What explains the rebirth of analog era media? Many people (including me!) predicted that vinyl records, turntables, broadcast TV antennas and even printed books seemed destined for the dustbin of technological history. We were so wrong, as I note in this new oped that has gone out through the Tribune Wire Service.

“Many of us threw away our record collections and antennas and began migrating from physical books to digital ones,” I note. “Now, these older technologies are enjoying a revival. What explains their resurgence, and what’s the lesson?”

I offer some data about the rebirth of analog era media as well as some possible explanations for their resurgence. “With vinyl records and printed books, people enjoy making a physical connection with the art they love. They want to hold it in their hands, display it on their wall and show it off to their friends. Digital music or books don’t satisfy that desire, no matter how much more convenient and affordable they might be. The mediums still matter.”

Read more here. Meanwhile, my own personal vinyl collection continues to grow without constraint! …

by Andrea O’Sullivan & Adam Thierer

This essay originally appeared on The Bridge on September 25, 2019.

It is quickly becoming one of the iron laws of technology policy that by attempting to address one problem (like privacy, security, safety, or competition), policymakers often open up a different problem on another front. Trying to regulate to protect online safety, for example, might give rise to privacy concerns, or vice versa. Or taking steps to address online privacy through new regulations might create barriers to new entry, thus hurting online competition.

In a sense, this is simply a restatement of the law of unintended consequences. But it seems to be occurring with greater regularity in the technology policy today, and it serves as another good reminder why humility is essential when considering new regulations for fast-moving sectors.

Consider a few examples.

Privacy vs security & competition 

Many US states and the federal government are considering data privacy regulations in the vein of the European Union’s wide-reaching General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). But as early experiences with the GDPR and various state efforts can attest, regulations aimed at boosting consumer privacy can often butt against other security and competition concerns.

Consider how the GDPR can be abused to undermine user security—and ultimately (and ironically) privacy itself. At this year’s Black Hat computer security conference, one researcher recently explained how the GDPR’s “right of access” provision—which mandates that companies give users their personal data—can be exploited by malicious actors to steal personally identifiable information. If a hacker is convincing enough, he or she can use “social engineering” to pose as the target and coax companies to divulge the information. Without GDPR’s mandated reporting infrastructure, such an attack would be much harder.

Nor are malicious actors even necessary for the GDPR to undermine security. In 2018, a customer requested their Alexa voice recordings from Amazon. The company sent the data to the wrong person in an apparent case of human error. If mighty Amazon cannot rise to the challenge of error-free GDPR compliance, what hope do smaller outfits have?

Perhaps the biggest story about the GDPR, however, has been its malign effects on competition. After all, the law earned its nickname—the “Google Data Protection Regulation”—for a reason. Titans like Google and Facebook have dominated European ad tech market since the advent of the GDPR because they can shoulder compliance risks in a way that smaller vendors cannot. More ad money has flowed to Google’s coffers as a result.

But the GDPR applies to far more than just ad tech. Ventures as varied as publishing and virtual tabletop dice rollers have been forced to shutter their digital doors rather than risk the wrath of European data authorities.

Similar stories emanate from the US. Illinois’ biometric privacy law, which governs the use of technologies like facial recognition and fingerprint scanning, led to the prohibition of Google’s Arts and Culture app which matched user-submitted photos with a classical work of art. If Google can’t hack it in the Land of Lincoln, how could a potential Google-slayer be expected to do so?

These are just the stories we hear about. A prematurely thwarted venture is unlikely to have a platform to voice their compliance problems. What is clear is that the data privacy laws enacted so far have had predictable negative impacts on security and competition, and that ill-defined “privacy fundamentalism” too often drives ill-fitting policies.

Safety vs. free speech & competition

Content moderation at scale is extremely challenging, especially as it relates to efforts to address “hate speech” and extremist viewpoints. On the one hand, free speech activists argue that onerous private content moderation policies can limit debate and punish certain viewpoints, particularly if a platform is a public default for expression. On the other hand, social justice activists contend that lax private standards can fuel the proliferation of conspiracy theories, radicalization, and violent rhetoric.

Recently, President Trump and some conservative lawmakers have been clamoring for greater regulatory controls of social media platforms in the name of “fairness” and countering supposed anti-conservative bias. Sens. Josh Hawley (R-MO) and Ted Cruz (R-TX), for example, have introduced a bill that would require platforms to submit their content moderation policies to regular regulatory audits. If a platform is deemed to be not “politically neutral,” it will lose its liability protections under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

This is reminiscent of the “fairness doctrine,” a long-standing Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policy that was a thinly-veiled attempt to influence the political content of broadcast programs. Conservatives rightly opposed such government involvement in content decisions in decades past, but with this new effort against technology platforms, many of them are repeating the mistakes of the past.

The history of the actual fairness doctrine serves as a cautionary tale here. Today the fairness doctrine is mostly remembered as an anti-conservative effort because of the attention paid to right-leaning talk radio. Former Kennedy administration official Bill Ruder admitted that their “massive strategy was to use the [fairness doctrine] to challenge and harass right-wing broadcasters, and hope that the challenges would be so costly to them that they would be inhibited and decide it was too costly to continue.”

But as testaments from previous broadcast leaders point out, the fairness doctrine was wielded against both “conservatives” and “liberals” depending on who was in power and what their objectives were. When the Nixon administration took office, they wielded the rule to muzzle broadcasters who criticized the White House. And the FCC also applied the doctrine against The Kingmen’s song “Louie Louie” for its suspiciously unintelligible lyrics.

The tension between policies to promote “safety” and government-protected rights to free speech can be literal, as well. Consider efforts to ban so-called “3-D printed guns.” Defense Distributed and other activists do not 3-D print and sell guns. Rather, they publish the schematics for others to print their own arms online. As with the encryption technologies we will discuss below, such code is probably First Amendment-protected speech, although the applications of the schematics may be considered “dual-use” (meaning with both civilian and military applications.) An outright ban on 3-D printed gun blueprints very clearly antagonizes the right to free speech in the US and could threaten innovation in other open source, peer-to-peer 3D-printed applications.

Safety vs. privacy & security

Efforts to promote “safety” can also too often backfire at the expense of privacy and security.

Perhaps the most dramatic and high-stakes illustration of this principle was the years-long legal drama that pitted law enforcement authorities against computer scientists in the so-called “Crypto Wars.” Although cryptographic technologies that conceal data for privacy or security have been around since the days of ancient Egypt—our own Founding Fathers are known to have communicated using ciphers—in the 20th century, they had mostly been limited to military and academic institutions.

The advent of public-key cryptography made these security techniques more accessible to the public for the first time. This was great news for information security: communications and devices could be made hardened to attacks, and people were given more privacy options. But law enforcement feared that criminals would use cryptography to cover their tracks. Thus, in the name of safety, law enforcement first tried banning cryptography as a dual use technology through munitions export controls. When that failed on First Amendment grounds, policymakers attempted to legislate “backdoors” into encryption protocols that would allow government access.

It is easy to see how outright bans or backdoors for encryption technologies could hurt privacy and security. Obviously, prohibiting the civilian use of a privacy and security technology limits privacy and security. But granting government access into encryption standards would ironically ultimately undermine safety as well. After all, if a government can get into an encryption standard, so might a malicious hacker. Although the “Crypto Wars” seemed settled in the 1990’s, these same debates have been cropping up again as more and more devices have default encryption technologies.

We can also think about mandated reporting requirements intended to promote public safety. Consider the “know your customer” rules imposed on financial institutions. To prevent ills like money laundering and financial fraud, banks and exchanges must keep detailed customer information on file. Yet this ostensibly “pro-safety” rule generates its own security and privacy risks. Banks must manage to responsibly store and protect this valuable customer data, lest their customers’ information get hacked and their identities stolen. This has sadly too often proven too tall an order, and third-party-managed personally identifiable information is exposed to outside parties all the time.

A similar problem arises with efforts to promote child safety online. Consider the debate over MySpace’s age verification efforts in the mid-2000s. Child safety advocates grew concerned over the risks facing children on new social media platforms. Young children lacking awareness of the dangers that could lurk online could unwittingly make friendships with predators posing as other children. So a movement grew to require these new platforms to verify age and identity with a government-provided identification card.

There were obvious technical problems. For starters, children that were young enough to fall under the age verification limit were unlikely to have a government-provided photo identification card. But beyond these simple administrative issues, there was the question of privacy and security. Could Myspace adequately protect the reams of sensitive data from outside breach? Might children actually be put more at danger should those items—which would likely include the children’s address—fall into the wrong hands? And should the government and social media platforms really be in the business of parenting to begin with? Might this actually create a “moral hazard” which leaves parents thinking that online spaces are safer than they actually are?

Tying it all together

In each of these instances, it probably seemed like there was no downside to newly proposed regulations. With time, however, the dynamic effects associated with those policies become evident, and often result in the opposite of what was intended, or the policies led to other problems that supporters did not originally envision.

The nineteenth-century French economic philosopher Frédéric Bastiat famously explained the importance of considering the many unforeseen, second-order effects of economic change and policy. Many pundits and policy analysts pay attention to only the first-order effects—what Bastiat called “the seen”—and ignore the subsequent and often “unseen” effects. Those unseen effects can have profound real-world consequences in the form of less technological innovation, diminished growth, fewer job opportunities, higher prices, diminished choices, and other costs.

Even when defenders of the failed interventions are forced to admit that their well-intentioned plans did not work out as planned, their response is typically of the  we-can-do-better variety. The result is usually just more regulation as one intervention begs another and another. As the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises taught us 70 years ago in his masterwork, Human Action:

“All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther…”

The lesson is clear: paternalistic public policies may sound sensible on the surface, but as Milton Friedman taught us long ago, “One of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than their results. We all know a famous road that is paved with good intentions.”

[This essay originally appeared on the AIER blog on May 28, 2019. The USA TODAY also ran a shorter version of this essay as a letter to the editor on June 2, 2019.]

In a hotly-worded USA Today op-ed last week, Senator Josh Hawley (R-Missouri) railed against social media sites Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. He argued that, “social media wastes our time and resources,” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” Sen. Hawley refers to these sites as “parasites” and blames them for a litany of social problems (including an unproven link to increased suicide), leading him to declare that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared.”

As far as moral panics go, Sen. Hawley’s will go down as one for the ages. Politicians have always castigated new technologies, media platforms, and content for supposedly corrupting the youth of their generation. But Sen. Hawley’s inflammatory rhetoric and proposals are something we haven’t seen in quite some time.

He sounds like those fire-breathing politicians and pundits of the past century who vociferously protested everything from comic books to cable television, the waltz to the Walkman, and rock-and-roll to rap music. In order to save the youth of America, many past critics said, we must destroy the media or media platforms they are supposedly addicted to. That is exactly what Sen. Hawley would have us do to today’s leading media platforms because, in his opinion, they “do our country more harm than good.”

We have to hope that Sen. Hawley is no more successful than past critics and politicians who wanted to take these choices away from the public. Paternalistic politicians should not be dictating content choices for the rest of us or destroying technologies and platforms that millions of people benefit from.

Addiction Panics: We’ve Been Here Before

Ironically, Sen. Hawley isn’t even right about what the youth of America are apparently obsessed with. Most kids view Facebook and Twitter as places where old people hang out. My teenage kids laugh when I ask them about those sites. Pew Research polling finds that many younger users are increasingly deleting Facebook (if they used it at all) or flocking to other platforms, such as Snapchat or YouTube.

But shouldn’t we be concerned with kids overusing social media more generally? Yes, of course we should—but that’s no reason to call for their outright elimination, as Sen. Hawley recommends. Such rhetoric is particularly concerning at a time when critics are proposing a “break up” of tech companies. Sen. Hawley sits on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights. It is likely he and others will employ these arguments to fan the flames of regulatory intervention or antitrust action against at least Facebook.

Forcing social media sites to “disappear” or be broken up is one of the worst ways to deal with these concerns. It is always wise to mentor our youth and teach them how to achieve a balanced media diet. Many youths—and many adults—are probably overusing certain technologies (smartphones, in particular) and over-consuming some types of media. For those truly suffering from addiction, it is worth considering targeted strategies to address that problem. However, that is not what antitrust law is meant to address.

Moreover, concerns about addiction and distraction have popped up repeatedly during past moral panics and we should take such claims with a big grain of salt. Sociologist Frank Furedi has documented how, “inattention has served as a sublimated focus for apprehensions about moral authority” going back to at least the early 1700s. With each new form of media or means of communication, the older generation taps into the same “kids-these-days!” fears about how the younger generation has apparently lost the ability to concentrate or reason effectively.

For example, in the past century, critics said the same thing about radio and television broadcasting, comparing them to tobacco in terms of addiction and suggesting that media companies were “manipulating” us into listening or watching. Rock-and-roll and rap music got the same treatment, and similar panics about video games are still with us today.

Strangely, many elites, politicians, and parents forget that they, too, were once kids and that their generation was probably also considered hopelessly lost in the “vast wasteland” of whatever the popular technology or content of the day was. The Pessimists Archive podcast has documented dozens of examples of this reoccurring phenomenon. Each generation makes it through the panic du jour, only to turn around and start lambasting newer media or technologies that they worry might be rotting their kids to the core. While these panics come and go, the real danger is that they sometimes result in concrete policy actions that censor content or eliminate choices that the public enjoys. Such regulatory actions can also discourage the emergence of new choices.

Missed Opportunity, or Marvelous Achievement?

Sen. Hawley makes another audacious assertion in his essay when he suggests that social media has not provided any real benefit to American workers or consumers. He says the rise of the Digital Economy has “encouraged a generation of our brightest engineers to enter a field of little productive value,” which he regards as “an opportunity missed for the nation.”

This is an astonishing statement, made more troubling by Hawley’s claim that all these digital innovators could have done far more good by choosing other professions. “What marvels might these bright minds have produced,” Hawley asks, “had they been oriented toward the common good?”

Why is it that Sen. Hawley gets to decide which professions are in “the common good”? This logic is insulting to all those who make a living in these sectors, but there is a deeper hubris in Sen. Hawley’s argument that social media does not serve “the common good.” Had some benevolent philosopher kings in Washington stopped the digital economy from developing over the past quarter century, would all those tech workers really have chosen more noble-minded and worthwhile professions? Could he or others in Congress really have had the foresight to steer us in a better direction?

In reality, U.S. tech companies produce high-quality jobs and affordable, collaborative communications platforms that are popular across the globe. In response to Sen. Hawley’s screed, the Internet Association, which represents America’s leading digital technology companies, noted that, in Sen. Hawley’s home state of Missouri alone, the Internet supports 63,000 jobs at 3,400 companies and contributed $17 billion in GDP to the state’s economy. Presumably, Sen. Hawley would not want to see those benefits “disappear” along with the social media sites that helped give rise to them.

But the Internet and social media have an equally profound impact on the entire U.S. economy, adding over 9,000 jobs and nearly 570 businesses to each metropolitan statistical area. The Digital Economy is a great American success story that is the envy of the world, not something to be lamented and disparaged as Sen. Hawley has.

For someone who believes that Facebook is a “drug” and a “parasite,” it is curious how active Sen. Hawley is on Facebook, as well as on Twitter. If he really believes that “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared,” then he should lead by example and get off the sites. But that is a decision he will have to make for himself. He should not, however, make it for the rest of us.

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Ajit Pai today announced plans to expand the role of economic analysis at the FCC in a speech at the Hudson Institute. This is an eminently sensible idea that other regulatory agencies (both independent and executive branch) could learn from.

Pai first made the case that when the FCC listened to its economists in the past, it unlocked billions of dollars of value for consumers. The most prominent example was the switch from hearings to auctions in order to allocate spectrum licenses. He perceptively noted that the biggest effect of auctions was the massive improvement in consumer welfare, not just the more than $100 billion raised for the Treasury. Other examples of the FCC using the best ideas of its economists include:

• Use of reverse auctions to allocate universal service funds to reduce costs.
• Incentive auctions that reward broadcasters for transferring licenses to other uses – an idea initially proposed in a 2002 working paper by Evan Kwerel and John Williams at the FCC.
• The move from rate of return to price cap regulation for long distance carriers.

More recently, Pai argued, the FCC has failed to use economics effectively. He identified four key problems:

1. Economics is not systematically employed in policy decisions and often employed late in the process. The FCC has no guiding principles for conduct and use of economic analysis.
2. Economists work in silos. They are divided up among bureaus. Economists should be able to work together on a wide variety of issues, as they do in the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s economic analysis unit, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.
3. Benefit-cost analysis is not conducted well or often, and the FCC does not take Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis (which assesses effects of regulations on small entities) seriously. The FCC should use Office of Management and Budget guidance as its guide to doing good analysis, but OMB’s 2016 draft report on the benefits and costs of federal regulations shows that the FCC has estimated neither benefits nor costs of any of its major regulations issued in the past 10 years. Yet executive orders from multiple administrations demonstrate that “Serious cost-benefit analysis is a bipartisan tradition.”
4. Poor use of data. The FCC probably collects a lot of data that’s unnecessary, at a paperwork cost of $800 million per year, not including opportunity costs of the private sector. But even useful data are not utilized well. For example, a few years ago the FCC stopped trying to determine whether the wireless market is effectively competitive even though it collects lots of data on the wireless market.

To remedy these problems, Pai announced an initiative to establish an Office of Economics and Data that would house the FCC’s economists and data analysts. An internal working group will be established to collect input within the FCC and from the public. He hopes to have the new office up and running by the end of the year. The purpose of this change is to give economists early input into the rulemaking process, better manage the FCC’s data resources, and conduct strategic research to help find solutions to “the next set of difficult issues.”

Can this initiative significantly improve the quality and use of economic analysis at the FCC?

There’s evidence that independent regulatory agencies are capable of making some decent improvements in their economic analysis when they are sufficiently motivated to do so. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authorizing statue contains language that requires benefit-cost analysis of regulations when the commission seeks to determine whether they are in the public interest. Between 2005 and 2011, the SEC lost several major court cases due to inadequate economic analysis.

In 2012, the commission’s general counsel and chief economist issued new economic analysis guidance that pledged to assess regulations according to the principal criteria identified in executive orders, guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, and independent research. In a recent study, I found that the economic analysis accompanying a sample of major SEC regulations issued after this guidance was measurably better than the analysis accompanying regulations issued prior to the new guidance. The SEC improved on all five aspects of economic analysis it identified as critical: assessment of the need for the regulation, assessment of the baseline outcomes that will likely occur in the absence of new regulation, identification of alternatives, and assessment of the benefits and costs of alternatives.

Unlike the SEC, the FCC faces no statutory benefit-cost analysis requirement for its regulations. Unlike the executive branch agencies, the FCC is under no executive order requiring economic analysis of regulations. Unlike the Federal Trade Commission in the early 1980s, the FCC faces little congressional pressure for abolition.

