to new challenges in this space and the child safety space while also ensuring our global competitive advantage is not sacrificed in the process.
• To sum up: let’s not casually trade in the American model for Europe’s. America’s more flexible, evolutionary model of privacy protection has served us well so far and can adapt to balance competing needs without crushing our innovative information economy or America’s global competitiveness.

Additional Reading:

• my big Mercatus Center filing to the FTC last year on privacy and Do Not Track regulation
• my recent Forbes oped, “The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy Plan“
• Initial Thoughts on FTC’s Final Privacy Report
• video & slides from Hill Briefing on Online Privacy Policy
• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness
• Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy

Wal-Mart is often cast as a villain by some labor unions, local politicians and small retailers, but for the average consumer Wal-Mart has been a savior: A relentless price-cutting machine that instantly changes the dynamics of every market it touches. Indeed, when Wal-Mart decides to jump into a sector by offering a new good or service in its stores, something akin to “the Southwest effect” on steroids kicks in: That market segment is often transformed overnight in that the good or service Wal-Mart starts delivering is essentially instantly commoditized. For the seller of that good or service, this is both a blessing and a curse: They gain the massive market reach that goes along with being in Wal-Mart’s 8,000 retail stores. On the other hand, they instantly surrender any semblance of pricing power they once had.  And this typically also puts downward pressure on prices not just for the particular good carried in the Wal-Mart stores, but for that entire market segment more generally. [This exact scenario is currently playing out in the book marketplace as Wal-Mart has gone to war with Amazon in cost-cutting bonanza.]

The reason I bring all this up is because, as most of you probably already heard, Wal-Mart jumped into the prepaid cell phone business this week with the launch of Straight Talk:

a new solution in no-contract cellular, exclusively at more than 3,200 Walmart stores nationwide starting October 18, 2009. Straight Talk will bring to the market a new low price for no-contract wireless service with two prepaid plans now available to customers nationwide at $30 and $45 a month. Straight Talk will only be available in Walmart stores and online at www.Walmart.com and www.StraightTalk.com. The average U.S. adult spends $78 on his or her cell phone bill to receive 1000 minutes a month. By switching to the $30 Straight Talk plan, for example, the average 1,000 minutes-per-month consumer could save more than $500 per year and still be on a reliable nationwide network.

I don’t want to overplay the significance of this development, but I really do believe that Wal-Mart’s presence in this field is significant, at least for entry-level mobile phones. While it would be easy for those of us who use more advanced smartphones to shrug off the Wal-Mart announcement, it would be a mistake for reasons made clear by David Worthington over at Technologizer:

As a technophile, it’s tempting for me to point out the short comings of those devices. There are only a few stock applications available, and unlimited data on a flip phone does not translate to the same experience that I have surfing the Web on my iPhone. But that does not matter, because the people who would buy these phones wouldn’t care. … It’s.. an economical choice for families with shoestring budgets. Leading wireless companies provide family plans, but they aren’t cheap, and usually require a commitment. … A pre-paid plan doesn’t require families to purchase much more than what they want to pay for. Whether Wal-Mart becomes a viable wireless company or not is up to the market, but its track record is pretty solid. Wal-Mart rapidly became the largest grocery store in the United States after all, and it has more locations than other pre-paid wireless companies. I’m guessing it’ll do well.

You better believe it. Have you seen the stacks of prepaid calling cards that adorn the shelves in every Wal-Mart checkout line?  Do you think they just have those there for decoration?  That’s a huge business, folks. While some of us haven’t touched a prepaid calling card since our college days decades ago, millions of people buy and use such cards every day.  As Worthington notes, prepaid plans mean you don’t have to pay for more than you’ll think you need and for many folks that’s about all they want to hear.  Esoteric inside-the-Beltway debates about tethering, Net neutrality, app stores, etc., are meaningless to most people.  They just want a phone that works at the right price — namely, cheap!

Finally, this development certainly calls into question the asinine theories being bandied about in Washington these days about the mobile marketplace lacking competition and innovation, something recent studies have shown to be complete bunk.  I’m not saying that Wal-Mart’s entry into this sector is going to turn cell phones into the equivalent of the toothpick or napkin market; there will always be room for differentiated phones and plans, especially at the higher end of the market. But as the retailing giant expands its reach in this sector, it’s bound to have an impact — especially for the entry-level devices and plans that low-income consumers might want.  Somehow I doubt this will let the regulation-happy gang over at our current FCC sleep any easier at night, but it should.

