Corbin Barthold invited me on Tech Freedom’s “Tech Policy Podcast” to discuss the history of antitrust and competition policy over the past half century. We covered a huge range of cases and controversies, including: the DOJ’s mega cases against IBM & AT&T, Blockbuster and Hollywood Video’s derailed merger, the Sirius-XM deal, the hysteria over the AOL-Time Warner merger, the evolution of competition in mobile markets, and how we finally ended that dreaded old MySpace monopoly!

What does the future hold for Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix? Do antitrust regulators at the DOJ or FTC have enough to mount a case against these firms? Which case is most likely to have legs?

Corbin and I also talked about the of progress more generally and the troubling rise of more and more Luddite thinking on both the left and right. I encourage you to give it a listen:

If there is one thing I have learned in almost 23 years of covering communications and media regulation it is this: No matter how well-intentioned, regulation often has unintended consequences that hurt the very consumers the rules are meant to protect. Case in point: “universal service” mandates that require a company to serve an entire area as a condition of offering service at all. The intention is noble: Get service out to everyone in the community, preferably at a very cheap rate. Alas, the result of mandating that result is clear: You get less competition, less investment, less innovation, and less consumer choice. And often you don’t even get everyone served.

Consider this Wall Street Journal article today, “Google Fiber Is Fast, but Is It Fair? The Company Provides Neighborhoods With Faster and Cheaper Service, but Are Some Being Left Behind?” In the story, Alistair Barr notes that:

U.S. policy long favored extending service to all. AT&T touted its “universal service” in advertisements more than a century ago. The concept was codified in a 1934 law requiring nationwide “wire and radio services” to reach everyone at “reasonable charges.” In exchange for wiring a community, telecommunications providers often gained a monopoly. Cities made similar deals with cable-TV providers beginning in the 1960s.

The problem, of course, is that while this model allowed for the slow spread of service to most communities, it came at a very steep cost: Monopoly and plain vanilla service. I documented this in a 1994 essay entitled, “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly.” As well-intentioned regulatory mandates started piling up, competition slowly disappeared. And a devil’s deal was eventually cut between regulators and AT&T to adopt the company’s advertising motto — “One Policy, One System, Universal Service” — as the de facto law of the land.

It took us almost a century to dig ourselves out of that mess and move towards telecommunications competition. Alas, we’re still living with the vestiges of this old regulatory mentality. Cities and counties across America still impose a wide variety of “universal service” regulatory mandates. Again, their intention is noble: They want everyone in their community served. You can’t blame them for that. But the result is still the same: Limited facilities-based competition and investment.

And so we return to today’s Wall Street Journal story about Google Fiber, which explains how local officials are finally starting to understand these realities. The story notes:

In 2011, Google struck a deal with authorities in both Kansas City, Kan., and Kansas City, Mo., to build the service based on customer demand. City officials say they didn’t push hard for universal coverage because they thought faster Internet service would boost the local economy and they were competing against so many other cities. “The main point was to win and bring that infrastructure to our city,” said Rick Usher, assistant city manager of Kansas City, Mo. As phone and cable companies slowed their own expansion plans, more cities allowed the selective approach.

Google’s ‘build-to-demand’ model is catching on because it produces results: More infrastructure investment, innovation, and competition. Traditional telecom and broadband operators are prepared to step up investment, too, when the incentives are right:

Verizon was required by cities and some state laws to build and offer its FiOS service widely across cities. It stopped expanding to new cities in 2010; to date, it has spent more than $23 billion on the FiOS rollout. Chief Financial Officer Fran Shammo said in March that the company wouldn’t expand to additional markets until FiOS had “finally returned its cost of capital.” If Verizon resumes expansion, the company would consider Google’s build-to-demand model because it has the potential to be more profitable, said Chris Levendos, a Verizon executive overseeing the FiOS build-out in Manhattan. Others are doing just that. AT&T said in April it would offer Internet speeds of up to one gigabit in as many as 100 cities. It is building to demand and working with local authorities to reduce construction costs, the company said. Tuesday, it said it would bring the high-speed service to Cupertino, Calif., close to Google’s headquarters. This approach “starts to make this business model look quite attractive,” John Stankey, AT&T’s chief strategy officer, said at an investor conference on Aug. 13.

Again, when you get the incentives right and give investors and innovators a green light, they will seize the opportunity. And that’s even true — actually, it is especially true — for high fixed-cost investments like fiber networks.

But wait, aren’t there some pockets of the population that will fall through the cracks under this alternative arrangement? In the short-term, potentially yes. But the right answer to that “digital divide” problem is never to restrict short-term investment and innovation opportunities just because you think you have a better, more “well intentioned” plan. That is the crucial mistake policymakers made in the past. Their desire to get everyone served at the exact same time with the exact same plain vanilla service meant we got sub-optimal technologies and stagnant markets with little hope of any new innovation or investment over the long-haul.

This is how “universal service” consistently fails us. Universal service sells us short. It sells human ingenuity short. The logic that motivates universal service regulation is that: ‘Well, this is about the best we can do. Let’s just get everyone some basic level of service and that will be just and good.’  Can you imagine if we would have applied this logic to other major markets and technologies?!

But what about the under-served communities? First, when you allow new innovation in networks, you never know how or where they might spread next. If you have more competitors offering unique networks architectures and services, there is a very good chance that entrepreneurial minds will figure out how to push out the boundaries of what is possible, especially in terms of how the service is delivered.

Consider this: Back in the old days, did it really make sense to try to stretch a thin copper wire way, way out into the middle of every valley, desert, farm field, and mountain? The myopic universal service mindset says: ‘Well, that’s all we had at the time.’ Perhaps for a time it really was. But how much quicker might we have seen some sort of alternative system if we hadn’t locked in those old assumptions as policy requirements? Is it impossible to believe that wireless technologies might have developed much more quickly if the incentives would have been right? Again, there was no reason for any innovators or investors to even consider the idea at a time when policymakers were mandating copper wires be stretched to every corner of the land, and as they were showering favored companies with subsidies to achieve that goal. That’s not something a new innovator could compete with, and so no one did. It would have been like policymakers saying we needed a “universal service” policy for cheap hamburgers for the masses and then showering McDonald’s with subsidies since they were the first one in many local markets who could deliver on that promise. Had we had such a universal cheap hamburger policy, do you think any other fast food places would have ever come to town and tried to compete against those subsidized burgers? Not likely.

The lesson for today’s policymakers is clear: Open up markets, relax regulatory burdens, eliminate discriminatory taxes and subsidies, and clear away other barriers to investment. Then see what happens. As the Google Fiber experience suggests, innovative minds can and will emerge to offer constructive solutions and slowly spread new networks and technologies.

OK, but won’t there still be some communities that are underserved, even with all that new innovation and investment. It’s certainly possible. And where those communities exist, some government action may be necessary to incentivize the spread of some sort of network to them, or even have the government build it for the community. I’m not opposed to that. (Have you ever driven through the hills of West Virginia or the mountains of rural Western states? Hard places to get wired networks out to!) I’m not very optimistic local governments will do a very good job of building sophisticated networks because they already have a horrible track record in this regard. But, again, I don’t oppose local action on this front if no other alternatives appear after a certain period of time.

But, again, the answer here is not crazy national and state-based universal service mandates that regulate everyone in every community as if they had the same problem. Let competition and innovation work its magic where it can and do not mess that up. Where it proves much harder for that network competition and innovation to take root, use smart incentives to get companies to build out their networks further, or offer alternative wireless infrastructure of some sort, or just have the government build the networks themselves. But we should always give competition and innovation the benefit of the doubt and see what happens first.

So, let me perfectly clear what I am saying here: GOOD INTENTIONS ARE NEVER ENOUGH! [And yes, I am using all caps because I am shouting!] The next time somebody starts mouthing something about how they have the moral high ground in these debates because their intentions are supposedly pure as the driven snow, ask them to show you results. Tell them you want evidence that their intentions have actually produced something concrete and positive for society. If their answer is, in essence, ‘Well, with our regulatory mandates we can at least get everybody some basic level of really crappy monopoly service,’ then tell them that they can take their good intentions and shove them. We can do better.

Call it what you want: a bailout, a thumb on the scales, bidder restrictions–the FCC might conspicuously intervene in the 2015 incentive auctions at the behest of smaller carriers and public interest advocates.

Chairman Wheeler’s recent comments indicate the FCC may devise a way to prevent the largest two carriers–AT&T and Verizon–from purchasing “too much” of the television broadcasters’ spectrum at auction. AT&T likely sees the writing on the wall and argues that if there are auction limits, the restrictions should apply only to the auction, rather than more extreme restrictions that would penalize AT&T and Verizon, the largest carriers, for previously-acquired spectrum. As The Switch’s Brian Fung put it,

the small carriers favor what are called “asymmetric” spectrum caps that affect various carriers differently, while opponents prefer “symmetric” caps that don’t account for existing market positions.

While I wish AT&T put up more of a fight to auction interventions, they (and staff at the FCC) are handicapped in pursuing an unrestricted auction. The blame lies mostly with Congress who gave the FCC vague (thus ripe for abuse) and conflicting mandates spanning decades. The 1993 law authorizing auctions, for instance, requires the FCC to “avoid[] excessive concentration of licenses” and to “disseminat[e] licenses among a wide variety of applicants” among other regulatory carve-outs for smaller competitors. These latter requirements, if implemented as rigorously as smaller carriers would like, directly undermine the purpose of the 2012 American Taxpayer Relief Act that requires the upcoming spectrum auctions raise $7 billion for a public safety broadband network and $20 billion for deficit reduction.

By asymmetrically penalizing AT&T and Verizon, the FCC increases the probability the auction fails to raise the tens of billions of dollars needed (see Fred Campbell’s recent paper). I haven’t heard a policymaker speak about the incentive auction without remarking how extraordinarily complex it is. That complexity–as was made clear in this week’s Senate hearing on the subject–means no one knows how much spectrum will be auctioned off or how much money will be raised. I was doubtful the FCC would secure the called-for 120 MHz for auction in the first place, but the Senate hearing convinced me that they might not get even 60 MHz. If the FCC meddles too much and the broadcasters aren’t assured they’ll get top dollar for their spectrum, the broadcasters might not show up to sell.

For many reasons, the FCC should ignore the pressures to restrict the large carriers in bidding. Smaller carriers argue the large carriers will outbid them only to preclude competition and hoard the spectrum. Every major carrier is spending billions to expand its footprint and capacity rapidly so the hoarding argument is hard to accept (not to mention, carriers face FCC build out requirements). The hoarding argument also confounds me because AT&T and Verizon are at the forefront arguing for more spectrum auctions, particularly spectrum from federal agencies. Would they want the market flooded with new spectrum only so they could spend billions to hoard it?

Asymmetric auction restrictions also resemble a bailout for smaller carriers. T-Mobile and Sprint–who most actively lobby for auction restrictions–are not mom-and-pop establishments. Each is a sophisticated, powerful corporation with access to capital markets and backed by larger international telecoms–Germany’s Deutsche Telekom for T-Mobile and Japan’s SoftBank for Sprint. DT and SoftBank have both pledged to spend billions in the next few years to improve their American carrier’s competitive position. Such carriers do not need an FCC handout.

The bailout resemblance is more apparent when you realize Sprint has been hamstrung for nearly a decade with damaging business decisions. Three come immediately to mind: 1) the dreadful merger with Nextel in 2005; 2) the ill-fated bet in 2008 to forgo LTE rollout in favor of WiMax, a competing 4G standard; and 3) the loss of over one million customers when it discontinued its push-to-talk iDEN service for network upgrades. The losses from the Nextel merger alone approach $30 billion.

To be clear, I don’t second-guess Sprint’s decisions. They did what innovative firms are supposed to do in attempting big, risky investments. However, it should not be the job of the FCC to favor some firms through spectrum auctions because some carriers’ business decisions did not pan out. That is not a competitive wireless auction–that is an FCC-orchestrated bailout. Granted, the FCC has been handed conflicting mandates. The Commission has ample discretion, however, to conduct a competitive auction that both complies with the law and improves chances of reaching the ambitious revenue goals. Intense meddling with auction results could prove disastrous.

Last week, the House held a hearing about the so-called IP Transition. The IP Transition refers to the telephone industry practice of carrying all wire-based consumer services–voice, Internet, and television–via faster, better fiber networks and not on the traditional copper wires that had fewer capabilities. Most consumers have not and will not notice the change. The completed IP Transition, however, has enormous implications for how the FCC regulates. As one telecom watcher said, “What’s at stake? Everything in telecom policy.”

For 100 years or so, phone service has had a special place in regulatory law given its importance in connecting the public. Phone service was almost exclusively over copper wires, a service affectionately called “plain old telephone service” (POTS). AT&T became the government-approved POTS national monopolist in 1913 (which ended with the AT&T antitrust breakup in the 1980s). The deal was: AT&T got to be a protected monopolist while the government got to require AT&T provide various public benefits. The most significant of these is universal service–AT&T had to serve virtually every US household and charge reasonable rates even to remote (that is, expensive) customers.

To create more phone competitors to the Baby Bells–the phone companies spun off from the AT&T break-up in the 1980s–the Congress passed the 1996 Telecom Act and the FCC put burdens on the Baby Bells to allow new phone companies to lease the Baby Bells’ AT&T-created copper wires at regulated rates. The market changed in ways never envisioned in the 1990s however. Today, phone companies face competition–not from the new phone companies leasing the old monopoly infrastructure but from entirely different technologies. You can receive voice service from your cable company (“digital voice”), your “phone” company (POTS), your wireless company, and even Internet-based providers like Vonage and Skype. Increasingly, households are leaving POTS behind in favor of voice service from cable or wireless providers. Yet POTS providers–like Verizon and AT&T (which also offer wireless service)–must abide by monopoly-era regulations that their cable and wireless competitors–Comcast, Sprint, and others–don’t have to abide by.

Understanding the significance of the IP Transition requires (unfortunately) knowing a little bit about Title I and Title II of the Communications Act. “Telecommunications services,” which are the phone companies with copper networks, are heavily regulated by the FCC under Title II. On the other hand, “information services,” which includes Internet service, are lightly regulated under Title I. This division made some sense in the 1990s. It is increasingly under stress now because burdened “telecommunications” companies like AT&T and Verizon are offering “information services” like Internet via DSL, FiOS, and U-Verse. Conversely, lightly-regulated “information services” companies like Comcast, Charter, and Time-Warner Cable are entering the regulated telephone market but face few of the regulatory burdens.

Which brings us to the IP Transition. As Title II phone companies replace their copper wires with fiber and deploy broadband networks to compete with cable companies, their customers’ phone service is being carried via IP packets. Functionally, these new networks act like a heavily-regulated Title II service since they carry voice, but they also act like the Title I broadband networks that cable providers built. So should these new fiber networks be burdened like Title II services or deregulated like Title I services? Or is it possible to achieve some middle ground using existing law? Those are the questions before the FCC and policymakers. Billions of dollars of investment will be accelerated or slowed and many firms will live or die depending on how the FCC and Congress act. Stay tuned.

Over at The Switch, the Washington Post’s excellent new technology policy blog, Brian Fung has an interesting post about tethering and Google Glass, but I think he perpetuates a common misconception:

Carriers have all sorts of rules about tethering, and sorting through them can be like feeling your way down a dark alley. Verizon used to charge $20 a month for tethering before the FCC ruled it had to allow tethering for free. Now, any data you use comes out of your cellular plan’s overall data allowance. AT&T gives you a separate pool of data for tethering plans, but charges up to $50 a month for the right, much as Verizon once did.

Fung claims that due to the likely increase in tethering as devices like Google Glass come to market, “assuming the FCC didn’t require all wireless carriers to make tethering free, it’d be a huge source of potential revenue for companies like AT&T.”

In fact, the cost of tethering on AT&T is not very different from the cost of doing so on Verizon, which means by definition that AT&T is not likely to get a windfall from increased use of tethering. It’s also evidence that the FCC tethering rule for Verizon doesn’t matter very much.