But Congress is considering legislation that would require all regulatory agencies to conduct economic analysis of major regulations and subject that analysis to limited judicial review. Proponents of executive branch regulatory review have always contended that the president has legal authority to extend the executive orders on regulatory impact analysis to cover independent agencies, and perhaps President Trump is audacious enough to try this. Thus, it appears Chairman Pai is trying to get the FCC out ahead of the curve.

Congress is considering reforming television laws and solicited comment from the public last month. On Friday, I submitted a letter encouraging the reform effort. I attached the paper Adam and I wrote last year about the current state of video regulations and the need for eliminating the complex rules for television providers.

As I say in the letter, excerpted below, pay TV (cable, satellite, and telco-provided) is quite competitive, as this chart of pay TV market share illustrates. In addition to pay TV there is broadcast, Netflix, Sling, and other providers. Consumers have many choices and the old industrial policy for mass media encourages rent-seeking and prevents markets from evolving.

Dear Chairman Upton and Chairman Walden:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s December 2014 questions on video regulation.

…The labyrinthine communications and copyright laws governing video distribution are now distorting the market and therefore should be made rational. Congress should avoid favoring some distributors at the expense of free competition. Instead, policy should encourage new entrants and consumer choice.

The focus of the committee’s white paper on how to “foster” various television distributors, while understandable, was nonetheless misguided. Such an inquiry will likely lead to harmful rules that favor some companies and programmers over others, based on political whims. Congress and the FCC should get out of “fostering” the video distribution markets completely. A light-touch regulatory approach will prevent the damaging effects of lobbying for privilege and will ensure the primacy of consumer choice.

Some of the white paper’s questions may actually lead policy astray. Question 4, for instance, asks how we should “balance consumer welfare and the rights of content creators” in video markets. Congress should not pursue this line of inquiry too far. Just consider an analogous question: how do we balance consumer welfare and the interests of content creators in literature and written content? The answer is plain: we don’t. It’s bizarre to even contemplate.

Congress does not currently regulate the distribution markets of literature and written news and entertainment. Congress simply gives content producers copyright protection, which is generally applicable. The content gets aggregated and distributed on various platforms through private ordering via contract. Congress does not, as in video, attempt to keep competitive parity between competing distributors of written material: the Internet, paperback publishers, magazine publishers, books on tape, newsstands, and the like. Likewise, Congress should forego any attempt at “balancing” in video content markets. Instead, eliminate top-down communications laws in favor of generally applicable copyright laws, antitrust laws, and consumer protection laws.

As our paper shows, the video distribution marketplace has changed drastically. From the 1950s to the 1990s, cable was essentially consumers’ only option for pay TV. Those days are long gone, and consumers now have several television distributors and substitutes to choose from. From close to 100 percent market share of the pay TV market in the early 1990s, cable now has about 50 percent of the market. Consumers can choose popular alternatives like satellite- and telco-provided television as well as smaller players like wireless carriers, online video distributors (such as Netflix and Sling), wireless Internet service providers (WISPs), and multichannel video and data distribution service (MVDDS or “wireless cable”). As many consumers find Internet over-the-top television adequate, and pay TV an unnecessary expense, “free” broadcast television is also finding new life as a distributor.

The New York Times reported this month that “[t]elevision executives said they could not remember a time when the competition for breakthrough concepts and creative talent was fiercer” (“Aiming to Break Out in a Crowded TV Landscape,” January 11, 2015). As media critics will attest, we are living in the golden age of television. Content is abundant and Congress should quietly exit the “fostering competition” game. Whether this competition in television markets came about because of FCC policy or in spite of it (likely both), the future of television looks bright, and the old classifications no longer apply. In fact, the old “silo” classifications stand in the way of new business models and consumer choice.

Therefore, Congress should (1) merge the FCC’s responsibilities with the Federal Trade Commission or (2) abolish the FCC’s authority over video markets entirely and rely on antitrust agencies and consumer protection laws in television markets. New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, and other countries have merged competition and telecommunications regulators. Agency merger streamlines competition analyses and prevents duplicative oversight.

Finally, instead of fostering favored distribution channels, Congress’ efforts are better spent on reforms that make it easier for new entrants to build distribution infrastructure. Such reforms increase jobs, increase competition, expand consumer choice, and lower consumer prices.

Thank you for initiating the discussion about updating the Communications Act. Reform can give America’s innovative telecommunications and mass-media sectors a predictable and technology neutral legal framework. When Congress replaces industrial planning in video with market forces, consumers will be the primary beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

Brent Skorup Research Fellow, Technology Policy Program Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Congressional debates about STELA reauthorization have resurrected the notion that TV stations “must provide a free service” because they “are using public spectrum.” This notion, which is rooted in 1930s government policy, has long been used to justify the imposition of unique “public interest” regulations on TV stations. But outdated policy decisions don’t dictate future rights in perpetuity, and policymakers abandoned the “public spectrum” rationale long ago.

All wireless services use the public spectrum, yet none of them are required to provide a free commercial service except broadcasters. Satellite television operators, mobile service providers, wireless Internet service providers, and countless other commercial spectrum users are free to charge subscription fees for their services.

There is nothing intrinsic in the particular frequencies used by broadcasters that justifies their discriminatory treatment. Mobile services use spectrum once allocated to broadcast television, but aren’t treated like broadcasters.

The fact that broadcast licenses were once issued without holding an auction is similarly irrelevant.  All spectrum licenses were granted for free before the mid-1990s. For example, cable and satellite television operators received spectrum licenses for free, but are not required to offer their video services for free.

If the idea is to prevent companies who were granted free licenses from receiving a “windfall”, it’s too late. As Jeffrey A. Eisenach has demonstrated, “the vast majority of current television broadcast licensees [92%] have paid for their licenses through station transactions.”

The irrelevance of the free spectrum argument is particularly obvious when considering the differential treatment of broadcast and satellite spectrum. Spectrum licenses for broadcast TV stations are now subject to competitive bidding at auction while satellite television licenses are not. If either service should be required to provide a free service on the basis of spectrum policy, it should be  satellite television.

Although TV stations were loaned an extra channel during the DTV transition, the DTV transition is over. Those channels have been returned and were auctioned for approximately $19 billion in 2008. There is no reason to hold TV stations accountable in perpetuity for a temporary loan.

Even if there were, the loan was  not free. Though TV stations did not pay lease fees for the use of those channels, they nevertheless paid a heavy price. TV stations were required to invest substantial sums in HDTV technology and to broadcast signals in that format long before it was profitable. The FCC required “rapid construction of digital facilities by network-affiliated stations in the top markets, in order to expose a significant number of households, as early as possible, to the benefits of DTV.” TV stations were thus forced to “bear the risks of introducing digital television” for the benefit of consumers, television manufacturers, MVPDs, and other digital media.

The FCC did not impose comparable “loss leader” requirements on MVPDs. They are free to wait until consumer demand for digital and HDTV content justifies upgrading their systems — and they are still lagging TV stations by a significant margin. According to the FCC, only about half of the collective footprints of the top eight cable MVPDs had been transitioned to all-digital channels at the end of 2012. By comparison, the DTV transition was completed in 2009.

There simply is no satisfactory rationale for requiring broadcasters to provide a free service based on their use of spectrum or the details of past spectrum licensing decisions. If the applicability of a free service requirement turned on such issues, cable and satellite television subscribers wouldn’t be paying subscription fees.

Shortly after Tom Wheeler assumed the Chairmanship at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), he summed up his regulatory philosophy as “competition, competition, competition.” Promoting competition has been the norm in communications policy since Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order to “promote competition and reduce regulation.” The 1996 Act has largely succeeded in achieving competition in communications markets with one glaring exception: broadcast television. In stark contrast to the pro-competitive approach that is applied in other market segments, Congress and the FCC have consistently supported policies that artificially limit the ability of TV stations to compete or innovate in the communications marketplace.

Radio broadcasting was not subject to regulatory oversight initially. In the unregulated era, the business model for over-the-air broadcasting was “still very much an open question.” Various methods for financing radio stations were proposed or attempted, including taxes on the sale of devices, private endowments, municipal or state financing, public donations, and subscriptions. “We are today so accustomed to the dominant role of the advertiser in broadcasting that we tend to forget that, initially, the idea of advertising on the air was not even contemplated and met with widespread indignation when it was first tried.”

Section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934 thus provided the FCC with broad authority to authorize over-the-air subscription television service (STV). When the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this provision, it held that “subscription television is entirely consistent with [the] goals” of the Act. Analog STV services did not become widespread in the marketplace, however, due in part to regulatory limitations imposed on such services by the FCC. As a result, advertising dominated television revenue in the analog era.

The digital television (DTV) transition offered a new opportunity for TV stations to provide STV services in competition with MVPDs. The FCC had initially hoped that “multicasting” and other new capabilities provided by digital technologies would “help ensure robust competition in the video market that will bring more choices at less cost to American consumers.”

Despite the agency’s initial optimism, regulatory restrictions once again crushed the potential for TV stations to compete in other segments of the communications marketplace. When broadcasters proposed offering digital STV services with multiple broadcast and cable channels in order to compete with MVPDs, Congress held a hearing to condemn the innovation. Chairmen from both House and Senate committees threatened retribution against broadcasters if they pursued subscription television services — “There will be a quid pro quo.” Broadcasters responded to these Congressional threats by abandoning their plans to compete with MVPDs.

It’s hard to miss the irony in the 1996 Act’s approach to the DTV transition. Though the Act’s stated purposes are to “promote competition and reduce regulation, it imposed additional regulatory requirements on television stations that have stymied their ability to innovate and compete. The 1996 Act broadcasting provision requires that the FCC impose limits on subscription television services “so as to avoid derogation of any advanced television services, including high definition television broadcasts, that the Commission may require using such frequencies,” and prohibits TV stations from being deemed an MVPD. The FCC’s rules require TV stations to “transmit at least one over-the-air video programming signal at no direct charge to viewers” because “free, over-the-air television is a public good, like a public park, and might not exist otherwise.

These and other draconian legislative and regulatory limitations have forced TV stations to follow the analog television business model into the 21st Century while the rest of the communications industry innovated at a furious pace. As a result of this government-mandated broadcast business model, TV stations must rely on advertising and retransmission consent revenue for their survival.

Though the “public interest” status of TV stations may once have been considered a government benefit, it is rapidly becoming a curse. Congress and the FCC have both relied on the broadcast public interest shibboleth to impose unique and highly burdensome regulatory obligations on TV stations that are inapplicable to their competitors in the advertising and other potential markets. This disparity in regulatory treatment has increased dramatically under the current administration — to the point that is threatening the viability of broadcast television.

Here are just three examples of the ways in which the current administration has widened the regulatory chasm between TV stations and their rivals:

• In 2012, the FCC required only TV stations to post “political file” documents online, including the rates charged by TV stations for political advertising; MVPDs are not required to post this information online. This regulatory disparity gives political ad buyers and incentive to advertise on cable rather than broadcast channels and forces TV stations to disclose sensitive pricing information more widely than their competitors.
• This year the FCC prohibited joint sales agreements for television stations only; MVPDs and online content distributors are not subject to any such limitations on their advertising sales. This prohibition gives MVPDs and online advertising platforms a substantial competitive advantage in the market for advertising sales.
• This year the FCC also prohibited bundled programming sales by broadcasters only; cable networks are not subject to any limitations on the sale of programming in bundles. This disparity gives broadcast networks an incentive to avoid limitations on their programming sales by selling exclusively to MVPDs (i.e., becoming cable networks).

The FCC has not made any attempt to justify the differential treatment — because there is no rational justification for arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

Sadly, the STELA process in the Senate is threatening to make things worse. Some legislative proposals would eliminate retransmission consent and other provisions that provide the regulatory ballast for broadcast television’s government mandated business model  without eliminating the mandate. This approach would put a quick end to the administration’s “death by a thousand cuts” strategy with one killing blow. The administration must be laughing itself silly. When TV channels in smaller and rural markets go dark, this administration will be gone — and it will be up to Congress to explain the final TV transition.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently sought additional comment on whether it should eliminate its network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules (known as the “broadcasting exclusivity” rules). It should just as well have asked whether it should eliminate its rules governing broadcast television. Local TV stations could not survive without broadcast exclusivity rights that are enforceable both legally and practicably.

The FCC’s broadcast exclusivity rules “do not create rights but rather provide a means for the parties to exclusive contracts to enforce them through the Commission rather than the courts.” (Broadcast Exclusivity Order, FCC 88-180 at ¶ 120 (1988)) The rights themselves are created through private contracts between TV stations and video programming vendors in the same manner that MVPDs create exclusive rights to distribute cable network programming.

Local TV stations typically negotiate contracts for the exclusive distribution of national broadcast network or syndicated programming in their respective local markets in order to preserve their ability to obtain local advertising revenue. The FCC has long recognized that, “When the same program a [local] broadcaster is showing is available via cable transmission of a duplicative [distant] signal, the [local] broadcaster will attract a smaller audience, reducing the amount of advertising revenue it can garner.” (Program Access Order, FCC 12-123 at ¶ 62 (2012)) Enforceable broadcast exclusivity agreements are thus necessary for local TV stations to generate the advertising revenue that is necessary for them to survive the government’s mandatory broadcast television business model.

The FCC determined nearly fifty years ago that it is an anticompetitive practice for multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) to import distant broadcast signals into local markets that duplicate network and syndicated programming to which local stations have purchased exclusive rights. ( See First Exclusivity Order, 38 FCC 683, 703-704 (1965)) Though the video marketplace has changed since 1965, the government’s mandatory broadcast business model is still required by law, and MVPD violations of broadcast exclusivity rights are still anticompetitive.

The FCC adopted broadcast exclusivity procedures to ensure that broadcasters, who are legally prohibited from obtaining direct contractual relationships with viewers or economies of scale, could enjoy the same ability to enforce exclusive programming rights as larger MVPDs. The FCC’s rules are thus designed to “allow all participants in the marketplace to determine, based on their own best business judgment, what degree of programming exclusivity will best allow them to compete in the marketplace and most effectively serve their viewers.” (Broadcast Exclusivity Order at ¶ 125.)

When it adopted the current broadcast exclusivity rules, the FCC concluded that enforcement of broadcast exclusivity agreements was necessary to counteract regulatory restrictions that prevent TV stations from competing directly with MVPDs. Broadcasters suffer the diversion of viewers to duplicative programming on MVPD systems when local TV stations choose to exhibit the most popular programming, because that programming is the most likely to be duplicated. ( See Broadcast Exclusivity Order at ¶ 62.) Normally firms suffer their most severe losses when they fail to meet consumer demand, but, in the absence of enforceable broadcast exclusivity agreements, this relationship is reversed for local TV stations: they suffer their most severe losses precisely when they offer the programming that consumers desire most.

The fact that only broadcasters suffer this kind of [viewership] diversion is stark evidence, not of inferior ability to be responsive to viewers’ preferences, but rather of the fact that broadcasters operate under a different set of competitive rules. All programmers face competition from alternative sources of programming. Only broadcasters face, and are powerless to prevent, competition from the programming they themselves offer to viewers. (Id. at ¶ 42.)

The FCC has thus concluded that, if TV stations were unable to enforce exclusive contracts through FCC rules, TV stations would be competitively handicapped compared to MVPDs. ( See id. at ¶ 162.)

Regulatory restrictions effectively prevent local TV stations from enforcing broadcast exclusivity agreements through preventative measures and in the courts: (1) prohibitions on subscription television and the use of digital rights management (DRM) prevent broadcasters from protecting their programming from unauthorized retransmission, and (2) stringent ownership limits prevent them from obtaining economies of scale.

Preventative measures may be the most cost effective way to protect digital content rights. Most digital content is distributed with some form of DRM because, as Benjamin Franklin famously said, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” MVPDs, online video distributors, and innumerable Internet companies all use DRM to protect their digital content and services — e.g., cable operators use the CableCard standard to limit distribution of cable programming to their subscribers only.

TV stations are the only video distributors that are legally prohibited from using DRM to control retransmission of their primary programming. The FCC adopted a form of DRM for digital television in 2003 known as the “broadcast flag”, but the DC Circuit Court of Appeals struck it down.

The requirement that TV stations offer their programming “at no direct charge to viewers” effectively prevents them from having direct relationships with end users. TV stations cannot require those who receive their programming over-the-air to agree to any particular terms of service or retransmission limitations through private contract. As a result, TV stations have no way to avail themselves of the types of contractual protections enjoyed by MVPDs who offer services on a subscription basis.

The subscription television and DRM prohibitions have a significant adverse impact on the ability of TV stations to control the retransmission and use of their programming. The Aereo litigation provides a timely example. If TV stations offered their programming on a subscription basis using the CableCard standard, the Aereo “business” model would not exist and the courts would not be tying themselves into knots over potentially conflicting interpretations of the Copyright Act. Because they are legally prohibited from using DRM to prevent companies like Aereo from receiving and retransmitting their programming in the first instance, however, TV stations are forced to rely solely on after-the-fact enforcement to protect their programming rights — i.e., protected and uncertain litigation in multiple jurisdictions.

Localism policies make after-the-fact enforcement particularly cost for local TV stations. The stringent ownership limits that prevent TV stations from obtaining economies of scale have the effect of subjecting TV stations to higher enforcement costs relative to other digital rights holders. In the absence of FCC rules enforcing broadcast exclusivity agreements, family owned TV stations could be forced to defend their rights in court against significantly larger companies who have the incentive and ability to use litigation strategically.

In sum, the FCC’s non-duplication and syndication rules balance broadcast regulatory limitations by providing clear mechanisms for TV stations to communicate their contractual rights to MVPDs, with whom they have no direct relationship, and enforce those rights at the FCC (which is a strong deterrent to the potential for strategic litigation). There is nothing unfair or over-regulatory about FCC enforcement in these circumstances. So why is the FCC asking whether it should eliminate the rules?

Today is a big day in Congress for the cable and satellite (MVPDs) war on broadcast television stations. The House Judiciary Committee is holding a hearing on the compulsory licenses for broadcast television programming in the Copyright Act, and the House Energy and Commerce Committee is voting on a bill to reauthorize “STELA” (the compulsory copyright license for the retransmission of distant broadcast signals by satellite operators). The STELA license is set to expire at the end of the year unless Congress reauthorizes it, and MVPDs see the potential for Congressional action as an opportunity for broadcast television to meet its Waterloo. They desire a decisive end to the compulsory copyright licenses, the retransmission consent provision in the Communications Act, and the FCC’s broadcast exclusivity rules — which would also be the end of local television stations.

The MVPD industry’s ostensible motivations for going to war are retransmission consent fees and television “blackouts”, but the  real motive is advertising revenue.

