We zero in on the distinction between general versus targeted economic development efforts and argue that:

whether we are referring to federal, state, or local planning efforts—the more highly tar­geted development efforts typically involve many tradeoffs that are often not taken into consider­ation by industrial policy advocates. Downsides include government steering of public resources into unproductive endeavors, as well as more serious problems, such as cronyism and even corruption.

We also stress the need to more tightly define the term “industrial policy” to ensure rational evaluation is even possible. We argue that, “industrial policy has intentionality and directionality, which distinguishes it from science policy, innovation policy, and economic policy more generally.” We like the focus definition used by economist Nathaniel Lane, who defines industrial policy as “intentional political action meant to shift the industrial structure of an economy.”

Our report examines the so-called “Japan model” of industrial policy that was all the rage in intellectual circles a generation ago and then compares it to the Chinese and European industrial policy efforts of today, which many pundits claim that the US needs to mimic. We find problems with those models and argue that:

America’s goal should not be to “imitate China” or “copy its playbook” when it comes to targeted industrial policy and technological governance of AI and other high-tech sectors. Europe’s approach, although not as heavy-handed, is also not a good model. Not only would the Chinese and European approaches potentially undermine the permissionless innovation ethos that made America’s tech companies become global powerhouses, but expanded industrial policy efforts would entail massive state bets on risky ventures using taxpayer resources.

We discuss the public choice dynamics surrounding many industrial development efforts and note that, “what is often described as “industrial policy” is in reality nothing more than industrial politics.” We highlight how many of the largest industrial policy programs have been prone to highly inefficient contracting procedures and massive cost overruns. Sometimes outright corruption even becomes a problem with some of the largest programs. But that’s not the only cost. Sometimes, in their effort to promote specific industrial outputs or outcomes, government undermines the very innovation they hope to spur.

When governments repress the entrepreneurial spirit of their most innovative creators and companies, this is bound to have negative ramifications for long-term competitiveness and economic growth. Heavy-handed industrial policy schemes can contribute to this sort of repression as the state gains more levers of control over private companies.

We note how that has certainly been the case in the European Union, where “countries have adopted a highly precautionary regulatory model for new digital sectors that shuns risk-taking and focuses on maximizing other values at the expense of disruptive change. This approach has resulted in fewer national champions, and it has cost Europe in terms of global competitive advantage,” we note. We also highlight the long string of failed European industrial policy programs.

Ours is not a doctrinaire analysis; we take a pragmatic approach to the evaluation of industrial policy programs and proposals. Some of them may succeed based simply on the reality that “if government officials roll the proverbial industrial policy dice enough times, some bets are bound to pay off, at least indirectly.” But any serious analysis of these efforts, we argue, must fully weigh the trade-offs associated with the potential tax and compliance burdens associated with funding them to begin with.

But we admit that, “industrial policy will always be with us to some extent, given the sheer size of government and the many existing programs already devoted to economic development or high-tech initiatives.” Toward that end, we wrap up the paper with a variety of high-level recommendations about industrial policy. We highlight how:

The priority should be generalized economic development over targeted development efforts. The most important thing that policymakers can do to boost economic opportunities is to create a legal and regulatory environment that is conducive to entrepreneurship, investment, innovation, and free trade.  [. . . ] government should focus on setting the table for entrepreneurial activity instead of trying to determine everything on the plate. To put this differently, policymakers need to avoid the “fun stuff” and focus on “boring” issues that often get neglected.

We apply these insights to the ongoing debate over regional economic development and the specific effort currently underway at the federal level to encourage “regional innovation hubs,” as federal and state lawmakers look to create “the next Silicon Valley” elsewhere.

In terms of our nation’s overall investment in R&D, we note that “[t]he United States has the most vibrant venture capital (VC) market in the world, and this market helps support risky ventures without gambling with taxpayer dollars.” While some bemoan the fact that private enterprise provides the bulk of R&D expenditures in the US – and that amount is increasing relative to governmental sources – this is actually something that should be celebrated. The strength of private-funded R&D helps set the US apart and make investment markets nimbler and more responsive to real-world needs. Moreover, global unicorn growth in the US continues at a healthy clip. From 2010 to mid-2021, the US created 53 percent of global unicorns, compared with 20 percent for China. These facts are often overlook in industrial policy debates.

