Works of authorship originate in private, safely kept under common law protections. Once published, however, expressive works become data ferae naturae—wild and natural information. As such, expressive works roam and reproduce freely. They may get captured in fixed copies, caged in atoms or bits. But the public, once it has absorbed an expressive work, generally retains relatively cheap access to it—unless and until copyright intervenes.
Copyright law limits public access to expressive works, herding them off the commons and into private hands. The Copyright Act offers a sort of ranch to authors, giving them a place to birth, raise, and sell their expressive works safe from the deprivations of grasping strangers. Authors enjoy those special privileges against the public not as a natural right, but rather solely thanks to a policy authorized by the U.S. Constitution and implemented through the Copyright Act. [The figure below] illustrates the path that copyright, together with some of its legal next-of-kin, takes from its origins towards its goals.
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While rightly shuddering at specter of copyism, we should also recognize that the unauthorized use of copyrighted works can, if it does not go so far as to undercut authors’ incentives, increase social wealth. Consider, for instance, an impoverished entrepreneur relying on pirated software to start her business. Supposing that she could not afford to buy an authorized copy, and that her unauthorized use would not depress software production, her infringement would generate a welcome consumer surplus. The same would hold true of, say, someone who enjoys an infringing copy of a CD despite being unwilling to pay its retail price. As [the figure below] illustrates, those exceptions to the strict enforcement of copyright law could in theory benefit us all without discouraging the production and distribution of expressive works.
[The above figure] surely offers too sanguine a view of the effects of copyright infringement, however. Without the limitations imposed by copyright law, some consumers who would otherwise willingly pay for authorized uses might instead opt to save their money by joining the unpaying masses of unauthorized users. The resulting exodus, from respecting copyright to infringing it, would risk decreasing the revenues afforded by copyright, bringing about the policy tragedy portrayed [earlier].
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On the standard economic view of copyrights, as on the economic view of other monopolies, average revenue equals demand. Those two measures trace one and the same line. Why? Because for most products and services, consumption closely matches supply at the market-clearing price. Sales reveal consumer demand and, in the case of copyright and other supposed monopolies, only one seller reaps revenue from those sales. Thus, for instance, might a utility’s sales show the aggregate consumer demand for electric power.
Even a so-called monopolist might face competition, however. The sole authorized seller of hard liquor might fail to capture the entire market of drinkers, for instance, losing some to the resale of stolen goods and others to moonshine. So, too, might an electrical utility suffer theft, competition from home-brewed power, and exit to gas appliances.
The caveats to “monopoly” prove especially strong in the case of copyright, which permits some unauthorized uses of protected works, such as fair uses, and fails to prevent many infringing uses. We might fairly say that the former category of uses, because copyright holders have no statutory power to bar them, do not really cut into the market share for a copyrighted work. Copyright holders cannot lose what never have, on that view. I here thus focus on infringing uses. Still, though, it bears noting that, whether due to permitted or forbidden uses, a copyright holder never commands all of the market for an expressive work.
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Jason Schultz weighs in on whether the Richter Scales video was fair use:
Hard to say for sure, but in the end, it probably is a fair use. On the one hand, the Video does use Lane’s photo without permission or attribution. Plus, this is how Lane pays her rent. She takes and licenses photos for a living. Uses like this, if they were to become widespread, could potentially undermine her livelihood and thus, her ability to take photographs like the one used in the video. Thus, there is an argument under Factor 4 that this is not fair.
However, the other three factors probably weigh in the Video’s favor. First and foremost, what The Richter Scales did was what copyright law often calls “transformative use” — using other people’s copyrighted works in a new way that adds creativity and cultural value. And while perhaps not a direct parody of Lane and her specific work, the inclusion of the photograph in the video was part of an overall commentary on the world that Lane photographs and the people in it. One could even argue that Lane is a part of that world herself and thus, implicitly part of the subject matter TRS intended to comment on. (Note: I haven’t talked to TRS, so I have no idea what they intended). Some courts have found fair use in similar cases involving Barbie dolls, use of concert posters in a book about the Grateful Dead, the Mastercard “Priceless” ad campaign, a Family Guy parody of Carol Burnett, and 2 Live Crew’s cover of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman.” Of course, other courts have come out differently, such as one decision over the use of Dr. Seuss-like rhymes in a book about the OJ Simpson murder trial. Still, overall, I think a court would find the video transformative and thus, that Factor 1 weighed in its favor.
Factors 2 and 3 would also probably weigh in favor of the Video. The photo is a published work depicting a factual occurrence (a person at a Web 2.0 event). It’s also being used for that purpose — to comment on the person being at the event. The amount of the photo taken is, of course, the whole thing, but with photographs its hard to apply this factor since few photos are useful in pieces. Courts have also found that when it is necessary to use another person’s entire copyrighted work to make your own commentary, that weighs in favor of fair use. Given that three of the four factors are likely in the Video’s favor (including the critical Factor 1), the Video is probably fair and not illegal.
As Schultz points out, this isn’t really the sort of issue copyright law was designed to resolve. Norms are likely to be more effective than laws in this sort of situation. Given that the video wasn’t a big money-maker, it’s not reasonable to expect them to pay her for using the photo, but it is reasonable to expect them to give her credit. And if they fail to do so, it’s worthwhile for the tech blogosphere to criticize them for failing to respect those norms.
Some commentators have defended copyrights as natural rights under Locke’s labor-desert theory of property. On that view, copyright qualifies as a natural right for the same reason that tangible property does: Because an author mixes herself, through her creative effort, in her expressions. Ayn Rand, Herbert Spencer, and Lysander Spooner represent prominent proponents of that justification of copyright.
