by Walter Stover and Anne Hobson

Franklin Foer’s article in the Atlantic on Jeff Bezos’s master plan offers insight into the mind of the famed CEO, but his argument that Amazon is all-powerful is flawed. Foer overlooks the role of consumers in shaping Amazon’s narrative. In doing so, he overestimates the actual autonomy of Bezos and the power of Amazon over its consumers. 

The article falls prey to an atomistic theory of Amazon. The thinking goes like this: I am an atom, and Amazon is a (much) larger atom. Because Amazon is so much larger than I am, I need some intervening force to ensure that Amazon does not prey on me. This intervening force must belong to an even larger atom (the U.S. government) in order to check Amazon’s power. The atomistic lens sees individuals as interchangeable and isolated from each other, able to be considered one at a time.

Foer’s application of this theory appears in his treatment of Hayek, one of the staunchest opponents of aggregation and atomism. For example, when he summarizes Hayek’s paper “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” he phrases Hayek’s argument as that “…no bureaucracy could ever match the miracle of markets, which spontaneously and efficiently aggregate the knowledge of a society.” Hayek found the notion of aggregation highly problematic, as seen in another of his articles, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in which he criticizes the idea of a “scientific” objective approach to measuring market variables. His argument against trying to build a science on macroeconomic variables notes that “…the coarse structure of the economy can exhibit no regularities that are not the results of the fine structure… and that those aggregate or mean values… give us no information about what takes place in the fine structure.”

Neither Amazon nor the market can aggregate the knowledge of a society. We can try to speak of the market in aggregate terms, but we end up summing up all of the differences between individuals and concealing the action and agency of the individuals at the bottom. We cannot speak of market activity without reference to the patterns of individual interactions. It is best to think of the market as an emergent, unintended outcome of a constellation of individual actors, not atoms, each of whom have different talents, wants, knowledge, and resources. Actors enter into exchanges with each other and form complicated, semi-rigid, multi-leveled social networks.

Foer describes the great power and wealth of “knowledge” that Amazon has acquired:

“Amazon, however, has acquired the God’s-eye view of the economy that Hayek never imagined any single entity could hope to achieve. At any moment, its website has more than 600 million items for sale and more than 3 million vendors selling them. With its history of past purchases, it has collected the world’s most comprehensive catalog of consumer desire, which allows it to anticipate both individual and collective needs. With its logistics business—and its growing network of trucks and planes—it has an understanding of the flow of goods around the world. In other words, if Marxist revolutionaries ever seized power in the United States, they could nationalize Amazon and call it a day.”

“…[Amazon] distributes economists across a range of teams, where they can, among other things, run controlled experiments that permit scientific, and therefore effective, manipulation of consumer behavior.”

Yet, having data (or having PhD economists, for that matter) is not the same as having complete knowledge or predictive power. Again, the atomistic theory reappears in the assumption that the behavior of individuals can be predicted based on past information in the same way we could compute the trajectory of a single billiard ball. The local, dispersed knowledge Hayek discussed in “The Use of Knowledge” is subjectively held in the minds of the actors, and thus inaccessible to outside observers. People do not, in fact, carry around independently fixed utility functions in their heads from which they–or anyone else–can accurately predict what they will choose in the future. 

 Instead, as economist James Buchanan argues, choices are genuine in that “participants do not know until they enter the process what their own choices will be.” In other words, wants are themselves generated in the choosing process. Amazon cannot reverse engineer the process from any single snapshot, or any series of snapshots, because choices are subjective and dynamic. As an example, any behavior–such as targeted ads or preferential pricing–based on attempts to predict future patterns of consumer behavior is itself information that enters into consumer purchasing decisions. 

Even assuming that Amazon could perfectly predict consumer preferences, this would not pose any kind of threat to consumer welfare, because consumers still retain the ability to shop elsewhere. And competition on the retailer front is still rampant. Walmart has 265 million customers each week and 2.2 million global employees. By contrast, Amazon has 105 million prime subscribers and 613,300 global employees. As long as Amazon cannot exercise coercive authority over consumers, it remains unclear why, exactly, increased predictive power would damage consumer welfare. 

When discussing the high level of trust consumers have in Amazon, Foer argues that “…while Amazon is trusted, no countervailing force has the inclination or capacity to restrain it.” 

Foer again ignores the diffuse countervailing power of consumers, somewhat similar in fashion to Hayek’s notion of dispersed knowledge. Individuals may not be able to exercise much power by themselves against Amazon, but they wield extraordinary power when taking the entire constellation of actors into consideration. This is not the same thing as a collective, organized response such as unions or consumer welfare protection organizations such as the Better Business Bureaus, though these organizations doubtless have very important roles to play. 

In the same way that the market order is a spontaneous outcome of individuals pursuing their own interests, the decentralized actions of consumers in the market similarly can result in the fortunes or fall of a firm without the need to organize everyone involved. Every choice made in the market on the margin is a signal to the firm. A decision to buy books from other websites (for example, from Alibris and not Amazon) is a minute manifestation of this diffuse power of consumers. One signal by itself does not carry much leverage, but when taken in totality, they constitute an ordered force that exerts powerful feedback on a firm’s actions. 

Such a theory of diffuse power can appear profoundly unsatisfactory. We tend to favor narratives of Davids versus Goliaths in part perhaps because we are unaccustomed to trying to think about spontaneous orders in general. In the long run, Amazon will live or die, but not according to the schedule or preferences of a single consumer. 

Diffuse power might seem to be a weak check, but what is the alternative? There are risks to policy intervention (as Foer points out, Marxists could nationalize Amazon and then try to use the consolidated information to run the economy, with disastrous results). Policymakers could restrict Amazon’s growth or activity in a way that limits innovation. It could step in too early and prevent consumer signals from running their course and changing Amazon’s direction to align more with our wants. 

Consumer signals in totality do serve as a countervailing force. And the evidence is in Foer’s article. Amazon (and Bezos in particular) is obsessed with consumer satisfaction and we all benefit from his obsession.

Note: This piece is part three of a series on the epistemic limitations of Artificial Intelligence. Part one on “The Limits of AI in Predicting Human Action” of that series can be found here. Part two on “Amazon, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Market Manipulation” can be found here.

Congress passed joint resolutions to rescind FCC online privacy regulations this week, which President Trump is expected to sign. Ignore the hyperbole. Lawmakers are simply attempting to maintain the state of Internet privacy law that’s existed for 20-plus years.

Since the Internet was commercialized in the 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission has used its authority to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” to prevent privacy abuses by Web companies and ISPs. In 2015, that changed. The Obama FCC classified “broadband Internet access service” as a common carrier service, thereby blocking the FTC’s authority to determine which ISP privacy policies and practices are acceptable.

Privacy advocates failed to convince the Obama FTC that de-identified browsing history is “sensitive” data. (The FTC has treated SSNs, medical information, financial information, precise location, etc. as “sensitive” for years and companies must handle these differently.) The FCC was the next best thing and in 2016 they convinced the FCC to say that browsing history is “sensitive data,” but it’s sensitive only when ISPs have it.

This has contributed to a regulatory mess for consumers and tech companies. Technological convergence is here. Regulatory convergence is not.

Consider a plausible scenario. I start watching an NFL game via Twitter on my tablet on Starbucks’ wifi. I head home at halftime and watch the game from my cable TV provider, Comcast. Then I climb into bed and watch overtime on my smartphone via NFL Mobile from Verizon.

One TV program, three privacy regimes. FTC guidelines cover me at Starbucks. Privacy rules from Title VI of the Communications Act cover my TV viewing. The brand-new FCC broadband privacy rules cover my NFL Mobile viewing and late-night browsing.

Other absurdities result from the FCC’s decision to regulate Internet privacy. For instance, if you bought your child a mobile plan with web filtering, she’s protected by FTC privacy standards, while your mobile plan is governed by FCC rules. Google Fiber customers are covered by FTC policies when they use Google Search but FCC policies when they use Yelp.

This Swiss-cheese approach to classifying services means that regulatory obligations fall haphazardly across services and technologies. It’s confusing to consumers and to companies, who need to write privacy policies based on artificial FCC distinctions that consumers disregard.

The House and Senate bills rescind the FCC “notice and choice” rules, which is the first step to restoring FTC authority. (In the meantime, the FCC will implement FTC-like policies.) 

Considering that these notice and choice rules have not even gone into effect, the rehearsed outrage from advocates demands explanation:  The theatrics this week are not really about congressional repeal of the (inoperative) privacy rules. Two years ago the FCC decided to regulate the Internet in order to shape Internet services and content. The leading advocates are outraged because FCC control of the Internet is slipping away. Hopefully Congress and the FCC will eliminate the rest of the Title II baggage this year.

Shortly after Tom Wheeler assumed the Chairmanship at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), he summed up his regulatory philosophy as “competition, competition, competition.” Promoting competition has been the norm in communications policy since Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order to “promote competition and reduce regulation.” The 1996 Act has largely succeeded in achieving competition in communications markets with one glaring exception: broadcast television. In stark contrast to the pro-competitive approach that is applied in other market segments, Congress and the FCC have consistently supported policies that artificially limit the ability of TV stations to compete or innovate in the communications marketplace.

Radio broadcasting was not subject to regulatory oversight initially. In the unregulated era, the business model for over-the-air broadcasting was “still very much an open question.” Various methods for financing radio stations were proposed or attempted, including taxes on the sale of devices, private endowments, municipal or state financing, public donations, and subscriptions. “We are today so accustomed to the dominant role of the advertiser in broadcasting that we tend to forget that, initially, the idea of advertising on the air was not even contemplated and met with widespread indignation when it was first tried.”

Section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934 thus provided the FCC with broad authority to authorize over-the-air subscription television service (STV). When the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this provision, it held that “subscription television is entirely consistent with [the] goals” of the Act. Analog STV services did not become widespread in the marketplace, however, due in part to regulatory limitations imposed on such services by the FCC. As a result, advertising dominated television revenue in the analog era.

The digital television (DTV) transition offered a new opportunity for TV stations to provide STV services in competition with MVPDs. The FCC had initially hoped that “multicasting” and other new capabilities provided by digital technologies would “help ensure robust competition in the video market that will bring more choices at less cost to American consumers.”

Despite the agency’s initial optimism, regulatory restrictions once again crushed the potential for TV stations to compete in other segments of the communications marketplace. When broadcasters proposed offering digital STV services with multiple broadcast and cable channels in order to compete with MVPDs, Congress held a hearing to condemn the innovation. Chairmen from both House and Senate committees threatened retribution against broadcasters if they pursued subscription television services — “There will be a quid pro quo.” Broadcasters responded to these Congressional threats by abandoning their plans to compete with MVPDs.