Let’s look first at the state of tethering on Verizon. New post-paid consumer contracts on Verizon must be for the new Share Everything plans that first came out last year. The plans charge a monthly line access fee per device, which includes unlimited calling and texting, and a monthly fee for data, which includes tethering. You decide which devices you want to connect and how much data you want to use. Let’s say you have 2 smartphones that each use 3GB of data per month. You pay $40/device and $80 for data per month, for a total of $160/month. Again, allegedly because of FCC rules, this plan includes tethering.

AT&T has comparable plans, called Mobile Share. The pricing is a little different, because AT&T charges a different amount per line depending on how much data you get. But if you want 2 smartphones and 6 total GB of data, it costs you $160/month, the same as on Verizon. And guess what, the AT&T plan includes tethering, even though the FCC doesn’t mandate that AT&T provide it.

Unlike Verizon, AT&T still offers its legacy plans to new customers. These plans do not come with free tethering, but the additional cost of tethering is at most $20 per line. Tethering is included if you pay for 5GB of data, and the upgrade from 3GB of data to 5GB of data is from $30 to $50. And that $20 upgrade cost includes 2GB of extra data. But if you want 2 smartphone lines with unlimited calling and texting, with 3GB per line and no tethering, it costs $210/month under the legacy plan. So at least for some users, switching to the Mobile Share plan is both cheaper and comes with the added bonus of free tethering.

When you consider that a) Verizon doesn’t even offer legacy plans any more, and b) many consumers, especially heavy callers and texters, are better off under the Mobile Share plans anyway, it becomes clear that tethering is not really more lucrative for AT&T than for Verizon. The FCC’s tethering mandate for Verizon did not make tethering much cheaper on Verizon than on AT&T, because there is actually fierce competition between Verizon and AT&T. If anything, the mandate probably incentivized Verizon to ditch their legacy plans for new customers, restricting consumer choice. But the bottom line is that, contra Fung, tethering is not likely to be a major source of revenue for AT&T absent FCC intervention.

Jerry Ellig, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, discusses the the FCC’s lifeline assistance benefit funded through the Universal Service Fund (USF). The program, created in 1997, subsidizes phone services for low-income households. The USF is not funded through the federal budget, rather via a fee from monthly phone bills — reaching an all-time high of 17% of telecomm companies’ revenues last year. Ellig discusses the similarities between the USF fee and a tax, how the fee fluctuates, how subsidies to the telecomm industry have boomed in recent years, and how to curb the waste, fraud and abuse that comes as a result of the lifeline assistance benefit.

Download

Related Links

• Jerry Ellig’s Biography Mercatus Center
• Benefits, Costs and other Important Stuff-Demystifying Regulatory Analysis Ellig, Mercatus Center
• The Future of Regulation Ellig, Pepperdine University School of Public Policy

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden’s new book, Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age, will go down as one of the most important Internet policy books of 2013 for two reasons. First, their book offers an excellent overview of how Internet regulation has unfolded on five different fronts: privacy and data protection; copyright; content censorship; social networks and user-generated content issues; and net neutrality regulation. They craft detailed case studies that incorporate important insights about how countries across the globe are dealing with these issues. Second, the authors endorse a specific normative approach to Net governance that they argue is taking hold across these policy arenas. They call their preferred policy paradigm “prosumer law” and it envisions an active role for governments, which they think should pursue “smarter regulation” of code.

In terms of organization, Brown and Marsden’s book follows the same format found in Milton Mueller’s important 2010 book Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance; both books feature meaty case studies in the middle bookended by chapters that endorse a specific approach to Internet policymaking. (Incidentally, both books were published by MIT Press.) And, also like Mueller’s book, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code does a somewhat better job using case studies to explore the forces shaping Internet policy across the globe than it does making the normative case for their preferred approach to these issues.

Thus, for most readers, the primary benefit of reading either book will be to see how the respective authors develop rich portraits of the institutional political economy surrounding various Internet policy issues over the past 10 to 15 years. In fact, of all the books I have read and reviewed in recent years, I cannot think of two titles that have done a better job developing detailed case studies for such a diverse set of issues. For that reason alone, both texts are important resources for those studying ongoing Internet policy developments.

That’s not to say that both books don’t also make a solid case for their preferred policy paradigms, it’s just that the normative elements of the texts are over-shadowed by the excellent case studies. As a result, readers are left wanting more detail about what their respective policy paradigms would (or should) mean in practice. Regardless, in the remainder of this review, I’ll discuss Brown and Marsden’s normative approach to digital policy and contrast it with Mueller’s since they stand in stark contrast and help frame the policy battles to come on this front.

Governing Cyberspace: Mueller vs. Brown & Marsden

Mueller’s normative goal in Networks and States was to breathe new life into the old cyber-libertarian philosophy that was more prevalent during the Net’s founding era but which has lost favor in recent years. He made the case for a “cyberliberty” movement rooted in what he described as a “denationalized liberalism” vision of Net governance. He argued that “we need to find ways to translate classical liberal rights and freedoms into a governance framework suitable for the global Internet. There can be no cyberliberty without a political movement to define, defend, and institutionalize individual rights and freedoms on a transnational scale.”

I wholeheartedly endorsed that vision in my review of Mueller’s book, even if he was a bit short on the details of how to bring it about. But it is useful to keep Mueller’s paradigm in mind because it provides a nice contrast with the approach Brown and Marsden advocate, which is quite different.

Generally speaking, Brown and Marsden reject most forms of “Internet exceptionalism” and certainly reject the sort of “cyberliberty” ethos that Mueller and I embrace. They instead endorse a fairly broad role for governments in ordering the affairs of cyberspace. In their self-described “prosumer” paradigm, the State is generally viewed as benevolent actor, well-positioned to guide the course of code development toward supposedly more enlightened ends.

Consistent with the strong focus on European policymaking found throughout the book, the authors are quite enamored with the “co-regulatory” models that have become increasing prevalent across the continent. Like many other scholars and policy advocates today, they occasionally call for “multi-stakeholderism” as a solution but they do not necessarily mean the sort of truly voluntary, bottom-up multi-stakeholderism of the Net’s early days. Rather, they are usually thinking of multi-stakeholderism as what is essentially pluralistic politics; it’s the government setting the table, inviting the stakeholders to it, and then guiding (or at least “nudging”) policy along the way. “We are convinced that fudging with nudges needs to be reinforced with the reality of regulation and coregulation, in order to enable prosumers to maximize their potential on the broadband Internet,” they say. (p. 187)

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?

Thus, despite the new gloss, their “prosumer law” paradigm ends up sounding quite a bit like a rehash of traditional “public interest” law and common carrier regulation, albeit with a new appreciation of just how dynamics markets built on code can be. Indeed, Brown and Marsden repeatedly acknowledge how often law and regulation fails to keep pace with the rapid evolution of digital technology. “Code changes quickly, user adoption more slowly, legal contracting and judicial adaptation to new technologies slower yet, and regulation through legislation slowest of all,” they correctly note (p. xv). This reflects what Larry Downes refers to as the most fundamental “law of disruption” of the digital age: “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”

At the end of the day, however, that insight doesn’t seem to inform Brown and Marsden’s policy prescriptions all that much. Theirs is a world in which policy tinkering errors will apparently be corrected promptly and efficiently by still more policy tinkering, or “smarter regulation.” Moreover, like many other Internet policy scholars today, they don’t mind regulatory interventions that come early and often since they believe that will help regulators get out ahead of the technological curve and steer markets in preferred directions. “If regulators fail to address regulatory objects at first, then the regulatory object can grow until its technique overwhelms the regulator,” they say (p. 31).

This is the same mentality that is often on display in Tim Wu’s work, which I have been quite critical of here and elsewhere. For example, Wu has advocated informal “agency threats” and the use of “threat regimes” to accomplish policy goals that prove difficult to steer though the formal democratic rulemaking process. As part of his “defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts,” Wu stresses the importance of regulators taking control of fast-moving tech markets early in their life cycles. “Threat regimes,” Wu argues, “are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid change — under conditions of ‘high uncertainty.’ Highly informal regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology or business model, or a practice about which little is known,” Wu concludes.

This is essentially where most of the “co-regulation” schemes that Brown and Marsden favor would take us: Code regulators would take an active role in shaping the evolution of digital technologies and markets early in its life cycle. What are the preferred regulatory mechanisms? Like Wu and many other cyberlaw professors today, Brown and Marsden favor robust interconnection and interoperability mandates bolstered by antitrust actions as well. And, again, they aren’t willing to wait around and let the courts adjudicate these issues in an ex post fashion. “Essential facilities law is a very poor substitute for the active role of prosumer law that we advocate, especially in its Chicago school minimalist phase” (p. 185). In other words, we shouldn’t wait for someone to bring a case and litigate it through the courts when preemptive, proactive regulatory interventions can sagaciously steer us to a superior end.

More specifically, they propose that “competition authorities should impose ex ante interoperability requirements upon dominant social utilities… to minimize network barriers” (p. 190) and they model this on traditional regulatory schemes such as must-carry obligations, API interface disclosure requirements, and other interconnection mandates (such as those imposed on AOL/Time Warner a decade ago to alleviate fears about instant messaging dominance). They also note that “Effective, scalable state regulation often depends on the recruitment of intermediaries as enforcers” to help achieve various policy objectives (p. 170).

The Problem with Interoperability Über Alles

So, in essence, the Brown-Marsden Internet policy paradigm might be thought of as interoperability über alles. Interoperability and interconnection in pursuit of more “open” and “neutral” systems is generally considered an unalloyed good and most everything else is subservient to this objective.

This is a serious policy error and one that I address in great detail in my absurdly long review of John Palfrey and Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems. I’m not going to repeat all 6,500 words of that critique here when you can just click back and read it, but here’s the high level summary: There is no such thing as “optimal interoperability” that can be determined in an a priori fashion. Ongoing marketplace experimentation with technical standards, modes of information production and dissemination, and interoperable information systems, is almost always preferable to the artificial foreclosure of this dynamic process through state action. The former allows for better learning and coping mechanisms to develop while also incentivizing the spontaneous, natural evolution of the market and market responses. The latter (regulatory foreclosure of experimentation) limits that potential.

More importantly, when interoperability is treated as sacrosanct and forcibly imposed through top-down regulatory schemes, it will often have many unintended consequences and costs. It can even lock in existing market power and market structures by encouraging users and companies to flock to a single platform instead of trying to innovate around it. (Go back and take a look at how the “Kingsbury Commitment” — the interconnection deal from the early days of the U.S. telecom system — actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry instead of assisting independent operators.)

Citing Palfrey and Gasser, Brown and Marsden do note that “mandated interoperability is neither necessary in all cases nor necessarily desirable” (p. 32), but they don’t spend as much time as Palfrey and Gasser itemizing these trade-offs and the potential downsides of some interoperability mandates. But what frustrates me about both books is the almost quasi-religious reverence accorded to interoperability and open standards when such faith is simply not warranted after historical experience is taken into consideration.

Plenty of the best forms of digital innovation today are due to a lack of interoperability and openness. Proprietary systems have produced some of the most exciting devices (iPhone) and content (video games) of modern times. Then again, voluntary interoperable and “open” services and devices thrive, too. The key point here — and one that I develop in far greater detail in my book chapter, “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters” — is that the market for digital services is working marvelously and providing us with choices of many different flavors. Innovation continues to unfold rapidly in both directions along the “open” vs. “closed” continuum. (Here are 30 more essays I have written on this topic if you need more proof.)

Generally speaking, we should avoid mandatory interop and openness solutions. We should instead push those approaches and solutions in a truly voluntary, bottom-up fashion. And, more importantly, we should be pushing for outside-the-box solutions of the Schumpeterian (creative destruction / disruptive innovation) variety instead of surrendering so quickly on competition through forced sharing mandates.

The Case for Patience & Policy Restraint

But Brown and Marsden clearly do not subscribe to that sort of Schumpeterian thinking. They think most code markets tip and lock into monopoly in fairly short order and that only wise interventions can rectify that. For example, they claim that Facebook’s “monopoly is now durable,” which will certainly come as a big surprise to the millions of us who do not use it all. And the story of MySpace’s rapid rise and equally precipitous fall has little bearing on this story, they argue.

But, no matter how you define the “social networking market,” here are two facts about it: First, it is still very, very young. It’s only about a decade old. Second, in that short period of time, we have already witnessed the entire first generation of players fall by the wayside. While the second generation is currently dominated by Facebook, it is by no means alone. Again, millions like me don’t use it at all and get along just fine with other “social networking” technologies, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, and even older tech like email, SMS, and yes, phone calls! Accusations of “monopoly” in this space strain credulity in the extreme. I invite you to read my Mercatus working paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” for a more thorough debunking of this logic. (Note: The final version of that paper will be published in the CommLaw Conspectus shortly.)

Such facts should have a bearing on the debate about regulatory interventions. We continue to witness the power of Schumpeterian rivalry as new and existing players battle in a race for the prize of market power. Brown and Marsden fear that the race is already over in many sectors and that it is time to throw in the towel and get busy regulating. But when I look around at the information technology marketplace today, I am astonished just how radically different it looks from even just a few years ago, and not just in the social media market. I have written extensively about the smartphone marketplace, where innovation continues at a frantic pace. As I noted in my essay here on “Smartphones & Schumpeter,” it’s hard to remember now, but just 6 short years ago:

• The iPhone and Android had not yet landed.
• Most of the best-selling phones of 2007 were made by Nokia and Motorola.
• Feature phones still dominated the market; smartphones were still a luxury (and a clunky luxury at that).
• There were no app stores and what “apps” did exist were mostly proprietary and device or carrier-specific; and,
• There was no 4G service.

It’s also easy to forget just how many market analysts and policy wonks were making absurd predictions at the time about how the telecom operators at the time had so much market power that they would crush new innovation without regulation. Instead, in very short order, the market was completely upended in a way that mobile providers never saw coming. There was a huge shift in relative market power flowing from the core of these markets to the fringes, especially to Apple, which wasn’t even a player in that space before the launch of the iPhone.

As I noted in concluding that piece last year, these facts should lead us to believe that this is a healthy, dynamic marketplace in action. Not even Schumpeter could have imagined creative destruction on this scale. (Just look as BlackBerry). But much the same could be said of many other sectors of the information economy.  While it is certainly true that many large players exist, we continue to see a healthy amount of churn in these markets and an astonishing amount of technological innovation.

Public Choice Insights: What History Tells Us

One would hope these realities would have a greater bearing on the policy prescriptions suggested by analysts like Brown and Marsden, but they don’t seem to. Instead, the attitude on display here is that governments can, generally speaking, act wisely and nudge efficiently to correct short-term market hiccups and set us on a better course. But there are strong reasons to question that presumption.

Specifically, what I found most regrettable about Brown and Marsden’s book was the way — like all too many books in this field these days — the authors briefly introduce “public choice” insights and concerns only to summarily dismiss them as unfounded or overblown. (See my review of Brett Frischmann’s book, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources for a more extended discussion of this problem as it pertains to discussions about not just infrastructure regulation by the regulation of all complex industries and technologies.)

Brown and Marsden make it clear that their intentions are pure and that their methods would incorporate the lessons of the past, but they aren’t very interested in dwelling on the long, lamentable history of regulatory failures and capture in the communications and media policy sectors. They do note the dangers of a growing “security-industrial complex” and argue that “commercial actors dominate technical actors in policy debates.” They also say that the “potential for capture by regulated interests, especially large corporate lobbies, is an essential insight” that informs their approach. The problem is that it really doesn’t. They largely ignore those insights and instead imply that, to the extent this is a problem at all, we can build a better breed of bureaucrats going forward who will craft “smarter regulation” that is immune from such pressures. Or, they claim that “multi-stakeholderism” — again, the new, more activist and government-influenced conception of it — can overcome these public choice problems.

