PFF has just published the transcript for an event we hosted last month asking “What Should the Next Communications Act Look Like?”  The event featured (in order of appearance) Link Hoewing of Verizon, Walter McCormick of US Telecom, Peter Pitsch of Intel, Barbara Esbin, Ray Gifford of Wilkinson, Barker, Knauer, and Michael Calabrese of the New America Foundation. It was a terrific discussion and it couldn’t have been more timely in light of recent regulatory developments at the FCC.  The folks at NextGenWeb were kind enough to make a video of the event and post it online along with a writeup, so I’ve included that video along with the event transcript down below the fold.

What Should the Next Coummunications Act Look Like [PFF Event Transcript]

Noting that the Telecom Act has become ” irrelevant to the ecosystem that has developed,” Verizon’s Executive Vice President Tom Tauke today called for Congress to overhaul the nation’s archaic communications laws and the regulatory regime that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is currently attempting to pigeonhole the Internet and entire Digital Economy into.  It’s an excellent speech, and I encourage you to read the entire thing (which I have embedded down below the fold in a Scribd reader).

“[T]he test for government intervention in the marketplace is to prevent either harm to users or anti-competitive activity,” he said. He rightly noted that, in an age of technological convergence and vigorous cross-platform competition, the old silo-based approach of the Telecom Act — with its various Titles for outmoded market definitions — no longer makes any sense. He noted:

by the very nature of the Internet Ecosystem, many are working together or competing in other company’s turf. Computer companies sell phones, and quite successfully. Search engines sell open operating systems. Network providers create their own apps stores. That means that the value proposition to the consumer is really a package created by many companies acting together with little, if any, regard to their previous corporate histories. So no set of companies should be immune from scrutiny.

Of course, a regulatory regime already exists that accomplishes this goal: antitrust law. But Tauke’s proposal isn’t quite that sweeping. He doesn’t call for the FCC to be dynamited the ground and to just shift everything into the antitrust bucket, which some of us would prefer. Instead, he speaks generically about the need for a more sensible process — most likely still enforced by the FCC — that would work as follows:

we could structure a process that uses the innovative, flexible and technology-driven nature of the Internet to address issues as they arise. Instead of the traditional rule-making process, federal enforcement agencies could structure themselves around an ongoing engagement with Internet engineers and technologists to analyze technology trends, define norms to guide such questions as network management, and understand in advance the implications of new, emerging technologies.

Moreover, he advocates greater reliance on expert technical opinion and interaction to help inform the policy process:

Technology leaders and experts from all players involved in the Internet should set up voluntary organizations and forums to provide advice, recommendations, and advisory opinions to government agencies. This will help inform the agencies’ role as backstops that deter damaging activities that undermine the vibrant competition and openness that defines the Internet.

Again, he doesn’t really make it clear who will be administering this new process; his focus on getting Congress to clear out the old regulatory cobwebs and adopt a fresh policy approach for the Digital Age.

Of course, it remains to be seen if anyone in Congress will bite. Many policymakers’ idea of “reform” is to just layer on more misguided regulations to the old system. It’s like attempting to renovate a dilapidated old home by adding a fresh coat of paint and new window treatments. That fact is, the foundations are still crumbling.  Fundamental change is needed, and fast.

I was hoping that Tauke would come right out and endorse what continues to be the best “third way” alternative out there: Progress & Freedom Foundation’s “Digital Age Communications Act” or “DACA” framework. In 2005-6, PFF brought together over 50 leading scholars–a non-partisan collection of lawyers, economists, engineers and others—with the ultimate aim of crafting a regulatory framework that is adaptive to the frequently changing communications landscape. The resulting Digital Age Communications Act  proposal advocated tearing down the old regulatory paradigms and replacing them all with a Federal Trade Commission-like “unfair competition” standard.

Under DACA, the FCC would retain some baseline regulatory authority to oversee the marketplace but this authority would be quite limited and would be based on more settled principles of competition law and economics (namely, streamlined antitrust regulation). Serious anti-competitive corporate actions that lead to demonstrable consumer harm would still be policed and punished under DACA. But this would be done on a limited, case-by-case basis without prejudging business models or practices or by imposing prophylactic regulatory regimes. In essence, DACA stood for the proposition that an ex post form of regulatory oversight was infinitely preferable to ex ante forms of preemptive and prophylactic regulation by the FCC.

To be clear, this is regulation. And, on a personal note, when the DACA working group released its initial framework in June 2005, I dissented to the plan on the grounds that DACA did not do enough to tie the hands of regulators. Moreover, I argued that there was no need to import a competition policy regime into the FCC when the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice remain perfectly capable of enforcing antitrust laws when anti-competitive conduct can be proven.

Nonetheless, the DACA framework would be vastly superior to the sort of heavy-handed regulatory approach that some defenders of the ancien regime still favor.  DACA has the added advantage of not being as susceptible to the problems of regulatory creep and regulatory capture.

Tauke didn’t go quite that far today, but I do hope that if Congress got around to reopening the Telecom Act and freshening up public policy in this area that they’d give DACA a second look.  It’s a reasonable “third way” approach that would satisfy many of the goals of traditional regulatory policy regime without all the excess baggage. Tom Tauke’s call for Congress to at least reopen and reconsider the broken old regime is the first step toward that goal.

Prepared Remarks of Verizon EVP Tom Tauke

Progress Snapshot 6.6, The Progress & Freedom Foundation (PDF)

Mobile broadband speeds (at the “core” of wireless networks) are about to skyrocket—and revolutionize what we can do on-the-go online (at the “edge”).  Consider four recent stories:

1. Networks: MobileCrunch notes that Verizon will begin offering 4G mobile broadband service (using Long Term Evolution or LTE) “in up to 60 markets by mid-2012″—at an estimated 5-12 Mbps down and 2-5 Mbps up, LTE would be faster than most wired broadband service.
2. Devices: Sprint plans to launch its first 4G phone (using WiMax, a competing standard to LTE) this summer.
3. Applications: Google has finally released Google Earth for the Nexus One smartphone on T-Mobile, the first to run Google’s Android 2.1 operating system.
4. Content: In November, Google announced that YouTube would begin offering high-definition 1080p video, including on mobile devices.

While the Nexus One may be the first Android phone with a processor powerful enough to crunch the visual awesomeness that is Google Earth, such applications will still chug along on even the best of today’s 3G wireless networks.  But combine the ongoing increases in mobile device processing power made possible by Moore’s Law with similar innovation in broadband infrastructure, and everything changes: You can run hugely data-intensive apps that require real-time streaming, from driving directions with all the rich imagery of Google Earth to mobile videoconferencing to virtual world experiences that rival today’s desktop versions to streaming 1080p high-definition video (3.7+ Mbps) to… well, if I knew, I’d be in Silicon Valley launching a next-gen mobile start-up!

