Recently, the Future of Life Institute released an open letter that included some computer science luminaries and others  calling for a 6-month “pause” on the deployment and research of “giant” artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Eliezer Yudkowsky, a prominent AI ethicist, then made news by arguing that the “pause” letter did not go far enough and he proposed that governments consider “airstrikes” against data processing centers, or even be open to the use of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, quite insane. Yet, this is the state of the things today as a AI technopanic seems to growing faster than any of the technopanic that I’ve covered in my 31 years in the field of tech policy—and I have covered a lot of them.

In a new joint essay co-authored with Brent Orrell of the American Enterprise Institute and Chris Messerole of Brookings, we argue that “the ‘pause’ we are most in need of is one on dystopian AI thinking.” The three of us recently served on a blue-ribbon  Commission on Artificial Intelligence Competitiveness, Inclusion, and Innovation, an independent effort assembled by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In our essay, we note how:

Many of these breakthroughs and applications will already take years to work their way through the traditional lifecycle of development, deployment, and adoption and can likely be managed through legal and regulatory systems that are already in place. Civil rights laws, consumer protection regulations, agency recall authority for defective products, and targeted sectoral regulations already govern algorithmic systems, creating enforcement avenues through our courts and by common law standards allowing for development of new regulatory tools that can be developed as actual, rather than anticipated, problems arise.

“Instead of freezing AI we should leverage the legal, regulatory, and informal tools at hand to manage existing and emerging risks while fashioning new tools to respond to new vulnerabilities,” we conclude. Also on the pause idea, it’s worth checking out this excellent essay from Bloomberg Opinion editors on why “An AI ‘Pause’ Would Be a Disaster for Innovation.”

The problem is not with the “pause” per se. Even if the signatories could somehow enforce a worldwide stop-work order, six months probably wouldn’t do much to halt advances in AI. If a brief and partial moratorium draws attention to the need to think seriously about AI safety, it’s hard to see much harm. Unfortunately, a pause seems likely to evolve into a more generalized opposition to progress.

The editors continue on to rightly note:

This is a formula for outright stagnation. No one can ever be fully confident that a given technology or application will only have positive effects. The history of innovation is one of trial and error, risk and reward. One reason why the US leads the world in digital technology — why it’s home to virtually all the biggest tech platforms — is that it did not preemptively constrain the industry with well-meaning but dubious regulation. It’s no accident that all the leading AI efforts are American too.

That is 100% right, and I appreciate the Bloomberg editors linking to my latest study on AI governance when they made this point. In this new R Street Institute study, I explain why “Getting AI Innovation Culture Right,” is essential to make sure we can enjoy the many benefits that algorithmic systems offer, while also staying competitive in the global race for competitive advantage in this space.

That report is the first in a trilogy of big studies on decentralized, flexible governance of artificial intelligence. We can achieve AI safety without crushing top-down bans or unworkable “pauses,” I argue. My next two papers are, “Flexible, Pro-Innovation Governance Strategies for Artificial Intelligence” (due out April 20th) and “Existential Risks & Global Governance Issues Surrounding AI & Robotics” (due out late May or early June). I’m also working on a co-authored essay taking a deep dive into the idea of AI impact assessments / auditing (late Spring / early Summer).

Relatedly, on April 7th, DeepLearningAI held an event on “Why at 6-Month AI Pause is a Bad Idea” featuring leading AI scientists Andrew Ng and Yann LeCun discussing the trade-offs associated with the proposal. A crucial point made in the discussion is that a pause, especially a pause in the form of a governmental ban, would be a misguided innovation policy decision. They stressed that there will be policy interventions to address targeted risks from specific algorithmic applications, but that it would be a serious mistake to stop the overall development of the underlying technological capabilities. It’s worth watching.

For more on AI policy, here’s a list of some of my latest reports and essays. Much more to come. AI policy will be the biggest tech policy fight of the our lifetimes.

• Adam Thierer, “Getting AI Innovation Culture Right,” R Street Institute Policy Study No. 281 (March 2023).
• Adam Thierer, “Can We Predict the Jobs and Skills Needed for the AI Era?,” R Street Institute Policy Study No. 278 (March 2023).
• Adam Thierer, “U.S. Chamber AI Commission Report Offers Constructive Path Forward,” R Street Blog, March 9, 2023.
• Adam Thierer, “What If Everything You’ve Heard about AI Policy is Wrong?” Medium, February 20, 2023.
• Adam Thierer, “Policy Ramifications of the ChatGPT Moment: AI Ethics Meets Evasive Entrepreneurialism,” Medium, February 14, 2023.
• Adam Thierer, “Mapping the AI Policy Landscape Circa 2023: Seven Major Fault Lines,” R Street Blog, February 9, 2023.
• Adam Thierer, “Artificial Intelligence Primer: Definitions, Benefits & Policy Challenges,” Medium, December 2, 2022.
• Neil Chilson & Adam Thierer, “The Coming Onslaught of ‘Algorithmic Fairness’ Regulations,” Regulatory Transparency Project of the Federalist Society, November 2, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “We Really Need To ‘Have a Conversation’ About AI … or Do We?” Discourse, October 6, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “How the Embedding of AI Ethics Works in Practice & How It Can Be Improved,” Medium, September 22, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “No Goldilocks Formula for Content Moderation in Social Media or the Metaverse, But Algorithms Still Help,” Medium, September 13, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “AI Eats the World: Preparing for the Computational Revolution and the Policy Debates Ahead,” Medium, September 10, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “‘Running Code and Rough Consensus’ for AI: Polycentric Governance in the Algorithmic Age,” Medium, September 1, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “AI Governance ‘on the Ground’ vs ‘on the Books,’” Medium, August 19, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “Why the Future of AI Will Not Be Invented in Europe,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “Existential Risks & Global Governance Issues around AI & Robotics,” [DRAFT CHAPTER, July 2022].
• Adam Thierer, “How Science Fiction Dystopianism Shapes the Debate over AI & Robotics,” Discourse, July 26, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “Why is the US Following the EU’s Lead on Artificial Intelligence Regulation?” The Hill, July 21, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “Algorithmic Auditing and AI Impact Assessments: The Need for Balance,” Medium, July 13, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “The Proper Governance Default for AI,” Medium, May 26, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “What I Learned about the Power of AI at the Cleveland Clinic,” Medium, May 6, 2022.

James Pethokousis of AEI interviews me about the current miserable state of modern science fiction, which is just dripping with dystopian dread in every movie, show, and book plot. How does all the techno-apocalyptica affect societal and political attitudes about innovation broadly and emerging technologies in particular. Our discussion builds on my recent a recent Discourse article, “How Science Fiction Dystopianism Shapes the Debate over AI & Robotics.” [Pasted down below.] Swing on over to Jim’s “Faster, Please” newsletter and hear what Jim and I have to say. And, for a bonus question, Jim asked me is we doing a good job of inspiring kids to have a sense of wonder and to take risks. I have some serious concerns that we are falling short on that front.

How Science Fiction Dystopianism Shapes the Debate over AI & Robotics

[Originally ran on Discourse on July 26, 2022.]

George Jetson will be born this year. We don’t know the exact date of this fictional cartoon character’s birth, but thanks to some skillful Hanna-Barbera hermeneutics the consensus seems to be sometime in 2022.

In the same episode that we learn George’s approximate age, we’re also told the good news that his life expectancy in the future is 150 years old. It was one of the many ways The Jestons, though a cartoon for children, depicted a better future for humanity thanks to exciting innovations. Another was a helpful robot named Rosie, along with a host of other automated technologies—including a flying car—that made George and his family’s life easier.

Most fictional portrayals of technology today are not as optimistic as  The Jetsons, however. Indeed, public and political conceptions about artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics in particular are being strongly shaped by the relentless dystopianism of modern science fiction novels, movies and television shows. And we are worse off for it.

AI, machine learning, robotics and the power of computational science hold the potential to drive explosive economic growth and profoundly transform a diverse array of sectors, while providing humanity with countless technological improvements in medicine and healthcare, financial services, transportation, retail, agriculture, entertainment, energy, aviation, the automotive industry and many others. Indeed, these technologies are already deeply embedded in these and other industries and making a huge difference.

But that progress could be slowed and in many cases even halted if public policy is shaped by a precautionary-principle-based mindset that imposes heavy-handed regulation based on hypothetical worst-case scenarios. Unfortunately, the persistent dystopianism found in science fiction portrayals of AI and robotics conditions the ground for public policy debates, while also directing attention away from some of the more real and immediate issues surrounding these technologies.

Incessant Dystopianism Untethered from Reality

In his recent book Robots, Penn State business professor John Jordan observes how over the last century “science fiction set the boundaries of the conceptual playing field before the engineers did.” Pointing to the plethora of literature and film that depicts robots, he notes: “No technology has ever been so widely described and explored before its commercial introduction.” Not the internet, cell phones, atomic energy or any others.

Indeed, public conceptions of these technologies, and even the very vocabulary of the field, has been shaped heavily by sci-fi plots beginning a hundred years ago with the 1920 play  R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), which gave us the term “robot,” and Fritz Lang’s 1927 silent film Metropolis, with its memorable Maschinenmensch, or “machine-human.” There has been a deep and rich imagination surrounding AI and robotics since then, but it has tended to be mostly negative and has grown more hostile over time.

The result has been a public and policy dialogue about AI and robotics that is focused on an endless parade of horribles about these technologies. Not surprisingly, popular culture also affects journalistic framings of AI and robotics. Headlines breathlessly scream of how “Robots May Shatter the Global Economic Order Within a Decade,” but only if we’re not dead already because… “If Robots Kill Us, It’s Because It’s Their Job.”

Dark depictions of AI and robotics are ever-present in popular modern sci-fi movies and television shows. A short list includes:  2001: A Space Odyssey, Avengers: Age of Ultron, Battlestar Galactica (both the 1978 original and the 2004 reboot), Black Mirror, Blade Runner, Ex Machina, Her, The Matrix, Robocop, The Stepford Wives, Terminator, Transcendence, Tron, WALL-E, Wargames and Westworld, among countless others. The least nefarious plots among these films and television shows rest on the idea that AI and robotics are going to drive us to a life of distraction, addiction or sloth. In more extreme cases, we’re warned about a future in which we are either going to be enslaved or destroyed by our new robotic or algorithmic overlords.

Don’t get me wrong; the movies and shows on the above list are some of my favorites.  2001 and Blade Runner are both in my top 5 all-time flicks, and the reboot of Battlestar is one of my favorite TV shows. The plots of all these movies and shows are terrifically entertaining and raise many interesting issues that make for fun discussions.

But they are not representative of reality. In fact, the vast majority of computer scientists and academic experts on AI and robotics agree that claims about machine “superintelligence” are wildly overplayed and that there is no possibility of machines gaining human-equivalent knowledge any time soon—or perhaps ever. “In any ranking of near-term worries about AI, superintelligence should be far down the list,” argues Melanie Mitchell, author of Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans.

Contra the  Terminator-esque nightmares envisioned in so many sci-fi plots, MIT roboticist Rodney Brooks says that “fears of runaway AI systems either conquering humans or making them irrelevant aren’t even remotely well grounded.” John Jordan agrees, noting: “The fear and uncertainty generated by fictional representations far exceed human reactions to real robots, which are often reported to be ‘underwhelming.’”

The same is true for AI more generally. “A close inspection of AI reveals an embarrassing gap between actual progress by computer scientists working on AI and the futuristic visions they and others like to describe,” says Erik Larson, author of, The Myth of Artificial Intelligence: Why Computers Can’t Think the Way We Do. Larson refers to this extreme thinking about superintelligent AI as “technological kitsch,” or exaggerated sentimentality and melodrama that is untethered from reality. Yet, the public imagination remains captivated by tales of impending doom.

Seeding the Ground with Misery and Misguided Policy

But isn’t it all just harmless fun? After all, it’s just make believe. Moreover, can’t science fiction—no matter how full of techno-misery—help us think through morally weighty issues and potential ethical conundrums involving AI and robotics?

Yes and no. Titillating fiction has always had a cathartic element to it and helped us cope with the unknown and mysterious. Most historians believe it was Aristotle in his Poetics who first used the term katharsis when discussing how Greek tragedies helped the audience “through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.”

But are modern science fiction depictions of AI and robotics helping us cope with technological change, or instead just stoking a constant fear of it? Modern sci-fi isn’t so much purging negative emotion about the topic at hand as it is endlessly adding to the sense of dread surrounding these technologies. What are the societal and political ramifications of a cultural frame of reference that suggests an entire new class of computational technologies will undermine rather than enrich our human experiences and, possibly, our very existence?

The New Yorker’s Jill Lepore says we live in “A Golden Age for Dystopian Fiction,” but she worries that this body of work “cannot imagine a better future, and it doesn’t ask anyone to bother to make one.” She argues this “fiction of helplessness and hopelessness” instead “nurses grievances and indulges resentments” and that “[i]ts only admonition is: Despair more.” Lapore goes so far as to claim that, because “the radical pessimism of an unremitting dystopianism” has appeal to many on both the left and right, it “has itself contributed to the unravelling of the liberal state and the weakening of a commitment to political pluralism.”

I’m not sure dystopian fiction is driving the unravelling of pluralism, but Lapore is on to something when she notes how a fiction rooted in misery about the future will likely have political consequences at some point.

Techno-panic Thinking Shapes Policy Discussions

The ultimate question is whether public policy toward new AI and robotic technologies will be shaped by this hyperpessimistic thinking in the form of precautionary principle regulation, which essentially treats innovations as “guilty until proven innocent” and seeks to intentionally slow or retard their development.

If the extreme fears surrounding AI and robotics  do inspire precautionary controls—as they already have in the European Union—then we need to ask how the preservation of the technological status quo could undermine human well-being by denying society important new life-enriching and life-saving goods and services. Technological stasis does not provide a safer or healthier society, but instead holds back our collective ability to innovate, prosper and better our lives in meaningful ways.

Louis Anslow, curator of  Pessimists Archive calls this “the Black Mirror fallacy,” referencing the British television show that has enjoyed great success peddling tales of impending techno-disasters. Anslow defines the fallacy as follows: “When new technologies are treated as much more threatening and risky than old technologies with proven risks/harms. When technological progress is seen as a bigger threat than technological stagnation.”

Anslow’s Pessimists Archive collects real-world case studies of how moral panic and techno-panics have accompanied the introduction of new inventions throughout history. He notes, “Science fiction has conditioned us to be hypervigilant about avoiding dystopias born of technological acceleration and totally indifferent to avoiding dystopias born of technological stagnation.”

Techno-panics can have real-world consequences when they come to influence policymaking. Robert Atkinson, president of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), has documented the many ways that “the social and political commentary [about AI] has been hype, bordering on urban myth, and even apocalyptic.” The more these attitudes and arguments come to shape policy considerations, the more likely it is precautionary principle-based recommendations will drive AI and robotics policy, preemptively limiting their potential. ITIF has published a report documenting “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” identifying how it will slow algorithmic advances in key sectors.

Similarly, in his important recent book Where Is My Flying Car ?, scientist J. Storrs Hall documents how “regulation clobbered the learning curve” for many important technologies in the U.S. over the last half century, especially nuclear, nanotech and advanced aviation. Society lost out on many important innovations due to endless bureaucratic delays, often thanks to opposition from special interests, anti-innovation activists, overzealous trial lawyers and a hostile media. Hall explained how this also sent a powerful signal to talented young people who might have been considering careers in those sectors. Why go into a field demonized by so many and where your creative abilities will be hamstrung by precautionary constraints?

Disincentivizing Talent

Hall argues that in those crucial sectors, this sort of mass talent migration “took our best and brightest away from improving our lives,” and he warns that those who still hope to make a career in such fields should be prepared to be “misconstrued and misrepresented by activists, demonized by ignorant journalists, and strangled by regulation.”

