I write about telecom and tech policy and have found that lawmakers and regulators are eager to learn about new technologies. That said, I find that good tech policies usually die of neglect as lawmakers and lobbyists get busy patching up or growing “legacy” policy areas, like public pensions, income taxes, Medicare, school financing, and so forth. So it was a pleasant surprise this spring to see Arizona lawmakers prioritize and pass several laws that anticipate and encourage brand-new technologies and industries.

Flying cars, autonomous vehicles, telehealth–legislating in any one of these novel legal areas is noteworthy. New laws in all of these areas, plus other tech areas, as Arizona did in 2021, is a huge achievement and an invitation to entrepreneurs and industry to build in Arizona.

Re: AVs and telehealth, Arizona was already a national leader in autonomous vehicles and Gov. Ducey in 2015 created the first (to my knowledge) statewide AV task force, something that was imitated nationwide. A new law codifies some of those executive orders and establishes safety rules for testing and commercializing AVs. Another law liberalizes and mainstreams telehealth as an alternative to in-person doctor visits. 

A few highlights about new Arizona laws on legal areas I’ve followed more closely:

1. Urban air mobility and passenger drones

Arizona lawmakers passed a law (HB 2485) creating an Urban Air Mobility study committee. 26 members of public and private representatives are charged with evaluating current regulations that affect and impede the urban air mobility industry and making recommendations to lawmakers. “Urban air mobility” refers to the growing aviation industry devoted to new, small aircraft designs, including eVTOL and passenger drones, for the air taxi industry. Despite the name, urban air mobility includes intra-city (say, central business district to airport) aviation as well as regional aviation between small cities.

The law is well timed. The US Air Force is giving eVTOL aircraft companies access to military airspace and facilities this year, in part to jumpstart the US commercial eVTOL industry, and NASA recently released a new study (PDF) about regional aviation and technology. NASA and the FAA last year also endorsed the idea of urban air mobility corridors and it’s part of the national strategy for new aviation.

The federal government partnering with cities and state DOTs in the next few years to study air taxis and to test the corridor concept. This Arizona study committee might be to identify possible UAM aerial corridors in the state and cargo missions for experimental UAM flights. They could also identify the regulatory and zoning obstacles to, say, constructing or retrofitting a 2-story air taxi vertiport in downtown Phoenix or Tucson.

Several states have drone advisory committees but this law makes Arizona a trailblazer nationally when it comes to urban air mobility. Very few states have made this a legislative priority: In May 2020 Oklahoma law created a task force to examine autonomous vehicle and passenger drones. Texas joined Oklahoma and Arizona on this front–this week Gov. Abbot signed a similar law creating an urban air mobility committee.

2. Smart corridor and broadband infrastructure construction

Infrastructure companies nationwide are begging state and local officials to allow them to build along roadways. These “smart road” projects include installing 5G antennas, fiber optics, lidar, GPS nodes, and other technologies for broadband or for connected and autonomous vehicles. To respond to that trend, Arizona passed a law (HB 2596) on May 10 that allows the state DOT–solely or via public-private partnership–to construct and lease out roadside passive infrastructure.

In particular, the new law allows the state DOT to construct, manage, and lease out passive “telecommunication facilities”–not simply conduit, which was allowed under existing law. “Telecommunication facilities” is defined broadly:

Any cable, line, fiber, wire, conduit, innerduct, access manhole, handhole, tower, hut, pedestal, pole, box, transmitting equipment, receiving equipment or power equipment or any other equipment, system or device that is used to transmit, receive, produce or distribute by wireless, wireline, electronic or optical signal for communication purposes.

The new Section 28-7383 also allows the state to enter into an agreement with a public or private entity “for the purpose of using, managing or operating” these state-owned assets. Access to all infrastructure must be non-exclusive, in order to promote competition between telecom and smart city providers. Access to the rights-of-way and infrastructure must also be non-discriminatory, which prevents a public-private partner from favoring its affiliated or favored providers. 

Leasing revenues from private companies using the roadside infrastructure are deposited into a new Smart Corridor Trust Fund, which is used to expand the smart corridor network infrastructure. The project also means it’s easier for multiple providers to access the rights-of-way and roadside infrastructure, making it easier to deploy 5G antennas and extend fiber backhaul and Internet connectivity to rural areas.

It’s the most ambitious smart corridor and telecom infrastructure deployment program I’ve seen. There have been some smaller projects involving the competitive leasing of roadside conduit and poles, like in Lincoln, Nebraska and a proposal in Michigan, but I don’t know of any state encouraging this statewide.

For more about this topic of public-private partnerships and open-access smart corridors, you can read my law review article with Prof. Korok Ray: Smart Cities, Dumb Infrastructure.

3. Legal protections for residents to install broadband infrastructure on their property

Finally, in May, Gov. Ducey signed a law (HB 2711) sponsored by Rep. Nutt that protects that resembles and supplements the FCC’s “over-the-air-reception-device” rules that protect homeowner installations of wireless broadband antennas. Many renters and landowners–especially in rural areas where wireless home Internet makes more sense–want to install wireless broadband antennas on their property, and this Arizona law protects them from local zoning and permitting regulations that would “unreasonably” delay or raise the cost of installation of antennas. (This is sometimes called the “pizza box rule”–the antenna is protected if it’s smaller than 1 meter diameter.) Without this state law and the FCC rules, towns and counties could and would prohibit antennas or fine residents and broadband companies for installing small broadband and TV antennas on the grounds that the antennas are an unpermitted accessory structure or zoning violation.

The FCC’s new 2021 rules are broader and protect certain types of outdoor 5G and WiFi antennas that serve multiple households. The Arizona law doesn’t extend to these “one-to-many” antennas but its protections supplement those FCC rules and clearer than FCC rules, which can directly regulate antennas but not town and city officials. Between the FCC rules and the Arizona law, Arizona households and renters have new, substantial freedom to install 5G and other wireless antennas on their rooftops, balconies, and yard poles. In rural areas especially this will help get infrastructure and small broadband antennas installed quickly on private property.

Too often, policy debates by state lawmakers and agencies are dominated by incremental reforms of longstanding issues and established industries. Very few states plant the seeds–via policy and law–for promotion of new industries. Passenger drones, smart corridors, autonomous vehicles, and drone delivery are maturing as technologies. Preparing for those industries signals to companies and their investors that innovation, legal clarity, and investment is a priority for the state. Hopefully other states will take Arizona’s lead and look to encouraging the industries and services of the future.

Last month, Senator and presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren released a campaign document, Plan for Rural America. The lion’s share of the plan proposed government-funded and -operated health care and broadband. The broadband section of the plan proposes raising $85 billion (from taxes?) to fund rural broadband grants to governments and nonprofits. The Senator then placed a Washington Post op-ed to decrying the state of rural telecommunications in America. 

While it’s commendable she has a plan, it doesn’t materially improve upon existing, flawed rural telecom subsidy programs, which receive only brief mention. In particular, the Plan places an unwarranted faith in the power of government telecom subsidies, despite red flags about their efficacy. The op-ed misdiagnoses rural broadband problems and somehow lays decades of real and perceived failure of government policy at the feet of the current Trump FCC, and Chairman Pai in particular.

As a result, the proposals–more public money, more government telecom programs–are the wrong treatment. The Senator’s plan to wire every household is undermined by “the 2% problem”–the cost to build infrastructure to the most remote homes is massive. 

Other candidates (and perhaps President Trump) will come out with rural broadband plans so it’s worth diving into the issue. Doubling down on a 20 year old government policy–more subsidies to more providers–will mostly just entrench the current costly system.

How dire is the problem?

Somewhere around 6% of Americans (about 20 million people) are unserved by a 25 Mbps landline connection. But that means around 94% of Americans have access to 25 Mbps landline broadband. (Millions more have access if you include broadband from cellular and WISP providers.)

Further, rural buildout has been improving for years, despite the high costs. From 2013 to 2017, under Obama and Trump FCCs, landline broadband providers covered around 3 or 4 million new rural customers annually. This growth in coverage seems to be driven by unsubsidized carriers because, as I found in Montana, FCC-subsidized telecom companies in rural areas are losing subscribers, even as universal service subsidies increased.

This rural buildout is more impressive when you consider that most people who don’t subscribe today simply don’t want Internet access. Somewhere between 55% to 80% of nonadopters don’t want it, according to Department of Commerce and Pew surveys. The fact is, millions of rural homes are connected annually despite the fact that most nonadopters today don’t want the service.

These are the core problems for rural telecom: (1) poorly-designed, overlapping, and expensive programs and (2) millions of consumers who are uninterested in subscribing to broadband.

Tens of billions for government-operated networks

The proposed new $85 billion rural broadband fund gets most of the headlines. It resembles the current universal service programs–the fund would disburse grants to providers, except the grants would be restricted to nonprofit and government operators of networks. Most significant: Senator Warren promises in her Plan for Rural America that, as President, she will “make sure every home in America has a fiber broadband connection.” 

Every home?

This fiber-to-every-farm idea had advocates 10 years ago. The idea has failed to gain traction because it runs into the punishing economics of building networks.

Costs rise non-linearly for the last few percent of households and $85 billion would bring fiber only to a small sliver of US households. According to estimates from the Obama FCC, it would cost $40 billion to build fiber to the final 2% of households. Further, the network serving those 2% of households would require an annual subsidy of $2 billion simply to maintain those networks since revenues are never expected to cover ongoing costs. 

Recent history suggests rapidly diminishing returns and that $85 billion of taxpayer money will be misspent. If the economics wasn’t difficult enough, real-world politics and government inefficiency also degrade lofty government broadband plans. For example, Australia’s construction of a nationwide publicly-owned fiber network–the nation’s largest-ever infrastructure project–is billions over budget and years behind schedule. The RUS broadband grant debacle in the US only supports the case that $85 billion simply won’t go that far. As Will Rinehart says, profit motive is not the cause of rural broadband problems. Government funding doesn’t fix the economics and government efficacy.

Studies will probably be come out saying it can be done more cheaply but America has been running a similar experiment for 20 years. Since 1998, as economists Scott Wallsten and Lucía Gamboa point out, the US government has spent around $100 billion on rural telecommunications. What does that $100 billion get? Mostly maintenance of existing rural networks and about a 2% increase of phone adoption.

Would the Plan improve or repurpose the current programs and funding? We don’t know. The op-ed from Sen. Warren complains that:

the federal government has shoveled more than a billion in taxpayer dollars per year to private ISPs to expand broadband to remote areas, but these providers have done the bare minimum with these resources.

This understates the problem. The federal government “shovels” not $1 billion, but about $5 billion, annually to providers in rural areas, mostly from the Universal Service Fund Congress established in 1996.

As for the “public option for broadband”–extensive construction of publicly-run broadband networks–I’m skeptical. Broadband is not like a traditional utility. Unlike electricity, water, or sewer, a city or utility network doesn’t have a captive customer base. There are private operators out there.

As a result, public operation of networks is a risky way to spend public funds. Public and public-private operation of networks often leads to financial distress and bankruptcy, as residents in Provo, Lake County, Kentucky, and Australia can attest.

Rural Telecom Reform

I’m glad Sen. Warren raised the issue of rural broadband, but the Plan’s drafters seem uninterested in digging into the extent of the problem and in solutions aside from throwing good money after bad. Lawmakers should focus on fixing the multi-billion dollar programs already in existence at the FCC and Ag Department, which are inexplicably complex, expensive to administer, and unequal towards ostensible beneficiaries. 

Why, for instance, did rural telecom subsidies break down to about $11 per rural household in Sen. Warren’s Massachusetts in 2016 when it was about $2000 per rural household in Alaska? 

Alabama and Mississippi have similar geographies and rural populations. So why did rural households in Alabama receive only about 20% of what rural Mississippi households receive? 

Why have administrative costs as a percentage of the Universal Service Fund more than doubled since 1998? It costs $200 million annually to administer the USF programs today. (Compare to the FCC’s $333 million total budget request to Congress in FY 2019 for everything else the FCC does.)

I’ve written about reforms under existing law, like OTARD rule reform–letting consumers freely install small, outdoor antennas to bring broadband to rural areas–and transforming the current program funds into rural broadband vouchers. There’s also a role for cities and counties to help buildout by constructing long-lasting infrastructure like poles, towers, and fiber conduit. These assets could be leased out a low cost to providers.

Conclusion

After years of planning, the FCC reformed some of the rural telecom program in 2017. However, the reforms are partial and it’s too early to evaluate the results. The foundational problem is with the structure of existing programs. Fixing that structure should be a priority for any Senator or President concerned about rural broadband. Broadband vouchers for rural households would fix many of the problems, but lawmakers first need to question the universal service framework established over 20 years ago. There are many signs it’s not fit for purpose.

I have been covering telecom and Internet policy for almost 30 years now. During much of that time – which included a nine year stint at the Heritage Foundation — I have interacted with conservatives on various policy issues and often worked very closely with them to advance certain reforms.

If I divided my time in Tech Policy Land into two big chunks of time, I’d say the biggest tech-related policy issue for conservatives during the first 15 years I was in the business (roughly 1990 – 2005) was preventing the resurrection of the so-called Fairness Doctrine. And the biggest issue during the second 15-year period (roughly 2005 – present) was stopping the imposition of “Net neutrality” mandates on the Internet. In both cases, conservatives vociferously blasted the notion that unelected government bureaucrats should sit in judgment of what constituted “fairness” in media or “neutrality” online.

Many conservatives are suddenly changing their tune, however. President Trump and Sen. Ted Cruz, for example, have been increasingly critical of both traditional media and new tech companies in various public statements and suggested an openness to increased regulation. The President has gone after old and new media outlets alike, while Sen. Cruz (along with others like Sen. Lindsay Graham) has suggested during congressional hearings that increased oversight of social media platforms is needed, including potential antitrust action.

Meanwhile, during his short time in office, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) has become one of the most vocal Internet critics on the Right. In a shockingly-worded USA Today editorial in late May, Hawley said, “social media wastes our time and resources” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” He even referred to these sites as “parasites” and blamed them for a long list of social problems, leading him to suggest that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared” along with various other sites and services.

Hawley’s moral panic over social media has now bubbled over into a regulatory crusade that would unleash federal bureaucrats on the Internet in an attempt to dictate “fair” speech on the Internet. He has introduced an astonishing piece of legislation aimed at undoing the liability protections that Internet providers rely upon to provide open platforms for speech and commerce. If Hawley’s absurdly misnamed new “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” is implemented, it would essentially combine the core elements of the Fairness Doctrine and Net Neutrality to create a massive new regulatory regime for the Internet.

The bill would gut the immunities Internet companies enjoy under 47 USC 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency Act. Eric Goldman of the Santa Clara University School of Law has described Section 230 as the “best Internet law” and “a big part of the reason why the Internet has been such a massive success.” Indeed, as I pointed out in a Forbes column on the occasion of its 15^th anniversary, Section 230 is “the foundation of our Internet freedoms” because it gives online intermediaries generous leeway to determine what content and commerce travels over their systems without the fear that they will be overwhelmed by lawsuits if other parties object to some of that content.

The Hawley bill would overturn this important legal framework for Internet freedom and instead replace it with a new “permissioned” approach. In true “Mother-May-I” style, Internet companies would need to apply for an “immunity certification” from the FTC, which would undertake investigations to determine if the petitioning platform satisfied a “requirement of politically unbiased content moderation.”

The vague language of the measure is an open invitation to massive political abuse. The entirety of the bill hinges upon the ability of Federal Trade Commission officials to define and enforce “political neutrality” online. Let’s consider what this will mean in practice.

Under the bill, the FTC must evaluate whether platforms have engaged in “politically biased moderation,” which is defined as moderation practices that are supposedly, “designed to negatively affect” or “disproportionately restricts or promote access to … a political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint.” As Blake Reid of the University of Colorado Law School rightly asks, “How, exactly, is the FTC supposed to figure out what the baseline is for ‘disproportionately restricting or promoting’? How much access or availability to information about political parties, candidates, or viewpoints is enough, or not enough, or too much?”