While our paper is comprehensive, admittedly, there are some things we leave out of the analysis or do not spend as much time discussing. For example, there is a never-ending debate about the relationship between national security and industrial policy that raises many hard questions. A nation needs military hardware to defend itself, and almost every program to provide weapons and military equipment in the US involve private contracting to get them. These are the biggest industrial policy programs at all, but we don’t spend a lot of time focus on them in our paper because that would have taken us far afield.

We have a short section on these issues that notes how “defense-related programs have also been prone to highly inefficient contracting procedures and massive cost overruns.” Many of these programs remain vital, however, and must find a way to make them more efficient and cost-effective. But there are still other issues related to national security and industrial policy that raise hard questions, including: export or import controls, trade restrictions, and more. These continue to be challenging issues and I personally hope to revisit some of them in upcoming essays.

With Congress still trying to finalize its mega industrial policy bill, our paper is relevant to the short-term debate over these issues. But our hope is that this paper offers a big-picture, long-term framework for thinking through the challenges associated with industrial policy issues both here and abroad.

Here is the outline of the paper and, again, you can find it at this link. (The report can also be found on SSRN & Research Gate).

1. Introduction: Definitional Challenges 5
2. Calls for Expanding Industrial Policy to Boost High-Tech Innovation 8
3. Some (Quickly Forgotten) Recent History 11
4. The Romantic View of Industrial Policy vs. Reality 15
5. The Challenge of Creating “National Champions”: Europe’s Failures 20
6. Adverse Effects of State-Led Promotion: The China Model Examined 23
7. Where Does Real Competitive Advantage Come From? 27
8. Industrial Policy Did Not Give Us the Internet and the iPhone 33
9. Evaluating Other Industrial Policy Efforts 39
10. Using Competitions and Prizes to Encourage Innovation More Efficiently 46
11. Conclusion: Generality Is Better Than Targeting

Additional Reading:

• Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy Advocates Should Learn from Don Lavoie,” Discourse, November 5, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “Government Planning and Spending Won’t Replicate Silicon Valley,” Discourse, August 18, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “To Promote Tech Hubs Across the Country, Governments Should Focus on Improving the General Business Environment,” Discourse, September 9, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse,” Discourse, June 28, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy as ‘Casino Economics‘,” The Hill, July 12, 2021.
• Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Should the U.S. Copy China’s Industrial Policy?” Discourse, March 11, 2021.
• Connor Haaland & Adam Thierer, “Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?” Discourse, February 11, 2021.
• Matthew D. Mitchell and Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy is a Very Old, New Idea,” Discourse, April 6, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “On Defining ‘Industrial Policy,’” Technology Liberation Front, September 3, 2020.
• Adam Thierer, “Skeptical Takes on Expansive Industrial Policy Efforts,” Technology Liberation Front, ongoing series.

In my latest column for The Hill, I consider that dangers of government gambling our tax dollars on risky industrial policy programs. I begin by noting:

Roll the dice at a casino enough times, and you are bound to win a few games. But knowing the odds are not in your favor, how much are you willing to risk losing by continuing to gamble? This is the same issue governments confront when they gamble taxpayer dollars on industrial policy efforts, which can best be described as targeted and directed efforts to plan for specific future industrial outputs and outcomes. Throwing enough money at risky ventures might net a few wins, but at what cost? Could those resources have been better spent? And do bureaucrats really make better bets than private investors?

I continue on to note that, while the US is embarking on a major new industrial policy push, history does not provide us with a lot of hope regarding Uncle Sam’s betting record when he starts rolling those industrial policy dice. “How much tolerance should the public have for government industrial policy gambling?” I ask. I continue on:

Generally speaking, “basic” support (broad-based funding for universities and research labs) is wiser than “applied” (targeted subsidies for specific firms or sectors). With basic R&D funding, the chances of wasting resources on risky investments can be contained, at least as compared to highly targeted investments in unproven technologies and firms.

I also argue that “The riskiest bets on new technologies and sectors are better left to private investors,” and note how, “America’s venture capital industry remains the envy of the world because it continues to power world-beating advanced technology.” Accordingly, I conclude:

While some government investments will always be necessary, policymakers engaging in casino economics means bad industrial policy bets and taxpayer money squandered on risky ventures best made by private actors. We need to keep Uncle Sam’s gambling habits in check.