It’s hard to miss the irony in the 1996 Act’s approach to the DTV transition. Though the Act’s stated purposes are to “promote competition and reduce regulation, it imposed additional regulatory requirements on television stations that have stymied their ability to innovate and compete. The 1996 Act broadcasting provision requires that the FCC impose limits on subscription television services “so as to avoid derogation of any advanced television services, including high definition television broadcasts, that the Commission may require using such frequencies,” and prohibits TV stations from being deemed an MVPD. The FCC’s rules require TV stations to “transmit at least one over-the-air video programming signal at no direct charge to viewers” because “free, over-the-air television is a public good, like a public park, and might not exist otherwise.

These and other draconian legislative and regulatory limitations have forced TV stations to follow the analog television business model into the 21st Century while the rest of the communications industry innovated at a furious pace. As a result of this government-mandated broadcast business model, TV stations must rely on advertising and retransmission consent revenue for their survival.

Though the “public interest” status of TV stations may once have been considered a government benefit, it is rapidly becoming a curse. Congress and the FCC have both relied on the broadcast public interest shibboleth to impose unique and highly burdensome regulatory obligations on TV stations that are inapplicable to their competitors in the advertising and other potential markets. This disparity in regulatory treatment has increased dramatically under the current administration — to the point that is threatening the viability of broadcast television.

Here are just three examples of the ways in which the current administration has widened the regulatory chasm between TV stations and their rivals:

• In 2012, the FCC required only TV stations to post “political file” documents online, including the rates charged by TV stations for political advertising; MVPDs are not required to post this information online. This regulatory disparity gives political ad buyers and incentive to advertise on cable rather than broadcast channels and forces TV stations to disclose sensitive pricing information more widely than their competitors.
• This year the FCC prohibited joint sales agreements for television stations only; MVPDs and online content distributors are not subject to any such limitations on their advertising sales. This prohibition gives MVPDs and online advertising platforms a substantial competitive advantage in the market for advertising sales.
• This year the FCC also prohibited bundled programming sales by broadcasters only; cable networks are not subject to any limitations on the sale of programming in bundles. This disparity gives broadcast networks an incentive to avoid limitations on their programming sales by selling exclusively to MVPDs (i.e., becoming cable networks).

The FCC has not made any attempt to justify the differential treatment — because there is no rational justification for arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

Sadly, the STELA process in the Senate is threatening to make things worse. Some legislative proposals would eliminate retransmission consent and other provisions that provide the regulatory ballast for broadcast television’s government mandated business model  without eliminating the mandate. This approach would put a quick end to the administration’s “death by a thousand cuts” strategy with one killing blow. The administration must be laughing itself silly. When TV channels in smaller and rural markets go dark, this administration will be gone — and it will be up to Congress to explain the final TV transition.

Today is a big day in Congress for the cable and satellite (MVPDs) war on broadcast television stations. The House Judiciary Committee is holding a hearing on the compulsory licenses for broadcast television programming in the Copyright Act, and the House Energy and Commerce Committee is voting on a bill to reauthorize “STELA” (the compulsory copyright license for the retransmission of distant broadcast signals by satellite operators). The STELA license is set to expire at the end of the year unless Congress reauthorizes it, and MVPDs see the potential for Congressional action as an opportunity for broadcast television to meet its Waterloo. They desire a decisive end to the compulsory copyright licenses, the retransmission consent provision in the Communications Act, and the FCC’s broadcast exclusivity rules — which would also be the end of local television stations.

The MVPD industry’s ostensible motivations for going to war are retransmission consent fees and television “blackouts”, but the  real motive is advertising revenue.

The compulsory copyright licenses prevent MVPDs from inserting their own ads into broadcast programming streams, and the retransmission consent provision and broadcast exclusivity agreements prevent them from negotiating directly with the broadcast networks for a portion of their available advertising time. If these provisions were eliminated, MVPDs could negotiate directly with broadcast networks for access to their television programming and appropriate TV station advertising revenue for themselves.

The real motivation is in the numbers. According to the FCC’s most recent media competition report, MVPDs paid a total of approximately $2.4 billion in retransmission consent fees in 2012. (See 15th Report, Table 19) In comparison, TV stations generated approximately $21.3 billion in advertising that year. Which is more believable: (1) That paying $2.4 billion in retransmission consent fees is “just not sustainable” for an MVPD industry that generated nearly $149 billion from video services in 2011 (See 15th Report, Table 9), or (2) That MVPDs want to appropriate $21.3 billion in additional advertising revenue by cutting out the “TV station middleman” and negotiating directly for television programming and advertising time with national broadcast networks? (Hint: The answer is behind door number 2.)

What do compulsory copyright licenses, retransmission consent, and broadcast exclusivity agreements have to do with video advertising revenue?

• The compulsory copyright licenses prohibit MVPDs substituting their own advertisements for TV station ads: Retransmission of a broadcast television signal by an MVPD is “actionable as an act of infringement” if the content of the signal, including “any commercial advertising,” is “in any way willfully altered by the cable system through changes, deletions, or additions” (see 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3), 119(a)(5), and 122(e));
• The retransmission consent provision prohibits MVPDs from negotiating directly with television broadcast networks for access to their programming or a share of their available advertising time: An MVPD cannot retransmit a local commercial broadcast television signal without the “express authority of the originating station” (see 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A)); and
• Broadcast exclusivity agreements (also known as non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity agreements) prevent MVPDs from circumventing the retransmission consent provision by negotiating for nationwide retransmission consent with one network-affiliated own-and-operated TV station. (If an MVPD were able to retransmit the TV signals from only one television market nationwide, MVPDs could, in effect, negotiate with broadcast networks directly, because broadcast programming networks own and operate their own TV stations in some markets.)

The effect of the compulsory copyright licenses, retransmission consent provision, and broadcast exclusivity agreements is to prevent MVPDs from realizing any of the approximately $20 billion in advertising revenue generating by broadcast television programming every year.

Why did Congress want to prevent MVPDs from realizing any advertising revenue from broadcast television programming?

Congress protected the advertising revenue of local TV stations because TV stations are legally prohibited from realizing any subscription revenue for their primary programming signal. (See 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)) Congress chose to balance the burden of the broadcast business model mandate with the benefits of protecting their advertising revenue. The law forces TV stations to rely primarily on advertising revenue to generate profits, but the law also protects their ability to generate advertising revenue. Conversely, the law allows MVPDs to generate both subscription revenue and advertising revenue for their own programming, but prohibits them from poaching advertising revenue from broadcast programming.

MVPDs want to upset the balance by repealing the regulations that make free over-the-air television possible  without repealing the regulations that require TV stations to provide free over-the-air programming. Eliminating only the regulations that benefit broadcasters while retaining their regulatory burdens is not a free market approach — it is a video marketplace firing squad aimed squarely at the heart of TV stations.

Adopting the MVPD version of video regulation reform would not kill broadcast programming networks. They always have the options of becoming cable networks and selling their programming and advertising time directly to MVPDs or distributing their content themselves directly over the Internet.

The casualty of this so-called “reform” effort would be local TV stations, who are required by law to rely on advertising and retransmission consent fees for their survival. Policymakers should recognize that killing local TV stations for their advertising revenue is the ultimate goal of current video reform efforts before adopting piecemeal changes to the law. If policymakers intend to kill TV stations, they should not attribute the resulting execution to the “friendly fire” of unintended consequences. They should recognize the legitimate consumer and investment-backed expectations created by the current statutory framework and consider appropriate transition mechanisms after a comprehensive review.

Most conservatives and many prominent thinkers on the left agree that the Communications Act should be updated based on the insight provided by the wireless and Internet protocol revolutions. The fundamental problem with the current legislation is its disparate treatment of competitive communications services. A comprehensive legislative update offers an opportunity to adopt a technologically neutral, consumer focused approach to communications regulation that would maximize competition, investment and innovation.

Though the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must continue implementing the existing Act while Congress deliberates legislative changes, the agency should avoid creating  new regulatory disparities on its own. Yet that is where the agency appears to be heading at its meeting next Monday.

A recent ex parte filing indicates that the FCC is proposing to deem joint retransmission consent negotiations by two of the top four Free-TV stations in a market a per se violation of the FCC’s good-faith negotiation standard and adopt a rebuttable presumption that joint negotiations by non-top four station combinations constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith.” The intent of this proposal is to prohibit broadcasters from using a single negotiator during retransmission consent negotiations with Pay-TV distributors.

This prohibition would apply in  all TV markets, no matter how small, including markets that lack effective competition in the Pay-TV segment. In small markets without effective competition, this rule would result in the absurd requirement that marginal TV stations with no economies of scale negotiate alone with a cable operator who possesses market power.

In contrast, cable operators in these markets would remain free to engage in joint negotiations to purchase their programming. The Department of Justice has issued a press release “clear[ing] the way for cable television joint purchasing” of national cable network programming through a single entity. The Department of Justice (DOJ) concluded that allowing nearly 1,000 cable operators to jointly negotiate programming prices would not facilitate retail price collusion because cable operators typically do not compete with each other in the sale of programming to consumers.

Joint retransmission consent negotiations don’t facilitate retail price collusion either. Free-TV distributors don’t compete with each other for the sale of their programming to consumers — they provide their broadcast signals to consumers for  free over the air. Pay-TV operators complain that joint agreements among TV stations are nevertheless responsible for retail price increases in the Pay-TV segment, but have not presented evidence supporting that assertion. Pay-TV’s retail prices have increased at a steady clip for years irrespective of retransmission consent prices.

To the extent Pay-TV distributors complain that joint agreements increase TV station leverage in retransmission consent negotiations, there is no evidence of harm to competition. The retransmission consent rules  prohibit TV stations from entering into exclusive retransmission consent agreements with any Pay-TV distributor — even though Pay-TV distributors are allowed to enter into such agreements for cable programming — and the FCC has determined that Pay- and Free-TV distributors do not compete directly for viewers. The absence of any potential for competitive harm is especially compelling in markets that lack effective competition in the Pay-TV segment, because the monopoly cable operator in such markets is the de facto single negotiator for Pay-TV distributors.

It is even more surprising that the FCC is proposing to prohibit joint sales agreements among Free-TV distributors. This recent development apparently stems from a DOJ Filing in the FCC’s incomplete media ownership proceeding.

A fundamental flaw exists in the DOJ Filing’s analysis: It failed to consider whether the relevant product market for video advertising includes other forms of video distribution, e.g., cable and online video programming distribution. Instead, the DOJ relied on precedent that considers the sale of advertising in  non-video media only.

Similarly, the Department has repeatedly concluded that the purchase of broadcast television spot advertising constitutes a relevant antitrust product market because advertisers view spot advertising on broadcast television stations as sufficiently distinct from advertising on other media (such as radio and newspaper). (DOJ Filing at p.8)

The DOJ’s conclusions regarding joint sales agreements are clearly based on its incomplete analysis of the relevant product market.