There is no Goldilocks formula for getting things just right when it comes to content moderation. It’s a trial-and-error process that is nightmarishly difficult because of the endless eye-of-the-beholder problems associated with constructing acceptable use policies for large speech platforms. We struggled with the same issues in the broadcast and cable era, but they have been magnified a million-fold in the era of the global Internet with the endless tsunami of new content that hits our screens and devices every day. “Do we want less moderation?” asks Sec, 230 guru Jeff Kosseff. “I think we need to look at that question hard.  Because we’re seeing two competing criticisms of Section 230,” he notes. “Some argue that there is too much moderation, others argue that there is not enough.”

The Hawley bill seems to imagine that a handful of FTC officials will magically be able to strike the right balance through regulatory investigations. That’s a pipe dream, of course, but let’s imagine for a moment that regulators could somehow sort through all the content on message boards, tweets, video clips, live streams, gaming sites, and whatever else, and then somehow figure out what constituted a violation of “political neutrality” in any given context. That would actually be a horrible result because let’s be perfectly clear about what that would really be: It would be a censorship board. By empowering unelected bureaucrats to make decisions about what constitutes “neutral” or “fair” speech, the Hawley measure would, as Elizabeth Nolan Brown of Reason summarizes, “put Washington in charge of Internet speech.” Or, as Sen. Ron Wyden argues more bluntly, the bill “will turn the federal government into Speech Police.” “Perhaps a more accurate title for this bill would be ‘Creating Internet Censorship Act,'” Eric Goldman is forced to conclude.

The measure is creating other strange bedfellows. You won’t see Berin Szoka of TechFreedom and Harold Feld of Public Knowledge ever agreeing on much, but they both quickly and correctly labelled Hawley’s bill a “Fairness Doctrine for the Internet.” That is quite right, and much like the old Fairness Doctrine, Hawley’s new Internet speech control regime would be open to endless political shenanigans as parties, policymakers, companies, and the various complainants line up to have their various political beefs heard and acted upon. “That’s the kind of thing Republicans said was unconstitutional (and subject to FCC agency capture and political manipulation) for decades,” says Daphne Keller of the Stanford Center for Internet & Society. Moreover, during the Net Neutrality holy wars, GOP conservatives endlessly blasted the notion that bureaucrats should be determining what constitute “neutrality” online because it, too, would result in abuses of the regulatory process. Yet, Sen. Hawley’s bill would now mandate that exact same thing.

What is even worse is that, as law professor Josh Blackman observes, “the bill also makes it exceedingly difficult to obtain a certification” because applicants need a supermajority of 4 of the 5 FTC Commissioners. This is public choice fiasco waiting to happen. Anyone who has studied the long, sordid history of broadcast radio and television licensing understands the danger associated with politicizing certification processes. The lawyers and lobbyists in the DC “swamp” will benefit from all the petitioning and paperwork, but it is not clear how creating a regulatory certification regime for Internet speech really benefits the general public (or even conservatives, for that matter).

Former FTC Commissioner Josh Wright identifies another obvious problem with the Hawley Bill: it “offers the choice of death by bureaucratic board or the plaintiffs’ bar.” That’s because by weakening Sec. 230’s protections, Hawley’s bill could open the floodgates to waves of frivolous legal claims in the courts if companies can’t get (or lose) certification. The irony of that result, of course, is that this bill could become a massive gift to the tort bar that Republicans love to hate!

Of course, if the law ever gets to court, it might be ruled unconstitutional. “The terms ‘politically biased’ and ‘moderation’ would have vagueness and overbreadth problems, as they can chill protected speech,” Josh Blackman argues. So it could, perhaps, be thrown out like earlier online censorship efforts. But a lot of harm could be done—both to online speech and competition—in the years leading up to a final determination about the law’s constitutionality by higher courts.

What is most outrageous about all this is that the core rationale behind Hawley’s effort—the idea that conservatives are somehow uniquely disadvantaged by large social media platforms—is utterly preposterous. In May, the Trump Administration launched a “tech bias” portal which “asked Americans to share their stories of suspected political bias.” The portal is already closed and it is unclear what, if anything, will come out of this effort. But this move and Hawley’s proposal point to the broader trend of conservatives getting more comfortable asking Big Government to redress imaginary grievances about supposed “bias” or “exclusion.”

In reality, today’s social media tools and platforms have been the greatest thing that ever happened to conservatives. Mr. Trump owes his presidency to his unparalleled ability to directly reach his audience through Twitter and other platforms. As recently as June 12, President Trump tweeted, “The Fake News has never been more dishonest than it is today. Thank goodness we can fight back on Social Media.” Well, there you have it!

Beyond the President, one need only peruse any social media site for a few minutes to find an endless stream of conservative perspectives on display. This isn’t exclusion; it’s amplification on steroids. Conservatives have more soapboxes to stand on and preach than ever before in the history of this nation.

Finally, if they were true to their philosophical priors, then conservatives also would not be insisting that they have any sort of “right” to be on any platform. These are private platforms, after all, and it is outrageous to suggest that conservatives (or any other person or group) are entitled to have a spot on any other them.

Some conservatives are fond of ridiculing liberals for being “snowflakes” when it comes to other free speech matters, such as free speech on college campuses. Many times they are right. But one has to ask who the real snowflakes are when conservative lawmakers are calling on regulatory bureaucracies to reorder speech on private platform based on the mythical fear of not getting “fair” treatment. One also cannot help but wonder if those conservatives have thought through how this new Internet regulatory regime will play out once a more liberal administration takes back the reins of power. Conservatives will only have themselves to blame when the Speech Police come for them.

Addendum: Several folks have pointed out another irony associated with Hawley’s bill is that it would greatly expand the powers of the administrative state, which conservatives already (correctly) feel has too much broad, unaccountable power. I should have said more on that point, but here’s a nice comment from David French of National Review, which alludes to that problem and then ties it back to my closing argument above: i.e., that this proposal will come back to haunt conservatives in the long-run:

when coercion locks in — especially when that coercion is tied to constitutionally suspect broad and vague policies that delegate immense powers to the federal government — conservatives should sound the alarm. One of the best ways to evaluate the merits of legislation is to ask yourself whether the bill would still seem wise if the power you give the government were to end up in the hands of your political opponents. Is Hawley striking a blow for freedom if he ends up handing oversight of Facebook’s political content to Bernie Sanders? I think not.

Additional thoughts on the Hawley bill:

Josh Wright

Daphne Keller

Blake Reid

TechFreedom

Josh Blackman

Sen. Ron Wyden

Jeff Kosseff

Eric Goldman

CCIA

NetChoice

Internet Association

David French at National Review

John Samples

A decade ago, a heated debate raged over the benefits of “a la carte” (or “unbundling”) mandates for cable and satellite TV operators. Regulatory advocates said consumers wanted to buy all TV channels individually to lower costs. The FCC under former Republican Chairman Kevin Martin got close to mandating a la carte regulation.

But the math just didn’t add up. A la carte mandates, many economists noted, would actually cost consumers just as much (or even more) once they repurchased all the individual channels they desired. And it wasn’t clear people really wanted a completely atomized one-by-one content shopping experience anyway.

Throughout media history, bundles of all different sorts had been used across many different sectors (books, newspapers, music, etc.). This was because consumers often enjoyed the benefits of getting a package of diverse content delivered to them in an all-in-one package. Bundling also helped media operators create and sustain a diversity of content using creative cross-subsidization schemes. The traditional newspaper format and business is perhaps the greatest example of media bundling. The classifieds and sports sections helped cross-subsidize hard news (especially local reporting). See this 2008 essay by Jeff Eisenach and me for details for more details on the economics of a la carte.

Yet, with the rise of cable and satellite television, some critics protested the use of bundles for delivering content. Even though it was clear that the incredible diversity of 500+ channels on pay TV was directly attributable to strong channels cross-subsidizing weaker ones, many regulatory advocates said we would be better off without bundles. Moreover, they said, online video markets could show us the path forward in the form of radically atomized content options and cheaper prices.

Flash-forward to today. As this Wall Street Journal article points out, online video providers are rejecting a la carte and recreating content bundles to keep a diversity of programming flowing. This happened in unregulated markets without any FCC rules. YouTube, Hulu, PlayStation, and many other online video providers are creating new bundles and monetization schemes.

It is also worth noting that this same sort of “re-bundling” of content is happening with online news sources and other digital platforms as various sites struggle to find content monetization schemes that can sustain diverse, high-quality content in the Digital Era. Content bundling and various paywall schemes are helping them do so.

The lesson here is that the economics of content creation and delivery are quite dynamic, challenging, and extremely hard to predict. Mandating “a la carte” unbundling of content sounded smart and well-intentioned to many people a decade ago, but it proved to be problematic even in highly competitive online markets. Thankfully, we did not mandate unbundling by law. We waited and watched to see how it naturally played out in various markets. We now have a better feel for how big of a mistake mandatory a la carte would have likely been in practice.

Until recently, I wasn’t familiar with Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net reports. Freedom House has useful recommendations for Internet non-regulation and for protecting freedom of speech. Their Freedom on the Net Reports make an attempt at grading a complex subject: national online freedoms.

However, their latest US report came to my attention. Tech publications like TechCrunch and Internet regulation advocates were trumpeting the report because it touched on net neutrality. Freedom House penalized the US score in the US report because the FCC a few months ago repealed the so-called net neutrality rules from 2015.

The authors of the US report reached a curious conclusion: Internet deregulation means a loss of online freedom. In 2015, the FCC classified Internet services as a “Title II” common carrier service. In 2018, the FCC, reversed course, and shifted Internet services from one of the most-regulated industries in the US to one of least-regulated industries. This 2018 deregulation, according to the Freedom House US report, creates an “obstacle to access” and, while the US is still “free,” regulation repeal moves the US slightly in the direction of “digital authoritarianism.”  

The authors of the US report resort to net neutrality platitudes and don’t actually examine the 2015 Title II order. It’s never encouraging when a substantive report begins with an inaccurate summation of the 2015 Order: that the Order “ensured that internet service providers treated internet traffic equally.” That’s not what the Order does. (The “treat all traffic equally” aspiration is “happy little bunny rabbit dreams,” in the words of early Internet developer David Clark.) Despite branding efforts by Internet regulation advocates, the 2015 Order wouldn’t be recognizable as net neutrality to the average net neutrality supporter. The Obama FCC was quite clear that the Order allowed ISP content blocking and prioritization of services.

Relatedly, as pro-net neutrality publications like TechCrunch have noted, the net neutrality policies in the 2015 Order are optional for ISPs. 

[A] tiny ISP in Texas called Alamo . . . wanted to offer a “family-friendly” edited subset of the internet to its customers. Funnily enough, this is permitted! And by publicly stating that it has no intention of providing access to “substantially all Internet endpoints,” Alamo would exempt itself from the net neutrality rules! Yes, you read that correctly—an ISP can opt out of the rules by changing its business model. They are . . . essentially voluntary.

The current FCC cited this optional nature of the 2015 rules as a good reason to repeal the rules:

In practice, the Title II Order deregulates curated Internet access relative to conventional Internet access and may induce ISPs to filter content more often, rendering the no-blocking and no-throttling rules ineffectual as long as an ISP disclosed it was offering curated services.

I noticed that this report isn’t the first time that advocate talking points have clouded what should be substantive regulatory analysis from Freedom House. In November 2017, Freedom House issued a statement when the FCC announced plans to repeal the 2015 Title II order:

This change . . . could also set a dangerous precedent for countries that model their policy on Washington’s. In less democratic countries, where most providers of online content are state-owned and censored, authorities would have an excuse to give faster lanes of access to progovernment outlets.

Their apparent unfamiliarity with US telecom laws means they got this exactly backwards. It was the 2015 Title II order that increased the amount of control that the President of the US has over Internet access, as Berin Szoka has explained.   If there was a model to would-be despots around the world, it was the Title II classification in 2015, which gave greater war power authority to the President to prioritize the President’s favored communications over the Internet. (Left unexplained by Freedom House: why the FCC’s non-Title II policy from roughly 1996 to 2015 had not already inspired authoritarians.)

The 2018 deregulation reduced Presidential power over Internet services. Yet, according to Freedom House, the President’s loss of power to prioritize communications is also a loss of freedom to Internet users.

The Freedom House US report omits these details, uncritically endorses net neutrality maxims, and therefore slightly downgrades the US score to 22 (lower is better). That puts the US in the same class as the UK (score: 23), a country that is arresting thousands of online trolls and posters annually for “grossly offensive” social media posts. This includes convictions for

• a teenage girl who posted the lyrics from Snap Dogg’s I’m Trippin’ to pay tribute to a boy who died in a road crash.
• a young man’s tasteless attempt to annoy his girlfriend, including by teaching her pug to do a Nazi salute.

Needless to say, nothing in the US, and certainly not the recent Internet deregulation, compares to these mass arrests and convictions for online behavior.

Ironically, the Freedom House US Internet report reveals the same deficiency as the 2015 Internet regulations: creating a standard that is aspirational, occasionally internally inconsistent, and multi-factor means that, too often, advocates can reach whatever pre-determined result they wish.

A few states have passed Internet regulations because the Trump FCC, citing a 20 year US policy of leaving the Internet “unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” decided to reverse the Obama FCC’s 2015 decision to regulate the Internet with telephone laws.

Those state laws regulating Internet traffic management practices–which supporters call “net neutrality”–are unlikely to survive lawsuits because the Internet and Internet services are clearly interstate communications and FCC authority dominates. (The California bill also likely violates federal law concerning E-Rate-funded Internet access.) 

However, litigation can take years. In the meantime ISP operators will find they face fewer regulatory headaches if they do exactly what net neutrality supporters believe the laws prohibit: block Internet content. Net neutrality laws in the US don’t apply to ISPs that “edit the Internet.”

The problem for net neutrality supporters is that Internet service providers, like cable TV providers, are protected by the First Amendment. In fact, Internet regulations with a nexus to content are subject to “strict scrutiny,” which typically means regulations are struck down. Even leading net neutrality proponents, like the ACLU and EFF, endorse the view that ISP curation is expressive activity protected by First Amendment.

As I’ve pointed out, these First Amendment concerns were raised during the 2016 litigation and compelled the Obama FCC to clarify that its 2015 “net neutrality” Order allows ISPs to block content. As a pro-net neutrality journalist recently wrote in TechCrunch about the 2015 rules,  

[A] tiny ISP in Texas called Alamo . . . wanted to offer a “family-friendly” edited subset of the internet to its customers. Funnily enough, this is permitted! And by publicly stating that it has no intention of providing access to “substantially all Internet endpoints,” Alamo would exempt itself from the net neutrality rules! Yes, you read that correctly — an ISP can opt out of the rules by changing its business model. They are . . . essentially voluntary.

The author wrote this to ridicule Judge Kavanaugh, but the joke is clearly not on Kavanuagh.

In fact, under the 2015 Order, filtered Internet service was less regulated than conventional Internet service. Note that the rules were “essentially voluntary”–ISPs could opt out of regulation by filtering content. The perverse incentive of this regulatory asymmetry, whereby the FCC would regulate conventional broadband heavily but not regulate filtered Internet at all, was cited by the Trump FCC as a reason to eliminate the 2015 rules. 

State net neutrality laws basically copy and paste from the 2015 FCC regulations and will have the same problem: Any ISP that forthrightly blocks content it doesn’t wish to transmit–like adult content–and edits the Internet is unregulated.

This looks bad for net neutrality proponents leading the charge, so they often respond that the Internet regulations cover the “functional equivalent” of conventional (heavily regulated) Internet access. Therefore, the story goes, regulators can stop an ISP from filtering because an edited Internet is the functional equivalent of an unedited Internet.

Curiously, the Obama FCC didn’t make this argument in court. The reason the Obama FCC didn’t endorse this “functional equivalent” response is obvious. Let’s play this out: An ISP markets and offers a discounted “clean Internet” package because it knows that many consumers would appreciate it. To bring the ISP back into the regulated category, regulators sue, drag the ISP operators into court, and tell judges that state law compels the operator to transmit adult content.

This argument would receive a chilly reception in court. More likely is that state regulators, in order to preserve some authority to regulate the Internet, will simply concede that filtered Internet drops out of regulation, like the Obama FCC did.