Read the whole thing here. And here’s a list of more of my recent writing on industrial policy:

• Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Does the US Need a More Targeted Industrial Policy for AI & High-Tech?” Presentation for IHS Papers Workshop: Does America Need a New Industrial Policy?, forthcoming, July 23, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse,” Discourse, June 28, 2021.
• Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Should the U.S. Copy China’s Industrial Policy?” Discourse, March 11, 2021.
• Connor Haaland & Adam Thierer, “Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?” Discourse, February 11, 2021.
• Matthew D. Mitchell and Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy is a Very Old, New Idea,” Discourse, April 6, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “On Defining ‘Industrial Policy,’” Technology Liberation Front, September 3, 2020.
• “Skeptical Takes on Expansive Industrial Policy Efforts,” Technology Liberation Front, ongoing series.

Our readers may be interested in this excellent WSJ article, Too Risky for Venture Capitalists: Why proposals for a government bailout were roundly rejected.  We should all take heart in the the fact that the venture capital community itself resoundingly opposed the notion of accepting a massive infusion of taxpayer money, especially Tom Friedman’s suggestion:

“You want to spend $20 billion of taxpayer money creating jobs?” Mr. Friedman wrote. “Fine. Call up the top 20 venture capital firms in America” and invest the money with them.

But I see three more reasons why those interested in technology policy should pay attention to this encouraging episode.

First, the groundswell of opposition seems to have been driven largely by the Internet, both as a vehicle for disseminating the bailout proposals and for voicing opposition to them:

Venture capitalists certainly agree that innovators and start-up companies, not bailed-out GMs or Chryslers, will create the new jobs. They rightly brag that almost 20% of U.S. gross domestic product is generated by companies built by venture capital, such as Intel, Apple and Google. Still, they almost universally panned the notion of taxpayer support. Their real-time rejection is an excellent example of how social media — here, the venture community dissecting a proposal online — can now quickly take down bad ideas.

Second, it should almost go without saying that venture capital is the fountainhead of innovation, especially the disruptive innovation that is constantly pushing the envelope of technology policy.  A healthy VC sector is the bedrock of a dynamic, free and innovative economy.  The VCs realize that this requires, more than anything else, avoiding the market distortions caused by government funding:

“The top venture firms don’t want, don’t need and are never going to take government money. The same is true of the top entrepreneurs,” Fred Wilson of New York’s Union Square Ventures wrote on his blog. “The worst firms, on the other hand, will gladly accept government money,” which would go to investors who can’t raise funds privately and to entrepreneurs whose ideas shouldn’t be funded. “It’s a problem of adverse selection….” The idea of direct government funding is also anathema because it would undermine market discipline. Pension funds, endowments and other institutional investors keep a close eye on how their invested money is doing. Venture firms can raise new funds only if their previous performance was good. Several venture capitalists pointed out the irony that government-funded venture capital could mean trading a credit bubble for another technology bubble. Artificially inflating the venture coffers through a government fund could risk repeating the debacle of 1999-2000, when too much money chased too few good ideas, resulting in the sharp deflation of the Internet bubble. 

Third, the VC community’s response should serve as a lesson for other industries, but particularly high-tech industries, about how the government subsidies they find attractive today in a time of intense pressure on their bottom lines could ultimately harm them.  Instead of jumping on bailout bandwagon, perhaps these industries ought to focus their lobbying efforts on some of the eminently sensible suggestions coming from the VC community, such as the following:

If policy makers want to help entrepreneurs and their investors, there’s no mystery about what’s needed. Immigration needs to be reopened. Venture capital is still available, but the U.S. is now a laggard in the other half of the equation, which is making sure the entrepreneur’s sweat, energy and risk-taking can ultimately pay off. Sarbanes-Oxley helped kill the market for public offerings, which had been a lucrative step for successful start-ups. Income taxes are going up, not down. And the U.S. capital gains tax rate of 15% contrasts with the 0% rate in Hong Kong, Singapore and even Germany, where there’s an understanding that these investments are made with income that’s already been taxed once.