A better understanding of power politics that is informed by the wisdom of the ages would instead counsel that minimizing the scope of politicization of technology markets is the better remedy. Capture and cronyism in communications and media markets has always grown in direct proportion to the overall scope of law governing those sectors. (I invite you to read all the troubling examples of this that Brent Skorup and I have documented in our new 72-page working paper, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” Warning: It makes for miserable reading but proves beyond any doubt that there is something to public choice concerns.)

To be clear, it’s not that I believe that “market failures” or “code failures” never occur, rather, as I noted in this debate with Larry Lessig, it’s that such problems are typically “better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).” It’s not just that traditional regulatory remedies cannot keep pace with code markets, it’s that those attempting to craft the remedies do not possess the requisite knowledge needed to know how to steer us down a superior path. (See my essay, “Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset,” for more on that point.)

Regardless, at a minimum, I expect scholars to take seriously the very real public choice problems at work in this arena. You cannot talk about the history of these sectors without acknowledging the horrifically anti-consumer policies that were often put in place at the request of one industry or another to shield themselves from disruptive innovation. No amount of wishful thinking about “prosumer” policies will change these grim political realities. Only by minimizing chances to politicize technology markets and decisions can we overcome these problems.

Conclusion

For those of us who prefer to focus on freeing code, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code is another reminder that liberty is increasingly a loser in Internet policy circles these days. Milton Mueller’s dream of decentralized, denationalized liberalism seems more and more unlikely as armies of policymakers, regulators, special interests, regulatory advocates, academics, and others all line up and plead for their pet interest or cause to be satisfied through pure power politics. No matter what you call it — fudging, nudging, coregulation, smart regulation, multistakeholderism, prosumer law, or whatever else, — there is no escaping the fact that we are witnessing the complete politicization of almost every facet of code creation and digital decisionmaking today.

Despite my deep reservations about a more politicized cyberspace, Brown and Marsden’s book is an important text because it is one of the most sophisticated articulations and defenses of it to date. Their book also helps us better understand the rapidly developing institutional political economy of Internet regulation in both broad and narrow policy contexts. Thus, it is worth your time and attention even if, like me, you are disheartened to be reading yet another Net policy book that ultimately endorses mandates over of markets as the primary modus operandi of the information age.

Additional Resources about the book:

• the official MIT Press website for Regulating Code
• shorter Brown & Marsden paper on “Prosumer Law” (via SSRN)
• Little Atoms podcast featuring Brown & Marsden discussing Regulating Code
• Ian Brown edited this beefy Research Handbook On Governance Of The Internet, which makes a nice complement to Regulating Code. It offers even more detailed case studies on the major issues featured in the book. A terrific resource (if you can afford it!)
• a video of Brown & Marsden discussing the book at the Oxford Internet Institute (also embedded below):

Other books you should read alongside “Regulating Code” (links are for my reviews of each):

• Milton Mueller’s Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance
• John Palfrey & Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems
• Rebecca MacKinnon’s Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom
• David G. Post’s In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace
• Christopher Yoo’s The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are Transforming the Network
• Larry Lessig’s Code (my 2-part exchange with Lessig upon Code’s 10^th anniversary: Part 1, Part 2)

Declan McCullagh, chief political correspondent for CNET and former Washington bureau chief for Wired News, discusses recent leaks of NSA surveillance programs. What do we know so far, and what more might be unveiled in the coming weeks? McCullagh covers legal challenges to the programs, the Patriot Act, the fourth amendment, email encryption, the media and public response, and broader implications for privacy and reform.

Download

Related Links

• Snowden: NSA snoops on U.S. phone calls without warrants, McCullagh
• Snowden: Feds can’t plug leaks by ‘murdering me’, McCullagh
• Feds: Power grid vulnerable to cyber threats, McCullagh

Today, AT&T announced they had abandoned their planned acquisition of T-Mobile after the DOJ sued to block the deal and the FCC published a report sharply critical of the deal. The following statement can be attributed to TechFreedom Fellows Larry Downes, Geoffrey Manne and Berin Szoka:

Nearly two years ago, the Obama FCC declared a spectrum crisis. But Congress has refused to authorize the agency to reallocate underused spectrum from television broadcasters and government agencies—which would take years anyway. The AT&T/T-Mobile merger would have eased this crisis and accelerated the deployment of next-generation 4G networks. The government killed the deal based on formalistic and outdated measures of market concentration—even though the FCC’s own data show dynamic competition, falling prices, and new entry. The disconnect is jarring. Those celebrating the deal’s collapse will wake up to a sober reality: There is no Plan B for more spectrum. All the hand-wringing about “preserving” competition has only denied consumers a strong 4G LTE competitor to compete with Verizon—and slammed the brakes on continued growth of the mobile marketplace. Unfortunately, this is just part of a broader pattern of regulators attempting to engineer technology markets they don’t understand. The letter sent today by the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee urging the Department of Justice to investigate Google’s business practices relies on similar contortions of market definition to conclude that the search market is not competitive. In both cases, regulators are applying 1960s economics to 21st century markets. Ultimately, it’s consumers who will lose from such central planning.

[Cross posted at Truthonthemarket]

As I have posted before, I was disappointed that the DOJ filed against AT&T in its bid to acquire T-Mobile.  The efficacious provision of mobile broadband service is a complicated business, but it has become even more so by government’s meddling.  Responses like this merger are both inevitable and essential.  And Sprint and Cellular South piling on doesn’t help — and, as Josh has pointed out, further suggests that the merger is actually pro-competitive.

Tomorrow, along with a great group of antitrust attorneys, I am going to pick up where I left off in that post during a roundtable discussion hosted by the American Bar Association.  If you are in the DC area you should attend in person, or you can call in to listen to the discussion–but either way, you will need to register here.  There should be a couple of people live tweeting the event, so keep up with the conversation by following #ABASAL.

Panelists: Richard Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, Boston Allen Grunes, Partner, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Washington Glenn Manishin, Partner, Duane Morris LLP, Washington Geoffrey Manne, Lecturer in Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland Patrick Pascarella, Partner, Tucker Ellis & West, Cleveland

Location:  Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. 1700 K St. N.W. Fifth Floor Washington, D.C. 20006

For more information, check out the flyer here.

Milton Mueller responded to my post Wednesday on the DOJ’s decision to halt the AT&T/T-Mobile merger by asserting that there was no evidence the merger would lead to “anything innovative and progressive” and claiming “[t]he spectrum argument fell apart months ago, as factual inquiries revealed that AT&T had more spectrum than Verizon and the mistakenly posted lawyer’s letter revealed that it would be much less expensive to expand its capacity than to acquire T-Mobile.”  With respect to Milton, I think he’s been suckered by the “big is bad” crowd at Public Knowledge and Free Press.  But he’s hardly alone and these claims — claims that may well have under-girded the DOJ’s decision to step in to some extent — merit thorough refutation.

To begin with, LTE is “progress” and “innovation” over 3G and other quasi-4G technologies.  AT&T is attempting to make an enormous (and risky) investment in deploying LTE technology reliably and to almost everyone in the US–something T-Mobile certainly couldn’t do on its own and something AT&T would have been able to do only partially and over a longer time horizon and, presumably, at greater expense.  Such investments are exactly the things that spur innovation across the ecosystem in the first place.  No doubt AT&T’s success here would help drive the next big thing–just as quashing it will make the next big thing merely the next medium-sized thing.

The “Spectrum Argument”

The spectrum argument that Milton claims “fell apart months ago” is the real story here, the real driver of this merger, and the reason why the DOJ’s action yesterday is, indeed, a blow to progress.  That argument, unfortunately, still stands firm.  Even more, the irony is that to a significant extent the spectrum shortfall is a product of the government’s own making–through mismanagement of spectrum by the FCC, political dithering by Congress, and local government intransigence on tower siting and co-location–and the notion of the government now intervening here to “fix” one of the most significant private efforts to make progress despite these government impediments is really troubling.

Anyway, here’s what we know about spectrum:  There isn’t enough of it in large enough blocks and in bands suitable for broadband deployment using available technology to fully satisfy  current–let alone future–demand.

Two incredibly detailed government sources for this conclusion are the FCC’s 15th Annual Wireless Competition Report and the National Broadband Plan.  Here’s FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski summarizing the current state of affairs (pdf):

The point deserves emphasis:  the clock is ticking on our mobile future. The FCC is an expert agency staffed with first-rate employees who have been working on spectrum allocation for decades – and let me tell you what the career engineers are telling me. Demand for spectrum is rapidly outstripping supply. The networks we have today won’t be able to handle consumer and business needs.

* * *

To avoid this crisis, the National Broadband Plan recommended reallocating 500 megahertz of spectrum for broadband, nearly double the amount that is currently available.

* * *

First, there are some who say that the spectrum crunch is greatly exaggerated – indeed, that there is no crunch coming. They also suggest that there are large blocks of spectrum just lying around – and that some licensees, such as cable and wireless companies, are just sitting on top of, or “hoarding,” unused spectrum that could readily solve that problem. That’s just not true.

* * *

The looming spectrum shortage is real – and it is the alleged hoarding that is illusory.

It is not hoarding if a company paid millions or billions of dollars for spectrum at auction and is complying with the FCC’s build-out rules. There is no evidence of non-compliance. . . . [T]he spectrum crunch will not be solved by the build-out of already allocated spectrum.

All of the evidence suggests that spectrum suitable for mobile broadband is scarce and growing scarcer.  Full stop.

It is troubling that critics–particularly those with little if any business experience–are so certain that even with no obvious source of additional spectrum suitable for LTE coming from the government any time soon, and even with exponential growth in broadband (including mobile) data use, AT&T’s current spectrum holdings are sufficient to satisfy its business plans (and its investors and stockholders).  You’d think AT&T would be delighted to hear this news–what we really need is a shareholder resolution to put Gigi Sohn on the board!

But seriously, put yourself in AT&T’s shoes for a moment.  Its long-term plans require the company to deploy significantly more spectrum than it currently holds in a reasonable time horizon (even granting Milton’s dubious premise that the company is squatting on scads of unused spectrum–remember that even if AT&T had all the spectrum sitting in its proverbial bank vault it would still be just about a third of the total amount of spectrum we’re predicted to need in just a few years).  Considering the various impediments of net neutrality regulation, congressional politics, presidential politics (think this had anything to do with claims about job losses from the merger, by chance?), reluctant broadcasters, the FCC, state PUCs, environmental groups and probably 10-12 others . . . the chances of being able to obtain the necessary spectrum and cell tower sitings in any other reasonable fashion were perhaps appropriately deemed . . . slim.

With the T-Mobile deal, on the other hand, “AT&T will gain cell sites equivalent to what would have taken on average five years to build without the transaction, and double that in some markets. AT&T’s network density will increase by approximately 30 percent in some of its most populated areas.” (Source).  I just don’t see how this jibes with the claim that the spectrum argument has fallen apart.

But there is a larger, “meta” point to make here, and it’s one that policy scolds and government regulators too often forget.  Even if none of that were true, as long as we don’t know for sure what is optimal and do know the DOJ is both a political organization made up of human beings operating not only under said ignorance but with incentives that don’t necessarily translate into “maximize social welfare” and also devoid of any actual “skin in the game,” I think the basic, simple, time-tested, logical and self-evident error cost principle counsels pretty firmly against intervention.  Humility, not hubris should rule the roost.

And that’s especially true since you know what will happen if the DOJ (or the FCC) succeeds in preventing AT&T from buying T-Mobile?  T-Mobile will still disappear and we’ll still be left with (according to the DOJ’s analysis) the terrifying prospect of only 3 national wireless telecom providers.  Only, in that case, everyone’s going to think a lot harder about investing in future developments that might warrant integration or cooperation or . . . well, the DOJ will challenge anything, so add to the list patent pools, too much success, not enough sharing, etc., etc.  And you wonder why I think this might constitute an assault on innovation?

Now, as for Milton’s specific claims, reminiscent of Public Knowledge’s and Free Press’ talking points, let me quote AT&T’s Public Interest Statement discussing its own particular spectrum holdings:

Because of the high demand for broadband service, AT&T already has had to deploy four carriers (for a total of 40 MHz of spectrum) for UMTS [3G] in some areas—and it will need to deploy more in the near future, even if doing so squeezes its GSM spectrum allocation and compromises GSM service quality . . . .  AT&T expects that, given the relative infancy of the LTE ecosystem and the time needed to migrate subscribers, it will need to continue to allocate spectrum to UMTS services for a substantial number of years—indeed, even longer than AT&T needs to continue allocating spectrum for GSM services.

* * *

AT&T has begun deployment of LTE services using its AWS and 700 MHz spectrum and currently plans to cover more than 250 million people by the end of 2013

* * *

AT&T projects it will need to use its 850 MHz and 1900 MHz spectrum holdings to support GSM and UMTS services for a number of years and, in the meantime, will not be able to re-deploy them for more spectrally efficient LTE services.

* * *

AT&T’s existing WCS spectrum holdings cannot be used for this purpose either, because the technical rules for the WCS band, such as limits on the power spectral density limits, make it infeasible to use that band for broadband service.

In other words, I don’t think AT&T has been (nor could it be, given the FCC’s detailed knowledge on the subject) hiding its spectrum holdings.  Instead, the company has been making quite clear that the spectrum it has is simply insufficient to meet anticipated demand.  And, well, duh!  Anyone who uses AT&T knows its network is overloaded.  Some of that’s because of tower-siting issues, some because it simply didn’t anticipate the extent of demand it would face.  I heard somewhere that no matter how hard they try to account for their perpetual under-accounting, every estimate by every mobile provider of anticipated spectrum needs in the past two decades or so has fallen short.  I’m quite sure that AT&T didn’t anticipate in 2007 that spectrum usage would increase by 8000% (yes, that’s thousand) by 2010.

Moreover, there will always (in any sensible system) be excess capacity at times–as it happens, at (conveniently) the times when spectrum usage is often counted–in order to deal with peak loads.  It is no more sensible to deploy capacity sufficient to handle the maximum load 100% of the time than it is to deploy capacity to handle only the minimum load 100% of the time.  Does that mean the often-unused spectrum is “excess”?  Clearly not.

Moreover (again), not all spectrum is in contiguous blocks sufficient to deploy LTE.  AT&T (at least) claims that is the case with much of its existing spectrum.  Spectrum isn’t simply fungible, and un-nuanced claims that “AT&T has X megahertz of spectrum and it is plenty” are just meaningless.  Again, just because Free Press says otherwise does not make it so.  You can simply discount AT&T’s claims if you like–I’m sure it’s possible they’re just lying; but you should probably be careful whose “information” you believe instead.

But, no, Milton, the spectrum argument did not “fall apart months ago.”  Gigi Sohn, Harold Feld and Sprint just said it did.  There’s a difference.

“Letter-Gate”

As for the infamous letter alleged to show that AT&T could expand LTE service from its previously-planned 80% of the country to the 97% it promises if the merger goes through for significantly less than it would cost to buy T-Mobile:  I don’t know exactly what its import is—but no one outside AT&T and, maybe, the FCC really does, either.  But I think a little sensible skepticism is in order.

First, for those who haven’t read it, the letter says, in relevant part:

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss AT&T’s current LTE deployment plans to reach 80 percent of the U.S. population by the end of 2013…; the estimated [Begin Confidential Information] $3.8 billion [End Confidential Information] in additional capital expenditures to expand LTE coverage from 80 to 97 percent of the U.S. population; and AT&T’s commitment to expand LTE to over 97 percent of the U.S. population as a result of this transaction.

That part, “$3.8 billion,” between the words “Begin Confidential Information” and “End Confidential Information” was supposed to be redacted, but apparently wasn’t when the letter was first posted to the FCC’s website.

While Public Knowledge and other critics of the deal would have you believe that this proves AT&T could roll-out nationwide LTE service for 1/10 of the cost of the T-Mobile deal, it’s basically impossible to tell what this number really means–except it certainly doesn’t mean that.