As one telecom scholar wrote in a Harvard Law publication years ago, “net neutrality” is dead in the US unless there’s a legal revolution in the courts.  Section 230 of the Telecom Act encourages ISPs to filter content and the First Amendment protects ISP curation of the Internet. State law can’t change that. The open Internet has been a net positive for society. However, state net neutrality laws may have the unintended effect of encouraging ISPs to filter. This is not news if you follow the debate closely, but rank-and-file net neutrality advocates have no idea. The top fear of leading net neutrality advocates is not ISP filtering, it’s the prospect that the Internet–the most powerful media distributor in history–will escape the regulatory state.

The move to small cells and fixed wireless broadband means states, cities, and the FCC are changing their regulatory approaches. For decades, wireless providers have competed primarily on coverage, which meant building large cell towers all over the country, each one serving hundreds of people. That’s changing. As Commissioner Carr noted,

5G networks will look very different from today’s 4G deployments. 5G will involve the addition of hundreds of thousands of new, small-scale facilities with antennas no larger than a small backpack.

Currently, wireless companies don’t have many good options when it comes to placing these lower-power, higher-bandwidth “small cells.” They typically install small cells and 5G transmitters on public rights-of-way and on utility poles, but there may not be room on poles and attachment fees might be high.  

One thing the FCC might consider to stimulate 5G and small cell investment is to dust off its 20 year-old over-the-air-reception-device (OTARD) rules. These little-known rules protect homeowners and renters from unwarranted regulation of TV and broadband antennas placed on their property. If liberalized, the OTARD rules would open up tens of millions of other potential small cell sites–on rooftops, on balconies, and in open fields and backyards around the country. 

Background

In the early 1990s, cities and homeowner associations would sometimes prohibit, charge for, or regulate satellite dishes that homeowners or renters installed on their rooftops or balconies. Lawmakers saw a problem and wanted to jumpstart competition in television (cities had authorized cable TV monopolies for decades and cable had over 95% of the pay-TV market).

In the 1996 Telecom Act, then, Congress instructed the FCC to increase TV competition by regulating the regulators. Congress said that state, local, and HOA restrictions cannot impose restrictions that

impair a viewer’s ability to receive video programming services through devices designed for over-the-air reception of television broadcast signals, multichannel multipoint distribution service [MMDS], or direct broadcast satellite services.

With these congressional instructions, the FCC created its OTARD rules, informally known as the “pizza box rule.” Briefly stated, if your TV antenna, satellite TV receiver, or “fixed wireless” antenna is smaller than a large pizza (1 meter diameter–no cell towers in front yards), you are free to install the necessary equipment on property you control, like a yard or balcony. (There are some exceptions for safety issues and historical buildings.) The 1996 law expressly protects MMDS (now called “broadband radio service”), which includes spectrum in the 2.1 GHz, 2.5 GHz, 2.6 GHz, 28 GHz, 29 GHz, and 31 GHz bands. The Clinton FCC expanded the rules to protect, broadly, any antennas that “receive or transmit fixed wireless signals.” You can even install a mast with an antenna that extends up to 12 feet above your roofline. 

OTARD reform

The rules protect fixed wireless antennas and could see new life in the 5G world. Carriers are building small cells and fixed wireless primarily to provide faster broadband and “mobile TV” services. Millions of Americans now view their cable and Netflix content on mobile devices and carriers are starting to test mobile-focused pay-TV services. AT&T has Watch TV, T-Mobile is expected to deploy a mobile TV service soon because of its Layer3 acquisition, and reporting suggests that Verizon is approaching YouTube TV and Apple to supply TV for its 5G service. 

The FCC’s current interpretation of its OTARD rules doesn’t help 5G and small cell deployment all that much, even though the antennas are small and they transmit TV services. The actual rules don’t say this but the FCC’s interpretation is that their OTARD protections don’t protect antenna “hubs” (one-to-many transmitters like small cells).  The FCC liberalized this interpretation in its Massport proceeding and allowed  hub  one-to-many transmitters [Correction, via Connor at the FCC: the FCC liberalized to say that one-to-many transmitters are permitted, not hub antennas.] but did not extend this interpretation for homeowners’ antennas.  In short, under the current interpretation, cities and HOAs can regulate, charge for, and prohibit the installation of 5G and small cells on private property.

The FCC should consider expanding its rules to protect the installation of (low power) 5G and small cell hubs on private property. This would directly improve, per the statute, “viewers’ ability to receive video programming services” via wireless. It would have the ancillary effect of improving other wireless services. The prospect of installing small cells on private property, even temporarily, should temper the fees carriers are charged to use the public rights-of-way and poles.

In rural areas, the FCC might also consider modifying the rules to allow masts that extend beyond 12 feet above the roofline. Transmitters even a few feet taller would improve wireless backhaul and coverage to nearby homes, thus increasing rural broadband deployment and IP-based television services.

Wireless trends

OTARD reform is especially timely today because the Wheeler and Pai FCCs have freed up several bands of spectrum and fixed wireless is surging. Fixed wireless and mesh network providers using CBRS and other spectrum bands could benefit from more installation sites, particularly in rural areas. C Spire, for instance, is creating “hub homes” for fixed wireless, and Starry and Rise Broadband are expanding their service areas. CableLabs is working on upgrading cable networks for mobile and 5G backhaul and cable operators might benefit from OTARD reform and more outside infrastructure.

Modifying the OTARD rules might be controversial but modification directly gives consumers and homeowners more control over improving broadband service in their neighborhood, just as the rules improved TV competition in the past. Courts are pretty deferential when agencies change an interpretation of an existing rule. Further, as the agency said years ago:

T he Federal Communications Commission has consistently maintained that it has the ultimate responsibility to determine whether the public interest would be served by construction of any specific antenna tower.

The future of wireless services is densification–putting fiber and small cells all over downtowns and neighborhoods in order to increase broadband capacity for cutting-edge services, like smart glasses for the blind and remote-controlled passenger cars. The OTARD rules and the FCC’s authority over wireless antennas provides another tool to improve wireless coverage and TV services.

Though ubiquitous in urban and rural landscapes, most people barely notice utility poles. Nevertheless, utility poles play a large role in national broadband policy. Improving pole access won’t generate the headlines like billion-dollar spectrum auctions and repeal of Title II Internet regulations, but it’s just as important for improving broadband competition and investment. To that end, the FCC is proposing to create “one-touch-make-ready” rules for FCC-regulated utility poles across the country. I was pleased to see that the FCC will likely implement this and other policy recommendations from the FCC’s Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee.*

“Access regulations”–like must-carry of broadcast TV, net neutrality, and telecom network unbundling–are always controversial and frequently fail. However, in my view, one-touch-make-ready is an example of useful access regulation and I think it’s likely to succeed at its aims–more broadband competition and investment. Pole access appears to be, using former FCC chief economist Jerry Faulhaber’s phrase, an efficient market boundary. FCC pole access mandates are feasible because the “interface”–physical wires and poles–is relatively simple and regulatory compliance–did the entrant damage existing users? did they provide notice?–is pretty easy to ascertain. Typically, visual inspection will reveal damage and the liable party is usually obvious.

As the FCC says in the proposed order, these proposed modifications and one-touch-make-ready,

put[] the parties most interested in efficient broadband deployment—new attachers—in a position to control the survey and make-ready processes.

Reasonable people (even on the free-market side) will disagree about how to regulate utility pole access. One-touch-make-ready was a controversial proposal and commercial operators have been divided on the issue. In the end, it was not unanimous but the BDAC reached large consensus on the issue. In my view, the FCC struck the right balance in protecting existing companies’ equipment and promoting infrastructure construction and competitive entry.

Some utility pole basics: Utility poles are often owned by a phone company, a utility company, or a city. At the top of utility poles are electric lines. (The FCC is not talking about doing work near the electric lines on top, which is trickier and more dangerous for obvious reasons.) The rule changes here affect the “communications space,” which is midway up the poles and typically has one or several copper, coaxial, or fiber lines strung across.

For decades, the “market” for communications space access was highly regulated but stable. National and local policy encouraged monopoly phone service and cable TV provision and, therefore, entrants rarely sought access to string up lines on utility poles. In the 1990s, however, phone and cable was deregulated and competition became national policy. In the last ten years, as the price of fiber broadband provision has fallen and consumer demand for competitive broadband options has increased, new companies–notably Google Fiber–have needed access to utility poles. The FCC notes in its proposed order that, going forward, “small cell” and 5G deployments will benefit from competitive, lower-cost fiber providers.

The pre-2018 approach to pole attachments, wherein many parties had effective veto rights over new entrants, was creating too many backlogs and discouraging competitive providers from making the investments necessary. The FCC’s proposed rules streamline the process by creating tighter deadlines for other parties to respond to new entrants. The rules also give new entrants new privileges and greater control in constructing new lines and equipment, so long as they notify existing users and don’t damage existing lines.

I’m pleased to see that the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee’s recommendations are proving useful to the agency. It’s encouraging that this FCC, by taking a weed-whacker to legacy policies regarding spectrum, pole access, and net neutrality, is taking steps to improve broadband in America.

*I’m the vice chair of the Competitive Access working group.

Related research and commentary:

The Importance of Spectrum Access to the Future of Innovation (pdf)

A Truly ‘Open Internet’ Would Be Free of Burdensome FCC Regulation (NRO)

Lawmakers frequently hear impressive-sounding stats about net neutrality like “83% of voters support keeping FCC’s net neutrality rules.”   This 83% number (and similar “75% of Republicans support the rules”) is based on a survey from the Program for Public Consultation released in December 2017, right before the FCC voted to repeal the 2015 Internet regulations.

These numbers should be treated with skepticism. This survey generates these high approval numbers by asking about net neutrality “rules” found nowhere in the 2015 Open Internet Order. The released survey does not ask about the substance of the Order, like the Title II classification, government price controls online, or the FCC’s newly-created authority to approve of and disapprove of new Internet services.

Here’s how the survey frames the issue:

Under the current regulations, ISPs are required to:    provide customers access to all websites on the internet.    provide equal access to all websites without giving any websites faster or slower download speeds.  

The survey then essentially asks the participant if they favor these “regulations.” The nearly 400-page Order is long and complex and I’m guessing the survey creators lacked expertise in this area because this is a serious misinterpretation of the Order. This framing is how net neutrality advocates discuss the issue, but the Obama FCC’s interpretations of the 2015 Order look nothing like these survey questions. Exaggeration and misinformation is common when discussing net neutrality and unfortunately these pollsters contributed to it. (The Washington Post Fact Checker column recently assigned “Three Pinocchios” to similar net neutrality advocate claims.)

Let’s break down these rules ostensibly found in the 2015 Order.

“ISPs are required to provide customers access to all websites on the internet”

This is wrong. The Obama FCC was quite clear in the 2015 Order and during litigation that ISPs are free to filter the Internet and block websites. From the oral arguments:

FCC lawyer: “If [ISPs] want to curate the Internet…that would drop them out of the definition of Broadband Internet Access Service.” Judge Williams: “They have that option under the Order?” FCC lawyer: “Absolutely, your Honor. …If they filter the Internet and don’t provide access to all or substantially all endpoints, then…the rules don’t apply to them.”

As a result, the judges who upheld the Order said, “The Order…specifies that an ISP remains ‘free to offer ‘edited’ services’ without becoming subject to the rule’s requirements.”

Further, in the 1996 Telecom Act, Congress gave Internet access providers legal protection in order to encourage them to block lewd and “objectionable content.” Today, many ISPs offer family-friendly Internet access that blocks, say, pornographic and violent content. An FCC Order cannot and did not rewrite the Telecom Act and cannot require “access to all websites on the internet.”

“ISPs are required to provide equal access to all websites without giving any websites faster or slower download speeds”

Again, wrong. There is no “equal access to all websites” mandate (see above). Further, the 2015 Order allows ISPs to prioritize certain Internet traffic because preventing prioritization online would break Internet services.

This myth–that net neutrality rules require ISPs to be dumb pipes, treating all bits the same–has been circulated for years but is derided by networks experts. MIT computer scientist and early Internet developer David Clark colorfully dismissed this idea as “happy little bunny rabbit dreams.”  He pointed out that prioritization has been built into Internet protocols for years and “[t]he network is not neutral and never has been.” 

Other experts, such as tech entrepreneur and investor Mark Cuban and President Obama’s former chief technology officer Aneesh Chopra, have observed that the need for Internet “fast lanes” as Internet services grow more diverse. Further, the nature of interconnection agreements and content delivery networks mean that some websites pay for and receive better service than others.

This is not to say the Order is toothless. It authorizes government price controls and invents a vague “general conduct standard” that gives the agency broad authority to reject, favor, and restrict new Internet services. The survey, however, declined to ask members of the public about the substance of the 2015 rules and instead asked about support for net neutrality slogans that have only a tenuous relationship with the actual rules.

“Net neutrality” has always been about giving the FCC, the US media regulator, vast authority to regulate the Internet.  In doing so, the 2015 Order rejects the 20-year policy of the United States, codified in law, that the Internet and Internet services should be “unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” The US tech and telecom sector thrived before 2015 and the 2017 repeal of the 2015 rules will reinstate, fortunately, that light-touch regulatory regime.

Years ago it looked like the Obama FCC would make broadband deployment, especially wireless service and spectrum reform, a top priority. They accomplished plenty–including two of the largest spectrum auctions to date–but, under tremendous political and special interest pressure, FCC leadership diverted significant agency resources into regulatory battles that had very little upside, like regulating TV apps and unprecedented regulation of Internet services.

Fortunately, the Trump FCC so far has made broadband deployment the agency’s top priority, which Chairman Pai signaled last year with the creation of the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee. As part of those deployment efforts, Commissioner Carr has led an effort to streamline some legacy regulatory obstacles, like historic preservation and environmental reviews and the FCC will vote this week on an order to expedite wireless infrastructure construction.

According to the FCC, somewhere around 96% of the US population has LTE coverage from three or more wireless operators, like Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint. The operators’ job isn’t done in rural areas, but much of the future investment into broadband networks will be to “densify” their existing coverage maps with “small cells” in order to provide wireless customers more bandwidth.

Since telecom companies build infrastructure, many current projects require review under the federal National Historic Preservation Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. However, unlike for the 100-foot cellphone towers in the past, the environmental checklists currently required for small cells are largely perfunctory since small cells typically use existing infrastructure, like utility poles. For Sprint’s tens of thousands of small cell site applications, for instance, the proposed order says “every single review resulted in a finding of no significant impact.”

The order under consideration will bring some structure to regulatory timelines and procedures. This should save carriers on unnecessary regulatory overhead and, more importantly, save time.

The order comes at a crucial time, which is why the prior FCC’s net neutrality distractions are so regrettable. Mobile broadband has huge demands and inadequate infrastructure and spectrum. According to studies, millions of Americans are going “mobile only,” and bypassing landline Internet service. Census Bureau surveys estimated that in 2015, about 20% of Internet-using households were mobile-only. (HT to Michael Horney.) That number is likely even higher today.

The construction of higher-capacity and 5G wireless, combined with repeal of the 2015 Internet regulations, will give consumers more options and better prices for Internet services, and will support new mobile applications like remote-control of driverless cars and AR “smart glasses” for blind people. Hopefully, after this order, the agency will continue with spectrum liberalization and other reforms that will expedite broadband projects.

Internet regulation advocates lost their fight at the FCC, which voted in December 2017 to rescind the 2015 Open Internet Order. Regulation advocates have now taken their “net neutrality” regulations to the states.

Some state officials–via procurement contracts, executive order, or legislation–are attempting to monitor and regulate traffic management techniques and Internet service provider business models in the name of net neutrality. No one, apparently, told these officials that government-mandated net neutrality principles are dead in the US.

As the litigation over the 2015 rules showed, o ur national laissez faire policy towards the Internet and our First Amendment guts any attempt to enforce net neutrality.  Recall that the 1996 amendments to the Communications Act announce a clear national policy about the Internet:

It is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.

In fact, that 1996 law was passed in order to encourage ISPs to filter objectionable content.

Further, regulators cannot prevent ISPs from exercising their First Amendment rights to curate the Internet. As Prof. Stuart Minor Benjamin wrote for the Harvard Law Review Forum in 2014,

If we really want to prevent Internet access providers from being speakers, we are going to have to radically reshape the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and understandings.

No radical reshaping of the First Amendment has occurred. For all these reasons, the Obama FCC attorney was forced to concede that

If they [that is, ISPs] filter the Internet . . . the [2015 Open Internet] rules don’t apply to them. 

