Thomas Rid, author of the new book Cyber War Will Not Take Place discusses whether so-called “cyber war” is a legitimate threat or not. Since the early 1990s, talk of cyber war has caused undue panic and worry and, despite major differences, the military treats the protection of cyberspace much in the same way as protection of land or sea. Rid also covers whether a cyber attack should be considered an act of war; whether it’s correct to classify a cyber attack as “war” considering no violence takes place; how sabotage, espionage and subversion come into play; and offers a positive way to view cyber attacks — have such attacks actually saved millions of lives?

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Related Links

• Cyber War Will Not Take Place, Rid
• About Thomas Rid, Rid
• The Great Cyberscare, Rid
• Cyberwar: don’t believe the hype, Stilgherrian

I was over at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the other day chatting with someone about various regulatory issues and Rush Limbaugh’s WSJ editorial came up.  The person I was speaking with made a comment about how conservatives have really been energized and unified in opposition to the re-imposition to the Doctrine.  I reminded them, however, that it wasn’t always the case that conservatives stood together in the fight over the Fairness Doctrine.  In fact, when I first came to town almost 20 years ago, there were still plenty of conservatives who actually favored it.  I was reminded of that fact when reading a new piece in Engage about “Broadcast ‘Fairness’ in the Twenty-First Century” by my friend Robert Corn-Revere.  Bob is one America’s great First Amendment defenders and his new essay offers an excellent history of efforts to micro-manage speech on the broadcast airwaves over the years.  In it, he reminds us that:

Given the recent vocal opposition to the Fairness Doctrine in the interest of preserving conservative talk radio, it is easy to forget that many prominent conservatives championed the doctrine before its demise. Phyllis Schlafly was a vocal proponent of the Fairness Doctrine because of what she described as “the outrageous and blatant anti-Reagan bias of the TV network newscasts,” and she testified at the FCC in the 1980s in support of the policy “to serve as a small restraint on the monopoly power wielded by Big TV Media.” Senator Jesse Helms was another long-time advocate of the Fairness Doctrine, and conservative groups Accuracy in Media and the American Legal Foundation actively pursued fairness complaints at the FCC against network newscasts.

Likewise, in our book, A Manifesto for Media Freedom, Brian Anderson and I note that some other prominent right-leaning politicians, such as Sen. Trent Lott, favored the Fairness Doctrine.  Moreover, even though most of those conservative individuals and groups have now turned against the Fairness Doctrine, some Republicans still defend (or even seek to expand) the same underlying regulatory concepts that served as the foundation of the Fairness Doctrine.  As Corn-Revere notes:

More recently, a Republican-controlled FCC under Kevin Martin has advocated far more extensive controls over broadcast and cable programming, including news and public affairs. These proposed regulations include requirements governing local programming, restrictions on the use of video news releases, and other new rules that would extend content controls beyond broadcasting. These initiatives have been embraced by liberal media activists, who have said they will seek to ensure that the FCC under the Democrats will adopt and enforce the proposals of the Martin Commission.  The common denominator of the liberal and conservative factions is the overriding belief that traditional First Amendment protections should not be applied to broadcasting or other electronic media.

Unfortunately, Bob’s got it exactly right: You really can’t trust anyone on the Left or Right to make a principled or consistent argument in favor of First Amendment freedoms across the board, including for broadcasting. I have made that point in greater detail in my recent essay on “FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment” as well as this old law review article, “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age.”

Simply stated, proposals to regulate speech — especially speech delivered over broadcast TV and radio platforms — can emanate from either side of the political aisle.  Of course, each side has their own set of rationales for imposing controls on speech and violating the First Amendment. It often comes down to content restraint (the conservative justification) versus content promotion (the liberal justification).  In his excellent book, The Creation of Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications, media historian Paul Starr labels these different groups the “advocates of repression” (those in favor of content restraint), versus the “advocates of uplift” (those in favor of promoting specific types of content). Typically, conservatives and Republicans have dominated the “advocates of repression” camp, while most liberals and Democrats fall in the “advocates of uplift” category.  Ford Rowan, author of the book Broadcast Fairness, put it this way: “Many liberals want regulation to make broadcasting do wonderful things; many conservatives want regulation to restrain broadcasting from doing terrible things.”