Claims about its meaning are actually largely content-less; nothing I’ve seen asks (or can possibly answer) whether the number in the letter was full cost, partial cost, annualized cost, based off of what baseline, etc., etc.  Moreover, unless I’m mistaken, nothing in the letter said anything at all about $3.8 billion being used to relieve congestion, meet future demand, increase speeds, reduce latency, expand coverage in urban areas, etc.  It seems to me that it’s referring to “additional” (additional to what?) capital expense to build infrastructure to make it even possible to offer LTE coverage to 97% of the U.S. population following the merger.  AT&T has from the outset said (bragged, more like it, because it’s supposed to bring lots of jobs and that’s what the politicians care about) that it planned to spend an “additional” $8 billion–additional to the $39 billion required to buy T-Mobile, that is–to build out its infrastructure as part of the deal.  But neither this letter nor any of AT&T’s statements (nor anyone with any familiarity with the relevant facts) has ever said it could or would have full-speed, LTE service available and up and running to 97% of the country for $3.8 billion or even $8 billion–or even merely $39 billion.  In fact, AT&T seemed to be saying that it was going to cost at least $47 billion to make that happen (and I can assure you that doesn’t begin to account for all the costs associated with integrating T-Mobile with AT&T once the $39 billion is out the door).

As I’ve alluded to above, deploying LTE service to rural areas is probably not as important for AT&T as increasing its network’s capacity in urban areas. The T-Mobile deal allows AT&T to alleviate the congestion problems experienced by its existing customers in urban areas more quickly than any other option–and because T-Mobile’s network is already up and running, that’s still true even if the federal government was somehow able to make tons of spectrum immediately available.  Moreover, with respect to the $3.8 billion, as I’ve discussed at length above, without T-Mobile’s–or someone’s!–additional spectrum and the miraculous removal of local government impediments to tower construction, pretty much no amount of money would enable AT&T to actually deliver LTE service to 97% of the country.  Is that what it would cost to build the extra pieces of hardware necessary to support such an offering?  That sounds plausible.  But actually deliver it? Hardly.

And just to play this out, let’s say the letter did mean just that — that AT&T could deliver real, fine LTE service to 97% of the country for a mere $3.8 billion direct, marginal outlay, even without T-Mobile.  It is still the case that none of us outsiders knows what such a claim would assume about where the necessary spectrum would come from and what, absent the merger, the effect would be on existing 3G coverage, congestion, pricing, etc., and what the expected ROI for such a project would be.  Elsewhere in the letter its author states that AT&T considered whether making this investment (without the T-Mobile merger) was prudent, and repeatedly rejected it.  In other words, all those armchair CEOs are organizing AT&T’s business and spending its money without the foggiest clue as to what the real consequences would be of doing so–and then claiming that, although, unlike them, actually in possession of the data relevant to such an assessment, AT&T must be lying, and could only justify spending $39 billion to buy T-Mobile as a means of securing its monopoly power.

And I think it’s important to gut check that claim, as well, as it’s what critics claim to fear (The Ma Bell from the Black Lagoon).  Unpacked, it goes something like this:

Given that:

1.  AT&T is going to spend $39 billion to buy T-Mobile;
2. It is going to spend $8 billion to build additional infrastructure;
3. Having bought T-Mobile, it is going to incur some ungodly amount of expense integrating T-Mobile’s assets and employees with its own;
4. It is going to incur huge, ongoing additional costs to govern a now-larger, more-complex organization;
5. It is going to continue to be regulated by the FCC and watched carefully by the DOJ and its unofficial consumer watchdog minions;
6. It will continue to face competition from its current largest and second-largest competitor;
7. It will continue to face entry threats from the likes of Dish and Lightsquared;
8. It will continue to face competition from fixed broadband offered by the likes of Comcast and Time Warner;
9. It will do all this quite publicly, under the watchful eyes of Congress and its union to whom it has made all manner of politically-expedient promises;

 Then it follows that:

1. Although it can’t muster the gumption to risk $3.8 billion to legitimately (it is claimed) extend full LTE coverage to 97% of the U.S. population, it nevertheless thinks it’s a sure bet that it will be able to recoup all of these expenditures, in this competitive and regulatory environment, by virtue of having thus taken out not its largest, not even its second-largest, but its smallest “national” competitor, and thereby having converted itself into an unfettered monopolist. QED.

The mind boggles.

So.  Back to Milton and his suggestion that I was wrong to claim that the DOJ’s action here is a threat to innovation and progress and his assertion that AT&T’s claims surrounding the benefits of the transaction fail to stand up to scrutiny:  C’mon, Miltons of the world!  Where’s your normally healthy skepticism?  I know you don’t like big infrastructure providers.  I know you’re angry your iPhone isn’t as functional as it is beautiful.  I know capitalists are only slightly more trustworthy than regulators (or is it the other way around?).  But why give in so credulously to the claims of the professional critics?  Isn’t it more likely that the deal’s critics are just blowing smoke here because they don’t like any consolidation?  It doesn’t take much research to understand (to the extent anyone can understand something so complex) the current state of the U.S. broadband market and its discontents–and why something like this merger is a plausible response.  And you don’t have to like, trust, or even stand the sight of any business executive to know that, however stupid or evil, he is still constrained by powerful market forces beyond his ken.  And “Letter-Gate” is just another pseudo-scandal contrived to suit an agenda of aggressive government meddling.

We all ought to be more wary of such claims, less quick to join anyone in condemning big as bad, and far less quick to, implicitly or explicitly, substitute the known depredations of the government for the possible ones of the market without a hell of a lot better evidence to do so.

On Forbes this morning, I argue that the Department of Justice’s effort to block the AT&T/T-Mobile merger signals a dangerous turn in antitrust enforcement.

While President Obama promised during his campaign to “reinvigorate” antitrust, few expected the agency would turn its attention with such laser-like precision on the technology sector, one of the few bright spots in the economy.  But as Comcast, Google, Intel, Oracle and now AT&T can testify, the agency seems determined to make its mark on the digital economy.  If only it had the slightest idea how that economy actually worked, and why it works so well.

Silicon Valley should take careful note of the dark turn in the agency’s view of what constitutes competitive harm.  But if experience is any guide, they probably won’t.  The tech community believes that if they ignore Washington, it isn’t really there, and explains away contrary evidence as random catastrophe, as unpredictable as an earthquake in Virginia.

Regardless of how this case resolves itself, that’s increasingly a dangerous attitude for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and tech leaders.  It’s morning in Palo Alto.  But is anyone awake?

As a rule of thumb, when I have to spend a given amount of time straightening out a company’s poor service or unscrupulous practices, I’ll spend an equivalent amount of time giving that company some payback. Today’s victim: T-Mobile. Fear the blog post.

A letter from Asurion Warranty Services arrived in my mail today thanking me for signing up for their “Premium Handset Protection Bundle” for T-Mobile phones.

Oh no I didn’t. It costs $5.99 a month for repair and replacement of my newly upgraded phone. That’s pretty much the price of a phone per year for such protections. Bad deal. I haven’t lost or damaged a phone in a decade, and I didn’t agree to get have this charge added to my phone bill.

I am on hold right now, trying to learn just how this got onto my bill. Friendly, helpful T-Mobile customer service people have told me that I should go down to the T-Mobile store where I upgraded in order to straighten this out. No I shouldn’t. T-Mobile should be straightening this out right now over the phone, with an apology and a thank you.

I am done with my 40-minute phone call, in which friendly customer service supervisor Kassidy K. (#1204178) tried to assign me the task Monday of calling the store where I upgraded my phone to get this straightened out. I explained to Kassidy K. that I’ve made the only call I need to—that’s the call we were on. Her next work-day is Wednesday, and I told her I expected to hear from her about this being cleared up.

If I have to make another call, it’s just as likely to be about returning my phone and canceling my service as getting this charge removed from my bill.

You people can argue all you want about top-down—whether the government should allow the AT&T-T-Mobile merger. I’ll do bottom-up—whether T-Mobile should get my business.

[Cross-Posted at Truthonthemarket.com]

There has been, as is to be expected, plenty of casual analysis of the AT&T / T-Mobile merger to go around.  As I mentioned, I think there are a number of interesting issues to be resolved in an investigation with access to the facts necessary to conduct the appropriate analysis.  Annie Lowrey’s piece in Slate is one of the more egregious violators of the liberal application of “folk economics” to the merger while reaching some very confident conclusions concerning the competitive effects of the merger:

Merging AT&T and T-Mobile would reduce competition further, creating a wireless behemoth with more than 125 million customers and nudging the existing oligopoly closer to a duopoly. The new company would have more customers than Verizon, and three times as many as Sprint Nextel. It would control about 42 percent of the U.S. cell-phone market. That means higher prices, full stop. The proposed deal is, in finance-speak, a “horizontal acquisition.” AT&T is not attempting to buy a company that makes software or runs network improvements or streamlines back-end systems. AT&T is buying a company that has the broadband it needs and cutting out a competitor to boot—a competitor that had, of late, pushed hard to compete on price. Perhaps it’s telling that AT&T has made no indications as of yet that it will keep T-Mobile’s lower rates.

Full stop?  I don’t think so.  Nothing in economic theory says so.  And by the way, 42 percent simply isn’t high enough to tell a merger to monopoly story here; and Lowrey concedes some efficiencies from the merger (“buying a company that has the broadband it needs” is an efficiency!).  To be clear, the merger may or may not pose competitive problems as a matter of fact.  The point is that serious analysis must be done in order to evaluate its likely competitive effects.  And of course, Lowrey (H/T: Yglesias) has no obligation to conduct serious analysis in a column — nor do I in a blog post. But this idea that the market concentration is an incredibly useful and — in her case, perfectly accurate — predictor of price effects is devoid of analytical content and also misleads on the relevant economics.

Quite the contrary, so undermined has been the confidence in the traditional concentration-price notions of horizontal merger analysis that the antitrust agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are premised in large part upon the notion that modern merger analysis considers shares to be an inherently unreliable predictor of competitive effects!!  (For what its worth, a recent The Wall Street Journal column discussing merger analysis makes the same mistake — that is, suggests that the merger analysis comes down to shares and HHIs.  It doesn’t.)

To be sure, the merger of large firms with relatively large shares may attract significant attention, may suggest that the analysis drags on for a longer period of time, and likely will provide an opportunity for the FCC to extract some concessions.  But what I’m talking about is the antitrust economics here, not the political economy.  That is, will the merger increase prices and harm consumers?  With respect to the substantive merits, there is a fact-intensive economic analysis that must be done before anybody makes strong predictions about competitive effects.  The antitrust agencies will conduct that analysis.  So will the parties.  Indeed, the reported $3 billion termination fee suggests that AT&T is fairly confident it will get this through; and it clearly thought of this in advance.  It is not as if the parties’ efficiencies contentions are facially implausible.  The idea that the merger could alleviate spectrum exhaustion, that there are efficiencies in spectrum holdings, and that this will facilitate expansion of LTE are worth investigating on the facts; just as the potentially anticompetitive theories are.   I don’t have strong opinions on the way that analysis will come out without doing it myself or at least having access to more data.

I’m only reacting to, and rejecting, the idea that we should simplify merger analysis to the dual propositions — that: (1) an increase in concentration leads to higher prices, and (2) when data doesn’t comport with (1) we can dismiss it by asserting without evidence that prices would have fallen even more.  This approach is, let’s just say, problematic.

In the meantime, the Sprint CEO has publicly criticized the deal.  As I’ve discussed previously, economic theory and evidence suggest that when rivals complain about a merger, it is likely to increase competition rather than reduce it.  This is, of course, a rule of thumb.  But it is one that generates much more reliable inferences than the simple view — rejected by both theory and evidence — that a reduction in the number of firms allows leads to higher prices.  Yglesias points out, on the other hand, that rival Verizon prices increased post-merger (but did it experience abnormal returns?  What about other rivals?), suggesting the market expects the merger to create market power.  At least there we are in the world of casual empiricism rather than misusing theory.

Adam Thierer here at TLF provides some insightful analysis as to the political economy of deal approval.   Karl Smith makes a similar point here.

Here are some quick thoughts on the proposed AT&T – T-Mobile merger, mostly borrowed from my previous writing on the wireless marketplace. First, however, I highly recommend this excellent analysis of the issue by Larry Downes, which cuts through the hysteria we’re already hearing and offers a sober look at the issues at stake here.  Anyway, here are a few of my random thoughts on the deal:

• The deal will likely be approved: First, to cut to the chase.. After much wrangling, the deal will probably be approved primarily because of two factors, both of which help political officials as much as AT&T: (1) The deal delivers upon the National Broadband Plan promise of getting the country blanketed with wireless broadband; and (2) it “brings home” T-Mobile by giving an American company control of a German-held interest. As Larry Dignan of ZNet says, it is tantamount to “playing the patriotism card.”

• One reason it might not be approved: Some Administration critics, especially from the more liberal part of the Democratic base, could make this a litmus test for Obama administration’s antitrust enforcement efforts. In the wake of the Comcast merger approval — albeit after several pounds of flesh were handed over “voluntarily” to get the deal approved — some of the Administration’s base will be looking for blood. I remember how the Powell FCC was under real heat to “get tough” on mergers back in 2001-02 and during that time blocked the proposed DirecTV-EchoStar deal, possibly as a result of the pressure. The same thing could happen to AT&T – T-Mobile here.

• It’s all about spectrum: From AT&T’s perspective, this deal is all about getting more high-quality spectrum, which is in increasingly short supply. Indeed, as Jerry Brito noted earlier, this merger should serve as another wake-up call regarding the need to get spectrum reform going again to ensure that existing players can reallocate their spectrum to those who demand it most. (Hint: Incentivize the TV broadcasters to sell... NOW!) But, in the short-term, this deal helps AT&T built out a more robust nationwide wireless network. Over the long-haul, that should help T-Mobile deliver better service to its customers.

• For T-Mobile… it survives!: What’s in the deal for T-Mobile and its customers?  Well, at this point, the company must just be relieved they made it this far and that someone wanted to buy them! Seriously, did anyone think T-Mobile would make it this long as a stand-alone operator?  I certainly didn’t. And many industry analysts have express surprise that it to this long for Deutsche Telekom to put them on the table and find a buyer. If the DOJ moves to block the deal, would it be on the hope of T-Mobile continuing to be a stand-alone #4 competitor?  That seems like a very risky proposition to me.  I suppose the better argument would be to block the deal based on the hope that T-Mobile might eventually hook up with Sprint to create a more formidable #3 operator. But, on that point…

• Standard compatibility helps: AT&T is a good fit for T-Mobile going forward because of their mutual reliance on HSPA+ for wireless broadband. That should smooth the integration process. Sprint, by contrast, would have made a lousy merger partner in this regard because of the different standards the firms have picked for next-generation wireless broadband.

• The market will still be quite competitive: I can’t see there being a major antitrust problem here in light of lower HHI in U.S. compared to international markets. As I noted in my essay on “Wireless Networks & Lemonade Stand Economics,” surveys have shown that the U.S. wireless market is much more competitive than most Asian and European markets. Even with this merger the HHI will still likely be much lower than those other countries.

• We need to accept the fact that the market is maturing. But as I also made clear in that “lemonade stand” essay last year, in a high fixed cost, low margin cost industry like broadband, it’s impossible to have hundreds (or even dozens) of competitors. This is particular true for the wireless sector. Rolling out a sophisticated and reliable wireless architecture is incredibly costly and labor-intensive. Just siting all the towers, for example, can be cumbersome and get quite expensive.  And then there are the endless “truck rolls” to fix tiny problems and upgrade facilities. Thus, like so many other mature industries, the “Rule of Three” was bound to kick in for wireless. From baby food to burgers, from candy bars to credit cards, and from tennis shoes to blue jeans, the story is the same: almost every mature industry usually shakes out to just a handful of providers. There are usually two or three large operators serving the entire sector, and then a few niche providers.  In this sense, AT&T and Verizon are the Coke and Pepsi of wireless broadband. And as with the soda market, there will be other smaller competitors and entrants at the margin, but none with the size the deliver the underlying product across the nation in a ubiquitous, highly competitive fashion. Thus, Sprint, US Cellular, Cricket, and MetroPCS will be the niche players of wireless, serving unique regions or offering unique plans (like Metro’s recent announcement of a lowest-cost wireless plan announced to date, but with various limitations on service). This is the way capitalism works.