I recently finished reading Free the Market: Why Only Government Can Keep the Marketplace Competitive, a new book by noted antitrust agitator Gary L. Reback. Unsurprisingly, Reback, who led the antitrust jihad against Microsoft during the 1990s, has written a book that reads like an extended love letter to antitrust law. This man loves antitrust the way teenage girls love the Jonas Brothers — gushing, teary-eyed, ‘I-would-just-die-for-you’ sort of love.  In Reback’s world, antitrust seemingly has no costs, no downsides, no trade-offs.  It is our salvation and he serves as its high prophet. Everything good that happened in the world of high-tech over the past few decades?  Oh, you can thank Almighty Antitrust for that.  Anything bad that happened?  Well, then, clearly there just wasn’t enough antitrust enforcement!  That’s this book in a nutshell.

Think I’m kidding?  How about this gem of quote from pg. 247: “Antitrust enforcement spawned Silicon Valley’s software industry as well.”  Wow, who knew!  Of course, that’s utter poppycock and should be somewhat insulting to the many entrepreneurial men and women in the high-tech world who risked everything in an attempt to build a better mousetrap. In Reback’s view of things, however, none of those mousetraps would have ever gotten built without antitrust there to supposedly shelter them from wicked “monopolists” (read: any large company) already operating in the marketplace.   I’m sure many in Silicon Valley will also be surprised to hear Reback’s assertion that, “On closer examination, the Valley looks like one big public welfare project.” (p. 54)  Ah yes, the old myth that government gave us the Net we know and love today. Please. Like many others, Reback spins a revisionist history of how early ARPANET involvement and seed money somehow made the Internet great when, in reality, the Net was stuck in the digital dark ages until it was finally allowed to be commercialized in 1992.

What irks me most about this book, however, is Reback’s perpetuation of the myth that antitrust is somehow not a form of economic regulation.  I hear this tired old argument trotted out time and time again, even by many conservatives. Reback says, for example, that “Antitrust sets the rules of the road, so to speak, but doesn’t tell people where to drive.” By contrast, he argues, “Advocates of regulation want[] continuing government oversight and rule making to produce what would be the beneficial results of a free market… Neither approach works all the time, and decided between them remains difficult.” (p. 19)  Again, this “choice” is largely a fiction since, for many industries, we end up getting both!

But the even bigger fiction here is the suggestion that antitrust law doesn’t “tell people where to drive.”  It most certainly does. Hell, it practically redraws the entire map of where you can drive!  And it massively distorts markets in the process, just as regulation does.  As Wayne Crews noted in the opening lines of  his excellent 2001 Cato Institute white paper,”The Antitrust Terrible 10: Why the Most Reviled “Anti-competitive” Business Practices Can Benefit Consumers in the New Economy“:

Antitrust law is a form of economic regulation.  And like all economic regulation, it transfers wealth, often in response to special-interest urging… [I]n antitrust cases, the targeted companies’ rivals have a direct financial, as opposed to ethical, interest in the outcome. Assertions that antitrust law is in the public interest do not change the fact that the private motives of rivals, and even ambitious enforcers, are always lurking in the background.

Moreover, in his important 2001 study on “The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases,” economist Robert W. Crandall of the Brookings Institution noted:

An antitrust decree may be even counterproductive by establishing an inefficient market structure… A decree may also be ineffective because the government and the court fail to anticipate changes in technology or customer demand. ..

The ongoing costs of enforcing antitrust decrees can be very large. If an industry is changing rapidly, structural remedies may be difficult to enforce…  Most of the antitrust decrees in the leading cases analyzed below continued in effect for many years, even decades. In many cases, these decrees required the continual supervision by the lower court and often led to appeals to the higher courts.

So much for antitrust supposedly not being a form of economic regulation and not having substantial costs. Moreover, after surveying 95 major Section 2 Sherman Act cases won by the government or ending in consent decrees, Crandall concluded that there was “remarkably little evidence that these cases and the relief that emanated from them had a positive effect on competition and consumer welfare.”  Gary Reback is unmoved by such evidence, however. Instead, he just builds his narrative on the old myth of the robber barons that so many antitrust crusaders rely on, and which has long-since been discredited by serious economic historians.