This interconnection of infrastructure, devices and applications should remind us that broadband isn’t just about “big dumb pipes”—especially in the mobile environment, where bandwidth is far more scarce (even in 4G) due to spectrum constraints.  Network congestion can spoil even the best devices on the best networks.  Just ask users in New York City, where AT&T has apparently just stopped selling the iPhone online in order to try to relieve AT&T’s over-taxed network under the staggering bandwidth demands of Williamsburg hipsters, Latter-Day Beatniks from the Village, Chelsea boys, and Upper West Side Charlotte Yorks all streaming an infinite plethora of YouTube videos and so on.

Unfortunately, the “neutralists” think that regulation, rather than innovation, is the better solution to dealing with the constant tension between the capacities of networks and the bandwidth demands of new applications.  But as Adam Thierer noted in making the The 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation in his debate last week with Ben Scott of the radical “media reform” advocacy group “Free Press”:

Innovation at the core of networks is every bit as important as innovation at the edge: We don’t want stagnation at the core or networks, and the applications that ride on them, will suffer.

Funding the Future of Broadband

All this begs the critical question: What funds the networks of the future? What policies need to be in place to make sure they are delivered? If we believe Free Press and other pro-regulatory forces backing the FCC’s pending plan to impose Net neutrality regulation, freezing innovation at the core through “common carriage” regulation is the best way to ensure greater network innovation and investment.  That’s essentially the argument they advanced in their filing to the FCC in the net neutrality proceeding (summarized here).  Does that make any sense? When was the last time increased regulation of anything led to increased investment and innovation in this or any other sector?

Importantly, the sort of mandatory dumb pipe approach that Free Press and the FCC favor would limit potentially beneficial forms of network experimentation with new approaches to delivering bits in a more rapid, more reliable, or more secure fashion.  Free Press apparently thinks speedy, reliable and secure networks just magically appear, like manna falling from heaven.  But networks don’t get built thanks to divine intervention or magic tricks.  Someone actually has to convince investors and shareholders to invest billions in risk capital on what are essentially high-tech crap-shoots.

Will massive investments in LTE or WiMax 4G wireless networks pay off as carriers compete with each to attract customers? That’s a very risky bet, since consumer wireless broadband service prices aren’t set by the cost of the networks but by what the market will bear: How much would you pay per month for a mobile data service capable of running applications that just aren’t feasible in today’s mobile environment?  That probably depends on whether there’s a “killer app” to make the greater speed of 4G plans worth the premium over 3G.  So, why would network operators try to strangle innovation at the applications layer (as Free Press fears)?  Faster web browsing is great, but what will really make buying a 4G phone and service plan worth the price premium are innovative mobile applications like mobile Google Earth, Microsoft’s Photosynth, 3-D gaming, immersive virtual worlds, and so on.

Rolling the dice on multi-billion dollar next-generation networks becomes an even scarier proposition once regulatory risk is factored into the equation.  Would you like to be the guy who has to convince your board, your employees, your shareholders, and the rest of the world that a multi-year, multi-billion investment in a commercially unproven technology is worth the risk when you have an FCC ready to wrap its tentacles around those networks and apply vague, open-ended regulatory notions like “Net neutrality” to them?

Consider recent innovations announced by Verizon and Google.

Verizon’s 10Gbps Super-Fast Fiber Demonstration

Verizon recently conducted a successful field-test of a passive optical network system known as XG-PON “that can transmit data at 10 Gbps) downstream and 2.4 Gbps upstream, four times as fast as the current top transmission speeds supporting the company’s all-fiber FiOS network.” Brian Whitton, executive director of access and video technologies at Verizon said, “This further validates our strategic choice of fiber-to-the-premises as the best way to build a future-proof network.”  It certainly does—assuming you can recoup the initial cost of building and deploying that network. But regulation which treats such advanced networks as nothing more than dumb pipes would undercut such innovations by dampening the incentive to further invest and innovate in this fashion.

That’s not to say Verizon and other network operators will need to block traffic or betray “neutrality” principles as Free Press fears.  Even today, Verizon has done what Free Press seems to think would never happen without regulation: Verizon recently announced it would begin allowing users to place Skype calls directly over the 3G network (which was previously only possible on Verizon phones over a Wi-Fi network).  As the Los Angeles Times explained:

By embracing Skype, Verizon is betting that any revenue it might lose from customers downgrading their voice-calling plans will be more than made up by added sales of data plans and a share of the revenue from Skype subscriptions.

So Verizon gets a cut of the revenue—so what?  How, exactly, is this obviously non-neutral deal bad for consumers?

Verizon’s Deal with HBO & TV Everywhere

The Los Angeles Times mentions another deal cut by Verizon that should illustrate just how important innovation is at the business model layer—i.e., in figuring out how to support the content and services taken for granted by users.  In response to the accelerating shift of consumers towards “cutting the video cord” as Internet-delivered video has become a more clear alternative to traditional cable or satellite video service, HBO has cut a deal with Verizon to make its content available to FiOS subscribers just as it does with other cable operators.

Again, this is exactly the kind of partnership that may be needed to sustain content production in a world where the traditional cable model is breaking down quickly.  Yet, for all their talk about the need for “new business models,” Free Press wants to ban this sort of innovation.  When the cable industry has attempted to expand upon the model of its deal with HBO to give subscribers online access to a far wider range of video programming through “TV Everywhere” service, Free Press has accused the cable industry of “Colluding to Kill Online TV” and demanded immediate antitrust action and “structural rules like compulsory licenses.”

Google’s 1Gbps Fiber Pilot Project

While Verizon’s December announcement about 10-Gbps FiOS speeds drew relatively little attention, Google generated lots of excitement when it announced earlier this month that it would build a 1 Gbps fiber network to serve up to 500,000 customers.  Google says it’s not entering the broadband business but considers this a “business model nudge and an innovation nudge.”[4] If it succeeds in raising the bar for broadband service and demonstrating what users could do with greater bandwidth, great!

But let’s not forget that the economic engine that drives Google (and will cross-subsidize this experiment) is advertising, which is under fierce attack.  Verizon and other Internet Service Providers (ISPs), by contrast, have to rely on subscription revenues to not just to pay the costs of that infrastructure but also the risk premium associated with building out new, faster networks in advance of consumer demand.  Unfortunately, all the recent hysteria about the use of “deep packet inspection” for behavioral advertising seems to have made it very unlikely that ISPs will be able to supplement subscription revenue with ad dollars any time soon.  But that’s exactly the kind of business model innovation that could defray some of the costs of deploying 4G wireless or super-fast fiber networks.

Even with the cross-subsidy of advertising for this promising pilot project, Google’s high hopes may be wrecked again by the same kind of extortionary demands that have long faced cable operators (and, more recently, fiber competitors) when dealing with local governments.  Google faced just such absurd demands with its municipal Wi-Fi scheme in San Francisco, ultimately helping to crater the deal.