• Don’t forget about Clearwire & the cable guys: Seems like a lot of folks are writing off Clearwire and WiMax technology already, but that could be a mistake. It’s a unique consortium approach to next-gen wireless and includes investment from major cable operators Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Brighthouse.  Of course, Sprint is a major partner in Clearwire and this could be the company’s chance to do something really exciting with those deep-pocketed backers in the cable industry.  There’s no guarantee it will pan out, but with names (and money) like that involved, I wouldn’t write it off just yet.  And their very presence in this landscape helps ensure that the market remains contestable.

• Don’t forget about Apple, Google, Microsoft, BlackBerry etc:  The mobile ecosystem is remarkably dynamic and features many different layers and players. A recent report by Mary Meeker and Matt Murphy of Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers on “Top Mobile Internet Trends” revealed that roughly 10 Billion mobile Internet devices will soon be upon upon us. That’s truly amazing. What’s equally amazing to me is how all the innovation in this space is changing the competitive dynamics of the wireless marketplace. In particular, the most interesting thing about today’s mobile marketplace is how the network infrastructure guys cower in fear of the big OS guys — Apple and Google in particular. The providers of the underlying infrastructure who supposedly have all the power sure don’t seem like it when it comes time to line up new smartphones. As the iPhone wars make clear, the carriers are falling all over themselves in a scramble to land the best devices out there and would pretty much do whatever Apple and Google want them to in order to get them. And don’t forget about the actual device makers, like Motorola and HTC! And the chipmakers! And the app makers! The reason this is important is because those providers in other layers of the mobile ecosystem increasingly exert enormous pressure on the network providers and act as a check on their power.

• Expect some Net neutrality “voluntary concessions”: The FCC will use the approval process to engage in some good ol’ fashion merger extortion and force all sorts of “voluntary concessions.” Some sort of Net neutrality provision(s) will likely be among them. Because AT&T has attempted to impose some limits on tethering and has recently crafted new data plans, you can expect that NN advocates with lead with sweeping restrictions on T’s ability to manage their service offerings and they might even push for formal price controls on new tiering or metering schemes.

• Markets are better at sorting out good vs. bad deals through experimentation: I have elsewhere written about the hysteria that so often accompanies media and communications mergers. There’s always a Chicken Little crowd that tells us the sky will fall. Reality usually plays out quite differently. To the extent the sky falls, it isn’t on consumers but on the companies themselves. Many mega-deals unravel or never live up to their initial billing. Sometimes that’s simply because the merging entities can’t unearth those oh-so-illusive “synergies” that they are looking for. But usually those deals don’t pan out as hoped because markets are ongoing experiments and others — other rivals, new entrants, investors, consumers, etc — respond to those experiments and innovate around incumbents. Do you remember the phone you carried around in your pocket just a few years ago? It made calls and it… well… it made calls. Think about how far we’ve come in such a short time. I am giving serious consideration to canceling my home wireline broadband plan once Verizon comes out with the right 4G smartphone for me. Hell, the 3G phone I carry around right now in my pocket is close to becoming my primary computer as it is. I already use it to write blog posts, to Tweet, to text, to email, schedule events, play games, and sometimes I even use it to make phone calls! The degree of innovation in this space never ceases to amaze me. Thus, when it comes to deals like AT&T – T-Mobile, we should avoid the static snapshot mentality and should instead be patient and see how things play out.  It isn’t the end of the story, it’s just another chapter in what has so far been an amazing journey.

Additional Reading:

• Wireless Innovation is Alive & Well: Two New Reports Set the Record Straight
• CTIA’s Refutation of Tim Wu’s 2007 Wireless Net Neutrality Paper
• Just How Dynamic is the Mobile Internet Marketplace?
• Progress on Spectrum Inventory…if Only Illusory
• Good news from House Energy & Commerce on spectrum
• The MetroPCS Net Neutrality Hullabaloo

The Technology Policy Institute has released an interesting new study from Robert Crandall and Charles Jackson on “Antitrust in High-Tech Industries,” which takes a close look at the impact of antitrust law in the three most high-profile technology cases of the last half century: IBM, AT&T and Microsoft.  Crandall and Jackson conclude:

In each of our three cases, the ultimate source of major changes in the competitive landscape appears to have been innovation and new technology — technology that was apparently not unleashed by the antitrust litigation. In each case, the government did not and probably could not see how technology would develop over time. Therefore, it was difficult for the government to design remedies that would  accelerate competition when this competition developed from new technologies.

I enjoyed the paper and encourage others to read the entire thing.  It’s very much in line with what we’ve written here in the past on the antitrust and high-tech markets.  See, for example, my review of Gary Reback’s recent book on antitrust and high-tech markets.  As I noted there, the crucial, ‘conflict of visions‘ issue comes down to an appreciation for dynamic competition and technological evolution over the sort of static competition, fixed-pie mindset that so many antitrust defenders espouse.  Those of us who believe in dynamic competition see markets in a constant state of flux and expect that sub-optimal market developments or configurations are exactly the spark that incentivizes new form of market entry, innovation, technological disruption, price competition, and so on.  But the static competition crowd looks at the same situation and imagines that the only hope is to wheel in the wrecking ball of antitrust regulation since they have little faith that things might change for the better. Moreover, they ignore the profound costs associated with such regulation and litigation.  Crandall and Jackson’s paper explains why patience is the better policy.

Former TLF blogger Tim Lee returns with this guest post. Find him most of the time at the Bottom-Up blog.

Thanks to Jim Harper for inviting me to return to TLF to offer some thoughts on the recent Adam Thierer–Tim Wu smackdown. I’ve recently finished finished reading The Master Switch, and I didn’t have have my friend Adam’s viscerally negative reactions.

To be clear, on the policy questions raised by The Master Switch, Adam and I are largely on the same page. Wu exaggerates the extent to which traditional media has become more “closed” since 1980, he is too pessimistic about the future of the Internet, and the policy agenda he sketches in his final chapter is likely to do more harm than good. I plan to say more about these issues in future writings; for now I’d like to comment on the shape of the discussion that’s taken place so far here at TLF, and to point out what I think Adam is missing about The Master Switch.

Here’s the thing: my copy of the book is 319 pages long. Adam’s critique focuses almost entirely on the final third of the book, (pages 205-319) in which Wu tells the history of the last 30 years and makes some tentative policy suggestions. If Wu had published pages 205-319 as a stand-alone monograph, I would have been cheering along with Adam’s response to it.

But what about the first 200-some pages of the book? A reader of Adam’s epic 6-part critique is mostly left in the dark about their contents. And that’s a shame, because in my view those pages not only contain the best part of the book, but they’re also the most libertarian-friendly parts.

Those pages tell the history of the American communications industries—telephone, cinema, radio, television, and cable—between 1876 and 1980. Adam only discusses this history in one of his six posts. There, he characterizes Wu as blaming market forces for the monopolization of the telephone industry. That’s not how I read the chapter in question. Although Wu certainly suggests that market forces tended toward consolidation (which seems obviously correct), he also makes it clear that the government played an active role in the process, through the patent system, the Kingsbury Commitment, turning a blind eye to industrial sabotage, and later through explicit pro-monopoly regulation. Adam’s only specific quibble with Wu’s history is his failure to mention the nationalization of the telephone network during World War I. Maybe that’s an important oversight, but I’m not sure it would have changed Wu’s story very much. Certainly I think characterizing this section of the book as an anti-free-market screed is unfair.

The Master Switch takes an even more explicitly libertarian tone in its discussion of broadcasting. Wu makes it plain that everything about the radio (and later television) industries post-1927 was the result of heavy-handed government regulation. He tells how federal regulations robbed the inventor of FM radio of the opportunity to commercialize his invention, and how the FCC delayed the introduction of television by more than a decade to give RCA (then the dominant radio firm) time to perfect its own television technology.

It’s easy to imagine chapters 5, 9, and 10 being published by Cato or the Mercatus Center. Consider, for example, this passage describing the FCC’s decision to delay the introduction of television (p. 144):

Consider for a moment the oddness of this phenomenon in the putatively free-market economy. The government was deciding, in effect, when a product that posed no hazard to the public health would be “ready” for sale. Consider, too, how incongruous this was in a society under the First Amendment: a medium with great potential to further the exercise of free speech was being stalled until such time as the government could agree it had attained an acceptable technical standard. Rather than letting the market decide what a technology in its present state was worth, a federal agency—not even a democratically elected body—was to forbid its sale outright.

Whatever else you might say about this passage, it’s certainly not blaming anything on market forces!

One of Wu’s central points is that during the 20th century, the communications policy world was divided along different ideological lines. On one hand were the champions of monopoly and central planning—Wu chooses legendary AT&T president Theodore Vail as its intellectual father. On the other hand were champions of choice and competition. It’s worth emphasizing that Adam and Wu are on the same side of this ideological battle. In 1930, 1950, or 1970, all of us would have been teaming up to oppose monopolistic regulations.

We would have regarded AT&T, RCA, and other state-sponsored monopolists as our common enemy. If we’d submitted amicus briefs in the Carterfone or MCI proceedings, we would have made largely the same arguments. Of course, we wouldn’t have agreed perfectly on our long-term policy agenda, but we would have regarded that as a relatively minor area of disagreement compared to the pressing problem of repealing blatantly monopolistic government policies and bringing some degree of competition to communications markets. And for most of the 20th century we would have been the underdogs. In 1950, the monopolists were not only utterly dominant in Washington, D.C., but their ideology still had a great deal of cachet with the intellectual class.

Vail’s corporatist ideology has fallen so far out of favor that today it’s hard to find anyone who’s willing to defend it forthrightly. The remnants of the once-great monopolists have been forced to adopt the rhetoric of the free market and pretend to care about choice and competition. And it’s only in this new intellectual environment that Adam can plausibly portray Wu a “cyber-collectivist” at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum from me and Adam. The Master Switch reminds us that much less separates Adam from Wu than separates either of them from Theodore Vail and David Sarnoff.

Adam began his first post by stating that he “disagrees vehemently with Wu’s general worldview and recommendations, and even much of his retelling of the history of information sectors and policy.” This is kind of silly. In fact, Adam and Wu (and I) want largely the same things out of information technology markets: we want competitive industries with low barriers to entry in which many firms compete to bring consumers the best products and services. We all reject the prevailing orthodoxy of the 20th century, which said that the government should be in the business of picking technological winners and losers. Where we disagree is over means: we classical liberals believe that the rules of property, contract, and maybe a bit of antitrust enforcement are sufficient to yield competitive markets, whereas left-liberals fear that too little regulation will lead to excessive industry concentration. That’s an important argument to have, and I think the facts are mostly on the libertarians’ side. But we shouldn’t lose sight of the extent to which we’re on the same side, fighting against the ancient threat of government-sponsored monopoly.

My friend Kerry Howley coined the term “state-worship” to describe libertarians who insist on making the government the villain of every story. For most of history, the state has, indeed, been the primary enemy of human freedom. Liberals like Wu are too sanguine about the dangers of concentrating too much power in Washington, D.C. But to say the state is an important threat to freedom is not to say that it’s the only threat worth worrying about. Wu tells the story of Western Union’s efforts to use its telegraph monopoly to sway the election of 1876 to Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. That effort would be sinister whether or not Western Union’s monopoly was the product of government interference with the free market. Similarly, the Hays code (Hollywood’s mid-century censorship regime) was an impediment to freedom of expression whether or not the regime was implicitly backed by the power of the state. Libertarians are more reluctant to call in the power of the state to combat these wrongs, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be concerned with them.

By casting every argument in terms of a Manichean struggle between “cyber-libertarians” and “cyber-collectivists,” Adam misses a lot of the value of The Master Switch. Many of the stories Wu tells are too complicated to fit comfortably at either end of the free-market-vs-regulation spectrum. For example, until I read The Master Switch, I didn’t realize how important, and harmful, patents were to the early development of communications markets. Should these stories make libertarians more skeptical of patent law? I’d be interested to hear Adam take, but he was too busy railing against Wu’s alleged cyber-collectivism to discuss the topic.

This is the third installment in a series of essays about Tim Wu’s new book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires.  As I noted in my first essay, Wu’s book promises to make waves in Internet policy circles, so I’m devoting some space here to debunking what I regard as some of the myths that drive his hyper-pessimistic worldview regarding the supposed death of openness.  In my second essay, I challenged Wu’s view of technological “cycles” and “market failure” and noted that he paints an overly simplistic portrait of both. In a similar vein, in this installment I will address Wu’s mistaken claim that purely free markets and “laissez-faire” have guided America’s communications and media sectors over the past century.

Wu’s narrative in The Master Switch is heavily dependent upon his retelling of the histories of several major sectors: telephony, film, broadcast radio, and cable television.  After surveying the history of those sectors throughout the past century, Wu concludes that “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible” (p. 303) and that a fairly sweeping new regulatory regime – which I will address in a forthcoming post – is necessary to address the imperfections of the free market.

As any serious historian of the past century of information industries knows, however, we’ve never had anything remotely resembling a “purely economic laissez-faire approach” to communications, media or information policy in this country.  We’ve had a mixed system that allowed a certain degree of market activity accompanied by very heavy doses of “public interest” regulation.  Indeed, the story of 20 ^th century communications and media markets is one of artificial barriers to entry, government (mis-)allocation of key resources (like spectrum), price controls, rate-of-return regulations, speech controls and mandates, regulatory capture, and good ‘ol boy corporatism.

History Grade: Incomplete

Sadly, Wu ignores much of that history in The Master Switch or fails to properly diagnose the root causes of “market failure.”  Consequently, as a work of industrial history, his grade is: Incomplete.

Part of the problem here is that, far too often in the book, Wu dwells on intentions. Like so many other so-called progressive scholars who view most corporate leaders like the satanic spawn of Gordon Gecko or Mr. Burns from “The Simpsons,” Wu often wants to base his indictment of markets on a moralizing view of corporate bad intentions.  He gives us selective juicy bits of boardroom shenanigans and corporate scheming that would make for a good John Grisham novel.  If one’s indictment of free-market capitalism is based on the desires of corporate leaders, however, then it is hardly unsurprising they would conclude that it is a failure.  After all, Adam Smith taught us long ago that every businessman longs for a monopoly over trade in their field.

But intentions are largely meaningless in the larger scheme of things.  It’s the nature of the process and outcomes that give us our real gauge of the worth of a market-based approach. We need answers to questions like:

• Have markets given us more or less choice, competition, diversity, etc.?
• To the extent there was an excessive concentration of private “power” in a given sector, was it fleeting or lasting?
• If it was lasting, were markets to blame, or did government tip the balance in favor or certain actors our outcomes?  In other words, how “free” was this “free market”?
• Finally, did markets and new technologies evolve to solve whatever “problems” were ailing certain sectors? If not, what held back that progress?

Sadly, Wu often gives us little more than superficial answers to these questions because, again, he’s often too busy attempting to peer inside the minds of corporate leaders to discern what motivated their supposedly wicked ways. In the process, he leaves out plenty of pertinent facts. In particular, despite his insistence to the contrary, he significantly underestimates the importance of regulatory capture or unnatural resource allocation / mismanagement as the key causes of the technological “closings” he cites.  He also downplays or occasionally ignores the trade-offs at work associated with regulatory solutions to the supposed problems he cites.  Finally, he largely fails to appreciate the sweeping nature of technological change that has revolutionized so many of these markets for the better in recent years.