Increasingly, however, the ideological divide is disappearing between these two camps. Congressional lawmakers such as former Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) on the political Left often favor the same content controls and mandates that Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) on the political Right. That’s true not just of broadcast regulation, but for proposals to censor video games, the Internet, and social networking sites.  And, even when it comes to the Fairness Doctrine, until just recently there was “a vast bipartisan conspiracy” to keep it on the books, as Corn-Revere argues.  I’m glad those conservatives who once favored the Fairness Doctrine came around to seeing the error in the ways.  Nonetheless, this episode illustrates how, once again, those of us who care about free speech and expression must remain vigilant in defending the First Amendment from attacks by both conservatives and liberals.

What would it take to create a more secure Internet?  That’s what John Markoff explores in his latest New York Times article, “Do We Need a New Internet?”  Echoing some of the same fears Jonathan Zittrain articulates in his new book The Future of the Internet, Markoff wonders if online viruses and other forms of malware have gotten so out-of-control that extreme measures may be necessary to save the Net.  Compared to when cyber-security attacks first started growing over 20 years ago, Markoff argues that:

[T]hings have gotten much, much worse. Bad enough that there is a growing belief among engineers and security experts that Internet security and privacy have become so maddeningly elusive that the only way to fix the problem is to start over.

Like many others, Markoff fingers anonymity as one potential culprit:

The Internet’s current design virtually guarantees anonymity to its users. (As a New Yorker cartoon noted some years ago, “On the Internet, nobody knows that you’re a dog.”) But that anonymity is now the most vexing challenge for law enforcement. An Internet attacker can route a connection through many countries to hide his location, which may be from an account in an Internet cafe purchased with a stolen credit card. “As soon as you start dealing with the public Internet, the whole notion of trust becomes a quagmire,” said Stefan Savage, an expert on computer security at the University of California, San Diego.

Consequently, Markoff suggests that:

A more secure network is one that would almost certainly offer less anonymity and privacy. That is likely to be the great tradeoff for the designers of the next Internet. One idea, for example, would be to require the equivalent of drivers’ licenses to permit someone to connect to a public computer network. But that runs against the deeply held libertarian ethos of the Internet.

Indeed, not only does it run counter to the ethos of the Net, but as Markoff rightly notes, “Proving identity is likely to remain remarkably difficult in a world where it is trivial to take over someone’s computer from half a world away and operate it as your own. As long as that remains true, building a completely trustable system will remain virtually impossible.”  I’ve spent a lot of time writing about that fact here and won’t belabor the point other than to say that efforts to eliminate anonymity for the entire Internet would prove extraordinarily intrusive and destructive — of both the Internet’s current architecture and the rights of its users.  There’s just something about a “show-us-you-papers,” national ID card-esque system of online identification that creeps most of us out. That’s why I spend so much time fighting age verification mandates for social networking sites and other websites; it’s the first step down a very dangerous road.

But what if we could apply such solutions in a narrower sense?  That is, could we create more secure communities within the overarching Internet superstructure that might provide greater security?  Markoff starts thinking along those lines when he suggests…

What a new Internet might look like is still widely debated, but one alternative would, in effect, create a “gated community” where users would give up their anonymity and certain freedoms in return for safety.

… but he is still thinking in terms of a replacement model for the entire Internet, which would be misguided for the reasons I stated above.  We don’t want to force a single, intrusive, anonymity-killing replacement model on the entire online universe.  Starting over isn’t even possible in a practical sense.

It’s a shame that Markoff didn’t interview my old colleague Wayne Crews for his story because Wayne has outlined an alternative framework worth considering. For many years, Wayne has been preaching about “spinternets,” or the notion that we need to start thinking about how develop not just one better Internet, but many better Internets. In a visionary piece for Forbes back in early 2001, Wayne argued that the solution to the growth of various online concerns “is more Internets, not more regulations”:

The Internet needs borders beyond which users can escape damaging political resolutions of these battles, which are rooted in the Internet’s nonowned, common-property status. Conflicting legislative visions in a cyberspace populated by exhibitionists at one extreme and would-be inhabitants of gated communities on the other, reveal the basic truth that not everybody wants or needs to be connected to everybody else.