A Framework for Promoting Openness, Investment & Innovation

Google and Verizon are, of course, just two of the many key players operating at the cutting edge—and convergence of—infrastructure, devices, applications and content technologies and business models.  But the two companies seem to have found common ground in working together—perhaps through their high profile partnership to make Motorola’s Droid handset, which runs Google’s Android operating system, the flagship of Verizon’s smartphone offerings.

Most notably, the two companies managed to work through most, though not all, their differences on the deeply divisive issue of net neutrality to forge a common set of principles for how to address technical disputes about network management: through self-regulation, especially through expert technical bodies like IETF, “with governmental involvement limited to dealing with bad actors on a case-by-case basis where industry mechanisms are unable to resolve conduct that is anticompetitive and harms consumers.” These principles, presented to the FCC in January, provide a clear alternative to the kind of “prophylactic” regulatory regime of full-blown “line-sharing” or “forced-access” mandates contemplated by Free Press.  These principles are also strongly reminiscent of the consensus proposal reached by a non-partisan group of 50 lawyers, economists, engineers and others PFF brought together in 2005-6 in the Digital Age Communications Act (DACA) project: Address actual harms through case-by-case adjudication ex post under the consumer welfare standard of antitrust law. Perhaps it’s time to dust off DACA as a “third way” on net neutrality.

Innovation at the Core Drives Innovation at the Edge (& Vice Versa)

Worth It?

OK, time for a quick rant. What is all this confusion and consternation over early termination fees (ETFs) for high-end smartphones?  I mean, seriously, how hard is this process to understand?  The FCC has worked itself into a lather over this and is bombarding wireless operators and Google with hate mail letters of inquiry harassing asking them about their ETF policies.  I just don’t get it.  Let’s review some simple realities:

• Smartphones — especially high-end devices like the iPhone, the Droid, and the Nexus One — are basically mobile mini computers.
• Mini mobile computers do not grow on trees; someone has to make them and sell them at a profit or else no one would offer them to begin with.
• But the people who make and sell these devices (and wireless service for these devices) want to ensure rapid, widespread distribution to win over customers and recoup their costs.
• So, they offer a classic business inducement — an upfront subsidy for the product in exchange for monthly payments to amortize the upfront “loan” they have given the customer;
• AND THEN THEY FORM A CONTRACT WITH THE BUYER TO MAKE THE DEAL WORK. And that contract obligates both sides to live up to their end of the deal.
• Hey… did I mention they need to form a contract to make the deal worth it? OK, good, wanted to make sure I got that point across.
• Then they give you a nice shiny new mobile mini-computer that for some reason we Americans still insist on calling a cell phone.
• Then you start paying off the “loan” they’ve given you for that device over the span of the service contract. This is called “prorating.”
• But, if you default on that loan by breaking your contract, you’ll be hit with a penalty — an early termination fee — since it would leave the carrier without a way to recoup the cost of that shiny new mobile mini-computer that they handed you on the cheap when you just absolutely had to have the hot new toy in town.

Is this process really all that complicated? And why is it so controversial? It certainly shouldn’t be. Prorating happens every day in countless ways in a capitalist economy.  And yet in the apparent techno-entitlement society we live in these days, some people seem to think there’s something scandalous about this process when it happens with our beloved mobile devices.  In reality, the smartphone subsidy and prorated contract system is really one of the great pro-consumer accomplishments of our time. With various inducements and buyer loyalty credits, I recently got my Motorola Droid from Verizon for just $99 bucks. Like the iPhone and Google’s new Nexus One, the Droid is worth over $500 bucks, and yet millions of Americans have been able to obtain these spectacular devices because of this system of upfront subsidies and prorating. And it’s not like Lucifer is present at the signing of the contract asking for a blood offering or your first born as part of the exchange. Nobody forces you to buy a $500 phone!

Moreover, if you really want, there are plenty of “unlocked” mobile devices you can pay full freight for and then take to any carrier you want to get service. Needless to say, not a lot of people bother. I think that tells us something. And, again, who can really blame consumers… just look at the prices of these unsubsidized phones! $574.99 for the Droid, $649.99 for the Nexus One, and $909.99 for the Sony Ericsson Xperia!  You could buy a used car for that kind of money.

Look, I can appreciate arguments about “better transparency” in this process to make sure consumers know what they are getting into, but you don’t need a PhD in economics to understand that you’ll have to make some payments over the long haul to pay off what you got up front on the cheap. My guess is that most people who buy an expensive smartphone have likely also has had a car or home loan at some point in their lives–or any loan for that matter.  The principle in all cases is the same: There is no free lunch.

Last week I commented on a severely one-sided FCC net neutrality hearing that featured a endless parade of horribles being prophesied by virtually every speaker. The litany of spooky stories became tedious and absurd. Everyone foretold of the impending doom that awaits unless government intervenes to save us from various corporate conspiracies to “silence” our voices.  Unsurprisingly, evidence was in short supply. It was pure Chicken Little poppycock.

This got me thinking again about what I have referred to as the “problem of proportionality.” I have discussed the problem of proportionality in the context of public policy debates about online safety and privacy, but it seems equally applicable to debates about net neutrality. Here’s how I explained the “problem of proportionality” in an earlier essay:

let’s think about how some of our lawmakers and media personalities talk about the Internet.  If we were to judge the Internet based upon the daily headlines in various media outlets or from the titles of various Congressional or regulatory agency hearings, then we’d be led to believe that the Internet is a scary, dangerous place. That ’s especially the case when it comes to concerns about online privacy and child safety. Everywhere you turn there’s a bogeyman story about the supposed dangers of cyberspace. But let’s go back to the numbers. While I certainly understand the concerns many folks have about their personal privacy or their child’s safety online, the fact is the vast majority of online transactions that take place online each and every second of the day are of an entirely harmless, even socially beneficial nature.  I refer to this disconnect as the “problem of proportionality” in debates about online safety and privacy. People are not just making mountains out of molehills, in many cases they are just making the molehills up or blowing them massively out of proportion.

Again, much the same is true of net neutrality. Indeed, it is even more true since actual net neutrality “incidents” are so hard to come by.  I was reminded of this recently when I was reading some stats posted over at the Verizon Policy Blog by Link Hoewing, Verizon’s Assistant Vice President of Internet and Technology Issues. Link wrote, “every day over Verizon’s network, 100 million people connect using a cell phone, landline phone or broadband connection. The amount of information they send back and forth is staggering:”

• 1.7 billion text messages exchanged
• 50 million video/pictures exchanged
• 400 million e-mails received
• 8.7 petabytes of video streamed—the equivalent of 4 million full-length movies
• 1 billion phone calls connected

Indeed, those are staggering numbers. And I have seen similar numbers from other operators, although not quite as large as this.