The compulsory copyright licenses prevent MVPDs from inserting their own ads into broadcast programming streams, and the retransmission consent provision and broadcast exclusivity agreements prevent them from negotiating directly with the broadcast networks for a portion of their available advertising time. If these provisions were eliminated, MVPDs could negotiate directly with broadcast networks for access to their television programming and appropriate TV station advertising revenue for themselves.

The real motivation is in the numbers. According to the FCC’s most recent media competition report, MVPDs paid a total of approximately $2.4 billion in retransmission consent fees in 2012. (See 15th Report, Table 19) In comparison, TV stations generated approximately $21.3 billion in advertising that year. Which is more believable: (1) That paying $2.4 billion in retransmission consent fees is “just not sustainable” for an MVPD industry that generated nearly $149 billion from video services in 2011 (See 15th Report, Table 9), or (2) That MVPDs want to appropriate $21.3 billion in additional advertising revenue by cutting out the “TV station middleman” and negotiating directly for television programming and advertising time with national broadcast networks? (Hint: The answer is behind door number 2.)

What do compulsory copyright licenses, retransmission consent, and broadcast exclusivity agreements have to do with video advertising revenue?

• The compulsory copyright licenses prohibit MVPDs substituting their own advertisements for TV station ads: Retransmission of a broadcast television signal by an MVPD is “actionable as an act of infringement” if the content of the signal, including “any commercial advertising,” is “in any way willfully altered by the cable system through changes, deletions, or additions” (see 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3), 119(a)(5), and 122(e));
• The retransmission consent provision prohibits MVPDs from negotiating directly with television broadcast networks for access to their programming or a share of their available advertising time: An MVPD cannot retransmit a local commercial broadcast television signal without the “express authority of the originating station” (see 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A)); and
• Broadcast exclusivity agreements (also known as non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity agreements) prevent MVPDs from circumventing the retransmission consent provision by negotiating for nationwide retransmission consent with one network-affiliated own-and-operated TV station. (If an MVPD were able to retransmit the TV signals from only one television market nationwide, MVPDs could, in effect, negotiate with broadcast networks directly, because broadcast programming networks own and operate their own TV stations in some markets.)

The effect of the compulsory copyright licenses, retransmission consent provision, and broadcast exclusivity agreements is to prevent MVPDs from realizing any of the approximately $20 billion in advertising revenue generating by broadcast television programming every year.

Why did Congress want to prevent MVPDs from realizing any advertising revenue from broadcast television programming?

Congress protected the advertising revenue of local TV stations because TV stations are legally prohibited from realizing any subscription revenue for their primary programming signal. (See 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)) Congress chose to balance the burden of the broadcast business model mandate with the benefits of protecting their advertising revenue. The law forces TV stations to rely primarily on advertising revenue to generate profits, but the law also protects their ability to generate advertising revenue. Conversely, the law allows MVPDs to generate both subscription revenue and advertising revenue for their own programming, but prohibits them from poaching advertising revenue from broadcast programming.

MVPDs want to upset the balance by repealing the regulations that make free over-the-air television possible  without repealing the regulations that require TV stations to provide free over-the-air programming. Eliminating only the regulations that benefit broadcasters while retaining their regulatory burdens is not a free market approach — it is a video marketplace firing squad aimed squarely at the heart of TV stations.

Adopting the MVPD version of video regulation reform would not kill broadcast programming networks. They always have the options of becoming cable networks and selling their programming and advertising time directly to MVPDs or distributing their content themselves directly over the Internet.

The casualty of this so-called “reform” effort would be local TV stations, who are required by law to rely on advertising and retransmission consent fees for their survival. Policymakers should recognize that killing local TV stations for their advertising revenue is the ultimate goal of current video reform efforts before adopting piecemeal changes to the law. If policymakers intend to kill TV stations, they should not attribute the resulting execution to the “friendly fire” of unintended consequences. They should recognize the legitimate consumer and investment-backed expectations created by the current statutory framework and consider appropriate transition mechanisms after a comprehensive review.

Aereo’s antenna system is frequently characterized perjoratively as a Rube Goldberg contraption, including in the Supreme Court oral arguments. Funny enough, Preston Padden, a veteran television executive, has characterized the legal system producing over-the-air broadcast television–Aereo’s chief legal opponents–precisely the same way. It’s also ironic that Aereo is in a fight for its life over alleged copyright violations since communications law diminishes the import of copyright law and makes copyright almost incomprehensible. Larry Downes calls the legal arguments for and against Aereo a “tangled mess.” David Post at the Volokh Conspiracy likewise concluded the situation is “pretty bizarre, when you think about it” after briefly exploring how copyright law interacts with communications law.

I agree, but Post actually understates how distorted the copyright law becomes when TV programs pass through a broadcaster’s towers, as opposed to a cable company’s headend. In particular, a broadcaster, which is mostly a passive transmitter of TV programs, gains more control over the programs than the copyright owners. It’s nearly impossible to separate the communications law distortions from the copyright issues, but the Aereo issue could be solved relatively painlessly by the FCC. It’s unfortunate copyright and television law intertwine like this because a ruling adverse to Aereo could potentially–and unnecessarily–upend copyright law.

This week I’ve seen many commentators, even Supreme Court justices, mischaracterize the state of television law when discussing the Aereo case. This is a very complex area and below is my attempt to lay out some of the deeper legal issues driving trends in the television industry that gave rise to the Aereo dispute. Crucially, the law is even more complex than most people realize, which benefits industry insiders and prevents sensible reforms.

The FCC, and Congress to a lesser extent, has gone to great lengths to protect broadcasters from competition from other television distributors, as the Copyright Office has said. There is nothing magical about free broadcast television. It’s simply another distribution platform that competes with several other TV platforms, including cable, satellite, IPTV (like AT&T U-Verse), and, increasingly, over-the-top streaming (like Netflix and Amazon Prime Instant Video).

Hundreds of channels and thousands of copyrighted programs are distributed by these non-broadcast distributors (mostly) through marketplace negotiations.

Strange things happen to copyrights when programs are delivered via the circuitous route 1) through a broadcast tower and 2) to a cable/satellite operator. Namely, copyright owners, by law, lose direct control over their intellectual property when local broadcasters transmit it. At that point, regulators, not copyright holders, determine the nature of bargaining and the prices paid.

Distribution of non-local broadcast programming

Right away, an oddity arises. Copyright treatment of local broadcasts differs from distant (non-local) broadcasts. Cable and satellite companies have never paid copyright royalties for signals from a local broadcast. (This is one reason the broadcast lawyer denied that Aereo is a cable company during Supreme Court oral arguments–Aereo merely transmits local broadcast signals.) But if a cable or satellite company retransmits signals from a non-local (“distant”) broadcaster, the company pays the Copyright Office for a copyright license. However, this license is not bargained for with the copyright holder; it is a compulsory license. Programmers are compelled to license their program and in return receive the price set by the panel of Copyright Office officials.

The Copyright Office has asked Congress for over 30 years to eliminate the compulsory license system for distant broadcasts. There are few major distant broadcasters carried by cable companies but the most popular is WGN, a Chicago broadcaster that is carried on many cable systems across the country. The programmers complain they’re underpaid and the Copyright Office has the impossible task of deciding a fair price for a compulsory copyright license. Alleged underpayment is partly why TBS, in 1998, converted from a distant broadcast network to a pure cable network, where TBS could bargain with cable and satellite companies directly.

Distribution of local broadcast programming

Yet things get even stranger when you examine how local broadcasts are treated. Copyright is, as best as I can tell, a nullity when a program is broadcast by a local broadcaster and then retransmitted by a cable company. Until 1992, no payments passed from cable companies to either the broadcaster or copyright holder of broadcast programs. Congress made the retransmission of locally-broadcasted programs royalty-free. Cable companies captured the free over-the-air signals and sold those channels along with cable channels to subscribers.

Why would broadcasters and programmers stand for this? They tolerated this for decades because the FCC requires broadcasts to be “free”–that is, funded by ads. Local broadcasters and programmers benefited from cable distribution because cable TV reaches more viewers that broadcasters can’t reach.

Then in 1992, as cable TV grew, Congress decided to rebalance the competitive scales. Congress created a new property right that ensured local broadcasters got paid by cable companies–the retransmission right. Congress did not require a copyright royalty payment. So cable (and later satellite) still didn’t pay copyright royalties for local broadcasts. The “retransmission right” is held by, not the copyright owner, but the owner of the broadcast tower. This is a bizarre situation where, as the Copyright Office says, Congress accords a “licensee of copyrighted works (broadcasters) greater proprietary rights than the owner of copyright.”

Welcome to the bizarro world of broadcast television that Aereo finds itself. On the bright side, perhaps the very public outcry over Aereo means the laws that permitted Aereo’s regulatory arbitrage will be scrutinized and rationalized. In the short term, I’m hoping the Supreme Court, as Downes mentions, punts the case to a lower court for more fact-finding. Aereo is a communications law case disguised as a copyright case. These issues really need to be before the FCC for a determination about what is a “cable operator” and an “MVPD.” A finding that Aereo is either one would end this copyright dispute.

The Supreme Court hears oral arguments today in a case that will decide whether Aereo, an over-the-top video distributor, can retransmit broadcast television signals online without obtaining a copyright license. If the court rules in Aereo’s favor, national programming networks might stop distributing their programming for free over the air, and without prime time programming, local TV stations might go out of business across the country. It’s a make or break case for Aereo, but for broadcasters, it represents only one piece of a broader regulatory puzzle regarding the future of over-the-air television.

If the court rules in favor of the broadcasters, they could still lose at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). At a National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) event earlier this month, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler focused on “the opportunity for broadcast licensees in the 21st century . . . to provide over-the-top services.” According to Chairman Wheeler, TV stations shouldn’t limit themselves to being in the “television” business, because their “business horizons are greater than [their] current product.” Wheeler wants TV stations to become over-the-top “information providers”, and he sees the FCC’s role as helping them redefine themselves as a “growing source of competition” in that market segment.

If TV stations share Chairman Wheeler’s vision for their future, the FCC’s “help” in redefining the role of broadcast licensees in the digital era could represent a potential win rather than a loss. If Wheeler truly seeks to enable TV stations to deliver a competitive, fixed and mobile cable-like service, it could signal a positive shift in the FCC’s traditionally stagnant approach to broadcast regulation.

Like all regulatory pronouncements, the devil is always in the details — notwithstanding the existing and legitimate skepticism that TV stations have as to whether the FCC can and will treat them fairly in the future. For better or worse, many will judge the “success” of the broadcast incentive auction by the amount of revenue it raises. This reality provides the FCC with unique incentives to “encourage” TV stations to give up their spectrum licenses. In Washington, “encouragement” can range from polite entreaty to regulatory pain.

After the FCC imposed new ownership limits on TV stations last month, some fear the FCC will choose pain as its persuader. Last month’s FCC action prompts them to ask, if Wheeler is sincere in his desire to help broadcasters pivot to a broader business model, why impose new ownership limits on TV stations that could hinder their ability to compete with cable and over-the-top companies?

Chairman Wheeler attempted to address this question in his NAB speech, but his answer was oddly inconsistent with his broader vision. He said the FCC’s new ownership limits are rooted in the traditional goals of competition, diversity, and localism among TV stations. That only makes sense, however, if you believe TV stations should compete only with other TV stations. Imposing new ownership limits on TV stations won’t help them pivot to a future in which they compete in a broader “information provider” market — it would hinder them.

I expect TV station owners are wondering: If we accept Chairman Wheeler’s invitation to look beyond our current product, will he meet us on the horizon? Or will we find ourselves standing there alone? It’s hard to predict the future, because the future is always just over the horizon.

After yesterday’s FCC meeting, it appears that Chairman Wheeler has a finely tuned microscope trained on broadcasters and a proportionately large blind spot for the cable television industry.

Yesterday’s FCC meeting was unabashedly pro-cable and anti-broadcaster. The agency decided to prohibit television broadcasters from engaging in the same industry behavior as cable, satellite, and telco television distributors and programmers. The resulting disparity in regulatory treatment highlights the inherent dangers in addressing regulatory reform piecemeal rather than comprehensively as contemplated by the #CommActUpdate. Congress should lead the FCC by example and adopt a “clean” approach to STELA reauthorization that avoids the agency’s regulatory mistakes.

The FCC meeting offered a study in the way policymakers pick winners and losers in the marketplace without acknowledging unfair regulatory treatment. It’s a three-step process.

• First, the policymaker obfuscates similarities among issues by referring to substantively similar economic activity across multiple industry segments using different terminology.
• Second, it artificially narrows the issues by limiting any regulatory inquiry to the disfavored industry segment only.
• Third, it adopts disparate regulations applicable to the disfavored industry segment only while claiming the unfair regulatory treatment benefits consumers.

The broadcast items adopted by the FCC yesterday hit all three points.

“Broadcast JSAs”

The FCC adopted an order prohibiting two broadcast television stations from agreeing to jointly sell more than 15% of their advertising time using the three-step process described above.

• First, the FCC referred to these agreements as “JSA’s” or “joint sales agreements”.
• Second, the FCC prohibited these agreements only among broadcast television stations even though the largest cable, satellite, and telco video distributors sell their advertising time through a single entity.
• Third, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler said all the agency was “doing [yesterday was] leveling the negotiating table” for negotiations involving the largely unrelated issue of “retransmission consent”, even though the largest cable, satellite, and telco video distributors all sell their advertising through a single entity.

If the FCC had  acknowledged that cable, satellite, and telcos jointly sell their advertising, and had the FCC included them in its inquiry as well, Chairman Wheeler could not have kept a straight face while asserting that all the agency was doing was leveling the playing field. Hence the power of obfuscatory terminology and artificially narrowed issues.

“Broadcast Exclusivity Agreements”

The FCC also issued a further notice yesterday seeking comment on broadcast “non-duplication exclusivity agreements” and “syndicated exclusivity agreements.” These agreements, which are collectively referred to as “broadcast exclusivity agreements”, are a form of territorial exclusivity: They provide a local television station with the exclusive right to transmit broadcast network or syndicated programming in the station’s local market only.

Unlike cable, satellite, and telco television distributors, broadcast television stations are  prohibited by law from entering into exclusive programming agreements with other television distributors in the same market: The Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act (STELA) prohibits television stations from entering into exclusive retransmission consent agreements — i.e., a television station must make its programming available to all other television distributors in the same market. Cable, satellite, and telco distributors are legally permitted to enter into exclusive programming agreements on a nationwide basis — e.g., DIRECTV’s NFL Sunday Ticket.

If the FCC is concerned by the limited form of territorial exclusivity permitted for broadcasters, it should be even more concerned about the broader exclusivity agreements that have always been permitted for cable, satellite, and telco television distributors. But the FCC nevertheless used the three-step process for picking winners and losers to limit its consideration of exclusive programming agreements to broadcasters  only.

• First, the FCC uses unique terminology to refer to “broadcast” exclusivity agreements (i.e., “non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity”), which obfuscates the fact that these agreements are a limited form of exclusive programming agreements.
• Second, the FCC is seeking comment on exclusive programming agreements between broadcast television stations and programmers only even though satellite and other video programming distributors have entered into exclusive programming agreements.
• Third, it appears the pretext for limiting the scope of the FCC’s inquiry to broadcasters will again be “leveling the playing field” between broadcasters and other television distributors — to benefit consumers, of course.

“Joint Retransmission Consent Negotiations”

Finally, the FCC prohibited a television broadcast station ranked among the top four stations (as measured by audience share) from negotiating “retransmission consent” jointly with another top four station in the same market if the stations are not commonly owned. The FCC reasoned that “the threat of losing programming of two more top four stations at the same time gives the stations undue bargaining leverage in negotiations with [cable, satellite, and telco television distributors].”

As an economic matter, “retransmission consent” is essentially a substitute for the free market copyright negotiations that could occur absent the “compulsory copyright license” in the 1976 Copyright Act and an earlier Supreme Court decision interpreting the term “public performance”. In the absence of retransmission consent, compensation for the use of programming provided by broadcast television stations and programming networks would be limited to the artificially low amounts provided by the compulsory copyright license.

To the extent retransmission consent is merely another form of program licensing, it is indistinguishable from negotiations between cable, satellite and telco distributors and cable programming networks — which typically involve the sale of  bundled channels. If bundling two television channels together “gives the stations undue bargaining leverage” in retransmission consent negotiations, why doesn’t a cable network’s bundling of multiple channels together for sale to a cable, satellite, or telco provider give the cable network “undue bargaining leverage” in its licensing negotiations? The FCC avoided this difficultly using the old one, two, three approach.

• First, the FCC used the unique term “retransmission consent” to refer to the sale of programming rights by broadcasters.
• Second, the FCC instituted a proceeding seeking comment only on “retransmission consent” rather than all programming negotiations.
• Third, the FCC found that lowering retransmission consent costs could lower the prices consumers pay to cable, satellite, and telco television distributors — to remind us that it’s all about consumers, not competitors.

If it were really about lowering prices for consumers, the FCC would also have considered whether prohibiting channel bundling by cable programming networks would lower consumer prices too. For reasons left unexplained, cable programmers are permitted to bundle as many channels as possible in their licensing negotiations.

“Clean STELA”

After yesterday’s FCC meeting, it appears that Chairman Wheeler has a finely tuned microscope trained on broadcasters and a proportionately large blind spot for the cable television industry. To be sure, the disparate results of yesterday’s FCC meeting could be unintentional. But, even so, they highlight the inherent dangers in any piecemeal approach to industry regulation. That’s why Congress should adopt a “clean” approach to STELA reauthorization and reject the demands of special interests for additional piecemeal legislative changes. Consumers would be better served by a more comprehensive effort to update video regulations.

Most conservatives and many prominent thinkers on the left agree that the Communications Act should be updated based on the insight provided by the wireless and Internet protocol revolutions. The fundamental problem with the current legislation is its disparate treatment of competitive communications services. A comprehensive legislative update offers an opportunity to adopt a technologically neutral, consumer focused approach to communications regulation that would maximize competition, investment and innovation.

Though the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must continue implementing the existing Act while Congress deliberates legislative changes, the agency should avoid creating  new regulatory disparities on its own. Yet that is where the agency appears to be heading at its meeting next Monday.

A recent ex parte filing indicates that the FCC is proposing to deem joint retransmission consent negotiations by two of the top four Free-TV stations in a market a per se violation of the FCC’s good-faith negotiation standard and adopt a rebuttable presumption that joint negotiations by non-top four station combinations constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith.” The intent of this proposal is to prohibit broadcasters from using a single negotiator during retransmission consent negotiations with Pay-TV distributors.

This prohibition would apply in  all TV markets, no matter how small, including markets that lack effective competition in the Pay-TV segment. In small markets without effective competition, this rule would result in the absurd requirement that marginal TV stations with no economies of scale negotiate alone with a cable operator who possesses market power.

