[Co-authored with Connor Haaland and originally published on The Bridge as, “Do Our Leaders Believe in Free Speech and Online Freedom Anymore?”]

A major policy battle has developed regarding the wisdom of regulating social media platforms in the United States, with the internet’s most important law potentially in the crosshairs. Leaders in both major parties are calling for sweeping regulation.

Specifically, President Trump and his presumptive opponent in the coming presidential election, former Vice President Joe Biden, have both called for “Section 230” of the Communications Decency Act to be repealed. Last week, the president took a misguided step in this direction by signing an executive order that, if fully carried out, will result in significantly greater regulation of the internet and of speech.

A Growing Call to Regulate Internet Platforms

The ramifications of these threats and steps could not be more profound. Without Section 230—also known as “the 26 words that created the internet”—we would have a much less advanced internet ecosystem. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Wikipedia would have never grown as quickly. Indeed, the repeal of Section 230 means many fewer jobs, less information distribution, and, frankly, less joy.

Shockingly, by backing Trump’s recent push for regulating these internet platforms, many conservatives are betraying their own principles—the ones that support freedom of expression and the ability to run private businesses without government interference.

Section 230 limits the liability online intermediaries face for the content and communications that travel over their networks. The immunities granted by Section 230 let online speech and commerce flow freely, without the constant threat of legal action or onerous liability looming overhead for digital platforms. To put it another way, without this provision, today’s vibrant internet ecosystem likely would not exist.

For completely different reasons, however, Biden and Trump want it axed. “Section 230 should be revoked, immediately should be revoked, number one. For [Facebook CEO Mark] Zuckerberg and other platforms,” said Biden in a New York Times interview. Like many other Democrats, Biden wants social media platforms to do far more to block speech they find to be offensive in various ways. If they fail to do more, Biden and other Democrats want Sec. 230 revised or repealed.

In contrast, Trump and his allies want these same platforms to do far less to curate content. Although lacking any empirical evidence, they allege that massive anti-conservative bias exists across today’s most popular platforms. As a result, they want Sec. 230 gutted. “Repeal 230,” said Trump in a tweet. Tensions reached a boiling point last week following a public fight between the president and Twitter after the social networking platform on May 27 added a fact-check notice to one of the president’s tweets about the supposed dangers of mail-in voting.

Retaliating Against Social Media

On May 28, Trump struck back against Twitter by signing an executive order on “preventing online censorship.” The EO cited Twitter six times but also went after Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube by name. Paradoxically, it also noted that the “freedom to express and debate ideas is the foundation for all of our rights as a free people,” even though the order will result in arbitrary government rule over our free speech rights.

Indeed, Trump’s executive order runs afoul of traditional conservative principles in several ways:

1. It expands the power of the government by delegating more authority to the administrative state and expanding arbitrary bureaucratic rule and regulatory abuse. It encourages the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission to take a more active interest in content policy decisions, which is of dubious legality. Section 3 of the EO also says the Department of Justice “shall review the viewpoint-based speech restrictions imposed by each online platform identified in the report … and assess whether any online platforms are problematic vehicles for government speech due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, or other bad practices.” (emphasis added)

   What do other bad practices entail, and who in the government gets to make the call? It is not prudent to delegate authority over something as sacred as our rights to free speech to unelected government bureaucrats. Such power will stifle civil discourse and increase the possibility for special interests to co-opt the government by using its power for their own desires.

2. It undermines property rights of private companies by letting Big Government dictate how they use their business platforms. Carrying out the president’s executive order would amount to a taking of private property by the government, an action that conservatives have historically loathed. Our Founding Fathers considered property rights to be the cornerstone of a free and just society, yet Trump pays that fact little respect in this EO, running afoul of a centuries-old American tradition.

3. It will encourage frivolous lawsuits. By gutting Sec. 230, a law that protects online platforms from punishing liability for third-party speech, Trump’s EO would empower trial lawyers. We are already too litigious a country, filing over 80 million cases in state courts every year, and we do not need another reason to be in the courtroom. Repealing 230 would open the floodgates to endless lawsuits about online speech and clog up our judicial system, using resources that could be directed to more important matters.

4. It undermines free speech and would likely hurt conservative voices most. Trump’s executive order makes a mockery of the First Amendment by applying the Fairness Doctrine and net neutrality notions to social media, regulations that conservatives have vociferously opposed. A recent lawsuit filed by the Center for Democracy and Technology that seeks to challenge the EO alleges this exact point, saying it could chill free speech. In the past we have seen such concepts applied arbitrarily, harming free speech and media competition.

   For instance, our colleague Brent Skorup, has written on how the FCC exploited another arbitrary rule—the “public interest” standard. He points to the fact that a documentary portraying former Sen. John Kerry in a negative light was taken off the air thanks to the authority of the public interest standard as a paradigmatic example of how arbitrary regulatory power can harm free speech. The EO also undermines platforms that have greatly amplified conservative voices in recent years. On Facebook, for instance, 7 of the top 10 most cited news outlets were conservative. Meanwhile, Trump and other conservative leaders have tapped the power of Twitter to directly communicate with their base. The EO would therefore likely result in much conservative content being removed quickly to avoid legal hassles with regulators or the courts.

5. The combined effect of all these other factors will undermine the global competitiveness of US-based firms, potentially benefiting Chinese internet companies the most. Willingly giving up a comparative advantage would be foolish, considering how America’s tech companies are the envy of the world. Not only does the EO affect existing social platforms, but it could stifle innovation throughout the digital economy moving forward. Who wants to try and innovate in a field that is subject to regulations that can change on a president’s whim?

6. It could be used by future politicians against conservative platforms, like Fox News and other right-leaning outlets. This is clearly not the intent of Trump’s executive order, but that will eventually be the result nonetheless. Going forward, we will have different presidents with different political outlooks. When making laws, regulations, and executive orders, it is always important to consider how they could be applied by successive administrations with opposite political and ideological stripes.

Today’s social media platforms are not perfect, but it is impossible for them to please everyone. There is no Goldilocks formula whereby they can get speech policies just right and make everyone happy. Instead, the ideal policy for speech platforms is: Let a thousand flowers bloom. One-size-fits-all content management and community standards shouldn’t be the goal. We need diverse platforms and approaches for a diverse citizenry.

But when presidential candidates and their allies line up in support of repealing Sec. 230 and opening the door to speech controls, the end result will be homogenized conformity with the will of those in power. That’s a horrible result for a nation that values diversity of opinion and freedom of speech, and it will only end up hurting those who seek to change the conversation.

Also see: Brent Skorup, “The Section 230 Executive Order, Free Speech, and the FCC,” Technology Liberation Front, June 3, 2010.

By Adam Thierer & Jennifer Huddleston Skees

“ He’s making a list and checking it twice. Gonna find out who’s naughty and nice .”

With the Christmas season approaching, apparently it’s not just Santa who is making a list. The Trump Administration has just asked whether a long list of emerging technologies are naughty or nice — as in whether they should be heavily regulated or allowed to be developed and traded freely.

If they land on the naughty list, these technologies could be subjected to complex export control regulations, which would limit research and development efforts in many emerging tech fields and inadvertently undermine U.S. innovation and competitiveness. Worse yet, it isn’t even clear there would be any national security benefit associated with such restrictions.  

From Light-Touch to a Long List

Generally speaking, the Trump Administration has adopted a “light-touch” approach to the regulation of emerging technology and relied on more flexible “soft law” approaches to high-tech policy matters. That’s what makes the move to impose restrictions on the trade and usage of these emerging technologies somewhat counter-intuitive. On November 19, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security launched a “ Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies .” The notice seeks public comment on “criteria for identifying emerging technologies that are essential to U.S. national security, for example because they have potential conventional weapons, intelligence collection, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorist applications or could provide the United States with a qualitative military or intelligence advantage.”

The Commerce Department has long sought to control the use of such technologies through a combination of methods, including formal export controls. The process for establishing such controls was clumsily cobbled together over time, so Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) to formalize these regulations. ECRA requires that the President formulate an interagency process to coordinate these rules with the goal of creating, “a regular and robust process to identify the emerging and other types of critical technologies of concern, as defined in United States foreign direct investment laws, and regulate their release to foreign persons as warranted regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction.” As part of this process, the Commerce Department is to create a list “of foreign persons and end-uses that are determined to be a threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States . . .  and to whom exports, reexports, and transfers of items are controlled.”

Sweeping Breadth

That is what prompted the Trump Administration’s recent Emerging Technologies notice, which includes is a remarkably sweeping list of technologies that the Commerce Department is considering for the exports controls list. The list has 14 major categories:

(1) Biotechnology

(2) Artificial intelligence

(3) Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technology

(4) Microprocessor technology

(5) Advanced computing technology

(6) Data analytics technology

(7) Quantum information and sensing technology

(8) Logistics technology

(9) Additive manufacturing / 3D printing

(10) Robotics

(11) Brain-computer interfaces

(12) Hypersonics

(13) Advanced materials

(14) Advanced surveillance technologies

The Department’s 14-category list also includes over 40 itemized examples of specific applications. For example, the “artificial intelligence” category alone includes a list of 11 applied types of AI, from AI cloud technologies and chipsets to neural networks to speech and audio processing.

The breadth of this list is remarkable in that it touches almost every emerging technology sector imaginable. It might have been easier for the Commerce Department to simply list those emerging technologies that will not be subject to review for potential export controls. It is an “everything-but-the-kitchen-sink” approach to emerging technology policy oversight and regulation that could clearly have far reaching consequences beyond national security.

There are some obvious dangers with such an open-ended review and it is important to remember these technologies have many beneficial applications as well as any potential risks.

Threatening Beneficial Uses

First, the potential export regulations create the danger of negative spillover effects that could undermine beneficial uses of each technology listed . All of the technologies listed have already been used in many ways that benefit both consumers and businesses. Limitations on their export could limit their availability or prevent improvements due to concerns that such broad interpretations of restrictions could limit the market.

For example, the regulation of AI mentioned above would not only address concerns about how AI might be used in weapons, but could even undermine the export of technology that has become a part of our everyday lives such as Siri in iPhones and Amazon’s Alexa. While the department claims that it seeks to “avoid negatively impacting U.S. leadership in the science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing sectors,” it is unlikely that any but the most narrowly tailored rules could actually avoid having a negative impact on innovation in the named technologies .

The more general purpose a technology the more difficult it will be to control the potential impact on the beneficial uses of the technology as well as the negative impacts. In fact, in some cases such as AI and robotics it can even be difficult to define what the technology is, because it is typically the applications and not the technology more generally that is being discussed and regulated. In many cases, the anti-export regulations would or could at least signal to entrepreneurial innovators that their time is better spent on other technologies or that their work should be taken elsewhere and risks the U.S. falling behind other countries in these important innovative areas.  

Undermining International Competitiveness

Second, the inquiry could undermine U.S. competitiveness by encouraging more offshoring in a world of innovation arbitrage opportunities . With our increasingly connected global economy and specifically the more mobile nature of many emerging technologies, it is becoming easier for innovators who find themselves subjected to onerous regulations in one country to move their research and development efforts to another. This is sometimes referred to as “ innovation arbitrage .”

While the U.S. remains a leader in attracting innovators, this scenario has already played out several times. For example, Amazon moved its drone testing program to the UK rather than test in the US due in large part to FAA regulations regarding drones. Similarly, 23andme also initially took its direct-to-consumer genetic testing abroad after the FDA threatened to shut down their product.

Heavily regulating the export of general applications of these technologies could actually backfire and encourage innovators to take their research to countries like China where they do not face such regulations. R. David Edelman, the director of the Project on Technology, the Economy, and National Security at MIT, has noted that while the inquiry might be “intended to help US companies be more competitive,” the reality is that “it would almost certainly give Chinese companies that don’t face those same restrictions a sizable advantage in the playing field.”

Moreover, if export controls undermine domestic innovation and competitiveness in this fashion and benefit developers in other countries, it means the U.S. will have less of a say over the ethical development of many important technologies. Bloomberg contributor Noah Smith observes that , when it comes to the global race for hegemony in genetic sciences, China is poised to take the lead. “If the U.S. shies away from developing genetic-engineering technology, these riches will flow to China, or to whatever other countries seize the technological edge,” he notes. That would be problematic not just from a competitive perspective, but also from an ethical perspective, because America would have less of a say in guiding the development of these important but controversial technologies. “Dystopian outcomes are also less likely with the U.S. at the helm,” Smith believes.

Limiting or Ending Technologies Consumers Already Enjoy

Third, the inquiry could pose a threat to everyday consumer technologies that are already widely distributed . The most interesting thing about the technologies listed in the notice is that many of them have moved well beyond the “emerging” phrase of development. They are already out in the wild and being used by people every day.

For example, among the AI technologies listed in the notice are “speech and audio processing (e.g., speech recognition and production)” as well as, “natural language processing (e.g., machine translation).” We already enjoy a great many services such as those today, including Siri and Alexa. Meanwhile, there are technologies already on the market that help disabled and autistic children communicate and interact with their peers using AI and robotics.

For example, the KASPAR robot helps children with such disabilities learn social skills to interact with their peers and teach conversational skills. Similarly, technology that translates apparently nonverbal sounds and other methods of communication into speech via apps and other technology with various voices that others can understand could be subject to development ending regulations or be unable to help children in other countries if the proposed export restrictions are phrased too broadly. Not only might new restrictions limit the development of new technologies, it could even limit or eliminate those that we have already embraced and improved the lives of many.

Risk to Research & Open-Source Efforts

Fourth, the expansion of export controls for many of the technologies listed in the inquiry opens the door to widespread policing of open source coding and communications , but offers no explanation of how that would even work. A large number of the technologies on the Commerce Department list have both commercial and non-commercial applications. Innovation scholars use terms like “ free innovation ” and “social entrepreneurialism” to describe innovative efforts that are undertaken by individuals or groups of people to pursue a broader array of social goals or values beyond just profit-seeking.

A prominent example of social entrepreneurs engaging in free innovation involves the use of 3D printers and open source designs to voluntarily create prosthetics for children with limb deficiencies. What happens to collaborative, non-commercial innovations like that if export controls are suddenly imposed on additive manufacturing technologies by the Department of Commerce? If one participant is based outside the US, is that sufficient to subject such collaboration to export controls? What, exactly, would be subjected to controls? The 3D printers? The open source blueprints? The website hosting such information? It is difficult to imagine how such regulation would work in practice but it is easy to imagine the effect it would have if pursued: It would create a massive chilling effect on many beneficial forms of innovation and simultaneously threaten freedom of speech and academic research.

This same problem could play out in many other technology fields listed in the Commerce Department notice, including: robotics, speech recognition, biotechnology, and genetic engineering, among many others often engage in open and cross-border collaboration for open source development. Free innovation and social entrepreneurialism are expanding rapidly in these and other emerging technology arenas. Thus, export control regulation can no longer hinge on going after “deep-pocketed” corporations looking to sell physical systems. To be truly effective, regulations will need to cover bottom-up, “grassroots” innovation. But that move will have profound ramifications for the freedom to freely tinker with or even freely research important technologies and technological processes.

Dubious National Security Benefits

There’s a final danger associated with this effort: it might not help advance America’s national security objectives , and could even hinder them.

To the extent that ECRA and this new Department of Commerce effort lead to heightened scrutiny for the many dozens of technologies identified, it could undermine research and development efforts in many of those fields. It could do so directly (by formally limiting or forbidding domestic R&D efforts) or indirectly (by incentivizing many domestic emerging tech innovators to move their operations offshore, or discouraging foreign developers from setting up shop here). Not only would such actions risk the US losing its lead in innovation, it could actually result in such regulations backfiring from a national security perspective.  

At the end of the day, the problem here is that Congress is failing to clearly identify what is “essential to the national security of the United States.” ECRA just passes the buck on that thorny question to the Commerce Department for a laundry list of emerging technologies. By soliciting public input, the best hope here is that experts in these various emerging technology sectors will step forward and identify the trade-offs associated with inclusion of most of these technologies on the export controls list. Hopefully, the list would then be narrowed the much smaller class of applied technologies that have a very real, immediate, and clearly catastrophic potential for harm to the national security interests of the nation. That would have been the better way to begin this process, but Congress and the Administration have instead adopted the opposite approach here and now we must hope that they are willing to significantly pare back the list of technologies even being considered for inclusion.

Back to the Crypto Wars?

In a sense, this debate was foreshadowed by the debate in the late 1990s over export controls for encryption technologies. As encryption emerged , law enforcement and national security agencies were concerned about its potential use by bad actors to hide or destroy evidence or information by using encrypted devices or services and sought to require backdoors to be able to access encrypted data and to restrict the export of certain types of encryption and certain encrypted devices. Such requirements, as the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation’s Daniel Castro and Alan McQuinn pointed out, would actually reduce the security of everyday Americans to cyber attacks, negatively impact U.S. businesses’ global competitiveness, and reduce the competitiveness and innovation of the technology sector not only in encryption but in related fields as well.

Luckily, many of these concerns were avoided and encryption restrictions have been narrowly tailored. Recent tensions between the FBI and tech companies like Apple illustrate that this debate is far from settled. Now it seems that the Commerce Department’s proposed restrictions could create the same vulnerabilities more broadly for a great number of emerging technologies.

“Soft Law” & Next Steps

In some ways this move to regulate technologies via export restrictions shows the dark side of the growing trend of “soft law.” Soft law, as we discuss in more detail in our forthcoming paper , includes regulatory actions such as guidance documents, working groups, sandboxing, and many other informal regulatory mechanisms. Such mechanisms are often used to regulate emerging technologies in the absence of formal actions or because the traditional policymaking apparatus cannot keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology. In many cases soft law has been used to accelerate technological development that otherwise might have been limited by traditional hard law.