But what I find most remarkable when I hear data about daily traffic volume is that all this activity is taking place without a peep about net neutrality “violations,” you know, like those nefarious-minded corporate conspiracies to “silence” us by blocking speech or expression.  Now, how can that be?  After all, we don’t have a net neutrality law on the books today.  There’s nothing stopping these carriers from engaging in the sort of behavior the worrywarts were predicting at last week’s hearing.

Of course, the critics would counter with the old “it’s-only-a-matter-of-time!” argument, or claim that the operators are on their best behavior right now because so many are watching for potential net neutrality violations. But there’s no way to prove that one way or the other. It’s all just conjecture at this stage. Regardless, the fact remains: trying to find actual net neutrality “violations” today is not just needle-in-the-haystack hard, it’s darn near impossible.

The better explanation for why that is the case comes down to simple economics and sound business practices: (1) ISPs have no incentive to block traffic since they only make money make money by carrying more content, not less; and (2) angering customers and getting a bad rap with the press is really bad for business — as in lost customers, lost shareholders, and therefore, lost profits.

So, it’s important to bring a little sanity and proportionality back to debates about net neutrality. There’s just no evidence supporting the horror stories bandied about about pro-regulatory critics. Billions of transactions are taking place online each and every day without any neutrality “violations” whatsoever.

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria:
From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on.

True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money.

Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_Groups_Statement_-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25^th and October 14^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. [...] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” (i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

The smell of high-tech regulation is increasingly in the air these days and many lawmakers and some activist groups now have the mobile marketplace in their regulatory cross-hairs. Critics make a variety of claims about the wireless market supposedly lacking competition, choice, innovation, or reasonable pricing. Consequently, they want to wrap America’s wireless sector in a sea of red tape.   Two important new studies thoroughly debunk these assertions and set the record straight regarding the state of wireless competition and innovation in the U.S. today. These reports are must-reading for Washington policymakers and FCC officials who are currently contemplating regulatory action.

First, Gerald Faulhaber and Dave Farber have a new report out entitled “Innovation in the Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer-Centric Framework.”  Here’s what Faulhaber and Farber find:

the three segments of the wireless marketplace (applications, devices, and core network) have exhibited very substantial innovation and investment since its inception. Perhaps more interesting, innovation in each segment is highly dependent upon innovation in the other segments. For example, new applications depend upon both advances in device hardware capabilities and advances in spectral efficiency of the core network to provide the network capacity to serve those applications. Further, we find that the three segments of the industry are also highly competitive. There are many players in each segment, each of which aggressively seeks out customers through new technology and new business methods. The results of this competition are manifest: (i) firms are driven to innovate and invest in order to win in the competitive marketplace; (ii) new business models have emerged that give customers more choice; and (iii) firms have opened new areas such as wireless broadband and laptop wireless in order to expand their strategic options.

They continue on to address the policy issues in play here and discuss the “consumer-centric” approach they recommend that the FCC adopt:

Having found that all three segments are highly competitive, we ask, where is the market failure? If none, then the principle of customer-centric applies: let customers make the key decisions regarding which products, services, open vs. managed business models, net neutrality, et al. will survive in the marketplace. While there is no shortage of pundits, advocates, lobbyists and academics advising the FCC that it, rather than customers, should be making these decisions and advising the FCC what those decisions should be, a customer-centric FCC must leave these decisions to customers in a competitive marketplace. Should the FCC decide to preempt customers and make choices for them, it follows as does night from day that the result will be (i) less customer choice, and therefore reduced customer well-being; (ii) higher costs for producers and therefore customers; (iii) lower incentives to invest and innovate, harming customers, producers and the American economy. In this case, economics and technology are on the same page: economists advise intervention only in the case of demonstrated market failure, and then only if there is evidence that the intervention will do more good than harm. The technologist’s advice is more pithy and down to earth: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!

Amen to that.  Let’s hope our lawmakers are listening.

Second, Everett Ehrlich, Jeffrey Eisenach, and Wayne Leighton have a terrific new paper out entitled “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation and Choice in Wireless Communications,” which reaches similar conclusions to those Faulhaber and Farber found in their report. Here’s the executive summary from the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton report:

Proposals to increase regulation of mobile wireless services, for example, by applying “net neutrality” regulation, are often based on claims that such regulation would enhance innovation and increase consumer choice. In fact, they would have the opposite effect. The business practices that would be banned by such regulation are efficient mechanisms for spreading and reducing risk, lowering transactions costs, and enhancing marketing activities, all of which contribute to innovation and choice. Moreover, product differentiation increases competition and thus contributes both directly and indirectly to consumer choice. While some types of exclusive agreements and other “discriminatory” practices can theoretically harm competition, the precondition for such harm to occur – i.e., market power in one or more of the affected markets – generally is not present in wireless markets. Hence, the proposed regulations cannot be justified on grounds of market failure. Rather than increasing innovation and consumer choice, as promised, they would severely disrupt the wireless sector’s highly successful business model and significantly reduce innovation and consumer choice.

Like the Faulhaber-Farber paper, the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper examines the major segments of the wireless marketplace — applications, devices, and networks — and shows them all to be vigorously competitive and experiencing significant innovation. Some of the following tables and charts help to illustrate this.

This first table shows how concentration ratios for the U.S. market (as measured by HHI) are among the lowest in the world.

The next two charts show that U.S. carriers have the lowest revenue per minute (60% lower than the average OECD country) even though average minutes per use are more than twice the amount of the next highest ranked country (Canada).

Finally, this final chart from their report offers a snapshot of mobile Internet penetration in 16 countries showing the U.S. on top:

Incidentally, the Faulhaber-Farber study also does a nice job listing the various mobile application stores out there today:

Device Manufacturer App Stores
Apple’s App Store
BlackBerry’s App World
Palm’s App Catalog
Nokia’s Ovi Store
Samsung’s Application Store
Sony’s PlayNow arena
LG’s Application Store

Software Developers
Google’s Android Market
Microsoft’s Windows Mobile

Carriers
AT&T’s MEdia Mall
Verizon Wireless’ Tools & Applications
Sprint’s Software Store
US Cellular’s easyedge
Cellular South’s Discover Center
Cricket’s Downloads

Independent Stores
Handango
GetJar

And the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper provides some addition perspective on innovation in the handset and applications space:

On the metrics that seem to be of greatest concern to regulation advocates – choice and innovation – the data also show the industry is performing well. For example, CTIA reports there are more than 630 different wireless handsets and devices available in the U.S., compared with only 147 in the United Kingdom, and notes that many of the most advanced handsets introduced in recent months have been launched in the U.S., including (among others) the iPhone 3G, the Google G1, and the Blackberry Storm. Amazon’s highly popular Kindle was also launched in the U.S. with connectivity provided by Sprint – while its European launch was delayed for a full year by Amazon’s inability to reach agreement with a mobile carrier there.