Therefore, vigorous rivalry between multiple independently controlled broadcast stations in each local radio and television market ensures that businesses, charities, and advocacy groups can reach their desired audiences at competitive rates. (Id. at pp. 8-9, emphasis added)

The DOJ’s failure to consider the availability of advertising opportunities provided by cable and online video programming renders its analysis unreliable.

Moreover, the FCC’s proposed rules would result in another video market double standard. Cable, satellite, and telco video programming distributors, including DIRECTV, AT&T U-verse, and Verizon FIOS, have entered into a joint agreement to sell advertising through a  single entity, NCC Media (owned by Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Cox Media). NCC Media’s Essential Guide to planning and buying video advertising says that cable programming has surpassed 70% of all viewing to ad-supported television homes in Prime and Total Day, and 80% of Weekend daytime viewing. According to NCC, “This viewer migration to cable [programming] is one of the best reasons to shift your brand’s media allocation from local broadcast to Spot Cable,” especially with the advent of NCC’s new consolidated advertising platform. (Essential Guide at p. 8) The Essential Guide also states:

• “It’s harder than ever to buy the GRP’s [gross rating points] you need in local broadcast in prime and local news.” (Id. at p. 16)
• “[There is] declining viewership on broadcast with limited inventory creating a shortage of rating points in prime, local news and other dayparts.” (Id. at p. 17)
• “The erosion of local broadcast news is accelerating.” (Id. at p. 18)
• “Thus, actual local broadcast TV reach is at or below the cume figures for wired cable in most markets.” (Id. at p. 19)

This Essential Guide clearly indicates that cable programming is part of the relevant video advertising product market and that there is intense competition between Pay- and Free-TV distributors for advertising dollars.  So why is the FCC proposing to restrict joint marketing agreements among Free-TV distributors in local markets when virtually the entire Pay-TV industry is jointly marketing all of their advertising spots nationwide?

The FCC should refrain from adopting new restrictions on local broadcasters until it can answer questions like this one. Though it is appropriate for the FCC to prevent anticompetitive practices, adopting disparate regulatory obligations that distort competition in the same product market is not good for competition  or consumers. Consumer interests would be better served if the FCC decided to address video competition issues more broadly — or there might not be any Free-TV competition to worry about.

Alice Marwick, assistant professor of communication and media studies at Fordham University, discusses her newly-released book, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity, and Branding in the Social Media Age. Marwick reflects on her interviews with Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, technology journalists, and venture capitalists to show how social media affects social dynamics and digital culture. Marwick answers questions such as: Does “status conscious” take on a new meaning in the age of social media? Is the public using social media the way the platforms’ creators intended? How do you quantify the value of online social interactions? Are social media users becoming more self-censoring or more transparent about what they share? What’s the difference between self-branding and becoming a micro-celebrity? She also shares her advice for how to make Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram and other platforms more beneficial for you.

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Related Links

• Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity, and Branding in the Social Media Age, Marwick
• Engineered Performances Alice E. Marwick’s ‘Status Update’, The New York Times
• Biography, Marwick

Timothy B. Lee, founder of The Washington Post’s blog The Switch discusses his approach to reporting at the intersection of technology and policy. He covers how to make tech concepts more accessible; the difference between blogs and the news; the importance of investigative journalism in the tech space; whether paywalls are here to stay; Jeff Bezos’ recent purchase of The Washington Post; and the future of print news.

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• Here are eight ways investing in Bitcoins could go horribly wrongn, Lee
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Sherwin Siy, Vice President of Legal Affairs at Public Knowledge, discusses emerging issues in digital copyright policy. He addresses the Department of Commerce’s recent green paper on digital copyright, including the need to reform copyright laws in light of new technologies. This podcast also covers the DMCA, online streaming, piracy, cell phone unlocking, fair use recognition, digital ownership, and what we’ve learned about copyright policy from the SOPA debate.

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• Sherwin Siy, Public Knowledge
• What the DMCA cell phone unlock ban means to you, Reardon
• Why The Library Of Congress Has A Lock On Your Phone, Henn

Richard Brandt, technology journalist and author, discusses his new book, One Click: Jeff Bezos and the Rise of Amazon.Com. Brandt discusses Bezos’ entrepreneurial drive, his business philosophy, and how he’s grown Amazon to become the biggest retailer in the world. This episode also covers the biggest mistake Bezos ever made, how Amazon uses patent laws to its advantage, whether Amazon will soon become a publishing house, Bezos’ idea for privately-funded space exploration and his plan to revolutionize technology with quantum computing.

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Related Links

• One Click: Jeff Bezos and the Rise of Amazon.com, Brandt
• History of Google/About Google, Brandt
• Five minutes with Richard Brandt, Author of One Click, Ennyman

Gina Keating, author of Netflixed: The Epic Battle for America’s Eyeballs, discusses the startup of Netflix and their competition with Blockbuster.

Keating begins with the history of the company and their innovative improvements to the movie rental experience. She discusses their use of new technology and marketing strategies in DVD rental, which inspired Blockbuster to adapt to the changing market.

Keating goes on to describe Netflix’s transition to internet streaming and Blockbuster’s attempts to retain their market share.

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Related Links

• Netflixed: The Epic Battle for America’s Eyeballs, Keating
• Gina Keating’s New Book about the Rise of Netflix, Babayan
• ‘Netflixed,’ Book by Gina Keating, Describes CEO Reed Hastings As a Nasty Boss’ Liedtke

Today Reason has published my policy paper addressing privacy concerns created by search, social networking and Web-based e-commerce in general.

These web sites have been in regulatory crosshairs for some time, although Congress and the Federal Trade Commission have been hesitant to push forward with restrictive legislation such as “Do Not Track” and mandatory opt-in or top-down mandates such as the White House drafted “Privacy Bill of Rights.” An the U.S. seems unwilling to go to the lengths Europe is, contemplating such unworkable rules like demanding an “Internet eraser button”—a sort of online memory hole that would scrub any information about you that is accessible on the Web, even if it is part of the public record.

In my paper, It’s Not Personal: The Dangers of Misapplied Policies to Search, Social Media and Other Web Content, I discuss the difficulty of regulating personal disclosure because different people have different thresholds for privacy. We all know people who refuse to go on Facebook because they are wary of allowing too much information about themselves to circulate. Where it gets dicey is when authority figures take a paternalistic attitude and start deciding what information I will not be allowed to share, for what they claim is my own good.

Top down mandates really don’t work, mainly because popular attitudes are always in flux. Offer me 50 percent off on a hotel room, and I may be willing to tell you where I’m vacationing. Find me interesting books and movies, and I may be happy to let you know my favorite titles.

Instead, ground-up guidelines that arise as users become more comfortable with the medium, and sites work to establish trust, work better. True, Google and Facebook often push the envelope in trying to determine where user boundaries are, but pull back when run into user protest. And when the FTC took up Google’s and Facebook’s practices, while the agency shook a metaphorical finger at both companies’ aggressiveness, it assessed no fines or penalties, essentially finding that no consumer harm was done.

This course has been wise. The willingness of users to exchange information about themselves in return for value is an important element of e-commerce. It is worth considering some likely consequences if the government pushes too hard to prevent sites from gathering information about users.

Free Services Go Away

Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of sites support themselves through targeted advertising. If the federal government began to clamp down on websites’ ability to use consumer information to target ads, an immediate consequence would be a decline in the amount of free content, information and services available on the Web. A University of Toronto study of Web sites in Europe, where targeted advertising is heavily regulated, found that advertising effectiveness decreased  65 percent relative to counterparts in the rest of the world, and predicts that of European sites will see a declining share of the $8 billion in global online ad revenues decrease over time because they can’t effectively deliver an audience of interested customers.

This may explain why there are no European search of social media sites that rival Google and Facebook, and why Hyves, a Netherlands-based social networking sites, charges a fee for users access most of the benefits Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+ and Pinterest users get for free.

‘Mother, May I?’ trumps experimentation

Regulation forces companies to evaluate compliance issues before pursuing a potentially innovative product or service direction. As a result, innovation is slowed, or does not happen at all, not because of market considerations, but on the advice of legal counsel. This is a major risk of any regulation or legislation in technology, an area that is constantly changing and evolving, and where success and survival often hinge on out-of-the-box thinking. It is another reason why guidelines are preferable to law.

Regulations against information-sharing undermine the community-building benefit of the medium

One of the reasons people go online is to meet and interact others who share interests and passions. Individuals with unique interests—from birdwatching to Axis & Allies gaming—can connect with far more like-minded individuals than they might in their own geographic community. These communities in turn build knowledge bases that the general population of users can turn to from time to time. For example, someone planning a vacation in New York City can use Google to find a bevy of bulletin boards and forums, some quite granular, that provide information about shows, restaurants and attractions, all from people who have shared their experience. These boards thrive because search engines like Google and social networks like Facebook drive traffic to them—all based on preferences. Regulate this technology away and the Web loses its unique community-building character.

Privacy regulation won’t address information security issues

Politicians often conflate privacy and security. The two are related, but are not the same thing.

Security pertains to the protection of critical user information that, if disclosed, can result in theft or fraud. Neither Do Not Track nor the on-line privacy “bill of rights” truly addresses security issues related to on-line information.

Wire fraud laws already make it illegal to steal user information. Identity theft and identity fraud are crimes. Companies that fail to adequately protect confidential and sensitive information, such as social security numbers, banking information or specific health-related data, that in the wrong hands could be used for malicious purposes. By contrast, the information websites collect, collate and process for targeted marketing is not highly personal and confidential, but has to do with individual habits and preferences that could otherwise be easily observed—does the person prefer beer or wine? The Cubs or the White Sox? Mystery novels or biographies? For the most part, it is anonymized. True, Facebook and other sites allow users to post pictures and disclose more intimate personal details such as religion or sexual orientation, but again, users can decide whether to disclose these facts and, if they do, decide who may see them. Opt-in, Do Not Track and privacy bills of rights are all about substituting government mandates for individual discretion. They do not strengthen or expand on any current laws against online fraud or theft, which by themselves are quite strong.

Make no mistake, personal choice must be respected, and the right to confidentiality should be protected. Yet specific harms must be understood, delineated and targeted in any legislation or regulation before it goes forward. The information economy is called so for a reason. Nothing would be more counterproductive to it than clumsy government policies designed to generally inhibit the voluntary exchange and use of information. Right now, search, social media and informational websites are the most visible users of consumer information, but in the background, many of the automated, intelligent services we expect the Web to support will need to trade in user information. These include such basic applications as Web-enabled home appliances, such as refrigerators that sense when you’re low on milk to more critical services such as health care management. This is why it’s best to derive privacy policies from a strong and constantly evolving knowledge base of best practices, rather than to codify them into laws that, in their failure to foresee innovation, will discourage it.

In the upcoming issue of Harvard Business Review, my colleague Paul Nunes at Accenture’s Institute for High Performance and I are publishing the first of many articles from an on-going research project on what we are calling “Big Bang Disruption.”