Even Title II supporters EFF and the ACLU acknowledge in their FCC joint filing that ISPs are speakers who can filter content and escape Title II regulation.

ACLU & EFF throw in the towel—ISPs may block content under the 1st Amend. & are exempt from Title II. #netneutrality https://t.co/xU7uWfPIn4 pic.twitter.com/ZrXjs8bUtS

— Brent Skorup (@bskorup) September 1, 2017

At the end of the day, net neutrality, having lost its original definition, is simply a re-branding of Internet regulation.

State Internet regulations, therefore, are at odds with federal law and policy.  Let’s set aside federal preemption for the moment (Seth Cooper explained why preemption likely kills most of these state Internet regulations). There are other arguments for why states can’t impose baby “net neutrality” bills. 

Net neutrality bills likely violate the law

The state “net neutrality” bills and executive orders represent common carriage regulation. State officials make no attempt to hide this since they largely copy-and-paste the nondiscrimination obligations directly from the 2015 Open Internet Order. Here’s the problem for states: regulators can’t impose common carrier obligations on non-common carriers.

When nondiscrimination principles deprive operators of control of content, that amounts to common carriage. This was established in a 1979 Supreme Court case, Midwest Video II. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down common carriage obligations on cable operators, who are non-common carriers. The Court said ,

With its access rules, however, the Commission has transferred control of the content of access cable channels from cable operators to members of the public who wish to communicate by the cable medium. …The access rules plainly impose common-carrier obligations on cable operators.

The FCC, the Court said, had no authority to transform them into common carriers.

In fact, this is why the 2010 Open Internet Order was struck down in Verizon v. FCC. There, relying on Midwest Video II, the DC Circuit held that the net neutrality principles couldn’t be enforced on non-common carriers. As the DC Circuit said of the FCC’s common carrier obligations for ISPs: “Midwest Video II is indistinguishable.”

State “net neutrality” regulations will likely fail for the same reason.  The 2015 rules were upheld because “broadband Internet access service” was classified as a Title II common carrier service. “Broadband Internet access service” providers will no longer be common carriers once the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order takes effect. By imposing common carrier rules on non-common carriers, states run afoul of Midwest Video II and Verizon.

Net neutrality bills balkanize the Internet

State-based Internet regulation is also bad policy, and many who support net neutrality principles–like Google–oppose this legal regime. Internet regulation advocates, by encouraging regulation state-by-state and city-by-city, have finally dispensed with the fiction that “net neutrality” is about the “open Internet.” In their eagerness to have someone, anyone regulate the Internet, these advocates are willing to balkanize the US Internet into dozens, or even hundreds, of splinternets, each with a different local or state regulator.

The Montana governor, for instance, encouraged every state and city to regulate the Internet, even providing a customizable template:

Any city or state can do this. We made you a template: https://t.co/yYgQTWdat1 #NetNeutrality https://t.co/dz3BFiN0uN

— Steve Bullock (@GovernorBullock) January 22, 2018

Further, net neutrality rules are not easy to apply and interpret, particularly the “catch-all” Internet conduct standard. Net neutrality supporters take vastly different stances on identical ISP conduct.

One illustration: the common practice of zero rating by mobile providers. One prominent net neutrality supporter (then-FCC chairman Tom Wheeler) said T-Mobile’s zero rating was “highly innovative and highly competitive.” Another (Prof. Susan Crawford) said it is “anti-competitive,” “dangerous,” and “malignant” and should be ended immediately. There were many advocates in both camps and everywhere in between.

Given the wide divergence of views on a single issue, dozens of “net neutrality” laws would create innumerable contradictions about what is allowed and disallowed online. The fragmented Internet and legal uncertainty would be particularly damaging to small app companies and competitive ISPs, who don’t have hallways of lawyers to ensure compliance, and who use or plan to use traffic priority techniques for gaming, disability services, VoIP, and driverless cars.

For the global, stateless Internet, having state and city CIOs create their own custom Internet regulation interpretations would destroy what made the Internet transformative–a permissionless, global network free of legacy regulations. State legislatures and governors, by ramming through “net neutrality,” are committing to waste countless taxpayer dollars in battling the federal government and telecom companies in (probably unwinnable) litigation. Their “best-case” scenario: a few states win in court and splinter the Internet.

Hopefully cooler heads will prevail and put state energies and treasure into doing something constructive about broadband, like urging reform of the $8.8 billion universal service fund or improving permitting processes and competition.

Last week the FCC commissioners voted to restructure the agency and create an Office of Economics and Analytics. Hopefully the new Office will give some rigor to the “public interest standard” that guides most FCC decisions. It’s important the FCC formally inject economics in to public interest determinations, perhaps much like the Australian telecom regulator’s “total welfare standard,” which is basically a social welfare calculation plus consideration of “broader social impacts.”

In contrast, the existing “standard” has several components and subcomponents (some of them contradictory) depending on the circumstances; that is, it’s no standard at all. As the first general counsel of the Federal Radio Commission, Louis Caldwell, said of the public interest standard, it means

as little as any phrase that the drafters of the Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority.

Unfortunately, this means public interest determinations are largely shielded from serious court scrutiny. As Judge Posner said of the standard in Schurz Communications v. FCC,

So nebulous a mandate invests the Commission with an enormous discretion and correspondingly limits the practical scope of responsible judicial review.

Posner colorfully characterized FCC public interest analysis in that case:

The Commission’s majority opinion … is long, but much of it consists of boilerplate, the recitation of the multitudinous parties’ multifarious contentions, and self-congratulatory rhetoric about how careful and thoughtful and measured and balanced the majority has been in evaluating those contentions and carrying out its responsibilities. Stripped of verbiage, the opinion, like a Persian cat with its fur shaved, is alarmingly pale and thin.

Every party who does significant work before the FCC has agreed with Judge Posner’s sentiments at one time or another.

Which brings us to the Office of Economics and Analytics. Cost-benefit analysis has its limits, but economic rigor is increasingly important as the FCC turns its attention away from media regulation and towards spectrum assignment and broadband subsidies.

The worst excesses of FCC regulation are in the past where, for instance, one broadcaster’s staff in 1989 “was required to review 14,000 pages of records to compile information for one [FCC] interrogatory alone out of 299.” Or when, say, FCC staff had to sift through and consider 60,000 TV and radio “fairness” complaints in 1970. These regulatory excesses were corrected by economists (namely, Ronald Coase’s recommendation that spectrum licenses be auctioned, rather than given away for free by the FCC after a broadcast “beauty contest” hearing), but history shows that FCC proceedings spiral out of control without the agency intending it.

Since Congress gave such a nebulous standard, the FCC is always at risk of regressing. Look no further than the FCC’s meaningless “Internet conduct standard” from its 2015 Open Internet Order. This “net neutrality” regulation is a throwback to the bad old days, an unpredictable conduct standard that–like the Fairness Doctrine–would constantly draw the FCC into social policy activism and distract companies with interminable FCC investigations and unknowable compliance requirements.

In the OIO’s mercifully short life, we saw glimpses of the disputes that would’ve distracted the agency and regulated companies. For instance, prominent net neutrality supporters had wildly different views about whether a common practice, “zero rating” of IP content, by T-Mobile violated the Internet conduct standard. Chairman Tom Wheeler initially called it “highly innovative and highly competitive” while Harvard professor Susan Crawford said it was “dangerous” and “malignant” and should be outlawed “immediately.” The nearly year-long FCC investigations into zero rating and the equivocal report sent a clear, chilling message to ISPs and app companies: 20 years of permissionless innovation for the Internet was long enough. Submit your new technologies and business plans to us or face the consequences.

Fortunately, by rescinding the 2015 Order and creating the new economics Office, Chairman Pai and his Republican colleagues are improving the outlook for the development of the Internet. Hopefully the Office will make social welfare calculations a critical part of the public interest standard.

The FCC released a proposed Order today that would create an Office of Economics and Analytics. Last April, Chairman Pai proposed this data-centric office. There are about a dozen bureaus and offices within the FCC and this proposed change in the FCC’s organizational structure would consolidate a few offices and many FCC economists and experts into a single office.

This is welcome news. Several years ago when I was in law school, I was a legal clerk for the FCC Wireless Bureau and for the FCC Office of General Counsel. During that ten-month stint, I was surprised at the number of economists, who were all excellent, at the FCC. I assisted several of them closely (and helped organize what one FCC official dubbed, unofficially, “The Economists’ Cage Match” for outside experts sparring over the competitive effects of the proposed AT&T-T-Mobile merger). However, my impression even during my limited time at the FCC was well-stated by Chairman Pai in April:

[E]conomists are not systematically incorporated into policy work at the FCC. Instead, their expertise is typically applied in an ad hoc fashion, often late in the process. There is no consistent approach to their use.

And since the economists are sprinkled about the agency, their work is often “siloed” within their respective bureau. Economics as an afterthought in telecom is not good for the development of US tech industries, nor for consumers.

As Geoffrey Manne and Allen Gibby said recently, “the future of telecom regulation is antitrust,” and the creation of the OEA is a good step in line with global trends. Many nations–like the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand–are restructuring legacy telecom regulators. The days of public and private telecom monopolies and discrete, separate communications, computer, and media industries (thus bureaus) is past. Convergence, driven by IP networks and deregulation, has created these trends and resulted in sometimes dramatic restructuring of agencies.

In Denmark, for instance, as Roslyn Layton and Joe Kane have written, national parties and regulators took inspiration from the deregulatory plans of the Clinton FCC. The Social Democrats, the Radical Left, the Left, the Conservative People’s Party, the Socialist People’s Party, and the Center Democrats agreed in 1999:

The 1990s were focused on breaking down old monopoly; now it is important to make the frameworks for telecom, IT, radio, TV meld together—convergence. We believe that new technologies will create competition. It is important to ensure that regulation does not create a barrier for the possibility of new converged products; for example, telecom operators should be able to offer content if they so choose. It is also important to ensure digital signature capability, digital payment, consumer protection, and digital rights. Regulation must be technologically neutral, and technology choices are to be handled by the market. The goal is to move away from sector-specific regulation toward competition-oriented regulation. We would prefer to handle telecom with competition laws, but some special regulation may be needed in certain cases—for example, regulation for access to copper and universal service.

This agreement was followed up by the quiet shuttering of NITA, the Danish telecom agency, in 2011.

Bringing economic rigor to the FCC’s notoriously vague “public interest” standard seemed to be occurring (slowly) during the Clinton and Bush administrations. However, during the Obama years, this progress was de-railed, largely by the net neutrality silliness, which not only distracted US regulators from actual problems like rural broadband expansion but also reinvigorated the media-access movement, whose followers believe the FCC should have a major role in shaping US culture, media, and technologies.

Fortunately, those days are in the rearview mirror. The proposed creation of the OEA represents another pivot toward the likely future of US telecom regulation: a focus on consumer welfare, competition, and data-driven policy.

Internet regulation advocates are trying to turn a recent FCC Notice of Inquiry about the state of US telecommunications services into a controversy. Twelve US Senators have accused the FCC of wanting to “redefin[e] broadband” in order to “abandon further efforts to connect Americans.”

Considering Chairman Pai and the Commission are already considering actions to accelerate the deployment of broadband, with new proceedings and the formation of the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee, the allegation that the current NOI is an excuse for inaction is perplexing.

The true “controversy” is much more mundane–reasonable people disagree about what congressional neologisms like “advanced telecommunications capability” mean. The FCC must interpret and apply the indeterminate language of Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, which requires the FCC about whether to determine “whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion.” If the answer is negative, the agency must “take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.” The inquiry is reported in an annual “Broadband Progress Report.” Much of the “scandal” of this proceeding is confusion about what “broadband” means.

What is broadband?

First: what qualifies as “broadband” download speed? It depends.

The OECD says anything above 256 kbps.

ITU standards set it at above 1.5 Mbps (or is 2.0 Mbps?).

In the US, broadband is generally defined as a higher speed. The USDA’s Rural Utilities Service defines it as 4.0 Mbps.

The FCC’s 2015 Broadband Progress Report found, as Obama FCC officials put it, that “the FCC’s definition of broadband” is now 25 Mbps. This is why advocates insist “broadband access” includes only wireline services above 25 Mbps.

But in the same month, the Obama FCC determined in the Open Internet Order that anything above dialup speed–56 kbps–is “broadband Internet access service.”

So, according to regulation advocates, 1.5 Mbps DSL service isn’t “broadband access” service but it is “broadband Internet access service.” Likewise a 30 Mbps 4G LTE connection isn’t a “broadband access” service but it is “broadband Internet access service.”

In other words, the word games about “broadband” are not coming from the Trump FCC. There is no consistency for what “broadband” means because prior FCCs kept changing the definition, and even use the term differently in different proceedings. As the Obama FCC said in 2009, “In previous reports to Congress, the Commission used the terms ‘broadband,’ ‘advanced telecommunications capability,’ and ‘advanced services’ interchangeably.”

Instead, what is going on is that the Trump FCC is trying to apply Section 706 to the current broadband market. The main questions are, what is advanced telecommunications capability, and is it “being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion”?

Is mobile broadband an “advanced telecommunications capability”?

Previous FCCs declined to adopt a speed benchmark for when wireless service satisfies the “advanced telecommunications capability” definition. The so-called controversy is because the latest NOI revisits this omission in light of consumer trends. The NOI straightforwardly asks whether mobile broadband above 10 Mbps satisfies the statutory definition of “advanced telecommunications capability.”

For that, the FCC must consult the statute. Such a capability, the statute says, is technology-neutral (i.e. includes wireless and “fixed” connections) and “enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications.”

Historically, since the statute doesn’t provide much precision, the FCC has examined subscription rates of various broadband speeds and services. From 2010 to 2015, the Obama FCCs defined advanced telecommunications capability as a fixed connection of 4 Mbps. In 2015, as mentioned, that benchmark was raised 25 Mbps.

Regulation advocates fear that if the FCC looks at subscription rates, the agency might find that mobile broadband above 10 Mbps is an advanced telecommunications capability. This finding, they feel, would undermine the argument that the US broadband market needs intense regulation. According to recent Pew surveys, 12% of adults–about 28 million people–are “wireless only” and don’t have a wireline subscription. Those numbers certainly raise the possibility that mobile broadband is an advanced telecommunications capability.

Let’s look at the three fixed broadband technologies that “pass” the vast majority of households–cable modem, DSL, and satellite–and narrow the data to connections 10 Mbps or above.*

Home broadband connections (10 Mbps+) Cable modem – 54.4 million DSL – 11.8 million Satellite – 1.4 million

It’s hard to know for sure since Pew measures adult individuals and the FCC measures households, but it’s possible more people have 4G LTE as home broadband (about 28 million adults and their families) than have 10 Mbps+ DSL as home broadband (11.8 million households).

Subscription rates aren’t the end of the inquiry, but the fact that millions of households are going mobile-only rather than DSL or cable modem is suggestive evidence that mobile broadband offers an advanced telecommunications capability. (Considering T-Mobile is now providing 50 GB of data per line per month, mobile-only household growth will likely accelerate.)

Are high-speed services “being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion”?

The second inquiry is whether these advanced telecommunications capabilities “are being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion.” Again, the statute doesn’t give much guidance but consumer adoption of high-speed wireline and wireless broadband has been impressive.

So few people had 25 Mbps for so long that the FCC didn’t record it in its Internet Access Services reports until 2011. At the end of 2011, 6.3 million households subscribed to 25 Mbps. Less than five years later, in June 2016, over 56 million households subscribed. In the last year alone, fixed providers extended 25 Mbps or greater speeds to 21 million households.

The FCC is not completely without guidance on this question. As part of the 2008 Broadband Data Services Improvement Act, Congress instructed the FCC to use international comparisons in its Section 706 Report. International comparisons also suggest that the US is deploying advanced telecommunications capability in a timely manner. For instance, according to the OECD the US has 23.4 fiber and cable modem connections per 100 inhabitants, which far exceeds the OECD average, 16.2 per 100 inhabitants.**

Anyways, the sky is not falling because the FCC is asking about mobile broadband subscription rates. More can be done to accelerate broadband–particularly if the government frees up more spectrum and local governments improve their permitting processes–but the Section 706 inquiry offers little that is controversial or new.

*Fiber and fixed wireless connections, 9.6 million and 0.3 million subscribers, respectively, are also noteworthy but these 10 Mbps+ technologies only cover certain areas of the country.