Is this what the future holds for AI and robotics? Hopefully not, and America continues to generate world-class talent on this front today in a diverse array of businesses and university programs. But if the waves of negativism about AI and robotics persist, we shouldn’t be surprised if it results in a talent shift away from building these technologies and toward fields that instead look to restrict them.

For example, Hall documents how, following the sudden shift in public attitudes surrounding nuclear power 50 years ago, “interests, and career prospects, in nuclear physics imploded” and “major discoveries stopped coming.” Meanwhile, enrollment in law schools and other soft sciences typically critical of technological innovation enjoyed greater success. Nobody writes any sci-fi stories about what a disaster that development has been for innovation in the energy sphere, even though it is now abundantly clear how precautionary principle policies have undermined environment goals and human welfare, with major geopolitical consequences for many nations.

If America loses the talent race on the AI front, it has ramifications for global competitive advantage going forward, especially as China races to catch up. In a world of global innovation arbitrage, talent and venture capital will flow to wherever it is treated most hospitably. Demonizing AI and robotics won’t help recruit or retain the next generation of talent and investors America needs to remain on top.

Flipping the Script

Some folks have had enough of the relentless pessimism surrounding technology and progress in modern science fiction and are trying to do something to reverse it. In a 2011  Wired essay decrying the dangers of “Innovation Starvation,” the acclaimed novelist Neal Stephenson decried the fact that “the techno-optimism of the Golden Age of [science fiction] has given way to fiction written in a generally darker, more skeptical and ambiguous tone.” While good science fiction, “supplies a plausible, fully thought-out picture of an alternate reality in which some sort of compelling innovation has taken place,” Stephenson said modern sci-fi was almost entirely focused on its potential downsides.

To help reverse this trend, Stephenson worked with the Center for Science and the Imagination at Arizona State University to launch Project Hieroglyph, an effort to support authors willing to take a more optimistic view of the future. It yielded a 2014 book, Hieroglyph: Stories and Visions for a Better Future that included almost 20 contributors. Later, in 2018, The Verge launched the “Better Worlds” project to support 10 writers of “stories that inspire hope” about innovation and the future. “Contemporary science fiction often feels fixated on a sort of pessimism that peers into the world of tomorrow and sees the apocalypse looming more often than not,” said Verge culture editor Laura Hudson when announcing the project.

Unfortunately, these efforts have not captured much public attention and that’s hardly surprising. “Pessimism has always been big box office,” says science writer Matt Ridley, primary because it really is more entertaining. Even though many of great sci-fi writers of the past, including Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, and Robert Heinlein, wrote positively about technology, they ultimately had more success selling stories with darker themes. It’s just the nature of things more generally, from the best of Greek tragedy to Shakespeare and on down the line. There’s a reason they’re still rebooting Beowulf all these years later, after all.

So, There’s Star Trek and What Else?

While technological innovation will never enjoy the respect it deserves for being the driving force behind human progress, one can at least hope that more pop culture treatments of it might give it a fair shake. When I ask crowds of people to name a popular movie or television show that includes mostly positive depictions of technology, Star Trek is usually the first (and sometimes the only) thing people mention. It’s true that, on balance, technology was treated as a positive force in the original series, although “V’Ger”—a defunct space probe that attains a level of consciousness—was the prime antagonist in Star Trek: The Motion Picture. Later, Star Trek: The Next Generation gave us the always helpful android Data, but also created the lasting mental image of the Borg, a terrifying race of cyborgs hell-bent on assimilating everyone into their hive mind.

The Borg provided some of The Next Generation’s most thrilling moments, but also created a new cultural meme, with tech critics often worrying about how today’s humans are being assimilated into the hive mind of modern information systems. Philosopher Michael Sacasas even coined the term “the Borg Complex,” to refer to a supposed tendency “exhibited by writers and pundits who explicitly assert or implicitly assume that resistance to technology is futile.” After years of a friendly back-and-forth with Sacasas, I felt compelled to even wrap up my book Permissionless Innovation with a warning to other techno-optimists not to fall prey to this deterministic trap when defending technological change. Regardless of where one falls on that issue, the fact that Sacasas and I were having a serious philosophical discussion premised on a famous TV plotline serves as another indication of how much science fiction shapes public and intellectual debate over progress and innovation.

And, truth be told, some movies know how to excite the senses without resorting to dystopianism.  Interstellar and The Martian are two recent examples that come to mind. Interestingly, space exploration technologies themselves usually get a fair shake in many sci-fi plots, often only to be undermined by onboard Ais or androids, as occurred not only in 2001 with the eerie HAL 9000, but also Alien.

There are some positive (and sometimes humorous) depictions of robots as in  Robot & Frank, or touching ones as in Bicentennial Man. Beyond The Jetsons, other cartoons like Iron Giant and Big Hero 6 offer more kindly visions of robots. KITT, a super-intelligent robot car, was Michael Knight’s dependable ally in NBC’s Knight Rider. And R2-D2 is always a friendly helper throughout the Star Wars franchise. But generally speaking, modern sci-fi continues to churn out far more negativism about AI and robotics.

What If We Took It All Seriously?

So long as the public and political imagination is spellbound by machine machinations that dystopian sci-fi produces, we’ll be at risk of being stuck with absurd debates that have no meaningful solution other than “Stop the clock!” or “Ban it all!” Are we really being assimilated into the Borg hive mind, or just buying time until a coming robopocalypse grinds us into dust (or dinner)?

If there was a kernel of truth to any of this, then we should adopt some of the extreme solutions, Nick Bostrom of Oxford suggests in his writing on these issues. Those radical steps include worldwide surveillance and enforcement mechanisms for scientists and researchers developing algorithmic and robotic systems, as well as some sort of global censorship of information about these capabilities to ensure the technology is not used by bad actors.

To Bostrom’s great credit, he is at least willing to tell us how far he’d go. Most of today’s tech critics prefer to just spread a gospel of gloom and doom and suggest  something must be done, without getting into the ugly details about what a global control regime for computational science and robotic engineering looks like. We should reject such extremist hypothesizing and understand that silly sci-fi plots, bombastic headlines and kooky academic writing should not be our baseline for serious discussions about the governance of artificial intelligence and robotics.

At the same time, we absolutely should consider what downsides any technology poses for individuals and society. And, yes, some precautions will be needed of a regulatory nature. But most of the problems envisioned by sci-fi writers are not what we should be concerned with. There are far more specific and nuanced problems AI and robotics confronts us with today that deserve more serious consideration and governance steps. How to program safer drones and driverless cars, improve the accuracy of algorithmic medical and financial technologies, and ensure better transparency for government uses of AI are all more mundane but very important issues that require reasoned discussion and balanced solutions today. Dystopian thinking gives us no roadmap to get there other than extreme solutions.

Imagining a Better Future

The way forward here is neither to indulge in apocalyptic fantasies nor pollyannaish techno-optimism, but to approach these technologies with reasoned risk analysis, sensible industry best practices, educational efforts and other agile governance steps. In a forthcoming book on flexible governance strategies for AI and robotics, I outline how these and other strategies are already being formulated to address real-world challenges in fields as diverse as driverless cars, drones, machine learning in medicine and much more.

A wide variety of ethical frameworks, offered by professional associations, academic groups and others, already exists to “bake in” best practices and align AI design with widely shared goals and values while also “keeping humans in the loop” at critical stages of the design process to ensure that they can continue to guide and occasionally realign those values and best practices as needed.

When things do go wrong, many existing remedies are available, including a wide variety of common law solutions (torts, class actions, contract law, etc.), recall authority possessed by many regulatory agencies, and various consumer protection policies and other existing laws. Moreover, the most effective solution to technological problems usually lies in more innovation, not less. It is only through constant trial and error that humanity discovers better  and safer ways of satisfying important wants and needs.

These are complicated and nuanced issues that demand tailored and iterative governance responses. But this should not be done using inflexible, innovation-limiting mandates. Concerns about AI dangers deserve serious consideration and appropriate governance steps to ensure that these systems are beneficial to society. However, there is an equally compelling public interest in ensuring that AI innovations are developed and made widely available to help improve human well-being across many dimensions.

So, enjoy your next dopamine hit of sci-fi hysteria—I know I will, too. But don’t let that be your guide to the world that awaits us. Even if most sci-fi writers can’t imagine a better future, the rest of us can.

A growing number of conservatives are calling for Big Government censorship of social media speech platforms. Censorship proposals are to conservatives what price controls are to radical leftists: completely outlandish, unworkable, and usually unconstitutional fantasies of controlling things that are ultimately much harder to control than they realize. And the costs of even trying to impose and enforce such extremist controls are always enormous.

Earlier this year, The Wall Street Journal ran a response I wrote to a proposal set forth by columnist Peggy Noonan in which she proposed banning everyone under 18 from all social-media sites (“We Can Protect Children and Keep the Internet Free,” Apr. 15). I expanded upon that letter in an essay here entitled, “Should All Kids Under 18 Be Banned from Social Media?” National Review also recently published an article penned by Christine Rosen in which she also proposes to “Ban Kids from Social Media.” And just this week, Zach Whiting of the Texas Public Policy Foundation published an essay on “Why Texas Should Ban Social Media for Minors.”

I’ll offer a few more thoughts here in addition to what I’ve already said elsewhere. First, here is my response to the Rosen essay. National Review gave me 250 words to respond to her proposal:

While admitting that “law is a blunt instrument for solving complicated social problems,” Christine Rosen (“Keep Them Offline,” June 27) nonetheless downplays the radicalness of her proposal to make all teenagers criminals for accessing the primary media platforms of their generation. She wants us to believe that allowing teens to use social media is the equivalent of letting them operate a vehicle, smoke tobacco, or drink alcohol. This is false equivalence. Being on a social-media site is not the same as operating two tons of steel and glass at speed or using mind-altering substances. Teens certainly face challenges and risks in any new media environment, but to believe that complex social pathologies did not exist before the Internet is folly. Echoing the same “lost generation” claims made by past critics who panicked over comic books and video games, Rosen asks, “Can we afford to lose another generation of children?” and suggests that only sweeping nanny-state controls can save the day. This cycle is apparently endless: Those “lost generations” grow up fine, only to claim it’s the  next generation that is doomed! Rosen casually dismisses free-speech concerns associated with mass-media criminalization, saying that her plan “would not require censorship.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Rosen’s prohibitionist proposal would deny teens the many routine and mostly beneficial interactions they have with their peers online every day. While she belittles media literacy and other educational and empowerment-based solutions to online problems, those approaches continue to be a better response than the repressive regulatory regime she would have Big Government impose on society.

I have a few more things to say beyond these brief comments.

First, as I alluded to in my short response to Rosen, we’ve heard similar “lost generation” stories before. Rosen might as well be channeling the ghost of Dr. Fredric Wertham (author of Seduction of the Innocent), who in the 1950s declared comics books a public health menace and lobbied lawmakers to restrict teen access to them, insisting such comics were “the cause of a psychological mutilation of children.” The same sort of “lost generation” predictions were commonplace in countless anti-video game screeds of the 1990s. Critics were writing books with titles like Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill and referring to video games as “murder simulators,” Ironically, just as the video game panic was heating up, juvenile crime rates were plummeting. But that didn’t stop the pundits and policymakers from suggesting that an entire generation of so-called “vidiots” were headed for disaster. (See my 2019 short history: “Confessions of a ‘Vidiot’: 50 Years of Video Games & Moral Panics“).

It is consistently astonishing to me how, as I noted in 2012 essay, “We Always Sell the Next Generation Short.” There seems to be a never-ending cycle of generational mistrust. “There has probably never been a generation since the Paleolithic that did not deplore the fecklessness of the next and worship a golden memory of the past,” notes Matt Ridley, author of The Rational Optimist.

For example, in 1948, the poet T. S. Eliot declared: “We can assert with some confidence that our own period is one of decline; that the standards of culture are lower than they were fifty years ago; and that the evidences of this decline are visible in every department of human activity.” We’ve heard parents (and policymakers) make similar claims about every generation since then.

What’s going on here? Why does this cycle of generational pessimism and mistrust persist? In a 1992 journal article, the late journalism professor Margaret A. Blanchard offered this explanation:

“[P]arents and grandparents who lead the efforts to cleanse today’s society seem to forget that they survived alleged attacks on their morals by different media when they were children. Each generation’s adults either lose faith in the ability of their young people to do the same or they become convinced that the dangers facing the new generation are much more substantial than the ones they faced as children.”

In a 2009 book on culture, my colleague Tyler Cowen also noted how, “Parents, who are entrusted with human lives of their own making, bring their dearest feelings, years of time, and many thousands of dollars to their childrearing efforts.” Unsurprisingly, therefore, “they will react with extreme vigor against forces that counteract such an important part of their life program.” This explains why “the very same individuals tend to adopt cultural optimism when they are young, and cultural pessimism once they have children,” Cowen says.

Building on Blanchard and Cowen’s observation, I have explained how the most simple explanation for this phenomenon is that many parents and cultural critics have passed through their “adventure window.” The willingness of humans to try new things and experiment with new forms of culture—our “adventure window”—fades rapidly after certain key points in life, as we gradually settle in our ways. As the English satirist Douglas Adams once humorously noted: “Anything that is in the world when you’re born is normal and ordinary and is just a natural part of the way the world works. Anything that’s invented between when you’re fifteen and thirty-five is new and exciting and revolutionary and you can probably get a career in it. Anything invented after you’re thirty-five is against the natural order of things.”

There is no doubt social media can create or exacerbate certain social pathologies among youth. But pro-censorship conservatives wants to take the easy way out with a Big Government media ban for the ages.

Ultimately, it’s a solution that will not be effective. Raising children and mentoring youth is certainly the hardest task we face as adults because simple solutions rarely exist to complex human challenges–and the issues kids face are often particularly hard for many parents and adults to grapple with because we often fail to fully understand both the unique issues each generation might face, and we definitely fail to fully grasp the nature of each new medium that youth embrace.  Simplistic solution–even proposals for outright bans–will not work or solve serious problems.

An outright government ban on online platforms or digital devices is likely never going to happen due to First Amendment constraints, but even ignoring the jurisprudential barriers, bans won’t work for a reason that these conservatives never bother considering: Many parents will help their kids get access to those technologies and to evade restrictions on their use. Countless parents already do so in violation of COPPA rules, and not just because they worry that their kid won’t have access to what some other kids have. Rather, many parents (like me) both wanted to make sure I could more easily communicate with them, and also ensure that they could enjoy those technologies and use them to explore the world.

These conservatives might think some parents like me are monsters for allowing my (now grown) children to get on social media when they were teens. I wasn’t blind to the challenges, but recognized that sticking one’s head in the ground or hoping for divine intervention from the Nanny State was impractical and unwise. The hardest conversations I ever had with my kids were about the ugliness they sometimes experienced online, but those conversations were also countered by the many joys that I knew online interactions brought them. Shall I tell you about everything my son learned online before 13 about building model rockets or soapbox derby cars? Or the countless sites my daughter visited gathering ideas for her arts and crafts projects when, before the age of 13, she started hand-painting and selling jean jackets (eventually prompting her to pursue an art school degree)? Again, as I noted in my National Review response, Rosen’s prohibitionist proposal would deny teens these experiences and the countless other routine and entirely beneficial interactions that they have with their peers online every day.

There is simply no substitute for talking to your kids in the most open, understanding, and loving fashion possible. My #1 priority with my own children was not foreclosing all the new digital media platforms and devices at their disposal. That was going to be almost impossible. Other approaches are needed.