The project is looking at the emerging ecosystem for innovation based on disruptive technologies.  It expands on work we have done separately and now together over the last fifteen years.

Our chief finding is that the nature of innovation has changed dramatically, calling into question much of the conventional wisdom on business strategy and competition, especially in information-intensive industries–which is to say, these days, every industry.

The drivers of this new ecosystem are ever-cheaper, faster, and smaller computing devices, cloud-based virtualization, crowdsourced financing, collaborative development and marketing, and the proliferation of mobile everything.  There will soon be more smartphones sold than there are people in the world.  And before long, each of over one trillion items in commerce will be added to the network.

The result is that new innovations now enter the market cheaper, better, and more customizable than products and services they challenge.  (For example, smartphone-based navigation apps versus standalone GPS devices.)  In the strategy literature, such innovation would be characterized as thoroughly “undiscplined.”  It shouldn’t succeed.  But it does.

So when the disruptor arrives and takes off with a bang, often after a series of low-cost, failed experiments, incumbents have no time for a competitive response.  The old rules for dealing with disruptive technologies, most famously from the work of Harvard’s Clayton Christensen, have become counter-productive.   If incumbents haven’t learned to read the new tea leaves ahead of time, it’s game over.

The HBR article doesn’t go into much depth on the policy implications of this new innovation model, but the book we are now writing will.  The answer should be obvious.

This radical new model for product and service introduction underscores the robustness of market behaviors that quickly and efficiently correct many transient examples of dominance, especially in high-tech markets.

As a general rule (though obviously not one without exceptions), the big bang phenomenon further weakens the case for regulatory intervention.  Market dominance is sustainable for ever-shorter periods of time, with little opportunity for incumbents to exploit it.

Quickly and efficiently, a predictable next wave of technology will likely put a quick and definitive end to any “information empires” that have formed from the last generation of technologies.

Or, at the very least, do so more quickly and more cost-effectively than alternative solutions from regulation.  The law, to paraphrase Mark Twain, will still be putting its shoes on while the big bang disruptor has spread halfway around the world.

Unfortunately, much of the contemporary literature on competition policy from legal academics is woefully ignorant of even the conventional wisdom on strategy, not to mention the engineering realities of disruptive technologies already in the market.  Looking at markets solely through the lens of legal theory is, truly, an academic exercise, one with increasingly limited real-world applications.

Indeed, we can think of many examples where legacy regulation actually makes it harder for the incumbents to adapt as quickly as necessary in order to survive the explosive arrival of a big bang disruptor.  But that is a story for another day.

Much more to come.

Related links:

1. “Creating a ‘Politics of Abundance’ to Match Technology Innovation,” Forbes.com.
2. “Why Best Buy is Going out of Business…Gradually,” Forbes.com.
3. “What Makes an Idea a Meme?“, Forbes.com
4. “The Five Most Disruptive Technologies at CES 2013,” Forbes.com

Why do mobile carriers sell phones with a subscription?  My roommate and I were debating this the other night.  Most other popular electronics devices aren’t sold this way.  Cable and satellite companies don’t sell televisions with their video service.  ISPs don’t sell laptops and desktops with their Internet service.  Bundling phones with mobile service subscriptions is pretty unique.  (The only mass-market analogs I can think of are satellite radio and GPS service.)

Why might this be?  Some might think that US carriers need control over the phones sold to their customers because roughly half of US subscribers use GSM phones (AT&T and T-Mobile) and half use CDMA phones (Verizon and Sprint), but that can’t be the reason because GSM is the standard in Europe yet bundling phones with subscriptions occurs.

Some say it occurs because it benefits carriers at the expense of consumers.  A law review article written a few years ago said bundling profitably exploits the misperceptions of consumers and the value they place on mobile services.  Tim Wu has said that selling phones is an anticompetitive response that allows carriers to control the platform and disable features (WiFi, Bluetooth, VoIP) that might eat into the carriers’ existing revenue streams.  But even if that’s true I don’t think that’s the whole answer.  If network services have that much control over the devices used for their services, why don’t cable, satellite, and Internet service providers sell TVs and computers that only work with their service?  At the very least, if we assume, as Wu does, that carrier control removes features consumers really want, consumers could simply purchase phones directly from phone makers–Apple, Motorola, Samsung, LG–with full functionality intact.

I don’t know the best answer, and maybe commenters can chime in, but I suspect phones and contracts are primarily sold together because of the engineering challenges presented by a device using radio spectrum.   (This would explain why GPS and satellite radio service providers also bundle devices with service.)  Different carriers purchase licenses to use different swaths of spectrum, and these different frequencies require different radio receivers.  Phones, then, need to have radios installed that are tailored for the particular carrier.

In any case, throughout most of the world, phones are sold with subscriptions.  Some on the left, like Wu, say that bundling shouldn’t be permitted because it enables large carriers to exclude competitors and remove functionality consumers want.  To that end, he proposes regulations that require all handsets to work with all carriers.  Despite these objections, I’ll push back on the claim that consumers are being duped or that competition is seriously harmed.  Bundling handsets with subscriptions has several pro-competitive and pro-consumer justifications.

1.  Acts as an installment plan

This may be the most powerful reason selling phones with subscriptions is near-universal:  consumers like it.  Modern smartphones are expensive consumer products costing hundreds of dollars.  Wherever you see expensive consumer products (home appliances, furniture, computers, clothes) you find retailers offering installment plans so that consumers don’t have to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars up-front.  By locking consumers into a two-year contract, carriers can offer heavily subsidized advanced handsets–that they usually sell at an initial loss–and charge more for services over two years.

Consumers seem to prefer bundling since it acts as a de facto financing agreement.  Noncontract prepaid plans are offered by every US carrier, yet the vast majority of Americans still use post-paid plans with contracts in large part because the (subsidized) phones offered are so much cheaper and more attractive deals.  (See my prior post on the subject.)  Further evidence that consumers really value this installment plan option comes from Belgium, where bundling phones with subscriptions was illegal years ago.  That all changed in 2008 when the iPhone 3G came out.  Belgians complained about the fact that their iPhones started at €525 when their neighbors, like those in the Netherlands (who allowed bundling), could get a subsidized phone for as little as €1.  Within a year, with support from a competition minister, the law was changed to allow phones to be sold with subscriptions.  Predictably, the up-front costs of Belgian phones subsequently dropped as carriers subsidized the phones, and broadband penetration increased.

2.  Reduces transactions costs for consumers

Consumers also benefit from having a one-stop shop for their mobile needs.  Instead of needing to go to a phone retailer like Best Buy and then to a carrier’s retail store, consumers can get everything at the carrier’s retail store.  This may sound like a small benefit, but I imagine this especially benefits rural Americans who don’t have the retail options city-dwellers do.

3.  Aids carriers’ marketing and improves competition

It’s probable that bundling phones with subscriptions makes carriers more competitive.  There’s a textbook antitrust justification for why this is true.  Vertical contracts with suppliers aligns the interests of the retailer (carrier) with the supplier (phone maker).  DROID is a good example.  It’s a brand used by Verizon to market higher-end Android smartphones to tech-savvy early adopters.  This is a case of vertical restraints that prevent free-riding on Verizon’s brand promotion since no other carrier can offer DROID phones.  By most accounts, creating the DROID brand was a lucrative marketing move that helped Verizon’s Android phones compete with iPhones.  While DROID is probably the most successful example, all carriers have phones they market and sell exclusively.

4.  Improves carriers’ bargaining power with handset makers (and improves phones)

Selling phones with subscriptions allows carriers to strengthen their position in the value chain.  Carriers don’t want to be passive bit-pipes.  They know crushing price competition between carriers would result.  (Not to mention, being “dumb pipes” would make carriers more susceptible to net neutrality rules.)  Carriers are already being squeezed by handset suppliers, namely Apple, with high prices, so it’s to their benefit to make the handsets complementary to a specific network and not easily interoperable with other carriers.  And by selling differentiated handsets to their customers, the carriers demand innovative handsets from suppliers to differentiate their brand from other carriers and make their network ecosystem attractive to consumers.  If phones worked on all networks, a mandate Wu and others seek, each carrier’s demand for innovative phones from their suppliers would subside.  (Then competition would be driven by consumer demands, but it’s my impression that phone makers prefer to deal with carriers.  Responding directly to consumer demands would tend to fragment the hardware market even more than the existing market, which would add to their costs.)

5.  Smooths revenue streams for carriers (and improves networks)

Finally, locking consumers into a two-year contract, with a subsidized phone as a carrot, gives some predictability to carriers’ revenue streams.  Lumpy revenue streams and high churn is a killer for long-term network investment plans.  Without the ability to sell phones with subscriptions, churn rates would be much higher since few customers would want to be in a long contract.

This is what happened in Finland for years, when regulators banned bundling.  After having one of the best networks when cell phones first became popular in the late 1990s, there was intense price competition for voice and text.  And while Finnish prices were low, the investments in a 3G data network fell far behind other countries.  No bundling led to very high churn rates and made price competition–not advanced services like broadband–the focus of carriers.  Seeing that the lack of network investment was brought on by the ban on bundling, the Finnish equivalent of the FCC repealed the anti-bundling law in 2005.  With the new ability to lock customers into contracts, phone prices fell and network investment into mobile broadband improved.

I expect selling phones with subscriptions will continue for the foreseeable future, absent regulation.  And, for the reasons I’ve outlined, the ability to sell phones with subscriptions is likely a good thing for consumers and the industry.

Finally, though, I’ll note that inexpensive high-end smartphones could upset this entire bundling regime.  Cheap phones would mean carriers are less able to lock consumers into contracts.  We’re not there yet, but phones like the LG Nexus 4–an unlocked high-end Android starting at $300–indicates the day may come when consumers can’t be bribed into contracts by subsidized phones any longer.  Consumers, at that point, will prefer to pay full price up-front and have the ability to switch carriers at any time.  I don’t know how the radio engineering issues would be overcome, but this would be a major disruption of the wireless market and would have some ambiguous effects on competition, network investment, and consumers.  And, it’s important to note that we may enter Wu’s desired world of phone interoperability without regulatory mandates.

Earlier today on Twitter, I listed what I thought were the Top 5 “Biggest Internet Policy Issues of 2012.” In case you don’t follow me on Twitter — and shame on you if you don’t! — here were my choices:

1. Copyright wars reinvigorated post-SOPA; tide starting to turn in favor of copyright reform. [TLF posts on copyright.]
2. Privacy still red-hot w ECPA reform, online advertising regs & kids’ privacy issues all pending. [TLF posts on privacy.]
3. WCIT makes Internet governance / NetFreedom a major issue worldwide. [TLF posts on Net governance.]
4. Antitrust threat looms larger w pending Google case + Apple books investigation. [TLF posts on antitrust.]
5. Cybersecurity regulatory push continues in both legislative (CISPA) & executive branch. [TLF posts on cybersecurity.]