**America’s high rank in the OECD is similar if DSL is included, but the quality of DSL varies widely and often doesn’t provide 10 Mbps or 25 Mbps speeds.

It’s becoming clearer why, for six years out of eight, Obama’s appointed FCC chairmen resisted regulating the Internet with Title II of the 1934 Communications Act. Chairman Wheeler famously did not want to go that legal route. It was only after President Obama and the White House called on the FCC in late 2014 to use Title II that Chairman Wheeler relented. If anything, the hastily-drafted 2015 Open Internet rules provide a new incentive to ISPs to curate the Internet in ways they didn’t want to before. 

The 2016 court decision upholding the rules was a Pyrrhic victory for the net neutrality movement. In short, the decision revealed that the 2015 Open Internet Order provides no meaningful net neutrality protections–it allows ISPs to block and throttle content. As the judges who upheld the Order said, “The Order…specifies that an ISP remains ‘free to offer ‘edited’ services’ without becoming subject to the rule’s requirements.” 

The 2014 White House pressure didn’t occur in a vacuum. It occurred immediately after Democratic losses in the November 2014 midterms. As Public Knowledge president Gene Kimmelman tells it, President Obama needed to give progressives “a clean victory for us to show that we are standing up for our principles.” The slapdash legal finessing that followed was presaged by President Obama’s November 2014 national address urging Title II  classification of the Internet, which cites the wrong communications law on the Obama White House website to this day.

The FCC staff did their best with what they were given but the resulting Order was aimed at political symbolism and acquiring jurisdiction to regulate the Internet, not meaningful “net neutrality” protections. As internal FCC emails produced in a Senate majority report show, Wheeler’s reversal that week caught the non-partisan career FCC staff off guard. Literally overnight FCC staff had to scrap the “hybrid” (non-Title II) order they’d been carefully drafting for weeks and scrape together a legal justification for using Title II. This meant calling in advocates to enhance the record and dubious citations to the economics literature.  Former FCC chief economist, Prof. Michael Katz, whose work was cited in the Order, later stated to Forbes that he suspected the “ FCC cited my papers as an inside joke, because they know how much I think net neutrality is a bad idea.” 

Applying 1934 telegraph and telephone laws to the Internet was always going to have unintended consequences, but the politically-driven Order increasingly looks like an own-goal, even to supporters. Former FCC chief technologist, Jon Peha, who supports Title II classification of ISPs almost immediately raised the alarm that the Order offered “massive loopholes” to ISPs that could make the rules irrelevant.  This was made clear when the FCC attorney defending the Order in court acknowledged that ISPs are free to block and filter content and escape the Open Internet regulations and Title II. These concessions  from the FCC surprised even AT&T VP Hank Hultquist:

Wow. ISPs are not only free to engage in content-based blocking, they can even create the long-dreaded fast and slow lanes so long as they make their intentions sufficiently clear to customers.

So the Open Internet Order not only permits the net neutrality “nightmare scenario,” it provides an incentive to ISPs to curate the Internet. Despite the activist PR surrounding the Order, so-called “fast lanes”–like carrier-provided VoIP, VoLTE, and IPTV–have existed for years and the FCC rules allow them.  The Order permits ISP blocking, throttling, and “fast lanes”–what remains of “net neutrality”?

Prof. Susan Crawford presciently warned in 2005: 

I have lost faith in our ability to write about code in words, and I’m confident that any attempt at writing down network neutrality will be so qualified, gutted, eviscerated, and emptied that it will end up being worse than useless.

Aside from some religious ISPs, ISPs don’t want to filter Internet content. But the Obama FCC, via the “net neutrality” rules, gives them a new incentive: the Order deregulates ISPs that filter. ISPs will fight the rules because they want to continue to offer their conventional Internet service without submitting to the Title II baggage. This is why ISPs favor scrapping the Order–not only is it the FCC’s first claim to regulate Internet access, if the rules are not repealed, ISPs will be compelled to make difficult decisions about their business models and technologies in the future.

There is reporting suggesting that the Trump FCC may move to eliminate the FCC’s complex Title II regulations for the Internet and restore the FTC’s ability to police anticompetitve and deceptive practices online. This is obviously welcome news. These reports also suggest that FCC Chairman Pai and the FTC will require ISPs add open Internet principles to their terms of service, that is, no unreasonable blocking or throttling of content and no paid priority. These principles have always been imprecise because federal law allows ISPs to block objectionable content if they wish (like pornography or violent websites) and because ISPs have a First Amendment right to curate their services.

Whatever the exact wording, there shouldn’t be a per se ban of paid priority. Whatever policy develops should limit  anticompetitive paid priority, not all paid priority. Paid prioritization is simply a form of consideration payment, which is economists’ term for when upstream producers pay downstream retailers or distributors for special treatment. There’s economics literature on consideration payments and it’s an accepted business practice in many other industries. Further, consideration payments often benefit small providers and niche customers. Some small and large companies with interactive IP services might be willing to pay for end-to-end service reliability.

The Open Internet Order’s paid priority ban has always been short sighted because it attempts to preserve the Internet as it existed circa 2002. It resembles the FCC’s unfounded insistence for decades that subscription TV (ie, how the vast majority of Americans consume TV today) was against “the public interest.” Like the defunct subscription TV ban, the paid priority ban is an economics-free policy that will hinder new services. 

Despite what late-night talk show hosts might say, “fast lanes” on the Internet are here and will continue. “Fast lanes” have always been permitted because, as Obama’s US CTO Aneesh Chopra noted, some emerging IP services need special treatment. Priority transmission was built into Internet protocols years ago and the OIO doesn’t ban data prioritization; it bans BIAS providers from charging “edge providers” a fee for priority.

The notion that there’s a level playing field online needing preservation is a fantasy. Non-real-time services like Netflix streaming, YouTube, Facebook pages, and major websites can mostly be “cached” on servers scattered around the US. Major web companies have their own form of paid prioritization–they spend millions annually, including large payments to ISPs, on transit agreements, CDNs, and interconnection in order to avoid congested Internet links.

The problem with a blanket paid priority ban is that it biases the evolution of the Internet in favor of these cache-able services and against real-time or interactive services like teleconferencing, live TV, and gaming. Caching doesn’t work for these services because there’s nothing to cache beforehand. 

When would paid prioritization make sense? Most likely a specialized service for dedicated users that requires end-to-end reliability. 

I’ll use a plausible example to illustrate the benefits of consideration payments online–a telepresence service for deaf people. As Martin Geddes described, a decade ago the government in Wales developed such a service. The service architects discovered that a well-functioning service had quality characteristics not supplied by ISPs. ISPs and video chat apps like Skype optimize their networks, video codecs, and services for non-deaf people (ie, most customers) and prioritize consistent audio quality over video quality. While that’s useful for most people, deaf people need basically the opposite optimization because they need to perceive subtle hand and finger motions. The typical app that prioritizes audio, not video, doesn’t work for them.

But high-def real-time video quality requires upstream and downstream capacity reservation and end-to-end reliability. This is not cheap to provide. An ISP, in this illustration, has three options–charge the telepresence provider, charge deaf customers a premium, or spread the costs across all customers. The paid priority ban means ISPs can only charge customers for increased costs. This paid priority ban unnecessarily limits the potential for such services since there may be companies or nonprofits willing to subsidize such a service.

It’s a specialized example but illustrates the idiosyncratic technical requirements needed for many real-time services. In fact, real-time services are the next big challenge in the Internet’s evolution. As streaming media expert Dan Rayburn noted, “ traditional one-way live streaming is being disrupted by the demand for interactive engagement.”  Large and small edge companies are increasingly looking for low-latency video solutions. Today, a typical “live” event is broadcast online to viewers with a 15- to 45-second delay. This latency limits or kills the potential for interactive online streaming services like online talk shows, pet cams, online auctions, videogaming, and online classrooms.

If the FTC takes back oversight of ISPs and the Internet it should, as with any industry, permit any business practice that complies with competition law and consumer protection law. The agency should disregard the unfounded belief that consideration payments online (“paid priority”) are always harmful.

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Ajit Pai today announced plans to expand the role of economic analysis at the FCC in a speech at the Hudson Institute. This is an eminently sensible idea that other regulatory agencies (both independent and executive branch) could learn from.

Pai first made the case that when the FCC listened to its economists in the past, it unlocked billions of dollars of value for consumers. The most prominent example was the switch from hearings to auctions in order to allocate spectrum licenses. He perceptively noted that the biggest effect of auctions was the massive improvement in consumer welfare, not just the more than $100 billion raised for the Treasury. Other examples of the FCC using the best ideas of its economists include:

• Use of reverse auctions to allocate universal service funds to reduce costs.
• Incentive auctions that reward broadcasters for transferring licenses to other uses – an idea initially proposed in a 2002 working paper by Evan Kwerel and John Williams at the FCC.
• The move from rate of return to price cap regulation for long distance carriers.

More recently, Pai argued, the FCC has failed to use economics effectively. He identified four key problems:

1. Economics is not systematically employed in policy decisions and often employed late in the process. The FCC has no guiding principles for conduct and use of economic analysis.
2. Economists work in silos. They are divided up among bureaus. Economists should be able to work together on a wide variety of issues, as they do in the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s economic analysis unit, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.
3. Benefit-cost analysis is not conducted well or often, and the FCC does not take Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis (which assesses effects of regulations on small entities) seriously. The FCC should use Office of Management and Budget guidance as its guide to doing good analysis, but OMB’s 2016 draft report on the benefits and costs of federal regulations shows that the FCC has estimated neither benefits nor costs of any of its major regulations issued in the past 10 years. Yet executive orders from multiple administrations demonstrate that “Serious cost-benefit analysis is a bipartisan tradition.”
4. Poor use of data. The FCC probably collects a lot of data that’s unnecessary, at a paperwork cost of $800 million per year, not including opportunity costs of the private sector. But even useful data are not utilized well. For example, a few years ago the FCC stopped trying to determine whether the wireless market is effectively competitive even though it collects lots of data on the wireless market.

To remedy these problems, Pai announced an initiative to establish an Office of Economics and Data that would house the FCC’s economists and data analysts. An internal working group will be established to collect input within the FCC and from the public. He hopes to have the new office up and running by the end of the year. The purpose of this change is to give economists early input into the rulemaking process, better manage the FCC’s data resources, and conduct strategic research to help find solutions to “the next set of difficult issues.”

Can this initiative significantly improve the quality and use of economic analysis at the FCC?

There’s evidence that independent regulatory agencies are capable of making some decent improvements in their economic analysis when they are sufficiently motivated to do so. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authorizing statue contains language that requires benefit-cost analysis of regulations when the commission seeks to determine whether they are in the public interest. Between 2005 and 2011, the SEC lost several major court cases due to inadequate economic analysis.

In 2012, the commission’s general counsel and chief economist issued new economic analysis guidance that pledged to assess regulations according to the principal criteria identified in executive orders, guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, and independent research. In a recent study, I found that the economic analysis accompanying a sample of major SEC regulations issued after this guidance was measurably better than the analysis accompanying regulations issued prior to the new guidance. The SEC improved on all five aspects of economic analysis it identified as critical: assessment of the need for the regulation, assessment of the baseline outcomes that will likely occur in the absence of new regulation, identification of alternatives, and assessment of the benefits and costs of alternatives.

Unlike the SEC, the FCC faces no statutory benefit-cost analysis requirement for its regulations. Unlike the executive branch agencies, the FCC is under no executive order requiring economic analysis of regulations. Unlike the Federal Trade Commission in the early 1980s, the FCC faces little congressional pressure for abolition.

But Congress is considering legislation that would require all regulatory agencies to conduct economic analysis of major regulations and subject that analysis to limited judicial review. Proponents of executive branch regulatory review have always contended that the president has legal authority to extend the executive orders on regulatory impact analysis to cover independent agencies, and perhaps President Trump is audacious enough to try this. Thus, it appears Chairman Pai is trying to get the FCC out ahead of the curve.

Congress passed joint resolutions to rescind FCC online privacy regulations this week, which President Trump is expected to sign. Ignore the hyperbole. Lawmakers are simply attempting to maintain the state of Internet privacy law that’s existed for 20-plus years.

Since the Internet was commercialized in the 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission has used its authority to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” to prevent privacy abuses by Web companies and ISPs. In 2015, that changed. The Obama FCC classified “broadband Internet access service” as a common carrier service, thereby blocking the FTC’s authority to determine which ISP privacy policies and practices are acceptable.

Privacy advocates failed to convince the Obama FTC that de-identified browsing history is “sensitive” data. (The FTC has treated SSNs, medical information, financial information, precise location, etc. as “sensitive” for years and companies must handle these differently.) The FCC was the next best thing and in 2016 they convinced the FCC to say that browsing history is “sensitive data,” but it’s sensitive only when ISPs have it.

This has contributed to a regulatory mess for consumers and tech companies. Technological convergence is here. Regulatory convergence is not.

Consider a plausible scenario. I start watching an NFL game via Twitter on my tablet on Starbucks’ wifi. I head home at halftime and watch the game from my cable TV provider, Comcast. Then I climb into bed and watch overtime on my smartphone via NFL Mobile from Verizon.

One TV program, three privacy regimes. FTC guidelines cover me at Starbucks. Privacy rules from Title VI of the Communications Act cover my TV viewing. The brand-new FCC broadband privacy rules cover my NFL Mobile viewing and late-night browsing.

Other absurdities result from the FCC’s decision to regulate Internet privacy. For instance, if you bought your child a mobile plan with web filtering, she’s protected by FTC privacy standards, while your mobile plan is governed by FCC rules. Google Fiber customers are covered by FTC policies when they use Google Search but FCC policies when they use Yelp.

This Swiss-cheese approach to classifying services means that regulatory obligations fall haphazardly across services and technologies. It’s confusing to consumers and to companies, who need to write privacy policies based on artificial FCC distinctions that consumers disregard.

The House and Senate bills rescind the FCC “notice and choice” rules, which is the first step to restoring FTC authority. (In the meantime, the FCC will implement FTC-like policies.) 

Considering that these notice and choice rules have not even gone into effect, the rehearsed outrage from advocates demands explanation:  The theatrics this week are not really about congressional repeal of the (inoperative) privacy rules. Two years ago the FCC decided to regulate the Internet in order to shape Internet services and content. The leading advocates are outraged because FCC control of the Internet is slipping away. Hopefully Congress and the FCC will eliminate the rest of the Title II baggage this year.

US telecommunications laws are in need of updates. US law states that “the Internet and other interactive computer services” should be “unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” but regulators are increasingly imposing old laws and regulations onto new media and Internet services. Further, Federal Communications Commission actions often duplicate or displace general competition laws. Absent congressional action, old telecom laws will continue to delay and obstruct new services. A new Mercatus paper by Roslyn Layton and Joe Kane shows how governments can modernize telecom agencies and laws.

Legacy Laws

US telecom laws are codified in Title 47 of the US Code and enforced mostly by the FCC. That the first eight sections of US telecommunications law are devoted to the telegraph, the killer app of 1850, illustrates congressional inaction towards obsolete regulations.

In the last decade, therefore, several media, Internet, and telecom companies inadvertently stumbled into Communications Act quagmires. An Internet streaming company, for instance, was bankrupted for upending the TV status quo established by the FCC in the 1960s;  FCC precedents mean broadcasters can be credibly threatened with license revocation for airing a documentary critical of a presidential candidate;  and the thousands of Internet service providers across the US are subjected to laws designed to constrain the 1930s AT&T long-distance phone monopoly .

US telecom and tech laws, in other words, are a shining example of American “kludgeocracy”–a regime of prescriptive and dated laws whose complexity benefits special interests and harms innovators.  These anti-consumer results led progressive Harvard professor Lawrence Lessig to conclude in 2008 that “it’s time to demolish the FCC.”  While Lessig’s proposal goes too far, Congress should listen to the voices on the right and left urging them to sweep away the regulations of the past and rationalize telecom law for the 21st century.

Modern Telecom Policy in Denmark

An interesting new Mercatus working paper explains how Denmark took up that challenge. The paper, “Alternative Approaches to Broadband Policy: Lessons on Deregulation from Denmark,” is by Denmark-based scholar Roslyn Layton, who served on President Trump’s transition team for telecom policy, and Joe Kane, a masters student in the GMU econ department. 

