Can we advance AI safety without new international regulatory bureaucracies, licensing schemes or global surveillance systems? I explore that question in my latest R Street Institute study, “Existential Risks & Global Governance Issues around AI & Robotics.” (31 pgs) My report rejects extremist thinking about AI arms control & stresses how the “realpolitik” of international AI governance is such that things cannot and must not be solved through silver-bullet gimmicks and grandiose global government regulatory regimes.
The report uses Nick Bostrom’s “vulnerable world hypothesis” as a launching point and discusses how his five specific control mechanisms for addressing AI risks have started having real-world influence with extreme regulatory proposals now being floated. My report also does a deep dive into the debate about a proposed global ban on “killer robots” and looks at how past treaties and arms control efforts might apply, or what we can learn from them about what won’t work.
I argue that proposals to impose global controls on AI through a worldwide regulatory authority are both unwise and unlikely to work. Calls for bans or “pauses” on AI developments are largely futile because many nations will not agree to them. As with nuclear and chemical weapons, treaties, accords, sanctions and other multilateral agreements can help address some threats of malicious uses of AI or robotics. But trade-offs are inevitable, and addressing one type of existential risk sometimes can give rise to other risks.
A culture of AI safety by design is critical. But there is an equally compelling interest in ensuring algorithmic innovations are developed and made widely available to society. The most effective solution to technological problems usually lies in more innovation, not less. Many other multistakeholder and multilateral efforts can help AI safety. Final third of my study is devoted to a discussion of that. Continuous communication, coordination, and cooperation—among countries, developers, professional bodies and other stakeholders—will be essential. Continue reading →