But where soft law thrives in the vacuum left by a lack of formal delegation and regulation, this inaction also poses risks. Agencies like the Commerce Department could extend amorphous powers over emerging technologies without the expertise to fully understand the way such regulations might negatively affect beneficial technological developments, which are typically hard to predict in advance.

A smarter approach to export controls for emerging technologies begins with a rational assessment of:

1. a more robust evaluation of what really constitutes a tangible, immediate, irreversible, and catastrophic harm to the national security interests of the United States;
2. the practicality of proposed controls for any emerging technologies considered for inclusion on the list;
3. the wisdom of placing technologies on the list which already have been developed or marketed overseas (or appear poised to be); and,
4. the potential unintended consequences that any new export controls might have on the innovative potential of American creators and companies, the future of research in important sectors, the free flow of knowledge regarding peaceful applications, and the competitive standing of the United States relative to other countries.
5. whether catastrophic concerns about emerging technologies might be better addressed through multilateral accords or agreements aimed at achieving global consensus regarding inappropriate use and applications (as has been done in chemical weapon treaties and nuclear non-proliferation efforts).

Several specific technologies may still qualify for inclusion on the export controls list after such an evaluation, but it will start with a more limited approach and then expand as necessary. Such an approach assumes that in general purpose technology is not a threat until proven otherwise. By inverting the process in this fashion, the Administration wouldn’t be treating every emerging technology under the sun as guilty until proven innocent; innovations would be allowed to flourish naturally until the potential for harm is well-documented.

Unfortunately, the Commerce Department’s proposed approach does just the opposite and risks minimizing the benefits of these emerging technologies while doing little to advance national security interests in a meaningful way.

[originally published on Plaintext on June 21, 2017.]

This summer, we celebrate the 20th anniversary of two developments that gave us the modern Internet as we know it. One was a court case that guaranteed online speech would flow freely, without government prior restraints or censorship threats. The other was an official White House framework for digital markets that ensured the free movement of goods and services online.

The result of these two vital policy decisions was an unprecedented explosion of speech freedoms and commercial opportunities that we continue to enjoy the benefits of twenty years later.

While it is easy to take all this for granted today, it is worth remembering that, in the long arc of human history, no technology or medium has more rapidly expanded the range of human liberties — both speech and commercial liberties — than the Internet and digital technologies. But things could have turned out much differently if not for the crucially important policy choices the United States made for the Internet two decades ago.

First, on June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Reno v. ACLU, which struck down the Communications Decency Act’s provisions seeking to regulate online content under the old broadcast media standard. The Court concluded that there was “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium” and rejected the congressional effort to pigeonhole this exciting new medium into the archaic censorship regimes of the past.

The Reno decision was tremendously important in protecting online speakers from the chilling effect of government “indecency” regulations. The decision also set a strong legal precedent and was cited in countless subsequent decisions involving not only online speech, but also efforts to regulate video game content.

Second, in July 1997, the Clinton Administration released The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a document that outlined the US government’s new policy approach toward the Internet and the emerging digital economy. The Framework was a bold vision statement that endorsed comprehensive online freedom of exchange, saying that “the private sector should lead [and] the Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry.” The Administration rejected a restrictive regulatory regime for commercial activities and instead recommended reliance on civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and industry self-regulation.

To “avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce,” the vision statement recommended that “parties should be able to enter into legitimate agreements to buy and sell products and services across the Internet with minimal government involvement or intervention.” But, “[w]here governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.”

Taken together, the Reno decision and the Clinton Administration’s Framework acted as a Magna Carta moment for the Internet and digital technologies. It signaled that “permissionless innovation” would become America’s governance stance toward online speech and commerce.

As I defined it in a book on the subject, permissionless innovation, “refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if any develop, can be addressed later.” The primary advantage of permissionless innovation as a governance disposition is that it sends a clear green light to citizens telling them they are at liberty to pursue their own interests and passions, free from the suffocating grip of prior restraints on free speech and free exchange.

But the Reno decision and the Clinton Administration’s Framework are not the only critical policy decisions that helped enshrine permissionless innovation as the lodestar of online policy in the US. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton Administration made the decision to allow open commercialization of the Internet, which was previously just the domain of government agencies and university researchers. Even more crucially, when Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996, lawmakers made it clear that traditional analog-era communications and media regulatory regimes would generally not be applied to the Internet.

The Telecom Act also included an obscure provision known as “Section 230,” which immunized online intermediaries from onerous liability for the content and communications that traveled over their networks. Section 230 was hugely important in that it let online speech and commerce flourish without the constant threat of frivolous lawsuits looming overhead. Internet scholar David Post has argued that “it is impossible to imagine what the Internet ecosystem would look like today without [Section 230]. Virtually every successful online venture that emerged after 1996 — including all the usual suspects, viz. Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, Reddit, Craigslist, YouTube, Instagram, eBay, Amazon — relies in large part (or entirely) on content provided by their users, who number in the hundreds of millions, or billions,” he notes. It is unlikely that the vibrant marketplace of online speech and commerce we enjoy today could have existed without the protections afforded by Section 230.

Finally, in 1998, another important legislative development occurred when Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which blocked all levels of government in the US from imposing discriminatory taxes on the Internet. That made it clear that the Net would not be milked as a “cash cow” the way previous communications systems had been.

So, let’s recap how policymakers generally got policy right for the Internet in the mid-1990s by enshrining permissionless innovation as the law of the land:

• The Executive Branch set the tone for online freedom by fully privatizing the underlying network and then establishing a governance vision based upon minimal government interference with online speech and exchange.
• The Legislative Branch generally endorsed the Clinton Administration’s vision for the Internet and digital technologies by ensuring that new policies would not be based upon the failed regulatory and tax policies of the past.
• The Judicial Branch upheld the centrality of the First Amendment in the Information Age and made it clear that this new medium for speech would be granted the strongest protection against government encroachments on freedom of speech and expression.

The combined effect of these wise, bipartisan policy decisions was that the Net and digital tech were “born free” instead of being born into regulatory captivity. We continue to enjoy the fruits of these freedoms today as citizens here in the US and across the world take advantage of the unprecedented ability to connect and communicate to pursue their passions and interests as they see fit.

There’s still more work to be done, however. Online platforms and digital technologies continue to come under attack from regulatory activists both here and abroad. Many governments continue to push back against these online speech and commercial freedoms, meaning we’ll need to redouble our efforts to highlight and defend the benefits of preserving these important victories.

Finally, as the underlying drivers of the Digital Revolution continue to spread into other segments of the economy, these freedoms will come into conflict with older top-down regulatory regimes for automobiles, aviation, medical technology, finance, and much more. This will create an epic conflict of governance visions between the Internet’s permissionless innovation model versus the precautionary, command-and-control regulatory regimes of the industrial age. We already see tension at work in policy deliberations over the Internet of Things, “big data,” driverless cars, commercial drones, robotics, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, virtual reality, the sharing economy, and others.

If policymakers hope to preserve and extend the benefits of the hard-fought victories of the Internet’s past twenty years, they will need to restate and reinvigorate their commitment to permissionless innovation to help spur the next great technological revolutions in these and other fields.

Wallach’s latest book is entitled, A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control. And, as I’ve noted here recently, the greatly expanded second edition of my latest book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, has just been released.

Of all the books of technological criticism or skepticism that I’ve read in recent years—and I have read stacks of them!— A Dangerous Master is by far the most thoughtful and interesting. I have grown accustomed to major works of technological criticism being caustic, angry affairs. Most of them are just dripping with dystopian dread and a sense of utter exasperation and outright disgust at the pace of modern technological change.

Although he is certainly concerned about a wide variety of modern technologies—drones, robotics, nanotech, and more—Wallach isn’t a purveyor of the politics of panic. There are some moments in the book when he resorts to some hyperbolic rhetoric, such as when he frets about an impending “techstorm” and the potential, as the book’s title suggests, for technology to become a “dangerous master” of humanity. For the most part, however, his approach is deeper and more dispassionate than what is found in the leading tracts of other modern techno-critics.

Many Questions, Few Clear Answers

Wallach does a particularly good job framing the major questions about emerging technologies and their effect on society. “Navigating the future of technological possibilities is a hazardous venture,” he observes. “It begins with learning to ask the right questions—questions that reveal the pitfalls of inaction, and more importantly, the passageways available for plotting a course to a safe harbor.” (p. 7) Wallach then embarks on a 260+ page inquiry that bombards the reader with an astonishing litany of questions about the wisdom of various forms of technological innovation—both large and small. While I wasn’t about to start an exact count, I would say that the number of questions Wallach poses in the book runs well into the hundreds. In fact, many paragraphs of the book are nothing but an endless string of questions.

Thus, if there is a primary weakness with A Dangerous Master, it’s that Wallach spends so much time formulating such a long list of smart and nuanced questions that some readers may come away disappointed when they do not find equally satisfying answers. On the other hand, the lack of clear answers is also completely understandable because, as Wallach notes, there really are no simple answers to most of these questions.

Just Slow Down!

Moving on to substance, let me make clear where Wallach and I generally see eye-to-eye and where we part ways.

Generally speaking, we agree about the need to come up with better “soft governance” systems for emerging technologies, which might include multistakeholder process, developer codes of conduct, sectoral self-regulation, sensible liability rules, and so on. (More on those strategies in a moment.)

But while we both believe it is wise to consider how we might “bake-in” better ethics and norms into the process of technological development, Wallach seems much more inclined than me to expect that we will be able to pre-ordain (or potentially require?) all this happens before much of this experimentation and innovation actually moves forward. Wallach opens by asking:

Determining when to bow to the judgment of experts and whether to intervene in the deployment of a new technology is certainly not easy. How can government leaders or informed citizens effectively discern which fields of research are truly promising and which pose serious risks? Do we have the intelligence and means to mitigate the serious risks that can be anticipated? How should we prepare for unanticipated risks? (p. 6)

Again, many good questions here! But this really gets to the primary difference between Wallach’s preferred approach and my own: I tend to believe that many of these things can only be worked out through ongoing trial and error, the constant reformulation of the various norms that govern the process of innovation, and the development of sensible ex post solutions to some of the most difficult problems posed by turbulent technological change.

By contrast, Wallach’s generally attitude toward technological evolution is probably best summarized by the phrases: “Slow down!” and, “Let’s have a conversation about it first!” As he puts it in his own words: “Slowing down the accelerating adoption of technology should be done as a responsible means to ensure basic human safety and to support broadly shared values.” (p. 13)

But I tend to believe that it’s not always possible to preemptively determine which innovations to slow down, or even how to determine what those “shared values” are that will help us make this determination. More importantly, I worry that there are very serious potential risks and unintended consequences associated with slowing down many forms of technological innovation, which could improve human welfare in important ways. There can be no prosperity, after all, without a certain degree of risk-taking and disruption.

Getting Out Ahead of the Pacing Problem

Yet, what concerns Wallach most is the much-discussed issue from the field of the philosophy of technology, the so-called “pacing problem.” Wallach concisely defines the pacing problem as “the gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.” (p. 251) “There has always been a pacing problem,” he notes, but he is concerned that technological innovation—especially highly disruptive and potentially uncontrollable forms of innovation—is now accelerating at an absolutely unprecedented pace.

(Just as an aside for all the philosophy nerds out there…  Such a rigid belief in the “pacing problem” represents a techno-deterministic viewpoint that is, ironically, sometimes shared by technological skeptics like Wallach as well as technological optimists like Larry Downes and even many in the middle of this debate, like Vivek Wadhwa. See, for example, The Laws of Disruption by Downes and “Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology” by Wadhwa. Although these scholars approach technology ethics and politics quite differently, they all seem to believe that the pace of modern technological change is so relentless as to almost be an unstoppable force of nature. I guess the moral of the story is that, to some extent, we’re all technological determinists now!)

Despite his repeated assertions that modern technologies are accelerating at such a potentially uncontrollable pace, Wallach nonetheless hopes we can achieve some semblance of control over emerging technologies before they reach a critical “inflection point.” In the study of history and science, an inflection point generally represents a moment when a situation and trend suddenly changes in a significant way and things begin moving rapidly in a new direction. These inflections points can sometimes develop quite abruptly, ushering in major changes by creating new social, economic, or political paradigms. As it relates to technology in particular, inflection points can refer to the moment with a particular technology achieves critical mass in terms of adoption or, more generally, to the time when that technology begins to profoundly transform the way individuals and institutions act.

Another related concept that Wallach discusses is the so-called “Collingridge dilemma,” which refers to the notion that it is difficult to put the genie back in the bottle once a given technology has reached a critical mass of public adoption or acceptance. The concept is named after David Collingridge, who wrote about this in his 1980 book, The Social Control of Technology. “The social consequences of a technology cannot be predicated early in the life of the technology,” Collingridge argued. “By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the technology is often so much part of the whole economics and social fabric that its control is extremely difficult.”

On “Having a Discussion” & Coming Up with “a Broad Plan”

These related concepts of inflection points and the Collingridge dilemma constitute the operational baseline of Wallach’s worldview. “In weighing speedy development against long-term risks, speedy development wins,” he worries. “This is particularly true when the risks are uncertain and the perceived benefits great.” (p. 85)

Consequently, throughout his book, Wallach pleads with us to take what I will call Technological Time Outs. He says we need to pause at times so that we can have “a full public discussion” (p. 13) and make sure there is a “broad plan in place to manage our deployment of new technologies” (p. 19) to make sure that innovation happens only at “a humanly manageable pace” (p. 261) “to fortify the safety of people affected by unpredictable disruptions.” (p. 262) Wallach’s call for Technological Time Outs is rooted in his belief that “the accelerating pace [of modern technological innovation] undermines the quality of each of our lives.” (p. 263)

That is Wallach’s weakest assertion in the book and he doesn’t really offer much evidence to prove that the velocity of modern technological is hurting us rather than helping us, as many of us believe. Rather, he treats it as a widely accepted truism that necessitates some sort of collective effort to slow things down if the proverbial genie is about to exit the bottle, or to make sure those genies don’t get out of their bottles without a lot of preemptive planning regarding how they are to be released into the world. In the following passage on pg. 72, Wallach very succinctly summarizes his approach recommended throughout A Dangerous Master:

this book will champion the need for more upstream governance: more control over the way that potentially harmful technologies are developed or introduced into the larger society. Upstream management is certainly better than introducing regulations downstream, after a technology is deeply entrenched or something major has already gone wrong. Yet, even when we can access risks, there remain difficulties in recognizing when or determining how much control should be introduced. When does being precautionary make sense, and when is precaution an over-reaction to the risks? (p. 72)

Those who have read my Permissionless Innovation book will recall that I open by framing innovation policy debates in almost exactly the same way as Wallach suggests in that last line above. I argue in the first lines of my book that:

The central fault line in innovation policy debates today can be thought of as ‘the permission question.’  The permission question asks: Must the creators of new technologies seek the blessing of public officials before they develop and deploy their innovations? How that question is answered depends on the disposition one adopts toward new inventions and risk-taking, more generally.  Two conflicting attitudes are evident. One disposition is known as the ‘precautionary principle.’ Generally speaking, it refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harm to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions. The other vision can be labeled ‘permissionless innovation.’ It refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if any develop, can be addressed later.

So, by contrasting these passages, you can see what I am setting up here is a clash of visions between what appears to be Wallach’s precautionary principle-based approach versus my own permissionless innovation-focused worldview.

How Much Formal Precaution?

But that would be a tad bit too simplistic because just a few paragraphs after Wallach makes the statement just above about “upstream management” being superior to ex post solutions formulated “after a technology is deeply entrenched,” Wallach begins slowly backing away from an overly-rigid approach to precautionary principle-based governance of technological processes and systems.

He admits, for example, that “precautionary measures in the form of regulations and governmental oversight can slow the development of research whose overall society impact will be beneficial,” (p. 26) and that can “be costly” and “slow innovation.” For countries, Wallach admits, this can have real consequences because “Countries with more stringent precautionary policies are at a competitive disadvantage to being the first to introduce a new tool or process.” (p. 74)

So, he’s willing to admit that what we might call a hard precautionary principle usually won’t be sensible or effective in practice, but he is far more open to soft precaution. But this is where real problems begin to develop with Wallach’s approach, and it presents us with a chance to turn the tables on him a bit and begin posing some serious questions about his vision for governing technology.

Much of what follows below are my miscellaneous ramblings about the current state of the intellectual dialogue about tech ethics and technological control efforts. I have discussed these issues at greater length in my new book as well as a series of essays here in past years, most notably: “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy; “What Does It Mean to “Have a Conversation” about a New Technology?”; and, “Making Sure the “Trolley Problem” Doesn’t Derail Life-Saving Innovation.”

As I’ve argued in those and other essays, my biggest problem with modern technological criticism is that specifics are in scandalously short supply in this field! Indeed, I often find the lack of details in this arena to be utterly exasperating. Most modern technological criticism follows a simple formula:

TECHNOLOGY –>> POTENTIAL PROBLEMS –>> DO SOMETHING!

But almost all the details come in the discussion about the nature of the technology in question and the apparent many problems associated with it. Far, far less thought goes into the “DO SOMETHING!” part of the critics’ work. One reason for that is probably self-evident: There are no easy solutions. Wallach admits as much at many junctures throughout the book. But that doesn’t excuse the need for the critics to give us a more concrete blueprint for identifying and then potentially rectifying the supposed problems.

Of course, the other reason that many critics are short of specifics is because what they really mean when they quip how much we need to “have a conversation” about a new disruptive technology is that we need to have a conversation about stopping that technology.