In contrast, cable operators in these markets would remain free to engage in joint negotiations to purchase their programming. The Department of Justice has issued a press release “clear[ing] the way for cable television joint purchasing” of national cable network programming through a single entity. The Department of Justice (DOJ) concluded that allowing nearly 1,000 cable operators to jointly negotiate programming prices would not facilitate retail price collusion because cable operators typically do not compete with each other in the sale of programming to consumers.

Joint retransmission consent negotiations don’t facilitate retail price collusion either. Free-TV distributors don’t compete with each other for the sale of their programming to consumers — they provide their broadcast signals to consumers for  free over the air. Pay-TV operators complain that joint agreements among TV stations are nevertheless responsible for retail price increases in the Pay-TV segment, but have not presented evidence supporting that assertion. Pay-TV’s retail prices have increased at a steady clip for years irrespective of retransmission consent prices.

To the extent Pay-TV distributors complain that joint agreements increase TV station leverage in retransmission consent negotiations, there is no evidence of harm to competition. The retransmission consent rules  prohibit TV stations from entering into exclusive retransmission consent agreements with any Pay-TV distributor — even though Pay-TV distributors are allowed to enter into such agreements for cable programming — and the FCC has determined that Pay- and Free-TV distributors do not compete directly for viewers. The absence of any potential for competitive harm is especially compelling in markets that lack effective competition in the Pay-TV segment, because the monopoly cable operator in such markets is the de facto single negotiator for Pay-TV distributors.

It is even more surprising that the FCC is proposing to prohibit joint sales agreements among Free-TV distributors. This recent development apparently stems from a DOJ Filing in the FCC’s incomplete media ownership proceeding.

A fundamental flaw exists in the DOJ Filing’s analysis: It failed to consider whether the relevant product market for video advertising includes other forms of video distribution, e.g., cable and online video programming distribution. Instead, the DOJ relied on precedent that considers the sale of advertising in  non-video media only.

Similarly, the Department has repeatedly concluded that the purchase of broadcast television spot advertising constitutes a relevant antitrust product market because advertisers view spot advertising on broadcast television stations as sufficiently distinct from advertising on other media (such as radio and newspaper). (DOJ Filing at p.8)

The DOJ’s conclusions regarding joint sales agreements are clearly based on its incomplete analysis of the relevant product market.

Therefore, vigorous rivalry between multiple independently controlled broadcast stations in each local radio and television market ensures that businesses, charities, and advocacy groups can reach their desired audiences at competitive rates. (Id. at pp. 8-9, emphasis added)

The DOJ’s failure to consider the availability of advertising opportunities provided by cable and online video programming renders its analysis unreliable.

Moreover, the FCC’s proposed rules would result in another video market double standard. Cable, satellite, and telco video programming distributors, including DIRECTV, AT&T U-verse, and Verizon FIOS, have entered into a joint agreement to sell advertising through a  single entity, NCC Media (owned by Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Cox Media). NCC Media’s Essential Guide to planning and buying video advertising says that cable programming has surpassed 70% of all viewing to ad-supported television homes in Prime and Total Day, and 80% of Weekend daytime viewing. According to NCC, “This viewer migration to cable [programming] is one of the best reasons to shift your brand’s media allocation from local broadcast to Spot Cable,” especially with the advent of NCC’s new consolidated advertising platform. (Essential Guide at p. 8) The Essential Guide also states:

• “It’s harder than ever to buy the GRP’s [gross rating points] you need in local broadcast in prime and local news.” (Id. at p. 16)
• “[There is] declining viewership on broadcast with limited inventory creating a shortage of rating points in prime, local news and other dayparts.” (Id. at p. 17)
• “The erosion of local broadcast news is accelerating.” (Id. at p. 18)
• “Thus, actual local broadcast TV reach is at or below the cume figures for wired cable in most markets.” (Id. at p. 19)

This Essential Guide clearly indicates that cable programming is part of the relevant video advertising product market and that there is intense competition between Pay- and Free-TV distributors for advertising dollars.  So why is the FCC proposing to restrict joint marketing agreements among Free-TV distributors in local markets when virtually the entire Pay-TV industry is jointly marketing all of their advertising spots nationwide?

The FCC should refrain from adopting new restrictions on local broadcasters until it can answer questions like this one. Though it is appropriate for the FCC to prevent anticompetitive practices, adopting disparate regulatory obligations that distort competition in the same product market is not good for competition  or consumers. Consumer interests would be better served if the FCC decided to address video competition issues more broadly — or there might not be any Free-TV competition to worry about.

It appears that Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Tom Wheeler is returning to a competition-based approach to communications regulation. Chairman Wheeler’s emphasis on “competition, competition, competition” indicates his intent to intervene in communications markets only when it is necessary to correct a market failure.

I expect most on both sides of the political spectrum would welcome a return to rigorous market analysis at the FCC, but you can’t please all of the people all of the time. The American Television Alliance (ATVA), whose FCC petition wouldn’t withstand even a cursory market power analysis, is sure to be among the displeased.

The ATVA petition asks the FCC to regulate prices for retransmission consent (the prices video service providers (VSPs) pay for the rights to provide broadcast television programming to pay-TV subscribers) because retransmission fees and competition among VSPs are increasing. Though true, this data doesn’t indicate that TV stations or broadcast television networks have market power — it indicates that legislative and policy efforts to increase competition among VSPs are working.

The increase in retransmission consent fees is the natural consequence of the increase in competition among VSPs. When incumbent cable companies were the dominant VSPs, they could use the threat of a blackout to force broadcasters to grant retransmission consent at extremely low prices (or even for free). If a TV station balked, it risked losing substantial advertising revenue because there was no other VSP to retransmit the station’s signal.

As a result of increasing competition among VSPs, broadcasters are finally in a position to negotiate fairer prices for their content. When a VSP threatens a blackout today, a broadcaster has the option of calling the VSP’s bluff, as Wall Street observed when Time Warner yanked CBS off the air during a dispute about wireless distribution rights last fall. Now that there are competitive VSPs in most markets, cable operators have something to lose from a blackout too — their subscribers.

VSPs have responded to increasing market competition by asking the government for special treatment. ATVA has cloaked their rent-seeking request in the language of market power, but haven’t provided any analysis supporting their contention that retransmission consent fees are “too high.” They appear to be hoping that, if they cry wolf loud enough, they can avoid paying a fairer price for television programming.

If retransmission fees were really “too high,” one would expect that they would be significantly higher than the fees VSPs charge for their own content. According to the data, however, VSPs charge significantly more for their affiliated content than broadcasters charge for retransmission consent. In 2012, VSPs paid an average of $1.50 for the top ten channels affiliated with cable networks. In comparison, VSPs paid an average of $0.58 in 2012 for the right to retransmit the channels of the top ten TV station companies (e.g., Sinclair) — sixty one percent (61%) less than VSPs were willing to pay for their affiliated content. (Sources: Kagan and SNL)

Are the significantly higher prices cable networks charged for their programming in 2012 driven by consumer ratings? No. Kagan data indicates that, in 2012, VSPs paid approximately the same amount — $0.57 per subscriber — for CNN (CNN en Español sold for $0.58) as the average for the top ten TV stations. Despite its similar price, however, CNN averaged only about 600,000 daily viewers during primetime whereas each of the national broadcast network news programs averaged over 8 million evening viewers daily. This viewership data, albeit limited, indicates that broadcasters are charging ten times less for their programming than VSPs charge for similar programming.

The premium VSPs pay for their own content reflects the economics of the video programming market. Though competition among VSPs has increased, there is still significantly greater concentration and market power in the video distribution market than in the video programming market. According to the FCC’s most recent video competition report, only about one-third (35%) of homes had access to at least four VSPs in 2011. (See Fifteenth Report at Table 2) The FCC found that, even in areas with four VSPs, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a common measure of horizontal market concentration, was over 2,500 (a highly concentrated marketplace). (See id. at ¶ 37) In comparison, there were more than twenty national video programming networks. (See id. at App. B)

Even a cursory review of the data indicates that recent increases in retransmission consent fees are a sign of market success, not a failure. It should be no surprise that, as competition among VSPs has increased, the price of retransmission consent has increased with it. It is the predictable result of cable’s decreasing monopsony power.

My response to Free State Foundation’s blog post, “Understanding the Un-Free Market for Retrans Consent Is the First Step for Reforming It”

The Free State Foundation (FSF) questioned my most recent blog post at RedState, which noted that the American Television Alliance’s (ATVA) arguments supporting FCC price regulation of broadcast television content are inconsistent with the arguments its largest members make against government intervention proposed by net neutrality supporters. FSF claimed that my post created a “false equivalency” between efforts to modify an existing regulatory regime and efforts to impose new regulations in a previously free market.

FSF’s “false equivalence” theory is a red herring that is apparently intended to distract from the substantive issues I raised. The validity of the economic arguments related to two-sided markets discussed in my blog doesn’t depend on the regulatory status of the two-sided markets those arguments address. The notion that the existence of regulation in the video marketplace gives ATVA a free pass to say anything it wants without heed for intellectual consistency is absurd.

I suspect FSF knows this. Its blog post does not dispute that ATVA’s arguments at the FCC are inconsistent with the arguments its largest members make against net neutrality; in fact, FSF failed to address the ATVA petition at all. Though the FSF blog was ostensibly prompted by my post at RedState, FSF decided to “leave the merits of ATVA’s various proposals to others” (except me, apparently).

FSF’s decision to avoid the merits of ATVA’s arguments at the FCC (the subject of my blog post), begs the question: What was the FSF blog actually about? It appears FSF wrote the blog to (1) reiterate its previous (and misleading) analyses of the video programing market, and (2) argue that the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act “represents the proper direction” for reforming it.

To be clear, I haven’t previously addressed either issue. But, in the spirit of collegial dialogue initiated by FSF, I discuss them briefly in this blog.

Retransmission Consent

FSF is right that, “In a truly free marketplace, private parties have the liberty to pursue [or not pursue] commercial deals with whomever they choose.” I also agree that the market for video programming is not a “truly free marketplace,” and that the rules governing retransmission consent “restrict private bargaining.” But, FSF’s one-sided characterization of retransmission consent as granting “special rights” to broadcasters only is flatly misleading.

FSF highlights how local broadcasters benefit from (1) “must carry” rules and (2) non-duplication and syndication agreements.

The must carry rules require for-pay video distributors (e.g., cable operators) to carry the programming of broadcasters who elect mandatory program carriage while prohibiting distributors from charging such broadcasters for that carriage. Although I agree with FSF that the must carry rules are particularly intrusive, they are also irrelevant to retransmission consent negotiations. Once a broadcaster elects to engage in retransmission consent negotiations for carriage, it cannot take advantage of must carry for three years. Even if it could, the existence of must carry wouldn’t provide the broadcaster any pricing advantage in negotiations with for-pay video distributors, whose goal is to carry the programming at the lowest possible cost (which must carry sets at zero).

FSF correctly notes that non-duplication and syndication agreements limit the ability of for-pay video distributors (e.g., cable operators) to bargain with non-local broadcasters for new and syndicated broadcast programming, respectively. But FSF sidesteps the fact that these limitations are created in the free market by private contractual arrangements between broadcast stations and the providers of network or syndicated programming, not the government. The FCC’s non-duplication and syndication “rules do not create these rights but rather provide a means for the parties to exclusive contracts to enforce them through the Commission rather than the courts.”

Finally, FSF fails to mention, either in its blog post or its scholarly papers, that the retransmission consent rules limit the ability of broadcasters to choose with whom they bargain by prohibiting broadcasters from entering into exclusive program carriage agreements with for-pay video distributors – a limitation on bargaining that does not apply to programming owned by for-pay video distributors. Unlike non-duplication and syndication, this exclusivity prohibition is not grounded in private contractual arrangements.

FSF does not address whether the potential negotiating advantages conferred on broadcasters by FCC enforcement of network non-duplication and syndication agreements is more valuable in retransmission consent negotiations than the potential disadvantages imposed by the prohibition on exclusive program carriage agreements. To the extent the value of exclusive carriage agreements (the opportunity cost of the retransmission consent regime for broadcasters) outweighs the value of network non-duplication and syndication enforcement (the benefit to broadcasters), for-pay video distributors benefit more from the retransmission consent regime than broadcasters.

Next Generation TV Act

To be sure, even if for-pay video distributors benefit more from retransmission consent than broadcasters, retransmission consent negotiations do not occur in a “truly free market.” I agree with FSF that, “The ultimate goal should be to eliminate regulatory intrusion in this space – and to thereby eliminate occasions for debate over whether this or that particular modification to the old regulations will tip the scales in favor of one class of competitors over another.” Unfortunately, the modifications proposed by the Next Generation TV Act (the Bill) would not eliminate such debates.

FSF describes the Bill as a “comprehensive free market reform.” It would indeed eliminate FCC enforcement of network non-duplication and syndication agreements (and compulsory copyright licenses—an issue that merits additional discussion), but it is far from comprehensive.

First, the Bill doesn’t eliminate must carry for non-profit (e.g., religious and educational) broadcasters – the broadcasters most likely to elect mandatory carriage. Retaining such protections for religious and educational broadcasters is certainly reasonable when viewed from a political perspective; however, it falls short of being a free market approach to video regulation generally.

More importantly, the Bill wouldn’t eliminate any of the underlying reasons for which broadcasters enter into non-duplication and syndication agreements. Broadcasters negotiate exclusive distribution rights in local markets because government regulations require broadcasters to provide their programming for free. As a result of this government mandate, broadcasters rely on local advertising revenue to generate profit. If for-pay video distributors could retransmit duplicative programming (syndicated or otherwise) from non-local broadcasters (e.g., because the local broadcaster had not negotiated exclusive distribution rights), the local broadcaster would lose a substantial portion (if not all) of its advertising revenue. In a “truly free market,” the local broadcaster could respond to the potential loss of advertising revenue by charging subscription fees for its over-the-air video programming delivery or repurposing its spectrum for an alternative use. But broadcasters today don’t operate in a truly free market, and the government generally won’t allow them to pursue other business models.

Although the Bill aims toward a more vibrant free market, my primary concern is that it would leave in place the intrusive business model restrictions on broadcasters while eliminating rules that help make the government-mandated business model work. Perhaps FSF would agree that, if the goal is to “eliminate regulatory intrusions in this space,” the Bill should also eliminate government restrictions on broadcast business models and spectrum use. Anything less is better described as “picking winners and losers,” not “comprehensive free market reform.”

Join TechFreedom on Thursday, December 19, the 100th anniversary of the Kingsbury Commitment, AT&T’s negotiated settlement of antitrust charges brought by the Department of Justice that gave AT&T a legal monopoly in most of the U.S. in exchange for a commitment to provide universal service.

The Commitment is hailed by many not just as a milestone in the public interest but as the bedrock of U.S. communications policy. Others see the settlement as the cynical exploitation of lofty rhetoric to establish a tightly regulated monopoly — and the beginning of decades of cozy regulatory capture that stifled competition and strangled innovation.

So which was it? More importantly, what can we learn from the seventy year period before the 1984 break-up of AT&T, and the last three decades of efforts to unleash competition? With fewer than a third of Americans relying on traditional telephony and Internet-based competitors increasingly driving competition, what does universal service mean in the digital era? As Congress contemplates overhauling the Communications Act, how can policymakers promote universal service through competition, by promoting innovation and investment? What should a new Kingsbury Commitment look like?

Following a luncheon keynote address by FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai, a diverse panel of experts moderated by TechFreedom President Berin Szoka will explore these issues and more. The panel includes:

• Harold Feld, Public Knowledge
• Rob Atkinson, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation
• Hance Haney, Discovery Institute
• Jeff Eisenach, American Enterprise Institute
• Fred Campbell, Former FCC Commissioner

Space is limited so RSVP now if you plan to attend in person. A live stream of the event will be available on this page. You can follow the conversation on Twitter on the #Kingsbury100 hashtag.  

When: Thursday, December 19, 2013 11:30 – 12:00Registration & lunch 12:00 – 1:45Event & live stream

The live stream will begin on this page at noon Eastern.

Where: The Methodist Building 100 Maryland Ave NE Washington D.C. 20002

Questions? Email contact@techfreedom.org.

The decision to forgo distribution is referred to as a “blackout” in the cable context and “blocking” in the Internet context, but the economic considerations affecting such negotiations are substantially the same.

The American Television Alliance (ATVA), a coalition comprised primarily of cable and satellite TV operators, is using the playbook of net neutrality proponents in abid to convince the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate prices for broadcast television content. The goal of ATVA’s cable and satellite members is to increase their profit margins by convincing the government to artificially lower the cost of programming they resell to consumers. I suspect the goal of ATVA’s non-profit members, e.g., Public Knowledge and New America Foundation, is to solidify the FCC’s flawed rationale for adopting net neutrality rules in 2010, which imposed restrictions on market arrangements between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet content providers without finding a market failure.

Many of ATVA’s cable members are also ISPs that have routinely argued against the imposition of net neutrality regulations in the market for Internet services. By supporting ATVA, these same companies appear to have abandoned the intellectual foundation for opposition to net neutrality. Are they now signaling their intent to embrace net neutrality regulation of the Internet?

An analysis of the similarities between the cable and Internet services markets illuminates this apparent inconsistency. Both cable and Internet services exhibit the characteristics of two-sided markets, and the economic relationships among the participants in both of these markets are substantially similar. All else being equal, consumers prefer distribution platforms (i.e., cable or ISP networks) that provide access to more rather than less content, and content providers prefer distribution on platforms with more rather than less users. As a result, either side of the market has the potential to behave anticompetitively, but only if it has substantial market power relative to the other. Recent economic literature demonstrates that, in the absence of market failure, permitting full pricing flexibility on both sides of two-sided communications markets maximizes consumer welfare by increasing investment in both network infrastructure and content.

Prominent ATVA members who are also ISPs recognized as much in their fight against net neutrality at the FCC. In its comments opposing net neutrality, Time Warner Cable argued that the “critical gap in the [FCC]‘s selective proposal to regulate broadband Internet access service providers is the absence of any assertion that they possess  market power—without which, it is unclear that even manifestly harmful discrimination would warrant regulatory intervention.” (Time Warner Cable Comments at 27 (emphasis in original)) Yet, the ATVA petition, filed by Time Warner Cable at the FCC, fails to provide any economic analysis or cite any precedent finding that broadcasters exercise market power warranting government intervention in retransmission consent negotiations.

The core of ATVA’s argument is a straightforward attack on the ordinary functioning of any two-sided market –  the same attack on the previously unregulated Internet made by net neutrality proponents. ATVA argues that, when a cable operator asks a broadcaster for consent to retransmit broadcast content (which is known as “retransmission consent”), the cable operator must either agree to pay the broadcasters or forgo distribution of that broadcaster’s content. Net neutrality advocates similarly argue that, if an Internet content provider were required to pay an ISP for Internet content distribution, the Internet content provider would either have to agree to pay the ISP or forgo distribution of its content. The decision to forgo distribution is referred to as a “blackout” in the cable context and “blocking” in the Internet context, but the economic considerations affecting such negotiations are substantially the same.