Yes, of course, the world can be an ugly place. I mean, have you ever watched the nightly news on television? It’s damn ugly. Shouldn’t we block youth access to it when scenes of war and violence are shown? Newspapers are full of ugliness, too. Should a kid be allowed to see the front page of the paper when it discusses or shows the aftermath of school shootings, acts of terrorism, or even just natural disasters? I could go on, but you get the point. And you could try to claim that somehow today’s social media environment is significantly worse for kids than the mass media of old, but you cannot prove it.

Of course you’ll have anecdotes, and many of them will again point to complex social pathologies. But I have entire shelves full of books on my office wall that made similar claims about the effects of books, the telephone, radio and television, comics, cable TV, every musical medium ever, video games, and advertising efforts across all these mediums. Hundreds upon hundreds of studies were done over the past half century about the effects of depictions of violence in movies, television, and video games. And endless court battles ensued.

In the end, nothing came out of it because the literature was inconclusive and frequently contradictory. After many years of panicking about youth and media violence, in 2020, the American Psychological Association issued a new statement slowly reversing course on misguided past statements about video games and acts of real-world violence. The APA’s old statement said that evidence “confirms [the] link between playing violent video games and aggression.”  But the APA has come around and now says that, “there is insufficient scientific evidence to support a causal link between violent video games and violent behavior.” More specifically, the APA now says: “Violence is a complex social problem that likely stems from many factors that warrant attention from researchers, policy makers and the public. Attributing violence to violent video gaming is not scientifically sound and draws attention away from other factors.”

This is exactly what we should expect to find true for youth and social media. Most of the serious scholars in the field already note studies and findings about youth and social media must be carefully evaluated and that many other factors need to be considered whenever evaluating claims about complex social phenomenon.

While Rosen belittles media literacy and other educational and empowerment-based solutions to online problems, those approaches continue to represent the best first-order response when compared to the repressive regulatory regime she would impose on society.

Finally, I want to just reiterate what I said in my brief  National Review response about the enormous challenges associated with mass criminalization or speech platforms. Rosen seems to image that all the costs and controversies will lie on the supply-side of social media. Just call for a ban and then magically all kids disappear from social media and the big evil tech capitalists eat all the costs and hassles. Nonsense. It’s the demand-side of criminalization efforts where the most serious costs lie. What do you really think kids are going to do if Uncle Sam suddenly does ban everyone under 18 from going on a “social media site,” whatever that very broad term entails? This will become another sad chapter in the history of Big Government prohibitionist efforts that fail miserably, but not before declaring mass groups of people criminals–this time including everyone under 18–and then trying to throw the book at them when they seek to avoid those repressive controls. There are better ways to address these problems than with such extremist proposals.

Additional Reading from Adam Thierer on Media & Content Regulation :

• “Should All Kids Under 18 Be Banned from Social Media?”
• “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?”
• “The APA’s Welcome New Statement on Video Game Violence“
• “Video Games and Moral Panic“
• Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods, 4th Edition.
• “Technopanics and the Great Social Networking Scare“
• “More on Monkey See-Monkey Do Theories about Media Violence & Real-World Crime“
• “Video Games, Media Violence & the Cathartic Effect Hypothesis.”)
• “The Classical Liberal Approach to Digital Media Free Speech Issues“
• “Left and right take aim at Big Tech — and the First Amendment“
• “When It Comes to Fighting Social Media Bias, More Regulation Is Not the Answer“
• “FCC’s O’Rielly on First Amendment & Fairness Doctrine Dangers“
• “Conservatives & Common Carriage: Contradictions & Challenges“
• “The Great Deplatforming of 2021“
• “A Good Time to Re-Read Reagan’s Fairness Doctrine Veto“
• “Sen. Hawley’s Radical, Paternalistic Plan to Remake the Internet“
• “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“
• “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“
• “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“
• “The Not-So-SMART Act“
• “The Surprising Ideological Origins of Trump’s Communications Collectivism“

• “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age,” Catholic University Law School, 15 CommLaw Conspectus (Summer 2007): 431-482.
• Testimony at FCC’s Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era”, March 3, 2010.
• “FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age,”

Here’s a slide presentation on “The Future of Innovation Policy” that I presented to some student groups recently. It builds on themes discussed in my recent books, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, and Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance: How Innovation Improves Economies and Governments. I specifically discuss the tension between permissionless innovation and the precautionary principle as competing policy defaults.

There is a war going on in the conservative movement over free speech issues and FCC Commissioner Mike O’Reilly just became a causality of that skirmish. Neil Chilson and I just posted a new essay about this over on the Federalist Society blog. As we note there:

Plenty of people claim to favor freedom of expression, but increasingly the First Amendment has more fair-weather friends than die-hard defenders. Michael O’Rielly, a Commissioner at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), found that out the hard way this week. Last week, O’Rielly delivered an important speech before the Media Institute highlighting a variety of problematic myths about the First Amendment, as well as “a particularly ominous development in this space.” In a previous political era, O’Rielly’s remarks would have been mainstream conservative fare. But his well-worded warnings are timely with many Democrats and Republicans – including some in the White House – looking to resurrect analog-era speech mandates and let Big Government reassert control over speech decisions in the United States.

Shortly after delivering his remarks, the White House yanked O’Rielly’s nomination to be reappointed to the agency. It was a shocking development that was likely motivated by growing animosities between Republicans on the question of how much control the federal government–and the FCC in particular–should exercise over speech platforms, including platforms that the FCC has no authority to regulate.

For the 30 years that I have been covering media and technology policy, I’ve heard conservatives rail against the Fairness Doctrine, Net Neutrality and arbitrary Big Government only to see many of them now reverse suit and become the biggest defenders of these things as it pertains to speech controls and FCC regulation. It will certainly be interesting to see what a potential future Biden Administration does with the various new regulations that some in the GOP are seeking to impose.

But all hope is not lost. There are still brave voices in Republican and conservative circles who continue to stand up the the First Amendment, freedom of speech, and limits on federal regulatory meddling with speech platforms and outcomes. Commissioner O’Reilly basically lost his job because he acted as the equivalent of an intellectual whistle-blower; he called out the ideological rot seen in recent statements and actions by the White House, Senator Josh Hawley, and many other Republicans.

There is nothing remotely “conservative” about calls for reinvigorating the Fairness Doctrine and FCC speech controls. That represents repressive regulation that betrays the First Amendment and which will ultimately backfire badly and come back to haunt conservatives down the road.

Read my new essay with Neil for more details. And down below I have listed all my recent writing on this topic.

Additional Reading:

• “FCC’s O’Rielly on First Amendment & Fairness Doctrine Dangers“
• “Sen. Hawley’s Radical, Paternalistic Plan to Remake the Internet“
• “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“
• “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“
• “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“
• “The Not-So-SMART Act“
• “The Surprising Ideological Origins of Trump’s Communications Collectivism“

The endless apocalyptic rhetoric surrounding Net Neutrality and many other tech policy debates proves there’s no downside to gloom-and-doomism as a rhetorical strategy. Being a techno-Jeremiah nets one enormous media exposure and even when such a person has been shown to be laughably wrong, the press comes back for more. Not only is there is no penalty for hyper-pessimistic punditry, but the press actually furthers the cause of such “fear entrepreneurs” by repeatedly showering them with attention and letting them double-down on their doomsday-ism. Bad news sells, for both the pundit and the press.

But what is most remarkable is that the press continues to label these preachers of the techno-apocalypse as “experts” despite a track record of failed predictions. I suppose it’s because, despite all the failed predictions, they are viewed as thoughtful & well-intentioned. It is another reminder that John Stuart Mill’s 1828 observation still holds true today: “I have observed that not the man who hopes when others despair, but the man who despairs when others hope, is admired by a large class of persons as a sage.”

Additional Reading:

• Regarding the Use of Apocalyptic Rhetoric in Policy Debates (10/29/14)
• The Problem with “Pessimism Porn” (5/23/14)
• Journalists, Technopanics & the Risk Response Continuum (7/15/12)
• How & Why the Press Sometimes “Sells Digital Fear” (4/8/12)
• law review article: “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle” (2013)

CollegeHumor has created this amazing video, “Black Mirror Episodes from Medieval Times,” which is a fun parody of the relentless dystopianism of the Netflix show “Black Mirror.” If you haven’t watched Black Mirror, I encourage you to do so. It’s both great fun and ridiculously bleak and over-the-top in how it depicts modern or future technology destroying all that is good on God’s green earth.

The CollegeHumor team picks up on that and rewinds the clock about a 1,000 years to imagine how Black Mirror might have played out on a stage during the medieval period. The actors do quick skits showing how books become sentient, plows dig holes to Hell and unleash the devil, crossbows destroy the dexterity of archers, and labor-saving yokes divert people from godly pursuits. As one of the audience members says after watching all the episodes, “technology will truly be the ruin of us all!” That’s generally the message of not only Black Mirror, but the vast majority of modern science fiction writing about technology (and also a huge chunk of popular non-fiction writing, too.)

If you go far enough back in the history of technology and technological criticism, you actually can find plenty of people insisting that the latest and greatest tech of the day would be the ruin of us all. As I noted here before, you can trace tech criticism at least back to Plato’s Phaedrus, which warned about the dangers of the written word. My colleague Tyler Cowen argues you can trace it even further back to the Bible and the Book of Genesis, especially the story of the Tower of Babel.

One can almost imagine how scorn was heaped on the first person to fashion a blade or a wheel out of stone. Before his untimely passing a few years ago, the great Calestous Juma used to occasionally tweet this hilarious cartoon that depicted just that moment in time. The people that carry those “NO” signs are still all around us today. Technopanics and fear cycles just repeat endlessly, as I have noted in dozens of essays and papers through the years.

[Originally published on the Mercatus Bridge blog on May 7, 2019.]

Cataracts can be extraordinarily debilitating. One day you can see the world clearly, the next you wake up struggling to see through a cloudy ocular soup. It is like looking through a piece of cellophane wrap or a continuously unfocused camera.

If you depend on your eyes to make a living as most of us do, then cataracts make it a daily struggle to get even basic things done. I spend most of my time reading and writing each workday. Once the cataracts hit, I had to purchase a half-dozen pair of strong reading glasses and spread them out all over the place: in my office, house, car, gym bag, and so on. Without them, I was helpless.

Reading is especially difficult in dimly lit environments, and even with strong glasses you can forget about reading the fine print on anything. Every pillbox becomes a frightening adventure. I invested in a powerful magnifying glass to make sure I didn’t end up ingesting the wrong things.

For those afflicted with particularly bad cataracts, it becomes extraordinarily risky to drive or operate machinery. More mundane things—watching TV, tossing a ball with your kid, reading a menu at many restaurants, looking at art in a gallery—also become frustrating.

Open Your Eyes to the Wonders of Innovation

In the past, there was very little that could be done about cataracts unless one was willing to undergo extremely dangerous procedures. The oldest type of cataract surgery (“couching”) involved the use of sharp instruments such as thorns and needles to rip the cloudy lens out of the eye. Unsurprisingly, blindness was a common result of this primitive practice. As medical techniques and instruments improved, doctors were able to perform more sophisticated and successful surgeries, albeit still with some risks because human hands were still doing much of the work.

Today, thanks to remarkable advances in medicine, all this is done in a few minutes with the assistance of laser technology. Better yet, patients get to choose exactly what sort of replacement lens they will have installed. I chose “multifocal intraocular” replacement lenses, which let me see near and far equally well.

When you have cataracts in both eyes, they usually perform the surgeries a few weeks apart to make sure one eye comes out alright before getting the other done. Both my outpatient procedures were quick, painless, and remarkably effective. Astonishingly, within 24 hours of having both surgeries, I tested at better than 20/15 vision, which is close to perfect. It was like regaining a lost superpower.

Am I a Cyborg?

My first-hand experience with the miracles of modern medical technology makes me feel even more strongly about what I do for a living. I have spent my life covering emerging technology policy and responding to tech critics, who have a litany of grievances about modern inventions. One common complaint is that today’s technologies are “dehumanizing,” or threaten to turn us all into some sort of cyborgs.

To be sure, my eye surgeries did indeed make me just a little bit less human. After all, I am walking around today with artificial lenses affixed to my eyeballs. Moreover, I previously had eye surgery to correct strabismus, which is basically a form of crossed eyes. Had I remained perfectly “human” or “natural,” I would still be trying to look at the world through two crossed eyes covered with cloudy lenses. No thanks, Mother Nature!

Incidentally, I also have a metal plate and six pins in my ankle from a nasty compound fracture I sustained in the late 1990s. So, my foot isn’t completely “natural” either. But without those implants, I would not likely have walked properly again. Also, due to a combination of bad genes and poor dietary habits, my mouth is full of so many replacement teeth and crowns that I can’t even count them all. Without them, I probably would have needed dentures by age 40, just as my poor grandmother did once her teeth failed her for similar reasons.

Meanwhile, my left knee and right hip have been acting up in recent years, making me wonder if replacements may be needed down the road. Finally, my hearing isn’t so great either after years of abusing my ears at concerts and with speakers played at unhealthy volumes. (Turn down those headphones, kids!) I suspect some sort of hearing supplement awaits me in the future so I can continue to hear properly.

Enhancing Our Humanity

Given the medical procedures I’ve had done or might do, it’s fair to say that the critics are correct: I really am becoming more of a cyborg—part biological, part technological. But what of it? Certainly, my life and the lives of countless other people have been improved thanks to “artificial” improvements to our bodies.

As Joel Garreau noted in his brilliant 2005 book, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies—And What It Means to Be Human, the history of our species in one of constant improvements to our health and capabilities through technological means. We have augmented our senses and abilities through the use of spectacles, hearing aids, artificial limbs, implants, and various other specialized medicines and treatments. We are living longer, healthier, less painful lives because of it.

Some critics respond by saying that certain “basic” technological improvements to human health are fine, or perhaps should even be subsidized and available to all. One era’s “radical” enhancements become the next generation’s human rights! We have seen that story unfold in the realm of reproductive health, for example. As Jordan Reimschisel and I have documented, in vitro fertilization (IVF) was originally met with hostility in the 1970s, with various authorities objecting to the idea of being able to “play God.” Opposition subsided quickly, however, as public acceptance and demand grew. Today, IVF is often covered by insurance plans.

Still, critics of newer technological capabilities tend to frown upon more sophisticated technological enhancements that could radically enhance our capabilities in ways that supposedly “dehumanize” us. There are always risks associated with new technological capabilities, but through ongoing trial and error experimentation, we find new ways to counter adversity and ailments—and yes, even overcome some of our inherent human limitations. We are not destined to become mindless automatons just because technology enhances our humanity in these ways. Indeed, there is nothing more human than building new and better tools to improve the quality of the lives of people across the globe.

We Can Cope with Change

Critics are fond of falling back on worst-case “technopanic” scenarios ripped from sci-fi novels, movies, and shows to explain how, if we are not careful, we are all just one modification away from creating (or becoming) Frankenstein monsters. We should heed those warnings to some extent, but not to the extent those critics suggest.

There are legitimate ethical issues associated with certain medical treatments and human enhancements. Genetic editing, for example, holds both promise and peril for our species. By modifying our genetic code, we can counter or even defeat debilitating or deadly diseases or ailments before they hobble us or our children. Of course, genetic modification could also be used in unsettling ways by parents or governments to create “designer babies” that have no choice in how their genetic code is altered before birth.

Ethical guidelines, and even some public policies, will need to be crafted and continuously updated to keep pace with these challenges. But, we must not let worst-case thinking determine the future of  all forms of human modification such that the many possible best-case outcomes are discouraged in the process. That would represent a massive setback for the millions of humans, including the unborn ones, who might be threatened by debilitating ailments.

