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The D.C. Circuit has struck down as arbitrary and capricious the FCC’s “cable cap.”  The cap prevented a single cable operator from serving more than 30% of U.S. homes—precisely the same percentage limit struck down by the court in 2001.  The court ruled that the FCC had failed to demonstrate that “allowing a cable operator to serve more than 30% of all cable subscribers would threaten to reduce either competition or diversity in programming.”

The court’s decision rested on the two critical charts (both generated by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer in his excellent Media Metrics special report) at the heart of the PFF amicus brief I wrote with our president, Ken Ferree:

First, the record is replete with evidence of ever increasing competition among video providers: Satellite and fiber optic video providers have entered the market and grown in market share since the Congress passed the 1992 Act, and particularly in recent years. Cable operators, therefore, no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that concerned the Congress in 1992.

Increasing Competition in the MVPD Marketplace

Second, over the same period there has been a dramatic increase both in the number of cable networks and in the programming available to subscribers.

Our chart shows the explosion in the number of programmers (though not the total amount of programming), as well as the falling rate of affiliation between cable operators and programmers, which was among the prime factors motivating Congress when it authorized a cable cap in the 1992 Cable Act:

Video Choices & Vertical Integration in the Multichannel Video Marketplace

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Continuing the “Cutting the (Video) Cord” series started by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer:  The WSJ had two great pieces yesterday about the increasing competitive relevance of television distributed by Internet—a trend that was at the heart of an amicus brief PFF recently filed in support of C omcast’s challenge of the FCC’s 30% cap on cable ownership.  The first WSJ piece declares that:

After more than a decade of disappointment, the goal of marrying television and the Internet seems finally to be picking up steam. A key factor in the push are new TV sets that have networking connections built directly into them, requiring no additional set-top boxes for getting online. Meanwhile, many consumers are finding more attractive entertainment and information choices on the Internet — and have already set up data networks for their PCs and laptops that can also help move that content to their TV sets.

The easier it is for consumers to receive traditional television programming (in addition to other kinds of video content) distributed over the Internet on their television, the less “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” power cable distributors have over programming.  So the Netflix-capable and Yahoo-widget-capable televisions described by the WSJ piece go a long way to increasing the substitutability of what we call Internet Video Programming Distributors (IVPDs) for Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs), such as cable, satellite television and fiber services offered by telcos such as Verizon’s FiOS.  

While such televisions are only expected to reach 14% of all TV sales by 2012, one must remember that a growing number of set-top boxes ( e.g., the Roku Digitial Video Player, game consoles like the Microsoft XBox 360 and Sony PlayStation 3, and TiVo DVRs) allow users to users to receive IVPD programming on their existing televisions.  

As we argued in our amicus brief, the immense competitive importance of IVPDs lies not in the potential for some users to “cut the cord” to cable and other MVPDs (though that will surely happen), but in the immediate impact IVPDs have as an alternative distribution channel for programmers.  In the pending D.C. Circuit case, we argue that both the FCC’s 30% cap, issued in December 2007, and the underlying portions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing such a cap should be struck down as unconstitutional because the ready availability of IVPDs as an alternative distribution channel means that cable no longer has the “special characteristic” of gatekeeper/bottleneck power that would justify imposing such a unique burden on the audience size of cable operators.  (Of course, Direct Broadcast Satellite and Telco Fiber are also eating away at cable’s share of the MVPD marketplace.)

The second WSJ piece, an op/ed, illustrates beautifully how cable operators are already losing “market power” (or at least negotiating leverage) in a very tangible way:  they’re having to pay more for programming.  Specifically, the Journal describes how Viacom plaid chicken with Time Warner—and won.   Continue reading →

This is just a listing of the installments of my ongoing “Media Deconsolidation Series.” I needed to create a single repository of all the essays so I could point back to them in future articles and papers. For those not familiar with it, this series represents an effort to set the record straight regarding the many myths surrounding the media marketplace. These myths are usually propagated by a group of radical anti-media regulatory activists who I call the “media reformistas.” Sadly, however, many policymakers, journalists, and members of the public are buying into some of these myths, too.

In particular, I have spent much time here debunking the notion that rampant consolidation is taking place and that media operators are only growing larger and devouring more and more companies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Over the past several years, traditional media operators and sectors have been coming apart at the seams in the face of unprecedented innovation and competition. The volume of divestiture activity has been quite intense, and most traditional media operators have been getting smaller, not bigger. As a result, America’s media marketplace is growing more fragmented and atomistic with each passing day.

Anyway, here’s the series so far…

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Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

  1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
  2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
  3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
  4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Continue reading →

When the definitive history of Kevin Martin’s regulatory reign of terror against the cable industry is finally written, I have a feeling that Ted Hearn of Multichannel News will be the man who pens it. There is no one who has been reporting on these issues longer or with more investigative vigor than Ted. In an absolutely scathing piece today about a former Martin staffer, Ted does a nice job summarizing the major elements of Martin’s war on cable. It reads like the list of grievances against King George found in the Declaration. (Think: “He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.”)  Anyway, I just thought I’d throw Ted’s list up here for those keeping score at home:

— He secretly rewrote an FCC study issued in November 2004 that had concluded that cable a la carte was a bad idea. — He walked away from a handshake agreement with NCTA, Comcast and Time Warner that the rollout of family programming packages would end his a la carte jihad. — He stripped cable’s control over critical wiring in apartment buildings, affirming the identical policy that a court had previously struck down. — He voided exclusive contracts between cable operators and apartment building owners just a few years after the FCC gave the green light to such deals. — He required cable operators to carry must carry TV stations in analog and digital for three years after voting against such a policy in February 2005. — He extended program access rules for five years, a gift to DirecTV and Dish Network even though the two satellite providers are larger than every cable company in the U.S. except Comcast and Time Warner. — He imposed expensive set-top box equipment mandates on cable, making it vastly more costly for Comcast and Time Warner to reach the goal of all-digital platforms. — He capped cable ownership at 30% of pay-TV subscribers nationally—the same limit that a federal court kicked back to the FCC as unlawful—while letting AT&T and Verizon basically divide the country’s phone market. — He slashed cable leased access rates to zero in an act of bureaucratic malice that a federal appeals court has now blocked and that the Office of Management and Budget has rejected as a violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act. — He decided to brand Comcast an Internet outlaw when all the company did was occasionally frustrate a tiny minority of customers whose massive consumption of Web porn and pirated Hollywood films was destroying the service for others.

As I mentioned yesterday, James Gattuso and I penned an editorial for National Review this week about the growth of FCC regulation and spending in recent years. In the op-ed, we also noted that, “For whatever reason, a disproportionate number of these [new regulatory proposals] have been aimed at cable television, so much so that press and industry analysts now speak of Chairman Martin’s ongoing ‘war on cable.'”

Today, the editors at National Review have chimed in with an editorial of their own on the issue entitled, “Pulling the Cable on Martin’s Crusade.” Specifically, the editors address what most pundits believe really motivates the Chairman’s crusade against cable: His desire to force cable companies to offer consumers channels on “a la carte” basis in an effort to “clean up” cable TV. “Martin should abandon this particular crusade,” the NR editors argue. “While we are sympathetic to parents’ desire to get the channels they want without having to buy access to racier fare, using economic regulation to restructure an industry is the wrong approach.” They continue:

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