Lists like these are entirely subjective, of course, but I am basing my list on the general amount of chatter I tended to see and hear about each topic over the course of the year.

What do you think the top tech policy issues of the year were?

My most recent Forbes column is entitled, “We All Hate Advertising, But We Can’t Live Without It.” It’s my attempt to briefly (a) defend the role advertising has traditionally played in sustaining news, entertainment, and online service, and (b) discuss some possible alternatives to advertising that could be tapped if advertising starts failing us a media cross-subsidy.

What got me thinking about this issue again was the controversy over satellite video operator DISH Network offering its customers a new “Auto Hop” capability for its Hopper whole-home HD DVR system. Auto Hop will give viewers the ability to automatically skip over commercials for most recorded prime time programs shown on ABC, CBS, FOX and NBC when viewed the day after airing. It makes the viewing experience feel like the ultimate free lunch. Alas, something still must pay the bills. As innovative as that technology is, we can be certain that it will not make content consumption cost-free. We’ll just pay the price in some other way. The same is true for online services since it’s never been easier to use technology to block ads.

So, what is going to pay the bills for content as ad-skipping becomes increasingly automated and effortless? Stated differently, what are the other possible methods of picking up the tab for content creation? Here’s a rough taxonomy:

I.     CHARGES

A.     Direct Fees (Periodic billing / Pay-per-view)

B.    Indirect Charges (Tiers / Bundles / Package pricing)

II.     ADVERTISING

A.    General / Mass market ads (Billboards / Banner ads / Pop-up online ads)

B.     Targeted ads (Directed pitch)

C.     Integrated (Product placement / Payola)

D.     Sponsorship / Underwriting

III.     PHILANTHROPIC

A.     Individual  (ex: Arts & opera funding)

B.     Foundational (ex: Knight Foundation)

C.     Governmental  (ex: CPB / BBC model)

IV.     INTERNAL CROSS-SUBSIDY  (Profitable division subsidizes unprofitable / “loss leader” strategies)

There are probably other ways of subsidizing content creation, but those are the primary methods. I have no idea what combination of strategies will sustain content going forward, but I think advertising is likely to play a diminished role in the mix as it becomes increasingly easy for us to filter it out of the mix. But the content creators will just shift costs elsewhere and raise the prices for programming through direct and indirect pricing techniques. Do you like HBO’s pricing model? Pay-per-view? Paywalls? Well, it doesn’t make a difference whether you do or not because you’ll likely be seeing a lot more of those models in your life in coming years if advertising fades as a subsidization method.

Alternatively, as I also note in my Forbes piece, “we could see a lot more Texaco Star Theaters in our future, with major companies essentially owning specific shows or networks.” Such program sponsorship and content underwriting has always been with it, but it could really explode as a cross-subsidy method if traditional advertising starts failing. “But it will be challenging for every show or website to find its own corporate benefactor, and it will also raise issues about undue influence and bias,” I note in my essay.

I hope no one seriously believes that philanthropic models can fill the gaps. Even if we saw a significant uptick in voluntary charitable giving or even taxpayer support for the arts and media, there’s no way in hell it will possibly begin to cover the the bill for what advertising support covers today.

In the end, I can’t help but think how great we’ve had it when it comes to advertising. As I also noted in my essay, advertising has been “the great subsidizer of the press, entertainment, and online services” historically and benefited us tremendously even if we haven’t appreciated that fact. “It’s possible that no single industry — not newspapers nor search engines nor anything else — has done as much to advance the storehouse of accessible human knowledge in the 20th century as advertisers,” argues Washington Post columnist Ezra Klein. Klein is exactly right, yet it doesn’t really make a difference how important advertising has been to us if we fail to appreciate that fact and increasingly take steps to exclude it from our lives.

As that becomes easier and easier to accomplish, we shouldn’t bitch and whine when the bills (literally) come due for the content we all desire. As always, there is no free lunch. We’ll pay the price one way or another.

Additional Reading:

• my recent Charleston Law Review article on “Advertising, Commercial Speech & First Amendment Parity”
• Ezra Klein on the Importance of Advertising to Media
• The Hidden Benefactor: How Advertising Informs, Educates & Benefits Consumers
• There is No Free Lunch! No Advertising, No Media
• PFF’s Mega-Filing in the FCC’s “Future of Media” Proceeding

Reason.org has just posted my commentary on the five reasons why Federal Trade Commission’s proposals to regulate the collection and use of consumer information on the Web will do more harm than good.

As I note, the digital economy runs on information. Any regulations that impede the collection and processing of any information will affect its efficiency. Given the overall success of the Web and the popularity of search and social media, there’s every reason to believe that consumers have been able to balance their demand for content, entertainment and information services with the privacy policies these services have.

But there’s more to it than that. Technology simply doesn’t lend itself to the top-down mandates. Notions of privacy are highly subjective. Online, there is an adaptive dynamic constantly at work. Certainly web sites have pushed the boundaries of privacy sometimes. But only when the boundaries are tested do we find out where the consensus lies.

Legislative and regulatory directives pre-empt experimentation. Consumer needs are best addressed when best practices are allowed to bubble up through trial-and-error. When the economic and functional development of European Web media, which labors under the sweeping top-down European Union Privacy Directive, is contrasted with the dynamism of the U.S. Web media sector which has been relatively free of privacy regulation – the difference is profound.

An analysis of the web advertising market undertaken by researchers at the University of Toronto found that after the Privacy Directive was passed, online advertising effectiveness decreased on average by around 65 percent in Europe relative to the rest of the world. Even when the researchers controlled for possible differences in ad responsiveness and between Europeans and Americans, this disparity manifested itself. The authors go on to conclude that these findings will have a “striking impact” on the $8 billion spent each year on digital advertising: namely that European sites will see far less ad revenue than counterparts outside Europe.

Other points I explore in the commentary are:

• How free services go away and paywalls go up
• How consumers push back when they perceive that their privacy is being violated
• How Web advertising lives or dies by the willingness of consumers to participate
• How greater information availability is a social good

The full commentary can be found here.

Six months may not seem a great deal of time in the general business world, but in the Internet space it’s a lifetime as new websites, tools and features are introduced every day that change where and how users get and share information. The rise of Facebook is a great example: the social networking platform that didn’t exist in early 2004 filed paperwork last month to launch what is expected to be one of the largest IPOs in history. To put it in perspective, Ford Motor went public nearly forty years after it was founded.

This incredible pace of innovation is seen throughout the Internet, and since Google’s public disclosure of its Federal Trade Commission antitrust investigation just this past June, there have been many dynamic changes to the landscape of the Internet Search market. And as the needs and expectations of consumers continue to evolve, Internet search must adapt – and quickly – to shifting demand.

One noteworthy development was the release of Siri by Apple, which was introduced to the world in late 2011 on the most recent iPhone. Today, many consider it the best voice recognition application in history, but its potential really lies in its ability revolutionize the way we search the Internet, answer questions and consume information. As Eric Jackson of Forbes noted, in the future it may even be a “Google killer.”

Of this we can be certain: Siri is the latest (though certainly not the last) game changer in Internet search, and it has certainly begun to change people’s expectations about both the process and the results of search. The search box, once needed to connect us with information on the web, is dead or dying. In its place is an application that feels intuitive and personal. Siri has become a near-indispensible entry point, and search engines are merely the back-end. And while a new feature, Siri’s expansion is inevitable. In fact, it is rumored that Apple is diligently working on Siri-enabled televisions – an entirely new market for the company.

The past six months have also brought the convergence of social media and search engines, as first Bing and more recently Google have incorporated information from a social network into their search results. Again we see technology adapting and responding to the once-unimagined way individuals find, analyze and accept information. Instead of relying on traditional, mechanical search results and the opinions of strangers, this new convergence allows users to find data and receive input directly from people in their social world, offering results curated by friends and associates.

As Social networks become more integrated with the Internet at large, reviews from trusted contacts will continue to change the way that users search for information. As David Worlock put it in a post titled, “Decline and Fall of the Google Empire,” “Facebook and its successors become the consumer research environment. Search by asking someone you know, or at least have a connection with, and get recommendations and references which take you right to the place where you buy.” The addition of social data to search results lends a layer of novel, trusted data to users’ results. Search Engine Land’s Danny Sullivan agreed writing, “The new system will perhaps make life much easier for some people, allowing them to find both privately shared content from friends and family plus material from across the web through a single search, rather than having to search twice using two different systems.”It only makes sense, from a competition perspective, that Google followed suit and recently merged its social and search data in an effort to make search more relevant and personal.

Inevitably, a host of Google’s critics and competitors has cried foul. In fact, as Google has adapted and evolved from its original template to offer users not only links to URLs but also maps, flight information, product pages, videos and now social media inputs, it has met with a curious resistance at every turn. And, indeed, judged against a world in which Internet search is limited to “ten blue links,” with actual content – answers to questions – residing outside of Google’s purview, it has significantly expanded its reach and brought itself (and its large user base) into direct competition with a host of new entities.

But the worldview that judges these adaptations as unwarranted extensions of Google’s platform from its initial baseline, itself merely a function of the relatively limited technology and nascent consumer demand present at the firm’s inception, is dangerously crabbed. By challenging Google’s evolution as “leveraging its dominance” into new and distinct markets, rather than celebrating its efforts (and those of Apple, Bing and Facebook, for that matter) to offer richer, more-responsive and varied forms of information, this view denies the essential reality of technological evolution and exalts outdated technology and outmoded business practices.

And while Google’s forays into the protected realms of others’ business models grab the headlines, it is also feverishly working to adapt its core technology, as well, most recently (and ambitiously) with its “Google Knowledge Graph” project, aimed squarely at transforming the algorithmic guts of its core search function into something more intelligent and refined than its current word-based index permits. In concept, this is, in fact, no different than its efforts to bootstrap social network data into its current structure: Both are efforts to improve on the mechanical process built on Google’s PageRank technology to offer more relevant search results informed by a better understanding of the mercurial way people actually think.

Expanding consumer welfare requires that Google, like its ever-shifting roster of competitors, must be able to keep up with the pace and the unanticipated twists and turns of innovation. As The Economist recently said, “Kodak was the Google of its day,” and the analogy is decidedly apt. Without the drive or ability to evolve and reinvent itself, its products and its business model, Kodak has fallen to its competitors in the marketplace. Once revered as a powerhouse of technological innovation for most of its history, Kodak now faces bankruptcy because it failed to adapt to its own success. Having invented the digital camera, Kodak radically altered the very definition of its market. But by hewing to its own metaphorical ten blue links – traditional film – instead of understanding that consumer photography had come to mean something dramatically different, Kodak consigned itself to failure.