In my post yesterday, I noted how Wu ignored many of these variables when discussing the AOL case study.  Today, I’ll jump back 100 years in history and Wu’s treatment of the early development in America’s communications sector and the rise of the AT&T monopoly.  As we’ll see, he makes some crucial oversights and, ultimately, makes an unconvincing case against “the purely economic laissez-faire approach” since no such thing ever existed in this field or the others he surveys.

Wu’s Incomplete AT&T Case Study

Wu spends a great deal of time in The Master Switch focusing on the old AT&T / Bell System and its leader Theodore Vail as the paradigmatic example of “the Cycle” in action.  To reiterate, “the Cycle” refers to the closing and eventual monopolization of a sector after a period of openness and competition. That Vail and AT&T were hell-bent on monopolizing the American communications systems is beyond question.  What is in question, however, is to what degree any of this process was the result of Wu’s much-lamented “purely economic laissez-faire approach.”  The answer: Not much.

Sixteen years ago I penned a short history of how this sad tale unfolded and called it, “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly.”   What an accurate reading of that history reveals is that this monopolization was anything but the product of “market forces.”  Instead, America’s early communications history – as was the case in so many other countries – was very much shaped by political forces.

During the early years of the past century, when competition among independents was still quite vibrant, AT&T’s extensive campaign for “One Policy, One System, Universal Service” was a thinly veiled front for complete control of the telephone system under one corporate roof.  But was that goal really achievable absent government assistance?  Most industry historians don’t think so.

In his 1994 book, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America, Richard H.K. Vietor of Harvard University noted “Vail chose at this time to put AT&T squarely behind government regulation, as the quid pro quo for avoiding competition. This was the only politically acceptable way for AT&T to monopolize telephony…  It seemed a necessary trade-off for the attainment of universal service.” (p. 167, 172, 185) And AT&T’s own 1917 Annual Report noted, “A combination of like activities under proper control and regulation, the service to the public would be better, more progressive, efficient, and economical than competitive systems.”

Industry historian Robert W. Garnet, author of The Telephone Enterprise: The Evolution of the Bell’s Horizontal Structure, 1876-1909, provides further support for Vietor’s finding that regulation was the crucial driver of monopolization:

Regulation played a crucial role in Vail’s plans. Astute enough to realize that the kind of system he proposed — universal integrated monopoly — would stand little chance of gaining public approval without some form of public control, he embraced state regulation. In doing so, he broke with the company’s long-standing opposition to what [AT&T] management had traditionally regarded as an unwarranted intrusion on its prerogatives. But after years of unfettered competition, during which the firm’s financial strengths had been sapped and its efforts to build an integrated system had been dangerously undermined, regulation became a much-preferred alternative. Thus, Vail obviously saw government regulation as the way to eliminate competitors: the one-way ticket, not only to universal service, but also to monopoly profits. (p. 130, emphasis added)

The Kingsbury Commitment as Classic Corporatism

With the courtship of state regulators and legislators grew more widespread and successful, the stage was then set for the complete monopolization of the industry by AT&T.  Two crucial decisions at the federal level sealed that result.  First came the “Kingsbury Commitment” of 1913. Named after AT&T Vice President Nathan C. Kingsbury, who helped negotiate its terms, the agreement outlined a plan whereby AT&T would sell off its $30 million in Western Union stock, agree not to acquire any other independent companies, and allow other competitors to interconnect with the Bell System.

At the time, the Kingsbury Commitment was thought to be pro-competitive. Yet, this was hardly an altruistic action on AT&T’s part. The agreement was not interpreted by regulators so as to restrict AT&T from acquiring any new telephone systems, but only to require that an equal number be sold to an independent buyer for each system AT&T purchased. Hence, the Kingsbury Commitment contained a built-in incentive for regional monopoly-swapping rather than continued competition. Gerald Brock, author of The Telecommunications Industry: The Dynamics of Market Structure found that, “This provision allowed Bell and the independents to exchange telephones in order to give each other geographical monopolies. So long as only one company served a given geographical area there was little reason to expect price competition to take place.” (1981, p. 156)

In their 1992 treatise on Federal Telecommunications Law, Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber summarized the result of the Kingsbury Commitment as follows:

The government solution, in short, was not the steamy, unsettling cohabitation that marks competition but rather a sort of competitive apartheid, characterized by segregation and quarantine. Markets were carefully carved up: one for the monopoly telegraph company; one for each of the established monopoly local telephone exchanges; one for the Bell’s monopoly long-distance operations. Bell might not own everything, but some monopolist or other would dominate each discrete market. The Kingsbury Commitment could be viewed as a solution only by a government bookkeeper, who counted several separate monopolies as an advance over a single monopoly, even absent any trace of competition among them. (1992, p. 16-17)

The lesson here is clear: the move toward market-carving and mandated interconnection, while appearing in the independents’ favor at first, actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry. Brock found that “interconnection reduced the Bell’s ability to drive the independents out of business but also eliminated the independents’ incentive to establish a competitive long-distance system.” That is a crucial point, and one that Wu overlooks in his book and that many regulatory activists ignore till this day: Although well-intentioned, interconnection mandates can disincentivize more direct forms of head-to-head competition and disruptive forms of technological innovation.

To his credit, Tim Wu does acknowledge how the Kingsbury Commitment ended up being a disaster in practice. “Superficially a victory for openness and competition, in time the Kingsbury Commitment would prove the insidious death knell of both,” he notes. (p. 56)  But Wu doesn’t dwell on the gravity of this fatal regulatory decision very long.  Instead, he quickly switches gears and suggests that the problem was that regulators just didn’t go far enough. He suggests a preemptive breakup might have been the better way to go and implies that monopolization was inevitable.

Of course, we can never know how differently things might have turned out if that course of action had been pursued. But the problem for Wu is that most of the examples he uses in his book depend on this ‘why-didn’t-the-government-see-it-coming-and-intervene-earlier’ sort of thinking, even though (a) we don’t know how much of a difference it would have made in practice, and (b) such interventions could have backfired and had profoundly deleterious unintended consequences, just as the Kingsbury Commitment did.  Such interventions would have just necessitated additional forms of prophylactic regulation to keep the market as atomistic as Wu preferred.  As the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises taught us six decades ago:

All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.  (Human Action, at 858, 3rd ed. 1963, 1949).

(In a moment, we’ll see how the market economy was entirely destroyed and socialism substituted for it in this field.)

Again to his credit, Wu is willing to admit that, “it should also be obvious to anyone – one need by no means to be a raving libertarian – that there are some substantial dangers implicit in aligning the immense power of the state with the greatest of information monopolists.” (p. 59) Well, I am a raving libertarian, so you can imagine how sympathetic I am to this argument!  More impressively, in a footnote to that line, Wu properly labels this system what it is. “The technical term for such a system is ‘corporatism’: in its extreme manifestation it is called ‘fascism,’” he notes. Quite right!  What the Kingsbury Commitment represented was the essence of corporatism or what used to be called fascism before the Nazis essentially made the term impossible to use as a descriptor in economic histories or political philosophy.

A final problem with Wu’s interpretation of the Kingsbury Commitment: He praises Vail and AT&T for at least agreeing to common carriage obligations as part of the deal. “[I]f we regard the Kingsbury Commitment as having sanctioned the most lucrative monopoly in history, it also made good on the essential goals of common carriage,” Wu says. (p. 59) Here he utterly fails to fully appreciate the linkage between common carriage obligations and the corporatist model of industrial organization.  The imposition of common carriage obligations on a particular company or sector is tantamount to a “Game Over” moment for truly free markets.  Once you make that plunge, you’ve essential raised the white flag and surrendered on the notion of facilities-based competition. It is the death knell for laissez-faire.  Yet, Wu never makes that connection clear.

World War I and Communications Nationalization

More surprising, however, is the fact that Wu completely ignores the second major federal intervention that sealed AT&T’s lock on the communications marketplace. It was World War I, the nation’s first major global crisis, that would provide the United States government with a convenient excuse to forcefully gain control over communications and forever change the structure of the telephone industry.  On August 1, 1918, in the midst of World War I, the federal government nationalized the entire telecommunications industry for national security reasons. If, as Wu correctly suggests, the Kingsbury Commitment represented a dose of “fascism,” then this was surely a bit of good ol’ fashion socialism!  How it escaped Wu’s attention is perplexing because its significance cannot be underestimated.

As I noted in my history of the rise of the Bell System monopoly, AT&T executives were initially quite nervous when it was announced that Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson, a long-time advocate of nationalizing the telegraph and telephone industries, would assume control of the telephone system. But, once the benefits of nationalization where made evident to Theodore Vail, his anxieties disappeared. Industry historian George P. Oslin notes when Vail expressed concern over the plan to Western Union President and close personal friend Newcom Carlton, Carlton reassured Vail that the plan was in his interest: “It’s your salvation. The government will be able to raise your rates and get you new money.” As Oslin argues, “That was what happened. Burleson appointed Vail, rated by Carlton as a genius, to manage the telephone, and Carlton to operate the telegraph.”

In his 1939 book AT&T: The Story of Industrial Conquest, Noobar R. Danielian concurred: “There is evidence that Vail appreciated the advantages of Federal control… he was not in much of a hurry in the early part of 1919 to have his System back from nominal government control.” (p. 248) This attitude should not be at all surprising since shortly after the industry was nationalized, AT&T’s proposed contract establishing the terms of government ownership and compensation was accepted by the postmaster general. Danielian summarizes the deal as follows:

The federal government…  agreed to pay to AT&T 4 1/2 percent of the gross operating revenues of the telephone companies as a service fee; to make provisions for depreciation and obsolescence at the high rate of 5.72 percent per plant; to make provision for the amortization of intangible capital; to disburse all interest and dividend requirements; and in addition, to keep the properties in as good a condition as before. Finally, AT&T was given the power to keep a constant watch on the government’s performance, to see that all went well with government operation, by providing that the books of the Postmaster General would be at all times open for inspection. One might well wonder where the real control was lodged. Needless to say, the contract was eminently satisfactory to the Bell System. (p. 252)

In addition, once the nationalized system was in place, AT&T wasted no time applying for immediate and sizable rate increases. High service connection charges were put into place for the first time. AT&T also began to realize it could use the backing of the federal government to coax state commissions into raising rates. Vail personally sent Postmaster General Burleson studies that displayed the need to raise rates. By January 21, 1919, just 5 1/2 months after nationalization, long-distance rates had increased by 20 percent. In addition to being much greater than returns earned during more competitive years, the rates established by the postmaster during the year of nationalization remained in force many years after privatization. Consequently, AT&T’s generous long distance returns continued to average near or above 20 percent during the 1920s.

By the time the industry was returned to private control on August 1, 1919, the regulatory route to competition elimination had paid off handsomely for Vail and AT&T.  Of the estimated $50 million in rate increases approved by the postmaster general during nationalization, approximately $42 million, or 84 percent went to AT&T.  Additionally, the government cut AT&T a $13 million dollar check at the end of the period to cover any losses they may have incurred, despite the fact that none were evident.

You cannot get a better deal than that!  The year of government nationalization was the final nail in the coffin of communications competition, and it was a nail struck with the hammer of Big Government. The lesson: There was absolutely nothing “natural” about this monopoly.   Congress basically blessed the entire farce in 1921 with the passage of the Graham Act, which Wu does cite in his history. As he notes, it “recognized AT&T’s monopoly and remov[ed] any remaining obstacles to integration.” (p. 59)   But, again, this is Wu implying that there had been something natural about that monopoly, which there most certainly wasn’t.

This sad tale of corporatism only grew worse in subsequent years with the initiation of extensive rate regulation and direct barriers to entry and innovation. Rate regulation guaranteed AT&T stable returns and ensured that regulators suddenly had a vested interest in keeping the company healthy and protected from competition so that it could achieve the industrial policy vision of “One Policy, One System, Universal Service.”  AT&T had so utterly captured legislators and regulators that its motto became the prime directive and modus operandi for all communications regulation over the next half century.

And this is a pattern – dare I call it “the real cycle” – that we have seen play out in many other sectors that Wu discusses in the book.  Yet, he doesn’t seem to fully appreciate just how profoundly public policy makers to have distorted markets in the quest to achieve various social policy goals.  In many regulated sectors, history shows that policymakers often ended up depending upon one firm, or a small handful of firms, to provide all industry output/service. Those favored actors, like AT&T and Vail, became partners with the State.  Consequently, competition was made more difficult, if not impossible, by force of law.  As the dean of regulatory economists Alfred E. Kahn noted in his seminal 1971 treatise The Economics of Regulation:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. (p. 12)

Conclusion

In sum, Wu serves up an incomplete history of Theodore Vail and the rise of the Bell System by downplaying the role that governments played in spawning, and then sheltering, the resulting monopoly.  In the case of Vail and AT&T, we can definitively conclude that there was no such thing as a “purely economic laissez-faire approach” allowed after World War I.  It basically became a crime to compete against the company or even attempt to innovate around it.

Thus, the lesson we should take from this case study is not, as Wu suggests, that markets failed but that they were never allowed to function naturally. Interventions pursued in the name of protecting consumers and serving “the public interest” often backfire and become the death knell of competition and innovation. Consequently, they undermine consumer welfare — which should be regarded as the ultimate “public interest” — in the process.

A more cautious historian would have acknowledged that and then questioned whether expanded regulatory inventions would — then or now — improve matters, or instead simply lead to even more deleterious forms of regulatory capture and corporatism.

[Jump to Part 4 in the series.]

I’m in front of a non-TiVo-enabled television this evening, which has permitted me to see ads for a search site called YP.com. It’s a rebranded YellowPages.com, affiliated with AT&T, and it’s organized to be a search engine for the things in your life—dining, travel nightlife—distinguished from Google’s utilitarian-tech web search. Meanwhile Microsoft’s Bing has overtaken Yahoo! as the number two search engine. I was surprised to learn that “undisputed search king” Google has only 65 percent of the search market. Google is doing well, of course, but it can’t be comfortable with all these well-funded rivals circling it.

This is good news for consumers. These competitors are driving Google to improve, and they can pull consumers away from Google by serving search niches such as lifestyle search (as YP does), more privacy protective search, and so on. Competitors will threaten and cut into Google’s advertising profits, too.

Television ads also remind us that HughesNet is offering broadband Internet via satellite. It’s mostly aimed at moving rural Internet users off of dial-up, but it’s an outlet for consumers anywhere who are unsatisfied with cable or DSL service. Critics will point out that it’s not very fast, kind of expensive, and includes daily usage caps. But this doesn’t deny HughesNet’s role as competition for cable and DSL.

Internet service provided badly enough by the major ISPs would make satellite broadband a viable competitor. If HughesNet’s investors were confident that they could sign up enough customers, they would make the investments that bring satellite broadband to the economy of scale it needs to be price-, speed-, and usage-competitive.

The spur of competition does not have to pierce the horse’s belly to have its effect.

Pundits are foaming at the mouth about AT&T’s just-announced end to unlimited data packages for smartphones. Here is Jeff Jarvis calling the move “cynical,” “retrograde,” and “evil.” However, he provides no evidence that this is anything but AT&T facing economic reality. The iPhone was a revolution, and how much data people consume given an awesome device turned out to be much more than AT&T was ready for. Now they’re asking their customers who use the most data to pay more, and this is evil?

Not only is it not evil, it’s incredibly fair. Most people will probably pay less for service. The cheapest of AT&T’s new plans is $15 for 200 MB of data. That’s $15 cheaper than their current $30 for unlimited iPhone use. According to AT&T, 65 percent of their customers use less than 200 MB of data a month. I consider myself a heavy iPhone user, and I just came back from a trip to NYC on which my iPhone was the only device I took with me, and yet with 2 days left in my billing cycle, I’ve used 154 MB of data. So, AT&T’s change will actually be a price-cut for me and the majority of AT&T customers.

Yup, real evil.