Just as technological innovation gave me (quite literally) a new outlook on the world, so too can it open up new possibilities for countless others. Each day brings inspiring news about how innovation is helping us overcome whatever ails us. The Wall Street Journal reported recently that, “[s]cientists have harnessed artificial intelligence to translate brain signals into speech, in a step toward brain implants that one day could let people with impaired abilities speak their minds.”

More modern miracles like that await us—so long as critics and regulators don’t hold back important innovations in medical technology. In the meantime, thanks to my new cyborg eyes, I have seven old pairs of reading glasses I no longer need, in case anyone wants them.

Over at the American Institute for Economic Research blog, I recently posted two new essays discussing increasing threats to innovation and discussing how to counter them. The first is on “The Radicalization of Modern Tech Criticism,” and the second discusses, “How To Defend a Culture of Innovation During the Technopanic.”

“Technology critics have always been with us, and they have sometimes helped temper society’s occasional irrational exuberance about certain innovations,” I note in the opening of the first essay. The problem is that the “technology critics sometimes go much too far and overlook the importance of finding new and better ways of satisfying both basic and complex human needs and wants.” I continue on to highlight the growing “technopanic” rhetoric we sometimes hear today, including various claims that “it’s OK to be a Luddite” and push for a “degrowth movement” that would slow the wheels of progress. That would be a disaster for humanity because, as I note in concluding that first essay:

Through ongoing trial-and-error tool building, we discover new and better ways of satisfying human needs and wants to better our lives and the lives of those around us. Human flourishing is dependent upon our collective willingness to embrace and defend the creativity, risk-taking, and experimentation that produces the wisdom and growth that propel us forward. By contrast, today’s neo-Luddite tech critics suggest that we should just be content with the tools of the past and slow down the pace of technological innovation to supposedly save us from any number of dystopian futures they predict. If they succeed, it will leave us in a true dystopia that will foreclose the entrepreneurialism and innovation opportunities that are paramount to raising the standard of living for billions of people across the world.

In the second essay, I make an attempt to sketch out a more robust vision and set of principles to counter the tech critics. Building on my last book, as well as a forthcoming one, I outline a sort of “rational-optimist creed.” This vision is inspired by the important work of Matt Ridley and his excellent book, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves. Generally speaking, rational optimists:

• believe there is a symbiotic relationship between innovation, economic growth, pluralism, and human betterment, but also acknowledge the various challenges sometimes associated with technological change;
• look forward to a better future and reject overly nostalgic accounts of some supposed “good ‘ol days” or bygone better eras;
• base our optimism on facts and historical analysis, not on blind faith in any particular viewpoint, ideology, or gut feeling;
• support practical, bottom-up solutions to hard problems through ongoing trial-and-error experimentation, but are not wedded to any one process to get the job done;
• appreciate entrepreneurs for their willingness to take risks and try new things, but do not engage in hero worship of any particular individual, organization, or particular technology.

Going further, I build on the excellent work of Robert D. Atkinson, founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, who in his 2005 book, The Past and Future of America’s Economy, identified the way “a political divide is emerging between preservationists who want to hold onto the past and modernizers who recognize that new times require new means.” I tried to provide a breakdown for how this conflict of visions plays out in various ways:

I also highlight some of my favorite works by other rational optimists, including, Steven Pinker ( Enlightenment Now), Deirdre McCloskey (Bourgeois Equality), Calestous Juma (Innovation and Its Enemies), Samuel Florman (The Existential Pleasures of Engineering), and Virginia Postrel (The Future and Its Enemies), and Joel Mokyr, (The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress).

I encourage you to jump over to the AIER blog and read both essays in full.

FCC Chairman Ajit Pai recently delivered an excellent speech at the Resurgent Conference, Austin, TX. In it, he stressed the importance of adopting a permissionless innovation policy vision to ensure a bright future for technology, economic growth, and consumer welfare. The whole thing is worth your time, but the last two paragraphs make two essential points worth highlighting.

Pai correctly notes that we should reject the sort of knee-jerk hysteria or technopanic mentality that sometimes accompanies new technologies. Instead, we should have some patience and humility in the face of uncertainty and be open to new ideas and technologies creations.

“Here’s the bottom line,” Pai concludes:

Whenever a technological innovation creates uncertainty, some will always have the knee-jerk reaction to presume it’s bad. They’ll demand that we do whatever’s necessary to maintain the status quo. Strangle it with a study. Call for a commission. Bemoan those supposedly left behind. Stipulate absolute certainty. Regulate new services with the paradigms of old. But we should resist that temptation. “Guilty until proven innocent” is not a recipe for innovation, and it doesn’t make consumers better off. History tells us that it is not preemptive regulation, but permissionless innovation made possible by competitive free markets that best guarantees consumer welfare. A future enabled by the next generation of technology can be bright, if only we choose to let the light in.

Read the whole thing here. Good stuff. I also appreciate him citing my work on the topic, which you can find in my last book and other publications.

Reason magazine recently published my review of Franklin Foer’s new book, World Without Mind: The Existential Threat of Big Tech. My review begins as follows:

If you want to sell a book about tech policy these days, there’s an easy formula to follow. First you need a villain. Google and Facebook should suffice, but if you can throw in Apple, Amazon, or Twitter, that’s even better. Paint their CEOs as either James Bond baddies bent on world domination or naive do-gooders obsessed with the quixotic promise of innovation. Finally, come up with a juicy Chicken Little title. Maybe something like World Without Mind: The Existential Threat of Big Tech. Wait—that one’s taken. It’s the title of Franklin Foer’s latest book, which follows this familiar techno-panic template almost perfectly.

The book doesn’t break a lot of new ground; it serves up the same old technopanicky tales of gloom-and-doom that many others have said will befall us unless  something is done to save us. But Foer’s unique contribution is to unify many diverse strands of modern tech criticism in one tome, and then amp up the volume of panic about it all. Hence, the “existential” threat in the book’s title. I bet you didn’t know the End Times were so near!

Read the rest of my review over at Reason. And, if you care to read some of my other essays on technopanics through the ages, here’s a compendium of them.

“First electricity, now telephones. Sometimes I feel as if I were living in an H.G. Wells novel.” –Dowager Countess, Downton Abbey

Every technology we take for granted was once new, different, disruptive, and often ridiculed and resisted as a result. Electricity, telephones, trains, and television all caused widespread fears once in the way robots, artificial intelligence, and the internet of things do today. Typically it is realized by most that these fears are misplaced and overly pessimistic, the technology gets diffused and we can barely remember our life without it. But in the recent technopanics, there has been a concern that the legal system is not properly equipped to handle the possible harms or concerns from these new technologies. As a result, there are often calls to regulate or rein in their use.

In the late 1980s, video cassette recorders (VCRs) caused a legal technopanic. The concerns were less that VCRs would lead to some bizarre human mutation as in many technopanics, but rather that the existing system of copyright infringement and vicarious liability could not adequately address the potential harm to the motion picture industry. The then president of the Motion Picture Association of America Jack Valenti famously told Congress, “I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman home alone.”

In the eyes of the film and television producers the legal system did not have the resources to protect their copyright or hold the manufacturers and distributors of these disruptive machines properly liable for their actions. The Ninth Circuit initially sided with the producers finding that recording of television programs for home-viewing was not part of a blanket fair use exception in copyright law and that the manufacturers and distributors of VCRs could be held vicariously liable for their actions. This was overturned at the Supreme Court by a single vote.

By denying the movie industry a victory, ironically, the courts actually handed them a much bigger one. By allowing for the widespread adoption of this technology, the courts actually provided a new line of profit for the studios in home video sales and did not cripple copyright law in the process. It also though shows that the process by and large works. Individuals who pirate or distributed copyrighted video material (remember the FBI warnings at the start of tapes) could still be held personally liable for their violations. If Congress had intervened, the actions would likely have been too broad or too narrow to give appropriate remedy as common law did. Similar concerns arise today with new creative techniques such as 3D printing, but typically it is best to at least let the common law attempt to address these concerns before deeming it incapable. This illustrates how liability norms can evolve naturally over time to strike a sensible balance.

This legal technopanic also emerged around the Internet. The global and anonymous nature of the Internet naturally make it more difficult to perceive the potential harms and to identify the perpetrators and gain jurisdiction over them. Or so the legal technopanic goes. Judge Easterbrook explained in his 1996 article Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, “the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules.” Intellectual property law and property rights more generally are relatively well defined general rules. The beauty of the common law is its ability to adapt to a specific situation. Still there are concerns which may require interventions to be made. When necessary these interventions are especially important because, as John Villasenor wrote, “While technology is usually described as an enabler … liability is often described as an impediment.”

For example, Congress preemptively limited the liability of internet service providers in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. While there always seem to be concerns over this immunity when bad things happen on the internet, by and large the courts have been able to determine when the ISP was actively contributing to the violations of state and federal laws. In fact the protection provided by Section 230 merely codified the same principles at common law which lead to the protection of the VCR.

A little protection via legislation was necessary to allow the internet to flourish, but that protection was needed in part because of a legal technopanic. Similarly, Congress intervened to establish a notice-and-takedown procedure through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), when it became apparent that existing copyright law was not evolving as quickly as technology to address both the internet host and the copyright holders concerns. While ideally the common law would have been allowed to evolve to a conclusion on the issue, the sudden rise of YouTube and other online services necessitated at least a temporary intervention. Such legislation represents a compromise that likely would have resulted in a winner or loser if it had played out in the courts. As a result, while the common law is typically preferable sometimes legislation is necessary to at least temporarily establish a norm and stem the prevention of innovation from a possible legal technopanic.

By and large the courts have adapted disruptive technology as quickly or even more so then society, and as a result allowed the common law to see reason. Perhaps the moral of the story is as Edward Coke wrote in 1642, “The common law itself is nothing else but reason.”

I’ve written here before about the problems associated with the “technopanic mentality,” especially when it comes to how technopanics sometimes come to shape public policy decisions and restict important new, life-enriching innovations. As I argued in a recent book, the problem with this sort Chicken Little thinking is that, “living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy on them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.”

Perhaps the worst thing about worst-case thinking is how short-sighted and hubristic it can be. The technopanic crowd often has an air of snooty-ness about them in that they ask us to largely ignore the generally positive long-run trends associated with technological innovation and instead focus on hypothetical fears about an uncertain future that apparently only they can foresee. This is the case whether they are predicting the destruction of jobs, economy, lifestyles, or culture. Techno-dystopia lies just around the corner, they say, but the rest of us ignorant sheep who just can’t see it coming!

In his wonderful 2013 book,  Smarter Than You Think: How Technology Is Changing Our Minds for the Better, Clive Thompson correctly noted that “dystopian predictions are easy to generate” and “doomsaying is emotionally self-protective: if you complain that today’s technology is wrecking the culture, you can tell yourself you’re a gimlet-eyed critic who isn’t hoodwinked by high-tech trends and silly, popular activities like social networking. You seem like someone who has a richer, deeper appreciation for the past and who stands above the triviality of today’s life.”

Stated differently, the doomsayers are guilty of a type of social and technical arrogance. They are almost always wrong on history, wrong on culture, and wrong on facts. Again and again, humans have proven remarkably resilient in the face of technological change and have overcome short-term adversity. Yet, the technopanic pundits are almost never called out for their elitist attitudes later when their prognostications are proven wildly off-base. And even more concerning is the fact that their Chicken Little antics lead them and others to ignore the more serious risks that could exist out there and which are worthy of our attention.

Here’s a nice example of that last point that comes from a silent film made all the way back in 1911! (Ironically, it was a tweet by Clive Thompson that brought this clip to my attention.) The short film is called The Automatic Motorist and here’s how Michael Waters summarizes the plot in a post over at Atlas Obscura: “In it, a robot chauffeur is developed to drive a newly wedded couple to their honeymoon destination. But this robot malfunctions, and all of a sudden the couple is marooned in outer space (and then sinking underwater, and then flying through the sky—it’s complicated).” In sum: don’t trust robots or autonomous systems or you will probably die.

Regardless of how silly the plot sounds or the film looks, what I really found interesting about it was the way that they film jumped right into the classic sci-fi dystopian scenario of ROBOTS GONE WILD. Countless other books, stories, movies, and TV shows would follow that same predictable plot line in subsequent decades. In one sense, it’s entirely logical why authors and screenwriters do this. Simply put, bad news sells, and that is especially true when the bad news is delivered in the form of robotic systems running amok and threatening the future of humanity.

But I wonder… did the creators of The Automatic Motorist ever consider the far more risky scenario surrounding automobiles? Specifically, isn’t it a shame that they didn’t foresee the millions upon millions of deaths that would occur due to human error behind the wheel?

The tale of automation-gone-wrong always makes for better box office and book sales, but fear-mongering about technologies can condition people (and policymakers) to think in fearful terms about those products and systems. Robotic cars would have been impossible in 1911, obviously, so perhaps this concern seems meaningless in this context. But it is indicative of the bigger problem of the technopanic crowd focusing on hypothetical worst-case scenarios and avoiding the more mundane — but ultimately far more concerning — real-world risks that might occur in the absence of ongoing technological innovation.

And in many ways this is still the debate we are having in 2017 as the discussion about robotic “driverless” cars has finally ripened. We stand on the brink of what may become one of the great public health success stories of our lifetime. With the roadway death toll climbing for the first time in decades (around 40,000 deaths last year; or over 100 people dying on the roads every day), and with 94 percent of accidents being attributable to human error, those facts alone should constitute the most powerful reason to give autonomous technology a chance to prove itself. If policymakers fail to do so, it could result in countless potential injuries and deaths that driverless cars probably could have prevented.

These “unseen” unintended consequences of misguided policies constitute as sort of hidden tax on humanity’s future. When the technopanic crowd that tells us we must live in fear of each and every new innovation, they are creating the riskiest future scenario of them all: one that is stagnant and backwards-looking. The burden of proof is on them to explain why we should be denied the benefits that accompany ongoing trial and error experimentation with new and better ways of doing things that could ensure us a safer and more prosperous future.

Wallach’s latest book is entitled, A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control. And, as I’ve noted here recently, the greatly expanded second edition of my latest book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, has just been released.

Of all the books of technological criticism or skepticism that I’ve read in recent years—and I have read stacks of them!— A Dangerous Master is by far the most thoughtful and interesting. I have grown accustomed to major works of technological criticism being caustic, angry affairs. Most of them are just dripping with dystopian dread and a sense of utter exasperation and outright disgust at the pace of modern technological change.

Although he is certainly concerned about a wide variety of modern technologies—drones, robotics, nanotech, and more—Wallach isn’t a purveyor of the politics of panic. There are some moments in the book when he resorts to some hyperbolic rhetoric, such as when he frets about an impending “techstorm” and the potential, as the book’s title suggests, for technology to become a “dangerous master” of humanity. For the most part, however, his approach is deeper and more dispassionate than what is found in the leading tracts of other modern techno-critics.

Many Questions, Few Clear Answers

Wallach does a particularly good job framing the major questions about emerging technologies and their effect on society. “Navigating the future of technological possibilities is a hazardous venture,” he observes. “It begins with learning to ask the right questions—questions that reveal the pitfalls of inaction, and more importantly, the passageways available for plotting a course to a safe harbor.” (p. 7) Wallach then embarks on a 260+ page inquiry that bombards the reader with an astonishing litany of questions about the wisdom of various forms of technological innovation—both large and small. While I wasn’t about to start an exact count, I would say that the number of questions Wallach poses in the book runs well into the hundreds. In fact, many paragraphs of the book are nothing but an endless string of questions.

Thus, if there is a primary weakness with A Dangerous Master, it’s that Wallach spends so much time formulating such a long list of smart and nuanced questions that some readers may come away disappointed when they do not find equally satisfying answers. On the other hand, the lack of clear answers is also completely understandable because, as Wallach notes, there really are no simple answers to most of these questions.