Where Shall We Draw the Line between Hard and Soft Law?

But this is what I found most peculiar about Wallach’s book: He never really gives us a good standard by which to determine when we should look to hard governance (traditional top-down regulation) versus soft governance (more informal, bottom-up and non-regulatory approaches).

On one hand, he very much wants society to exercise greatly restraint and precaution when it comes to many of the technologies he and others worry about today. Again, he’s particularly concerned about the potential runaway development and use of drones, genetic editing, nanotech, robotics, and artificial intelligence. For at least one class of robotics—autonomous military robots—Wallach does call for immediate policy action in the form of an Executive Order to ban “killer” autonomous systems. (Incidentally, there’s also a major effort underway called the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” that aims to make such a ban part of international law through a multinational treaty.)

But Wallach also acknowledges the many trade-offs associated with efforts to preemptively controls on robotics and other technology. Perhaps for that reason, Wallach doesn’t develop a clear test for when the Precautionary Principle should be applied to new forms of innovation.

Clearly there are times when it is appropriate, although I believe it is only in an extremely narrow subset of cases. In the 2 ^nd Edition of my Permissionless Innovation book, I tried to offer a rough framework for when formal precautionary regulation (i.e., highly-restrictive policy defaults are necessary, such as operational restrictions, licensing requirements, research limitations, or even formal bans) might be necessary. I do not want to interrupt the flow of this review of Wallach’s book too much, so I have decided to just cut-and-paste that portion of Chapter 3 of my book (“When Does Precaution Make Sense?”) down below as an appendix to this essay.

The key takeaway of that passage from my book is that all of us who study innovation policy and the philosophy of technology—Wallach, myself, the whole darn movement—have done a remarkably poor job being specific about precisely when formal policy precaution is warranted. What is the test? All too often, we get lazy and apply what we might call an “I-Know-It-When-I-See-It” standard. Consider the possession of bazookas, tanks, and uranium. Almost all of us would agree that citizens should not be allowed to possess or use such things. Why? Well, it seems obvious, right? They just shouldn’t! But what is the exact standard we use to make that determination.

In coming years, I plan on spending a lot more time articulating a better test by which Precautionary Principle-based policies could be reasonably applied. Those who know me may be taken aback by what I just said. After all, I’ve spend many years explaining why Precautionary Principle-based thinking threatens human prosperity and should be rejected in the vast majority of cases. But that doesn’t excuse the lack of a serious and detailed exploration of the exact standard by which we determine when we should impose some limits on technological innovation.

Generally speaking, while I strongly believe that “permissionless innovation” should remain the policy default for most technologies, there certainly exists some scenarios where the threat of harm associated with a new innovation might be highly probable, tangible, immediate, irreversible, and catastrophic in nature. If so, that could qualify it for at least a light version of the Precautionary Principle. In a future paper or book chapter I’m just now starting to research, I hope to fuller develop those qualifiers and formulate a more robust test around them.

I would have very much liked to see Wallach articulate and defend a test of his own for when formal precaution would make sense. And, by extension, when should we default to soft precaution, or soft law and informal governance mechanisms for emerging technologies.

We turn to that issue next.

Toward Soft Governance & the Engineering of Better Technological Ethics

Even though Wallach doesn’t provide us with a test for determining when precaution makes sense or when we should instead default to soft governance, he does a much better job explaining the various models of soft law or informal governance that might help us deal with the potential negative ramifications of highly disruptive forms of technological change.

What Wallach proposes, in essence, is that we bake a dose of precautionary directly into the innovation process through a wide variety of informal governance/oversight mechanisms. “By embedding shared values in the very design of new tools and techniques, engineers improve the prospect of a positive outcome,” he claims. “The upstream embedding of shared values during the design process can ease the need for major course adjustments when it’s often too late.” (p. 261)

Wallach’s favored instrument of soft governance is what he refers to as “Governance Coordinating Committees” (GCCs). These Committees would coordinate “the separate initiatives by the various government agencies, advocacy groups, and representatives of industry” who would serve as “issue managers for the comprehensive oversight of each field of research.” (p. 250) He elaborates and details the function of GCCs as follows:

These committees, led by accomplished elders who have already achieved wide respect, are meant to work together with all the interested stakeholders to monitor technological development and formulate solutions to perceived problems. Rather than overlap with or function as a regulatory body, the committee would work together with existing institutions. (p. 250-51)

Wallach discussed the GCC idea in much greater detail in a 2013 book chapter he penned with Gary E. Marchant for a collected volume of essays on Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies. (I highly recommend you pick up that book if you can afford it! Many terrific essays in that book on these issues.) In their chapter, Marchant and Wallach specify some of the soft law mechanisms we might use to instill a bit of precaution preemptively. These mechanisms include: “codes of conduct, statements of principles, partnership programs, voluntary programs and standards, certification programs and private industry initiatives.”

If done properly, GCCs could provide exactly the sort of wise counsel and smart recommendations that Wallach desires. In my book and many law review articles on various disruptive technologies, I have endorsed many of the ideas and strategies Wallach identifies. I’ve also stressed the importance of many other mechanisms, such as education and empowerment-based strategies that could help the public learn to cope with new innovations or use them appropriately. In addition, I’ve highlighted the many flexible, adaptive ex post remedies that can help when things go wrong. Those mechanisms include common law remedies such as product defects law, various torts, contract law, property law, and even class action lawsuits. Finally, I have written extensively about the very active role played by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other consumer protection agencies, which have broad discretion to police “unfair and deceptive practices” by innovators.

Moreover, we already have a quasi-GCC model developing today with the so-called “multistakeholder governance” model that is often used in both informal and formal ways to handle many emerging technology policy issues.  The Department of Commerce (the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in particular) and the FTC have already developed many industry codes of conduct and best practices for technologies such as biometrics, big data, the Internet of Things, online advertising, and much more. Those agencies and others (such as the FDA and FAA) are continuing to investigate other codes or guidelines for things like advanced medical devices and drones, respectively. Meanwhile, I’ve heard other policymakers and academics float the idea of “digital ombudsmen,” “data ethicists,” and “private IRBs” (institutional review boards) as other potential soft law solutions that technology companies might consider. Perhaps going forward, many tech firms will have Chief Ethical Officers just as many of them today have Chief Privacy Officers or Chief Security Officers.

In other words, there’s already a lot of “soft law” activities going on in this space. And I haven’t even begun an inventory of the many other bodies or groups that already exist in each sector today that has set forth their own industry self-regulatory codes, but they exist in almost every field that Wallach worries about.

So, I’m not sure how much his GCC idea will add to this existing mix, but I would not be opposed to them playing the sort of coordinating “issue manager” role he describes. But I still have many questions about GCC’s, including:

• How many of them are needed and how we will know which one is the definitive GCC for each sector or technology?
• If they are overly formal in character and dominated by the most vociferous opponents of any particular technology, a real danger exists that a GCC could end up granting a small cabal a “heckler’s veto” over particular forms of innovation.
• Alternatively, the possibility of “regulatory capture” could be a problem for some GCCs if incumbent companies come to dominate their membership.
• Even if everything went fairly smoothly and the GCCs produced balanced reports and recommendations, future developers might wonder if and why they are to be bound by older guidelines.
• And if those future developers choose not to play by the same set of guidelines, what’s the penalty for non-compliance?
• And how are such guidelines enforced in a world where what I’ve called “global innovation arbitrage” is an increasing reality?

Challenging Questions for Both Hard and Soft Law

To summarize, whether we are speaking of “hard” or “soft” law approaches to technological governance, I am just not nearly as optimistic as Wallach seems to be that we will be able to find consensus on these three things:

(1) what constitutes “harm” in many of these circumstances;

(2) which “shared values” should prevail when “society” debates the shaping of ethics or guiding norms for emerging technologies but has highly contradictory opinions about those values (consider online privacy as a good example, where many people enjoy hyper-sharing while other demand hyper-privacy); and,

(3) that we can create a legitimate “governing body” (or bodies) that will be responsible for formulating these guidelines in a fair way without completely derailing the benefits of innovation in new fields and also remaining relevant for very long.

Nonetheless, as he and others have suggested, the benefit of adopting a soft law/informal governance approach to these issues is that it at least seeks to address these questions in more flexible and adaptive fashion. As I noted in my book, traditional regulatory systems “tend to be overly rigid, bureaucratic, inflexible, and slow to adapt to new realities. They focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. Worse yet, administrative regulation generally preempts or prohibits the beneficial experiments that yield new and better ways of doing things.” ( Permissionless Innovation, p. 120)

So, despite the questions I have raised here, I welcome the more flexible soft law approach that Wallach sets forth in his book. I think it represents a far more constructive way forward when compared to the opposite “top-down” or “command-and-control” regulatory systems of the past. But I very much want to make sure that even these new and more flexible soft law approaches leave plenty of breathing room for ongoing trial-and-error experimentation with new technologies and systems.

Conclusion

In closing, I want to reiterate that not only did I appreciate the excellent questions raised by Wendell Wallach in A Dangerous Master, but I take them very seriously. When I sat down to revise and expand my Permissionless Innovation book last year, I decided to include this warning from Wallach in my revised preface: “The promoters of new technologies need to speak directly to the disquiet over the trajectory of emerging fields of research. They should not ignore, avoid, or superficially dampen criticism to protect scientific research.” (p. 28–9)

As I noted, in response to Wallach: “I take this charge seriously, as should others who herald the benefits of permissionless innovation as the optimal default for technology policy. We must be willing to take on the hard questions raised by critics and then also offer constructive strategies for dealing with a world of turbulent technological change.”

Serious questions deserve serious answers. Of course, sometimes those posing those questions fail to provide many answers of their own! Perhaps it is because they believe the questions answer themselves. Other times, it’s because they are willing to admit that easy answers to these questions typically prove quite elusive. In Wallach’s case, I believe it’s more the latter.

To wrap up, I’ll just reiterated that both Wallach and I share a common desire to find solutions to the hard questions about technological innovation. But the crucial question that probably separates his worldview and my own is this: Whether we are talking about hard or soft governance, how much faith should we place in preemptive planning vs. ongoing trial and error experimentation to solve technological challenges? Wallach is more inclined to believe we can divine these things with the sagacious foresight of “accomplished elders” and technocratic “issue managers,” who will help us slow things down until we figure out how to properly ease a new technology into society (if at all). But I believe that the only way we will find many of the answers we are searching for is by allowing still more experimentation with the very technologies that he and others seek to control the development of. We humans are outstanding problem-solvers and have the uncanny ability among all mammals to adapt to changing circumstances. We roll with the punches, learn from them, and become more resilient in the process. As I noted in my 2014 essay, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change”:

we modern pragmatic optimists must continuously point to the unappreciated but unambiguous benefits of technological innovation and dynamic change. But we should also continue to remind the skeptics of the amazing adaptability of the human species in the face of adversity. [. . .] Humans have consistently responded to technological change in creative, and sometimes completely unexpected ways. There’s no reason to think we can’t get through modern technological disruptions using similar coping and adaptation strategies.

Will the technologies that Wallach fears bring about a “techstorm” that overwhelms our culture, our economy, and even our very humanity? It’s certainly possible, and we should continue to seriously discuss the issues that he and other skeptics raise about our expanding technological capabilities and the potential for many of them to do great harm. Because some of them truly could.

But it is equally plausible—in fact, some of us would say, highly probable—that instead of overwhelming us, we learn how to bend these new technological capabilities to our will and make them work for our collective benefit. Instead of technology becoming “a dangerous master,” we will instead make it our helpful servant, just as we have so many times before.

APPENDIX: When Does Precaution Make Sense?

[excerpt from chapter 3 of Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. Footnotes omitted. See book for all references.]

But aren’t there times when a certain degree of precautionary policymaking makes good sense? Indeed, there are, and it is important to not dismiss every argument in favor of precautionary principle–based policymaking, even though it should not be the default policy rule in debates over technological innovation.

The challenge of determining when precautionary policies make sense comes down to weighing the (often limited) evidence about any given technology and its impact and then deciding whether the potential downsides of unrestricted use are so potentially catastrophic that trial-and-error experimentation simply cannot be allowed to continue. There certainly are some circumstances when such a precautionary rule might make sense. Governments restrict the possession of uranium and bazookas, to name just two obvious examples.

Generally speaking, permissionless innovation should remain the norm in the vast majority of cases, but there will be some scenarios where the threat of tangible, immediate, irreversible, catastrophic harm associated with new innovations could require at least a light version of the precautionary principle to be applied.  In these cases, we might be better suited to think about when an “anti-catastrophe principle” is needed, which narrows the scope of the precautionary principle and focuses it more appropriately on the most unambiguously worst-case scenarios that meet those criteria.

But most cases don’t fall into this category. Instead, we generally allow innovators and consumers to freely experiment with technologies, and even engage in risky behaviors, unless a compelling case can be made that precautionary regulation is absolutely necessary.  How is the determination made regarding when precaution makes sense? This is where the role of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and regulatory impact analysis is essential to getting policy right.  BCA represents an effort to formally identify the tradeoffs associated with regulatory proposals and, to the maximum extent feasible, quantify those benefits and costs.  BCA generally cautions against preemptive, precautionary regulation unless all other options have been exhausted—thus allowing trial-and-error experimentation and “learning by doing” to continue. (The mechanics of BCA are discussed in more detail in section VII.)

This is not the end of the evaluation, however. Policymakers also need to consider the complexities associated with traditional regulatory remedies in a world where technological control is increasingly challenging and quite costly. It is not feasible to throw unlimited resources at every problem, because society’s resources are finite.  We must balance risk probabilities and carefully weigh the likelihood that any given intervention has a chance of creating positive change in a cost-effective fashion.  And it is also essential to take into account the potential unintended consequences and long-term costs of any given solution because, as Harvard law professor Cass Sunstein notes, “it makes no sense to take steps to avert catastrophe if those very steps would create catastrophic risks of their own.”  “The precautionary principle rests upon an illusion that actions have no consequences beyond their intended ends,” observes Frank B. Cross of the University of Texas. But “there is no such thing as a risk-free lunch. Efforts to eliminate any given risk will create some new risks,” he says.

Oftentimes, after working through all these considerations about whether to regulate new technologies or technological processes, the best solution will be to do nothing because, as noted throughout this book, we should never underestimate the amazing ingenuity and resiliency of humans to find creative solutions to the problems posed by technological change.  (Section V discusses the importance of individual and social adaptation and resiliency in greater detail.) Other times we might find that, while some solutions are needed to address the potential risks associated with new technologies, nonregulatory alternatives are also available and should be given a chance before top-down precautionary regulations are imposed. (Section VII considers those alternative solutions in more detail.)

Finally, it is again essential to reiterate that we are talking here about the dangers of precautionary thinking as a public policy prerogative—that is, precautionary regulations that are mandated and enforced by government officials. By contrast, precautionary steps may be far more wise when undertaken in a more decentralized manner by individuals, families, businesses, groups, and other organizations. In other words, as I have noted elsewhere in much longer articles on the topic, “there is a different choice architecture at work when risk is managed in a localized manner as opposed to a society-wide fashion,” and risk-mitigation strategies that might make a great deal of sense for individuals, households, or organizations, might not be nearly as effective if imposed on the entire population as a legal or regulatory directive.

Finally, at times, more morally significant issues may exist that demand an even more exhaustive exploration of the impact of technological change on humanity. Perhaps the most notable examples arise in the field of advance medical treatments and biotechnology. Genetic experimentation and human cloning, for example, raise profound questions about altering human nature or abilities as well as the relationship between generations.

The case for policy prudence in these matters is easier to make because we are quite literally talking about the future of what it means to be human.  Controversies have raged for decades over the question of when life begins and how it should end. But these debates will be greatly magnified and extended in coming years to include equally thorny philosophical questions.  Should parents be allowed to use advanced genetic technologies to select the specific attributes they desire in their children? Or should parents at least be able to take advantage of genetic screening and genome modification technologies that ensure their children won’t suffer from specific diseases or ailments once born?

Outside the realm of technologically enhanced procreation, profound questions are already being raised about the sort of technological enhancements adults might make to their own bodies. How much of the human body can be replaced with robotic or bionic technologies before we cease to be human and become cyborgs?  As another example, “biohacking”—efforts by average citizens working together to enhance various human capabilities, typically by experimenting on their own bodies —could become more prevalent in coming years.  Collaborative forums, such as Biohack.Me, already exist where individuals can share information and collaborate on various projects of this sort.  Advocates of such amateur biohacking sometimes refer to themselves as “grinders,” which Ben Popper of the Verge defines as “homebrew biohackers [who are] obsessed with the idea of human enhancement [and] who are looking for new ways to put machines into their bodies.”

These technologies and capabilities will raise thorny ethical and legal issues as they advance. Ethically, they will raise questions of what it means to be human and the limits of what people should be allowed to do to their own bodies. In the field of law, they will challenge existing health and safety regulations imposed by the FDA and other government bodies.

Again, most innovation policy debates—including most of the technologies discussed throughout this book—do not involve such morally weighty questions. In the abstract, of course, philosophers might argue that every debate about technological innovation has an impact on the future of humanity and “what it means to be human.” But few have much of a direct influence on that question, and even fewer involve the sort of potentially immediate, irreversible, or catastrophic outcomes that should concern policymakers.

In most cases, therefore, we should let trial-and-error experimentation continue because “experimentation is part and parcel of innovation” and the key to social learning and economic prosperity.  If we froze all forms of technological innovation in place while we sorted through every possible outcome, no progress would ever occur. “Experimentation matters,” notes Harvard Business School professor Stefan H. Thomke, “because it fuels the discovery and creation of knowledge and thereby leads to the development and improvement of products, processes, systems, and organizations.”