The “Nordic model” is often caricatured by American conservatives (and progressives like Bernie Sanders) as socialist control of industry. But as AEI’s James Pethokoukis and others point out, it’s time both sides updated their 1970s talking points. “[W]hen it comes to regulatory efficiency and business freedom,” Tyler Cowen recently noted, “Denmark has a considerably higher [Heritage Foundation] score than does the U.S.”

Layton and Kane explore Denmark’s relatively free-market telecom policies. They explain how Denmark modernized its telecom laws over time as technology and competition evolved. Critically, the center-left government eliminated Denmark’s telecom regulator in 2011 in light of the “convergence” of services to the Internet. Scholars noted,

Nobody seemed to care much—except for the staff who needed to move to other authorities and a few people especially interested in IT and telecom regulation.

Even-handed, light telecom regulation performs pretty well. Denmark, along with South Korea, leads the world in terms of broadband access. The country also has a modest universal service program that depends primarily on the market. Further, similar to other Nordic countries, Denmark permitted a voluntary forum, including consumer groups, ISPs, and Google, to determine best practices and resolve “net neutrality” controversies.

Contrast Denmark’s tech-neutral, consumer-focused approach with recent proceedings in the United States. One of the Obama FCC’s major projects was attempting to regulate how TV streaming apps functioned–despite the fact that TV has never been more abundant and competitive. Countless hours of staff time and industry time were wasted (Trump’s election killed the effort) because advocates saw the opportunity to regulate the streaming market with a law intended to help Circuit City (RIP) sell a few more devices in 1996.  The biggest waste of government resources has been the “net neutrality” fight, which stems from prior FCC attempts to apply 1930s telecom laws to 1960s computer systems. Old rules haphazardly imposed on new technologies creates a compliance mindset in our tech and telecom industries. Worse, these unwinnable fights over legal minutiae prevent FCC staff from working on issues where they can help consumers. 

Americans deserve better telecom laws but the inscrutability of FCC actions means consumers don’t know what to ask for. Layton and Kane illuminate that alternative frameworks are available. They highlight Denmark’s political and cultural differences from the US. Nevertheless, Denmark’s telecom reforms and pro-consumer policies deserve study and emulation. The Danes have shown how tech-neutral, consumer-focused policies not only can expand broadband access, they reduce government duplication and overreach.

If Congress and the President wanted to prevent intrusive regulation of the Internet, how would they do it? They know that silence on the issue wouldn’t protect Internet services. As Congress learned in the 1960s and 1970s with cable TV, congressional silence, to the FCC, looks like permission to enact a far-reaching regulatory regime.

In the 1990s, Congress knew the FCC would be tempted to regulate the Internet and Internet services and that silence would be seen as an invitation to regulate the Internet. Congress and President Clinton therefore passed a 1996 law, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which stated:

It is the policy of the United States… to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.

But this statement raised the possibility that the FCC would regulate Internet access providers and would claim (as FCC defenders do today) they were not regulating “the Internet,” only access providers. To preempt such sophistry, Congress added that the “interactive computer services” shielded from regulation include:

specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet….

Congress proved prescient. For over a decade, as the FCC’s traditional areas of regulation waned in importance, advocates and FCC officials have sought to regulate Internet access providers and the Internet. After two failed attempts to regulate providers and enforce net neutrality norms, the FCC decided to regulate Internet access providers with Title II, the same provisions regulating telephone and telegraph providers. Section 230 featured prominently in the dissents of commissioners Pai and O’Rielly who both noted that the Open Internet Order was a simple rejection of the plain words of Congress. Nevertheless, two judges on DC Circuit Court of Appeals blessed those regulations and the Open Internet Order in 2016.

If “unfettered from Federal regulation” means anything, doesn’t it mean that the FCC cannot use Title II, its most stringent regulatory regime, to regulate Internet access providers?  Is there any combination of words Congress could draft that would protect Internet access providers and Internet services from Title II?

There is a pending appeal challenging the Open Internet Order before the DC Circuit and after that is appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in particular, might be receptive to a common-sense argument that “unfettered from Federal regulation” is hazy around the edges but it cannot mean regulation of ISPs’ content, services, protocols, network topology, and business models.

I understand the sentiment that a net neutrality compromise is urgently needed to save the Internet from Title II. But until the Open Internet Order appeals have concluded, I think it’s premature to compromise and grant the FCC permanent authority to regulate the Internet with vague standards (e.g., no one knows what “reasonable throttling” means). A successful appeal could mean a third and final court loss for net neutrality purists, thereby restoring Section 230’s free-market protections for the Internet. Until the Supreme Court denies cert or agrees with the FCC that up is down, black is white, and agencies can ignore clear statutes, I’m not persuaded that Congress should nullify its own deregulatory language of Section 230 with a net neutrality compromise.

Title II allows the FCC to determine what content and media Internet access providers must transmit on their own private networks, so the First Amendment has constantly dogged the FCC’s “net neutrality” proceedings. If the Supreme Court agrees to take up an appeal from the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected a First Amendment challenge this summer, it will likely be because of Title II’s First Amendment deficiencies.

Title II has always been about handicapping ISPs qua speakers and preventing ISPs from offering curated Internet content. As former FCC commissioner Copps said, absent the Title II rules, “a big cable company could block access to an investigative report about its less-than-stellar customer service.” Tim Wu told members of Congress that net neutrality was intended to prevent ISPs from favoring, say, particular news sources or sports teams.

But just as a cable company chooses to offer some channels and not others, and a search engine chooses to promote some pages and not others, choosing to offer a curated Internet to, say, children, religious families, or sports fans involves editorial decisions. As communications scholar Stuart Benjamin said about Title II’s problem, under current precedent, ISPs “can say they want to engage in substantive editing, and that’s enough for First Amendment purposes.”

Title II – Bringing Broadcast Regulation to the Internet

Title II regulation of the Internet is frequently compared to the Fairness Doctrine, which activists used for decades to drive conservatives out of broadcast radio and TV. As a pro-net neutrality media professor explained in The Atlantic last year, the motivation for the Fairness Doctrine and Title II Internet regulation is the same: to “rescue a potentially democratic medium from commercial capture.” This is why there is almost perfect overlap between the organizations and advocates who support the Fairness Doctrine and those who lobbied for Title II regulation of the Internet.

These advocates know that FCC regulation of media has proceeded in similar ways for decades. Apply the expansive “gatekeeper” label to a media distributor and then the FCC will regulate distributor operations, including the content transmitted. Today, all electronic media distributors–broadcast TV and radio, satellite TV and radio, cable TV, and ISPs–whether serving 100 customers or 100 million customers, are considered “gatekeepers” and their services and content are subject to FCC intervention.

With broadband convergence, however, the FCC risked losing the ability to regulate mass media. Title II gives the FCC direct and indirect authority to shape Internet media like it shapes broadcast media. In fact, Chairman Wheeler called the Title II rules “must carry–updated for the 21st century.”

The comparison is apt and suggests why the FCC can’t escape the First Amendment challenges to Title II. Must-carry rules require cable TV companies to transmit all local broadcast stations to their cable TV subscribers. Since the must-carry rules prevent the cable operator editorial discretion over their own networks, the Supreme Court held in Turner I that the rules interfered with the First Amendment rights of cable operators.

But the Communications Act Allows Internet Filtering

Internet regulation advocates faced huge problem, though. Unlike other expansions of FCC authority into media, Congress was not silent about regulation of the Internet. Congress announced a policy in the 1996 update to the Communications Act that Internet access providers should remain “unfettered by State and Federal regulation.”

Regulation advocates dislike Section 230 because of its deregulatory message and because it expressly allows Internet access providers to filter the Internet.

Professor Yochai Benkler, in agreement with Lawrence Lessig, noted that Section 230 gives Internet access providers editorial discretion. Benkler warned that because of 230, “ISPs…will interject themselves between producers and users of information.” Further, these “intermediaries will be reintroduced not because of any necessity created by the technology, or because the medium requires a clearly defined editor. Intermediaries will be reintroduced solely to acquire their utility as censors of morally unpalatable materials.”  

Professor Jack Balkin noted likewise that “…§ 230(c)(2) immunizes [ISPs] when they censor the speech of others, which may actually encourage business models that limit media access in some circumstances.” 

Even the FCC acknowledges the consumer need for curated services and says in the Open Internet Order that Title II providers can offer “a service limited to offering ‘family friendly’ materials to end users who desire only such content.”

While that concession represents a half-hearted effort to bring the Order within compliance of Section 230, it simply exposes the FCC to court scrutiny. Allowing “family friendly” offers but not other curated offers is content-based distinction. Under Supreme Court RAV v. City of St. Paul, “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”  Further, the Supreme Court said in US v. Playboy, content-based burdens must satisfy the same scrutiny as content-based bans on content. 

Circuit Split over the First Amendment Rights of Common Carriers

Hopefully the content-based nature of the Title II regulations are reason enough for the Supreme Court to take up an appeal. Another reason is that there is now a circuit split regarding the extent of First Amendment protections for common carriers.

The DC Circuit said that the FCC can prohibit content blocking because ISPs have been labeled common carriers.

In contrast, other courts have held that common carriers are permitted to block content on common carrier lines. In Information Providers Coalition v. FCC, the 9th Circuit held that common carriers “are private companies, not state actors…and accordingly are not obliged to continue…services of particular subscribers.” As such, regulated common carriers are “free under the Constitution to terminate service” to providers of offensive content. The Court relied on its decision a few years earlier in  Carlin Communications v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company that when a common carrier phone company is connecting thousands of subscribers simultaneously to the same content, the “phone company resembles less a common carrier than it does a small radio station” with First Amendment rights to block content. 

Similarly, the 4th Circuit in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. US held that common carrier phone companies are First Amendment speakers when they bundle and distribute TV programming, and that a law preventing such distribution “impairs the telephone companies’ ability to engage in a form of protected speech .” 

The full DC Circuit will be deciding whether to take up the Title II challenges. If the judges decline review, the Supreme Court would be the final opportunity for a rehearing. If appeal is granted, the First Amendment could play a major role. The Court will be faced with a choice: Should the Internet remain “unfettered” from federal regulation as Congress intended? Or is the FCC permitted to perpetuate itself by bringing legacy media regulations to the online world?

Yesterday, Hillary Clinton’s campaign released a tech and innovation agenda. The document covers many tech subjects, including cybersecurity, copyright, and and tech workforce investments, but I’ll narrow my comments to the areas I have the most expertise in: broadband infrastructure and Internet regulation. These roughly match up, respectively, to the second and fourth sections of the five-section document.

On the whole, the broadband infrastructure and Internet regulation sections list good, useful priorities. The biggest exception is Hillary’s strong endorsement of the Title II rules for the Internet, which, as I explained in the National Review last week, is a heavy-handed regulatory regime that is ripe for abuse and will be enforced by a politicized agency.

Her tech agenda doesn’t mention a Communications Act rewrite but I’d argue it’s implied in her proposed reforms. Further, her statements last year at an event suggest she supports significant telecom reforms.  In early 2015, Clinton spoke to tech journalist Kara Swisher (HT Doug Brake) and it was pretty clear Clinton viewed Title II as an imperfect and likely temporary effort to enforce neutrality norms. In fact, Clinton said she prefers “a modern, 21st-century telecom technology act” to replace Title II and the rest of the 1934 Communications Act.

It’s refreshing to see that, regarding broadband and Internet policy, there’s significant bipartisan agreement that government’s role should be primarily to provide public goods, protect consumers, and lower regulatory barriers, not micromanage providers, deploy public networks, and shape social policy. (Niskanen Center’s Ryan Hagemann similarly agrees that, with the exception of Title II, there’s a lot to like in Clinton’s tech agenda. )  In fact, 85% of the text in Clinton’s broadband infrastructure and Internet policy sections could be copied-and-pasted to a free-market Republican presidential candidate’s tech platform and it would be right at home.

It’s difficult to know what to make of her pledge to defend and enforce Title II. I suspect it represents a promise she won’t reverse the Title II determination of the FCC, not that she’s particularly enamored with Title II. Clinton (and President Bill Clinton ) seem to prefer a more hands-off approach to the Internet.

The Good

The document emphasizes that all types of broadband should be encouraged, including “fiber, wireless, satellite, and other technologies.” It’s nice to see this flexibility because many advocates are pushing a fiber optics-only agenda that is simply infeasible and tremendously expensive. (Professor Susan Crawford has said bluntly that governments should “refuse to fund last-mile solutions that aren’t primarily fiber.” )  The reality, acknowledged by Google and others, is that fixed wireless and satellite broadband are needed to affordably connect households in rural and suburban areas for the foreseeable future.  A fiber-only policy, because it’s impractically expensive, would have rather regressive effects and Clinton’s all-the-above strategy is commendable.

There’s also a recognition in the document that broadband networks are not natural monopolies and can be competitive, especially if the federal government works to lower entry barriers. Government policy for several decades was that telephone and cable networks were natural monopolies. Increasingly, broadband is competitive, especially as consumers go wireless only, but we’re still living with the negative side effects of past policies. The Clinton document emphasizes the need to reduce local regulatory barriers, streamline permitting, and allow nondiscriminatory access to conduits, poles, and rights-of-way controlled by local governments.

Spectrum policy is critical to any technology agenda and it’s a priority for Clinton. She emphasizes the need for more spectrum and identifying and reclaiming underutilized federal spectrum, a subject I’ve written about. The federal government uses spectrum worth hundreds of billions of dollars and pays very little for that asset, so there’s significant consumer gains available.

Clinton’s call to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement in technology and telecommunications is also noteworthy. Though the DOJ and FTC can overreach, they are better equipped to handle broadband and tech competition issues than the FCC.

The Not So Good

In the “Close the Digital Divide” item, there are some problems. In a word: the right goal with the wrong tools. The legacy broadband subsidy programs, which Clinton wishes to retain and expand, are fragmented and poorly designed. They essentially function as corporate welfare programs and should be eliminated in favor of consumer-focused subsidies.

One item says that by 2020 “100 percent of households in America will have the option of affordable broadband.” Literally connecting all American homes to the Internet is impossible today because millions of Americans simply don’t want the Internet. According to Pew, 70% of non-adopters are just not interested, and many would not subscribe no matter the price.  (Relatedly, after over a century of telephone’s existence and tens of billions in federal universal service funding, US phone subscribership has hovered around 95% for 20 years. )  

To accomplish the expansion of broadband access, Clinton promises to fund the FCC’s Connect America Fund (CAF), the Ag Department’s Rural Utilities Service Program (RUS), and the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). They differ somewhat in purpose and strategy but their major flaw is the same: they primarily fund and lend to broadband providers, not subscribers.

As I’ve noted before,

A direct subsidy plus a menu of options is a good way to expand access to low-income people (assuming there are effective anti-fraud procedures). A direct subsidy is more or less how the US and state governments help lower-income families afford products and services like energy, food, housing, and education. For energy bills there’s LIHEAP. For grocery bills there’s SNAP and WIC. For housing, there’s Section 8 vouchers. For higher education, there’s Pell grants.

By subsidizing providers, not consumers, there’s immense waste, corruption, and featherbedding. For instance, last year, Tony Romm at Politico published an in-depth investigation about the RUS program, funded by the stimulus. The waste in the RUS broadband program is appalling and the program will serve only a fraction of the subscribers that were promised. As one GAO researcher said about the program, “We are left with a program that spent $3 billion and we really don’t know what became of it.”  “ Even more troubling,” Romm explained “RUS can’t tell which residents its stimulus dollars served.”

Similarly, Clinton cites E-rate as a model for connecting “anchor institutions” like libraries and schools. E-rate likewise primarily benefits telecom and tech companies, not the intended recipients. As OECD researchers have found regarding EdTech government investment,   

The results…show no appreciable improvements in student achievement in reading, mathematics or science in the countries that had invested heavily in ICT for education.

Rather than the E-rate model, a smarter policy is to provide block grants to schools and institutions to give them more flexibility to optimize according to their own perceived technology and education needs.  The federal government already started doing this to a limited extent with Section IV of the 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act, which allocates $1.6 billion annually in block grants to states for tech-focused education spending. Policymakers should eliminate the expensive, dysfunctional E-rate program, which is funded by regressive fees on telephone bills, and expand the block grants somewhat to make up the shortfall.