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

The smell of high-tech regulation is increasingly in the air these days and many lawmakers and some activist groups now have the mobile marketplace in their regulatory cross-hairs. Critics make a variety of claims about the wireless market supposedly lacking competition, choice, innovation, or reasonable pricing. Consequently, they want to wrap America’s wireless sector in a sea of red tape.   Two important new studies thoroughly debunk these assertions and set the record straight regarding the state of wireless competition and innovation in the U.S. today. These reports are must-reading for Washington policymakers and FCC officials who are currently contemplating regulatory action.

First, Gerald Faulhaber and Dave Farber have a new report out entitled “Innovation in the Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer-Centric Framework.”  Here’s what Faulhaber and Farber find:

the three segments of the wireless marketplace (applications, devices, and core network) have exhibited very substantial innovation and investment since its inception. Perhaps more interesting, innovation in each segment is highly dependent upon innovation in the other segments. For example, new applications depend upon both advances in device hardware capabilities and advances in spectral efficiency of the core network to provide the network capacity to serve those applications. Further, we find that the three segments of the industry are also highly competitive. There are many players in each segment, each of which aggressively seeks out customers through new technology and new business methods. The results of this competition are manifest: (i) firms are driven to innovate and invest in order to win in the competitive marketplace; (ii) new business models have emerged that give customers more choice; and (iii) firms have opened new areas such as wireless broadband and laptop wireless in order to expand their strategic options.

They continue on to address the policy issues in play here and discuss the “consumer-centric” approach they recommend that the FCC adopt:

Having found that all three segments are highly competitive, we ask, where is the market failure? If none, then the principle of customer-centric applies: let customers make the key decisions regarding which products, services, open vs. managed business models, net neutrality, et al. will survive in the marketplace. While there is no shortage of pundits, advocates, lobbyists and academics advising the FCC that it, rather than customers, should be making these decisions and advising the FCC what those decisions should be, a customer-centric FCC must leave these decisions to customers in a competitive marketplace. Should the FCC decide to preempt customers and make choices for them, it follows as does night from day that the result will be (i) less customer choice, and therefore reduced customer well-being; (ii) higher costs for producers and therefore customers; (iii) lower incentives to invest and innovate, harming customers, producers and the American economy. In this case, economics and technology are on the same page: economists advise intervention only in the case of demonstrated market failure, and then only if there is evidence that the intervention will do more good than harm. The technologist’s advice is more pithy and down to earth: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!

Amen to that.  Let’s hope our lawmakers are listening.

Second, Everett Ehrlich, Jeffrey Eisenach, and Wayne Leighton have a terrific new paper out entitled “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation and Choice in Wireless Communications,” which reaches similar conclusions to those Faulhaber and Farber found in their report. Here’s the executive summary from the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton report:

Proposals to increase regulation of mobile wireless services, for example, by applying “net neutrality” regulation, are often based on claims that such regulation would enhance innovation and increase consumer choice. In fact, they would have the opposite effect. The business practices that would be banned by such regulation are efficient mechanisms for spreading and reducing risk, lowering transactions costs, and enhancing marketing activities, all of which contribute to innovation and choice. Moreover, product differentiation increases competition and thus contributes both directly and indirectly to consumer choice. While some types of exclusive agreements and other “discriminatory” practices can theoretically harm competition, the precondition for such harm to occur – i.e., market power in one or more of the affected markets – generally is not present in wireless markets. Hence, the proposed regulations cannot be justified on grounds of market failure. Rather than increasing innovation and consumer choice, as promised, they would severely disrupt the wireless sector’s highly successful business model and significantly reduce innovation and consumer choice.

Like the Faulhaber-Farber paper, the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper examines the major segments of the wireless marketplace — applications, devices, and networks — and shows them all to be vigorously competitive and experiencing significant innovation. Some of the following tables and charts help to illustrate this.

This first table shows how concentration ratios for the U.S. market (as measured by HHI) are among the lowest in the world.

The next two charts show that U.S. carriers have the lowest revenue per minute (60% lower than the average OECD country) even though average minutes per use are more than twice the amount of the next highest ranked country (Canada).

Finally, this final chart from their report offers a snapshot of mobile Internet penetration in 16 countries showing the U.S. on top:

Incidentally, the Faulhaber-Farber study also does a nice job listing the various mobile application stores out there today:

Device Manufacturer App Stores Apple’s App Store BlackBerry’s App World Palm’s App Catalog Nokia’s Ovi Store Samsung’s Application Store Sony’s PlayNow arena LG’s Application Store

Software Developers Google’s Android Market Microsoft’s Windows Mobile

Carriers AT&T’s MEdia Mall Verizon Wireless’ Tools & Applications Sprint’s Software Store US Cellular’s easyedge Cellular South’s Discover Center Cricket’s Downloads

Independent Stores Handango GetJar

And the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper provides some addition perspective on innovation in the handset and applications space:

On the metrics that seem to be of greatest concern to regulation advocates – choice and innovation – the data also show the industry is performing well. For example, CTIA reports there are more than 630 different wireless handsets and devices available in the U.S., compared with only 147 in the United Kingdom, and notes that many of the most advanced handsets introduced in recent months have been launched in the U.S., including (among others) the iPhone 3G, the Google G1, and the Blackberry Storm. Amazon’s highly popular Kindle was also launched in the U.S. with connectivity provided by Sprint – while its European launch was delayed for a full year by Amazon’s inability to reach agreement with a mobile carrier there. As noted above, the number and variety of available applications is increasing rapidly: In addition to the Apple Apps Store, application downloads are now available from the Android Market (Google), the Palm Software Store, Blackberry App World and the Nokia Ovi Store, offering a total of more than 60,000 different applications. On July 14, 2009 Apple announced that more than 1.5 billion applications had been downloaded from its iPhone App Store since its launch in July 2008.

Actually, that number is even higher now.  As I noted here recently, in just a little over a year, Apple reports there’s been 2 billion downloads of over 85,000 apps from over 125,000 developers.  It’s just stunning when you think about it.

I encourage everyone to read both reports cover-to-cover.  They provide a comprehensive look at the reality on the ground — or in the air, as the case may be — in America’s mobile marketplace.

Interesting piece here from Slate’s Farhad Manjoo on why AT&T should dump unlimited data plans and end what he calls the “iPhone all-you-can-eat buffet.”  He notes that: “The typical smartphone customer consumes about 40 to 80 megabytes of wireless capacity a month. The typical iPhone customer uses 400 MB a month. AT&T’s network is getting crushed by that demand.” Because “some iPhone owners are hogging the network” and causing “a slowed-down wireless network,” Manjoo recommends a congestion pricing model as a method of balancing supply and demand:

How would my plan work? I propose charging $10 a month for each 100 MB you upload or download on your phone, with a maximum of $40 per month. In other words, people who use 400 MB or more per month will pay $40 for their plan, or $10 more than they pay now. Everybody else will pay their current rate—or less, as little as $10 a month. To summarize: If you don’t use your iPhone very much, your current monthly rates will go down; if you use it a lot, your rates will increase. (Of course, only your usage of AT&T’s cellular network would count toward your plan; what you do on Wi-Fi wouldn’t matter.) To understand the advantages of tiered pricing, let’s look at AT&T’s current strategy of spending billions to build more network space. Why won’t this work? For the same reason building more roads doesn’t reduce traffic—more capacity increases the attractiveness of driving, which brings a lot more cars to the road, which leads to more gridlock.

Congestion pricing and metering is something I’ve written quite a bit about here in the context of wireline broadband (1, 2, 3), but Manjoo is equally correct that it could be applied for wireless data plans.  It has the added value of taking pressure off lawmakers to impose Net neutrality regulation since pricing of the pipe becomes an effective substitute for most other forms of network management. In other words, price, don’t block bandwidth-hogging customers and applications.  The problem, Manjoo explains:

Of course, users would cry bloody murder at first. The traditional criticism of tiered pricing on telecommunications systems is that it’s too expensive and too annoying for customers; people don’t know how much they’re spending during the month, and then they’re smacked with huge bills. Most Internet companies aren’t big fans of tiered pricing, either. They worry that adding a meter to Internet time will reduce people’s propensity to try out new stuff online—killing innovation on the world’s most innovative communications platform. But tiered pricing on the iPhone doesn’t have to be onerous. I’d call on AT&T to create automatic tiers—everyone would start out on the $10/100 MB plan each month, and your price would go up automatically as your usage passes each 100 MB tier. The key to implementing this policy is transparency. The phone should have an indicator—sort of like the battery bar—that changes color as you pass each monthly tier. That way, people can adjust their usage to suit how much they’d like to pay—limiting surfing if they approach the next tier, or deciding to press on if money’s no object.

What Manjoo is getting at here is what economists refer to as a “Ramsey two-part tariff.” A two-part tariff (or price) would involve a flat fee for service up to a certain level and then a per-unit / metered fee over a certain level. It is widely regarded by most economists as the most efficient and pragmatic solution to high-fixed cost, low marginal cost investment conundrums.  It’s hard to know where the demarcation should be in terms of where the flat rate ends and the metering begins, but that’s for market experimentation to sort out. But the clear advantage of this solution is that it preserves flat-rate, all-you-can-eat pricing for casual to moderate bandwidth users and only resorts to less popular metering pricing strategies when the usage is “excessive,” however that is defined.

Some companies have shown signs of embracing it, but few have formally adopted congestion pricing or metering.  Worse yet, some of the regulation-happy activist groups in D.C. (like the neo-Marxist charlatans as the UnFree Press) have already made ridiculous accusations that metered pricing is somehow “unfair” when, in reality, it is the fairest system under the sun. There’s even been legislation introduced by Rep. Eric Massa (D-NY) that would forbid the practice through the imposition of Internet price controls.  Foreclosing experimentation with such innovative pricing schemes would be a real innovation-killer.

I hope we get there eventually for all high-speed data services, whether we are talking wireline or wireless. Although I generally try to be agnostic about business models, I think this one is worth doing a little cheerleading for because it helps take regulatory pressure off the marketplace.  Pricing also acts as a signal for others innovators and entrepreneurs in the market regarding how to adjust investment strategies or enter new markets.

Last Wednesday, Holman Jenkins penned a column in The Wall Street Journal about net neutrality (Adam discussed it here). In response, I have a letter to the editor in today’s The Wall Street Journal:

To the Editor: Mr. Jenkins suggests that Google would likely “shriek” if a startup were to mount its servers inside the network of a telecom provider. Google already does just that. It is called “edge caching,” and it is employed by many content companies to keep costs down. It is puzzling, then, why Google continues to support net neutrality. As long as Google produces content that consumers value, they will demand an unfettered Internet pipe. Political battles aside, content and infrastructure companies have an inherently symbiotic relationship. Fears that Internet providers will, absent new rules, stifle user access to content are overblown. If a provider were to, say, block or degrade YouTube videos, its customers would likely revolt and go elsewhere. Or they would adopt encrypted network tunnels, which route around Internet roadblocks. Not every market dispute warrants a government response. Battling giants like Google and AT&T can resolve network tensions by themselves. Ryan Radia Competitive Enterprise Institute Washington

To be sure, the market for residential Internet service is not all that competitive in some parts of the country — Rochester, New York, for instance — so a provider might in some cases be able to get away with unsavory practices for a sustained period without suffering the consequences. Yet ISP competition is on the rise, and a growing number of Americans have access to three or more providers. This is especially true in big cities like Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington D.C.

Instead of trying to put a band-aid on problems that stem from insufficient ISP competition, the FCC should focus on reforming obsolete government rules that prevent ISP competition from emerging. Massive swaths of valuable spectrum remain unavailable to would-be ISP entrants, and municipal franchising rules make it incredibly difficult to lay new wire in public rights-of-way for the purpose of delivering bundled data and video services.

Blogger’s Note: I posted this blog entry over at BroadbandCensus.com earlier in the day. It’s the first of series this week — One Web Week — in which I’m taking a step back to look at the issue of broadband data and broadband transparency from a bit of a longer time frame. And today couldn’t be a more timely day to do so, with Genachowski’s speech highlighting a new sixth principle of Network Neutrality: broadband transparency! -Drew Clark

WASHINGTON, September 21, 2009 – Broadband data is important for the future of our country – and public and transparent broadband data is even more important.

Today, at this moment, new Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski is making a speech in which he is highlighting the vital principle of public and transparent broadband data.

For three years now, this principle has been the core belief animating my efforts as a journalist, and as the entrepreneur founding BroadbandCensus.com. Now, as we enter the fourth year since this saga began, it’s time to take stock and reflect on what BroadbandCensus.com has accomplished.

And with One Web Week having arrived, I’d like to lay out this history from a personal perspective. In this series of blog posts, I’m going to speak about what we’ve been through, who we have worked with to advance the principles of public and transparent broadband data, and what we ultimately aim to achieve at BroadbandCensus.com.

• Today’s topic: The debate begins, with the Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in 2006.
• Tomorrow’s topic, on One Web Day: The founding of BroadbandCensus.com in the fall of 2007.
• Wednesday topic: The Broadband Census for America Conference in September 2008, and our work with the academic community to foster public and transparent broadband data-collection efforts.
• Thursday’s topic, in advance of the U.S. Broadband Coalition’s report to the Federal Communications Commission: BroadbandCensus.com’s involvement with the National Broadband Plan in 2009.
• The concluding topic, on Friday morning: The role BroadbandCensus.com and broadband users have to play in the creation of a robust and reliable National Broadband Data Warehouse.

The Beginnings: Why I Sued Kevin Martin’s Federal Communications Commission

BroadbandCensus.com was founded in October 2007 after I spent nearly a year and a half with the Center for Public Integrity, a non-profit investigative journalism organization based here in Washington. But the quest for public and transparent broadband data goes back further.

For more than 15 years, I have covered the politics of telecom, media and technology. Most of that was spent at the National Journal Group in Washington, a key source of inside information about policy and lobbying. My aim there, as it is now, was to ensure that all the facts are brought to the table, that divergent viewpoints are fairly represented, and that questions asked go to the center of the debate.

When it came to broadband, the looming questions were and still are: where do we have broadband in the United States, and who is offering it? What kind of service is promised, and are carriers delivering on those promises?

In 2006, issues of broadband policy lurked in the background of many major political and media controversies: Net neutrality, online piracy, media ownership and control, the build out of high-speed networks, both wired and wireless, and the role of Web 2.0 in government and society. Whatever the ultimate resolutions for each of these controversies, the first step was better broadband data.

At this time, I headed the Center for Public Integrity’s media and telecommunications project, “Well Connected.” We were expanding its focus on media ownership to the new source of media control: the nation’s broadband infrastructure.

The Federal Communications Commission had a database about the carriers that offer broadband by ZIP code. This database is created from the carriers filing the Form 477 with the FCC. The FCC publishes other databases of the locations of radio and television broadcasters, and of cable companies. We asked for a copy of the Form 477 database in August 2006. At that time, we cited the Freedom of Information Act.

An FCC staff member called me to discuss arrangements for getting our electronic copy. When I called the FCC staffer back, less than 45 minutes later, he told me that he had been instructed not to talk to me further. From that point on, only Kevin Martin’s lawyers would do the talking.

The FCC missed their 20-day deadline to timely respond to our FOIA letter. On September 25, 2006, the Center for Public Integrity filed suit in federal district court , seeking to enforce our FOIA request. We asked the district court to grant us access to the Form 477 database, with information about subscriber numbers redacted (if necessary). The end result would be a database with the names of the carriers that offer broadband on a ZIP code basis.

Even though the FCC has been collecting the Form 477 since 2000, and already has a database of all of this information, they have only ever released the number of providers within a ZIP code, and not the names of the providers. Even then, the agency only released the number if the number was four or more – out of an excessive concern for identifying carrier information.

That’s like saying that the government will restrict the release of information it has about how many gas stations there are in your town if there are not four or more gas stations in town. In any case, the government won’t tell you the names of the gas stations, or where you can find them, so that you can buy gas. And most definitely, they won’t share the prices at which the gas stations sell gas.

“We filed suit against the FCC to obtain the data that the public and policy-makers need in order to get a complete and accurate picture of the current state of broadband,” I said at the time.