ATVA’s attack on retransmission consent agreements suffers from the same infirmity as the net neutrality attack on ISPs: It is a “solution in search of a problem.” As Time Warner Cable noted in its comments on net neutrality:

“Consumers have to come to expect that they can access the content and services they want, when they want. Service providers almost invariably meet those expectations, and in those isolated instances when they have not, the marketplace has exerted the discipline necessary to rectify matters.” (Time Warner Cable Comments at 18)

Those who believe in free markets should exhibit the same trust in the marketplace when addressing the issue of “black outs” for video content as they do when addressing the issue of “blocking” Internet content. Broadcasters have no greater incentive to “black out” cable viewers (and potentially lose advertising revenue) than ISPs have to “block” Internet content (and potentially lose subscription revenue).

Of course, ATVA doesn’t complain about blackouts,  per se. Every blackout to date has been resolved by the marketplace without restrictive FCC rules, and even if they weren’t, consumers could still access broadcast programming over the air free of charge. ATVA’s real complaint is that broadcasters are demanding “excessive” retransmission consent fees due to the popularity of their programming – an allegation that is uncomfortably similar to the “gatekeeper” theory the FCC relied on in its net neutrality order. There, the FCC concluded that an ISP could “force” edge providers to pay “inefficiently high fees” because that ISP is “typically” an Internet content provider’s “only option” for reaching a particular end user. Both theories reflect a desire to intervene in the ordinary pricing mechanisms of two-sided markets without engaging in a thorough market power analysis. They also ignore the fact that, in a two-sided market, charging for content distribution “may well have important pro-competitive effects.” (Time Warner Cable Comments at 31)

The apparent inconsistency of ATVA members who support regulation of retransmission consent agreements while opposing net neutrality is not a new or surprising phenomenon in Washington. It is essential, however, for those who believe in liberty to recognize the danger that ATVA’s theory represents to free market principles: An ATVA win on retransmission consent would continue the expansion of FCC authority unbounded by rigorous analysis that began with the net neutrality order. With a rewrite of the Communications Act on the horizon, free market advocates cannot afford to lose this battle. If we do, we risk losing the war before it even begins.

From the time Tom Wheeler was nominated to become the next FCC Chairman, many have wondered, “What would Wheeler do?” Though it is still early in his chairmanship, the only ruling issued in Chairman Wheeler’s first meeting signals a pro-investment approach to communications regulation.

The declaratory ruling clarified that the FCC would evaluate foreign investment in broadcast licensees that exceeds the 25 percent statutory benchmark using its existing analytical framework. It had previously been unclear whether broadcasters were subject to the same standard as other segments of the communications industry. The ruling recognized that providing broadcasters with regulatory certainty in this respect would promote investment and that greater investment yields greater innovation.

The FCC’s decision to apply the same standards for reviewing foreign ownership of broadcasters as it applies to other segments of the communications industry is very encouraging. It affirms the watershed policy decisions in the USF/ICC Transformation Order, in which the FCC concluded that “leveling the playing field” promotes competition whereas implied subsidies deter investment and are “unfair for consumers.”

Chairman Wheeler’s separate statement is also very encouraging. Its first sentence declares that, “Promoting a regulatory framework that does not inhibit the flow of capital to the US communications sector is an important goal of Commission policy.” This Chairman understands that, in a global economy, U.S. companies must compete with innovators around the world to obtain the necessary investment to develop new information technologies and deploy new communications infrastructure. His separate statement indicates the Chairman’s intent to renew the FCC’s commitment to encouraging private investment.

Regrettably, the Chairman’s separate statement is potentially troubling as well. After noting that the broadcast incentive auction is intended to allow the market to assure that the spectrum is put to its highest and best use, Chairman Wheeler says he will “assess foreign ownership petitions and applications by looking at, among other factors, whether they will help to fulfill these goals, including efficient spectrum usage.”

It is not entirely clear what the Chairman meant by this non sequitur (would the FCC impose channel sharing conditions on stations seeking approval for foreign investment exceeding the benchmark?). But it indicates a willingness to use the FCC’s authority over mergers and acquisitions to promote unrelated policy goals through the imposition of unrelated conditions. As I’ve noted previously, using the FCC’s transaction authority in this way silences public debate over critical policy issues and shields the resulting decision from judicial review – due process protections that are essential to ensure that the FCC acts in the public interest. Ironically, the prospect of unpredictable, case-by-case conditions on foreign investment would appear to be at odds with the Chairman’s goal of promoting a regulatory framework that doesn’t inhibit the flow of private capital to the U.S. communications industry.

It is also possible that the Chairman was merely attempting to deter speculative investments in broadcast spectrum that could sabotage the incentive auction. The success of the incentive auction is critical to the future of our mobile broadband ecosystem, and it is appropriate that the FCC be mindful of sudden, significant foreign investments in broadcast spectrum in these circumstances.

It is still early in Wheeler’s chairmanship, and the future is bright in the spring. If the Chairman maintains his focus on pro-investment policies during his term, the future could be brighter in every season.

There are few things more likely to get constituents to call their representative than TV programming blackouts, and the increase in broadcasting disruptions arising from licensing disputes in recent years means Congress may be forced to once again fix television and copyright laws. As Jerry Brito explains at Reason, the current standoff between CBS and Time Warner Cable is the result of bad regulations, which contribute to more frequent broadcaster blackouts. While each type of TV distributor (cable, satellite, broadcasters, telcos) is both disadvantaged and advantaged through regulation, broadcasters are particularly favored. As the US Copyright Office has said, the rule at issue in CBS-TWC is “part of a thicket of communications law requirements aimed at protecting and supporting the broadcast industry.”

But as we approach a damaging tipping point of rising programming costs and blackouts, Congress’ potential rescuer–Aereo–appears on the horizon, possibly buying more time before a major regulatory rewrite. Aereo, for the uninitiated, is a small online company that sets up tiny antennas in certain cities to capture broadcast television station signals–like CBS, NBC, ABC, Fox, the CW, and Univision–and streams those signals online to paying customers, who can watch live or record the local signals captured by their own “rented” Aereo antenna. Broadcasters hate this because the service deprives them of lucrative retransmission fees and unsuccessfully sued to get Aereo to cease operations.

Let’s back up. Broadcast television is–as my colleague Tom Hazlett says–the “killer app of 1952.” It’s an old technology featuring a few dozen channels that hasn’t fared well with the rise of subscription television offering hundreds of channels–Comcast, Dish, U-Verse, and others. Only about 10% to 15% of households rely on rabbit ears antennas to receive free broadcast TV, while the rest have a subscription.

I’m doubtful Congress will step in and make online distributors like Aereo pay for retransmission. While the laws tilt in broadcasters’ favor, Aereo gives cable and satellite companies additional leverage since–if they have a protracted fight with a broadcaster–they can direct their customers to Aereo. TWC is, in fact, doing this in its current dispute with CBS. Since customers have an online option, no one needs to miss NFL preseason football or the latest How I Met Your Mother. Aereo is not an ideal solution, but it gives a cable or satellite provider another bargaining weapon.

For several reasons, I think Congress may allow Aereo to proceed. First, with the variety of print, online, and television options consumers face today, broadcast programming is no longer a sacred cow. Congress, the FCC, and the tech and telecom industries are anxious to get more broadcasters off the air to make room for spectrum-hungry mobile technologies. That is the precise purpose of the pending incentive auctions. Broadcasters are a powerful group with compelling arguments for the status quo–they provide high-demand local news, sports, and weather, for instance–but many people are beginning to realistically imagine life without them.

Second, the primary political justification for protecting local broadcasters–local ownership and diversity–has “virtually vanished” because of industry consolidation in the 1990s and 2000s, as Harold Feld from Public Knowledge notes. It was easier in the past to defend these regulatory carve-outs for broadcasters when locally-owned operations were the beneficiaries, but today many broadcasters are owned by large media companies.

Finally, in the dynamic video marketplace, Congress may be hesitant to impose more regulations on new video technologies. Protecting a 1950s technology by enforcing 1990s laws on today’s Internet services makes little sense. Already, television laws passed in the 1990s look terribly dated and give Congress and the FCC headaches. Rewriting television and copyright laws is a huge task involving many powerful industries seeking protection from disruptive law changes. With the House and Senate controlled by different parties, this makes a grand compromise even less likely.

So Aereo and other antenna rental services represent some relief for regulators since it gives cable and satellite providers a little more leverage. The service is only in a few cities but is quickly expanding. If consumers adopt the service during future disputes, a semblance of equilibrium may return when subscription services bargain with broadcasters. For that reason, Congress may want to sit back and see how it plays out.

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

“All this top-40s music sounds the same.”  I think we’ve all heard this sentiment.  The nature of regional radio broadcasting almost requires a regression to the mean in musical tastes.  A radio station cannot be all things to all people.  I suspect most people will be surprised to learn that some of the most innovative radio broadcasts are taking place at hundreds of stations across the country—and only few people can listen to them.  These stations, known as low power FM (LPFM), carry niche programming like independent folk rock music, fishing shows, political news, reggae, blues, and religious programming.  (And one station in Sitka, Alaska consists entirely of a live feed of whale sounds.)

The FCC began licensing LPFM stations in 2000.  These tiny stations typically cost under $10,000 to create but by law have the power to broadcast their signals only 3.5 miles out (the typical full power FM station has a 26-mile range).  Because of their limited listening area and alternative formats, LPFM stations have small but loyal audiences.

Using traditional FCC station spacing rules, over 100,000 LPFM stations potentially could be broadcasting in the United States.  Yet, despite the FCC’s hopes of “thousands of new voices” on the airwaves, today the number of LPFM stations is less than 1,000.  To this day, there’s only one LPFM station located in a top 50 media market, where most radio audiences live.  Why, more than a decade after these stations were first allowed, are so few in existence?

When faced with the regulatory restrictions imposed on LPFM stations it’s clear why there is so much untapped potential.  Power limits aside, LPFM stations are subject to onerous ownership and advertising rules that were pushed (typically) by the progressive media groups who lobbied for them.  LPFM stations can be licensed only to local entities, and those entities cannot own more than one station.

Further—and most limiting—stations must be noncommercial.  Despite their hyperlocal appeal, LPFM stations are prohibited from running advertisements from local restaurants, churches, retail stores, and car dealers.  Constrained to relying mostly on donations and volunteer staff, few stations ever get on the air.

Several forces conspired to bring about these crippling restrictions.  The FCC has long advocated “localism” in broadcast radio, thus the local ownership restrictions.  Further, many of the activists who pushed for LPFM stations are suspicious of large commercial enterprises and wanted noncommercial mandates.  These groups envisioned a nationwide network of nonprofit cooperatives broadcasting music and news for those with alternative tastes.  They unwittingly ensured that such a development would never become reality, outside of a few rural college towns.  (It’s also ironic that most stations seem to be church-affiliated.  But what other national nonprofit organizations can run stations comprised mainly of volunteers using donations?)

Additionally, the full power FM stations we all listen to in the car saw diminishing market share in their futures if upstart companies were able to string together several LPFM stations and siphon off some of their ad revenues and audience.  When it became obvious that LPFM was going forward a decade ago, I imagine full power stations didn’t object to the FCC and the activist groups’ efforts to make LPFM noncommercial and local.

Suddenly, this year, people are excited about LPFM again.  You see, after LPFM licensing began over a decade ago, the FCC and activists quickly saw that their vision of thousands of new stations wasn’t realistic.  In light of the disappointing launch, the FCC lobbied Congress for years to expand more LPFM licensing opportunities.  In response, Congress passed the Local Community Radio Act in 2011, which only marginally expanded opportunities for LPFM licensees.  I wish new LPFM applicants the best, but I don’t think there’s any reason to be excited.

First, the impact of the 2011 law is minimal and shows the futility of the FCC playing catch up to the marketplace.  The process to approve more LPFM stations took years.  In the meantime, listeners have several platforms for instant music access, including Pandora and Spotify streaming, iTunes, Sirius-XM radio, and cloud computing music storage.  And with the increasing popularity of smartphones, it has never been easier to have personalized, portable music selections.

Still, the FCC and the Congress spent years only nibbling at the edges of the matured broadcast radio market.  The modest change in the 2011 law, recently implemented, might enable dozens or perhaps a few hundred more stations.  But when 100,000 LPFM stations is the approximate ceiling, it’s clear how little things have really changed.  The activists will blame Big Radio for limiting LPFM in Big Radio’s markets, but the blame belongs equally to the noncommercial mandates.

LPFM stations, with liberalized rules that allow them to accept commercial sponsors and band together, could provide a dynamic alternative to the current music and radio broadcast landscape.  After a decade of filings, notices, and rule changes, the FCC and the activists will have LPFM is right back where it started—small, isolated, and rare.

I’ve written several articles in the last few weeks critical of the dangerously unprincipled turn at the Federal Communications Commission toward a quixotic, political agenda.  But as I reflect more broadly on the agency’s behavior over the last few years, I find something deeper and even more disturbing is at work.  The agency’s unreconstructed view of communications, embedded deep in the Communications Act and codified in every one of hundreds of color changes on the spectrum map, has become dangerously anachronistic.

The FCC is required by law to see separate communications technologies delivering specific kinds of content over incompatible channels requiring distinct bands of protected spectrum.  But that world ceased to exist, and it’s not coming back.  It is as if regulators from the Victorian Age were deciding the future of communications in the 21 ^st century.  The FCC is moving from rogue to steampunk.

With the unprecedented release of the staff’s draft report on the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, a turning point seems to have been reached.  I wrote on CNET  (see “FCC:  Ready for Reform Yet?”) that the clumsy decision to release the draft report without the Commissioners having reviewed or voted on it, for a deal that had been withdrawn, was at the very least ill-timed, coming in the midst of Congressional debate on reforming the agency.  Pending bills in the House and Senate, for example, are especially critical of how the agency has recently handled its reports, records, and merger reviews.  And each new draft of a spectrum auction bill expresses increased concern about giving the agency “flexibility” to define conditions and terms for the auctions.

The release of the draft report, which edges the independent agency that much closer to doing the unconstitutional bidding not of Congress but the White House, won’t help the agency convince anyone that it can be trusted with any new powers.   Let alone the novel authority to hold voluntary incentive auctions to free up underutilized broadcast spectrum.

What is the Spectrum Screen Really Screening, Anyway?

One particularly disturbing feature of the report was what appears to be a calculated jury-rigging of the spectrum screen, as I wrote in an op-ed for The Hill.  (See “FCC Plays Fast and Loose with the Law…Again”)  For the first time since introducing the test as a way to simplify merger review, the draft report lowers the amount of spectrum it believes available for mobile use, even as technology continues to make more spectrum usable.  The lower total added 82 markets in which the screen would have been triggered, though the staff report in any case never actually performs the analysis of any local market.

The rationale for the adjustment is hidden in a non-public draft of an order on the transfer of Qualcomm’s FLO-TV licenses to AT&T, an order that is only now just circulating among the Commissioners.   Indeed, the Qualcomm order was only circulated a day before the T-Mobile report was released to the public and (in unredacted form) to  the DoJ.

(Keeping draft documents private is the normal course of business at the agency—the T-Mobile report being the rare and disturbing exception of releasing a report before even the Commissioners have reviewed or voted on it, here in obvious hopes of influencing the Justice Department’s antitrust litigation).

In the draft Qualcomm order, according to a footnote in the draft T-Mobile report, agency staff propose a first-time-ever reduction in the total amount of usable spectrum that forms the basis of the screen.  (Under the test, if the total spectrum of the combined entity in a market is less than a third of the usable spectrum, the market is presumed competitive and no analysis is required.)

For purposes of the T-Mobile analysis, the unexplained reduction is assumed to be acceptable to the Commission and applied to calculations of spectrum concentration in each of the local Cellular Market Areas.  (The calculation also assumes AT&T has the pending Qualcomm spectrum.)  Notably, without the reduction the number of local markets in which the screen would be triggered goes down by a third.

Asked in a press conference today about the curious manipulation, FCC Chairman Genachowski refused to comment.

The spectrum screen, by the way, never made much sense.  Its gross oversimplification of total usable spectrum, for one thing, hides a ridiculous assumption that all bands of usable spectrum are equally usable, defying the most basic physics of mobile communications.  With a wink to the apples-and-oranges nature of different bands, since 2004 the agency has decided more or less arbitrarily to increase the total amount of “usable” spectrum by including some new bands of usable spectrum and not others, with little rhyme or reason.

The manipulation of the spectrum screen’s coefficients, in fact, have no rationale other than to fast-track some preferred mergers and create regulatory headaches for others.  In truth, a screen that counted all spectrum actually being used for mobile communications, and counted it equally, would suggest that Sprint, in combination with its subsidiary Clearwire, is the only dangerously monopolistic holder of spectrum assets.  As Chart 38 of the FCC’s 15 ^th Annual Mobile Competition Report suggests, Sprint and Clearwire hold more “spectrum” than any other carrier—enough to trigger the screen in most if not all CMAs.  That is, if it was all counted.

That isn’t necessarily the right outcome either.  Much of Clearwire’s spectrum is in the >1 GHz. Bands, and, at least for now, those bands are usable but not as attractive for mobile communications as other, lower bands.

As the Mobile Competition Report notes, “these different technical characteristics provide relative advantages for the deployment of spectrum in different frequency bands under certain circumstances. For instance, there is general consensus that the more favorable propagation characteristics of lower frequency spectrum allow for better coverage across larger geographic areas and inside buildings, while higher frequency spectrum may be well suited for adding capacity.”

So not all spectrum is equal after all.  What, then, is the point or usefulness of the screen?  And what of this unmentioned judo move in the staff report, which suddenly changed the point of the screen from one that simplified merger review to a conclusive presumption against a finding of “public interest”?  The original point of the screen was to quickly eliminate competitive markets that don’t require detailed analysis.  In the AT&T/T-Mobile staff report, for the first time, it’s used to reject a proposed transaction if too many market (how many is not indicated) are triggered that would require that analysis.

But why continue to compare apples and oranges for any purpose, when the real data on CMA competition is readily available?  The only answer can be that the analysis wouldn’t yield the result that the agency had in mind when it started its review.  For in painstaking detail, the 15 ^th Mobile Competition report also demonstrates that adoption is up, usage is off the charts, prices for voice, data, and text continue to plummet, investments in infrastructure continue at a dramatic pace despite the economy, and new source of competitive discipline are proliferating, in the form of device manufacturers, mobile O/S providers, app developers, and inter-modal competitors.  For starters.