Altogether, there’s a lot to like in Clinton’s broadband infrastructure and Internet policy agenda. There are hiccups–namely Title II enforcement and retention of broken broadband and tech subsidy programs–and hopefully her advisors will reexamine those. Given Clinton’s past statements about the need for a modernized Communications Act in place of Title II, she and her advisors have developed a forward-looking telecom agenda.

The FCC’s transaction reviews have received substantial scholarly criticism lately. The FCC has increasingly used its license transaction reviews as an opportunity to engage in ad hoc merger reviews that substitute for formal rulemaking. FCC transaction conditions since 2000 have ranged from requiring AOL-Time Warner to make future instant messaging services interoperable, to price controls for broadband for low-income families, to mandating merging parties to donate $1 million to public safety initiatives.

In the last few months alone,

• Randy May and Seth Cooper of the Free State Foundation wrote a piece that the transaction reviews contravene rule of law norms.
• T. Randolph Beard et al. at the Phoenix Center published a research paper about how the FCC’s informal bargaining during mergers has become much more active and politically motivated in recent years.
• Derek Bambauer, law professor at the University of Arizona, published a law review article that criticized the use of informal agency actions to pressure companies to act in certain ways. These secretive pressures “cloak what is in reality state action in the guise of private choice.”

This week, in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, my colleague Christopher Koopman and I added to this recent scholarship on the FCC’s controversial transaction reviews.

We echo the argument that the FCC merger policies undermine the rule of law. Firms have no idea which policies they’ll need to comply with to receive transaction approval. We also note that the FCC is motivated to shift from formal regulation, which is time consuming and subject to judicial review, to “regulation by transaction,” which has fewer restraints on agency action. The FCC and the courts have put few meaningful limits on what can be coerced from merging firms. Many concessions from merging firms are policies that the FCC is simply unwilling to accomplish via formal rulemaking or, sometimes, is outright prohibited by law from regulating. Since a firm’s concessions in this coercive process are nominally voluntary, they typically can’t sue.

We point out, further, that the FCC has a potentially damaging legal issue on its hands. Since the agency is now extracting concessions related to content distribution and TV and radio programming, its transaction review authority may be presumptively unconstitutional and subject to facial First Amendment challenges. That means many parties can challenge the law, not simply the ones burdened by conditions (who fear FCC retaliation).

Content-neutral licensing laws, like the FCC’s transaction review authority, are presumptively unconstitutional when there’s a risk  that public officials will intimidate speakers about content. We cite for this proposition the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., a 1988 case striking down as unconstitutional a city requirement that newspapers seek a public interest determination from public officials before installing newsracks. As the Court said, for rules with a “nexus to expression,”

a facial [First Amendment] challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.

The public officials in City of Lakewood hadn’t even pressured newspapers about content; the mere potential for intimidation was a constitutional violation. If the agency’s authority was challenged, the FCC would be in worse shape than the public officials in City of Lakewood. Unlike those local officials, the FCC has used licensing to pressure firms to add certain types of programming. So the law certainly has the nexus to expression that the Supreme Court requires for a facial challenge.

We highlight, for instance, the many concessions related to content in the 2010 Comcast-NBCU merger. Comcast-NBCU conceded to create children’s, public interest, and Spanish-language TV and video-on-demand programming, relinquish editorial control over Hulu programming, and spend millions of dollars on digital literacy and FDA nutritional TV public service announcements. In that merger and many others, the FCC conditioned approval on compliance with open access and net neutrality policies. As I and others have pointed out, net neutrality rules also threaten free speech rights.

We conclude with some policy recommendations to avoid a constitutional problem for the FCC, including congressional repeal of the FCC’s transaction review authority. We point out that the FCC actually has Clayton Act authority to review common carrier mergers, but the FCC refuses to use it, likely because the agency views traditional competition analysis as too constraining. In our view, unless or until the FCC promulgates predictable guidelines about what is relevant in a transaction review and stays away from content distribution issues, the FCC’s transaction review authority is vulnerable to legal challenge.

The FCC has signaled that it may vote to overhaul the Lifeline program this month. Today, Lifeline typically provides a $9.25 subsidy for low-income households to purchase landline or mobile telephone service from eligible providers. While Lifeline has problems–hence the bipartisan push for reform–years ago the FCC structured Lifeline in a way that generally improves access and mitigates abuse (the same cannot be said about the three other major universal service programs).

A direct subsidy plus a menu of options is a good way to expand access to low-income people (assuming there are effective anti-fraud procedures). A direct subsidy is more or less how the US and state governments help lower-income families afford products and services like energy, food, housing, and education. For energy bills there’s LIHEAP. For grocery bills there’s SNAP and WIC. For housing, there’s Section 8 vouchers. For higher education, there’s Pell grants.

Programs structured this way make transfers fairly transparent, which makes them an easy target for criticism but also promotes government accountability, and gives low-income households the ability to consume these services according to their preferences. If you want to attend a small Christian college, not a state university, Pell grants enable that. If you want to purchase rice and tomatoes, not bread and apples, SNAP enables that. The alternative, and far more costly, ways to improve consumer access to various services is to subsidize providers, which is basically how Medicare the rural telephone programs operate, or command-and-control industrial policy, like we have for television and much of agriculture.

Because the FCC is maintaining the consumer subsidy and expanding the menu of Lifeline options to include wired broadband, mobile broadband, and wifi devices, there’s much to commend in the proposed reforms.

Lifeline Broadband Subsidies

Ironically, despite tech activist declarations that 10 Mbps is not “real broadband,” the FCC considers 10 Mbps broadband totally adequate as low-income families’ sole connection to the digital world. If the proposals stand, Lifeline subsidies can be used for 10 Mbps wireline and wireless subscriptions.

The confusion about “real broadband” echoed from tech activists, some tech reporting, and a presidential candidate arises because the FCC has at least three different conceptions of “broadband,” essentially based on whatever definition will increase its regulatory control. For Title II purposes, even a mere 1 Mbps is “broadband” because the FCC wants to be inclusive and regulate all providers. For Section 706, defining “broadband” as high as practical increases the agency’s regulatory powers, so it’s not “real broadband” unless it’s 25 Mbps. For universal service and (apparently) Lifeline subsidies, 10 Mbps is “broadband” because setting it too high would be too restrictive for the consumers and carriers who benefit from a moderate standard.

Wireless Substitution

Expanding Lifeline to mobile broadband suggests an increasing awareness by the FCC that, for many Americans, wireless broadband is a substitute for wireline broadband. This is a little surprising because the FCC decided in January 2016 that “fixed and mobile broadband services are not functional substitutes.” The available data, however, shows that wireless is a substitute for the millions of homes that don’t contain avid Netflix watchers. While popular broadband offerings have monthly limits of 300 GB or more, based on Sandvine data, the typical US home with a wired Internet connection probably uses under 30 GB per month.

Pew surveys also reveal many Americans who substitute wireless for wireline. Of those in the growing number of smartphone-only households, 65% said their smartphones allow them to do everything online they need. Note also that, of those with no home broadband connection–which includes smartphone-only households–only 25% are interested in subscribing. This is why it’s good the FCC doesn’t simply subsidize carriers–most nonadopters simply have no interest in home Internet. Certainly there are some in these groups who don’t realize that their lives would be enriched by a wired broadband connection, but that is mainly a question of digital literacy and education.

Concerns and Reforms

While I support the FCC expanding the menu of Lifeline options and improving the eligibility process, I’m wary of some of the proposed reforms. More details will come out later but Commissioner O’Rielly has pointed out several potential problems with the direction this is going. For one, the eligibility process has always been a mess, in part because it’s based on a patchwork of federal and state programs. The largest problem is the FCC is proposing a major increase in the Lifeline budget, which will increase most Americans’ phone bills. Until the FCC gets its Lifeline house in order, it’s premature to increase the fund so substantially.

Further, I’d like to see satellite broadband on the “menu” of options for Lifeline consumers. Based on the preliminary reports, it’s not clear that satellite broadband will be eligible. Satellite broadband satisfies the speed requirement (10 Mbps) but the FCC plans to require a 150 GB allowance for fixed connections. Satellite is considered a fixed connection. However, satellite broadband providers generally have a low data allowance during daytime hours. On the other hand, they often have unmetered, unlimited data in off-peak hours. Arguably, because data is unmetered every day, satellite broadband should qualify. It would give low-income rural households, who have very low Internet penetration, one more option to be connected.

Finally, one possible reform to ensure the truly needy are benefiting would be to simultaneously increase substantially the $9.25 monthly subsidy but disallow subsidies to households with subscription TV. The most recent data I can find is a 2010 FCC report that 80% of Internet non-adopters have satellite or “cable premium” television. Tightening the requirements means fewer households are eligible but it would increase public support for the program and I think the FCC could then afford to be more generous with the Lifeline subsidy.

Yesterday, almost exactly one year after the FCC classified Internet service as a common carrier service, Sen. Mike Lee and his Senate cosponsors (including presidential candidates Cruz and Rubio) introduced the Restoring Internet Freedom Act. Sen. Lee also published an op-ed about the motivation for his bill, pointing out the folly of applying a 1930s AT&T Bell monopoly law to the Internet. It’s a short bill, simply declaring that the FCC’s Title II rules shall have no force and it precludes the FCC from enacting similar rules absent an act of Congress.

It’s a shame such a bill even has to be proposed, but then again these are unusual times in politics. The FCC has a history of regulating new industries, like cable TV, without congressional authority. However, enforcing Title II, its most intrusive regulations, on the Internet is something different altogether. Congress was not silent on the issue of Internet regulation, like it was regarding cable TV in the 1960s when the FCC began regulating.

Former Clinton staffer John Podesta said after Clinton signed the 1996 Telecom Act, “Congress simply legislated as if the Net were not there.” That’s a slight overstatement. There is one section of the Telecommunications Act, Section 230, devoted to the Internet and it is completely unhelpful for the FCC’s Open Internet rules. Section 230 declares a US policy of unregulation of the Internet and, in fact, actually encourages what net neutrality proponents seek to prohibit: content filtering by ISPs.

The FCC is filled with telecom lawyers who know existing law doesn’t leave room for much regulation, which is why top FCC officials resisted common carrier regulation until the end. Chairman Wheeler by all accounts wanted to avoid the Title II option until pressured by the President in November 2014. As the Wall Street Journal reported last year, the White House push for Title II “blindsided officials at the FCC” who then had to scramble to construct legal arguments defending this reversal. The piece noted,

The president’s words swept aside more than a decade of light-touch regulation of the Internet and months of work by Mr. Wheeler toward a compromise.

The ersatz “parallel version of the FCC” in the White House didn’t understand the implications of what they were asking for and put the FCC in a tough spot. The Title II rules and legal justifications required incredible wordsmithing but still created internal tensions and undesirable effects, as pointed out by the Phoenix Center and others. This policy reversal, to go the Title II route per the President’s request, also created First Amendment and Section 230 problems for the FCC. At oral argument the FCC lawyer disclaimed any notion that the FCC would regulate filtered or curated Internet access. This may leave a gaping hole in Title II enforcement since all Internet access is filtered to some degree, and new Internet services, like LTE Broadcast, Free Basics, and zero-rated video, involve curated IP content. As I said at the time, the FCC “is stating outright that ISPs have the option to filter and to avoid the rules.”

Nevertheless, Title II creates a permission slip regime for new Internet services that forces tech and telecom companies to invest in compliance lawyers rather than engineers and designers. Hopefully in the next few months the DC Circuit Court of Appeals will strike down the FCC’s net neutrality efforts for a third time. In any case, it’s great to see that Sen. Lee and his cosponsors have made innovation policy priority and want to continue the light-touch regulation of the Internet.

People are excited about online TV getting big in 2016. Alon Maor of Qwilt predicts in Multichannel News that this will be “the year of the skinny bundle.” Wired echoes that sentiment. The Wall Street Journal’s Geoffrey A. Fowler said, “it’s no longer the technology that holds back cable cutting–it’s the lawyers.”

Well, I’m here to say, lawyers can’t take all the blame. In my experience, it’s the technology, too. Some of the problem is that most discussion about the future of online TV and cable cutting fails to distinguish streaming video-on-demand (SVOD) and streaming linear TV (“linear” means continuous pre-programmed and live “channels”, often with commercials, much like traditional cable).

SVOD includes Netflix, HBO Go, and Hulu. Yes, SVOD technology is very good. The major SVOD players spend millions on networks and caching so that their (static) content is as close to consumers as possible.

But streaming linear TV–like Sling and live sports–cannot be cached like static content and appears to have kinks to iron out before mass-market adoption. Read online video analysts and you realize that streaming linear and live TV online is an entirely different animal from SVOD. In August, Ben Popper at the Verge had a fascinating longform piece about the MLB’s streaming TV operation, Major League Baseball Advanced Media (BAM), which is the industry leader doing live streaming video. (HBO hired BAM for streaming the latest Game of Thrones season after HBO Go’s in-house streaming offering suffered from outages.)

Linear online TV is hard! As one BAM executive explains vividly,

What people forget is that the internet, as a technology was never designed to do something like this–deliver flawless video simultaneously to millions of people. I liken it to trying to live on Mercury. The planet is completely inhospitable. Every day all you’re doing is [fighting] a battle for survival in a place that really does not want you.

So I say this understanding the significant technical difficulties they face: in my experience, streaming linear TV is not ready for prime-time yet. (If I could find information about how firms do it, I would also distinguish pre-recorded linear TV–like Sling’s HGTV channel–from live online TV, because firms likely use different network topologies. Another time, perhaps.) Perhaps I’m an outlier, but media reports about Sling outages suggest that I’m not. I used Sling TV for the past few months and had high hopes but I just dropped my subscription. My test for acceptable streaming quality is: “Would I invite friends over to watch something using this streaming service?” Most SVOD services pass that test. Through caching and streaming protocols, SVOD operators can assure pretty consistent streaming even during times of moderate congestion.

Since linear TV typically has programming that is transmitted (nearly) live, operators can’t really do the distributed caching of content that makes SVOD function well. As a result, streaming linear TV like Sling TV and WatchESPN (a Sling subscription gives you access to ESPN’s online sports portal) currently do not pass my test. Frankly, the streaming quality varied from excellent to unwatchable. Punching into the app and casting it to my TV, I was never sure which Sling would show up that day: Good Sling or Bad Sling. On good days, the Monday Night Football game looked better than cable TV. Other days, the stream would, for instance, work well and then fail at every commercial break (perhaps the commercials were stored on another, overwhelmed server?).

Now, it’s impossible to know for sure where the network bottleneck is and why a video stream is stuttering. To be more certain that the problem was with Sling TV or WatchESPN and not, say, my Chromecast, my Wifi, or my ISP, every time Sling or WatchESPN had several severe streaming problems in a period of short time, I did an unscientific test. I would close down the Sling app, open up Netflix, and start streaming Netflix via my Chromecast. Without exception for the past three months, Netflix loaded quickly and streamed well. Keeping everything the same except the source of content suggests (but doesn’t prove) that the problem was not a local network or device problem.

There are ways of using network architecture and protocols to improve linear TV on broadband, typically with dedicated servers and last-mile bandwidth reservation. Comcast Stream TV is an example and LTE Broadcast might someday soon provide linear and live TV for mobile customers. But given so-called net neutrality rules, these services are controversial and regulated. ISPs can have their own proprietary TV service like Stream TV but, given net neutrality hysteria, probably won’t offer dedicated bandwidth to distributors like Sling. In this narrow area, the FCC’s rules are a pretty good deal for larger, vertically integrated firms that can put programming bundles together. It’s not so great for the small ISPs and WISPs who want to respond to cable cutter demands and offer a quality TV product from another company via broadband.

So I expect linear online TV to remain niche until the quality improves. A big draw of Sling is the cancel-at-any-time policy which lowers the risk if you’re dissatisfied with programming and allows single-season sports fans like me to subscribe for a season or two. I subscribed in the fall and winter to watch NCAA and NFL football. Sling recognizes that a lot of its subscribers are like me. But if Sling and other linear TV programmers want to expand beyond niche, they’ll need higher-quality streams. (And Sling might wish to remain niche so they don’t upset their programmers by cannibalizing traditional subscription TV.) Would I sign up for Sling again? Sure. Maybe the prognosticators are right, and the technology will develop rapidly in 2016. I have my doubts.