Of course, ongoing experimentation with new technologies always entails certain risks and potential downsides, but the central argument of this book is that (a) the upsides of technological innovation almost always outweigh those downsides and that (b) humans have proven remarkably resilient in the face of uncertain, ever-changing futures.

In sum, when it comes to managing or coping with the risks associated with technological change, flexibility and patience is essential. One size most certainly does not fit all. And one-size-fits-all approaches to regulating technological risk are particularly misguided when the benefits associated with technological change are so profound. Indeed, “[t]echnology is widely considered the main source of economic progress”; therefore, nothing could be more important for raising long-term living standards than creating a policy environment conducive to ongoing technological change and the freedom to innovate.

I wanted to draw your attention to yet another spectacular speech by Maureen K. Ohlhausen, a Commissioner with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). I have written here before about Commissioner Ohlhausen’s outstanding speeches, but this latest one might be her best yet.

On Tuesday, Ohlhausen was speaking at U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation day-long event on “The Internet of Everything: Data, Networks and Opportunities.” The conference featured various keynote speakers and panels discussing, “the many ways that data and Internet connectiviting is changing the face of business and society.” (It was my honor to also be invited to deliver an address to the crowd that day.)

As with many of her other recent addresses, Commissioner Ohlhausen stressed why it is so important that policymakers “approach new technologies and new business models with regulatory humility.” Building on the work of the great Austrian economist F.A. Hayek, who won a Nobel prize in part for his work explaining the limits of our knowledge to plan societies and economies, Ohlhausen argues that:

regulators face a fundamental knowledge problem that limits the effective reach of regulation. A regulator must acquire knowledge about the present state and future trends of the industry being regulated. The more prescriptive the regulation, and the more complex the industry, the more detailed knowledge the regulator must collect. But, regulators simply cannot gather all the information relevant to every problem. Such information is widely distributed and therefore very expensive to collect. Even when a regulator manages to collect information, it quickly becomes out of date as a regulated industry continues to evolve. Obsolete data is a particular concern for regulators of fast-changing technological fields like the Internet of Things. This knowledge problem means that centralized problem solving cannot make full use of the available knowledge about a problem. Therefore, centralized regulation generally offers worse solutions when compared to distributed or emergent constraints such as social norms.

She continued on to explain the dangers of “precautionary principle” thinking as applied to new technologies, noting that, far too often, policymakers seek to impose preemptive, top-down controls on new sectors and technologies based on “concern over largely hypothetical future harms.” That’s a point I have stressed repeatedly in my own work on the importance of “permissionless innovation.” As I note in my book of the same title, living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.

What’s the better alternative to precautionary controls to address potential risks? As Commissioner Ohlhausen noted in her speech to the Chamber of Commerce, regulators should “focus on identifying and addressing real, not speculative, consumer harm.” She explains how the FTC already has the tools to do so:

At the FTC, this focus is part of our statute. Congress charged us in Section 5 of the FTC Act with preventing deceptive or unfair acts and practices. Deceptive acts violate Section 5 only if they are material – that is, if they actually harm consumers. And practices are only unfair if there is a substantial harm that consumers cannot avoid and that outweighs any benefits to consumers or competition. In both cases, the law concerns itself with addressing actual consumer harms. Likewise the FTC carefully evaluates consumer welfare (or, its corollary, consumer harm) when it exercises its antitrust authority.

Importantly, she noted, the focus in this regard is on  ex post enforcement, not highly prescriptive ex ante regulation. “This incremental approach, which we have been using for nearly 100 years, has significant benefits,” Ohlhausen argued, and it is “consistent with Hayek’s thesis about the knowledge problem.” Namely, regulators should not be acting based on limited knowledge to address hypothetical future threats. Doing so derails opportunities for innovation and leads to myriad unintended consequences.

But the best part of Commissioner Ohlhausen’s speech was her embrace of what author Matt Ridley calls “rational optimism”:

Over the past two centuries, humankind has proven its ability to transform innovation into widespread prosperity. Fueled by supportive social attitudes and free market institutions, businesses have been the engines of this prosperity. Regulators who don’t want to stall these engines of innovation should remember the long history of beneficial innovation, remain humble about what they can know and accomplish, focus on addressing real consumer harm, and apply tools appropriate to the harms that do arise.

Critics will protest that innovation can just be too darn disruptive and that we have to preemptively legislate or regulate to counter those effects. But Ohlhausen has a powerful response to those critics:

innovation can, and will, be unnerving or unsettling. By its very nature, innovation changes things. Change is uncomfortable. That is why, as long as there has been innovation, there have been detractors and doomsayers. William Petty, the economist and doctor, said, “When a new invention is first propounded, in the beginning every man objects and the poor inventor runs the gauntloop of all petulant wits.” And he was talking in 1679! Pessimism about innovation sells newspapers and books. It also has a surprising intellectual caché. “The man who despairs when others hope is admired by a large class of persons as a sage,” said John Stuart Mill. But if the past 200 years of innovation have any lesson, it is this: society has repeatedly and quickly integrated and greatly benefited from innovation. The somber doomsday “sages” – from the Luddites in 19th century England to critics of credit card technology in the 1970s – have been wrong about the general effects of innovation. The many benefits have far outweighed the few costs. I am quite optimistic that the disruption of the Internet of Everything will continue the trend and greatly promote our prosperity.

Preach it, sister! That is exactly right.

Anyway, make sure to read Commissioner Ohlhausen’s entire speech. It is absolutely spectacular. I wish every regulatory approached their jobs with the same degree of humility, patience, and “rational optimism” that Commissioner Ohlhausen does.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking a more active interest in state and local barriers to entry and innovation that could threaten the continued growth of the digital economy in general and the sharing economy in particular. The agency recently announced it would be hosting a June 9th workshop “to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the [sharing] economy.” Filings are due to the agency in this matter by May 26th. (Along with my Mercatus Center colleagues, I will be submitting comments and also releasing a big paper on reputational feedback mechanisms that same week. We have already released this paper on the general topic.)

Relatedly, just yesterday, the FTC sent a letter to Michigan policymakers about restricting entry by Tesla and other direct-to-consumer sellers of vehicles. Michigan passed a law in October 2014 prohibiting such direct sales. The FTC’s strongly-worded letter decries the state’s law as “protectionism for independent franchised dealers” noting that “current provisions operate as a special protection for dealers—a protection that is likely harming both competition and consumers.” The agency argues that:

consumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the vehicles they want to buy and how they want to buy them. Automobile manufacturers have an economic incentive to respond to consumer preferences by choosing the most effective distribution method for their vehicle brands. Absent supportable public policy considerations, the law should permit automobile manufacturers to choose their distribution method to be responsive to the desires of motor vehicle buyers.

The agency cites the “well-developed body of research on these issues strongly suggests that government restrictions on distribution are rarely desirable for consumers” and the staff letter continues on to utterly demolish the bogus arguments set forth by defenders of the blatantly self-serving, cronyist law. (For more discussion of just how anti-competitive and anti-consumer these laws are in practice, see this January 2015 Mercatus Center study, “State Franchise Law Carjacks Auto Buyers,” by Jerry Ellig and Jesse Martinez.)

The FTC’s letter is another example of how the agency can take steps using its advocacy tools to explain to state and local policymakers how their laws may be protectionist and anti-consumer in character. Needless to say, this also has ramifications for how the agency approaches parochial restraints on entry and innovation affecting the sharing economy.

In our forthcoming Mercatus Center comments to the FTC for its June 6th sharing economy workshop, Christopher Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I will address many issues related to the sharing economy and its regulation. Beyond addressing all five of the specific questions asked in the Commission’s workshop notice, we also include a discussion about “Federal Responses to Local Anticompetitive Regulations.” Down below I have reproduced the current rough draft of that section of our filing in the hope of getting input from others. Needless to say, the idea of the FTC aggressively using its advocacy efforts or even federal antitrust laws to address state and local barriers to trade and innovation will make some folks uncomfortable–especially on federalism grounds. But we argue that a good case can be made for the agency using both its advocacy and antitrust tools to address these issues. Let us know what you think.

The Federal Trade Commission possesses two primary tools to address public restraints of trade created by state and local authorities: advocacy and antitrust.[1]

Through its advocacy program, the Commission can provide specific comments to state and local officials regarding the effects of both proposed and existing regulations.[2] Commissioner Joshua Wright has noted that, “For many years, the FTC has used its mantle to comment on legislation and regulation that may restrain competition in a way that harms consumers.”[3] Thus, at a minimum, the Commission can and should shine light on parochial governmental efforts to restrain trade and limit innovation throughout the sharing economy.[4] By shining more light on state or local anti-competitive rules, the Commission will hopefully make governments, or their surrogate bodies (such as licensing boards), more transparent about their practices and more accountable for laws or regulations that could harm consumer welfare. However, to be successful, the Commission’s advocacy efforts depend upon the willingness of state and local legislators and regulators to heed its advice.^[5]

The Commission has already used its advisory role in its recent guidance to state and local policymakers regarding the regulation of ridesharing services. The Commission noted then that “a regulatory framework should be responsive to new methods of competition,” and set forth the following vision regarding what it regards as the proper approach to parochial regulation of passenger transportation services:

Staff recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle transportation should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate consumer protections. [Regulators] also should proceed with caution in responding to calls for change that may have the effect of impairing new forms or methods of competition that are desirable to consumers. . . .  In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to achieve some countervailing procompetitive virtue or other public benefit such as protecting the public from significant harm.[6]

This represents a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about parochial regulation of the sharing economy more generally.

Unfortunately, in areas relevant to the regulation of the sharing economy (e.g., taxicab regulations and rules governing home and apartment rentals) anticompetitive regulations have remained on the books—and in some instances have expanded—in spite of more than 30 years of Commission comment and advocacy.[7]  In fact, as Public Citizen noted in a recent Supreme Court filing:

[M]any more occupations are regulated than ever before, and most boards doing the regulating—in both traditional and new professions—are dominated by industry members who compete in the regulated market. Those board member-competitors, in turn, commonly engage in regulation that can be seen as anticompetitive self-protection. The particular forms anticompetitive regulations take are highly varied, the possibilities seemingly limited only by the imaginations of the board members.[8]

In these instances, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement authority may need to be utilized when its advocacy efforts fall short with regard to regulations that favor incumbents by limiting competition and entry.[9] Many academics have endorsed expanded antitrust oversight of public barriers to trade and innovation.[10] As Commissioner Wright has argued, “the FTC is in a good position to use its full arsenal of tools to ensure that state and local regulators do not thwart new entrants from using technology to disrupt existing marketplace.”[11] He notes specifically that he is “quite confident that a significant shift of agency resources away from enforcement efforts aimed at taming private restraints of trade and instead toward fighting public restraints would improve consumer welfare.”[12] We agree.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission made it clear that local authorities cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws.[13] This is particularly true, the Court noted, “where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” such as a professional licensing board consisting primarily of members of the affected interest being regulated.[14] “Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,” the Court held, “for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy.”[15]

The touchstone of this case and the Court’s related jurisprudence in this area is political accountability.[16] State officials must (1) “clearly articulate” and (2) “actively supervise” licensing arrangements and regulatory bodies if they hope to withstand federal antitrust scrutiny.[17] The Court clarified this test in N.C. Dental holding that “the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls.”[18] In other words, if state and local officials want to engage in protectionist activities that restrain trade in pursuit of some other countervailing objective, then they need to own up to it by being transparent about their anticompetitive intentions and then actively oversee the process after that to ensure it is not completely captured by affected interests.[19]

Some might argue that this does not go far enough to eradicate anti-competitive barriers to trade at the state or local level that could restrain the innovative potential of the sharing economy. While that may be true, some limits on the Commission’s federal antitrust discretion are necessary to avoid impinging upon legitimate state and local priorities.

Over time, it is our hope that by empowering the public with more options, more information and better ways to shine light on bad actors, the sharing economy will continue to make many of those old regulations unnecessary. Thus, in line with Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen’s wise advice, the Commission should encourage state and local officials to exercise patience and humility as they confront technological changes that disrupt traditional regulatory systems.[20]

But when parochial regulators engage in blatantly anti-competitive activities that restrain trade, foster cartelization, or harm consumer welfare in other ways, the Commission can act to counter the worst of those tendencies.[21] The Commission’s standard of review going forward was appropriately articulated by Commissioner Wright recently when he noted that, “in the context of potentially disruptive forms of competition through new technologies or new business models, we should generally be skeptical of regulatory efforts that have the effect of favoring incumbent industry participants.”[22]

Such parochial protectionist barriers to trade and innovation will become even more concerning as the potential reach of so many sharing economy businesses grows larger. The boundary between intrastate and interstate commerce is sometimes difficult to determine for many sharing economy platforms. Clearly, much of the commerce in question occurs within the boundaries of a state or municipality, but sharing economy services also rely upon Internet-enabled platforms with a broader reach. To the extent state or local restrictions on sharing economy operations create negative externalities in the form of “interstate spillovers,” the case for federal intervention is strengthened.[23] It would be preferable if Congress chose to deal with such spillovers using its Commerce Clause authority (Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution),[24] but the presence of such negative externalities might also bolster the case for the Commission’s use of antitrust to address parochial restraints on trade.

[1]     See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 19-20.

[2]     Id., at 20. (“The primary goal of such advocacy is to convince policymakers to consider and then minimize any adverse effects on competition that may result from regulations aimed at preventing various consumer harms.”) Also see James C. Cooper and William E. Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, (August 2010): 1582, “Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens.”).

[3]     Joshua D. Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets:  Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC,” Remarks of Joshua D. Wright Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the Big Ideas about Information Lecture Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2015, at 15, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/04/regulation-high-tech-markets-public-choice-regulatory-capture-ftc.

[4]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1610, (“Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions are realized in practice.”)

[5]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1582, (“The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.”).

[6]     Federal Trade Commission, Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado Regulations, (March 6, 2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.

[7]     Marvin Ammori, “Can the FTC Save Uber,” Slate, March 12, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.html (noting that, “not only does the FTC have the authority to take these cities to impartial federal courts and end their anticompetitive actions; it also has deep expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”) Also see, Edmund W. Kitch, “Taxi Reform—The FTC Can Hack It,” Regulation, May/June 1984, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1984/5/v8n3-3.pdf.

[8]     Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 24.

[9]     Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 6, 2014): 24, (“Antitrust review is entirely appropriate for curbing the excesses of occupational licensing because the anticompetitive effect has a similar effect on the market—and in particular consumers—as does traditional cartel activity.”)

[10]   See Mark A. Perry, “Municipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 57, (Fall 1990): 1413-1445; William J. Martin, “State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, (Summer, 2005): 1079-1102; Jarod M. Bona, “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol 5, (Spring 2011): 28-51; Ingram Weber “The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 79, (2012); Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw, “Cartels by Another Name:  Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, (2014): 1093-1164.

[11]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 28-9.

[12]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 29.

[13]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[14]   Id.

[15]   Id. Also see Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1143, (“Who could seriously argue that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the state’s?”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 3, (“Antitrust immunity for private parties who act under color of state law is especially problematic, given that anticompetitive conduct is most likely to occur when private parties are in a position to exploit government’s regulatory powers.”)

[16]   See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 16, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/reflections-supreme-courts-north-carolina-dental-decision-ftcs-campaign, (“states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers.”); Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1137, (“political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.)

[17]   See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy and Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003): 54, (“clear articulation requires that a state enunciate an affirmative intent to displace competition and to replace it with a stated criterion. Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly placed with the state.”) This test has been developed and refined in a variety of cases over the past 35 years. See: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

[18]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[19]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1156. (“Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-regulation to professionals and walk away.”) See also North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“[Federal antitrust] immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).

[20]  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Commission, “Regulatory Humility in Practice,” Remarks of the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 2015).

[21]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1094, (“state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of criminal sanction.”). See also Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 2, 21, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-534_resp_amcu_plf-cato.authcheckdam.pdf, (noting that courts “should presume strongly against granting state-action immunity in antitrust cases.  It makes little sense to impose powerful civil and criminal punishments on private parties who are deemed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct, while exempting government entities—or, worse, private parties acting under the government’s aegis—when they engage in the exact same conduct. . . . “Whatever one’s opinion of antitrust law in general, there is no justification for allowing states broad latitude to disregard federal law and erect private cartels with only vague instructions and loose oversight.”)

[22]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 7.

[23]   FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force, 44, (“an unfortunate gap has emerged between scholarship and case law. Although many of the leading commentators have expressed serious concern regarding problems posed by interstate spillovers, their thinking has yet to take root in the law. Such spillovers undermine both economic efficiency and some of the same political representation values thought to be protected by principles of federalism.”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 13, (“Allowing states expansive power to exempt private actors from antitrust laws would also disrupt national economic policy by encouraging a patchwork of state-established entities licensed to engage in cartel behavior. This would disrupt interstate investment and consumer expectations, and would have spillover effects across state lines.”) Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1598, (“When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.”

[24]   See Adam Thierer, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce, and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1998): 81-118.

Last Wednesday, it was my great pleasure to testify at a Senate Commerce Committee hearing entitled, “The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things.” The hearing focused “on how devices… will be made smarter and more dynamic through Internet technologies. Government agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, however, are already considering possible changes to the law that could have the unintended consequence of slowing innovation.”

But the session went well beyond the Internet of Things and became a much more wide-ranging discussion about how America can maintain its global leadership for the next-generation of Internet-enabled, data-driven innovation. On both sides of the aisle at last week’s hearing, one Senator after another made impassioned remarks about the enormous innovation opportunities that were out there. While doing so, they highlighted not just the opportunities emanating out of the IoT and wearable device space, but also many other areas, such as connected cars, commercial drones, and next-generation spectrum.