Like Kodak and every other technology company before it, Google must be willing and able to adapt and evolve; just as for Lewis Carol’s Red Queen, “here it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.” Neither consumers nor firms are well served by regulatory policy informed by nostalgia. Even more so than Kodak, Google confronts a near-constantly evolving marketplace and fierce competition from unanticipated quarters. If regulators force it to stop running, the market will simply pass it by.

[Cross posted at Forbes]

On Forbes today, I look at the phenomenon of memes in the legal and economic context, using my now notorious “Best Buy” post as an example. Along the way, I talk antitrust, copyright, trademark, network effects, Robert Metcalfe and Ronald Coase.

It’s now been a month and a half since I wrote that electronics retailer Best Buy was going out of business…gradually.  The post, a preview of an article and future book that I’ve been researching on-and-off for the last year, continues to have a life of its own.

Commentary about the post has appeared in online and offline publications, including The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, TechCrunch, Slashdot, MetaFilter, Reddit, The Huffington Post, The Motley Fool, and CNN. Some of these articles generated hundreds of user comments, in addition to those that appeared here at Forbes.

(I was also interviewed by a variety of news sources, including TechCrunch’s Andrew Keen.)

Today, the original post hit another milestone, passing 2.9 million page views.

Watching the article move through the Internet, I’ve gotten a first-hand lesson in how network effects can generate real value.

Network effects are an economic principle that suggests certain goods and services experience increasing returns to scale.  That means the more users a particular product or service has, the more valuable the product becomes and the more rapidly its overall value increases.  A barrel of oil, like many commodity goods, does not experience network effects – only one person can own it at a time, and once it’s been burned, it’s gone.

In sharp contrast, the value of networked goods increase in value as they are consumed.  Indeed, the more they are used, the faster the increase–generating a kind of momentum or gravitational pull.  As Robert Metcalfe, founder of 3Com and co-inventor of Ethernet explained it, the value of a network can be plotted as the square of the number of connected users or devices—a curve that approaches infinity until most everything that can be connected already is.  George Gilder called that formula “Metcalfe’s Law.”

Since information can be used simultaneously by everyone and never gets used up, nearly all information products can be the beneficiaries of network effects.  Standards are the obvious example.  TCP/IP, the basic protocol that governs interactions between computers connected to the Internet, started out humbly as an information exchange standard for government and research university users.  But in part because it was non-proprietary and therefore free for anyone to use without permission or licensing fees, it spread from public to private sector users, slowly at first but over time at accelerating rates.

Gradually, then suddenly, TCP/IP became, in effect, a least common denominator standard by which otherwise incompatible systems could share information.  As momentum grew, TCP/IP and related protocols overtook and replaced better-marketed and more robust standards, including IBM’s SNA and DEC’s DECnet.  These proprietary standards, artificially limited to the devices of a particular manufacturer, couldn’t spread as quickly or as smoothly as TCP/IP.

From computing applications, Internet standards spread even faster, taking over switched telephone networks (Voice over IP), television (over-the-top services such as YouTube and Hulu), radio (Pandora, Spotify)—you name it.

Today the TCP/IP family of protocols, still free-of-charge, is the de facto global standard for information exchange, the lynchpin of the Internet revolution.  The standards continue to improve, thanks to the largely-voluntary efforts of The Internet Society and its virtual engineering task forces.  They’re the best example I know of network effects in action, and they’ve created both a platform and a blueprint for other networked goods that make use of the standards.

Beyond standards, network effects are natural features of other information products including software.  Since the marginal cost of a copy is low (essentially free in the post-media days of Web-based distribution and cloud services), establishing market share can happen at relatively low cost.  Once a piece of software—Microsoft Windows, AOL instant messenger in the old days, Facebook and Twitter more recently—starts ramping up the curve, it gains considerable momentum, which may be all it takes to beat out a rival or displace an older leader.  At saturation, a software product becomes, in essence, the standard.

From a legal standpoint, unfortunately, market saturation begins to resemble an illegal monopoly, especially when viewed through the lens of industrial age ideas about markets and competition.  (That, of course, is the lens that even 21 ^st century regulators still use.)  But what legal academics, notably Columbia’s Tim Wu, misunderstand about this phenomenon is that such products have a relatively short life-cycle of dominating.  These “information empires,” as Wu calls them, are short-lived, but not, as Wu argues, because regulators cut them down.

Even without government intervention, information products are replaced at accelerating speeds by new disruptors relying on new (or greatly improved) technologies, themselves the beneficiaries of network effects.  The actual need for legal intervention is rare.  Panicked interference with the natural cycle, on the other hand, results in unintended consequences that damage emerging markets rather than correcting them.  Distracted by lingering antitrust battles at home and abroad, Microsoft lost momentum in the last decade.  No consumer benefited from that “remedy.”

For more, see “What Makes an Idea a Meme?” on Forbes.

[Cross-posted at Reason.org]

This week Google announced that it is grouping 60 of its Web services, such as Gmail, the Google+ social network, YouTube and Google Calendar, under a single privacy policy that would allow the company to share user data between any of those services. These changes will be effective March 1.

Although we have yet to see it play out in practice, this likely means that if you use Google services, the videos you play on YouTube may automatically be posted to your Google+ page. If you’ve logged an appointment in your Google calendar, Google may correlate the appointment time with your current location and local traffic conditions and send you an email advising you that you risk being late.

At the same time, if you’ve called in sick with the intention of going fishing, that visit to the nearby state park might show up your Google+ page, too.

The policy, however, will not include Google’s search engine, Google’s Chrome web browser, Google Wallet or Google Books.

The decision quickly touched off discussion as to whether Google was pushing the collection and manipulation too far. The Federal Trade Commission is already on its back over data sharing and web tracking. With this latest decision, although it’s not that far from how Facebook, Hotmail and Foursquare work, just more streamlined, Google, some say, is all but flouting user and regulatory concerns.

But let’s not rush to condemn this move. I, for one, want to see what happens because Google is boldly putting the privacy paradox to the test.

Going by my own Google search, the term “privacy paradox” has been kicked around for almost ten years. Boiled down, it describes the repeated finding that while individuals express a high degree of concern for privacy protection online, few, in practice, take advantage of privacy safeguards when they are offered.

This apparent contradictory behavior has been noted in a number of studies, including a noted 2007 paper in the Journal of Consumer Affairs.  A 2005 Pew Internet Study, cited at the time by Forbes, found that that 54 percent believe that Web sites invade their privacy when they track behavior. But the same study showed that 64 percent were willing to give up personal information to get access to a Web site.

In the marketplace, when search engines like Google began facing vocal pushback from users and regulators on its tracking of user search histories, one of Google’s competitors, Ask.com, tried to differentiate itself by unveiling AskEraser. Just like it sounds, the tool allows users to opt out of search tracking. As Forbes reported, users shrugged and AskEraser did nothing for Ask’s market share, while Google’s continued to grow.

Contrary to the first hysterical media reports, Google is not recording your whole digital life. There indeed is an opt-out: you don’t have to be part of the Google service ecosystem, which is far from the only game in town. Remember, browsing and search are outside this program. Everything else is available from other sources. Moreover, data is only shared if you’re logged in under your Google username. Otherwise you can look at all the YouTube videos and Google maps you want without anyone being the wiser.

I’ll admit the biggest outcry may come over the policy with regard to Android phones. Since you’re technically logged into your phone all the time, it seems tougher to opt out. But there are other devices aside from Android, even from Verizon, so consumer will have alternatives without having to change service providers. Nonetheless, given the popularity of the combination of mobility and social networking, seen not only in Google and Facebook, but in Twitter, Yelp! and Foursquare, it is arguable that a majority of users are not as concerned about their privacy as advocates of more restrictive regulations believe.

And arguable is the operative word. There indeed may be enough significant user backlash that Google backs off. In the last six months we’ve seen at least two instances of rapid market correction–Netflix’s decision not to go through with structurally separating mail and online video rental accounts and Bank of America’s reversal of its plan to charge online banking fees. Both occurred before the government could step in a provide its own (and no doubt clumsy) remedy.

Then again, there’s a significant body of research that suggests that, in spite of their own complaints, users may opt to accept greater benefits and convenience in exchange for more disclosure about their habits. With this mind, it will serve consumers best if companies like Google are allowed to experiment with the privacy paradox to find where actual boundaries are, rather than hamstringing potential innovation by pre-emptively and blindly setting them.

[Cross posted from TechFreedom]

Today, the Digital Advertising Alliance, a group of leading digital ad agencies and online ad networks, unveiled a campaign to bring attention to AdChoices, its icon-based system allowing users to opt-out of behavioral advertising. The following statement can be attributed to Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom:

In the 1990s, Congress tried and failed to regulate Internet content. Instead, the courts have required an approach grounded in user empowerment, education and enforcement of existing laws against fraud and deception. Today, we’re seeing the the advertising industry build on this approach for consumer protection on privacy. The AdChoices campaign launched last summer empowers consumers to make their own choices on privacy. The ad campaign launched today educates consumers on how to use this tool. The Digital Advertising Alliance has promised to enforce industry’s principles. Consumer advocates should hold them to that promise. It’s also fair to insist that empowerment and education improve over time. But today, for once, let’s give the ad industry credit for doing the right thing.

I thought Todd Zywicki, a senior scholar with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, did a nice job on Judge Napolitano’s “Freedom Watch” show addressing the contentious question of whether government should be regulating food advertising in order to somehow make American kids healthier. Todd pointed out how the advertising guidelines currently being developed are anything but “voluntary” and noted that there are many causes of childhood obesity. Watch the clip here:

Importantly, Todd also notes that there are First Amendment issues in play here. Commercial free speech is not completely without constitutional protection, as I noted in my recent Charleston Law Review article on “Advertising, Commercial Speech & First Amendment Parity.”

Finally, as we always note here about regulation generally — especially restrictions on advertising — there is no free lunch (excuse the pun in this case!). Advertising has traditionally been the great subsidizer of media and information in America. It has also kept competitors on their toes and kept prices in check.  These benefits are lost when we regulate advertising. So, while some nanny state-ers would like to convince us that they simply have the best interests of our kids in mind, the reality is that the regulations they favor will likely drive up costs for families and limit their choices of both products and media platforms, both of which are subsidized by advertising.

Washington Post columnist Ezra Klein had a terrific column yesterday (Human Knowledge, Brought to You By…) on one of my favorite subjects: how advertising is the great subsidizer of the press, media, content, and online services.  Klein correctly notes that “our informational commons, or what we think of as our informational commons, is, for the most part, built atop a latticework of advertising platforms. In that way,” he continues, “it’s possible that no single industry — not newspapers nor search engines nor anything else — has done as much to advance the storehouse of accessible human knowledge in the 20th century as advertisers. They didn’t do it because they are philanthropists, and they didn’t do it because they love information. But they did it nevertheless.”