For tech policy progressives, 2015 was a great year. After a decade of campaigning, network neutrality advocates finally got the Federal Communications Commission to codify regulations that require Internet service providers to treat all traffic the same as it crosses the network and is delivered to customers.

Yet the rapid way broadband business models, always tenuous to begin with, are being overhauled, may throw some damp linens on their party. More powerful smart phones, the huge uptick in Internet streaming and improved WiFi technology are just three factors driving this shift.

As regulatory mechanisms lag market trends in general, they can’t help but be upended along with the industry they aim to govern. Looking ahead to the coming year, the consequences of 2015’s regulatory activism will create some difficult situations for the FCC.

Zero rating will clash with net neutrality

 The FCC biggest question will be whether “zero rating,” also known as “toll-free data,” is permissible under its new Open Internet rules. Network neutrality prohibits an ISP from favoring one provider’s content over another’s. Yet by definition, that’s what zero rating does: an ISP agrees not to count data generated by a specific content provider against a customer’s overall bandwidth cap. Looking at from another angle, instead of charging more for enhanced quality—the Internet “toll road” network neutrality is designed to prevent, zero rating offers a discount for downgraded transmission. As ISPs, particularly bandwidth-constrained wireless companies, replace “all-you-can-eat” data with tiered pricing plans that place a monthly limit on total data used—and assess additional charges on consumers who go beyond the cap—zero rating agreements become critical in allowing companies like Alphabet (formerly Google), Facebook and Netflix, companies that were among the most vocal supports of network neutrality, to keep users regularly engaged.

T-Mobile has been aggressive with zero rating, having reached agreements with Netflix, Hulu, HBO Now, and SlingTV for its Binge On feature. Facebook, another network neutrality advocate, has begun lobbying for zero rating exceptions outside the U.S. Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg told a tech audience in India, where net neutrality has been a long-standing rule, that zero rating is not a violation, a contention that some tech bloggers immediately challenged.

When it came to net neutrality rulings, the FCC may have hoped it would only have to deal with disputes dealing with the technical sausage-making covered by the “reasonable network management” clause in the Title II order (to be fair, zero rating involves some data optimization). But any ruling that permits zero rating would collapse its entire case for network neutrality. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, another vocal net neutrality supporter, understands this explicitly, and wants the FCC to nip zero rating in the bud.

The problem is that zero-rating is not anti-consumer, but a healthy, market-based response to bandwidth limitations. Even though ISPs are treating data differently, customers get access to more entertainment and content without higher costs. Bottom line: consumers get more for their money. For providers like Alphabet and Facebook, which rely on advertising, there stands to be substantial return on investment. Unlike blanket regulation, it’s voluntary, sensitive to market shifts and not coercive.

How long before these companies who lobbied for network neutrality begin their semantic gymnastics to demand exemptions for zero rating? The Court of Appeals may make it moot by overturning Title II reclassification outright. But failing that, expect some of the big Silicon Valley tech companies to start their rhetorical games soon.

  Internet streaming will confound the FCC

The zero rating controversy is just one more outgrowth of the rise in Internet streaming.

For the past seven years, the FCC’s regulatory policy has been based on the questionable assertion that cable and phone companies are monopoly bottlenecks.

Title II reclassification is aimed at preventing ISPs from using these perceived bottlenecks to extract higher costs from content providers. Yet at the same time, the FCC, in keeping with its cable/telco/ISPs-are-monopolies mindset, depends on them to fund its universal service and e-rate funds and fulfill its public interest mandate by carrying broadcast feeds from local television stations.

The simple fact is that the local telephone, cable and ISP bundlers are not monopolies. The 463,000 subscribers the top 8 cable companies lost in the second quarter of 2015 are getting their TV entertainment from somewhere. Those who are not cutting the cord completely are reducing their service: Another study estimated that 45 percent of U.S. households reduced the level of cable or satellite service in 2014.

Consumers are replacing their cable bundle with streaming options such as Roku, Amazon Fire, Apple TV and Google Play. These companies aggregate and optimize the Internet video for big screen TVs and home entertainment centers. Broadcast and basic cable programs are usually free (but carry ads); other programming can be purchased by subscription (Netflix, HBO Now) or on demand (iTunes, Amazon). While in many cases consumers retain their broadband connection, that remains their only purchase from the cable or telephone company. But even that might be optional, too. Millennial consumers are comfortable using free WiFi services or zero-rated wireless plans like T-Mobile’s Binge On.

But as consumers cut the cord, cable revenues go down. When cable revenues drop, so does the funding for all those FCC pet causes. The question is how hard will the FCC push to require streaming services to pay universal service fees, or include local TV feeds among their channel offerings? Under the current law, the FCC has no regulatory jurisdiction over streaming applications, unless, as with Title II, it tries to play fast and loose with legal definitions. The FCC has never been shy about overreaching, and as early as October 2014 Chairman Tom Wheeler suggested that IP video aggregators could be considered multichannel video programming distributors, a term that to date has been applied only to cable television companies.

Ironically, streaming stands to meet two long-held progressive policy goals—a la carte programming selection and structural separation of the companies that build and manage physical broadband networks and the companies that provide the applications that ride it. Cable and Internet bundles are so 2012! Yet 2016 finds the FCC is woefully unprepared for this shift. In fact, last we looked was encouraging small towns to borrow millions of dollars to get onto the cable TV business.

Over the past seven years, the FCC has pursued Internet regulations from an ideological perspective—treating it as a necessary component of the overall business ecosystem. In truth, regulation is supposed to serve consumer interests, and should be applied to address extant problems, not as precautionary measures. Unfortunately, the FCC has chosen to ignore market realities and apply rules that fit its own deliberate misperceptions. The Commission’s looming inability to find consistency in enforcing its own edicts is a problem solely of its own making.

The FCC’s Open Internet Order is long and complex and the challenge to it is likewise difficult to untangle. The agency regularly engages in ad hoc rulemaking that results, per Judge Posner, in “unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have somehow to be conciliated.” The Open Internet Order is no exception and therefore faces several legal vulnerabilities.

In my view, the soft underbelly of the Order is the agency’s position that ISPs are not First Amendment speakers. While courts are generally very deferential to agencies, they are not deferential on constitutional questions. Further, the court panel (two Democrat appointees, one Republican appointee), unfortunately, was not in the carriers’ favor. The major carriers, however, have focused their arguments on whether the agency should receive deference in classifying Internet access as a telecommunications service.

That said, it’s possible the major carriers could get at least a partial win with their arguments. That likelihood is increased because Alamo Broadband and Dan Berninger raised the First Amendment problems with the Order. Given the strength of the First Amendment arguments, the Court might shy away from reaching the issue of whether ISPs are speakers. Below, some thoughts on the moments during oral arguments that surprised me and what went according to predictions.

The Unexpected

A receptive ear in Judge Williams re: the First Amendment arguments. (Good for: ISPs) The First Amendment arguments went better than I’d expected. Alamo and Berninger’s counsel, Brett Shumate, argued the First Amendment issues well and had good responses for skeptical questions. Shumate found a receptive ear in Judge Williams, who seemed to understand the serious First Amendment risks posed by the Order. Williams repeatedly brought up the fact that MetroPCS a few years ago tried to curate the Internet and provide its customers free YouTube, only to face resistance from the FCC and net neutrality activists.

The other two judges were more skeptical but Shumate corrected some misconceptions. The biggest substantive objection from Srinivasan, who sounded the most skeptical of the First Amendment arguments, was that if the Court reaches the First Amendment issues, it has determined that the FCC has reasonably classified Internet access as a common carrier service. He suggested that this means the First Amendment issues mostly disappear. No, Shumate explained. Congress and the FCC can call services whatever they want. They could declare Google Search or Twitter feeds a common carrier service tomorrow and that would have zero effect on whether filtering by Google and Twitter is protected by the First Amendment. Tatel asked whether Section 230’s liability protections suggest ISPs are common carriers and Shumate corrected that misconception, a subject I have written on before.

A major FCC concession that ISPs have to option to change their offerings and escape common carrier regulation. (Good for: ISPs) Title II advocates are spinning the terse First Amendment exchanges as a victory. I’m not convinced. The reason the arguments didn’t generate more heat was because the FCC lawyer made a huge concession at the outset: ISPs that choose to filter the Internet are not covered by the Open Internet Order.

FCC lawyer: “If [ISPs] want to curate the Internet…that would drop them out of the definition of Broadband Internet Access Service.” Judge Williams: “They have that option under the Order?” FCC lawyer: “Absolutely, your Honor. …If they filter the Internet and don’t provide access to all or substantially all endpoints, then they drop out of the definition of [BIAS] and the rules don’t apply to them.”

This admission seriously undermines the purposes of the Order. The FCC is stating outright that ISPs have the option to filter and to avoid the rules. That seems to mean that Comcast’s Stream Internet protocol television service, where it is curating streaming TV programs, is not covered by the rules. If Facebook’s Free Basics or a similar service launched in the US giving free, limited access to the Web, that is not covered by the Order. Finally, this means that the many broadband packages that offer family-friendly filtering are outside of the FCC’s rules. It’s not clear how much remains to be regulated since all ISPs reserve the right to filter content and each filters at least some content.

Judge Tatel directing most questioning. (Good for: wash) Many view Judge Tatel as the “swing vote” but I was surprised at the relative quiet from Williams and Srinivasan. Tatel was the most inquisitive, by my listening. He was much more skeptical of some of the FCC’s arguments regarding interconnection than I expected but also more skeptical of the First Amendment arguments than I expected.

Little discussion of Chevron Step 0. (Good for: FCC) Many on the free-market side wanted to make this case about Chevron Step 0 and the notion that Title II is too economically and socially significant to warrant deference. Unfortunately, at oral argument there was very little discussion of Chevron Step 0.

The Expected

Focus on agency discretion. (Good for: FCC) The judges generally seem to see this as a straightforward Chevron case and the questions focused on Chevron Step 1, whether there is ambiguity in the statute about “offering telecommunications” for the FCC to interpret. As expected, the FCC did fairly well in their arguments because these technical issues are very hard to untangle.

On Chevron Step 2, whether the reinterpretation of “telecommunications service” to include Internet access was reasonable, the US Telecom attorney was strong. He leaned heavily on the fact that in Section 230, which amends the Communications Act, Congress announces a national policy that the Internet and specifically Internet access services, should remain “unfettered by Federal regulation.” That would seem to preclude the FCC from using, at the very least, its most powerful regulatory weapon–common carriage–against Internet access providers. Even if “telecommunications service” is ambiguous, he stated, it was unreasonable to include Internet access in that definition.

Focus on whether mobile broadband can be properly classified under Title II. (Benefit: ISPs) As many commentators have noted, the idea that the traditional phone network and the mobile broadband network can be classified as the same interconnected network is far-fetched. Each judge seemed very skeptical of the FCC’s argument and Tatel suggested there was a lack of adequate notice.

Srinivasan pointed out that striking down the wireless rules and maintaining the wireline rules would mean that using the same tablet in different areas of your house would lead to different regulatory treatment, depending on whether you’re on the cellular broadband network or Wifi. Title II supporters think this is pretty clever gotcha but communications law already abounds with seemingly absurd FCC- and court-created legal distinctions. (The FCC invents its own absurd distinction and offers vastly different regulatory treatment for DNS operated by an ISP v. DNS operated by literally anyone else.)

Conclusion

Predictions about major regulatory cases are notoriously difficult. I’ve read (and made) enough predictions about big court cases to know that prognosticators almost always get it wrong. If that’s the case, at least consider one thought-provoking outcome: the rules are largely struck down because the FCC provided inadequate notice on most of the major issues of classification.

If the rules, in contrast, were sustained under Chevron and judged to have had adequate notice, the Court would likely need to confront the First Amendment issues. I don’t think Tatel and Srinivasan, especially, want to rule on these hard constitutional questions. The judges must know the Supreme Court has, as Prof. Susan Crawford says, an “absolutist approach” to the First Amendment that protects speakers of all kinds. Sustaining the rules means the FCC risks a loss on First Amendment grounds on appeal that would nearly eliminate the ability of the FCC to regulate the Internet. For that reason, and because of the notice problems, the Court may strike down the rules on notice and comment grounds, thereby preserving the ability of the FCC to take a fourth bite at the apple.

On October 7th I appeared on a webinar hosted by Prof. Barry Umansky and Ball State’s Digital Policy Institute about the FCC’s Title II case before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, US Telecom Association v. FCC. The other panelists were Andrew Schwartzman of Georgetown University and Stuart Brotman of Harvard Law School and the Brookings Institution. Check it out, but here’s a brief summary of our hour-long discussion.

Much of our discussion was about whether and how the Court will analyze the FCC’s Open Internet rules under the Chevron doctrine. Andrew argues that this is a Chevron case, that “telecommunications service” is ambiguous in the Communications Act, and that the FCC’s reinterpretation of telecommunications to include Internet access is reasonable. I disagreed and argued that classifying Internet access service as a “telecommunications service” is unreasonable given technical realities and Sections 620, 230, and 231 of the Communications Act.

Later, Andrew contended that ISPs are clearly common carriers and the FCC is simply codifying this reality. Again, I disagreed. ISPs, for instance, reserve the right to revoke service from people based on the content they send or post (like being abusive, harassing, or hateful online). Common carriers don’t do that. ISPs filter content they suspect customers don’t want (like spam). Common carriers don’t do that. ISPs offer customized access services (like parental controls and Web whitelists and blacklists). Common carriers don’t do that.

Stuart raises the point that the deferential Chevron doctrine might not be applied at all. Making this case to the Court–that regulating most of the Internet is too socially and economically significant to receive Chevron deference–seems to be dominant legal strategy for Title II opponents. As Prof. Dan Lyons, points out in a blog post this week, the Supreme Court seems to be increasingly hostile to agencies’ major reinterpretations of law.

We’ll see. I actually agree with my copanelist Andrew that the DC Circuit will tend to view this as a garden-variety administrative law case. Courts are generally deferential to expert agencies on reinterpreting the law and, as Lyons notes, it’s still pretty rare for courts to find that an agency decision does not get substantial deference.

For that reason, I point out in the webinar that the perhaps the strongest argument for the ISPs is raised by Alamo Broadband and Dan Berninger–that the Open Internet rules violate the First Amendment. I wrote recently why the Open Internet rules may violate the First Amendment. I note in the webinar that, unlike administrative law questions, courts are not deferential to agencies when the First Amendment is at issue. Courts interpret the coverage of the First Amendment broadly and the First Amendment is increasingly an effective tool to strike down regulations that implicate speech.

We wrap up the webinar by discussing whether a legislative compromise is possible before the 2016 elections (no). There will more analysis of the legal briefs before the December oral arguments and I’d expect two major issues, whether Chevron applies and whether the rules violate the First Amendment, to be in the conversation.

Last Friday I attended a fascinating conference hosted by the Duke Law School’s Center for Innovation Policy about television regulation and competition. It’s remarkable how quickly television competition has changed and how online video providers are putting pressure on old business models.

I’ve been working on a project about competition in technology, communications, and media and one chart that stands out is one that shows increasing competition in pay television, below. Namely, that cable providers have lost nearly 15 million subscribers since 2002. Cable was essentially the only game in town in 1990 for pay television (about 100% market share). Yet today, cable’s market share approaches 50%. This competitive pressure accounts for some cable companies trying to merge in recent years.

Much of this churn by subscribers was to satellite providers but it’s the “telephone” companies providing TV that’s really had a competitive impact in recent years. Telcos went from about 0% market share in 2005 to 13% in 2014. This new competition can be tied to Congress finally allowing telephone companies to provide TV in 1996. However, these new services didn’t really get started until a decade ago when 1) digital and IP technology improved, and 2) the FCC made it clear by deregulating DSL ISPs that telephone companies could expect a market return for investing in fiber broadband nationwide.

UPDATE:

And below is market share data going back ten more years to 1994 using FCC data, which uses a slightly different measurement methodology (hence the kink around 2003-2004). I’ve also omitted market share of Home Satellite Dish (those large dishes you sometimes see in rural areas). Though HSD has negligible market share today, it had a few million subscribers in the mid-1990s. I may add HSD later.