I was impressed by the energy and nonpartisan vision that the Senators brought to these issues, but I wanted to single out the passionate statement that Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) delivered when it came his turn to speak because he very eloquently articulated what’s at stake in the battle for global innovation supremacy in the modern economy. (Sen. Booker’s remarks were not published, but you can watch them starting at the 1:34:00 mark of the hearing video.)

Embrace the Opportunity

First, Sen. Booker stressed the enormous opportunity with the Internet of Things. “ This is a phenomenal opportunity for a bipartisan, profoundly patriotic approach to an issue that can explode our economy. I think that there are trillions of dollars, creating countless jobs, improving quality of life, [and] democratizing our society,” he said. “We can’t even imagine the future that this portends of, and we should be embracing that.”

Sen. Booker has it exactly right. And for more details about the enormous innovation opportunities associated with the Internet of Things, see Section 2 of my new law review article, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” which provides concrete evidence.

Protect America’s Competitive Advantage in the Innovation Age

Second, Sen. Booker highlighted the importance of getting our policy vision right to achieve those opportunities. He noted that “a lot of my concerns are what my Republican colleagues also echoed, which is we should be doing everything possible to encourage this and nothing to restrict it.”

“ America right now is the net exporter of technology and innovation in the globe, and we can’t lose that advantage,” he said and “we should continue to be the global innovators on these areas.” He continued on to say:

And so, from copyright issues, security issues, privacy issues… all of these things are worthy of us wrestling and grappling with, but to me we cannot stop human innovation and we can’t give advantages in human innovation to other nations that we don’t have. America should continue to lead.

This is something I have been writing actively about now for many years and I agree with Sen. Booker that America needs to get our policy vision right to ensure we don’t lose ground in the international competition to see who will lead the next wave of Internet-enabled innovation. As I noted in my testimony, “If America hopes to be a global leader in the Internet of Things, as it has been for the Internet more generally over the past two decades, then we first have to get public policy right. America took a commanding lead in the digital economy because, in the mid-1990s, Congress and the Clinton administration crafted a nonpartisan vision for the Internet that protected “permissionless innovation”—the idea that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted without prior approval.”

Meanwhile, as I documented in my longer essay, “Why Permissionless Innovation Matters: Why does economic growth occur in some societies & not in others?” our international rivals languished on this front because they strapped their tech sectors with layers of regulatory red tape that thwarted digital innovation.

Reject Fear-Based Policymaking

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Sen. Booker stressed how essential it was that we reject a fear-based approach to public policymaking. As he noted at the hearing about these new information technologies, “ there’s a lot of legitimate fears, but in the same way of every technological era, there must have been incredible fears.”

He cited, for example, the rise of air travel and the onset of humans taking flight. Sen. Booker correctly noted that while that must have been quite jarring at first, we quickly came to realize the benefits of that new innovation. The same will be true for new technologies such as the Internet of Things, connected cars, and private drones, Booker argued. In each case, some early fears about these technologies could lead to overly-precautionary approach to policy. “ But for us to do anything to inhibit that leap in humanity to me seems unfortunate,” he said.

Once again, the Senator has it exactly right. As I noted in my law review article on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” as well as my recent essay, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change,” humans have exhibited the uncanny ability to adapt to changes in their environment, bounce back from adversity, and learn to be resilient over time. A great deal of wisdom is born of experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures while both developing new technologies and learning how to live with them. More often than not, citizens have found ways to adapt to technological change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms, new norms, or other creative fixes.

Booker gets that and understands why we need to be patient to allow that process to unfold once again so that we can enjoy the abundance of riches that will accompany a more innovative economy.

Avoiding Global Innovation Arbitrage

Sen. Booker also highlighted how some existing government legal and regulatory barriers could hold back progress. On the wireless spectrum front he noted that “ the government hoards too much spectrum and there is a need for more spectrum out there. Everything we are talking about,” he argued, “is going to necessitate more spectrum.” Again, 100% correct. Although some spectrum reform proposals (licensed vs. unlicensed, for example) will still prove contentious, we can at least all agree that we have to work together to find ways to open up more spectrum since the coming Internet of Things universe of technologies is going to demand lots of it.

Booker also noted that another area where fear undermines American leadership is the issue of private drone use. He noted that, “ the potential possibilities for drone technology to alleviate burdens on our infrastructure, to empower commerce, innovation, jobs… to really open up unlimited opportunities in this country is pretty incredible to me.”

The problem is that existing government policies, enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have been holding back progress. And that has had consequences in terms of global competitiveness. “As I watch our government go slow in promulgating rules holding back American innovation,” Booker said, “what happened as a result of that is that innovation has spread to other countries that don’t have these rules (or have) put in place sensible regulations. But now we seeing technology exported from America and going other places.”

Correct again! I wrote about this problem in a recent essay on “global innovation arbitrage,” in which I noted how “Capital moves like quicksilver around the globe today as investors and entrepreneurs look for more hospitable tax and regulatory environments. The same is increasingly true for innovation. Innovators can, and increasingly will, move to those countries and continents that provide a legal and regulatory environment more hospitable to entrepreneurial activity.”

That’s already happening with drone innovation, as I documented in that piece. Evidence suggests that the FAA’s heavy-handed and overly-precautionary approach to drones has encouraged some innovators to flock overseas in search of more hospitable regulatory environment.

Luckily, just this weekend, the FAA finally announced its (much-delayed) rules for private drone operations. (Here’s a summary of those rules.) Unfortunately, the rules are a bit of mixed bag, with some greater leeway being provided for very small drones, but the rules will still be too restrictive to allow for other innovative applications, such as widespread drone delivery (which has Amazon angry, among others.)

Bottom line: if our government doesn’t take a more flexible, light-touch approach to these and other cutting-edge technologies, than some of our most creative minds and companies are going to bolt.

I dealt with all of these innovation policy issues in far more detail in my latest little book Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, which I condensed further still into this essay on, “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation.” But Sen. Booker has offered us an even more concise explanation of just what’s at stake in the battle for innovation leadership in the modern economy. His remarks point the way forward and illustrate, as I have noted before, that innovation policy can and should be a nonpartisan issue.

Additional Reading

• testimony: “My Testimony for Senate Internet of Things Hearing,” February 11, 2015.
• essay: “A Nonpartisan Policy Vision for the Internet of Things,” December 11, 2014.
• law review article: “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” November 2014.
• essay: “Don’t Hit the (Techno-)Panic Button on Connected Car Hacking & IoT Security,” February 10, 2015.
• essay: “Striking a Sensible Balance on the Internet of Things and Privacy,” January 16, 2015.
• essay: “Some Initial Thoughts on the FTC Internet of Things Report,” January 28, 2015.
• slide presentation: “Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology,” September 12, 2014.
• essay: “CES 2014 Report: The Internet of Things Arrives, but Will Washington Welcome It?” January 8, 2014.

What sort of public policy vision should govern the Internet of Things? I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about that question in essays here over the past year, as well as in a new white paper (“The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation”) that will be published in the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology early next year.

But I recently heard three policymakers articulate their recommended vision for the Internet of Things (IoT) and I found their approach so inspiring that I wanted to discuss it here in the hopes that it will become the foundation for future policy in this arena.

Last Thursday, it was my pleasure to attend a Center for Data Innovation (CDI) event on “How Can Policymakers Help Build the Internet of Things?” As the title implied, the goal of the event was to discuss how to achieve the vision of a more fully-connected world and, more specifically, how public policymakers can help facilitate that objective. It was a terrific event with many excellent panel discussions and keynote addresses.

Two of those keynotes were delivered by Senators Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) and Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.). Below I will offer some highlights from their remarks and then relate them to the vision set forth by Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen in some of her recent speeches. I will conclude by discussing how the Ayotte-Fischer-Ohlhausen vision can be seen as the logical extension of the Clinton Administration’s excellent 1997 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, which proposed a similar policy paradigm for the Internet more generally. This shows how crafting policy for the IoT can and should be a nonpartisan affair.

Sen. Deb Fischer

In her opening remarks at the CDI event last week, Sen. Deb Fischer explained how “the Internet of Things can be a game changer for the U.S. economy and for the American consumer.” “It gives people more information and better tools to analyze data to make more informed choices,” she noted.

After outlining some of the potential benefits associated with the Internet of Things, Sen. Fischer continued on to explain why it is essential we get public policy incentives right first if we hope to unlock the full potential of these new technologies. Specifically, she argued that:

In order for Americans to receive the maximum benefits from increased connectivity, there are two things the government must avoid. First, policymakers can’t bury their heads in the sand and pretend this technological revolution isn’t happening only to wake up years down the road and try to micromanage a fast-changing, dynamic industry. Second, the federal government must also avoid regulation just for the sake of regulation. We need thoughtful, pragmatic responses and narrow solutions to any policy issues that arise. For too long, the only “strategy” in Washington policy-making has been to react to crisis after crisis. We should dive into what this means for U.S. global competitiveness, consumer welfare, and economic opportunity before the public policy challenges overwhelm us, before legislative and executive branches of government – or foreign governments – react without all the facts.

Fischer concluded by noting that, “it’s entirely appropriate for the U.S. government to think about how to modernize its regulatory frameworks, consolidate, renovate, and overhaul obsolete rules. We’re destined to lose to the Chinese or others if the Internet of Things is governed in the United States by rules that pre-date the VCR.”

Sen. Kelly Ayotte

Like Sen. Fischer, Ayotte similarly stressed the many economic opportunities associated with IoT technologies for both consumers and producers alike. [Note: Sen. Ayotte did not publish her remarks on her website, but you can watch her speech from the CDI event beginning around the 17-minute mark of the event video.]

Ayotte also noted that IoT is going to be a major topic for the Senate Commerce Committee and that there will be an upcoming hearing on the issue. She said that the role of the Committee will be to ensure that the various agencies looking into IoT issues are not issuing “conflicting regulatory directives” and “that what is being done makes sense and allows for future innovation that we can’t even anticipate right now.” Among the agencies she cited that are currently looking into IoT issues: FTC (privacy & security), FDA (medical device apps), FCC (wireless issues), FAA (commercial drones), NHTSA (intelligent vehicle technology), NTIA (multistakeholder privacy reviews), as well as state lawmakers and regulatory agencies.

Sen. Ayotte then explained what sort of policy framework America needed to adopt to ensure that the full potential of the Internet of Things could be realized. She framed the choice lawmakers are confronted with as follows:

we as policymakers we can either create an environment that allows that to continue to grow, or one that thwarts that. To stay on the cutting edge, we need to make sure that our regulatory environment is conducive to fostering innovation.” […] “we’re living in the Dark Ages in the ways the some of the regulations have been framed. Companies must be properly incentivized to invest in the future, and government shouldn’t be a deterrent to innovation and job-creation.

Ayotte also stressed that “technology continues to evolve so rapidly there is no one-size-fits-all regulatory approach” that can work for a dynamic environment like this. “If legislation drives technology, the technology will be outdated almost instantly,” and “that is why humility is so important,” she concluded.

The better approach, she argued was to let technology evolve freely in a “permissionless” fashion and then see what problems developed and then address them accordingly. “[A] top-down, preemptive approach is never the best policy” and will only serve to stifle innovation, she argued. “If all regulators looked with some humility at how technology is used and whether we need to regulate or not to regulate, I think innovation would stand to benefit.”

FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen

Fischer and Ayotte’s remarks reflect a vision for the Internet of Things that FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen has articulated in recent months. In fact, Sen. Ayotte specifically cited Ohlhausen in her remarks.

Ohlhausen has actually delivered several excellent speeches on these issues and has become one of the leading public policy thought leaders on the Internet of Things in the United States today. One of her first major speeches on these issues was her October 2013 address entitled, “The Internet of Things and the FTC: Does Innovation Require Intervention?” In that speech, Ohlhausen noted that, “The success of the Internet has in large part been driven by the freedom to experiment with different business models, the best of which have survived and thrived, even in the face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the impact on consumers and competitors.”

She also issued a wise word of caution to her fellow regulators:

It is . . . vital that government officials, like myself, approach new technologies with a dose of regulatory humility, by working hard to educate ourselves and others about the innovation, understand its effects on consumers and the marketplace, identify benefits and likely harms, and, if harms do arise, consider whether existing laws and regulations are sufficient to address them, before assuming that new rules are required.

In this and other speeches, Ohlhausen has highlighted the various other remedies that already exist when things do go wrong, including FTC enforcement of “unfair and deceptive practices,” common law solutions (torts and class actions), private self-regulation and best practices, social pressure, and so on. (Note: Inspired by Ohlhausen’s approach, I devoted the final section of my big law review article on IoT issues to a deeper exploration of all those “bottom-up” solutions to privacy and security concerns surrounding the IoT and wearable tech.)

The Clinton Administration Vision

These three women have articulated what I regard as the ideal vision for fostering the growth of the Internet of Things. It should be noted, however, that their framework is really just an extension of the Clinton Administration’s outstanding vision for the Internet more generally.

In the 1997 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, the Clinton Administration outlined its approach toward the Internet and the emerging digital economy. As I’ve noted many times before, the Framework was a succinct and bold market-oriented vision for cyberspace governance that recommended reliance upon civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and ongoing marketplace experiments to solve information age problems. Specifically, it stated that “the private sector should lead [and] the Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry.” “[G]overnments should encourage industry self-regulation and private sector leadership where possible” and “avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce.”

Sen. Ayotte specifically cited those Clinton principles in her speech and said, “I think those words, given twenty years ago at the infancy of the Internet, are today even more relevant as we look at the challenges and the issues that we continue to face as regulators and policymakers.”

I completely agree. This is exactly the sort of vision that we need to keep innovation moving forward to benefit consumers and the economy, and this also illustrates how IoT policy can be a nonpartisan effort.

Why does this matter so much? As I noted in this recent essay, thanks to the Clinton Administration’s bold vision for the Internet:

This policy disposition resulted in an unambiguous green light for a rising generation of creative minds who were eager to explore this new frontier for commerce and communications. . . . The result of this freedom to experiment was an outpouring of innovation. America’s info-tech sectors thrived thanks to permissionless innovation, and they still do today. An annual Booz & Company report on the world’s most innovative companies revealed that 9 of the top 10 most innovative companies are based in the U.S. and that most of them are involved in computing, software, and digital technology.

In other words, America got policy right before and we can get policy right again to ensure we are again global innovation leaders. Patience, flexibility, and forbearance are the key policy virtues that nurture an environment conducive to entrepreneurial creativity, economic progress, and greater consumer choice.

Other policymakers should endorse the vision originally sketched out by the Clinton Administration and now so eloquently embraced and extended by Sen. Fischer, Sen. Ayotte, and Commissioner Ohlhausen. This is the path forward if we hope to realize the full potential of the Internet of Things.

If there are two general principles that unify my recent work on technology policy and innovation issues, they would be as follows. To the maximum extent possible:

1. We should avoid preemptive and precautionary-based regulatory regimes for new innovation. Instead, our policy default should be innovation allowed (or “permissionless innovation”) and innovators should be considered “innocent until proven guilty” (unless, that is, a thorough benefit-cost analysis has been conducted that documents the clear need for immediate preemptive restraints).
2. We should avoid rigid, “top-down” technology-specific or sector-specific regulatory regimes and/or regulatory agencies and instead opt for a broader array of more flexible, “bottom-up” solutions (education, empowerment, social norms, self-regulation, public pressure, etc.) as well as reliance on existing legal systems and standards (torts, product liability, contracts, property rights, etc.).

I was very interested, therefore, to come across two new essays that make opposing arguments and proposals. The first is this recent Slate oped by John Frank Weaver, “We Need to Pass Legislation on Artificial Intelligence Early and Often.” The second is Ryan Calo’s new Brookings Institution white paper, “The Case for a Federal Robotics Commission.”

Weaver argues that new robot technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” In order to preemptively address concerns about new technologies such as driverless cars or commercial drones, “we need to legislate early and often,” Weaver says. Stated differently, Weaver is proposing “precautionary principle”-based regulation of these technologies. The precautionary principle generally refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.

Calo argues that we need “the establishment of a new federal agency to deal with the novel experiences and harms robotics enables” since there exists “distinct but related challenges that would benefit from being examined and treated together.” These issues, he says, “require special expertise to understand and may require investment and coordination to thrive.

I’ll address both Weaver and Calo’s proposals in turn.

Problems with Precautionary Regulation

Let’s begin with Weaver proposed approach to regulating robotics and autonomous systems.

What Weaver seems to ignore—and which I discuss at greater length in my latest book—is that “precautionary” policy-making typically results in technological stasis and lost opportunities for economic and social progress. As I noted in my book, if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon such fears—it means that best-case scenarios will never come about. Wisdom and progress are born from experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures. As the old adage goes, “nothing ventured, nothing gained.”

More concretely, the problem with “permissioning” innovation is that traditional regulatory policies and systems tend to be overly-rigid, bureaucratic, costly, and slow to adapt to new realities. Precautionary-based policies and regulatory systems focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. As a result, preemptive bans or highly restrictive regulatory prescriptions can limit innovations that yield new and better ways of doing things.

Weaver doesn’t bother addressing these issues. He instead advocates regulating “early and often” without stopping to think through the potential costs of doing so. Yet, all regulation has trade-offs and opportunity costs. Before we rush to adopt rules based on knee-jerk negative reactions to new technology, we should conduct comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of the proposals and think carefully about what alternative approaches exist to address whatever problems we have identified.