As noted above, the number and variety of available applications is increasing rapidly: In addition to the Apple Apps Store, application downloads are now available from the Android Market (Google), the Palm Software Store, Blackberry App World and the Nokia Ovi Store, offering a total of more than 60,000 different applications. On July 14, 2009 Apple announced that more than 1.5 billion applications had been downloaded from its iPhone App Store since its launch in July 2008.

Actually, that number is even higher now.  As I noted here recently, in just a little over a year, Apple reports there’s been 2 billion downloads of over 85,000 apps from over 125,000 developers.  It’s just stunning when you think about it.

I encourage everyone to read both reports cover-to-cover.  They provide a comprehensive look at the reality on the ground — or in the air, as the case may be — in America’s mobile marketplace.

Seems like every week the tech rumor mills unveil some new smartphone that’s supposedly going to give the iPhone a run for its money. Over the past couple years, dozens of advanced handsets have been released with much fanfare — the LG Voyager, Palm Pre, Blackberry Storm, Samsung Omnia, to name a few — but time and time again, we end up with a device that can’t hold a candle to the iPhone’s amazing browser, massive app store, and sleek multi-touch interface.

But all this could change later this year. A number of handsets are due for release on several major networks over the next few months that run on Android, Google’s open source mobile operating system. Android is currently available on only a single device, the HTC G1. It’s a decent phone, but it lacks the polish of the iPhone and is only available with a contract from T-Mobile, which lags behind Sprint, AT&T, and Verizon in terms of 3G coverage.

I’m especially excited about the Android 2.0-based Motorola “Sholes,” a great-looking phone that’s supposedly due for release in November 2009 from Verizon. If rumors pan out, the Sholes should come with a slide-out keyboard, an extremely high-res display, a 5MP camera, and all-around solid specs. Via Android and Me:

The Motorola Sholes should include:

• OMAP3430 – 600 MHz ARM Cortex A8 + PowerVR SGX 530 GPU + 430MHz C64x+ DSP + ISP (Image Signal Processor)
• Dimensions 60.00 x 115.80 x 13.70 mm
• Weight 169 g
• Battery Li-ion 1400 mAh.
• Standby 450 hours, talk time 420 minutes
• 3.7-inch touch-sensitive display with a resolution of 854×480 pixels, 16 million color depth. Physical screen size is 45.72 mm by 81.34 mm.
• 512MB/256MB ROM/RAM
• microSD / microSDHC expansion slot
• Camera: 5.0 megapixel with autofocus and video recorder
• Connectivity: USB2.0, 3.5mm audio jack, Bluetooth 2.0 + EDR, Wi-Fi
• Supported audio formats: AMR-NB/WB, MP3, PCM / WAV, AAC, AAC +, eAAC +, WMA
• Supported video formats: MPEG-4, H.263, H.264, WMV
• GPS

Policymakers should take note of the coming onslaught of Android phones as a reminder that platform competition is alive and well in the U.S. wireless market — despite the claims of certain activists and academics whose definition of “consumer choice” encompasses only those devices that they deem sufficiently “open.”

The latest edition (Version 4.0) of my PFF special report on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now up.  For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education and media literacy efforts, and various other tools, methods, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety.  After evaluating that state of this market, I conclude: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”  Moreover, I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation.

Version 4.0 of the report is now over 250 pages long (up from 200 pages in Version 3.0) and it contains almost 70 exhibits (up from 50), 725 references (up from roughly 500), and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. Other new sections or appendices have also been added to the report, including:

• a new section examining how many households really need parental control tools;
• a new appendix on the downsides of mandatory parental controls and restrictive default settings;
• a new section on the dangers of “deputizing the online middleman” solution as an approach to solving child safety concerns;
• a new appendix reviewing the findings of 5 past online safety task forces;
• … and much more.

I issue major updates once a year and 1 or 2 minor tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety marketplace and debate. The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past couple of years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

Over at the Verizon Policy Blog, Link Hoewing has a sharp piece up entitled, “Of Business Models and Innovation.” He makes a point that I have often stressed in my debates with Zittrain and Lessig, namely, that the whole “open vs. closed” debate is typically greatly overstated or misunderstood.   Hoewing correctly argues that:

The point is not that open or managed models are always better or worse.  The point is that there is no one “right” model for promoting innovation.  There are examples of managed and open business models that have been both good for innovation and bad for it. There are also examples of managed and open models that have both succeeded and failed.  The point is in a competitive market to let companies develop business models they believe will serve consumers best and see how things play out.

Exactly right.  Moreover, the really important point here is that there exists a diverse spectrum of innovative digital alternatives from which to choose. Along the “open vs. closed” spectrum, the range of digital technologies and business models continues to grow and grow in both directions.  Do you want wide-open, tinker-friendly devices, sites, or software? You got it. Do you want a more closed, simple, and safe online experience?  You can have that, too.  And there are plenty of choices in between.

This is called progress!

Today, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced the members of the new Online Safety and Technology Working Group (OSTWG).  I am honored to be among those chosen to participate in this new task force and I look forward to continuing the work started last year with the Harvard Berkman Center’s Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF), which I also served on.   I was very proud of the work done by the ISTTF and the impressive final report that Prof. John Palfrey crafted to reflect our findings.  I am eager to investigate these issues further and take a look at the latest research and technologies that can help us better understand how to protect our kids online while also protecting the free speech and privacy rights of Netizens.

The new NTIA working group, which was established under the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act,” will report to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information on industry-implemented online child safety tools and efforts. Within a year of convening its first meeting, the group will submit a report of its findings and make recommendations on how to increase online safety measures.

Below the fold I have listed the complete roster of OSTWG task force members.  I very much looking forward to working with this outstanding group.  And I’m happy to report that my TLF blogging colleague Braden Cox will be joining me on this task force!

Ms. Parry Aftab, WiredSafety
Ms. Elizabeth Banker, Yahoo! Inc.
Mr. Christopher Bubb, AOL
Ms. Anne Collier, Net Family News, Inc./ConnectSafely.org*
Mr. Braden Cox, NetChoice Coalition
Ms. Caroline Curtin, Microsoft
Mr. Brian Cute, Afilias U.S.A.
Mr. Jeremy Geigle, Arizona Family Council
Ms. Marsali Hancock, Internet Keep Safe Coalition
Mr. Michael Kaiser, National Cyber Security Alliance
Mr. Christopher Kelly, Facebook
Mr. Brian Knapp, Loopt, Inc.
Mr. Timothy Lordan, Internet Education Foundation
Mr. Larry Magid, SafeKids.com/ConnectSafely.org
Mr. Brian Markwalter, Consumer Electronics Association
Mr. Michael McKeehan, Verizon Communications, Inc.
Dr. Samuel McQuade, III, Rochester Institute of Technology
Ms. Orit Michiel, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
Mr. John Morris, Center for Democracy & Technology
Mr. Jonathon Nevett, Network Solutions, LLC
Mr. Hemanshu Nigam, MySpace/Fox Interactive Media*
Ms. Jill Nissen, Ning, Inc.
Mr. Jay Opperman, Comcast Corporation
Mr. Kevin Rupy, United States Telecom Association
Mr. John Shehan, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children
Mr. K. Dane Snowden, CTIA – the Wireless Association
Mr. Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation
Ms. Patricia Vance, Entertainment Software Rating Board
Mr. Ralph Yarro, The CP80 Foundation

* denotes co-chairs of the task force

As anyone who has spent time searching for comments on the FCC’s website can tell you, the agency doesn’t exactly have the most user-friendly website.  In the interest of making it easier for others to read the comments that came in last week in the agency’s “Child Safe Viewing Act” Notice of Inquiry, I have compiled all the major comments (those over 3 or 4 pages) and provided links to them below the fold.