Just Slow Down!

Moving on to substance, let me make clear where Wallach and I generally see eye-to-eye and where we part ways.

Generally speaking, we agree about the need to come up with better “soft governance” systems for emerging technologies, which might include multistakeholder process, developer codes of conduct, sectoral self-regulation, sensible liability rules, and so on. (More on those strategies in a moment.)

But while we both believe it is wise to consider how we might “bake-in” better ethics and norms into the process of technological development, Wallach seems much more inclined than me to expect that we will be able to pre-ordain (or potentially require?) all this happens before much of this experimentation and innovation actually moves forward. Wallach opens by asking:

Determining when to bow to the judgment of experts and whether to intervene in the deployment of a new technology is certainly not easy. How can government leaders or informed citizens effectively discern which fields of research are truly promising and which pose serious risks? Do we have the intelligence and means to mitigate the serious risks that can be anticipated? How should we prepare for unanticipated risks? (p. 6)

Again, many good questions here! But this really gets to the primary difference between Wallach’s preferred approach and my own: I tend to believe that many of these things can only be worked out through ongoing trial and error, the constant reformulation of the various norms that govern the process of innovation, and the development of sensible ex post solutions to some of the most difficult problems posed by turbulent technological change.

By contrast, Wallach’s generally attitude toward technological evolution is probably best summarized by the phrases: “Slow down!” and, “Let’s have a conversation about it first!” As he puts it in his own words: “Slowing down the accelerating adoption of technology should be done as a responsible means to ensure basic human safety and to support broadly shared values.” (p. 13)

But I tend to believe that it’s not always possible to preemptively determine which innovations to slow down, or even how to determine what those “shared values” are that will help us make this determination. More importantly, I worry that there are very serious potential risks and unintended consequences associated with slowing down many forms of technological innovation, which could improve human welfare in important ways. There can be no prosperity, after all, without a certain degree of risk-taking and disruption.

Getting Out Ahead of the Pacing Problem

Yet, what concerns Wallach most is the much-discussed issue from the field of the philosophy of technology, the so-called “pacing problem.” Wallach concisely defines the pacing problem as “the gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.” (p. 251) “There has always been a pacing problem,” he notes, but he is concerned that technological innovation—especially highly disruptive and potentially uncontrollable forms of innovation—is now accelerating at an absolutely unprecedented pace.

(Just as an aside for all the philosophy nerds out there…  Such a rigid belief in the “pacing problem” represents a techno-deterministic viewpoint that is, ironically, sometimes shared by technological skeptics like Wallach as well as technological optimists like Larry Downes and even many in the middle of this debate, like Vivek Wadhwa. See, for example, The Laws of Disruption by Downes and “Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology” by Wadhwa. Although these scholars approach technology ethics and politics quite differently, they all seem to believe that the pace of modern technological change is so relentless as to almost be an unstoppable force of nature. I guess the moral of the story is that, to some extent, we’re all technological determinists now!)

Despite his repeated assertions that modern technologies are accelerating at such a potentially uncontrollable pace, Wallach nonetheless hopes we can achieve some semblance of control over emerging technologies before they reach a critical “inflection point.” In the study of history and science, an inflection point generally represents a moment when a situation and trend suddenly changes in a significant way and things begin moving rapidly in a new direction. These inflections points can sometimes develop quite abruptly, ushering in major changes by creating new social, economic, or political paradigms. As it relates to technology in particular, inflection points can refer to the moment with a particular technology achieves critical mass in terms of adoption or, more generally, to the time when that technology begins to profoundly transform the way individuals and institutions act.

Another related concept that Wallach discusses is the so-called “Collingridge dilemma,” which refers to the notion that it is difficult to put the genie back in the bottle once a given technology has reached a critical mass of public adoption or acceptance. The concept is named after David Collingridge, who wrote about this in his 1980 book, The Social Control of Technology. “The social consequences of a technology cannot be predicated early in the life of the technology,” Collingridge argued. “By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the technology is often so much part of the whole economics and social fabric that its control is extremely difficult.”

On “Having a Discussion” & Coming Up with “a Broad Plan”

These related concepts of inflection points and the Collingridge dilemma constitute the operational baseline of Wallach’s worldview. “In weighing speedy development against long-term risks, speedy development wins,” he worries. “This is particularly true when the risks are uncertain and the perceived benefits great.” (p. 85)

Consequently, throughout his book, Wallach pleads with us to take what I will call Technological Time Outs. He says we need to pause at times so that we can have “a full public discussion” (p. 13) and make sure there is a “broad plan in place to manage our deployment of new technologies” (p. 19) to make sure that innovation happens only at “a humanly manageable pace” (p. 261) “to fortify the safety of people affected by unpredictable disruptions.” (p. 262) Wallach’s call for Technological Time Outs is rooted in his belief that “the accelerating pace [of modern technological innovation] undermines the quality of each of our lives.” (p. 263)

That is Wallach’s weakest assertion in the book and he doesn’t really offer much evidence to prove that the velocity of modern technological is hurting us rather than helping us, as many of us believe. Rather, he treats it as a widely accepted truism that necessitates some sort of collective effort to slow things down if the proverbial genie is about to exit the bottle, or to make sure those genies don’t get out of their bottles without a lot of preemptive planning regarding how they are to be released into the world. In the following passage on pg. 72, Wallach very succinctly summarizes his approach recommended throughout A Dangerous Master:

this book will champion the need for more upstream governance: more control over the way that potentially harmful technologies are developed or introduced into the larger society. Upstream management is certainly better than introducing regulations downstream, after a technology is deeply entrenched or something major has already gone wrong. Yet, even when we can access risks, there remain difficulties in recognizing when or determining how much control should be introduced. When does being precautionary make sense, and when is precaution an over-reaction to the risks? (p. 72)

Those who have read my Permissionless Innovation book will recall that I open by framing innovation policy debates in almost exactly the same way as Wallach suggests in that last line above. I argue in the first lines of my book that:

The central fault line in innovation policy debates today can be thought of as ‘the permission question.’  The permission question asks: Must the creators of new technologies seek the blessing of public officials before they develop and deploy their innovations? How that question is answered depends on the disposition one adopts toward new inventions and risk-taking, more generally.  Two conflicting attitudes are evident. One disposition is known as the ‘precautionary principle.’ Generally speaking, it refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harm to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions. The other vision can be labeled ‘permissionless innovation.’ It refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if any develop, can be addressed later.

So, by contrasting these passages, you can see what I am setting up here is a clash of visions between what appears to be Wallach’s precautionary principle-based approach versus my own permissionless innovation-focused worldview.

How Much Formal Precaution?

But that would be a tad bit too simplistic because just a few paragraphs after Wallach makes the statement just above about “upstream management” being superior to ex post solutions formulated “after a technology is deeply entrenched,” Wallach begins slowly backing away from an overly-rigid approach to precautionary principle-based governance of technological processes and systems.

He admits, for example, that “precautionary measures in the form of regulations and governmental oversight can slow the development of research whose overall society impact will be beneficial,” (p. 26) and that can “be costly” and “slow innovation.” For countries, Wallach admits, this can have real consequences because “Countries with more stringent precautionary policies are at a competitive disadvantage to being the first to introduce a new tool or process.” (p. 74)

So, he’s willing to admit that what we might call a hard precautionary principle usually won’t be sensible or effective in practice, but he is far more open to soft precaution. But this is where real problems begin to develop with Wallach’s approach, and it presents us with a chance to turn the tables on him a bit and begin posing some serious questions about his vision for governing technology.

Much of what follows below are my miscellaneous ramblings about the current state of the intellectual dialogue about tech ethics and technological control efforts. I have discussed these issues at greater length in my new book as well as a series of essays here in past years, most notably: “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy; “What Does It Mean to “Have a Conversation” about a New Technology?”; and, “Making Sure the “Trolley Problem” Doesn’t Derail Life-Saving Innovation.”

As I’ve argued in those and other essays, my biggest problem with modern technological criticism is that specifics are in scandalously short supply in this field! Indeed, I often find the lack of details in this arena to be utterly exasperating. Most modern technological criticism follows a simple formula:

TECHNOLOGY –>> POTENTIAL PROBLEMS –>> DO SOMETHING!

But almost all the details come in the discussion about the nature of the technology in question and the apparent many problems associated with it. Far, far less thought goes into the “DO SOMETHING!” part of the critics’ work. One reason for that is probably self-evident: There are no easy solutions. Wallach admits as much at many junctures throughout the book. But that doesn’t excuse the need for the critics to give us a more concrete blueprint for identifying and then potentially rectifying the supposed problems.

Of course, the other reason that many critics are short of specifics is because what they really mean when they quip how much we need to “have a conversation” about a new disruptive technology is that we need to have a conversation about stopping that technology.

Where Shall We Draw the Line between Hard and Soft Law?

But this is what I found most peculiar about Wallach’s book: He never really gives us a good standard by which to determine when we should look to hard governance (traditional top-down regulation) versus soft governance (more informal, bottom-up and non-regulatory approaches).

On one hand, he very much wants society to exercise greatly restraint and precaution when it comes to many of the technologies he and others worry about today. Again, he’s particularly concerned about the potential runaway development and use of drones, genetic editing, nanotech, robotics, and artificial intelligence. For at least one class of robotics—autonomous military robots—Wallach does call for immediate policy action in the form of an Executive Order to ban “killer” autonomous systems. (Incidentally, there’s also a major effort underway called the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” that aims to make such a ban part of international law through a multinational treaty.)

But Wallach also acknowledges the many trade-offs associated with efforts to preemptively controls on robotics and other technology. Perhaps for that reason, Wallach doesn’t develop a clear test for when the Precautionary Principle should be applied to new forms of innovation.

Clearly there are times when it is appropriate, although I believe it is only in an extremely narrow subset of cases. In the 2 ^nd Edition of my Permissionless Innovation book, I tried to offer a rough framework for when formal precautionary regulation (i.e., highly-restrictive policy defaults are necessary, such as operational restrictions, licensing requirements, research limitations, or even formal bans) might be necessary. I do not want to interrupt the flow of this review of Wallach’s book too much, so I have decided to just cut-and-paste that portion of Chapter 3 of my book (“When Does Precaution Make Sense?”) down below as an appendix to this essay.

The key takeaway of that passage from my book is that all of us who study innovation policy and the philosophy of technology—Wallach, myself, the whole darn movement—have done a remarkably poor job being specific about precisely when formal policy precaution is warranted. What is the test? All too often, we get lazy and apply what we might call an “I-Know-It-When-I-See-It” standard. Consider the possession of bazookas, tanks, and uranium. Almost all of us would agree that citizens should not be allowed to possess or use such things. Why? Well, it seems obvious, right? They just shouldn’t! But what is the exact standard we use to make that determination.

In coming years, I plan on spending a lot more time articulating a better test by which Precautionary Principle-based policies could be reasonably applied. Those who know me may be taken aback by what I just said. After all, I’ve spend many years explaining why Precautionary Principle-based thinking threatens human prosperity and should be rejected in the vast majority of cases. But that doesn’t excuse the lack of a serious and detailed exploration of the exact standard by which we determine when we should impose some limits on technological innovation.

Generally speaking, while I strongly believe that “permissionless innovation” should remain the policy default for most technologies, there certainly exists some scenarios where the threat of harm associated with a new innovation might be highly probable, tangible, immediate, irreversible, and catastrophic in nature. If so, that could qualify it for at least a light version of the Precautionary Principle. In a future paper or book chapter I’m just now starting to research, I hope to fuller develop those qualifiers and formulate a more robust test around them.

I would have very much liked to see Wallach articulate and defend a test of his own for when formal precaution would make sense. And, by extension, when should we default to soft precaution, or soft law and informal governance mechanisms for emerging technologies.

We turn to that issue next.

Toward Soft Governance & the Engineering of Better Technological Ethics

Even though Wallach doesn’t provide us with a test for determining when precaution makes sense or when we should instead default to soft governance, he does a much better job explaining the various models of soft law or informal governance that might help us deal with the potential negative ramifications of highly disruptive forms of technological change.

What Wallach proposes, in essence, is that we bake a dose of precautionary directly into the innovation process through a wide variety of informal governance/oversight mechanisms. “By embedding shared values in the very design of new tools and techniques, engineers improve the prospect of a positive outcome,” he claims. “The upstream embedding of shared values during the design process can ease the need for major course adjustments when it’s often too late.” (p. 261)

Wallach’s favored instrument of soft governance is what he refers to as “Governance Coordinating Committees” (GCCs). These Committees would coordinate “the separate initiatives by the various government agencies, advocacy groups, and representatives of industry” who would serve as “issue managers for the comprehensive oversight of each field of research.” (p. 250) He elaborates and details the function of GCCs as follows:

These committees, led by accomplished elders who have already achieved wide respect, are meant to work together with all the interested stakeholders to monitor technological development and formulate solutions to perceived problems. Rather than overlap with or function as a regulatory body, the committee would work together with existing institutions. (p. 250-51)

Wallach discussed the GCC idea in much greater detail in a 2013 book chapter he penned with Gary E. Marchant for a collected volume of essays on Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies. (I highly recommend you pick up that book if you can afford it! Many terrific essays in that book on these issues.) In their chapter, Marchant and Wallach specify some of the soft law mechanisms we might use to instill a bit of precaution preemptively. These mechanisms include: “codes of conduct, statements of principles, partnership programs, voluntary programs and standards, certification programs and private industry initiatives.”

If done properly, GCCs could provide exactly the sort of wise counsel and smart recommendations that Wallach desires. In my book and many law review articles on various disruptive technologies, I have endorsed many of the ideas and strategies Wallach identifies. I’ve also stressed the importance of many other mechanisms, such as education and empowerment-based strategies that could help the public learn to cope with new innovations or use them appropriately. In addition, I’ve highlighted the many flexible, adaptive ex post remedies that can help when things go wrong. Those mechanisms include common law remedies such as product defects law, various torts, contract law, property law, and even class action lawsuits. Finally, I have written extensively about the very active role played by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other consumer protection agencies, which have broad discretion to police “unfair and deceptive practices” by innovators.

Moreover, we already have a quasi-GCC model developing today with the so-called “multistakeholder governance” model that is often used in both informal and formal ways to handle many emerging technology policy issues.  The Department of Commerce (the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in particular) and the FTC have already developed many industry codes of conduct and best practices for technologies such as biometrics, big data, the Internet of Things, online advertising, and much more. Those agencies and others (such as the FDA and FAA) are continuing to investigate other codes or guidelines for things like advanced medical devices and drones, respectively. Meanwhile, I’ve heard other policymakers and academics float the idea of “digital ombudsmen,” “data ethicists,” and “private IRBs” (institutional review boards) as other potential soft law solutions that technology companies might consider. Perhaps going forward, many tech firms will have Chief Ethical Officers just as many of them today have Chief Privacy Officers or Chief Security Officers.

In other words, there’s already a lot of “soft law” activities going on in this space. And I haven’t even begun an inventory of the many other bodies or groups that already exist in each sector today that has set forth their own industry self-regulatory codes, but they exist in almost every field that Wallach worries about.

So, I’m not sure how much his GCC idea will add to this existing mix, but I would not be opposed to them playing the sort of coordinating “issue manager” role he describes. But I still have many questions about GCC’s, including:

• How many of them are needed and how we will know which one is the definitive GCC for each sector or technology?
• If they are overly formal in character and dominated by the most vociferous opponents of any particular technology, a real danger exists that a GCC could end up granting a small cabal a “heckler’s veto” over particular forms of innovation.
• Alternatively, the possibility of “regulatory capture” could be a problem for some GCCs if incumbent companies come to dominate their membership.
• Even if everything went fairly smoothly and the GCCs produced balanced reports and recommendations, future developers might wonder if and why they are to be bound by older guidelines.
• And if those future developers choose not to play by the same set of guidelines, what’s the penalty for non-compliance?
• And how are such guidelines enforced in a world where what I’ve called “global innovation arbitrage” is an increasing reality?