Incidentally, Weaver also does not acknowledge the contradiction inherent in his thinking when he says robotic technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” Well, if robotic technology is truly developing “faster than we can legislate it,” then “getting out ahead of it” would be seemingly impossible! Unless, that is, he envisions regulating robotic technologies so stringently as to effectively bring new innovation to a grinding halt (or banning altogether).

To be clear, my criticisms should not be read to suggest that zero regulation is the best option. There are plenty of thorny issues that deserve serious policy consideration and perhaps even some preemptive rules. But how potential harms are addressed matters deeply. We should exhaust all other potential nonregulatory remedies first — education, empowerment, transparency, etc. — before resorting to preemptive controls on new forms of innovation. In other words, ex post (or after the fact) solutions should generally trump ex ante (preemptive) controls.

I’ll say more on this point in the conclusion since my response addresses general failings in Ryan Calo’s Federal Robotics Commission proposal, to which we now turn.

Problems with a Federal Robotics Commission

Moving on to Calo, it is important to clarify what he is proposing because he is careful not to overstate his case in favor of a new agency for robotics. He elaborates as follows:

“The institution I have in mind would not “regulate” robotics in the sense of fashioning rules regarding their use, at least not in any initial incarnation. Rather, the agency would advise on issues at all levels—state and federal, domestic and foreign, civil and criminal—that touch upon the unique aspects of robotics and artificial intelligence and the novel human experiences these technologies generate. The alternative, I fear, is that we will continue to address robotics policy questions piecemeal, perhaps indefinitely, with increasingly poor outcomes and slow accrual of knowledge. Meanwhile, other nations that are investing more heavily in robotics and, specifically, in developing a legal and policy infrastructure for emerging technology, will leapfrog the U.S. in innovation for the first time since the creation of steam power.”

Here are some of my concerns with Calo’s proposed Federal Robotics Commission.

Will It Really Just Be an Advisory Body?

First, Calo claims he doesn’t want a formal regulatory agency, but something more akin to a super-advisory body. He does, however, sneak in that disclaimer that he doesn’t envision it to be regulatory “at least not in any initial incarnation.” Perhaps, then, he is suggesting that more formal regulatory controls would be in the cards down the road. It remains unclear.

Regardless, I think it is a bit disingenuous to propose the formation of a new governmental body like this and pretend that it will not someday very soon come to possess sweeping regulatory powers over these technologies. Now, you may well feel that that is a good thing. But I fear that Calo is playing a bit of game here by asking the reader to imagine his new creation would merely stick to an advisory role.

Regulatory creep is real. There just aren’t too many examples of agencies being created solely for their advisory expertise and then not also getting into the business of regulating the technology or topic that is included in that agency’s name. And in light of some of Calo’s past writing and advocacy, I can’t help but think he is actually hoping that the agency comes to take on a greater regulatory role over time. Regardless, I think we can bank on that happening and I that there are reasons to worry about it for reasons noted above and which I will elaborate on below.

Incidentally, if Calo is really more interested in furthering just this expert advisory capacity, there are plenty of other entities (including non-governmental bodies) that could play that role. How about the National Science Foundation, for example? Or how about a multi-stakeholder body consisting of many different experts and institutions? I could go on, but you get the point. A single point of action is also a single point of failure. I don’t want just one big robotics bureaucracy making policy or even advising. I’d prefer a more decentralized approach, and one that doesn’t carry a (potential) big regulatory club in its hand.

Public Choice / Regulatory Capture Problems

Second, Calo underestimates the public choice problems of creating a sector-specific or technology-specific agency just for robotics. To his credit, he does admit that, “agencies have their problems, of course. They can be inefficient and are subject to capture by those they regulate or other special interests.” He also notes he has criticized other agencies for various failings. But he does not say anything more on this point.

Let’s be clear. There exists a long and lamentable history of sector-specific regulators being “captured” by the entities they regulate. To read the ugly reality, see my compendium, “Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found.” That piece documents what leading academics of all political stripes have had to say about this problem over the past century. No one ever summarized the nature and gravity of this problem better than the great Alfred Kahn in his masterpiece, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (1971):

“When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. [. . . ] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.” (pgs. 12, 46)

The history of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is highly instructive in this regard and was documented in a 66-page law review article I penned with Brent Skorup entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector,” (Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Vol. 18, 2013). Again, it doesn’t make for pleasant reading. Time and time again, instead of serving the “public interest,” the FCC served private interests. The entire history of video marketplace regulation is one of the most sickening examples to consider since there have almost eight decades worth of case studies of the broadcast industry using regulation as a club to beat back new entry, competition, and innovation. [Skorup and I have another paper discussing that specific history and how to go about reversing it.] This history is important because, in the early days of the Commission, many proponents thought the FCC would be exactly the sort of “expert” independent agency that Calo envisions his Federal Robotics Commission would be. Needless to say, things did not turn out so well.

But the FCC isn’t the only guilty offender in this regard. Go read the history about how airlines so effectively cartelized their industry following World War II with the help of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Thankfully, President Jimmy Carter appointed Alfred Kahn to clean things up in the 1970s. Kahn, a life-long Democrat, came to realize that the problem of capture was so insidious and inescapable that abolition of the agency was the only realistic solution to make sure consumer welfare would improve. As a result, he and various other Democrats in the Carter Administration and in Congress worked together to sunset the agency and its hideously protectionist, anti-consumer policies. (Also, please read this amazing 1973 law review article on “Economic Regulation vs. Competition,” by Mark Green and Ralph Nader if you need even more proof of why this is a such a problem.)

In other words, the problem of regulatory capture is not something one can casually dismiss. The problem is still very real and deserves more consideration before we casually propose creating new agencies, even “advisory” agencies. At a minimum, when proposing new agencies, you need to get serious about what sort of institutional constraints you might consider putting in place to make sure that history does not repeat itself. Because if you don’t, various large, well-heeled, and politically-connected robotics companies could come to capture any new “Federal Robotics Commission” in very short order.

Can We Clean Up Old Messes Before Building More Bureaucracies?

Third, speaking of agencies, if it is the case that the alphabet soup collection of regulatory agencies we already have in place are not capable of handling “robotics policy” right now, can we talk about reforming them (or perhaps even getting rid of a few of them) first? Why must we just pile yet another sector-specific or technology-specific regulator on top of the many that already exist? That’s just a recipe for more red tape and potential regulatory capture. Unless you believe there is value in creating bureaucracy for the sake of creating bureaucracy, there is no excuse for not phasing out agencies that failed in their original mission, or whose mission is now obsolete, for whatever reason. This is a fundamental “good government” issue that politicians and academics of all stripes should agree on.

Calo indirectly addresses this point by noting that “we have agencies devoted to technologies already and it would be odd and anomalous to think we are done creating them.” Curiously, however, he spends no time talking about those agencies or asking whether they have done a good job. Again, the heart of Calo’s argument comes down the assertion that another specialized, technology-specific “expert” agency is needed because there are “novel” issues associated with robotics. Well, if it is true, as Calo suggests, that we have been down this path before (and we have), and if you believe our economy or society has been made better off for it, then you need to prove it. Because the objection to creating another regulatory bureaucracy is not simply based on distaste for Big Government; it comes down to the simple questions: (1) Do these things work; and (2) Is there a better alternative?

This is where Calo’s proposal falls short. There is no effort to prove that technocratic or “scientific” bureaucracies, on net, are worth their expense (to taxpayers) or cost (to society, innovation, etc.) when compared to alternatives. Of course, I suspect this is where Calo and I might part ways regarding what metrics we would use to gauge success. I’ll save that discussion for another day and shift to what I regard as the far more serious deficiency of Calo’s proposal.

Do We Become Global Innovation Leaders Through Bureaucratic Direction?

Fourth, and most importantly, Calo does not offer any evidence to prove his contention that we need a sector-specific or technology-specific agency for robotics in order to develop or maintain America’s competitive edge in this field. Moreover, he does not acknowledge how his proposal might have the exact opposite result. Let me spend some time on this point because this is what I find most problematic about his proposal.

In his latest Brookings essay and his earlier writing about robotics, Calo keeps suggesting that we need a specialized federal agency for robotics to avoid “poor outcomes” due to the lack of “a legal and policy infrastructure for emerging technology.” He even warns us that other countries who are looking into robotics policy and regulation more seriously “will leapfrog the U.S. in innovation for the first time since the creation of steam power.”

Well, on that point, I must ask: Did America need a Federal Steam Agency to become a leader in that field? Because unless I missed something in history class, steam power developed fairly rapidly in this country without any centralized bureaucratic direction. Or how about a more recent example: Did America need a Federal Computer Commission or Federal Internet Commission to obtain or maintain a global edge in computing, the Internet, or the Digital Economy?

To the contrary, we took the EXACT OPPOSITE approach. It’s not just that no new agencies were formed to guide the development of computing or the Internet in this country. It’s that our government made a clear policy choice to break with the past by rejecting top-down, command-and-control regulation by unelected bureaucrats in some shadowy Beltway agency.

Incidentally, it was Democrats who accomplished this. While many Republicans today love to crack wise-ass comments about Al Gore and the Internet while simultaneously imagining themselves to be the great defenders of Internet freedom, the reality is that we have the Clinton Administration and one its most liberal members—Ira Magaziner—to thank for the most blessedly “light-touch,” market-oriented innovation policy that the world has ever seen.

What did Magaziner and the Clinton Administration do? They crafted the amazing 1997 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a statement of the Administration’s principles and policy objectives toward the Internet and the emerging digital economy. It recommended reliance upon civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and ongoing marketplace experiments to solve information age problems. First, “the private sector should lead. The Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry,” the Framework recommended. “Even where collective action is necessary, governments should encourage industry self-regulation and private sector leadership where possible.” Second, “governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce” and “parties should be able to enter into legitimate agreements to buy and sell products and services across the Internet with minimal government involvement or intervention.”

I’ve argued elsewhere that the Clinton Administration’s Framework, “remains the most succinct articulation of a pro-freedom, innovation-oriented vision for cyberspace ever penned.” Of course, this followed the Administration’s earlier move to allow the full commercialization of the Internet, which was even more important. The policy disposition they established with these decisions resulted in an unambiguous green light for a rising generation of creative minds who were eager to explore this new frontier for commerce and communications. And to reiterate,they did it without any new bureaucracy.

If You Regulate “Robotics,” You End Up Regulating Computing & Networking

Incidentally, I do not see how we could create a new Federal Robotics Commission without it also becoming a de facto Federal Computing Commission. Robotics and the many technologies and industries it already includes — driverless cars, commercial drones, Internet of Things, etc. — is becoming a hot policy topic, and proposals for regulation are already flying. These robotic technologies are developing on top of the building blocks of the Information Revolution: microprocessors, wireless networks, sensors, “big data,” etc.

Thus, I share Cory Doctorow’s skepticism about how one could logically separate “robotics” from these other technologies and sectors for regulatory purposes:

I am skeptical that “robot law” can be effectively separated from software law in general. … For the life of me, I can’t figure out a legal principle that would apply to the robot that wouldn’t be useful for the computer (and vice versa).

In his Brookings paper, Calo responded to Doctorow’s concern as follows:

the difference between a computer and a robot has largely to do with the latter’s embodiment. Robots do not just sense, process, and relay data. Robots are organized to act upon the world physically, or at least directly. This turns out to have strong repercussions at law, and to pose unique challenges to law and to legal institutions that computers and the Internet did not.

I find this fairly unconvincing. Just because robotic technologies have a physical embodiment does not mean their impact on society is all that more profound than computing, the Internet, and digital technologies. Consider all the hand-wringing going on today in cybersecurity circles about how hacking, malware, or various other types of digital attacks could take down entire systems or economies. I’m not saying I buy all that “technopanic” talk (and here are about three dozens of my essays arguing the contrary), but the theoretical ramifications are nonetheless on par with dystopian scenarios about robotics.

The Alternative Approach

Of course, it certainly may be the case that some worst-case scenarios are worth worrying about in both cases—for robotics and computing, that is. Still, is a Federal Robotics Commission or a Federal Computing Commission really the sensible way to address those issues?

To the contrary, this is why we have a Legislative Branch! So many of the problems of our modern era of dysfunctional government are rooted in an unwise delegation of authority to administrative agencies. Far too often, congressional lawmakers delegate broad, ambiguous authority to agencies instead of facing up to the hard issues themselves. This results in waste, bloat, inefficiencies, and an endless passing of the buck.

There may very well be some serious issues raised by robotics and AI that we cannot ignore, and which may even require a little preemptive, precautionary policy. And the same goes for general computing and the Internet. But that is not a good reason to just create new bureaucracies in the hope that some set of mythical technocratic philosopher kings will ride in to save the day with their supposed greater “expertise” about these matters. Either you believe in democracy or you don’t. Running around calling for agencies and unelected bureaucrats to make all the hard choices means that “the people” have even less of a say in these matters.

Moreover, there are many other methods of dealing with robotics and the potential problems robotics might create than through the creation of new bureaucracy. The common law already handles many of the problems that both Calo and Weaver are worried about. To the extent robotic systems are involved in accidents that harm individuals or their property, product liability law will kick in.

On this point, I strongly recommend another new Brookings publication. John Villasenor’s outstanding April white paper, “Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for Legislation,” correctly argues that,

“when confronted with new, often complex, questions involving products liability, courts have generally gotten things right. … Products liability law has been highly adaptive to the many new technologies that have emerged in recent decades, and it will be quite capable of adapting to emerging autonomous vehicle technologies as the need arises.”

Thus, instead of trying to micro-manage the development of robotic technologies in an attempt to plan for every hypothetical risk scenario, policymakers should be patient while the common law evolves and liability norms adjust. Traditionally, the common law has dealt with products liability and accident compensation in an evolutionary way through a variety of mechanisms, including strict liability, negligence, design defects law, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and so on. There is no reason to think the common law will not adapt to new technological realities, including robotic technologies. (I address these and other “bottom-up” solutions in my new book.)

In the meantime, let’s exercise some humility and restraint here and avoid heavy-handed precautionary regulatory regimes or the creation of new technocratic bureaucracies. And let’s not forget that many solutions to the problems created by new robotic technologies will develop spontaneously and organically over time as individuals and institutions learn to cope and “muddle through,” as they have many times before.

Additional Reading

• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change, June 30, 2014
• New Paper: “Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars,” September 17, 2014
• Slide Presentation: Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology, September 12, 2014
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014)
• The Growing Conflict of Visions over the Internet of Things & Privacy, January 14, 2012
• Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things? IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013
• My Filing to the FTC in its ‘Internet of Things’ Proceeding, May 31, 2013

I’m pleased to announce the release of my latest law review article, “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates.” It appears in the new edition of the George Mason University Law Review. (Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 2013)

This is the second of two complimentary law review articles I am releasing this year dealing with privacy policy. The first, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” was published in Vol. 36 of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy this Spring. (FYI: Both articles focus on privacy claims made against private actors — namely, efforts to limit private data collection — and not on privacy rights against governments.)

My new article on benefit-cost analysis in privacy debates makes a seemingly contradictory argument: benefit-cost analysis (“BCA”) is extremely challenging in online child safety and digital privacy debates, yet it remains essential that analysts and policymakers attempt to conduct such reviews. While we will never be able to perfectly determine either the benefits or costs of online safety or privacy controls, the very act of conducting a regulatory impact analysis (“RIA”) will help us to better understand the trade-offs associated with various regulatory proposals.

However, precisely because those benefits and costs remain so remarkably subjective and contentious, I argue that we should look to employ less-restrictive solutions — education and awareness efforts, empowerment tools, alternative enforcement mechanisms, etc. — before resorting to potentially costly and cumbersome legal and regulatory regimes that could disrupt the digital economy and the efficient provision of services that consumers desire. This model has worked fairly effectively in the online safety context and can be applied to digital privacy concerns as well.

The article is organized as follows. Part I examines the use of BCA by federal agencies to assess the utility of government regulations. Part II considers how BCA can be applied to online privacy regulation and the challenges federal officials face when determining the potential benefits of regulation. Part III then elaborates on the cost considerations and other trade-offs that regulators face when evaluating the impact of privacy-related regulations. Part IV discusses alternative measures that can be taken by government regulators when attempting to address online safety and privacy concerns. This article concludes that policymakers must consider BCA when proposing new rules but also recognize the utility of alternative remedies such as education and awareness campaigns, to address consumer concerns about online safety and privacy.

I’ve embedded the full article down below in a Scribd reader, but you can also download it from my SSRN page and my Mercatus author page.

A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates by Adam Thierer

Today I’ll be testifying at a Senate Commerce Committee hearing on online privacy and commercial data collection issues. In my remarks, I make three primary points:

1. First, no matter how well-intentioned, restrictions on data collection could negatively impact the competitiveness of America’s digital economy, as well as consumer choice.
2. Second, it is unwise to place too much faith in any single, silver-bullet solution to privacy, including “Do Not Track,” because such schemes are easily evaded or defeated and often fail to live up to their billing.
3. Finally, with those two points in mind, we should look to alternative and less costly approaches to protecting privacy that rely on education, empowerment, and targeted enforcement of existing laws. Serious and lasting long-term privacy protection requires a layered, multifaceted approach incorporating many solutions.

The testimony also contains 4 appendices elaborating on some of these themes.

Down below, I’ve embedded my testimony, a list of 10 recent essays I’ve penned on these topics, and a video in which I explain “How I Think about Privacy” (which was taped last summer at an event up at the University of Maine’s Center for Law and Innovation). Finally, the best summary of my work on these issues can be found in this recent Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy article, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing.” (This is the first of two complimentary law review articles I will be releasing this year dealing with privacy policy. The second, which will be published early this summer by the George Mason University Law Review, is entitled, “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates.”)