Broadband Providers Seek to Forestall Publication of Carrier-Level Broadband Data

I’ve recounted the story of the FOIA litigation at great length, in June 2007, in a story, “Center Spearheads Efforts to Disclose Broadband Data,” and in February 2009 in Ars Technica, “US broadband infrastructure investments need transparency.”

We were seeking something quite straightforward: the identities of broadband carriers that offer service within a particular geographic location. At the time, we were seeking ZIP code information, because that was the best information that the FCC had. I and many others have long recognized that ZIP codes are extremely problematic and coarse unit of measurement. And that is why it is extremely positive that, in July 2009, the NTIA declared that it needed broadband information by Census block.

But in 2006 and 2007, getting carrier-level broadband data by ZIP would have been a good first step. Then-Chairman Kevin Martin, of course, was never a fan of public disclosure. After his agency nixed any sort of collaboration or compromise in approaching our FOIA request, Martin sought to shore up support from industry. On December 15, 2006, the agency issued a “Public Notice to Service Providers Who Filed FCC Form 477s With The Commission And Sought Confidential Treatment Of The Information Submitted.”

AT&T and Verizon Communications, along with the Wireless Communications Association International, intervened in the lawsuit. Others filed as “friends of the court,” on the side of the FCC. The public notice and the interventions forced Judge Rosemary Collyer to recuse herself from the case, as she owned stock in AT&T. The case went to Judge Ellen Huvelle.

“As a non-profit publisher of investigative journalism committed to transparent and comprehensive reporting both in the U.S. and around the world, the Center for Public Integrity believes that making data about the names of the broadband provider on a ZIP code-by-ZIP code basis would allow consumers to ‘truth-check’ the FCC data,” I wrote at the time. “Adding citizen-provided information about the speed, quality and price of such connections would, in turn, create a robust collection of information further informing telecommunications-related public policy debates.”

In their defense, the carriers said that disclosure would cause them competitive harm – the legal standard for denying the disclosure of data under the Freedom of Information Act.

In our legal briefings, the Center noted “that all of the major communications companies – including cable, wireless and telecom players – already provide ZIP code lookup of service availability on their Web sites.” If the information was not available on web site, the information was readily available by calling up the carrier and asking if service was available at that address. Because such information was already readily-discoverable, aggregating the data on a single web site would not cause competitive harm, either.

Among those who intervened in the suit, some sincerely believed that disclosure would have caused them harm. Others litigated merely because of the possibility of a negative FOIA precedent. Whatever the case, Kevin Martin’s FCC certainly went all-out to defend restrictions on data.

In its legal briefings, the FCC argued that releasing the data would lead to competition in communications. “Disclosure could allow competitors to free ride on the efforts of the first new entrant to identify areas where competition is more likely to be successful,” the agency told the federal district court in Washington.

It was supremely ironic that that the FCC and the communications industry were fighting our efforts to obtain public and transparent broadband data at the same time that Congress and the FCC began to clamor for precisely that which we were seeking: better broadband data to address a range of policy concerns.

Together with my friend Scott Wallsten, then of the Progress and Freedom Foundation (later with Technology Policy Institute, and now at the FCC), the Center for Public Integrity organized a Conference on Broadband Statistics on June 28, 2007, at the National Academy of Science.

Scott and I gathered an assemblage of many people, including officials from Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, ConnectKentucky, plus leading academics and policy practitioners in the field, including experts from Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Pew Internet and American Life Project, and the University of Texas at Austin, to consider precisely these questions. Audio from the June 2007 conference is available here; a transcript of the proceeding is available here.

More recently, Wallsten’s appointment as the economics director of the FCC’s broadband task force has prompted some controversy. But Wallsten has always been supportive of my efforts – and those of others in the field – to push for greater disclosure of broadband data. See “What Disconnect?,” and “Hiding the Broadband Map.”

The Aftermath: Kevin Martin and Me

Unfortunately, the Center lost the lawsuit when Judge Huvelle ruled against the Center in August 2007, and again in October 2007 after a motion for reconsideration. I’ll talk briefly in Tuesday’s blog post about the founding of BroadbandCensus.com in the aftermath of this defeat, and on Wednesday about BroadbandCensus.com’s efforts, in 2008, to advance public and transparent broadband.

But it’s worth fast-forwarding to get to the end of the Kevin Martin story.

Martin’s tenure at the FCC was marked by his repeated jokes about how he led the FCC like the KGB. That would seem to be of a piece with denying Freedom of Information Act requests like the one I initiated.

Yet I never anticipated just how pointed his criticism of public and transparent broadband data could be. I had been invited to speak at the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners’ and the FCC’s joint conference on broadband deployment and data at the FCC, in San Jose, on November 6, 2008 – two days after the presidential election.

In my presentation, on the background to and requirements of the Broadband Data Improvement Act, I referred to the Center’s FOIA lawsuit, quoted in the section above, about how the FCC didn’t want disclosure of carrier data to lead to greater competition. Kevin Martin interrupted my presentation seven times! He disagreed with my characterization of the FCC’s position on broadband data.

“It was actually also because the carriers do not want it to be disclosed, and so it was not provided in a public way,” Martin first interjected. I disagreed with him, saying that “The FCC chose through its discretion over a period of time not to release information about carrier by carrier level.”

To which Martin replied, “I am not going to have an argument with you over it. I think we should move on…. This is not about FOIA litigation. No one is interested in that.”

I came back with, “I am just pointing out that the law does not need to be changed for the FCC to release this data.”

And that still isn’t the end of the story.

Two weeks later, on November 18, 2008, Kevin Martin was back in Washington for what appeared to be his final swan song: accepting an award at the Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies at the National Press Club. Martin gave his remarks, and was praised by the Phoenix Center. After chatting with journalists for a few minutes, we all went our separate ways.

Later, as I was walking over to the elevator to depart, I saw the elevator door closing on Kevin Martin and his long-time chief of staff, Dan Gonzalez.

Martin opened the doors by pushing the open button, and I walked in. Martin asked me what I had in my hands. It was a box with flyers, so I handed him a flyer from BroadbandCensus.com, and told him a bit about our next upcoming activity as the elevator went to the ground floor.

As we stepped into the lobby, I asked Martin if he had a nice trip back from the broadband data conference in San Jose.

He chuckled somewhat under his breath, and then said: “You may not believe this, but I think what you are doing is a good thing. I just can’t end up giving it to you.”

About BroadbandCensus.com

Gilder explains the true meaning of the microcosm with his uniquely poetic prose:

As Peter Drucker said. “What one man can do, another can do again.” Distilling discoveries of science, a set of technologies, and a Philosophy of enterprise, the microcosm is far too big for any one country. Even its products are mostly made of ideas—waves that suffuse the mindscape of the world. (p.127)

The vital importance of ideas in all aspects of the microcosm, including hardware, is a central theme of the book:

Computer hardware thus is another form of information technology like books, films, and disks. The value resides in the ideas rather than in their material embodiment. The chip design is itself a software program. Even the design of the computer’s plastic chassis and keyboard may well have begun as a software program. Like a book, a spreadsheet financial package, even a film on a videocassette, a microchip design is conceived and developed on a computer screen and takes form in a storage device that costs between 80 cents and $2 to manufacture. The current dominance of such products in the world economy signifies the end of the industrial era and the onset of the age of the microcosm. (p. 159)

Consider debate over handset exclusivity: Those who insist that AT&T be forced to relinquish its exclusive rights to the iPhone ignore the fact that the iPhone is not so much a device as a brilliant idea—actually, a cluster of innovations made possible because AT&T was willing to partner with Apple on the risky venture of developing the expensive device and bringing it to market. Speaking of ideas made reality, I can’t wait to get my hands on a Microsoft Surface!

http://www.youtube.com/v/rP5y7yp06n0

Despite my frequent disagreements with his policy conclusions, Farhad Manjooo of Slate is one of the most gifted tech policy pundits around today and everything he writes is worth reading (and I whole-heartedly agreed with his recent article on the high-tech and antitrust).  Alas, I find myself again disagreeing with him again today.

In his latest column, “The Great iPhone Lockdown: Should the FCC force Apple to sell Google’s apps?” Manjoo responds to a recent essay by TLF contributor Ryan Radia (“Newsflash to FCC: The iPhone is a Closed Platform, and Consumers Love It“). In that essay, Ryan generally argued that: (a) a lot of people own and love the iPhone despite some silly restrictions on certain apps; and (b) if they don’t like that, there are plenty of other options from which they can choose. Consequently, regulation seems unwarranted and likely highly misguided in light of the potential unitended consequences in might yield.  It’s an argument I very much agree with, of course.  Anyway, Manjoo responds:

Radia’s argument isn’t crazy. Just the other day, I argued that the government shouldn’t go after Google for antitrust violations because the tech industry is fluid; companies that are on top today can fall tomorrow. So what if Apple rejects apps capriciously? If its actions are so terrible, consumers will eventually abandon it.

But then Manjoo counters that argument and goes completely off-the-rails with several assertions that I find quite perplexing:

Yet [Radia’s] analysis misses a key point: The iPhone runs on public networks and therefore falls under government jurisdiction. At the very least, the regulators have a duty to ensure fair competition on wireless networks—and by arbitrarily blocking rivals from its device, the iPhone’s software platform simply isn’t fair. We would never accept its rules in other contexts: Imagine if Apple were building cars instead of phones and one day decided that everyone who’d bought an iCar would be banned from listening to any music not purchased from iTunes. Or say that Apple banned all Mac users from downloading Firefox because the browser duplicated the functionality of Safari. Such restrictions sound ridiculous; they wouldn’t pass the barest scrutiny of regulators or consumers. So why should we allow Apple to do the same thing with the iPhone?

Well, let’s begin with a few things he gets wrong here.  First, ” The iPhone runs on public networks and therefore falls under government jurisdiction.”  Uh, no. Last time I checked, AT&T was not running a “public network” owned by the government.  It’s true that AT&T is subjected to some FCC and state rules governing the provision of service, but it isn’t a “public network” like our highway system or inter-coastal waterways.  Thus, AT&T has the right to set terms of service (along with partners like Apple) to achieve both profitability and continue to invest in innovative new networks and services.

Manjoo then asserts that: ” At the very least, the regulators have a duty to ensure fair competition on wireless networks—and by arbitrarily blocking rivals from its device, the iPhone’s software platform simply isn’t fair.” It’s true that there are consumer protection laws on the books, but it’s unclear to me how the FCC has any jurisdictional authority to be regulating Apple or the iPhone.  There simply is none as I noted here in my essay, “Where is FCC Authority to Regulate in Apple-Google Spat?”

Manjoo’s next argument that “We would never accept its rules in other contexts,” uses some very rather strange examples. He asks us to consider what we (or the government, I suppose) might do “if Apple were building cars instead of phones and one day decided that everyone who’d bought an iCar would be banned from listening to any music not purchased from iTunes. Or say that Apple banned all Mac users from downloading Firefox because the browser duplicated the functionality of Safari.”

Well, I think it’s quite clear what we would do: WE WOULD STOP USING APPLE PRODUCTS!  Or at least we could if we didn’t like the terms of the deals they offered.  So, even if it is true that many of us would find such restrictions “ridiculous,” as Manjoo suggests, it certainly does not follow that ” they wouldn’t pass the barest scrutiny of regulators...”  Rubbish. I’m not even sure which agency it is that Manjoo think would be in the business of regulating “iCars” or, for that matter, Firefox and Safari web browsers. (A “Federal Computer Commission?”)

Regardless, it’s a bad idea.  These are activities that are better settled by consumer responses and market backlashes. If you want more innovation and competition in response to bone-headed moves by Apple (or anyone else for that matter), the solution is most definitely NOT the sort of common carriage regulatory regime that Manjoo seems to be suggesting.  That will just lock us into plain vanilla technologies, networks, and services.  Real tech innovation happens when people and competitors get pissed and get off their duffs to do something about it, not when government attempts to micro-manage results by tinkering with yesterday’s platforms.

Again, I want to make it very clear that I am not saying there is no such thing as “market failure” or “code failure.” To the contrary, as I argued in my recent exchange with Lawrence Lessig, I see mini-market failures happening all the time in the technology world.  But:

here’s the amazing thing: I usually wake up the next day, fire up my RSS reader again, and find a world almost literally transformed overnight. I see the power of public pressure, press scrutiny, social norms, and innovation by competitors combining to correct the “bad code” or “code failures” of the previous day. OK, so sometimes it takes longer that a day, a week, or a month. And occasionally legal sanctions must enter the picture if the companies or coders did something particularly egregious. But, more often than not, markets evolve and bad code eventually gives way to better code; short-term “market failures” give rise to a world of innovative alternatives.

Thus, I went on to argue that:

“code failures” are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s). Of course, this assumes we can agree on a definition of “bad code” and “code failures.” What concerns me about the way Prof. Lessig approaches these issues in Code and in his subsequent work is that he is far too quick to declare the debate over by labeling short-term code hiccups as sky-is-falling market failures. The end result of such myopic techno-pessimism is the inevitable call for governments to intervene and “do something” to correct supposed code failures. The cyber-libertarian instead counsels patience. Let’s give those other forces — alternative platforms, new innovators, social norms, public pressure, etc. — a chance to work some magic. Evolution happens, if you let it.

But, again, such evolution and innovation will most decidedly not happen if you people are always running around crying “market failure!” and calling in the code cops at every juncture, as Manjoo seems to be doing in the Apple-Google spat.  The problem with that think, as I noted in my debate with Lessig, is that it:

creates perverse marketplace incentives by discouraging efforts to innovate or “route around” bad code or code failure. We don’t want the whole world sitting around waiting for government to regulate the mousetrap to improve it or even give everyone better access to it; we should want the world to be innovating to create better mousetraps!

No one is going to build a better mousetrap to compete with Apple if regulators make it too easy for Apple to become the one preferred platform for all mobile apps developers. If Google is pissed about Apple screwing them over on their Google Voice app, that is a great thing: It will give them all the better reason to plow even more resources into Android and other platforms to compete against Apple!  And that’s exactly the sort of serious competition and innovation we should all be rooting for.

How is it that smart people like Manjoo fail to grasp this crucial point?

The iPhone-obsessed blogosphere is atwitter about the Apple”s exclusion of the Google voice application from the iPhone app store. On Friday, the FCC sent letters of inquiry to the two companies as well as AT&T.

Whatever one thinks about whether Apple and AT&T should be able to operate their own networks as they see fit, this cat-fight should at least demonstrate the pointlessness of the investigation opened by the FTC in May as to whether Apple and Google are violating the antitrust laws by having two members of their boards of directors in common: Google CEO Eric Schmidt and former Genentech CEO Art Levinson. If the two companies were, in fact, trying to collude in an anti-competitive manner, they don’t seem to be doing a very good job of it!

Meanwhile, if you don’t like how Apple runs its app store, don’t get an iPhone! If you already have one, you could follow the lead of TechCrunch’s Michael Arrington and simply cancel your existing iPhone contract to get a more “open” phone—such as one powered by Google’s Android operating system.

Me, I’m just waiting for Google Voice to offer number portability so I can start using the service without having to change the number I’ve had for the last five years—and plan to take to my ashen grave (somewhere beyond low Earth orbit).

Last summer, my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin and I explained that, while many consumers dislike not being able to get popular smartphones like the iPhone on the wireless network of their choice, such exclusive deals actually benefit consumers. Barbara summarizes her testimony (PDF) as follows:

the dynamic created by the exclusive arrangement between Apple and AT&T that produced the iPhone allowed the two companies to bridge the gap between the technologies of today and the disruptive innovations of tomorrow. Moreover, it is undeniable that the breakthrough success of the iPhone has spurred a wave of competitors. If every wireless carrier had been able to sell the iPhone when it was initially released, I noted, it seems unlikely there would have been as much carrier support for developing competing products like the Google G1, RIM Blackberry Storm, Samsung Instinct or Palm Pre.