Again, this proceeding was required under the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of the bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB 09-26) is to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.”  I filed 150+ pages worth of comments in this matter last week, and here’s my analysis of why this bill and the FCC’s proceeding are worth monitoring closely.

• Association of National Advertisers (ANA)
• AT&T
• Center for Democracy & Technology (Individual Comments)
• CDT (Joint Comments with other Public Interest Groups)
• Children’s Media Policy Coalition
• Coalition for Independent Ratings
• Comcast
• Common Sense Media
• Consumer Electronic Association (CEA)
• CTIA – The Wireless Association
• Cox Communications
• CustomPlay
• Digimarc Corp
• Digital Watermarking Alliance
• Digital Media Association
• Dish Network
• DirecTV
• Entertainment Software Association (ESA)
• Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI)
• Google (+ attachments A, B, C)
• Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)
• Microsoft
• NAB + NCTA + MPAA (0n TV Guidelines)
• National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA)
• Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF)
• Sanyo
• Smart Television Alliance
• Sprint-Nextel
• TiVo
• TV Guardian
• TV Watch
• U.S. Telecom Association
• Verizon & Verizon Wireless
• Wi-LAN V-Chip Corp

Today I filed comments with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its proceeding examining the marketplace for “advanced blocking technologies.”  This proceeding was required under the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of the bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB 09-26) is to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.”  My colleagues will no doubt laugh about the fact that I have dropped an absurd 150 pages worth of comments on the FCC in this matter, but I had a lot to say on this topic!  Parental controls, child safety, and free speech issues have been the focus of much of my research agenda over the past 10 years.

In my filing, I argue that the FCC should tread carefully in this matter since the agency has no authority over most of the media platforms and technologies described in the Commission’s recent Notice of Inquiry.  Moreover, any related mandates or regulatory actions in in this area could diminish future innovation in this field and would violate the First Amendment rights of media creators and consumers alike.  The other major conclusions of my filing are as follows:

• There exists an unprecedented abundance of parental control tools to help parents decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.
• There is a trade-off between complexity and convenience for both tools and ratings, and no parental control tool is completely foolproof.
• Most homes have no need for parental control technologies because parents rely on other methods or there are no children in the home.
• The role of household media rules and methods is underappreciated and those rules have an important bearing on this debate.
• Parental control technologies work best in combination with educational efforts and parental involvement.
• The search for technological silver-bullets and “universal” solutions represent a quixotic, Holy Grail-like quest and it will destroy innovation in this marketplace.
• Enforcement of “household standards” made possible through use of parental controls and other methods negates the need for “community standards”-based content regulation.

My entire filing can be found here and down below in a Scribd reader.  All comments in the matter are due tomorrow and then reply comments are due on May 18th.

[FCC FILING] Adam Thierer-PFF Re Child Safe Viewing Act NOI (MB 09-26)

Some sensible thinking here about broadband pork stimulus plans from Saul Hansell of the New York Times. In his piece on the NYT Bits blog this week, “Does Broadband Need a Stimulus?” he argues that people should stop grumbling about the “relatively small sum” of $6 billion that the new administration has proposed for wiring rural areas and urban centers. Hansell argues:

This also seems to be a rather sound policy choice because, as I look at it, the noise about a broadband gap is hooey. With new cable modem technology becoming available, 19 out of 20 American homes eventually will be able to have Internet service that is faster than any available now anywhere in the world. And that’s without one new cable being laid.

That fact hasn’t prevented a lot of folks involved in telecommunications policy from calling for a lot of money to be spent on backhoes and cable riggers. For example, the Communications Workers of America and the Telecommunications Industry Association called for $25 billion in subsidies to network providers as well as tax breaks. The Free Press, a group that advocates for media diversity, recommended spending $44 billion, with an emphasis on subsidizing companies to compete with existing cable and phone companies.

Running a new fiber-optic cable to every American home may well increase competition in broadband providers, but it isn’t needed to deliver high-speed Internet service. Current cable modems use just one of the more than 100 channels on a typical cable system and can often offer speeds of 16 megabits per second or more. The next generation of modems, using a technology called Docsis 3, allows several of those video channels to be combined to offer what ultimately can be Internet service as fast as 1 gigabit per second — 10 times faster than is offered in Japan, which generally is regarded as having the fastest broadband infrastructure.

What is most significant about Docsis 3 is that it turns out to be quite inexpensive to upgrade existing cable systems to use it. As a result, Comcast and other cable systems are already deploying the technology rather quickly. In other words, with no government intervention, the country is going to have the infrastructure very soon to provide almost everyone with the fastest possible Internet service.

To be sure, Verizon and, to a much lesser degree, AT&T, are already building out fiber-optic-based networks that compete with the cable companies in broadband, voice and video. Clearwire, a venture that includes Sprint, is building a wireless broadband network.

Certainly, competition often lowers prices and increases choices. But it is hardly clear that the country would get an adequate return from subsidizing what is essentially duplicate capacity.

Amen to all that. Plus, Hansell might have cited the 70 years of experience we have with universal service programs, which have proven to be the very model of waste, fraud, and abuse that many tax-and-spenders claim they now wish to avoid. Moreover, those inefficient subsidies have discouraged competition in rural areas. If we only subsidized McDonalds in rural area, do you think Burger King, Taco Bell or any other fast-food chain would have ever come to town?  But that’s basically the way this racket has worked in the telecom world for years.

FWIW…  Just upgraded — at no cost — to Verizon’s 20/5 FIOS plan. Been hitting almost 25 megs pretty consistently today. I was on Verizon’s 10/2 plan beforehand and the 5/2 plan before that. Didn’t notice as much of a difference when I moved from 5 to 10, but jump to 20 is definitely noticeable on big file downloads.

Cox Cable has also been offering nice speed boosts in my neighborhood (McLean, VA) recently, so I suspect that’s why I was offered the free upgrade yesterday when I called Verizon about adding some new HD channels to my FIOS TV package.