Testimony of Adam D. Thierer before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation hearing…

Some of My Recent Essays on Privacy & Data Collection

1. A Better, Simpler Narrative for U.S. Privacy Policy – March 19, 2013
2. On the Pursuit of Happiness… and Privacy – March 31, 2013 (condensed from Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy article, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing”)
3. Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy? – Feb. 20, 2011
4. Two Paradoxes of Privacy Regulation – Aug. 25, 2010
5. Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead – Nov. 13, 2010
6. When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed – Apr. 29, 2011
7. Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004 – March 25, 2011
8. Who Really Believes in “Permissionless Innovation”? – March 4, 2013 (condensed from Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle”)
9. The Problem of Proportionality in Debates about Online Privacy and Child Safety – Nov. 28, 2009
10. Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness– Jan. 5, 2011

I’m excited to announce the release of my latest law review article, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” which appears in the next edition (vol. 36) of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. This is the first of two complimentary law review articles that I will be releasing this year dealing with privacy policy. The second, which will be published later this summer by the George Mason University Law Review, is entitled, “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates.” (FYI: Both articles focus on privacy claims made against private actors — namely, efforts to limit private data collection — and not on privacy rights against governments.)

The new Harvard Journal article is divided into three major sections. Part I focuses on some of normative challenges we face when discussing privacy and argues that there may never be a widely accepted, coherent legal standard for privacy rights or harms here in the United States. It also explores the tensions between expanded privacy regulation and online free speech. Part II turns to the many enforcement challenges that are often ignored when privacy policies are being proposed or formulated and argues that legislative and regulatory efforts aimed at protecting privacy must now be seen as an increasingly intractable information control problem. Most of the problems policymakers and average individuals face when it comes to controlling the flow of private information online are similar to the challenges they face when trying to control the free flow of digitalized bits in other information policy contexts, such as online safety, cybersecurity, and digital copyright.

If the effectiveness of law and regulation is limited by the normative considerations discussed in Part I and the practical enforcement complications discussed in Part II, what alternatives remain to assist privacy-sensitive individuals? I address that question in Part III of the paper and argue that the approach America has adopted to deal with concerns about objectionable online speech and child safety offers a path forward on the privacy front as well. A so-called “3-E” solution that combines consumer education, user empowerment, and selective enforcement of existing targeted laws and other legal standards (torts, anti-fraud laws, contract law, and so on), has helped society achieve a reasonable balance in terms of addressing online safety while also safeguarding other important values, especially freedom of expression.  That does not mean perfect online safety exists, not only because the term means very different things to different people, but because it would be impossible to achieve in the first instance as a result of information control complications. But the “3-E” approach has the advantage of enhancing online safety without sweeping regulations being imposed that could undermine the many benefits information networks and online services offer individuals and society.  This same framework can guide online privacy decisions—both at the individual household level and the public policy level.

I’ve embedded the full article down below in a Scribd reader, but you can also download it from my SSRN page and it should be available on the HJLPP website shortly. [Update 4/16: It is now live on the site.] In coming weeks, I hope to do some blogging that builds on the themes and arguments I develop in this article.

The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has just released its final privacy framework proposal, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change.” The agency released a draft report with the same title back in late 2010 and then asked for comments. [Here were my comments to the agency.] The FTC’s final report comes just a month after the Obama Administration released its 50-page privacy framework, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World, which included a privacy “bill of rights.” That report was primarily driven by the Department of Commerce. [I penned a Forbes column about that report the day it was released.]  The new FTC report is fairly consistent with the earlier Commerce Department report.  Here are some of the key themes or recommendations from the final FTC report:

• rooted in a set of baseline privacy principles with a strong push for “privacy by design,” more consumer choice, and better transparency.
• along with Dept of Commerce, the agency will work with industry to develop privacy codes of conduct and then give them teeth with possibility of FTC enforcement.
• pushes for industry to pursue voluntary “Do Not Track” mechanism, which to the agency apparently means “do not collect” any info.
• calls on Congress to pass data security legislation and legislation “to provide greater transparency for, and control over, the practices of information brokers.” Also, “to further increase transparency, the Commission calls on data brokers that compile data for marketing purposes to explore creating a centralized website where data brokers could (1) identify themselves to consumers and describe how they collect and use consumer data and (2) detail the access rights and other choices they provide with respect to the consumer data they maintain.”
• the agency will host a workshop later this year to discuss privacy withing “large platform providers.” The report notes: “To the extent that large platforms, such as Internet Service Providers, operating systems, browsers, and social media, seek to comprehensively track consumers’ online activities, it raises heightened privacy concerns.”
• the agency is also stepping up oversight on mobile privacy issues.
• the agency says it “generally supports the exploration of efforts to develop additional mechanisms, such as the ‘eraser button’ for social media,” but stops short of saying it should be mandated at this time.

Some of my initial random thoughts about the FTC report:

Not as bad as it could have been…

Overall, the FTC’s final privacy report not as heavy-handed as it could have been. There’s no sweeping, immediate effort to impose a top-down privacy regime or “Data Directive” that some of us feared would put the FTC in a position to become a full-blown Data Protection Agency and regulate every facet of the information economy.

… but “self-regulation” sure sounds a lot like European-style “co-regulation.”

Nonetheless, it doesn’t mean that can’t happen. It is clear that the new FTC and Commerce privacy reports signal the next step in the Obama Administration’s gradual move toward more of a “co-regulation” model for Internet governance on the privacy front. The Administration seems to favor a “government steers, industry rows” model for privacy policy that assigns a broad oversight role to federal regulators allowing them to “nudge” the tech industry in certain directions with the stern but amorphous “do this or else” sword of Damocles hanging over industry “self-regulatory” decisions on this front.

In his dissenting statement, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch makes this point (on C-8):

The Report also acknowledges that it is intended to serve as a template for legislative recommendations. Moreover, to the extent that the Report’s “best practices” mirror the Administration’s privacy “Bill of Rights,” the President has specifically asked either that the “Bill of Rights” be adopted by the Congress or that they be distilled into “enforceable codes of conduct.” As I testified before the same subcommittee, this is a “tautology;” either these practices are to be adopted voluntarily by the firms involved or else there is a federal requirement that they be adopted, in which case there can be no pretense that they are “voluntary.” It makes no difference whether the federal requirement is in the form of enforceable codes of conduct or in the form of an act of Congress. Indeed, it is arguable that neither is needed if these firms feel obliged to comply with the “best practices” or face the wrath of “the Commission” or its staff.

Columbia Law School professor and former FTC adviser Tim Wu refers to this as an “agency threats” model of governance. That’s generally what the FTC is endorsing here. Intimidation is often a very effective regulatory policy. Thus, I hope we can dispense with this silly notion that this process represents truly voluntary self-regulation.  Ask yourself this: If the FTC and Dept of Commerce had instead proposed this same framework for overseeing private media ratings or online speech “codes of conduct,” would anyone seriously call it “voluntary” or “self-regulatory”?  I don’t think so. We’d understand that these implied threats constituted a form of indirect speech control. The only difference in this case–as I have noted here many times before–is that a bit of selective morality is in play when it comes to privacy policy; many of those who oppose regulation-via-intimidation in other contexts are, unfortunately, positively giddy about when it comes to privacy! And so we have arrived at the point where these tactics have become favored information control mechanisms in some contexts but not others.

Trade-offs associated with regulation still must be considered.

If the Obama Administration’s new co-regulatory model results in the sort of de facto regulatory regime that many wanted them to just impose forcefully right from the start, then we are right back at the same point we were before in terms of the trade-offs between information sharing and the largely unregulated economy of “free” online sites and services. As I noted in my filing to the FTC in this matter: ” There is no free lunch. While well-intentioned, government regulation that attempts to create a cost-free opt-out for data collection and targeted online advertising will likely have damaging unintended consequences. In terms of direct costs to consumers, Do Not Track could result in higher prices for service as paywalls go up or, at a minimum, advertising will become less relevant to consumers and, therefore, more “intrusive” in other ways.” To be clear, we could get this result even in absence of a top-down regulatory regime if the FTC and Commerce are able to use threats to accomplish their same regulatory objectives.

“Harmonization” is overrated.

The final FTC report continues the Obama Admin’s misguided obsession with “global harmonization” in terms of achieving more consistent international privacy norms and regulations. As I have noted before, this is an epic blunder. If our norms aren’t the same as Europe’s or the rest of the world’s, some might point out that’s why our Internet sector is better positioned and more highly regarded than the rest of the planet’s online sectors and operators! Even if you don’t accept that premise, you should be skeptical of the wisdom of doing whatever it takes to make America’s privacy policies more consistent with the regulatory models others follow. Sometimes when it comes to global standards and “harmonization,” the better approach is to just go our own way.

The FTC has been doing plenty without additional regulatory authority.

Ironically, the report opens with two pages (p. ii-iii) of “developments since issuance of the preliminary report,” listing the many ways the FTC has been active on this front over the past year in the absence of expanded authority. That includes major actions against two tech titans, Google and Facebook, which included the FTC slapping 20-year privacy audits on them. The FTC also lists many other enforcement actions (via COPPA, FCRA, and  general Sec. 5 authority) and other educational steps it has taken over the past year.  All of which begs the question: Why, then, do we need to expanded federal regulation and enhanced agency power over the information economy?

Does anyone still care about personal responsibility?

Sadly, the report doesn’t have much to say about the role of personal responsibility in this context. It does note that “All stakeholders should expand their efforts to educate consumers about commercial data privacy practices.” That’s good. But had this been an agency report on child safety issues, I have to imagine that the agency would have pointed out that best practices begin at home. As I noted in my filing to the agency, “For some reason, when the topic of debate shifts from concerns about potentially objectionable content to the free movement of personal information, personal responsibility and self-regulation become the last option, not the first.  . . . those who advocate personal responsibility and industry self-regulatory approaches to free-speech and child-protection issues should be advancing the same position with regards to privacy. . . . it is not unreasonable to expect privacy-sensitive consumers to exercise some degree of personal responsibility to avoid unwanted content or communications in this context, just as they must in the context of objectionably content or online child safety.”   Again, the Obama Administration doesn’t seem very interested in pushing personal responsibility as the first order of business with regards to online privacy the way it has for online safety issues.  That’s a real shame.

There is another way.

In closing, I continue to believe that privacy is best governed by a set of evolutionary norms, ongoing online marketplace interactions and experiments, contractual negotiations, public pressures, educational efforts, user empowerment, personal responsibility, and targeted legal enforcement and the use of state torts when true harms can be demonstrated. That’s been the uniquely American approach to privacy protection and we should not abandon it lightly.

I’ll try to update this post after I read through the report a second time but wanted to just get these initial thoughts out for now.

Additional Reading:

• my big Mercatus Center filing to the FTC last year on privacy and Do Not Track regulation
• my recent Forbes oped, “The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy Plan“

other TLF essays…

• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness
• Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy

Yet another hearing on privacy issues has been slated for this coming Wednesday, March 16th. This latest one is in the Senate Commerce Committee and it is entitled “The State of Online Consumer Privacy.” As I’m often asked by various House and Senate committee staffers to help think of good questions for witnesses, I’m listing a few here that I would love to hear answered by any Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or Dept. of Commerce (DoC) officials testifying. You will recall that both agencies released new privacy “frameworks” late last year and seem determined to move America toward a more “European-ized” conception of privacy regulation. [See our recent posts critiquing the reports here.] Here are a few questions that should be put to the FTC and DoC officials, or those who support the direction they are taking us. Please feel free to suggest others:

• Before implying that we are experiencing market failure, why hasn’t either the FTC or DoC conducted a thorough review of online privacy policies to evaluate how well organizational actions match up with promises made in those policies?
• To the extent any sort of internal cost-benefit analysis was done internally before the release of these reports, has an effort been made to quantify the potential size of the hidden “privacy tax” that new regulations like “Do Not Track” could impose on the market?
• Has the impact of new regulations on small competitors or new entrants in the field been considered?  Has any attempt been made to quantify how much less entry / innovation would occur as a result of such regulation?
• Were any economists from the FTC’s Economics Bureau consulted before the new framework was released? Did the DoC consult any economists?
• Why do FTC and DoC officials believe that citing unscientific public opinions polls from regulatory advocacy organizations serves as a surrogate for serious cost-benefit analysis or an investigation into how well privacy policies actual work in the marketplace?
• If they refuse to conduct more comprehensive internal research, have the agencies considered contracting with external economists to build a body of research looking into these issues (as the Federal Communications Commission did in a decade ago in its media ownership proceeding)?
• Has either agency attempted to determine consumer’s “willingness to pay” for increased privacy regulation?
• More generally, where is the “harm” and aren’t there plenty of voluntary privacy-enhancing tools out there that privacy-sensitive users can tap to shield their digital footsteps, if they feel so inclined?

Now is a critical time for online commerce as policymakers assess their approaches to privacy. And as NetChoice says in our comments filed today, now is the perfect time for the Department of Commerce to be more involved in privacy issues.

What? We’re calling for more government involvement in a politically charged issue? Yes, and here’s why it’s an appropriate response to the Commerce Dept’s Notice of Inquiry.

Data flows today are much more complex than they were even a decade ago.  Simple one-way transfers between one country and another have been replaced by multinational corporations that transfer data across multiple jurisdictions on a daily basis.

Because of this, privacy-related laws and regulation can have a broad impact on the growth of online commerce, not just here in the U.S. but across the globe. And as a voice for commerce, the Department of Commerce should promote pro-commerce policies over there (EU, Asia, elsewhere) and over here (in the U.S.).

Here’s what we say in our comments:

• The Commerce Department should act as an international ambassador for innovative American online companies.  The Department can play an important role as a government-to-government advocate for flexible international rules to promote continued innovation and economic growth.  And as a government agency speaking to other government agencies, the Commerce Department can bring credibility and leverage that cannot be matched by corporate interests alone.

• Domestically, the Commerce Department should work with the FTC to step-up state and federal enforcement against unfair or deceptive information practices. Aggressive enforcement will help foster a better climate for innovation than would expanded regulation. New regulations are followed only by legitimate businesses who were already complying with the old regulations. Bad actors, on the other hand, ignore both old and new regulations with impunity (e.g., Spammers are still spamming even after the FTC issued new regulations pursuant to the CAN-SPAM Act).

But whether it is overseas or here in the U.S., we advocate that the Commerce Department promote a privacy framework that is flexible enough to permit innovation, and that opposes static laws that undermine consumer interests in improved online services.

Louis XVI

Americans often quote, or allude to, the French expression ” Le Roi est mort, vive le Roi!” But few realize that this apparent paradox was meant quite literally by the French:From its first official proclamation in 1422 upon the coronation of Charles VII to 1774, when Louis XV finally died, the term expressed the abstract constitutional concept that sovereignty transfered from the old king (the first “Le Roi“) to the new king (the second  “Le Roi“) the very instant the old king died. Thus, France was literally never without a king until until the monarchy was finally dis-established in early 1793. When Louis XVI was guillotined later that year, his death was acclaimed simply with “Le Roi est mort!“

Tomorrow, September 30, ICANN’s Joint Project Agreement with the Department of Commerce finally terminates. “ Le JPA est mort!” But a new agreement (the “Affirmation”) will take its place, apparently providing more accountability than the JPA ever did. Vive l’Affirmation! There may come a day when, like Louis XVI, ICANN’s JPA-like agreement with Commerce terminates and nothing is there to replace it, but that day has not yet come.

Grant Gross has a great piece on this new agreement. Grant extensively quotes my PFF Adjunct Fellow (my ICANN mentor and former ICANN board member) Mike Palage, who explained that the JPA’s successor (JPA II?):

will tell [ICANN] what it should do, but it can’t legally bind them [much like past agreements]… It gives the appearance in the global community that the U.S. government has recognized that ICANN has done what is was supposed to do. What it’s also doing is … it’s putting in some accountability mechanisms.”

Yet Palage expressed concern about the new agreement:

Now while the devil will be in the detail, the only concern I have is that the private sector be on equal footing with the public sector in being able to hold ICANN accountable… If ICANN is to remain a public-private partnership that is founded on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, accountability and bottom-up coordination, then both the private and public sectors should have equal confidence in the accountability mechanism available to them.

Mike explained how to choose the “Right Path to a Permanent Accountability Framework” in a PFF paper in August, and has explained a clear vision for ICANN 3.0.

The Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing yesterday where a number of Senators as well as Julius Genachowski, the new Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, did a lot of fretting about the state of the modern children’s television programming marketplace.  According to the Wall Street Journal, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV):

suggested that a “little red button” be required on TVs so that a child could push the button to find out how a show is rated. Democratic Sen. Mark Pryor of Arkansas agreed that a red button might help since parents often have difficulties figuring out which shows are appropriate for their children to watch.

Well, I have some good news for the Senators: There are already quite a few little buttons on every remote control made today, and at least one of those buttons can pull up an on-screen guide to get more program info! (Another of them can turn the TV off!) Moreover, the ratings for just about every program already appear at the beginning of each show, and sometimes in between. And you can find out plenty more online about every TV show under the sun if you care to look.  So, I’m not sure what that fuss is all about, and we certainly don’t need to mandate “little red buttons” on every TV set when program information can be found in so many other ways.

What is more troubling about all the hand-wringing taking place at the hearing, as well as the talk of reopening the Children’s Television Act of 1990 to potentially impose more content mandates on video programmers and distributors, is that: (1) there doesn’t seem to be much appreciation for just how much wonderful children’s programming is out there today compared to the past, and (2) there doesn’t seem to be much recognition of the serious First Amendment issues at stake when government gets involved in the messy business of regulating video programming.