Challenging Questions for Both Hard and Soft Law

To summarize, whether we are speaking of “hard” or “soft” law approaches to technological governance, I am just not nearly as optimistic as Wallach seems to be that we will be able to find consensus on these three things:

(1) what constitutes “harm” in many of these circumstances;

(2) which “shared values” should prevail when “society” debates the shaping of ethics or guiding norms for emerging technologies but has highly contradictory opinions about those values (consider online privacy as a good example, where many people enjoy hyper-sharing while other demand hyper-privacy); and,

(3) that we can create a legitimate “governing body” (or bodies) that will be responsible for formulating these guidelines in a fair way without completely derailing the benefits of innovation in new fields and also remaining relevant for very long.

Nonetheless, as he and others have suggested, the benefit of adopting a soft law/informal governance approach to these issues is that it at least seeks to address these questions in more flexible and adaptive fashion. As I noted in my book, traditional regulatory systems “tend to be overly rigid, bureaucratic, inflexible, and slow to adapt to new realities. They focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. Worse yet, administrative regulation generally preempts or prohibits the beneficial experiments that yield new and better ways of doing things.” ( Permissionless Innovation, p. 120)

So, despite the questions I have raised here, I welcome the more flexible soft law approach that Wallach sets forth in his book. I think it represents a far more constructive way forward when compared to the opposite “top-down” or “command-and-control” regulatory systems of the past. But I very much want to make sure that even these new and more flexible soft law approaches leave plenty of breathing room for ongoing trial-and-error experimentation with new technologies and systems.

Conclusion

In closing, I want to reiterate that not only did I appreciate the excellent questions raised by Wendell Wallach in A Dangerous Master, but I take them very seriously. When I sat down to revise and expand my Permissionless Innovation book last year, I decided to include this warning from Wallach in my revised preface: “The promoters of new technologies need to speak directly to the disquiet over the trajectory of emerging fields of research. They should not ignore, avoid, or superficially dampen criticism to protect scientific research.” (p. 28–9)

As I noted, in response to Wallach: “I take this charge seriously, as should others who herald the benefits of permissionless innovation as the optimal default for technology policy. We must be willing to take on the hard questions raised by critics and then also offer constructive strategies for dealing with a world of turbulent technological change.”

Serious questions deserve serious answers. Of course, sometimes those posing those questions fail to provide many answers of their own! Perhaps it is because they believe the questions answer themselves. Other times, it’s because they are willing to admit that easy answers to these questions typically prove quite elusive. In Wallach’s case, I believe it’s more the latter.

To wrap up, I’ll just reiterated that both Wallach and I share a common desire to find solutions to the hard questions about technological innovation. But the crucial question that probably separates his worldview and my own is this: Whether we are talking about hard or soft governance, how much faith should we place in preemptive planning vs. ongoing trial and error experimentation to solve technological challenges? Wallach is more inclined to believe we can divine these things with the sagacious foresight of “accomplished elders” and technocratic “issue managers,” who will help us slow things down until we figure out how to properly ease a new technology into society (if at all). But I believe that the only way we will find many of the answers we are searching for is by allowing still more experimentation with the very technologies that he and others seek to control the development of. We humans are outstanding problem-solvers and have the uncanny ability among all mammals to adapt to changing circumstances. We roll with the punches, learn from them, and become more resilient in the process. As I noted in my 2014 essay, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change”:

we modern pragmatic optimists must continuously point to the unappreciated but unambiguous benefits of technological innovation and dynamic change. But we should also continue to remind the skeptics of the amazing adaptability of the human species in the face of adversity. [. . .] Humans have consistently responded to technological change in creative, and sometimes completely unexpected ways. There’s no reason to think we can’t get through modern technological disruptions using similar coping and adaptation strategies.

Will the technologies that Wallach fears bring about a “techstorm” that overwhelms our culture, our economy, and even our very humanity? It’s certainly possible, and we should continue to seriously discuss the issues that he and other skeptics raise about our expanding technological capabilities and the potential for many of them to do great harm. Because some of them truly could.

But it is equally plausible—in fact, some of us would say, highly probable—that instead of overwhelming us, we learn how to bend these new technological capabilities to our will and make them work for our collective benefit. Instead of technology becoming “a dangerous master,” we will instead make it our helpful servant, just as we have so many times before.

APPENDIX: When Does Precaution Make Sense?

[excerpt from chapter 3 of Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. Footnotes omitted. See book for all references.]

But aren’t there times when a certain degree of precautionary policymaking makes good sense? Indeed, there are, and it is important to not dismiss every argument in favor of precautionary principle–based policymaking, even though it should not be the default policy rule in debates over technological innovation.

The challenge of determining when precautionary policies make sense comes down to weighing the (often limited) evidence about any given technology and its impact and then deciding whether the potential downsides of unrestricted use are so potentially catastrophic that trial-and-error experimentation simply cannot be allowed to continue. There certainly are some circumstances when such a precautionary rule might make sense. Governments restrict the possession of uranium and bazookas, to name just two obvious examples.

Generally speaking, permissionless innovation should remain the norm in the vast majority of cases, but there will be some scenarios where the threat of tangible, immediate, irreversible, catastrophic harm associated with new innovations could require at least a light version of the precautionary principle to be applied.  In these cases, we might be better suited to think about when an “anti-catastrophe principle” is needed, which narrows the scope of the precautionary principle and focuses it more appropriately on the most unambiguously worst-case scenarios that meet those criteria.

But most cases don’t fall into this category. Instead, we generally allow innovators and consumers to freely experiment with technologies, and even engage in risky behaviors, unless a compelling case can be made that precautionary regulation is absolutely necessary.  How is the determination made regarding when precaution makes sense? This is where the role of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and regulatory impact analysis is essential to getting policy right.  BCA represents an effort to formally identify the tradeoffs associated with regulatory proposals and, to the maximum extent feasible, quantify those benefits and costs.  BCA generally cautions against preemptive, precautionary regulation unless all other options have been exhausted—thus allowing trial-and-error experimentation and “learning by doing” to continue. (The mechanics of BCA are discussed in more detail in section VII.)

This is not the end of the evaluation, however. Policymakers also need to consider the complexities associated with traditional regulatory remedies in a world where technological control is increasingly challenging and quite costly. It is not feasible to throw unlimited resources at every problem, because society’s resources are finite.  We must balance risk probabilities and carefully weigh the likelihood that any given intervention has a chance of creating positive change in a cost-effective fashion.  And it is also essential to take into account the potential unintended consequences and long-term costs of any given solution because, as Harvard law professor Cass Sunstein notes, “it makes no sense to take steps to avert catastrophe if those very steps would create catastrophic risks of their own.”  “The precautionary principle rests upon an illusion that actions have no consequences beyond their intended ends,” observes Frank B. Cross of the University of Texas. But “there is no such thing as a risk-free lunch. Efforts to eliminate any given risk will create some new risks,” he says.

Oftentimes, after working through all these considerations about whether to regulate new technologies or technological processes, the best solution will be to do nothing because, as noted throughout this book, we should never underestimate the amazing ingenuity and resiliency of humans to find creative solutions to the problems posed by technological change.  (Section V discusses the importance of individual and social adaptation and resiliency in greater detail.) Other times we might find that, while some solutions are needed to address the potential risks associated with new technologies, nonregulatory alternatives are also available and should be given a chance before top-down precautionary regulations are imposed. (Section VII considers those alternative solutions in more detail.)

Finally, it is again essential to reiterate that we are talking here about the dangers of precautionary thinking as a public policy prerogative—that is, precautionary regulations that are mandated and enforced by government officials. By contrast, precautionary steps may be far more wise when undertaken in a more decentralized manner by individuals, families, businesses, groups, and other organizations. In other words, as I have noted elsewhere in much longer articles on the topic, “there is a different choice architecture at work when risk is managed in a localized manner as opposed to a society-wide fashion,” and risk-mitigation strategies that might make a great deal of sense for individuals, households, or organizations, might not be nearly as effective if imposed on the entire population as a legal or regulatory directive.

Finally, at times, more morally significant issues may exist that demand an even more exhaustive exploration of the impact of technological change on humanity. Perhaps the most notable examples arise in the field of advance medical treatments and biotechnology. Genetic experimentation and human cloning, for example, raise profound questions about altering human nature or abilities as well as the relationship between generations.

The case for policy prudence in these matters is easier to make because we are quite literally talking about the future of what it means to be human.  Controversies have raged for decades over the question of when life begins and how it should end. But these debates will be greatly magnified and extended in coming years to include equally thorny philosophical questions.  Should parents be allowed to use advanced genetic technologies to select the specific attributes they desire in their children? Or should parents at least be able to take advantage of genetic screening and genome modification technologies that ensure their children won’t suffer from specific diseases or ailments once born?

Outside the realm of technologically enhanced procreation, profound questions are already being raised about the sort of technological enhancements adults might make to their own bodies. How much of the human body can be replaced with robotic or bionic technologies before we cease to be human and become cyborgs?  As another example, “biohacking”—efforts by average citizens working together to enhance various human capabilities, typically by experimenting on their own bodies —could become more prevalent in coming years.  Collaborative forums, such as Biohack.Me, already exist where individuals can share information and collaborate on various projects of this sort.  Advocates of such amateur biohacking sometimes refer to themselves as “grinders,” which Ben Popper of the Verge defines as “homebrew biohackers [who are] obsessed with the idea of human enhancement [and] who are looking for new ways to put machines into their bodies.”

These technologies and capabilities will raise thorny ethical and legal issues as they advance. Ethically, they will raise questions of what it means to be human and the limits of what people should be allowed to do to their own bodies. In the field of law, they will challenge existing health and safety regulations imposed by the FDA and other government bodies.

Again, most innovation policy debates—including most of the technologies discussed throughout this book—do not involve such morally weighty questions. In the abstract, of course, philosophers might argue that every debate about technological innovation has an impact on the future of humanity and “what it means to be human.” But few have much of a direct influence on that question, and even fewer involve the sort of potentially immediate, irreversible, or catastrophic outcomes that should concern policymakers.

In most cases, therefore, we should let trial-and-error experimentation continue because “experimentation is part and parcel of innovation” and the key to social learning and economic prosperity.  If we froze all forms of technological innovation in place while we sorted through every possible outcome, no progress would ever occur. “Experimentation matters,” notes Harvard Business School professor Stefan H. Thomke, “because it fuels the discovery and creation of knowledge and thereby leads to the development and improvement of products, processes, systems, and organizations.”

Of course, ongoing experimentation with new technologies always entails certain risks and potential downsides, but the central argument of this book is that (a) the upsides of technological innovation almost always outweigh those downsides and that (b) humans have proven remarkably resilient in the face of uncertain, ever-changing futures.

In sum, when it comes to managing or coping with the risks associated with technological change, flexibility and patience is essential. One size most certainly does not fit all. And one-size-fits-all approaches to regulating technological risk are particularly misguided when the benefits associated with technological change are so profound. Indeed, “[t]echnology is widely considered the main source of economic progress”; therefore, nothing could be more important for raising long-term living standards than creating a policy environment conducive to ongoing technological change and the freedom to innovate.

[This is an excerpt from Chapter 6 of the forthcoming 2nd edition of my book, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom,” due out later this month. I was presenting on these issues at today’s New America Foundation “Cybersecurity for a New America” event, so I thought I would post this now.  To learn more about the contrast between “permissionless innovation” and “precautionary principle” thinking, please consult the earlier edition of my book or see this blog post.]

Viruses, malware, spam, data breeches, and critical system intrusions are just some of the security-related concerns that often motivate precautionary thinking and policy proposals.^[1] But as with privacy- and safety-related worries, the panicky rhetoric surrounding these issues is usually unfocused and counterproductive.

In today’s cybersecurity debates, for example, it is not uncommon to hear frequent allusions to the potential for a “digital Pearl Harbor,”^[2] a “cyber cold war,”^[3] or even a “cyber 9/11.”^[4] These analogies are made even though these historical incidents resulted in death and destruction of a sort not comparable to attacks on digital networks. Others refer to “cyber bombs” or technological “time bombs,” even though no one can be “bombed” with binary code.^[5] Michael McConnell, a former director of national intelligence, went so far as to say that this “threat is so intrusive, it’s so serious, it could literally suck the life’s blood out of this country.”^[6]

Such outrageous statements reflect the frequent use of “threat inflation” rhetoric in debates about online security.^[7] Threat inflation has been defined as “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify.”^[8] Unfortunately, such bombastic rhetoric often conflates minor cybersecurity risks with major ones. For example, dramatic doomsday stories about hackers pushing planes out of the sky misdirects policymakers’ attention from the more immediate, but less gripping, risks of data extraction and foreign surveillance. Well-meaning skeptics might then conclude that our real cybersecurity risks are also not a problem. In the meantime, outdated legislation and inappropriate legal norms continue to impede beneficial defensive measures that could truly improve security.

Meanwhile, similar concerns have already been raised about security vulnerabilities associated with the Internet of Things^[9] and driverless cars.^[10] Legislation has already been floated to address the latter concern through federal certification standards.^[11] More broad-based cybersecurity legislative proposals have also been proposed, most notably the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, which would extend legal immunity to corporations that share customer data with intelligence agencies.^[12]

Ironically, these efforts to expand federal cybersecurity authority come before the federal government has even gotten its own house in order. According to a recent report, federal information security failures had increased by an astounding 1,169 percent, from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 69,851 in fiscal year 2014.^[13] Of course, many of these same agencies would be tasked with securing the massive new datasets containing personally identifiable details about US citizens’ online activities that legislation like the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act would authorize. In the worst-case scenario, such federal data storage could counterintuitively encourage more attacks on government systems.

It’s important to put all these security issues in some context and to realize that proposed legal remedies are often inappropriate to address online security concerns and sometimes end up backfiring. In his research on the digital security marketplace, my Mercatus Center colleague Eli Dourado has illustrated how we are already able to achieve “Internet Security without Law.”^[14] Dourado documented the many informal institutions that enforce network security norms on the Internet to show how cooperation among a remarkably varied set of actors improves online security without extensive regulation or punishing legal liability. “These informal institutions carry out the functions of a formal legal system—they establish and enforce rules for the prevention, punishment, and redress of cybersecurity-related harms,” Dourado says.^[15]

For example, a diverse array of computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) operate around the globe, sharing their research on and coordinating responses to viruses and other online attacks. Individual Internet service providers (ISPs), domain name registrars, and hosting companies work with these CSIRTs and other individuals and organizations to address security vulnerabilities.