Quite right. As I noted in my recent Charleston Law Review article on “Advertising, Commercial Speech & First Amendment Parity,” media economists have found that advertising has traditionally provided about 70% to 80% of support for newspapers and magazines, and advertising / underwriting has entirely paid for broadcast TV and radio media. And it goes without saying that advertising has been an essential growth engine for online sites and services. How is it that we’re not required to pay per search, or pay for most online news services, or shell out $19.95 a month for LinkedIn, Facebook, or other social media services? The answer, of course, is advertising.  Thus, Klein notes, while “we see [] advertising as a distraction… without the advertising, the information wouldn’t exist. So the history of information, in the United States at least, is the history of platforms that could support advertising.”

And the sustaining power of advertising for new media continues to grow. As I noted in my law review article:

Advertising is proving increasingly to be the only media industry business model with any real staying power for many commercial media and information-producing sectors. Pay-per-view mechanisms, micropayments, and even subscription-based business models are all languishing.  Consequently, the overall health of modern media marketplace and the digital economy—and the aggregate amount of information and speech that can be produced or supported by those sectors—is fundamentally tied up with the question of whether policymakers allow the advertising marketplace to evolve in an efficient, dynamic fashion. In this sense, it is not hyperbole to say that an attack on advertising is tantamount to an attack on media itself.

In this sense, I would have liked to seen Klein connect the dots between recent privacy-related legislative and regulatory proposals and the long-term health of online communities and services. As several of us here at the TLF have noted too many times to mention, there is no free lunch. What powers the “free” Internet are data collection and advertising. In essence, the relationship between consumers and online content and service providers isn’t governed by any formal contract, but rather by an unwritten quid pro quo: tolerate some ads or we’ll be forced to charge you for service.  Most consumers gladly take that deal—even if many of them gripe about annoying or intrusive ads, at times.

If new privacy regulations break this quid pro quo, there will be consequences. Namely, there will likely be costs in the form of prices for sites and services that relied on more targeted forms of advertising. Of course, we can hope and pray that older, more “spammy” forms of advertising (think big banner ads and pop-ups) can fill the gap and continue to sustain the online ecosystem, but it’s a big gamble. Thus, I wish Klein would have pointed out that online advertising is currently under attack in both the legislative and regulatory arena and that, if new privacy mandates are put on the books, then (a) consumers should not be surprised if they have to pay more, and/or (b) we shouldn’t be surprised to get less of those media and communications platforms and services in the future.

Regardless, kudos to Ezra Klein for being willing to so eloquently defend advertising’s essential role as the great sustainer of media and information in America. Please do read his entire essay. Truly outstanding.

Additional Reading:

• Adam Thierer, “op-ed: “Privacy Regulation and the ‘Free’ Internet”
• Adam Thierer, Berin Szoka, and W. Kenneth Ferree, Comments of the Progress & Freedom Foundation in the Matter of the Federal Communications Commission’s Examination of the Future of Media and Information Needs of Communities In a Digital Age, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, May 5, 2010, 28-38.
• Adam Thierer, Public Interest Comment on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, February 18, 2011).
• Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress Snapshot 4.19, Sept. 2008.
• Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading? Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point 16.2, June 2009.

Charleston Law Review Essay on Advertising and the First Amendment [PDF]

[Cross-posted at Reason.org]

One of the more critically praised films this year has been Shame, which has been in limited release around the country since December.  Although it’s an independent production, the film is being distributed by 20th Century Fox, a major studio, and stars Michael Fassbender, an actor who appears to be in the middle of his breakout moment.

The film is also rated NC-17.

Until recently, the Motion Picture Association of America’s NC-17 rating, which restricts admission to theatergoers 18 and older, was the box office kiss of death. Not only did NC-17 carry the notoriety of its predecessor, the X rating, it seriously hampered a film’s marketing. Boys Don’t Cry, The Cooler and Clerks are among the well-known examples of acclaimed films that were cut to win the more commercially acceptable R rating, in spite of protest from their filmmakers and actors that the cuts diminished the power and the point of the scenes in question.

But most newspapers and local TV stations won’t carry ads for NC-17 movies. Some theater chains, such as Cinemark, won’t exhibit them. Major retailers like Wal-Mart nor video rental chains like Blockbuster won’t stock NC-17-rated DVDs.

In Hollywood, art and commerce have always been in tense balance. That balance may shifting as the Web becomes a larger factor in advertising. For example, a newspaper’s policy against advertising NC-17 movies is meaningless if a theater chain no longer uses newspaper advertising at all. AMC, the second biggest chain in the country, has been cutting back on print advertising since 2009. Last June, the company documented its shift from print to Web in a quarterly filing with the SEC. Regal Entertainment Group, another chain, reportedly is following suit.

Meanwhile, consumers are buying and renting fewer DVDs from brick-and-mortar outfits, choosing to buy or rent online or simply watch on demand. Netflix, for example, makes Lust, Caution, a 2007 NC-17 feature directed by Academy Award winner Ang Lee, available both by mail and streaming.

Film promotion and advertising is a great example of the way the Web has become a significant marketing vehicle. Shame, albeit a grim, downbeat story of a sex addict and his troubled sister, not only opened to favorable reviews, it had one of the most impressive box office debuts for an NC-17 movie, averaging $36,118 per screen in a tight release in ten theaters in six cities the weekend of Dec. 2-4. By comparison, that weekend’s box office leader, Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn Part 1, averaged just $4,087 per screen. The Muppets, second place in total gross, averaged $3,222.

Now in wider release, Shame has made $2 million as of Jan. 3, and currently ranks eighth among the 26 NC-17 films released since 1990.

As for Web-based marketing, Shame has its own site at FoxSearchlight.com. Shame has a fan page on Facebook. “Shame” delivers several movie-related links on the first page of a Google search, pretty impressive when you consider the title is a fairly common keyword (somewhere John Bradshaw’s eating his heart out).

You can find trailers for Shame at iTunes and Internet Movie Database (imdb.com), both mainstream sites for film previews. You don’t have to look too hard to find the “red band” trailer, which is played in theaters only in front of R-rated movies. Studios and exhibitors also can reach audiences through sites like Yahoo and Flixster, as well as through social networking, email and Twitter. These alternatives counter the limitations of advertising policies of old media.

They also decrease the clout of the MPAA Ratings Board, which has been accused of ratings bias against smaller, independent features aimed at adult audiences. Probably the best evidence of this is presented in the documentary This Film is Not Been Rated. Well aware that an NC-17 rating can kill a film at the box office, the ratings board has not been adverse to using it as a club to tone down films which its members subjectively find either morally or tastefully questionable.

While the shortcomings of the MPAA’s rating system have been discussed at length in many forums, I’ve always thought the most unfortunate aspect was that the MPAA never tried to counter the stigma of NC-17 as meaning “dirty movie.” Unlike the Electronic Entertainment Software Association, which devised the MA AO rating for video games while successfully communicating that the market can—and should—accommodate products designed exclusively for adults, the MPAA never tried to engage the media outlets, retailers and video rental companies that openly equated NC-17 with porn.

That Web-based marketing can chip away at this perception will prove much better for audiences and filmmakers. Most NC-17 movies are not aimed at mainstream moviegoers anyway. If Shame continues to find its audience—and draws more attention in the form of several Academy Award nominations, which many critics believe it will—studios may be less inclined to make compromising cuts on the MPAA’s whim out of fear of losing box office revenues. And this means a little more weight on the “art” side of art-commerce balance.

I spoke at the MSU/Quello Center’s “Governance of Social Media” workshop on November 11.  My talk runs 21 minutes and starts at 1:16:54 in this video. The Q&A begins at 1:41:00.

My presentation follows below.

<iframe src="https://docs.google.com/present/embed?id=ddj47dk6_61fb8npzcz&size=m" frameborder="0" width="555" height="451"></iframe>

Downloadable slides (PDF)

Come hear the other side of the privacy debate! Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) will lead a discussion among policy experts united by a desire to address demonstrated dangers of data abuse without giving up the value created by data as the vital currency of the digital economy. The Roundtable  is Wednesday, September 14, 8-9:30 am in Congressional Visitors Center Meeting Room North, CVC 268:

The roundtable discussion will cover online privacy issues in anticipation of the final reports to be released this fall by the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission. Invited participants will consider questions and policy issues related to the value of data, where government should or shouldn’t be involved in regulating online privacy, and alternatives to government regulation. Congressman Blackburn, a member of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and vice chair of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, pledged to conduct a national series of tech industry roundtables in a speech to the Telecommunications Industry Association earlier this year. Her first roundtable was held in late June at the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s new online advertising community center in New York City. Congressman Blackburn also recently wrote an op-ed titled “The FTC’s Internet Kill Switch” that addresses why any proposed privacy regulation must consider the costs of diminished competition and innovation.

I shared my thoughts on Rep. Blackburn’s healthy skepticism of regulation in a CNET editorial in June: On Online Privacy and Avoiding overregulation. The TLF’s Ryan Radia (Competitive Enterprise Institute), Jim Harper (Cato), Larry Downes and I (both TechFreedom) will be there.  Joining us will be Howard Beales (George Washington University School of Business), Daniel Castro (Information Technology and Innovation Foundation), Harold Furchgott-Roth (Hudson’s Center for Economics of the Internet), Tom Lenard (Technology Policy Institute) and Randy May (Free State Foundation)/

For CNET this morning, I offer five crucial corrections to the Protect IP Act, which was passed out of committee in the Senate back in May.

Yesterday, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, co-chair of the Congressional Internet Caucus, told a Silicon Valley audience that the House was working on its own version and would introduce it in the next few weeks.

Protect IP would extend efforts to combat copyright infringement and trademark abuse online, especially by websites registered outside the U.S.

Since Goodlatte promised the new bill would be “quite different” from the Senate version, I thought it a good time to get out my red pen and start crossing off the worst mistakes in policy and in drafting in Protect IP.

The full details are in the article, but in brief, here’s what I hope the House does in its version:

1. Drop provisions that tamper with the DNS system in an effort to block U.S. access to banned sites.
2. Drop provisions that tamper with search engines, indices, and any other linkage to banned sites.
3. Remove a private right of action that would allow copyright and trademark holders to obtain court orders banning ad networks and financial transaction processors from doing business with banned sites.
4. Scale back current enforcement abuses by the Department of Homeland Security under the existing PRO-IP Act of 2008.
5. Focus the vague and overinclusive definition of the kind of websites that can be banned, limiting it to truly criminal enterprises.

As I’ve written elsewhere, the Senate version was in some ways even worse than last year’s COICA bill.  It imposes significant costs on innocent Internet users, and would do so with no corresponding benefits to anyone, including rightsholders.

The best thing the House could do would be to ignore this dud and work instead on reforming the broken copyright system.  That would do the most to correct the imbalance in endless copyrights and a shrinking public domain, eliminating much of the incentive for infringement that exists today.

But short of that, I hope at least that the most dangerous provisions are removed.