To conclude that AT&T’s interest in T-Mobile’s spectrum and physical infrastructure—an effort to overcome the failure of the FCC and local regulators to provide alternative spectrum or to allow infrastructure investments to proceed at an even faster pace—isn’t in the public interest requires the staff to ignore every piece of data the same staff, in another part of the space-time contiuum, collected and published.  But so long as HHIs and spectrum concentration are manipulated and relied on to foreclose real analysis, it all makes sense.

A Rogue Agency Slips into Steampunk

That is largely the point of Geoff Manne’s detailed critique of the substance of the report posted here at TLF, and of my own ridiculously long post on Forbes.  (See “A Strategic Plan for the FCC.”)

The Forbes piece tries to put the staff report into the context of on-going calls for agency reform that were working their way through Congress even before the release.  In it, I conclude that the real problem for the agency is that even with the significant changes of the 1996 Communications Act, the agency is still operating in a stovepipe model, where different communications technologies (cable, cellular, wire, satellite, “local”) are still regulated separately, with different bureaus and in many cases different regulations.

The model assumes that audio and video programming are different from data communications, offered by different industries using incompatible, single-purpose technologies.  A television is not a phone or a radio or a computer.  Broadcast is only for programming, cellular only for voice, satellites only for industrial use.  Cable is an inconveniently novel form of pay television, and data communications are only for large corporations with mainframe computers.

Those siloed regulations are further fragmented by attaching special regulatory conditions to individual license transfers and individual bands of spectrum as part of auctions. Dozens of unrelated and seemingly random requirements were added to Comcast-NBC Universal, for example.  At the last minute the agency added an eccentric version of the net neutrality rules to the 2008 auction for 700 Mhz. spectrum, but only for the C block.

The agency continues to operate under an anachronistic view that distinct technologies support distinct forms of communications (radio, TV, cable, data).  But the world has shifted dramatically under their feet since 1996.  The convergence of nearly all networks to the Internet’s single, non-proprietary standard of packet-switching, digital networks operating under TCP/IP protocols has been nothing short of a revolution in communications.  But it’s a revolution the agency sat out.  It has no idea what role it ought to play in the post-apocalyptic world; nor has Congress given them one.

As different kinds of communications technologies have all (or nearly all) converged on IP, communications applications have blurred beyond the ability to distinguish them.  Voice communications are now offered over data networks, data is flowing over the wires, TV is everywhere, and mobile devices that were unimaginable in 1996 now do everything.

Quite simply, the mismatch between the agency’s structure and the reality of a single digital, virtual network treating all content as bits regardless of the technology or the source that transports it has left the agency unable to cope or to regulate rationally.  Consider some of the paradoxes the agency has been forced to wrestle with in recent years:

• Is Voice over IP to be regulated as a traditional voice service, with barnacled requirements for Universal Service contribution and 911 services applied and, if so, applied how?
• Is TV on the Internet, delivered using any and every possible technology including wireless, fiber, copper, and cable, subject to the same Victorian standards of decency as broadcast TV, itself now entirely digital?
• Is the public interest served when mobile providers combine spectrum and infrastructure assets, largely to overcome the agency’s own paralysis in moving the deeply fractured spectrum map into even the 20^th century and the incompetent and corrupt local zoning agencies that hold up applications for new towers and antennae until the proper tribute is rendered?

In the face of these paradoxes, the FCC has become ungrounded; a victim of its own governing statute, which in many respects requires it to remain anachronistic.  Left without clear guidance from Congress on how or whether to regulate what applications (that’s really all we have now—applications, independent of technology), the agency increasingly improvises.

It’s like the wonderful genre of animation known as “steampunk,” where modern technology is projected anachronistically into the past, exploring what life would have been like if the 19 ^th century had robots, flight, information processing, and modern armaments, all powered by the steam engine.  (The concept of steam punk has now become a popular design genre, including some functioning devices wrapped in steampunk elements, as in the photo below.)

A Steampunk Computer

It’s cute on film, but applied to the real world it’s simply dangerous.  The FCC is required by law to keep its head in the sand with respect both to the realities of digital technology and the economics of the modern communications ecosystem.  Yet its natural desire to regulate something leaves the Commission flailing wildly in the dark for a foothold for its ancient regulatory structure in a world it doesn’t inhabit.

The Open Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, for example, asked helplessly in over 80 separate paragraphs for education and update on the nature of the revolution spurred by the deployment of broadband Internet. (“We seek more detailed comment on the technological capabilities available today, as offered for sale and as actually deployed in providers’ networks.”)  Of course it had to ask these questions – the agency never regulated broadband.  Under the 1996 Act, as the 2005 Brand X case emphasizes, it never could.

Consider just a few of the absurd counterfactuals that the agency’s steampunk policies have led it in just the last few years (more examples greatly appreciated, by the way):

• Broadband isn’t being deployed  in a “reasonable and timely fashion” (2011 Section 706 Broadband Report)
• The mobile communications market is not “effectively competitive” (14^th and 15^th Mobile Competition Report)
• High concentrations of customers and spectrum, calculated using rigged HHIs and spectrum screens, are sufficient to raise presumptive antitrust concerns regardless of actual competitive and consumer welfare (AT&T/T-Mobile draft memo)
• Spectrum suitable for mobile use is decreasing (AT&T/Qualcomm memo)
• Despite a lack of any examples, broadband providers  “potentially face at least three types of incentives to reduce the current openness of the Internet” (Open Internet order)
• Encouraging competition and protecting consumer choice “cannot be achieved by preventing only those practices that are demonstrably anticompetitive or harmful to consumers.” (Open Internet order)
• The agency” expect[s] the costs of compliance with our prophylactic rules to be small”  (Open Internet order)
• Absent a mandatory data roaming regime for mobile broadband, “there will be a significant risk that fewer consumers would have nationwide access to competitive mobile broadband services….”  (Data Roaming order).

Not that there isn’t considerable expertise within the agency, and glimmers of understanding that manage to escape in whiffs from the steam pipes.  The 2010 National Broadband Plan, developed with a great deal of both internal and external agency expertise, does an admirable job of describing the current state of the broadband environment in the U.S.  More impressive, the later chapters predict with considerable vision the application areas that will drive the next decade of broadband deployment and use, including education, employment, health care and the smart grid.

The NBP, unfortunately, is the exception.  More and more of the agency’s reports, orders, and decisions instead bury the expertise, forcing ridiculous conclusions through an implausible lens of nostalgia and distortion.  The agency’s statutorily mandated hold on a never-realistic glorious communications past is increasingly threatening the health of the real communications ecosystem–an even more glorious (largely because unregulated) communications present.

I Love it When a Plan Comes Together

The FCC’s steampunk mentality is threatening to wreak havoc on the natural evolution of the Internet revolution.  It’s also turning the FCC from a respected and Constitutionally-required “independent” agency that answers to Congress and not the White House into a partisan monster, pursuing an agenda that’s light on facts and heavy on the politics of the administration and favored participants in the Internet ecosystem.  The agency relies on clichés and unexamined mantras rather than data—even its own data.  Mergers are bad, edge providers are good, and the agency doesn’t acknowledge that many of the genuine market failures that do exist are creatures of its own stovepipes.

As I note in the long Forbes piece, there was a simple, elegant way to avoid the steampunk phenomenon –an alternative that would have saved the FCC from increased obsolescence and the rest of us from its increasingly bizarre and disruptive regulatory behavior.   And in came from within the walls of FCC headquarters.

In 1999, in the midst of the first great Web boom, then-chairman William Kennard (a Democratic appointee) had a vision for the future of communications that has proven to be entirely accurate.  Kennard created a short, straightforward “strategic plan” for the agency that emphasized breaking down the silos.  It also took a realistic view of the agency’s need and ability to regulate an IP world, encouraging future Chairmen to get out of the way of a revolution that would provide far more benefit to consumers if left to police itself than with an FCC trying to play constant catch-up.

Kennard also proposed dramatic reform of spectrum policy, recognizing as is now obvious that imprinting the agency’s stovepiped model for communications like a tattoo on the radio waves was unnecessarily limiting the uses and usefulness of mobile technology, creating artificial scarcity and, eventually, a crisis.

In just a few pages of the report, the strategic plan lays out an alternative, including flexible allocations that wouldn’t require FCC permission to change uses, market-based mechanisms to ensure allocations moved easily to better and higher uses (no lingering conditions), even the creation of a spectrum inventory (still waiting).  The plan called for incentive systems for spectrum reallocation, an interoperable public safety network, and expanded use of unlicensed spectrum.  All reforms that we’re still violently agreeing need to be made.

We’ve arrived, unfortunately, at precisely the future Kennard hoped to avoid.  And we’re still moving, at accelerating speeds, in precisely the wrong direction.  Instead of working to ease spectrum restrictions and leave the “ecosystem” (the FCC’s own term) to otherwise police itself, recent NPRMs and NOIs suggest an agency determined to leverage its limited broadband authority into as many aspects of the converged world as possible.  As the Free State Foundation’s Seth Cooper recently wrote,  today’s FCC has developed a “proclivity to import legacy regulations into today’s IP world when doing so makes little or no sense.”

Fun’s fun.  I like my steampunk as well as anybody.  But I’d prefer to see it on a mobile broadband device, or over Netflix streamed through my IP-enabled television or game console.  Or anywhere else other than at the FCC.

On NPR’s Marketplace this morning, I talk about net neutrality litigation with host John Moe.

Nearly a year after the FCC passed controversial new “Open Internet” rules by a 3-2 vote, the White House finally gave approval for the rules to be published last week, unleashing lawsuits from both supporters and detractors.

The supporters don’t have any hope or expectation of getting a court to make the rules more comprehensive.  So why sue?  When lawsuits challenging federal regulations are filed in multiple appellate courts, a lottery determines which court hears a consolidated appeal.

So lawsuits by net neutrality supporters are a procedural gimmick, an effort to take cases challenging the FCC’s authority out of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which has already made clear the FCC has no legal basis here.

But Verizon’s lawsuit challenges the rules as material changes to existing licenses for spectrum, a challenge that is exclusive to the D.C. Circuit.  If the D.C. Circuit agrees that the rules can be challenged under that provision of the law, then the case stays in D.C..

Beyond the procedure, the substance of Verizon’s challenge will be formidable.  In the 2010 Comcast case, the court eviscerated the FCC’s argument that various provisions of the Communications Act give them the authority to police broadband providers.

And the Open Internet order largely repeated those arguments, a sure sign that the agency really doesn’t expect to win here.  The December vote was largely symbolic, fulfilling an Obama campaign promise to codify net neutrality and moving the noisy and messy proceeding from the agency to the courts.

The real issue here is convergence.  In 1996, when the Communications Act was last overhauled, the commercial use of the Internet was in its infancy.  Broadcast TV, radio, telephone, cable, mobile and data services were still separate technologies, and the 1996 Act gave the FCC separate and different authority over each.  For the Internet, the agency got next to no authority.

In the 15 years since President Clinton signed the 1996 act, of course, the world of communications has been revolutionized by the Internet and broadband.  The FCC’s traditional regulatory subjects have largely converged onto the TCP/IP protocol, generating a flowering of innovation and new devices and services.  Cable providers are phone companies, phone companies are content providers, and computer companies such as Apple and Google are, well, everything.

Consumers are living in a golden age of communications, but the agency has been left with little to oversee.  Wireline voice has become an unprofitable and shrinking business as consumers cut the cord.  The audience for broadcast TV is getting older and smaller at a rapid pace.  This term, the Supreme Court is likely to slap the agency again for its Victorian sensibilities with regard to TV and radio content censorship.

Perhaps Congress will someday decide that broadband services require the kind of oversight and micromanagement the FCC once had over traditional forms of communication.  Then again, wiser heads may take note of the success of the Internet in a world without much regulation, and decide to leave well enough alone.  Perhaps a great overhaul of communications law will clear the decks altogether, creating a single body of law for the converged industries.

Who can say?  But in the meantime, the FCC can’t simply grant itself new authority to regulate.  Regardless of the sincerity of its belief that “prophylactic” rules to preserve the Open Internet are important, federal agencies can’t regulate without Congressional authorization.  Whether in the courts or in Congress itself, the net neutrality rules will be struck down, first and foremost because the FCC had no power to enact them.

Last week the Senate Commerce Committee passed–with deep bi-partisan support–the Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act.

The bill, co-sponsored by Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller and Ranking Member Kay Bailey Hutchison, is a comprehensive effort to resolve several long-standing stalemates and impending crises having to do with one of the most critical 21st century resources: radio spectrum.

My analysis of the bill appears today on CNET. See “Spectrum reform, public safety network move forward in Senate.”

The proposed legislation is impressive in scope; it offers new and in some cases novel solutions to more than half-a-dozen spectrum-related problems, including:

1. Voluntary incentive auctions – The bill authorizes the FCC to coordinate “voluntary incentive auctions” (VIA) of under-utilized spectrum from over-the-air TV broadcasters to better uses, including mobile broadband. Broadcasters giving up some or all of their licensed spectrum would share the proceeds with the government. The FCC has been asking for this authority for two years.

2. Public safety network – The bill would break the logjam over the long-desired nationwide interoperable public safety network. It would create a new non-profit public-private partnership to build the network, with an outright grant of the D-block of 700 Mhz. spectrum. (That block, freed up as part of the 2009 transition to digital TV, has sat idle since a failed auction in 2008.) Financing for the build-out would come from proceeds of the VIAs. The public safety network has been in limbo since it was first proposed soon after 9/11. (The proposed bill is S. 911.)

3. Spectrum inventory – The FCC would be required to complete a comprehensive inventory of existing licenses (which, amazingly, doesn’t exist) within 180 days. President Obama ordered the agency to complete the inventory over a year ago, but so far only a “baseline” inventory has been created.

4. Secondary markets – The FCC would be required to begin a rulemaking to review current limits to secondary spectrum markets that interfere with liquidity, in the hopes of making them more robust. (VIAs could take years to organize and conduct.)

5. Public spectrum – The National Telecommunications and Information Administration would be required to identify significant blocks of underutilized federal spectrum allocations and make them available for auction by the FCC.

6. Spectrum innovation – The National Science Foundation and other grant-making agencies would be required to accelerate research grants for new technologies that would make spectrum use more efficient.

7. Repacking – While the FCC can’t require broadcasters to participate in VIAs, it can force them to move to nearby channels if doing so would free up more valuable blocks of spectrum for auction. A fund would be created to compensate stations for the disruption of switching channels.

The range of issues that S.911 deals with suggests the breadth of the current spectrum crisis. Here it is in a nutshell. Radio frequencies are a limited public resource. Up until recently, however, there’s been more than enough to go around. Following the advice of Nobel prizewinning economist Ronald A. Coase, the FCC has used auctions to find the best and highest use for this resource, generating significant revenue in the process.

But the digital age has changed the dynamics of spectrum. Mobile uses are exploding, as are mobile devices, mobile applications, mobile users and mobile everything else. Moore’s Law is rapidly overtaking FCC law once again. Existing wireless networks are groaning under the strain of volume that has increased 8000% since the launch of the iPhone.

Last year’s National Broadband Plan, for example, predicted that 300 Mhz. of additional spectrum would need to be found in the next five years to keep mobile broadband on track.

But the government’s current processes of finding and allocating more spectrum are simply too slow to keep pace with the current wave of technological innovation. It will get worse as 3G moves to 4G and from there–well, who knows? All we can safely predict is that the “G”s will keep coming, and arrive faster all the time. So radical re-thinking of spectrum management is urgent. We need serious spectrum policy reform, and we need it yesterday.

Part of the solution will come from technology itself, including innovation to make more efficient use of existing allocations, expanding the range of usable spectrum for more uses, capabilities to dynamically share spectrum and rebalance loads, and so on. There are impressive developments in these and other strategies for coping with the potential of spectrum exhaustion, but no one can say with confidence that the solutions will outpace the problems.

The bigger issue underlying spectrum exhaustion is the glacial pace with which current regulatory systems work to rebalance allocations.

Once a license is granted, the licensee can largely rely on keeping it indefinitely. If they operate in a stable or shrinking market (such as over-the-air broadcast, which the Consumer Electronics Association said recently has shrunk to only 8% of U.S. households), there’s no incentive to optimize the property, which, for the licensee, is a sunk cost.

Given the limits of secondary markets, there’s also little incentive to find more efficient uses of the allocation and free up spectrum that is no longer needed for its licensed purpose. Indeed, even for operators who want to exit the market in part or in whole, use limitations on existing allocations make transfer through secondary markets cumbersome if not impossible.

Even if the FCC unblocks these markets, game theory problems may constrain the effectiveness of either the VIAs or the secondary markets.

Federal users, of course, feel no competitive threat to optimize their allocations, and fall back to the conversation-ending “national defense” excuse whenever the possibility emerges of giving up some of the frequencies they are warehousing.

And then there are state and local authorities, who also share jurisdiction over communications. Limits on cell tower construction, use, and other technical improvements aren’t addressed in the proposed legislation. But they are equally to blame for the crisis mentality.

S. 911 is a good start toward removing some of the institutional barriers that limit our flexibility in rebalancing spectrum needs and spectrum allocations. But it’s only a start. If the information revolution is to continue uninterrupted, we need a lot more improvements.

And soon.

What I hoped would be a short blog post to accompany the video from Geoff Manne and my appearances this week on PBS’s “Ideas in Action with Jim Glassman” turned out to be a very long article which I’ve published over at Forbes.com.

I apologize to Geoff for taking an innocent comment he made on the broadcast completely out of context, and to everyone else who chooses to read 2,000 words I’ve written in response.

So all I’ll say here is that Geoff Manne and I taped the program in January, as part of the launch of TechFreedom and of “The Next Digital Decade.”   Enjoy!

I’ve written posts today for both CNET and Forbes on legislation introduced yesterday by Senators Olympia Snowe and John Kerry that would require the FCC and NTIA to complete inventories of existing spectrum allocations.  These inventories were mandated by President Obama last June (after Congress failed to pass legislation), but got lost at the FCC in the net neutrality armageddon.

Everyone believes that without relatively quick action to make more spectrum available, the mobile Internet could seize up.  Given the White House’s showcasing of wireless as a leading source of new jobs, investment, and improved living conditions for all Americans, both Congress and President Obama, along with the FCC and just about everyone else, knows this is a crisis that must be avoided.

Indeed, the National Broadband Plan estimates conservatively that mobile users will need 300-500 mhz of new spectrum over the next 5-10 years.

The last major auction, however, conducted in 2008 for analog spectrum given up by broadcasters in the Digital TV transition, was only 62 mhz.  And that process took years.

So while auctions–perhaps of more of the over-the-air allocations–could help, it can’t be the silver bullet.  We’ll need creative solutions–including technology to make better use of existing allocations, spectrum sharing, release of government-held frequencies.

But why not start by figuring out who has spectrum now, and see if it’s really being put to the use that’s in the best interests of American consumers, who are ultimately the owners of the entire range.