Again, there’s that notion of “gated communities” that Markoff brought up. It’s not for everybody, but those seeking greater security could perhaps find it inside such online communities. Of course, others who wanted a different experience could start a completely different gated community under Wayne’s model.

But the problem with this notion, quite obviously, is that very few people want to stay inside their gated communities all the time. In the physical world of gated communities, for example, members of it still like to get out of there once and awhile to visit shops, events, parks, friends and family, etc.  The same goes for the Internet.  Just ask all those former denizens of AOL’s gated community.  For awhile, many of them — over 25 million strong at the zenith of its popularity — were content to spend most of their digital day inside the walls of Case’s Castle.  Gradually, however, they felt the need to explore outside those walls.  And so they did.  A mass exodus ensued and the walls came crumbling down around AOL’s gated community.

But that doesn’t necessarily mean the idea of online gated communities is entirely dead. There are certainly many closed, tightly-controlled networks out there already — mostly in corporate or government environments — that offer a glimpse of how such a model might work in practice.  Also, smaller social networking sites aimed at kids provide another example since they are usually tightly-controlled walled gardens that offer much greater security.

But Wayne was always thinking of something bigger — much bigger — than just closed corporate / government networks. He was thinking about a world of many different Internet s that didn’t necessarily have a back door to the broader Internet. Think of it as many parallel, but unconnected digital systems and networks, each serving a different set of values and cultures with unique rules.

Wayne envisioned the primary critique of this model in his original piece, noting that “it will be criticized as Balkanization.”  Indeed, Sonia Arrison called it “techno-isolationism, which goes against the very spirit that makes the Internet great.”  Indeed, it certainly would destroy something very precious about the current Internet — universal connectivity and openness.  But that’s sort of the point, isn’t it!  Universal connectivity and openness have given us many wonderful things, but some troubling things, too.  That’s what Markoff was getting at in his NYT piece, and it’s part of what Wayne was aiming to address with his splinternets idea.

But do we really want to encourage a world of multiple Internets where, presumably, they are split right down to the root? In other words, there wouldn’t be a common language for networks to communicate or a way to access many sites and services outside the particular Net you are on at any given time. It would be the equivalent of living on different digital planets that never linked or communicated.

I think it’s unlikely we’ll ever get there, and if we did it would likely be driven by global governments challenging ICANN and existing Internet governance structures. In other words, the DNS root would be completely split by some countries (China?) who didn’t want to play by the same rules as the rest of the interconnected world, or who wanted to try to impose a different vision upon a new, competing global network.

But might there be a way to find a happy middle ground between the Wild West commons of the current Net and the “techno-isolationism” of Wayne’s splinternet model?  Perhaps “Splinternet-lite” is the solution.  Within the confines of the existing Internet superstructure, there are ways to create walled gardens today and limit the number of back doors to the broader Net.  Again, the smaller social networking sites and virtual worlds aimed at kids already do that. Once you’re in there, you’re in a very different world. You have to be fully verified before you’re even let in the door, and once you’re inside their are tight limits on what you say, do, and explore. And you’ll get booted out pretty quickly if you break the rules.  The result is greater safety and peace-of-mind for kids and parents alike. It’s a less clear, however, how that model would “scale up” and apply to the entire universe of online networks.  I think we’ll have to be content with small patches of security within a world of insecurity. That’s the cost of the openness and interconnectivity that the Net current gives us.

In sum, there is no clear answer to John Markoff’s question, “Do we need a new Internet?”  We certainly could do more to address the problems with the current Net, but upending it and starting over isn’t likely an option.  More micro-splinternets within the overarching Net superstructure, however, might help those who are particularly risk-conscious find safe haven from various cyber-security fears. But it won’t shelter them from those problems completely.