On that first point, let me just reiterate what I have found after conducting an exhaustive survey of the market for children’s programming in my ongoing PFF special report, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.  I found that the overall market for family and children’s programming options continues to expand quite rapidly. Thirty years ago, families had a limited number of children’s television programming options at their disposal on broadcast TV.  Today, by contrast, there exists a broad and growing diversity of children’s television options from which families can choose. The list below highlights just some of the more popular family- or child-oriented networks available on cable, telco, and satellite television today. And this list continues to grow rapidly.

• ABC Family Channel (http://abcfamily.go.com)
• Animal Planet (http://animal.discovery.com)
• Anime Network (www.theanimenetwork.com)
• Black Family Channel (www.blackfamilychannel.com)
• Boomerang (www.cartoonnetwork.com/tv_shows/boomerang)
• Cartoon Network (www.cartoonnetwork.com)
• Discovery Channel (www.discovery.com)
• Discovery Kids (http://kids.discovery.com)
• Disney Channel (www.disney.go.com/disneychannel)
• Encore WAM!
• Familyland Television Network (www.familyland.org/content/Content.aspx?CategoryID=51)
• FUNimation (www.funimation.com)
• Hallmark Channel (www.hallmarkchannel.com)
• Hallmark Movie Channel (www.hallmarkmoviechannel.com)
• HBO Family (www.hbofamily.com)
• History Channel (www.history.com)
• KTV – Kids & Teens Television (www.ktvzone.com)
• Learning Channel (http://tlc.discovery.com)
• National Geographic Channel (http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel)
• Nickelodeon (www.nick.com)
• Nick 2
• Nick Toons (http://nicktoonsnetwork.nick.com/home.html)
• Noggin (www.noggin.com)
• N Channel (www.the-n.com)
• PBS (www.pbs.org)
• PBS Kids (http://pbskids.org/go)
• Science Channel (http://science.discovery.com)
• Showtime Family Zone
• Sprout (www.sproutonline.com)
• Starz! Kids and Family (http://www.starz.com/appmanager/seg/s?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=starz_kids_family)
• Toon Disney (http://psc.disney.go.com/abcnetworks/toondisney)
• Varsity World (www.varsityworld.com)

Importantly, this list does not include the growing universe of religious / spiritual television networks. Nor does it include the many family or educational programs that traditional TV broadcasters offer. Finally, the list does not include the massive market for interactive computer software or websites for children.  All of this begs the obvious question: What more is it that policymakers want?

More offerings are always welcome, of course.  But, on a personal note, as the parents of two young kids (ages 5 and 7), my wife and I regularly struggle to sort through all the wonderful video programming options at our disposal.  We often find ourselves swimming through an ocean of choices available from our local broadcasters and multichannel video provider. Moreover, our kids are spending an increasing amount of time watching snippets of video via kid-oriented online search portals like KidZui and Glubble. Such online walled gardens offer a safe place for parents to find terrific online content for their kids.

I have to admit, all the choices my kids have today have left me a bit jealous!  I grew up in small central Illinois town with a couple of crummy (Iowa-based!) broadcast stations that were barely visible on our TV (and usually only when my Dad made me hold the antenna and stick my arms up in the air to get reception!) There was also one local cinema in town that usually showed old movies from the ‘50s and ‘60s that few kids cared to see.  And that was generally the extent of video choices for kids in our town.  Sure, the 1970s brought us Sesame Street as well as Mister Rogers (if that was your cup of tea).  Today, however, we still have those shows and much, much more.  Our kids now enjoy an unprecedented cornucopia of media alternatives and, contrary to what some policymakers would have us believe, many of them are extremely high-quality in nature.  My parents would have likely given anything to just have even one network as incredibly enriching as Noggin at their disposal in the ‘60s and ‘70s.  Instead, on the occasions that the TV had to become a babysitter and nothing worthwhile was on the tube, I usually ended up watching trashy soap operas.  (Don’t even get me started on “Days of Our Lives.” I could write a short history of the show’s 1975-1982 seasons!)

Speaking of trashy shows, there was a lot of talk at yesterday’s hearing about the “need to protect our children from harmful content,” as Sen. Rockefeller began the hearing by arguing.  But as I have shown in my parental controls report, not only are there more and better quality options to steer your kids toward today, but it is easier than ever before to steer them right to those preferred options and lock down everything else in sight.  As I concluded in that report:

there has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children. […] parents now have [many tools and techniques] at their disposal to better control media content and raise their children as they see fit. That is not to say that media and communications technologies don’t continue to play a major role in our society and culture. But… parents have been empowered with tools, controls, strategies, and information, that can help them devise and then enforce a media plan for their families that is in line with their own values.

So, again, it must be asked: What is the problem here?

Finally, it should be noted that any effort by Congress or the FCC to tinker with video programming marketplace will eventually run up against serious First Amendment concerns and eventual court challenges.  In a previous session of Congress, before he became Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Sen. Rockefeller aggressively pushed for expanded content controls, not just for broadcast television, but for cable and satellite platforms as well.  In a 2005 PFF report on Sen. Rockefeller’s “Indecent and Gratuitous and Excessively Violent Programming Control Act of 2005,” First Amendment attorney Robert Corn-Revere of the law firm Davis Wright Tremaine argued that efforts to expand the horizons of FCC regulation to cover more content and platforms “would be almost certain to fail a constitutional challenge.”  Likewise, in a 2007 PFF white paper, constitutional law expert Laurence H. Tribe of the Harvard Law School, noted that the old “it’s-for-the-children” rationale for such content regulation is exactly backwards:

the malleability of children—how easy it is to mold their minds and to influence them—counts against and not in favor of centralized governmental controls. One of the arguments that you will often find is, yes, it’s all very well to believe in free speech between consenting adults but we’re talking about kids here and their minds are like plastic and they are being molded and shaped and, therefore, we have greater power to protect them. Therefore, you should keep your hands off them because they are so easy to shape. No, no, no. The argument is not that kids are malleable and therefore, Big Brother should be empowered. The argument is that kids are malleable and, therefore, families should be empowered. Parental authority should be at the center of decision making.

Indeed. And, as already noted, parents have more tools and strategies to exercise that authority than ever before, as well as more programming options to choose from. Policymakers should be celebrating these modern media marketplace developments, not bemoaning them.  We are blessed to be living in the Golden Age of children’s video programming.

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

This morning, the House Energy & Commerce Committee will hold a hearing on “Behavioral Advertising: Industry Practices And Consumers’ Expectations.” If nothing else, it promises to be quite entertaining:  With full-time Google bashers Jeff Chester and Scott Cleland on the agenda, the likelihood that top Google officials will be burned in effigy appears high!

Chester, self-appointed spokesman for what one might call the People for the Ethical Treatment of Data (PETD) movement, is sure to rant and rave about the impending techno-apocalypse that will, like all his other Chicken-Little scenarios, befall us all if online advertisers were permitted to better tailor ads to consumers’ liking. After all, can you imagine the nightmare of less annoying ads that might actually convey more useful information to consumers? Isn’t serving up “untargeted” dumb banner ads for Viagra to young women and Victoria’s Secret ads to Catholic school kids the pinnacle of modern online advertising?  Gods forbid we actually make advertising more relevant and interest-based!  (Those Catholic school boys may appreciate the lingerie ads, but few will likely buy bras.)

Anyway, according to National Journal’s Tech Daily Dose, the hearing lineup also includes:

• Charles Curran, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative
• Christopher Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook
• Edward Felten, Director, Center for IT Policy, Princeton University
• Anne Toth, Chief Privacy Officer & Vice President, Policy, Yahoo!
• Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google

That’s an interesting group and we’re sure that they will say interesting things about the issue. Nonetheless, because four of them have a corporate affiliation that fact will inevitably be used by some critics to dismiss what they have to say about the sensibility of more targeted or interest-based forms of online advertising. So, we’d like to offer a few thoughts and pose a few questions to make sure that Committee members understand why, regardless of what it means for any particular online operator, targeting online advertising is very pro-consumer and essential to the future of online content, culture, and competition.  As Wall Street Journal technology columnist Walt Mossberg has noted, “Advertising is the mother’s milk of all the mass media.”  Much of the “free speech” we all cherish isn’t really free, but ad-supported!

Our Approach

We have previously set forth a framework for analyzing advertising policy issues in two PFF reports: “Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate” and “Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?” At root, our model depends heavily on two common-sense, and inter-related, principles:

1. We live in a world of trade-offs; and
2. There is no free lunch.

Their Approach

We are deeply concerned that too few people are talking about—or even understand the relevance of—those two principles in the debate over targeted online advertising. It seems that too many who wish to retard the further evolution of the advertising marketplace are living a lie based upon the antithesis of our model. Many privacy advocates seem to imagine that regulatory actions don’t have consequences and that Congress can simply mandate new privacy standards for the Internet without having any impact on the free flow of ideas supported by, and direct facilitated through, advertising.

Simply put, the privacy critics often imagine that their values are indicative of everyone’s values. Our blogging colleague Jim Harper of the Cato Institute has referred to this as “preference imposition” but we’ll use a simpler term: Elitism. In essence, privacy advocates seem to believe that:

1. People are too ignorant, busy or just plain stupid, and cannot be trusted to make wise decisions for themselves (or their children); and/or
2. Everyone shares the same values or concerns when it comes to privacy such that a national “baseline” regulatory standard (namely, mandatory “opt-in” regulations for data collection and use) should govern the entire online marketplace.

Let’s be clear: Such a mandate, and the thinking behind it, would greatly impoverish the future Internet economy. Too many people think of the Internet as a magic box that just keeps cranking out free goodies. But something powers that box of goodies: advertising.  More than anything else, it’s advertising that keeps the Internet “Free, Innovative & Open,” to borrow the slogan of our friends at CDT, which seems to flirt with joining the PETD movement, despite their well-earned reputation for pragmatic skepticism of government interference with the Internet.

The regulatory advocates complain that giving consumers the right to opt-out of data collection and use isn’t meaningful because very few consumers will exercise the opt-out.  Again, they presume that this must be because users just don’t know what’s good for them because of course if they really understood what was being done with “their data,” they would never choose to just “give it away” for a few scraps from the advertisers’ table.  It never occurs to them that (i) many, perhaps most, users just don’t care and that (ii) that their “ignorance” about the all specific details of “how the sausage is made” (online data collection and use practices for targeting advertising) may be completely rational.

But just as importantly, would-be privacy regulatory don’t seem to understand—or perhaps simply don’t care—that what’s true of opt-out is also true of opt-in:  in practice, few people will bother doing either.  In a world of perfect information and infinite time, of course, there would be no difference in outcomes with the two different rules.  But in the real world with real constraints on time, knowledge and everything else, mandating opt-in would make all the difference in the world by severely limiting the ability of advertisers to target advertising.

The Ignored Trade-offs

We’ve been assembling evidence on the real-world costs of restricting targeted advertising. Here are just a few data points we’ve seen to give you a sense of what’s at stake:

• Relevance to Users: The best evidence that users prefer seeing more relevant ads is their increased likeliness to actually click on an ad—instead of just ignoring it or trying to block it. The most recent study of this issue concluded that Click-Through Rates (CTR) can be improved by as much as 670% by using basic behavioral targeting as compared to simple contextual targeting—0r even more than 1000% using more sophisticated targeting. Conversion rates (the percentage of clicks that actually result in a sale) also strongly indicate that consumers find ads more interesting, and in one 2005 study, were estimated to increase up to 3000% with behavioral targeting.
• Macro: More Revenue to Fund All Services & Content: eMarketer (in June 2008) estimated that U.S. spending on behavioral targeting would grow from $.775 billion in 2008 to $4.4 billion in 2012—representing fully a quarter of display ad spending.  The total amount of money at stake is huge:  U.S. online ad revenues totaled $23.5 billion in 2008.
• Micro: More Revenue for Individual Publishers: Estimates on the increased profitability of behavioral targeting range as high as 1200% (eMarketer).

While these examples illustrate the broad outlines of the trade-offs ignored by privacy regulatory advocates, the key dilemma to understand is this: If, under an opt-in regime, publishers would be able to target advertising for webpages based on the keywords contained within those pages, and not on other content the user has looked at, the value of most Internet content will depend not on how many eyeballs it attracts but primarily on the economic value of the keywords that are directly associated with it. Pages with keywords related to products and services will fetch a fine price because advertisers will be able to make money off ads on those pages ( e.g., a site for digital camera reviews). But content with little commercial value will generate little revenue. Indeed, this is perhaps the single greatest problem faced by journalism sites. Who wants to advertise on a story about North Korea? How many users are going to be interested in taking a honeymoon in the DMZ?

But if such websites could target advertising to users’ user’s likely interests based on an anonymous profile of their interests created by collecting data about their browsing “behavior,” web content becomes valuable because of the audience it attracts, not just because the content itself serves as a rough proxy for a user’s interests. This democratization of Internet advertising revenue is essential for sustaining the future of journalism in particular, but also for “free” culture more generally.

As we noted in our response to the FTC’s proposed self-regulatory guidelines on data collection for advertising:

Depending on how regulation is structured, therefore, it is possible that new privacy mandates would severely curtail the overall quantity of content and services offered—and greatly limit the ability of new providers to enter the market with innovative offerings. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, companies would change the character of their offerings and water-down sophisticated services that cater to consumer demand; in other words, the quality of service would deteriorate. Bottom line: Something must give because there is no free lunch. Regulation is a giant game of economic whack-a-mole: Attempting to control one of the primary variables of price, quantity, or quality inevitably results in non-optimal adjustments in the other two variables. The absence of price as a variable in this context means there is one less variable for the government to control in the first place. Simply stated, stifling the evolution of the online advertising marketplace will likely result in fewer free online services and less content, less high-quality online services and content, or some combination of both… We stand at an important crossroads in the debate over the online marketplace and the future of a “free and open” Internet. Many of those who celebrate that goal focus on concepts like “net neutrality” at the distribution layer, but what really keeps the Internet so “free and open” is the economic engine of online advertising at the applications and content layers. If misguided government regulation chokes off the Internet’s growth or evolution, we would be killing the goose that laid the golden eggs…. These observations are even more relevant to the online marketplace, where advertising has been shown to be the only business model with any real staying power. Walled gardens, pay-per-view, micropayments, and subscription-based business models are all languishing. Consequently, the overall health of the Internet economy and the aggregate amount of information and speech that can be supported online are fundamentally tied up with the question of whether we allow the online advertising marketplace to evolve in an efficient, dynamic fashion. Heavy-handed privacy regulation (or co-regulation) could, therefore, become the equivalent of a disastrous industrial policy for the Internet that chokes off the resources needed to fuel e-commerce and online free speech going forward.

Our Challenge to the Advocates of Privacy Regulation

For these reasons, we have repeatedly issued the following three-part challenge in our previous work to those who advocate the regulation of online advertising:

1. Identify the harm or market failure that requires government intervention.
2. Prove that there is no less restrictive alternative to regulation.
3. Explain how the benefits of regulation outweigh its costs.

We’re still waiting…

We’ve also made it clear that there is an alternative to the pre-emptive, one-size-fits-all regulation demanded by the regulatory advocates:  We’ve proposed a “layered approach” based on user education, user empowerment, self-regulation and FTC enforcement of privacy policies.  Our goal is as follows:

The ideal state of affairs would be to create a system of tools and data disclosure practices that would empower each user to implement their personal privacy preferences while also recognizing the freedom of those who rely on advertising revenues to “condition the use of their products and services on disclosure of information”—not to mention the viewing of ads! Self-regulatory efforts can be refined, especially through technological innovation to better satisfy the concerns of policymakers, privacy advocates, and average consumers. For example, if websites and ad networks participating in a self-regulatory framework supplemented their current “natural language” privacy policies with equivalent “machine-readable” code [ e.g., P3p], that data could be “read” by browser tools that would implement pre-specified user preferences by blocking the collection of information depending on whether the privacy policies of certain websites or ad networks met the user’s preferences about data-use. Such robust and granular disclosure, if implemented for behavioral advertising, would exceed the wildest dreams of those who argue that users currently do not read privacy policies—without disrupting the browsing experience or cluttering websites. But this system would only work if users had to make real choices about “pay*ing+ for ‘free’ content and services by disclosing their personal information.”

A Final Word About Advertising

On some level, this debate isn’t about user privacy at all, but about the alleged evils of advertising as inherently manipulative.  Jeff Chester straddles both camps.  His rantings about the use of “neuromarketing” boil down to the same simple idea that the Neo-Marxists have been pushing for decades:  Since people are stupid, ignorant and/or lazy (see above), they’re easy to control and trick with shiny objects, pretty faces, memorable slogans, and catchy jingles. No better response to this argument has ever been made than was offered in this 1959 magazine ad by the ad firm Young & Rubicam (emphasis added for Chester’s benefit):

There is no chestnut more overworked than the critical whinny: “Advertising sells people things they don’t need.” We, as one agency, plead guilty. Advertising does sell people things they don’t need. Things like television sets, automobiles, catsup, mattresses, cosmetics, ranges, refrigerators, and so on and on. People don’t really need these things. People don’t really need art, music, literature, newspapers, historians. wheels, calendars, philosophy, or, for that matter, critics of advertising, either. All people really need is a cave, a piece of meat and, possibly, a fire. The complex thing we call civilization is made up of luxuries. An eminent philosopher of our time has written that great art is superior to lesser art in the degree that it is “life-enhancing.” Perhaps something of the same thing can be claimed for the products that are sold through advertising. They enhance life, to whatever degree they can.