You can guess why some people would prefer not to open that dialogue.

And perhaps why something so obvious as an inventory doesn’t already exist.

Following up on my Congressional testimony last week, I’ve written two articles on how the House and Senate are moving forward with plans to undo the FCC’s December 23,2010 “Open Internet” order, aka net neutrality. For my inaugural post for Forbes, I write about the experience of being a witness before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet, and provide some background on how the FCC found itself backed into a corner that led to the unpopular (on both sides) new rules. See “Deep in the Net Neutrality Trenches.”

On CNET this morning, I review in detail the steps taken last week by Congress. These include two hearings, one featuring all five FCC Commissioners. After the hearings, the House approved an amendment to the on-going budget negotiations that would deny the agency any funding to implement or enforce its rules. Later, both the House and Senate issued a Joint Resolution of Disapproval, which, if passed, would nullify the rule-making and deny the FCC future authority to try again.

The conventional wisdom suggests that these are futile gestures, as President Obama would veto either measure (as well as other pending legislation on the subject). But not necessarily. Even before the new Congress came in, the President demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Republicans (e.g., extending the Bush tax cuts). Net neutrality is certainly a priority for the White House, but it may not be as high as other priorities.  The net neutrality rules–unpopular with just about everyone–mail fall victim to horse-trading over the budget or other more important legislative goals for the White House.

I’ll be speaking (ad nauseum) about the Report and Order at two events next week in Washington.

On March 1, TechFreedom is sponsoring an event to review my white paper on the FCC’s December, 2010 Report and Order on the Open Internet.  The event is free, but RSVP is required.  Commentators include Internet pioneer Dave Farber, Free State Foundation’s Randolph May, Open Internet Coalition’s Markham Erickson, Verizon’s Link Hoewing, and Public Knowledge’s Harold Feld.  Opening remarks will be delivered by Congressman Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), who has introduced legislation to reverse the order and limit the FCC’s jurisdiction over Internet matters.   The white paper is available here.

On March 2, I’ll join Richard Bennett and Randolph May at the Institute for Policy Innovation’s Third Annual Communications Summit.    Other speakers include former Congressman Rick Boucher, FCC Commissioner Meredith Baker, and Andrew Keen.

Back in 2007 I penned a law review article, “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age” in which I argued that “If America is to have a consistent First Amendment in the Information Age, efforts to extend the broadcast regulatory regime must be halted and that regime must be relegated to the ash heap of history.” I made that argument based not only upon the fundamental bankruptcy of the rationales supporting the old broadcast regulatory regime, or its unfairness to broadcasters relative to other media competitors, but also because such asymmetrical regulations no longer make sense — and are increasingly impractical to enforce — in an age of technological convergence and media abundance.

The good news is that, slowly but surely, the courts are coming around to this logic, at least as it pertains to speech controls.  We saw that again today with a ruling by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that held as unconstitutional $1.2 million in fines that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) levied on ABC broadcast affiliates seven years ago for airing a brief glimpse of Charlotte Ross’ bare buttocks on the cop drama “NYPD Blue.”   As the Wall Street Journal’s Amy Schatz notes, “Broadcasters have now won a series of court victories against government efforts to police airwaves and fine stations for airing risqué content. The Supreme Court could soon get a chance to review the issue. In the meantime, the FCC’s campaign to enforce indecency rules has ground to a halt.”

It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will throw the whole regime out, but I can’t help but think that’s where we are headed. The only real argument left for retaining the old regulatory regime it is that broadcast television should be treated as one massive safe harbor, where people could find squeaky-clean content 24/7.  The current regime is a partial safe harbor for the hours of the day when children are supposedly present in the viewing audience (6am – 10pm).  Some have argued that safe harbor should be retained or even expanded such that parents have a place that they know will supposedly always be “safe” for their kids.  But the problem with that notion is that (1) parents already have plenty of other things to let their kids see or hear if they are nervous about what might be on broadcast TV, and (2) we can’t stop viewers or listeners from flocking away from more heavily regulated broadcast platforms, as they have already been doing for years.  In a sense, therefore, technological advances make this regime less relevant with each passing day and eventually may make it moot altogether even if it’s not tossed out by the Supreme Court for being so hopelessly vague.

As a matter of principle, however, this old regime needs to go because it was never justifiable to begin with.  The courts should have never allowed a technology-specific carve-out to the First Amendment to take root in the law. Again, we need to get back to a consistent First Amendment that protects all speech and media platforms equally.

P.S. I’m forced to agree with Joe Flint’s quip in the L.A. Times that “There is nothing indecent about actress Charlotte Ross’ rear end.”  Frankly, I’ve never understood why her bare butt earned the wrath of the FCC.  Now, on the other hand, when we had to see Dennis Franz’s flabby rear-end in that one painful shower scene in season 2, well, that was just plain wrong.  Blatantly obscene. The FCC should have commandeered DoD drones and taken out all the ABC broadcast towers in America that night.  (Kidding!)

When the only tool you have is a hammer, as the old cliché goes, everything looks like a nail.

Net neutrality, as I first wrote in 2006, is a complicated issue at the accident-prone intersection of technology and policy.  But some of its most determined—one might say desperate—proponents are increasingly anxious to simplify the problem into political slogans with no melody and sound bites with no nutritional value.  Even as—perhaps precisely because—a “win-win-win” compromise seems imminent, the rhetorical excess is being amplified.  The feedback is deafening.

In one of the most bizarre efforts yet to make everything be about net neutrality, Public Knowledge issued several statements this week “condemning” Fox’s decision to prohibit access to its online programming from Cablevision internet users.  In doing so, the organization claims, Fox has committed “the grossest violations of the open Internet committed by a U.S. company.”

This despite the fact that the open Internet rules (pick whatever version you like) apply only to Internet access providers.  Indeed, the rules are understood principally as a protection for content providers.  You know, like Fox.

OK, let’s see how we got here.

The Fox-Cablevision Dispute

In response to a fee dispute between the two companies, Fox on Saturday pulled its programming from the Cablevision system, and blocked Cablevision internet users from accessing Fox programming on-line.  Separately, Hulu.com (minority owned by Fox) enforced a similar restriction, hoping to stay “neutral” in the dispute.  Despite the fact that “The Simpsons” and “Family Guy” weren’t even on this weekend (pre-empted by some sports-related programming, I guess), the viewing public was incensed, journalists wrote, and Congress expressed alarm. The blackout, at least on cable, persists.

A wide range of commentators, including Free State Foundation’s Randolph May, view the spat as further evidence of the obsolescence of the existing cable television regulatory regime.  Among other oddities left over from the days when cable was the “community antenna” for areas that couldn’t get over-the-air signals, cable providers are required to carry local programming without offering any competing content.   But local providers are not obliged to make their content available to the cable operator, or even to negotiate.

As cable technology has flourished in both content and services, the relationship between providers and content producers has mutated into something strange and often unpleasant.  Just today, Sen. John Kerry sent draft legislation to the FCC aimed at plugging some of the holes in the dyke.  That, however, is a subject for another day.

Because somehow, Public Knowledge sees the Fox-Cablevision dispute as a failure of net neutrality.  In one post, the organization “condemns” Fox for blocking Internet access to its content.  “Blocking Web sites,” according to the press release, “is totally out of bounds in a dispute like this.”  Another release called out Fox, which was said to have “committed what should be considered one of the grossest violations of the open Internet committed by a U.S. company.”

The Open Internet means everything and nothing

What “open Internet” are they talking about?  The one I’m familiar with, and the one that I thought was at the center of years of debate over federal policy, is one in which anyone who wants to can put up a website, register their domain name, and then can be located and viewed by anyone with an Internet connection.

In the long-running net neutrality debate, the principal straw man involves the potential (it’s never happened so far) for Internet access providers, especially large ones serving customers nationally, to make side deals with the operators of some websites (Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Yahoo, eBay, perhaps) to manipulate Internet traffic at the last mile on their behalf.

Perhaps for a fee, in some alternate future, Microsoft would pay extra to have search results from Bing given priority, making it look “faster” than Google.  That would encourage Google to strike a similar deal and, before you know it, only the largest content providers would appear to be worth visiting.

That would effectively end the model of the web that has worked so well, where anyone with a computer can be a publisher, and the best material has the potential to rise to the top.  Where even entrepreneurs without a garage can launch a product or service on a shoestring and, if enough users like it, catapult themselves into being the next Google, eBay, Facebook or Twitter.

What does any of this have to do with Fox’s activities over the weekend?

As Public Knowledge sees it, any interference with web content is a violation of the open Internet, even if that interference is being done by the content provider itself! Fox has programming content on both its own site and on the Hulu website, content it places there, like every other site operator, on a voluntary basis.

But, having once made that content available for viewing, according to Public Knowledge, it should be a matter of federal law that they keep it there, and not limit access to it in any way for any consumer anywhere at any time.  It’s only consumers who have rights here:  “Consumers should not have their access to Web content threatened because a giant media company has a dispute over cable programming carriage.”  (emphasis added)

On this view, it’s not content owners who have rights (under copyright and otherwise) to determine how and when their content is accessed.  Rather, it is the consumer who has an unfettered right to access any content that happens to reside on any server with an Internet connection.  Here’s the directory to everything on my computer, dear readers.  Have at it.

The “Government’s Policy” Explained

Indeed, according to PK, this remarkable view of the law has long-since been embraced by the FCC.  “We need to remember that the government’s policy is that consumers should have access to lawful content online, and that policy should not be disrupted by a programming dispute.”

Here’s how Public Knowledge retcon’s that version of “the government’s policy.”

Until this spring, the 2005 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policy statement held that Internet users had the right to access lawful content of their choice.  There was no exception in that policy for customers who happened to have their Internet provider caught up in a nasty retransmission battle with a broadcaster.

Said policy statement that was struck down [sic] on April 6 by the U.S. Appeals Court, D.C. Circuit, when Comcast challenged the enforcement of the policy against the company for blocking users of the BitTorrent [sic].

The policy statement was based on the assumption that if there were a bad actor in preventing the consumer from seeing online content, it would be an Internet Service Provider (ISP) blocking or otherwise inhibiting access to content.  In this case, of course, it’s the content provider that was doing the blocking.  It’s a moot point now, but it shouldn’t matter who is keeping consumers away from the lawful content. (emphasis added)

Where to begin?  For starters, the policy statement was not “struck down” in the Comcast case.  The court held (courts do that, by the way, not statements of policy) that the FCC failed to identify any provision of the Communications Act that gave them the power to enforce the policy statement against Comcast.

That is all the court held.  The court said nothing about the statement itself, and even left open the possibility that there were provisions that might work but which were not cited by the agency.  (The FCC chose not to ask for a rehearing of the decision, or to appeal it to the U.S. Supreme Court.)

Moreover, there is embedded here an almost willful misuse of the phrase “lawful content.”  Lawful content means any web content other than files that users want to share with each other without license from copyright holders, including commercial software, movies, music, and documents.  None of that activity (much of what BitTorrent is still used for, by the way–the source of the Comcast case in the first place) is “lawful.”  The FCC does not want to discourage—and may indeed want to require—ISPs from interfering, blocking, and otherwise policing the access of that unlawful content.

Here, however, PK reads “lawful content” to mean content that the user has a lawful right to access, which, apparently, is all content—any file on any device connected to the Internet.

But “lawful content” does not somehow confer proprietary rights to consumers to access whatever content they like, whenever and however they like.  The owner of the content, the entity that made it available, can always decide, for any or no reason, to remove it or restrict it.   Lawful content isn’t a right for consumers—it just means something other than unlawful content.

Still, the more remarkable bit of linguistic judo is the last paragraph, in which the 2005 Open Internet policy statement becomes not a policy limiting the behavior of access providers but of absolutely everyone connected to the Internet.

The opposite is utterly clear from reading the policy statement, which addressed itself specifically to “providers of telecommunications for Internet access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) services.”

But that language, according to Public Knowledge, is just an “assumption.”  The FCC actually meant not just ISPs but anyone who can possibly interference with what content a user can access, which is to say anyone with a website.  When it comes to consumer access to content, it “shouldn’t matter” that the content provider herself decides to limit access.  The content, after all, is “lawful,” and therefore, no one can “[keep] consumers away” from it.

The nonsensical nature of this mangling of completely clear language to the contrary becomes even clearer if you try for a moment to take it to the next logical step.  On PK’s view, all content that was ever part of the Internet is “lawful content,” and, under the 2005 policy statement, no one is allowed to keep consumers away from it, including, as here, the actual owners of the content.

So does that mean that having put up this post (I presume the content is “lawful”), I can’t at some future date take it down, or remove some part of it?

Well maybe their objection is just to selective limitation.  Having agreed to the social contract that comes with creating a website, I’ve agreed to an open principal (enforceable by federal law) that requires my making it freely and permanently available to anyone, anywhere, who wants to view it.  I can’t block users with certain IP addresses, whether that blocking is based on knowledge that those addresses are spammers, or residents of a country with whom I am not legally permitted to do business, or, as here, are customers of a company with whom I am engaged in a dispute over content in another channel.

But of course selective limitation of content access is a feature of every website.  You know, like the kind that comes with requiring a user to register and sign in (eBay), or accept cookies that allow the site to customize the user’s experience (Yahoo!), or pay a subscription fee to access some or all of the information (The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times), or that requires a consumer see not just the “lawful content” they want but also, side-by-side, advertising or other information that helps pay for the creation and upkeep of the site (Google, everyone else).

Or that allows a user to view a file but not to copy and resell copies of it (streaming media).  Or that limits access or use of a web service by geography (banking, gambling and other protected industries).   Or that require users to grant certain rights to the site provider to use information provided by the user (Facebook, Twitter) in exchange for use of the services.

Paradise Lost by the D.C. Circuit’s Comcast Decision

Or maybe their objection is just to when Fox does it?

Under PK’s view of net neutrality, the Web is a consumer paradise, where content magically appears for purely altruistic reasons and stays forever to frolic and interact.  Fox can’t limit, even arbitrarily and capriciously, who can and cannot watch its programming on the Web.  It must make it freely available to everyone and anyone, or face condemnation by self-appointed consumer advocates who will, as prosecutor, judge and jury, convict them of having committed “the grossest violations” possible of the FCC’s open Internet policy.

That is, if only the law that PK believes represents longstanding “government policy” was still on the books.  For the real tragedy of the Fox-Cablevision dispute is that the FCC is now powerless to enforce that policy, and indeed, is powerless to stop even the “grossest violations.”

If only the D.C. Circuit hadn’t ruled against the FCC in the Comcast case, then the agency would, on this view, be able to stop Fox and Hulu from restricting access to Fox programming from Cablevision internet customers.  Or anyone else.  Ever.

That of course was never the law, and never will be.   More-or-less coincidentally, the FCC has limited jurisdiction over Fox as a broadcaster, but not to require it to make its programming available on the web, on-demand to everyone who wants to see it.

Fox aside, there is nothing in The Communications Act that could possibly be thought to extend the agency’s power to policing the behavior of all web content providers, which these days includes pretty much every single Internet user.

Nor did the Open Internet policy statement have anything to say about content providers, period.  If it had, it would have represented an ultra vires extension of the FCC’s powers that would have shamed even the most pro-regulatory cheerleader.  It would never have stood up to any legal challenge (First Amendment?  Fifth Amendment?  For starters…)

Not only does it matter but it certainly “should matter who is keeping consumers away from lawful content.”  When the “who” is the owner of the content itself, they have the right and almost certainly the need to restrict access to some or all consumers, now or in the future, without having to ask permission from the FCC.

And thank goodness.  An FCC with the power to order content providers to make content available to anyone and everyone, all the time and with no restrictions, would surely lead to a web with very little content in the first place.

Who would put any content online otherwise?  Government agencies?  Not-for-profits?  Non-U.S. users not subject to the FCC?   (But since their content would be available to U.S. consumers, who on the PK view have all the rights here, perhaps the FCC’s authority, pre-Comcast, extended to non-U.S. content providers, too.)

Not much of a web there.

No one Believes This—Including Public Knowledge

The wistful nostalgia for life before the Comcast decision is beyond misguided.  No proposal before or since would have changed the fundamental principal that open Internet rules apply to Internet access providers only.

Under the detailed net neutrality rules proposed by the FCC in 2009, for example, the Policy Statement would be extended and formalized, but would still apply only to “providers of broadband Internet access service.”  Likewise the Google-Verizon proposed legislative framework.  Likewise even the ill-advised proposal to reclassify broadband Internet access under Title II to give the FCC more authority—it’s still more authority only over access providers, not just anyone with an iPhone.

(Though perhaps PK is hanging its hopes on some worrisome language in the Title II Notice of Inquiry that might extend that authority, see “The Seven Deadly Sins of Title II Reclassification.”)

Public Knowledge has never actually proposed its own version of net neutrality legislation.  So I guess it’s possible that they’ve imagined all along that the rules would apply to content providers as well as ISPs.

Well, but the organization does have a “position” statement on net neutrality.  And guess what?  It doesn’t line up with their new-found understanding of the 2005 FCC Policy statement either.   Public Knowledge’s own position on net neutrality addresses itself solely to limits and restrictions on “network operators.”   (E.g., “Public Knowledge supports a neutral Internet where network operators may offer different levels of access at higher rates as long as that tier is offered on a nondiscriminatory basis to every other provider.”)

So apparently even Public Knowledge is among the sensible group in the net neutrality debate who reject the naïve and foolish idea that “it shouldn’t matter who is keeping consumers away from the lawful content.”

Did the rhetoric just get away from them over there, or are those who support Public Knowledge’s push for net neutrality really supporting something very different–different even than what the organization says it means by that phrase?  Something that would extend federal regulatory authority to every publisher of content on the web, including you?

I’m not sure which answer is more disturbing.

Better late than never, I’ve finally given a close read to the Notice of Inquiry issued by the FCC on June 17^th.  (See my earlier comments, “FCC Votes for Reclassification, Dog Bites Man”.)  In some sense there was no surprise to the contents; the Commission’s legal counsel and Chairman Julius Genachowski had both published comments over a month before the NOI that laid out the regulatory scheme the Commission now has in mind for broadband Internet access.

Chairman Genachowski’s “Third Way” comments proposed an option that he hoped would satisfy both extremes.  The FCC would abandon efforts to find new ways to meet its regulatory goals using “ancillary jurisdiction” under Title I (an avenue the D.C. Circuit had wounded, but hadn’t actually exterminated, in the Comcast decision), but at the same time would not go as far as some advocates urged and put broadband Internet completely under the telephone rules of Title II.