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC's December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap

When people ask me why I do what I do for a living — and, more specifically, why I focus all my attention on digital media and technology policy — I often respond by showing them the new gadgets or software I am playing with at any given time.  I just love digital technology.  I am swimming in a sea of digital gadgets, consumer electronics, online applications, computing software, video games, and all sorts of cyber-stuff.

Anyway, even though this is a technology policy blog, I sometimes highlight new digital toys or applications that have changed my life for the better. As the year winds down, therefore, I thought I would share with you five technologies that improved my life and productivity in 2008. I’d also love to hear from all of you about the technologies that you fell in love with this year in case I might have missed them. Here’s my list:

#1) Naturally Speaking 10:

Thanks to Nate Anderson’s outstanding review over at Ars Technica, I finally made the plunge and bought Dragon Naturally Speaking 10 earlier this month.  Wow, what a life-changer. I had played around with an earlier version of this market-leading speech recognition technology and found it somewhat clunky and unreliable. But Ver. 10, has ironed out almost all the old problems and become an incredibly sophisticated piece of software in the process. I love the way I can use simple voice commands to navigate menus in Microsoft Word and in Firefox. Perhaps best of all, I can dictate random rants into a pocket recording device and then upload them to Naturally Speaking (via a USB connection) and have them instantly transcribed. I’m even composing blog entries like this using it! Only problem is inserting HTML code; that’s still a hassle. Also, I find that switching from one input device to another definitely affects the quality of the transcription. Once you “train” Naturally Speaking using one device, it makes sense to stick with it. It’s not just the quality of the microphone; it’s also the proximity to your mouth that makes a difference. Regardless, this is one great product and, best of all, it’s should help save my rapidly-aging hands from becoming prematurely arthritic! All those years of video games and keyboards have taken their toll.

#2) Scribd:

Like many other policy wonks and academics, I’ve long been housing my papers and studies on SSRN to give them more widespread visibility or share them with others. But SSRN’s format is clunky and its functionality is extremely limited. Worst of all, it didn’t provide any embeddable code such that documents could be hosted directly within a blog post. Scribd solves all those problems for me. It’s a slick document-hosting service that is also highly searchable. It also offers up relevant documents as you are viewing others (the same way YouTube does for video). Very cool feature. Better yet, Scribd let’s you create groups for your organization or interests to collect related documents in one place. (For example, check out the PFF group page here.) Why couldn’t SSRN be more like this?!

#3) Ubiquity for Firefox:

“CTRL-SPACE BAR.” Thanks to Ubiquity, that keyboard shortcut has forever changed the way I use the Firefox web browser. I know this won’t seem like a big deal to some people, but for an old geek like me, I still prefer navigating some applications with keyboard shortcuts instead of using my mouse and drop-down menus. Ubiquity lets me do so in a browser environment. Basically, anytime I see something in my browser that I’d like more info about, I just run my cursor over that term, hit CTRL/SPACE and up pops a command prompt box that lets me run an inquiry of my choice. Once that box pops up, I can run a quick search about the term by just typing Google, MSN, or Yahoo and then hitting enter. Or I can map it instantly by typing “map.” Or search for an image or video related to it by typing “Flickr” or “YouTube.” Or “eBay” it. Or “Wiki” it. Or “Digg” it. And so on, and so on. Here’s lists of the command prompts at your disposal (1, 2, 3).

#4) HTC Touch (Verizon Wireless XV6900):

Screw the iPhone. This is little beauty can do everything the iPhone can do and do it in more compact package. This thing sits in my front shirt pocket and I often forget its there. It also has a stylus. Don’t understand how you iPhone zombies get along without one. It also has none of the silly restrictions that encumber the iPhone. I’ve downloaded more mods and apps to this thing than I know what to do with. While you iPhoners are salivating over the slim pickings at the iPhone apps store, I’m sitting on 10,000 choices to decide from over at Handango (and that doesn’t even begin to scratch the market for homebrew hacks). HTC’s TouchFlo navigation is very cool and works effortlessly with the flick of your thumb. The touchscreen keyboard wasn’t so hot, but who cares when dozens of aftermarket ones are available (I went with Resco). Same goes for the IE mobile browser, which is the weak spot of any Windows Mobile equipped device. But I solved that problem with my next choice…

#5) Skyfire mobile web browser:

The mobile version of Internet Explorer has just never cut it, and Skyfire capitalized on that fact to produce a very slick touchscreen browser for Windows Mobile smartphones. The early beta version had some bugs, but they’ve been working those out and producing a great product in the process. Is the iPhone Safari mobile browser better? Yes, it still is. Even an Apple-hater like me will admit it.  But Skyfire is catching up quickly.

________________
Honorable mentions…

LinkedIn: Yes, I know LinkedIn has been around a couple of years, but it really took off in 2008 and made impressive improvements to become more than just the “Facebook for Old Farts” I once thought it was. I am a huge fan of the new applications they have worked into the site, especially the WordPress blog app and the Amazon books app.

Google Chrome: Although it won’t be displacing Firefox in my heart any time soon, I have come to really appreciate Chrome’s speed compared to my Firefox experience, which is now bogged down with waaaaaay too many add-ons. (So much so that it takes me well over a minute to even get Firefox to boot up!) So, I pull up Chrome and run it alongside Firefox to surf script-heavy or graphically-intensive sites (like ESPN.com) or to just keep my eMail accounts and LinkedIn page active on another screen.

Just FYI, the latest update of my booklet on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now live. The new version, Version 3.1, provides minor updates to all sections of the book and a new appendix of relevant research in the field. I issue major updates early each year and 1 or 2 tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety market and debate.

For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education efforts, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety. I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As I conclude after evaluating that state of the market: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”

The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past two years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

After gaining final approval to rollout FiOS in New York City a few weeks ago, Verizon has come to a preliminary agreement with the District of Columbia to deploy FiOS television service in the nation’s capital. This long-awaited announcement follows nearly a year of negotiation between Verizon and D.C. franchising authorities.

Thanks to its especially onerous franchising regime, the District of Columbia has lagged behind surrounding areas in fiber-optic connectivity. Neighboring communities such as Arlington, Fairfax, and Bethesda have had FiOS for years, and D.C.’s lack of fiber-optic service has long been a sore spot for the city.

D.C. residents can’t celebrate just yet, though. Verizon must overcome one more regulatory hurdle before starting to dig up the streets. The franchise agreement must receive a green-light from both the D.C. city council and the Attorney General. If the New York City episode is any indication, getting politicians to acquiesce will involve expensive demands and forced concessions, resulting in higher prices for everyone.

As the nation’s second largest telecom, Verizon has the resources and legal know-how needed to navigate the municipal franchising process. But what about the entrepreneur who simply wants to offer service to a single neighborhood? Because of build-out requirements, revenue-sharing provisions, and other artificial entry barriers, it’s no wonder that there are so few new players in last-mile service. Getting permission to bring new television service to a community should be simple and straightforward, not costly and drawn-out.