Encouraging the development of robust and lawful software vulnerability markets would provide even more effective cybersecurity reporting. Some private companies and nonprofit security research firms have offered financial incentives for hackers to find and report software vulnerabilities to the proper parties for years now.[16] Such “bug bounty” and “vulnerability auction” programs better align hackers’ monetary incentives with the public interest. By allowing a space for security researchers to responsibly report and profit from discovered bugs, these markets dissuade hackers from selling vulnerabilities to criminal or state-backed organizations.[17]

A growing market for private security consultants and software providers also competes to offer increasingly sophisticated suites of security products for businesses, households, and governments. “Corporations, including software vendors, antimalware makers, ISPs, and major websites such as Facebook and Twitter, are aggressively pursuing cyber criminals,” notes Roger Grimes of Infoworld.^[18] “These companies have entire legal teams dedicated to national and international cyber crime. They are also taking down malicious websites and bot-spitting command-and-control servers, along with helping to identify, prosecute, and sue bad guys,” he says.^[19] Meanwhile, more organizations are employing “active defense” strategies, which are “countermeasures that entail more than merely hardening one’s own network against threats and instead seek to unmask one’s attacker or disable the attacker’s system.”^[20]

A great deal of security knowledge is also “crowd-sourced” today via online discussion forums and security blogs that feature contributions from experts and average users alike. University-based computer science and cyber law centers and experts have also helped by creating projects like Stop Badware, which originated at Harvard University but then grew into a broader nonprofit organization with diverse financial support.^[21] Meanwhile, informal grassroots security groups like The Cavalry have formed to build awareness about digital security threats among developers and the general public and then devise solutions to protect public safety.^[22]

The recent debacle over the Commerce Department’s proposed new export rules for so-called cyberweapons provides a good example of how poorly considered policies can inadvertently undermine such beneficial emergent ecosystems. The agency’s new draft of US “Wassenaar Arrangement” arms control policies would have unintentionally criminalized the normal communication of basic software bug-testing techniques that hundreds of companies employ each day.[23] The regulators who were drafting the new rules had good intentions. They wanted to crack down on cyber criminals’ abilities to sell malware to hostile state-backed initiatives. However, their lack of technical sophistication led them to unknowingly write a proposal that would have compelled software engineers to seek Commerce Department permission before communicating information about minor software quirks. Fortunately, regulators wisely heeded the many concerned industry comments and rescinded the initial proposal.[24]

Dourado notes that informal, bottom-up efforts to coordinate security responses offer several advantages over top-down government solutions such as administrative regulatory regimes or punishing liability regimes. First, the informal cooperative approach “gives network operators flexibility to determine what constitutes due care in a dynamic environment.” “Formal legal standards,” by contrast, “may not be able to adapt as quickly as needed to rapidly changing circumstances,” he says.^[25] Simply put, markets are more nimble than mandates when it comes to promptly patching security vulnerabilities.

Second, Dourado notes that “formal legal proceedings are adversarial and could reduce ISPs’ incentives to share information and cooperate.”^[26] Heavy-handed regulation or threatening legal liability schemes could have the unintended consequence of discouraging the sort of cooperation that today alleviates security problems swiftly.

Indeed, there is evidence that existing cybersecurity law prevents defensive strategies that could help organizations to more quickly respond to system infiltrations. For example, some argue that private individuals and organizations should be allowed to defend themselves using special measures to expel or track system infiltrators, often called “hacking back” or “active defense.” Anthony Glosson’s analysis for the Mercatus Center discusses how the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act currently prevents computer security specialists from utilizing defensive hacking techniques that could improve system defenses or decrease the number of attempted attacks.[27]

Third, legal solutions are less effective because “the direct costs of going to court can be substantial, as can be the time associated with a trial,” Dourado argues.^[28] By contrast, private actors working cooperatively “do not need to go to court to enforce security norms,” meaning that “security concerns are addressed quickly or punishment . . . is imposed rapidly.”^[29] For example, if security warnings don’t work, ISPs can “punish” negligent or willfully insecure networks by “de-peering,” or terminating network interconnection agreements. The very threat of de-peering helps keep network operators on their toes.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Dourado notes that international cooperation between state-based legal systems is limited, complicated, and costly. By contrast, under today’s informal, voluntary approach to online security, international coordination and cooperation are quite strong. The CSIRTs and other security institutions and researchers mentioned above all interact and coordinate today as if national borders did not exist. Territorial legal system and liability regimes don’t have the same advantage; enforcement ends at the border.

Dourado’s model has ramifications for other fields of tech policy. Indeed, as noted above, these collaborative efforts and approaches are already at work in the realms of online safety and digital privacy. Countless organizations and individuals collaborate on educational initiatives to improve online safety and privacy. And many industry and nonprofit groups have established industry best practices and codes of conduct to ensure a safer and more secure online experience for all users. The efforts of the Family Online Safety Institute were discussed above. Another example comes from the Future of Privacy Forum, a privacy think tank that seeks to advance responsible data practices. The think tank helps create codes of conduct to ensure privacy best practices by online operators and also helps highlight programs run by other organizations.^[30] Likewise, the National Cyber Security Alliance helps promote Internet safety and security efforts among a variety of companies and coordinates National Cyber Security Awareness Month (every October) and Data Privacy Day (held annually on January 28).^[31]

What these efforts prove is that not every complex social problem requires a convoluted legal regime or heavy-handed regulatory response. We can achieve reasonably effective safety and security without layering on more and more law and regulation.^[32] Indeed, the Internet and digital systems could arguably be made more secure by reforming outdated legislation that prevents potential security-increasing collaborations. “Dynamic systems are not merely turbulent,” Postrel notes. “They respond to the desire for security; they just don’t do it by stopping experimentation.”^[33] She adds, “Left free to innovate and to learn, people find ways to create security for themselves. Those creations, too, are part of dynamic systems. They provide personal and social resilience.”^[34]

Education is a crucial part of building resiliency in the security context as well. People and organizations can prepare for potential security problems rationally if given even more information and better tools to secure their digital systems and to understand how to cope when problems arise. Again, many corporations and organizations already take steps to guard against malware and other types of cyberattacks by offering customers free (or cheap) security software. For example, major broadband operators offer free antivirus software to customers and various parental control tools to parents. In the context of “connected car” technology, automakers have banded together to come up with privacy and security best practices to address worries about remote hacking of cars as well as concerns about how much data they collect about our driving habits.[35]

Thus, although it is certainly true that “more could be done” to secure networks and critical systems, panic is unwarranted because much is already being done to harden systems and educate the public about risks.^[36] Various digital attacks will continue, but consumers, companies, and others organizations are learning to cope and become more resilient in the face of those threats through creative “bottom-up” solutions instead of innovation-limiting “top-down” regulatory approaches.

[1]    This section partially adapted from Adam Thierer, “Achieving Internet Order without Law,” Forbes, June 24, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/06/24/achieving-internet-order-without-law. The author wishes to thank Andrea Castillo for major contributions to this section.

[2]    See Richard A. Serrano, “Cyber Attacks Seen as a Growing Threat,” Los Angeles Times, February 11, 2011, A18. (“[T]he potential for the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber attack.”)

[3]    Harry Raduege, “Deterring Attackers in Cyberspace,” The Hill, September 23, 2011, 11, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/183429-deterring-attackers-in-cyberspace.

[4]    Kurt Nimmo, “Former CIA Official Predicts Cyber 9/11,” InfoWars.com, August 4, 2011, http://www.infowars.com/former-cia-official-predicts-cyber-911.

[5]    Rodney Brown, “Cyber Bombs: Data-Security Sector Hopes Adoption Won’t Require a ‘Pearl Harbor’ Moment,” Innovation Report, October 26, 2011, 10, http://digital.masshightech.com/launch.aspx?referral=other&pnum=&refresh=6t0M1Sr380Rf&EID=1c256165-396b-454f-bc92-a7780169a876&skip=; Craig Spiezle, “Defusing the Internet of Things Time Bomb,” TechCrunch, August 11, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2015/08/10/defusing-the-internet-of-things-time-bomb.

[6]    “Morning Edition: Cybersecurity Bill: Vital Need or Just More Rules?” NPR, March 22, 2012, http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=149099866.

[7]    Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy” (Mercatus Working Paper No. 11-24, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, 2011).

[8]    Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, “Introduction: Understanding Threat Inflation,” in American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11, ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (London: Routledge, 2009), 1.

[9]    Tufekci, “Dumb Idea”; Byron Acohido, “Hackers Take Control of Internet Appliances,” USA Today, October 15, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/10/15/hackers-taking-control-of-internet-appliances/2986395.

[10]   Ed Markey, Tracking & Hacking: Security & Privacy Gaps Put American Drivers at Risk, US Senate, February 2015, http://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2015-02-06_MarkeyReport-Tracking_Hacking_CarSecurity%202.pdf.

[11]   Ed Markey, “Markey, Blumenthal to Introduce Legislation to Protect Drivers from Auto Security and Privacy Vulnerabilities with Standards and ‘Cyber Dashboard,’” press release, February 11, 2015, http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markey-blumenthal-to-introduce-legislation-to-protect-drivers-from-auto-security-and-privacy-vulnerabilities-with-standards-and-cyber-dashboard.

[12]   Andrea Castillo, “How CISA Threatens Both Privacy and Cybersecurity,” Reason, May 10, 2015, https://reason.com/archives/2015/05/10/why-cisa-wont-improve-cybersecurity.

[13]   Eli Dourado and Andrea Castillo, “Poor Federal Cybersecurity Reveals Weakness of Technocratic Approach” (Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, June 22, 2015), http://mercatus.org/publication/poor-federal-cybersecurity-reveals-weakness-technocratic-approach.

[14]   Eli Dourado, “Internet Security without Law: How Security Providers Create Online Order” (Mercatus Working Paper No. 12-19, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, June 19, 2012), http://mercatus.org/publication/internet-security-without-law-how-service-providers-create-order-online.

[15]   Ibid.

[16]   Charlie Miller, “The Legitimate Vulnerability Market: Inside the Secretive World of 0-day Exploit Sales,” Independent Security Evaluators, May 6, 2007, http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2007/papers/29.pdf.

[17]   Andrea Castillo, “The Economics of Software-Vulnerability Sales: Can the Feds Encourage ‘Pro-social’ Hacking?” Reason, August 11, 2015, https://reason.com/archives/2015/08/11/economics-of-the-zero-day-sales-market.

[18]   Roger Grimes, “The Cyber Crime Tide Is Turning,” Infoworld, August 9, 2011, http://www.pcworld.com/article/237647/the_cyber_crime_tide_is_turning.html.

[19]   Dourado, “Internet Security.”

[20]   Anthony D. Glosson, “Active Defense: An Overview of the Debate and a Way Forward,” (Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, August 10, 2015), http://mercatus.org/publication/active-defense-overview-debate-and-way-forward-guardians-of-peace-hackers-cybersecurity.

[21]   http://stopbadware.org.

[22]   https://www.iamthecavalry.org.

[23]   Andrea Castillo, “The Government’s Latest Attempt to Stop Hackers Will Only Make Cybersecurity Worse,” Reason, July 28, 2015, https://reason.com/archives/2015/07/28/gov-ploy-to-stop-hackers-will-backfire.

[24]   Russell Brandom, “The US is Rewriting its Controversial Zero-Day Export Policy,” The Verge, July 29, 2015, http://www.theverge.com/2015/7/29/9068665/wassenaar-export-zero-day-revisions-department-of-commerce.

[25]   Dourado, “Internet Security.”

[26]   Ibid.

[27]   Glosson, “Active Defense.”

[28]   Dourado, “Internet Security.”

[29]   Dourado, “Internet Security.”

[30]   Future of Privacy Forum, “Best Practices,” http://www.futureofprivacy.org/resources/best-practices/.

[31]   See http://www.staysafeonline.org/ncsam and http://www.staysafeonline.org/data-privacy-day.

[32]   Glosson, “Active Defense,” 22. (“The precautionary principle is especially inadvisable in the dynamic realm of tech policy, and until the ostensible harms of active defense materialize, the law should facilitate maximum innovation in the network security field.”)

[33]   Postrel, Future and Its Enemies, at 199.

[34]   Ibid., 202.

[35]   See Future of Privacy Forum, “Connected Cars Project,” accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/connectedcars; Auto Alliance, “Automakers Believe That Strong Consumer Data Privacy Protections Are Essential to Maintaining the Trust of Our Customers,” accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.autoalliance.org/automotiveprivacy. See also Future of Privacy Forum, “Comments of the Future of Privacy Forum on Connected Smart Technologies in Advance of the FTC ‘Internet of Things’ Workshop,” May 31, 2013, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF-Comments-Regarding-Internet-of-Things.pdf.

[36]   Adam Thierer, “Don’t Panic over Looming Cybersecurity Threats,” Forbes, August 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2011/08/07/dont-panic-over-looming-cybersecurity-threats.

It was my pleasure this week to be invited to deliver some comments at an event hosted by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) to coincide with the release of their latest study, “The Privacy Panic Cycle: A Guide to Public Fears About New Technologies.” The goal of the new ITIF report, which was co-authored by Daniel Castro and Alan McQuinn, is to highlight the dangers associated with “the cycle of panic that occurs when privacy advocates make outsized claims about the privacy risks associated with new technologies. Those claims then filter through the news media to policymakers and the public, causing frenzies of consternation before cooler heads prevail, people come to understand and appreciate innovative new products and services, and everyone moves on.” (p. 1)

As Castro and McQuinn describe it, the privacy panic cycle “charts how perceived privacy fears about a technology grow rapidly at the beginning, but eventually decline over time.” They divide this cycle into four phases: Trusting Beginnings, Rising Panic, Deflating Fears, and Moving On. Here’s how they depict it in an image:

The report can be seen as an extension of the literature on “moral panics” and “techno-panics.” Some relevant texts in this field include Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda’s Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance, Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear, and Barry Glassner’s Culture of Fear. But there’s a rich body of academic writing on this topic and I’ve tried to make a small contribution to this literature in recent years, most notably with a lengthy 2013 law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” In that paper, I try to connect the literature on moral panic theory (which mostly focuses on panics about speech and cultural changes) to other scholarship about how panics and threat inflation are used in many other contexts, including the fields of national security policy, cybersecurity, and more.

I define “technopanic,” as “intense public, political, and academic responses to the emergence or use of media or technologies, especially by the young.”  “Threat inflation” has been defined by national security policy experts Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall as “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify.”

Castro and McQuinn’s new study on privacy panic cycles fits neatly within this analytical framework and makes an important contribution to the literature. They warn of the real dangers associated with these privacy panics, especially in terms of lost opportunities for innovation. “Policymakers should not get caught up in the panics that follow in the wake of new technologies,” they argue, “and they should not allow hypothetical, speculative, or unverified claims to color the policies they put in place. Similarly, they should not allow unsubstantiated claims put forth by privacy fundamentalists to derail legitimate public sector efforts to use technology to improve society,” they say. (p. 28)

I think one of the most important takeaways from the study is that, as Castro and McQuinn note, “history has shown, many of the overinflated claims about loss of privacy have never materialized.” (p. 28) They identify many reasons why that may be the case but, most notably, they explain how societal attitudes often quickly adjust and also that “social norms dissuade many practices that are feasible but undesirable.” (p. 28) I have spent a lot of time thinking through this process of individual and social acclimation to new technologies and, most recently, wrote an essay on this topic entitled, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change.”

Castro and McQuinn highlight several historical case studies that illustrate how privacy panics play out in practice. They include studies of photography, the transistor, and RFID tags. They also continue on to map out how various new technologies are currently—or might soon be—experiencing a privacy panic. Those include drones, facial recognition, connected cars, behavioral advertising, the Internet of Things and wearable tech. Here’s where Castro and McQuinn believe each of those technologies falls currently on the privacy panic curve.

One problem with the ITIF report, however, is that it avoids the question of what constitutes a serious enough privacy “harm” that might be worth actually panicking over. Certainly there must be something that deserves special concern – perhaps even a little bit of panic. Of course, as I noted in my remarks at the event, this is problem with a great deal of literature in this field due to the challenge associated with defining what we even mean by “privacy” or “privacy harm.” Nonetheless, while some privacy fundamentalists are far too aggressive in using amorphous conceptions of privacy harms to fuel privacy panics, it can also be the case that others (like Castro, McQuinn, and myself) don’t do enough to specify when extremely serious privacy problems exist that warrant heightened concern.