Instead, the Commission would propose a “lite” version of Title II, based on a few guiding principles:

• Recognize the transmission component of broadband access service—and only this component—as a telecommunications service;
• Apply only a handful of provisions of Title II (Sections 201, 202, 208, 222, 254, and 255) that, prior to the Comcast decision, were widely believed to be within the Commission’s purview for broadband;
• Simultaneously renounce—that is, forbear from—application of the many sections of the Communications Act that are unnecessary and inappropriate for broadband access service; and
• Put in place up-front forbearance and meaningful boundaries to guard against regulatory overreach.

The NOI pretends not to take a position on any of three possible options – (1) stick with Title I and find a way to make it work, (2) reclassify broadband and apply the full suite of Title II regulations to Internet access providers, or (3) compromise on the Chairman’s Third Way, applying Title II but forbearing on any but the six sections noted above—at least, for now (see ¶ 98).  It asks for comments on all three options, however, and for a range of extensions and exceptions within each.

I’ve written elsewhere (see “Reality Check on ‘Reclassifying’ Broadband” and  “Net Neutrality and the Inconvenient Constitution”) about the dubious legal foundation on which the FCC rests its authority to change the definition of “information services” to suddenly include broadband Internet, after successfully (and correctly) convincing the U.S. Supreme Court that it did not.  That discussion will, it seems, have to wait until its next airing in federal court following inevitable litigation over whatever course the FCC takes.

This post deals with something altogether different—a number of startling tidbits that found their way into the June 17 ^th NOI.  As if Title II weren’t dangerous enough, there are hints and echoes throughout the NOI of regulatory dreams to come.  Beyond the hubris of reclassification, here are seven surprises buried in the 116 paragraphs of the NOI—its seven deadly sins.  In many cases the Commission is merely asking questions.  But the questions hint at a much broader—indeed overwhelming—regulatory agenda that goes beyond Net Neutrality and the undoing of the Comcast decision.

Pride:  The folly of defining “facilities-based” provisioning – The FCC is struggling to find a way to apply reclassification only to the largest ISPs – Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, Time Warner, etc.  But the statutory definition of “telecommunications” doesn’t give them much help.  So the NOI invents a new distinction, referred to variously as “facilities-based” providers (¶ 1) or providers of an actual “physical connection,” (¶ 106) or limiting the application of Title II just to the “transmission component” of a provider’s consumer offering (¶ 12).

All the FCC has in mind here is “a commonsense definition of broadband Internet service,” (¶ 107) (which they never provide), but in any case the devil is surely in the details.  First, it’s not clear that making that distinction would actually achieve the goal of applying the open Internet rules—network management, good or evil, largely occurs well above the transmission layers in the IP stack.

The sin here, however, is that of unintentional over-inclusion.  If Title II is applied to “facilities-based” providers, it could sweep in application providers who increasingly offer connectivity as a way to promote usage of their products.

Limiting the scope of reclassification just to “facilities-based” providers who sell directly to consumers doesn’t eliminate the risk of over-inclusion.  Some application providers, for example, offer a physical connection in partnership with an ISP (think Yahoo and Covad DSL service) and many large application providers own a good deal of fiber optic cable that could be used to connect directly with consumers.  (Think of Google’s promise to build gigabit test beds for select communities.)  Municipalities are still working to provide WiFi and WiMax connections, again in cooperation with existing ISPs.  (EarthLink planned several of these before running into financial and, in some cities, political trouble.)

There are other services, including Internet backbone provisioning, that could also fall into the Title II trap (see ¶ 64).  Would companies, such as Akamai, which offer caching services, suddenly find themselves subject to some or all of Title II?  (See ¶ 58)  How about Internet peering agreements (unmentioned in the NOI)?  Would these private contracts be subject to Title II as well?  (See ¶ 107)

Lust:  The lure of privacy, terrorism, crime, copyright – Though the express purpose of the NOI is to find a way to apply Title II to broadband, the Commission just can’t help lusting after some additional powers it appears interested in claiming for itself.  Though the Commissioners who voted for the NOI are adamant that the goal of reclassification is not to regulate “the Internet” but merely broadband access, the siren call of other issues on the minds of consumers and lawmakers may prove impossible to resist.

Recognizing, for example, that the Federal Trade Commission has been holding hearings all year on the problems of information privacy, the FCC now asks for comments about how it can use Title II authority to get into the game (¶ 39, 52, 82, 83, 96), promising of course to “complement” whatever actions the FTC is planning to take.

Cyberattacks and other forms of terrorism are also on the Commission’s mind.  In his separate statement, for example, Chairman Genachowski argues that the Comcast decision “raises questions about the right framework for the Commission to help protect against cyber-attacks.”

The NOI includes several references to homeland security and national defense—this in the wake of publicity surrounding Sen. Lieberman’s proposed law to give the President extensive emergency powers over the Internet.  (See Declan McCullaugh, “Lieberman Defends Emergency Net Authority Plan.”)  Lieberman’s bill puts the power squarely in the Department of Homeland Security—is the FCC hoping to use Title II to capture some of that power for itself?

And beyond shocking acts of terrorism, does the FCC see Title II as a license to require ISPs to help enforce other, lesser crimes, including copyright infringement, libel, bullying and cyberstalking, e-personation—and the rest?  Would Title II give the agency the ability to impose its content “decency” rules, limited today merely to broadcast television and radio, to Internet content, as Congress has unsuccessfully tried to help the Commission do on three separate occasions?

(Just as I wrote that sentence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC’s recent effort to craft more aggressive indecency rules, applied to Janet Jackson’s nipple, violates the First Amendment.  The Commission is having quite a bad year in the courts!)

Anger:  Sharing the pain of CALEA – That last paragraph is admittedly speculation.  The NOI contains no references to copyright, crime, or indecency.  But here’s a law enforcement sin that isn’t speculative.  The NOI reminds us that separate from Title II, the FCC is required by law to enforce the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). (¶ 89) CALEA is part of the rich tapestry of federal wiretap law, and requires “telecommunications carriers” to implement technical “back doors” that make it easier for federal law enforcement agencies to execute wiretapping orders.  Since 2005, the FCC has held that all facilities-based providers are subject to CALEA.

Here, the Commission assumes that reclassification would do nothing to change the broader application of CALEA already in place, and seeks comment on “this analysis.”  (¶ 89)  The Commission wonders how that analysis impacts its forbearance decisions, but I have a different question.  Assuming the definition of “facilities-based” Internet access providers is as muddled as it appears (see above), is the Commission intentionally or unintentionally extending the coverage of CALEA to anyone selling Internet “connectivity” to consumers, even those for whom that service is simply in the interest of promoting applications?

Again, would residents of communities participating in Google’s fiber optic test bed awake to discover that all of that wonderful data they are now pumping through the fiber is subject to capture and analysis by any law enforcement officer holding a wiretapping order?  Oops?

Gluttony:  The Insatiable Appetite of State and Local Regulators – Just when you think the worst is over, there’s a nasty surprise waiting at the end of the NOI.  Under Title II, the Commission reminds us, many aspects of telephone regulation are not exclusive to the FCC but are shared with state and even local regulatory agencies.

Fortunately, to avoid the catastrophic effects of imposing perhaps hundreds of different and conflicting regulatory schemes to broadband Internet access, the FCC has the authority to preempt state and local regulations that conflict with FCC “decisions,” and to preempt the application of those parts of Title II the FCC may or may not forbear.

But here’s the billion dollar question, which the NOI saves for the very last (¶ 109):  “Under each of the three approaches, what would be the limits on the states’ or localities’ authority to impose requirements on broadband Internet service and broadband Internet connectivity service?”

What indeed?  One of the provisions the FCC would not apply under the Third Way, for example, is § 253, which gives the Commission the authority to “preempt state regulations that prohibit the provision of telecommunications services.” (¶ 87)  So does the Third Way taketh federal authority only to giveth to state and local regulators?  Is the only way to avoid state and local regulations—oh, well, if you insist–to go to full Title II?  And might the FCC decide in any case to exercise their discretion, now or in the future, to allow local regulations of Internet connectivity?

What might those regulations look like?  One need only review the history of local telephone service to recall the rate-setting labyrinths, taxes, micromanagement of facilities investment and deployment decisions—not to mention the scourge of corruption, graft and other government crimes that have long accompanied the franchise process.  Want to upgrade your cable service?  Change your broadband provider?  Please file the appropriate forms with your state or local utility commission, and please be patient.

Fear-mongering?  Well, consider a proposal that will be voted on this summer at the annual meeting of the National Association of Utilities Commissioners.  (TC-1 at page 30)  The Commissioners will decide whether to urge the FCC to adopt what it calls a “fourth way” to fix the Net Neutrality problem.  Their description of the fourth way speaks for itself.  It would consist of:

“bi-jurisdictional regulatory oversight for broadband Internet connectivity service and broadband Internet service which recognizes the particular expertise of States in: managing front-line consumer education, protection and services programs; ensuring public safety; ensuring network service quality and reliability; collecting and mapping broadband service infrastructure and adoption data; designing and promoting broadband service availability and adoption programs; and implementing  competitively neutral pole attachment, rights-of-way and tower siting rules and programs.”

The proposal also asks the FCC, should it stick to the Third Way approach, to add in several other provisions left out of Chairman Genachowski’s list, including one (again, § 253) that would preserve the state’s ability to help out.

Or consider a proposal currently being debated by the California Public Utilities Commission.  California, likewise, would like to use reclassification as the key that unlocks the door to “cooperative federalism,” and has its own list of provisions the FCC ought not to forbear under the Third Way proposal.

Among other things, the CPUC’s general counsel is unhappy with the definition the FCC proposes for just who and what would be covered by Title II reclassification.  The CPUC proposal argues for a revised definition that “should be flexible enough to cover unforeseen technological [sic] in both the short- and long-term.”

The CPUC also proposes the FCC add to the list of those regulated by Title II providers Voice over Internet Protocol telephony, which is often a software application riding well above the “transmission” component of broadband access.

California is just the first (tax-starved) state I looked for.  I’m sure there are and will be others who will respond hungrily to the Commission’s invitation to “comment” on the appropriate role of state and local regulators under either a full or partial Title II regime.  (¶ 109, 110)

Sloth:  The sleeping giant of basic web functions – browsers, DNS lookup, and more – The NOI admits that the FCC is a bit behind the times when it comes to technical expertise, and they would like commenters to help them build a fuller record.  Specifically, ¶ 58 asks for help “to develop a current record on the technical and functional characteristics of broadband Internet service, and whether those characteristics have changed materially in the last decade.”

In particular, the NOI wants to know more about the current state of web browsers, DNS lookup services, web caching, and “other basic consumer Internet activities.”

Sounds innocent enough, but those are very loaded questions.  In the Brand X case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the FCC that broadband Internet access over cable fit the definition of a Title I “information service” and not a Title II “telecommunications service,” browsers, DNS lookup and other “basic consumer Internet activities” were crucial to the analysis of the majority.  Because cable (and, later, it was decided, DSL) providers offered not simply a physical connection but also supporting or “enhanced” services to go with it—including DNS lookup, home pages, email support and the like—their offering to consumers was not simple common carriage.

Justice Scalia disagreed, and in dissent made the argument that cable Internet was in fact two separable offerings – the physical connection (the packet-switched network) and a set of information services that ran on top of that connection.  Consumers used some information services from the carrier, and some from other content providers (other web sites, e.g.).  Those information services were rightly left unregulated under Title I, but Congress intended the transmission component, according to Justice Scalia, to be treated as a common carrier “telecommunications service” under Title II.

The Third Way proposal in large part adopts the Scalia view of the Communications Act (see ¶ 20, 106), despite the fact that it was the FCC who argued vigorously against that view all along, and despite the fact that a majority of the Court agreed with them.

By asking these innocent questions about technical architecture, the FCC appears to be hedging its bets for a certain court challenge.   Any effort to reclassify broadband Internet access will generate long, complicated, and expensive litigation.  What, the courts will ask, has driven the FCC to make such an abrupt change in its interpretation of terms like “information service” whose statutory definitions haven’t changed since 1996?

We know it is little more than that the Chairman would like to undo the Comcast decision, of course, and thereafter complete the process of enrolling the open Internet rules proposed in October.  But in the event that proves an unavailing argument, it would be nice to be able to argue that the nature of the Internet and Internet access have fundamentally changed since 2005, when Brand X was decided.  If it’s clear that basic Internet services have become more distinct from the underlying physical connection, at least in the eyes of consumers, so much the better.

Or perhaps something bigger is lumbering lazily through the NOI.  Perhaps the FCC is considering whether “basic Internet activities” (browsing, searching, caching, etc.) have now become part of the definition of basic connectivity.  Perhaps Title II, in whole or in part, will apply not only to facilities-based providers, but to those who offer basic Internet services essential for web access.  (Why extend Title II to providers of “basic” information service?  See below, “Greed.”)   If so, the exception will swallow the rule, and just about everything else that makes the Internet ecosystem work.

Vanity:  The fading beauty of the cellular ingénue – Perhaps the most worrisome feature of the proposed open Internet rules is that they would apply with equal force to wired and wireless Internet access.  As any consumer knows, however, those two types of access couldn’t be more different.

Infrastructure providers have made enormous progress in innovating improvements to existing infrastructure—especially the cable and copper networks.  New forms of access have also emerged, including fiber optic cable, satellite, WiFi/WiMax, and the nascent provisioning of broadband over power lines, which has particular promise in remote areas which may have no other option for access.

Broadband speeds are increasing, and there’s every expectation that given current technology and current investment plans, the National Broadband Plan’s goal of 100 million Americans with access to 100 mbps Internet speeds by 2010 will be reached without any public spending.

The wireless world, however, is a different place.  After years of underutilization of 3G networks by consumers who saw no compelling or “killer” apps worth using, the latest generation of portable computing devices (iPhone, Android, Blackberry, Windows) has reached the tipping point and well beyond.  Existing networks in many locations are overcommitted, and political resistance to additional cell tower and other facilities deployment is exacerbating the problem.

Just last week, a front page story in the San Francisco Chronicle reported on growing tensions between cell phone providers and residents who want new towers located anywhere but near where they live, go to school, shop, or work.  CTIA-The Wireless Association announced that it would no longer hold events in San Francisco, after the city council, led by Mayor Gavin Newsome, passed a “Cell Phone Right to Know” ordinance that requires retail disclosure of a phone’s specific adoption rate of emitted radiation.

Given the likely continued lagging of cellular deployment, it seems prudent to consider less stringent restrictions on network management for wireless than for wireline.  Under the open Internet rules, providers would be unable to limit or ban outright certain high-bandwidth data services, notably video services and peer-to-peer file sharing, that the network may simply be unable to support.  But the proposed open Internet rules will have none of that.

The NOI does note some of the significant differences between wired and wireless (¶ 102), but also reminds us that the limited spectrum for wireless signals affords them special powers to regulate the business practices of providers. (¶ 103)  Under Title III of the Communications Act, which applies to wireless, the FCC has and makes use of the power to ensure spectrum uses are serving a broad “public interest.”

In some ways, then, Title III gives the Commission powers to regulate wireless broadband access beyond what they would get from a reclassification to Title II.  So even if the FCC were to choose the first option and leave the current classification scheme alone, wireless broadband providers might still be subject to open Internet rules under Title III.  It would be ironic if the only broadband providers whose network management practices were to be scrutinized were those who needed the most flexibility.  But irony is nothing new in communications law.

One power, however, might elude the FCC, and therefore might give further weight to a scheme that would regulate wireless broadband under Title III and Title II.  Title III does not include the extension of Universal Service to wireless broadband (¶ 103).  This is a particular concern given the increased reliance of under-served and at-risk communities on cellular technologies for all their communications needs.  (See the recent Pew Internet & Society study for details.)

While the NOI asks for comment on whether and to what extent the FCC ought to treat wireless broadband differently and at a later time from wired services, the thrust of this section makes clear the Commission is thinking of more, not less regulation for the struggling cellular industry.

Greed:  Universal Service taxes – So what about Universal Service?  In an effort to justify the Title II reclassification as something more than just a fix to the Comcast case, the FCC has (with some hedging) suggested that D.C. Circuit’s ruling also calls into question the Commission’s ability to implement the National Broadband Plan, published only a few weeks prior to the decision in Comcast.

At a conference sponsored by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research that I attended, Chairman Genachowski was emphatic that nothing in Comcast constrained the FCC’s ability to execute the plan.

But in the run-up to the NOI, the rhetoric has changed.  Here the Chairman in his separate statement says only that “the recent court decision did not opine on the initiatives and policies that we have laid out transparently in the National Broadband Plan and elsewhere.”

Still, it’s clear that whether out of genuine concern or just for more political and legal cover, the Commission is trying to make the case that Comcast casts serious doubt on the Plan, and in particular the FCC’s recommendations for reform of the Universal Service Fund (USF).  (¶¶ 32-38).

Though the NOI politely recites the legal theories posed by several analysts for how USF reform could be done without any reclassification, the FCC is skeptical.  For the first and only time in the NOI, the FCC asks not for general comments on its existing authority to reform Universal Service but for the kind of evidence that would be “needed to successfully defend against a legal challenge to implementation of the theory.”

There is, of course, a great deal at stake.  The USF is fed by taxes paid by consumers as part of their telephone bills, and is used to subsidize telephone service to those who cannot otherwise afford it.  Some part of the fund is also used for the “E-Rate” program, which subsidizes Internet access for schools and libraries.

Like other parts of the fund, E-Rate has been the subject of considerable corruption.  As I noted in Law Four of “The Laws of Disruption,” a 2005 Congressional oversight committee labeled the then $2 billion E-Rate program, which had already spawned numerous criminal convictions for fraud, a disgrace, “completely [lacking] tangible measures of either effectiveness or impact.”

Today the USF collects $8 billion annually in consumer taxes, and there’s little doubt that the money is not being spent in a particularly efficient or useful way.  (See, for example, Cecilia Kang’s Washington Post article this week, “AT&T, Verizon get most federal aid for phone service.”)  The FCC is right to call for USF reform in the National Broadband Plan, and to propose repurposing the USF to subsidize basic Internet access as well as dial tone.  The needs for universal Internet access—employment, education, health care, government services, etc.—are obvious.

But what has this to do with Title II reclassification?  There’s no mention in the NOI of plans to extend the class of services or service providers obliged to collect the USF tax, which is to say there’s nothing to suggest a new tax on Internet access.  But Recommendation 8.10 of the NBP encourages just that.  The Plan recommends that Congress “broaden the USF contributions base” by finding some method of taxing broadband Internet customers.  (Congress has so far steadfastly resisted and preempted efforts to introduce any taxes on Internet access at the federal and state level.)

If Congress agreed with the FCC, broadband Internet access would someday be subject to taxes to help fund a reformed USF.  The bigger the category of providers included under Title II (the most likely collectors of such a tax), the bigger the USF.  The temptation to broaden the definition of affected companies from “facilities based” to something, as the California Public Utilities Commission put it, more “flexible,” would be tantalizing.

***

Other than these minor quibbles, the NOI offers nothing to worry about!