We often hear complaints about the lack of choice in broadband and television service, but governmental attempts to enhance choice are mistakenly focused on prying open incumbent networks to let competitors leech off existing infrastructure. But as Verizon has demonstrated, what’s really needed is more infrastructure competition. Laying redundant sets of wires does have duplicative costs, but these are outweighed by the competitive benefits of greater choice. There’s room in the marketplace for multiple television and broadband providers. Last-mile service is not a natural monopoly.

Adding FiOS to the mix will bring the benefits of greater competition to D.C. subscribers. In northern Virginia, a fierce rivalry between Verizon and Comcast has pushed prices downward, even for consumers whose residences have yet to be “lit.” Cable companies have responded to FiOS with infrastructure upgrades focused on the most competitive markets. Comcast’s Blast! tier, which offers a 16mbps downstream pipe for about $50 a month, is available across Arlington and Fairfax counties, while most subscribers residing outside of the FiOS footprint can only get up to 8mbps.

Competition works, and consumers deserve more of it. Franchise reform, along with spectrum liberalization, must play an essential role in any legislative attempt to improve last-mile residential communications services in the United States.

Very useful chart over on the Verizon policy blog put together by Link Hoewing and Larry Plumb. Link uses it illustrate the changes we have seen over the past three decades in terms of Internet access platforms and speeds. It’s too small to read here, so make sure to go there to see it more clearly and also see Link’s interesting discussion.

Progress & Freedom Foundation released a new report this week entitled “A Primer on the US Mobile Television Market,” by Joseph S. Kraemer, Ph.D., who is an Adjunct Fellow at PFF and a Director at Law and Economics Consulting Group. It’s not a policy piece; it just focuses on the projected growth of the mobile television marketplace over the next few years. Kraemer explains why “mobile video is forecasted to explode over the next four or five years.” He notes that it is the logical evolution of the television marketplace:

mobile digital television is a logical extension of the digitally-driven development of television from passive entertainment to an interactive, high value, versatile medium. Each stage builds upon the set of earlier stages. “Personal television” adds functionality and value to “web TV” which did the same to “digital television” which, in turn, did the same to “analog broadcast television.” The development process is additive and cumulative. Although critically important, mobile television is just one aspect of the evolving “personal television” stage.

The report is packed with lots of useful factoids and charts for media analysts. And the paper also contains a useful glossary of terms and acronyms about various mobile media technologies. I’ve embedded the paper below so you can take a quick look, or you can download the 31-page report here.

Verizon’s Tom Tauke and NCTA’s Kyle McSlarrow take to fisticuffs in their comments (well worth reading and remarkably… candid) on the Verizon Policy Blog after Tom asked “Will Cable and FCC Thwart Consumer Choice?”  In case you missed it, Verizon has been feuding with cable providers before the FCC about Verizon’s practice of calling customers who ask to cancel their telephone service and offering them incentives to stay with Verizon rather than switch to a cable VoIP service.

Adam Thierer very capably addressed this subject several months ago:

there are two issues here: (1) Is Verizon technically violating any existing FCC regulations; and (2) do those rules make any sense?

I’ll leave it to the legal beagles to sort out the answer to question #1. From my perspective, the more important question is, regardless of what the regs say, what’s the impact of all this is on consumers and competition? On that point, it’s hard for me to see how those old number portability regulations make sense if they limit the ability of incumbents to play hard-ball in an attempt to retain customers. After all, that’s what we should want more of in the marketplace: good ol’ fashion head-to-head, facilities-based competition….

Bottom line: the FCC should be careful about regulating customer inducements by incumbents whether those offers happen before or after the porting process. The better approach would be to make sure that the incumbents can offer whatever inducements they want but then also make sure that rivals have a clear opportunity to respond and beat the offer.

Amen!

PFF has just releasing an updated edition of my booklet on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.” The new version, Version 3.0, includes two new appendixes and updates to each section to reflect new parental control tools and programs developed in the last nine months.

The updated report is timely as it comes on the heels of the recently-announced Internet Safety Technical Task Force, which is being chaired by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. I am privileged to serve as a member of the Task Force, which is evaluating various online safety technologies and strategies and then reporting back to state attorneys general with our findings.

Those issues and much more are covered in the latest edition of my report. The report explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education efforts, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety. I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As I conclude after evaluating that state of the market: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”

Version 3.0 of the special report, now over 200 pages, contains over fifty exhibits and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. A greatly expanded section on video empowerment technologies has also been included. Finally, two appendices have also been added: a comprehensive legislative index cataloging over thirty bills introduced in Congress on these issues (complied with John Morris of Center for Democracy & Technology), and a glossary of 35 relevant terms and cases.

The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, as are the previous editions. And I am happy to provide hard copies to those who are interested.

PFF has just released my latest paper entitled “Parental Control Perfection? The Impact of the DVR and VOD Boom on the Debate over TV Content Regulation.” In the report, I focus on the extent to which new video technologies, such as digital video recorders (DVRs) and video on demand (VOD) services, are changing the way households consume media and are helping parents better tailor viewing experiences to their tastes and values. I provide evidence showing the rapid spread of these technologies and discuss how parents are using these tools in their homes. Finally, I argue that these developments will have profound implications for debates over the regulation of video programming. As parents are given the ability to more effectively manage their family’s viewing habits and experiences, it will lessen—if not completely undercut—the need for government intervention on their behalf.

This 16-page report can be found at: http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.20DVRboomcontentreg.pdf

In an interesting post today, Glenn Fleishman explores what AT&T’s purchase of 700 MHz spectrum from Aloha Partners today means for Verizon. While my conspiracy theory radar tingles a bit, I had this same thought earlier today. No point in paraphrasing; enter the blockquote.

AT&T spends $2.5b for 12 MHz across 200m people in the 700 MHz band: Let’s talk two-steps-ahead. In the terms for the C Block licenses that Google wanted very open and Verizon and AT&T wanted to have cell-spectrum-like restrictions, AT&T did a volte-face and said it would agree to most of the openness that Google wanted. Huh, I said, I wonder what made them do that? Well, it’s gamesmanship. AT&T was obviously already in a position to acquire Aloha Partners’s licenses.

This means that AT&T is reverse-encumbering the other band. While the C Block involves more bandwidth and greater coverage, Verizon is now in a worse position because of the lack of device and application lock-in if they choose to bid in 700 MHz as AT&T will already have holdings. AT&T can have the flexibility to deploy different services in the different 700 MHz blocks. I think.

AT&T can now focus on bidding on the A and B blocks, which can compliment their Aloha acquisition and which don’t come with open-access restrictions. So did AT&T pull off a Machiavellian ploy to saddle Verizon with an open access mandate?