Perhaps worst of all, in Reback’s world, there’s no such thing as too much litigation when it comes to antitrust enforcement:

“Just keep on suing them” is a time-honored American antitrust strategy of choice for dealing with dominant firms that choke vast sectors of the economy. The magnitude of the potential gain to society from opening multiple markets to competition more than offsets the somewhat uncertain likelihood of producing the right results by bold antitrust enforcement. (p. 246)

Again, no mention here of the deadweight loss to society associated with years and years of legal wrangling that accompanies such lawsuits.  Reback just sweeps all that under the rug — and why wouldn’t he as an antitrust lawyer!  But those costs on the economy and innovation are real.  There’s also no serious mention of how antitrust law has all too often been used as weapon by disgruntled marketplace competitors to hobble rivals using such legal tactics.  Reback gives the same lip service to antitrust being about “protecting consumers” as many other defenders do, but all too often his book — like antitrust law itself — sounds more like a defense of certain companies, industry sectors, or old ways of doing business.

Oh, and the earlier antitrust intervention and litigation comes the better!  That’s another favorite of Reback and the antitrust bar. Referring specifically to the Microsoft case, Reback argues that, “government intervention at an early stage of market development was less intrusive and more beneficial than waiting for a bad problem to get worse.”  (p. 185)  Where does one draw the line in terms of how early might be too early to intervene?  Reback never makes it clear because, as with so much else in the world of antitrust, it’s all an arbitrary guessing game.  We’ll let unelected bureaucrats and judges make those judgment calls and engage in a preemptive strike to establish a sensible industrial policy competition policy for high-tech markets.  After all, it’s not like these markets are fast-moving and prone to sudden disruptive change or anything!

Let’s be clear about something here.  What separates Mr. Reback from those of us here who are antitrust skeptics is not the question of whether “market power” sometimes exists within certain industry sectors.  There certainly are times when it does, but we differ over how to best deal with those problems.  To borrow from some remarks I made during a recent debate with Larry Lessig, what separates us is that those of us who are antitrust skeptics believe that market power concerns:

are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting [market] failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).

Of course, this assumes we can agree on a definition of “market failure.” What concerns me about the way antitrust proponents come at things is that they are typically far too quick to declare short-term market fluctuations as sky-is-falling market failures.  The end result of such myopic thinking is the inevitable call for governments to intervene and “do something” to correct supposed market failures that will likely adjust in time.  Thus, we antitrust skeptics counsel patience over preemptive strikes.  Again, here’s how I put it in that debate with Prof. Lessig:

Let’s give those other forces — alternative platforms, new innovators, social norms, public pressure, etc. — a chance to work some magic. Evolution happens, if you let it. Moreover, if you are always running around crying “market failure!” and calling in the code cops, it creates perverse marketplace incentives by discouraging efforts to innovate or “route around” bad code or code failure. We don’t want the whole world sitting around waiting for government to regulate the mousetrap to improve it or even give everyone better access to it; we should want the world to be innovating to create better mousetraps! [But] one need not believe that the markets… are “perfectly competitive” to accept that they are “competitive enough” — or at least, better than regulatory alternatives.

I can think of no better example of this than the case of IBM in the 1970s and early 80s.  Back then, IBM was the big, bad dog of the computing world, with significant “market power” in mainframes — the only computers that really counted at the time.  And some folks at the time feared IBM might “leverage” that power into new fields. As a result, the Department of Justice opened an antitrust case against Big Blue in 1969 that would become a 13-year quagmire, with little to show for all the legal wrangling by the time the case was abandoned in 1982.  Here’s how CNet staff writer Rachel Konrad summarized the fiasco back in 2000:

In January 1969, the government began a sweeping antitrust investigation into IBM’s dominance and attempted to break it into smaller companies that would compete against one another. During the six most critical years of the trial, from 1975 to 1980, the parties called 974 witnesses and read 104,400 pages of transcripts, according to Emerson Pugh’s 1995 book “Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and Its Technology.”

The 13-year investigation, which required IBM to retain 200 attorneys at one point, fizzled in the early ’80s as the computing landscape shifted from mainframes to personal computers. The government abandoned the tainted effort entirely in 1982, as clones of the IBM PC eroded Big Blue’s dominance. But the company, still fearful of the watchful eye of the Justice Department, took pains to avoid the appearance of a monopoly long after it relinquished its hold on the market. People who worked for IBM in the ’80s and early ’90s said the company routinely fell victim to “pricing death strategy”–a reluctance to lower prices below cost, even on products that weren’t selling–to avoid what the government would call predatory pricing. By the mid-’80s, the company was in bad shape. The antitrust troubles, combined with ill-timed product failures such as the Future System, pinched revenues. The company began a nearly decade-long financial slide. In retrospect, the antitrust case against IBM seemed laughable.