I’ve warned about the dangers of subsidies to the high-tech industry, but I do recognize that the unintended consequences of  subsidizing technological innovation may far outstrip those of subsidizing technological infrastructure, which is what the Obama administration seems to be focused on.  Indeed, if one is going to spend taxpayer money on any subsidies in the name of “stimulus,” it’s difficult to think of a better way to spend that money than on promoting broadband deployment and adoption (however much of a myth it is that we are lagging behind the rest of the world in these areas).  

Still, no matter how worthy the objective, all subsidies distort markets. Few do as much damage as those showered on industries particularly based on risk—e.g., venture capital and financial markets.  But whatever these distortions, the Golden Rule still applies: he who has the gold, makes the rules!  With government subsidies, come government controls.

MIT’s Technology Review has a great review of a new biography of Georges Doriot (Wikipedia) by Businessweek Editor Spencer E. Ante entitled, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital.  Born in France, Doriot fought in World War I, then studied at Harvard Business School, served as director of the U.S. military’s Military Planning Division during World War II as a brigadier general, and in 1946 launched American Research and Development Corporation (ARD) as the first publicly owned venture capital firm.

Doriot’s legacy looms large today, even if his name is new to most:

Contemporaneously with ARD’s watershed investment in [Digital Equipment Corporation], others began walking the trails Doriot had blazed: Arthur Rock (a student of Doriot’s in the Harvard class of 1951) backed the departure of the “Traitorous Eight” from Shockley Semiconductor to form ­Fairchild Semiconductor in 1957, then funded ­Robert Noyce and ­Gordon Moore when they left ­Fairchild to found Intel; ­Laurance ­Rockefeller formed ­Venrock, which has since backed more than 400 companies, including Intel and Apple; Don ­Valentine formed Sequoia Capital, which would invest in Atari, Apple, Oracle, Cisco, Google, and YouTube.

Doriot himself would likely have felt at home among today’s embattled and outnumbered regulation-skeptics in the technology policy community:

he opposed both the dirigiste political economy of his native France and the tax hikes and anticompetitive laws enacted in the United States under the New Deal. Such regulations, he maintained, arrogated to bureaucrats the function of the markets; their worst feature was that they let government lend money to failing businesses. Ante notes that a former colleague of Doriot’s, James F. Morgan, recalled him as “the most schizophrenic Frenchman I’ve ever met”–devoted to his original land’s wine, cuisine, and language even as “the French capacity to make very simple things complicated drove him nuts.”

Even more intriguing is what Doriot’s experience has to say about the vital role that corporations and securities laws plays in facilitating–or hindering–innovation by constraining the structures of the investment vehicles that fund the commercialization of new technologies:

Doriot endured bureaucratic regulators who did not understand or care how a venture capital firm differed from other investment companies. ARD suffered because, since it was incorporated as a publicly traded investment company, its employees could not generally receive stock options in its portfolio companies, despite Doriot’s ceaseless pleas to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The reality that Doriot’s company faced from 1959 onward was that a new organizational form–the limited partnership, born in Texas’s oil-wildcatting industry–was being adopted by newer VC firms. Ante quotes a former ARD executive who recalled that after he supervised the IPO of one portfolio company, the net worth of that company’s CEO “went from 0 to $10 million and I got a $2,000 raise.” A VC limited partnership, by contrast, gave its general partners not just management fees but also portions of its capital gains; additionally, it permitted profits to be passed on to its investors without incurring corporate taxes, and it mandated that limited partners stand clear of management. Small wonder that when Perkins helped found Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers in 1972, it was as a limited partnership. When Doriot finally accepted the SEC’s intransigence, he deemed ARD “not competitive anymore” and sought the merger with Textron. Similar disagreements continue between government and industry. After the dot-com and telecom crashes, Washington passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new accounting rules for expensing stock options, despite the predictions of many tech­nology executives and VCs that regulation would undermine innovation. John Doerr at Kleiner ­Perkins, for one, believes that that happened: ­”Sarbanes-Oxley did have some chilling effects on technology startups in terms of the cost of being able to go public.”

R.I.P., Monsieur Dorian.  I look forward to reading Ante’s biography.

Note that an audio version of the Technology Review article is available in audio form (Flash, MP3) as part of TR’s podcast of all their stories.  Once you get used to the Audiodizer computer voices that read the story–whose unintentionally hilarious mispronunciations and mis-emphases I have grown to love–the podcast becomes a valuable source of high-quality tech news and commentary.