That facially plausible extension of Locke’s theory does not, however, withstand close scrutiny. His labor-desert justification of property gives an author clear title only to the particular tangible copy in which she fixes her expression–not to some intangible plat in the noumenal realm of ideas. Locke himself did not try to justify intangible property. He appears, in fact, to have viewed copyright as merely a policy tool for promoting the public good. Modern commentators who would venture so far beyond the boundaries of Locke’s thought and into the abstractions of intellectual property thus ought to leave his name behind.
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I earlier analogized copyright infringement to exceeding the speed limit. On reflection, though, I think that understates the case against infringement, and that it more resembles tax evasion than it does speeding. That far from establishes copyright as a natural right. To the contrary, it establishes it as a welfare right, granted by the State, based on the redistribution of wealth, and enjoyed by authors at our expense. Here is how I put it now, in a revised version of what I posted earlier:
When you infringe a copyright, you can admit to breaking the law without also admitting to violating a natural right. Thus does a good driver on an empty road speed with a clear conscience.
So, too, might a citizen drive dangerously close to the Tax Code’s limits. To misjudge, and blunder into tax evasion, could lead to loss of liberty and property. Citizens thus obey the Tax Code for good reason. Voluntary payment of excess taxes remains very rare, however; most people evidently pay their taxes under compulsion rather than out of joy. In that, the Tax Code resembles the Copyright Act. Both rely on positive legislation; both create regulatory regimes; both redistribute property (money in the one case, rights to throats, pens, and presses in the other). We grudgingly accept that the Tax Code and the Copyright Act create special beneficiaries of State power, the former by way of tax credits, the latter by way of exclusive rights. We might even celebrate it, reasoning that both the poor and authors merit our generosity. But we do not speak of a natural right to welfare. Nor should we speak of a natural right to copyright.
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To say that copyright does not protect any natural right is not to say that it lacks any moral justification. We naturally frown on unauthorized and misattributed copying. A singer who claims authorship of a song written by another commits a sort of fraud on his listeners. Most of the time, that sort of fraud does not rise to the level of materiality, and thus does not justify litigation. We typically do not rely to any substantial detriment on the accuracy of an expressive work’s description, after all. If we like a work, we like it, regardless of its source. Misdescriptions of authorship can trick us into buying the wrong expressions, however. You might, for instance, buy tickets to a Djelimady Tounkara concert only to find another, lesser guitarist on stage. That would naturally rouse your indignation.
We don’t need copyrights to vindicate that sort of wrong, however; common law and various state and federal statutes already afford many remedies for it. Consumers of misleadingly labeled goods or services can plead fraud under tort law and breach or promissory estoppel under contract law. The licensee of a materially misdescribed work would enjoy a strong contract law defense, one voiding any agreement alleged by the licensor publisher. An author who sees her work sold under another’s name would, as a wronged competitor, have standing to sue for unfair competition under state or federal law. The publisher of such an author might likewise enjoy legal and equitable remedies for passing off. The Federal Trade Commission and its many state counterparts can protect consumers and competitors of falsely labeled expressive works, while various federal and state executive officers can fight such wrongs with the criminal sanctions levied against the many guises of fraud.
Those legal tools give us ample ways to discourage materially harmful misdescriptions of expressive works. We don’t need copyright to satisfy our moral intuitions on that front, and most people’s condemnations against unauthorized copying don’t go much beyond harmful lying.
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TechCrunch reports that Jackass 2.5 will debut online, for free.
Sure this is an important development in the evolution of entertainment business models to accommodate modern communications, but I’m just as excited because it’s such an advance for our culture!
Dudes! Jackass 2.5!
Over at Techdirt, I note a development that I don’t think has gotten nearly as much attention as it should:
Imeem, a social networking site that was in the recording industry's crosshairs earlier this year for allowing file-sharing on its network, has pulled off an impressive feat. This summer it settled its lawsuit with Warner Music by promising to give Warner a cut of advertising revenues from the site. Now the Wall Street Journal is reporting that it’s signed similar deals with all four major labels, meaning that Imeem is now the first website whose users have the music industry's blessing to share music for free. What's especially striking about this is that for the last decade, the fundamental principle of the labels' business strategy is that sharing music without paying for it is stealing. They drove Napster, AudioGalaxy, Grokster, Kazaa, and other peer-to-peer file-sharing services out of business on that basis. As we pointed out way back in 2000, all this accomplished was to drive file-sharing underground where the recording industry couldn't get a cut of the profits. Had they approached Napster in 2000 the way they approached Imeem this year, they could have been collecting ad revenue from every file-sharing transaction over the last seven years. Instead, they wasted a lot of money on lawsuits, angered a lot of their customers, and ultimately still had to concede that music sharing might be OK as long as they get a cut. The only significant difference between Napster and Imeem is that Imeem only allows you to play music on its website, whereas Napster allowed you to download songs to your hard drive. But this isn't as big of a difference as it might appear at first glance. The Imeem website doesn't provide a "download" button, but there's no DRM involved, and it's quite easy to download music files from Imeem using third-party tools. And because Imeem's site doesn't use DRM, Imeem downloading tools are probably legal under the DMCA. So what we have here is the de facto legalization of Napster-like sites, as long as the record labels get a cut of the advertising revenue. It's an exciting development, albeit one that should have happened seven years ago.
This was largely reported as a run-of-the-mill business story by the tech press. But I think it’s much bigger than that. Between this and the swift abandonment of music DRM, I think 2007 will be seen as the real turning point for online music.
Why would copyright holders choose to abandon their statutory rights and rely solely on their common law ones? A few “blockheaded” authors might do so non-monetary reasons, of course. Thanks to the combined effect of copyright misuse and § 505 of the Copyright Act, however, even crassly profit-maximizing copyright holders might find abandonment financially attractive.
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