Vivek Wadhwa, who is affiliated with Harvard Law School and is director of research at Duke University’s Center for Entrepreneurship, has a terrific column in today’s Washington Post warning of the dangers of government trying to micromanage high-tech innovation and the Digital Economy from above.

For reasons I have never been able to understand, the Washington Post uses different headlines for its online opeds versus its print edition. That’s a shame, because while I like the online title of Wadhwa’s essay, “Uncle Sam’s Choke-Hold on Innovation,” the title in the print edition is better: “Google, Twitter and the Best Regulator.” By “best regulator” Wadhwa means the marketplace, and this is a point we have hammered on here at the TLF relentlessly: Contrary to what some critics suggest, the best regulator of “market power” is the market itself because of the way it punishes firms that get lethargic, anti-innovative, or just plain cocky. Wadhwa notes:

The technology sector moves so quickly that when a company becomes obsessed with defending and abusing its dominant market position, countervailing forces cause it to get left behind. Consider: The FTC spent years investigating IBM and Microsoft’s anti-competitive practices, yet it wasn’t government that saved the day; their monopolies became irrelevant because both companies could not keep pace with rapid changes in technology — changes the rest of the industry embraced. The personal-computer revolution did IBM in; Microsoft’s Waterloo was the Internet. This — not punishment from Uncle Sam — is the real threat to Google and Twitter if they behave as IBM and Microsoft did in their heydays.

Quite right. I’ve discussed the Microsoft and IBM antitrust sagas many times here before. In particular, see my 2009 review of Gary Reback’s book on antitrust and high-tech and my recent essay on “Libertarianism & Antitrust: A Brief Comment.” I’ve also commented on the FTC’s look at Twitter and Google in my recent essays, “Twitter, the Monopolist? Is this Tim Wu’s “Threat Regime” In Action?” and “The Question of Remedies in a Google Antitrust Case.”

The crucial points I have tried to get across in these essays, as well as all my essays countering the modern cyber-progressives,” is that high-tech market power concerns are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting market or “code failure” comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those responses, especially in markets built upon bits instead of atoms.

That’s why Wadhwa’s insight — that “the technology sector moves so quickly that when a company becomes obsessed with defending and abusing its dominant market position, countervailing forces cause it to get left behind” — is so cogent. We’re not talking about markets like steel and corn here. Things move much, much more quickly when bits and code and are the foundations of what Tim Wu calls “information empires.” There’s no doubt that some companies will gain scale and even “power” quickly in our new Digital Economy, but they can also lose it in the blink of an eye.

The best modern example that I’ve documented here before is AOL. It’s easy to forget now, but just a short decade ago, academics and regulators were in a tizzy over Big Bad AOL. And why not? After all, 25 million subscribers were willing to pay $20 per month to get a guided tour of AOL’s walled garden version of the Internet.  And then AOL and Time Warner announced a historic mega-merger that had some predicting the rise of “new totalitarianisms” and corporate “Big Brother.”

But the deal quickly went off the rails. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss. By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion. By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.  In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!  In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service and then to spin off AOL entirely.  Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade.” The formal divorce between the two firms took place in 2008. Further deconsolidation followed for Time Warner, which spun off its cable TV unit and various other properties.

Meanwhile, AOL has lost its old dial-up business and walled garden empire and is still struggling to reinvent itself as an advertising company. It’s about the last company on anybody’s lips when we talk about tech titans today. What an epic tale of creative destruction! That all happened is less than 10 years! And yet, again, a decade ago, tech pundits and cyberlaw intellectuals like Larry Lessig were penning entire books about the ominous threat posed by the AOL walled garden model of Internet governance.

Lessig’s myopia was based on an inherent techno-pessimism I have discussed and critiqued in my Next Digital Decade book chapter, “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters.” Countless Ivory Tower cyber-academics today adopt a static view of markets and market problems. This “static snapshot” crowd gets so worked up about short term spells of “market power” – which usually don’t represent serious market power at all – that they call for the reordering of markets to suit their tastes.  Sadly, they sometimes do this under the banner of “Internet freedom,” claiming that techno-cratic elites can “free” consumers from the supposed tyranny of the marketplace.

In reality, that vision wraps markets in chains and ultimately leaves consumers worse off by stifling innovation and inviting in ham-handed regulatory edicts and bureaucracies to plan this fast-paced sector of our economy. Importantly, that vision ignores the deadweight losses associated with expanding government red tape and bureaucracy as well as the very real danger of “regulatory capture” that exists anytime Washington decides to get cozy with a major sector of the economy.

As Wadhwa correctly concludes, “Government has no place in this technology jungle.” I wish other academics and tech pundits would heed that warning.

It might be tempting to laugh at France’s ban on words like “Facebook” and Twitter” in the media. France’s Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel recently ruled that specific references to these sites (in stories not about them) would violate a 1992 law banning “secret” advertising. The council was created in 1989 to ensure fairness in French audiovisual communications, such as in allocation of television time to political candidates, and to protect children from some types of programming.

Sure, laugh at the French. But not for too long. The United States has similarly busy-bodied regulators, who, for example, have primly regulated such advertising themselves. American regulators carefully oversee non-secret advertising, too. Our government nannies equal the French in usurping parents’ decisions about children’s access to media. And the Federal Communications Commission endlessly plays footsie with speech regulation.

In the United States, banning words seems too blatant an affront to our First Amendment, but the United States has a fairly lively “English only” movement. Somehow, regulating an entire communications protocol doesn’t have the same censorious stink.

So it is that our Federal Communications Commission asserts a right to regulate the delivery of Internet service. The protocols on which the Internet runs are communications protocols, remember. Withdraw private control of them and you’ve got a more thoroughgoing and insidious form of speech control: it may look like speech rights remain with the people, but government controls the medium over which the speech travels.

The government has sought to control protocols in the past and will continue to do so in the future. The “crypto wars,” in which government tried to control secure communications protocols, merely presage struggles of the future. Perhaps the next battle will be over BitCoin, an online currency that is resistant to surveillance and confiscation. In BitCoin, communications and value transfer are melded together. To protect us from the scourge of illegal drugs and the recently manufactured crime of “money laundering,” governments will almost certainly seek to bar us from trading with one another and transferring our wealth securely and privately.

So laugh at France. But don’t laugh too hard. Leave the smugness to them.

Social widgets, such as the now-ubiquitous Facebook “Like” button and Twitter “Tweet” button, offer users a convenient way to share online content with their friends and followers. These widgets have recently come under scrutiny for their privacy implications. Yesterday, The Wall Street Journal reported that Facebook, Twitter, and Google are informed each time a user visits a webpage that contains one of the respective company’s widgets:

Internet users tap Facebook Inc.’s “Like” and Twitter Inc.’s “Tweet” buttons to share content with friends. But these tools also let their makers collect data about the websites people are visiting. These so-called social widgets, which appear atop stories on news sites or alongside products on retail sites, notify Facebook and Twitter that a person visited those sites even when users don’t click on the buttons, according to a study done for The Wall Street Journal.

It wasn’t exactly a secret that social widgets “phone home.” However, the Journal’s story shed new light on how the firms that offer social widgets handle the data they glean regarding user browsing habits. Facebook and Google reportedly store this data for a limited period of time — two weeks and 90 days, respectively — and, importantly, the data isn’t recorded in a way that can be tied back to a user (unless, of course, the user affirmatively decides to “like” a webpage). Twitter reportedly records browsing data as well, but deletes it “quickly.”

Assuming the companies effectively anonymize the data they glean from their social widgets, privacy-conscious users have little reason to worry. I’m not aware of any evidence that social widget data has been misused or breached. However, as Pete Warden reminded us in an informative O’Reilly Radar essay posted earlier this week, anonymizing data is harder than it sounds, and supposedly “anonymous” data sets have been successfully de-anonymized on several occasions. (For more on the de-anonymization of data sets, see Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov’s 2008 research paper on the topic).

While these social widgets may well pose no real threat to privacy, some especially privacy-sensitive users might be wary of the risk of being “tracked” by a social networking service, however small that risk may be. Such concerns aren’t totally unreasonable — if, say, the browsing data collected by Facebook or Google were to be breached and subsequently de-anonymized and tied to authenticated (logged-in) users by malicious actors, the resulting privacy harms could be quite serious.

Fortunately for privacy-conscious users, there are several ways to stop social widgets from collecting data about your browsing habits. As the Journal points out, you can simply log out of your Twitter or Facebook account prior to visiting other websites. Other methods include clearing out your cookies or using your browser’s privacy mode when visiting social networking sites. And, of course, there’s always the “nuclear option” of deleting your social networking accounts entirely.

Perhaps the most convenient, slick way to avoid social widgets is to simply use a browser add-on that selectively disables cross-site requests from Facebook, Twitter, and Google. The WSJ profiled one such add-on, Disconnect, which is compatible with Chrome, Firefox, and Safari.

If you’re a Firefox user, the popular add-on NoScript also offers a robust and effective mechanism for blocking social widgets. To do so, you’ll need to paste a few lines of code in NoScript’s Application Boundaries Enforcer (ABE), a powerful module that allows users to establish custom rules governing scripts and cross-site requests. If you’ve got NoScript installed (get it here), simply go to the ‘Options’ menu, select the ‘Advanced’ tab, then the ‘ABE’ subtab:

After checking the ‘Enable ABE’ box, select the USER Ruleset, then paste in the following lines:

Site .facebook.com .fbcdn.net facebook.net
Accept from SELF
Accept from .facebook.com .fbcdn.net facebook.net
Deny INCLUSION

Site .twitter.com
Accept from SELF
Accept from .twitter.com
Deny INCLUSION

Site .google.com googleapis.com
Accept from SELF
Accept from .google.com
Deny INCLUSION

Then hit ‘Refresh’ and ‘OK’ and you’re all set. If you’ve done this correctly, you should no longer see Facebook, Twitter, or Google widgets. To verify that no data is being transmitted to the companies, install and run HTTP traffic analyzer Fiddler then visit a webpage featuring social widget. If no HTTP request is transmitted to a social networking service, you’re in the clear. Note that this technique also doesn’t affect the functionality of Twitter, Facebook, or Google, so you can still use each of these services with full functionality. If you want to block other social widgets, simply add additional lines to ABE in NoScript in the same manner as above including the domains of the services you wish to block.

As this post hopefully illustrates, privacy-conscious users aren’t helpless; extant technological solutions can address many privacy concerns already, while more robust tools are constantly emerging. As for Facebook, Twitter, and Google, it’s hard to fault them for responding to user demands. Statistics indicate that social widgets are immensely valuable and popular among users, so activating them by default is a sensible decision.

I’d like to see these firms offer a mechanism for authenticated users to opt out of social widget data collection entirely. Greater transparency regarding how the data sets are anonymized would also be welcome. Meanwhile, privacy-conscious users can take matters into their own hands by opting out manually.