IBM had become the victim of a classic “disruptive technology” paradigm shift that few could have foreseen in 1969.  As Peter Pitsch noted in his 1996 PFF book The  Innovation Age, “In 1981 the Department of Justice was still pressing their case against IBM while market forces were about to lay waste to the company.” Pitsch continued:

IBM certainly did not expect to see PCs erode the market share and profitability of its venerable mainframe computers, but the fall of the old “big iron” machines was rapid and spectacular. The revenue of IBM’s mainframe unit fell from roughly $9 billion in 1990 to an estimated $4.5 billion in 1994… [T]he parties destined to become players in the PC revolution were unknown when the PC was introduced, and the experts’ predictions of a much-ballyhooed computer face-off between IBM and AT&T never materialized. Innovative companies that did not exist at the beginning of the revolution rose rapidly. Few people had ever heard of a small company named Microsoft. Nor had they heard of Intel, Novell, Compaq, Dell, or Netscape.

Pitsch went on to summarize how IBM’s manufacturing capacity was slashed in the years that followed and also notes that, astonishingly, “ in the space of five years after 1987, IBM lost two thirds of its market value — more than $70 billion.”  In sum, new marketplace innovation and competition handled the short-term market power concern that antitrust regulators had about Big Blue.  Pitsch goes on to explain what the antitrust regulators missed:

A dominant firm can lose its “King of the Hill” status in two ways. First, if it does not continually improve, it will lose market share and profits to low-cost imitators. For example, the ability of low-end PC manufacturers to make IBM clones fostered robust price competition in the PC market. Second, today’s market leaders must worry that some established and well-financed competitor or possibly an upstart produce a technical breakthrough that will displace them. This situation reflects [the] fact that gains from innovation are so powerful and beneficial to consumers that they outweigh the higher prices dominant firms can charge. Indeed, attempts to eliminate these high profits by regulating prices would almost certainly disserve consumers even if the regulations dampened the incentives for innovation only slightly.

What Pitsch is talking about here is dynamic competition, not the static competition, fixed-pie mentality that Gary Reback and so many antitrust defenders espouse.  Those of us who believe in dynamic competition see markets in a constant state of flux and expect that sub-optimal market developments or configurations are exactly the spark that incentivizes new form of market entry, innovation, price competition, and so on. But the static competition crowd looks at the same situation outlined above and imagines that the only hope is to wheel in the wrecking ball of antitrust regulation.  Indeed, such dynamic thinking is completely alien — even outlandish — to passionate antitrust supporters like Reback.  Nonetheless, the last 30 or 40 years of economic literature on antitrust — and the work of “Chicago School” economists in particular — has illustrated that antitrust is not the pro-consumer nirvana that Reback makes it out to be.

But Reback considers just about everything the Chicago School taught us to be antitrust apostasy and he would like to erase four decades worth of economic literature and evidence that suggests antitrust law is a form of economic regulation and does have unintended consequences that often hurt consumer welfare.  His fairy tale narrative of antitrust as the savior of capitalism is utter rubbish, and his recommendations to expand antitrust enforcement wouldn’t “Free the Market” as he argues in his book’s shameful title, but would instead wrap it in chains.

In closing, I would just like to encourage everyone to go out right now and read R.W. Grant’s classic story about the madness of antitrust, “Tom Smith and His Incredible Bread Machine.”  Or, if you want a more serious treatment of the issue, then I highly recommend Dominick T. Armentano’s, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure.  Oh, and just for kicks, you might want to read this Wall Street Journal story from earlier this week about how antitrust officials are being pressed by dairy farmers to open an antitrust investigation because some of them believe consolidation is responsible for the fact that milk prices have dropped 36% recently, the lowest level in three decades.  Only deep in the story do you read that: “Consumers are benefiting. The federal Bureau of Labor Statistics said in its monthly Consumer Price Index report released Wednesday that retail dairy prices in August were 10.4% lower than they were a year ago.”  Of course, once you realize that antitrust is more about protecting companies than protecting consumers you are not surprised that such information becomes an afterthought.