The ITIF report rightly singles out the many groups that all too often use fear tactics and threat inflation to advance their own agendas. In the academic literature on moral panics, these people or groups are referred to as “fear entrepreneurs.” They hope to create and then take advantage of a state of fear to demand that “something must be done” about supposed problems that are often either greatly overstated or which will be solved (or just go away) over time. (For more on “fear entrepreneurs,” see Frank Furedi’s outstanding 2009 article on “Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Probabilistic Risk Assessment.”) These individuals and groups often end up having a disproportionate impact on policy debates and, through their vociferous activism, threaten to achieve a sort of “heckler’s veto” over digital innovation.

However, as I stressed in my remarks at ITIF’s launch event for the study, I believe that Castro and McQuinn were wrong to single out the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) as one of these troublemakers. Castro and McQuinn claim that “there is now a professional class of people whose job is to manage privacy risks and promote the idea that technology is becoming more invasive. These privacy professionals have a vested interest in inflating the perceived privacy risk of new technologies as their livelihood depends on businesses’ willingness to pay them to address these concerns.” (8)

I think that mischaracterizes the role that most IAPP-trained privacy professionals play today. I have done a lot of work with IAPP itself and many of the privacy professionals they have trained. In my experience, these folks aren’t trying to fan the flames of “privacy panics.” To the contrary, many (perhaps most) IAPP professionals are actively involved in putting out those fires or making sure that they do not start raging in the first place. This is particularly true of the huge number of IAPP-trained privacy professionals who work for major technology companies and who work hard every day to find practical solutions to real-world privacy and security-related concerns.

Of course, as with any large membership organization, one can find some IAPP-trained privacy professionals who may indeed be guilty of fueling privacy panics for personal or organizational purposes. After all, some IAPP-trained folks work for privacy advocacy organizations which could be classified as “privacy fundamentalists” in their philosophical orientation. But just because some IAPP-trained people play techno-panic games, it certainly doesn’t mean that most of them do.

Relatedly, another small nitpick I have with the ITIF study is that it groups together a large number of privacy and security-focused tech policy groups and implies that they are all equally guilty of fueling privacy panics. In reality, there is a small core group of individuals and advocacy organizations who are far more vociferous and extreme in their privacy panic rhetoric. Others may be guilty of that at times, but not nearly to the same extent as the most panicky Chicken Littles.

The only other problem I had with the study, and this is really quite a small matter, is that I would have liked to have seen some discussion about some strategies we might be able to employ to help counter privacy panics, or lessen the likelihood that they develop at all. In my own work, I have tried to develop constructive solutions to privacy and security-related concerns that might give rise to panics. Those solutions include things like education and tech literacy efforts, empowerment tools, transparency efforts, and so on. It’s also worth reminding concerned critics that there exists a broad range of existing legal remedies that can help address privacy concerns after the fact. These include torts and common law solutions, contractual remedies, class actions, other targeted legal solutions, and enforcement of “unfair and deceptive practices” by the Federal Trade Commission or state attorneys general. And there’s also important industry self-regulatory efforts and best practices that can help alleviate many of these privacy concerns. I would have liked to have seen the ITIF study address these or other potential solutions to privacy panics.

Overall, however, I thought that the ITIF report makes an important contribution to the literature in this field and provides us with a useful analytic framework to help us evaluate and critique privacy-related technopanics in the future.

The video of the launch event is below and the full paper can be found here. Also, for further reading on technopanics, see my compendium of 40 essays I have written on the topic.

Last Wednesday, it was my great pleasure to testify at a Senate Commerce Committee hearing entitled, “The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things.” The hearing focused “on how devices… will be made smarter and more dynamic through Internet technologies. Government agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, however, are already considering possible changes to the law that could have the unintended consequence of slowing innovation.”

But the session went well beyond the Internet of Things and became a much more wide-ranging discussion about how America can maintain its global leadership for the next-generation of Internet-enabled, data-driven innovation. On both sides of the aisle at last week’s hearing, one Senator after another made impassioned remarks about the enormous innovation opportunities that were out there. While doing so, they highlighted not just the opportunities emanating out of the IoT and wearable device space, but also many other areas, such as connected cars, commercial drones, and next-generation spectrum.

I was impressed by the energy and nonpartisan vision that the Senators brought to these issues, but I wanted to single out the passionate statement that Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) delivered when it came his turn to speak because he very eloquently articulated what’s at stake in the battle for global innovation supremacy in the modern economy. (Sen. Booker’s remarks were not published, but you can watch them starting at the 1:34:00 mark of the hearing video.)

Embrace the Opportunity

First, Sen. Booker stressed the enormous opportunity with the Internet of Things. “ This is a phenomenal opportunity for a bipartisan, profoundly patriotic approach to an issue that can explode our economy. I think that there are trillions of dollars, creating countless jobs, improving quality of life, [and] democratizing our society,” he said. “We can’t even imagine the future that this portends of, and we should be embracing that.”

Sen. Booker has it exactly right. And for more details about the enormous innovation opportunities associated with the Internet of Things, see Section 2 of my new law review article, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” which provides concrete evidence.

Protect America’s Competitive Advantage in the Innovation Age

Second, Sen. Booker highlighted the importance of getting our policy vision right to achieve those opportunities. He noted that “a lot of my concerns are what my Republican colleagues also echoed, which is we should be doing everything possible to encourage this and nothing to restrict it.”

“ America right now is the net exporter of technology and innovation in the globe, and we can’t lose that advantage,” he said and “we should continue to be the global innovators on these areas.” He continued on to say:

And so, from copyright issues, security issues, privacy issues… all of these things are worthy of us wrestling and grappling with, but to me we cannot stop human innovation and we can’t give advantages in human innovation to other nations that we don’t have. America should continue to lead.

This is something I have been writing actively about now for many years and I agree with Sen. Booker that America needs to get our policy vision right to ensure we don’t lose ground in the international competition to see who will lead the next wave of Internet-enabled innovation. As I noted in my testimony, “If America hopes to be a global leader in the Internet of Things, as it has been for the Internet more generally over the past two decades, then we first have to get public policy right. America took a commanding lead in the digital economy because, in the mid-1990s, Congress and the Clinton administration crafted a nonpartisan vision for the Internet that protected “permissionless innovation”—the idea that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted without prior approval.”

Meanwhile, as I documented in my longer essay, “Why Permissionless Innovation Matters: Why does economic growth occur in some societies & not in others?” our international rivals languished on this front because they strapped their tech sectors with layers of regulatory red tape that thwarted digital innovation.

Reject Fear-Based Policymaking

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Sen. Booker stressed how essential it was that we reject a fear-based approach to public policymaking. As he noted at the hearing about these new information technologies, “ there’s a lot of legitimate fears, but in the same way of every technological era, there must have been incredible fears.”

He cited, for example, the rise of air travel and the onset of humans taking flight. Sen. Booker correctly noted that while that must have been quite jarring at first, we quickly came to realize the benefits of that new innovation. The same will be true for new technologies such as the Internet of Things, connected cars, and private drones, Booker argued. In each case, some early fears about these technologies could lead to overly-precautionary approach to policy. “ But for us to do anything to inhibit that leap in humanity to me seems unfortunate,” he said.

Once again, the Senator has it exactly right. As I noted in my law review article on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” as well as my recent essay, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change,” humans have exhibited the uncanny ability to adapt to changes in their environment, bounce back from adversity, and learn to be resilient over time. A great deal of wisdom is born of experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures while both developing new technologies and learning how to live with them. More often than not, citizens have found ways to adapt to technological change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms, new norms, or other creative fixes.

Booker gets that and understands why we need to be patient to allow that process to unfold once again so that we can enjoy the abundance of riches that will accompany a more innovative economy.

Avoiding Global Innovation Arbitrage

Sen. Booker also highlighted how some existing government legal and regulatory barriers could hold back progress. On the wireless spectrum front he noted that “ the government hoards too much spectrum and there is a need for more spectrum out there. Everything we are talking about,” he argued, “is going to necessitate more spectrum.” Again, 100% correct. Although some spectrum reform proposals (licensed vs. unlicensed, for example) will still prove contentious, we can at least all agree that we have to work together to find ways to open up more spectrum since the coming Internet of Things universe of technologies is going to demand lots of it.

Booker also noted that another area where fear undermines American leadership is the issue of private drone use. He noted that, “ the potential possibilities for drone technology to alleviate burdens on our infrastructure, to empower commerce, innovation, jobs… to really open up unlimited opportunities in this country is pretty incredible to me.”

The problem is that existing government policies, enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have been holding back progress. And that has had consequences in terms of global competitiveness. “As I watch our government go slow in promulgating rules holding back American innovation,” Booker said, “what happened as a result of that is that innovation has spread to other countries that don’t have these rules (or have) put in place sensible regulations. But now we seeing technology exported from America and going other places.”

Correct again! I wrote about this problem in a recent essay on “global innovation arbitrage,” in which I noted how “Capital moves like quicksilver around the globe today as investors and entrepreneurs look for more hospitable tax and regulatory environments. The same is increasingly true for innovation. Innovators can, and increasingly will, move to those countries and continents that provide a legal and regulatory environment more hospitable to entrepreneurial activity.”

That’s already happening with drone innovation, as I documented in that piece. Evidence suggests that the FAA’s heavy-handed and overly-precautionary approach to drones has encouraged some innovators to flock overseas in search of more hospitable regulatory environment.

Luckily, just this weekend, the FAA finally announced its (much-delayed) rules for private drone operations. (Here’s a summary of those rules.) Unfortunately, the rules are a bit of mixed bag, with some greater leeway being provided for very small drones, but the rules will still be too restrictive to allow for other innovative applications, such as widespread drone delivery (which has Amazon angry, among others.)

Bottom line: if our government doesn’t take a more flexible, light-touch approach to these and other cutting-edge technologies, than some of our most creative minds and companies are going to bolt.

I dealt with all of these innovation policy issues in far more detail in my latest little book Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, which I condensed further still into this essay on, “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation.” But Sen. Booker has offered us an even more concise explanation of just what’s at stake in the battle for innovation leadership in the modern economy. His remarks point the way forward and illustrate, as I have noted before, that innovation policy can and should be a nonpartisan issue.

Additional Reading

• testimony: “My Testimony for Senate Internet of Things Hearing,” February 11, 2015.
• essay: “A Nonpartisan Policy Vision for the Internet of Things,” December 11, 2014.
• law review article: “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” November 2014.
• essay: “Don’t Hit the (Techno-)Panic Button on Connected Car Hacking & IoT Security,” February 10, 2015.
• essay: “Striking a Sensible Balance on the Internet of Things and Privacy,” January 16, 2015.
• essay: “Some Initial Thoughts on the FTC Internet of Things Report,” January 28, 2015.
• slide presentation: “Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology,” September 12, 2014.
• essay: “CES 2014 Report: The Internet of Things Arrives, but Will Washington Welcome It?” January 8, 2014.

On Sunday night, 60 Minutes aired a feature with the ominous title, “Nobody’s Safe on the Internet,” that focused on connected car hacking and Internet of Things (IoT) device security. It was followed yesterday morning by the release of a new report from the office of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass) called Tracking & Hacking: Security & Privacy Gaps Put American Drivers at Risk,  which focused on connected car security and privacy issues. Employing more than a bit of techno-panic flare, these reports basically suggest that we’re all doomed.

On 60 Minutes, we meet former game developer turned Department of Defense “cyber warrior” Dan (“call me DARPA Dan”) Kaufman–and learn his fears of the future: “Today, all the devices that are on the Internet [and] the ‘Internet of Things’ are fundamentally insecure. There is no real security going on. Connected homes could be hacked and taken over.”

60 Minutes reporter Lesley Stahl, for her part, is aghast. “So if somebody got into my refrigerator,” she ventures, “through the internet, then they would be able to get into everything, right?” Replies DARPA Dan, “Yeah, that’s the fear.” Prankish hackers could make your milk go bad, or hack into your garage door opener, or even your car.

This segues to a humorous segment wherein Stahl takes a networked car for a spin. DARPA Dan and his multiple research teams have been hard at work remotely programming this vehicle for years. A “hacker” on DARPA Dan’s team proceeded to torment poor Lesley with automatic windshield wiping, rude and random beeps, and other hijinks. “Oh my word!” exclaims Stahl.

Never mind that we are told that the “hackers” who “hacked” into this car had been directly working on its systems for years—a luxury scarcely available to the shadowy malicious hackers about whom DARPA Dan and his team so hoped to frighten us. The careful setup, editing, and Lesley Stahl’s squeals made for convincing theater.

Then there’s the Markey report. On the surface, the findings appear grim. For instance, we are warned that “Nearly 100% of cars on the market include wireless technologies that could pose vulnerabilities to hacking or privacy intrusions.” Nearly 100%? We’re practically naked out there! But digging through the report, we learn that the basis for this claim is that most of the 16 manufacturers surveyed responded that 100% of their vehicles are equipped with wireless entry points (WEPs)—like Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, navigation, and anti-theft features. Because these features “could pose vulnerabilities,” they are listed as a threat—one that lurks in nearly 100% of the cars on the market, at that.

Much of the report is similarly panicky and sometimes humorous (complaint #3: “many manufacturers did not seem to understand the questions posed by Senator Markey.”) The report concludes that the “alarmingly inconsistent and incomplete state of industry security and privacy practice,” warrants recommendations that federal regulators — led by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) — “promulgate new standards that will protect the data, security and privacy of drivers in the modern age of increasingly connected vehicles.”

Take a Deep Breath

As we face an uncertain future full of rapidly-evolving technologies, it’s only natural that some might feel a little anxiety about how these new machines and devices operate. Despite the exaggerated and sometimes silly nature of techno-panic reports like these, they reflect many people’s real and understandable concerns about new technologies.

But the problem with these reports is that they embody a “panic-first” approach to digital security and privacy issues. It is certainly true that our cars are become rolling computers, complete with an arsenal of sensors and networking technologies, and the rise of the Internet of Things means almost everything we own or come into contact with will possess networking capabilities. Consequently, just as our current generation of computing and communications technologies are vulnerable to some forms of hacking, it is likely that our cars and IoT devices will be as well.

But don’t you think that automakers and IoT developers know that? Are we really to believe that journalists, congressmen, and DARPA Dan have a greater incentive to understand these issues than the manufacturers whose companies and livelihoods are on the line? And wouldn’t these manufacturers only take on these risks if consumer demand and expected value supported them? Watching the 60 Minutes spot and reading through the Markey report, one is led to think that innovators in this space are completely oblivious to these threats, simply don’t care enough to address them, and don’t have any plans in motion. But that is lunacy.

No Mention of Liability?

To begin, neither report even mentions the possibility of massive liability for future hacking attacks on connected cars or IoT devices. That is amazing considering how the auto industry already attracts an absolutely astonishing amount of litigation activity. (Ambulance-chasing is a full-time legal profession, after all.) Thus, to the extent that some automakers don’t want to talk about everything they are doing to address security issues, it’s likely because they are still figuring out how to address the various vulnerabilities out there without attracting the attention of either enterprising hackers or trial lawyers.

Nonetheless, contrary to the absurd statement by Mr. Kaufman that “There is no real security going on” for connected cars or the Internet of Things, the reality is that these are issues that developers are actively studying and trying to address. Manufacturers of connected devices know that: (1) nobody wants to own or use devices that are fundamentally insecure or dangerous; and (2) if they sell such devices to the public, they are in for a world of hurt once the trial lawyers see the first headlines about it.

It also still quite unclear how big the threat is here. Writing over at Forbes yesterday, Doug Newcomb notes that “the threat of car hacking has largely been overblown by the media – there’s been only one case of a malicious car hack, and that was an inside job by a disgruntled former car dealer employee. But it’s a surefire way to get the attention of the public and policymakers,” he correctly observes. Newcomb also interviewed Damon McCoy, an assistant professor of computer science at George Mason University and a car security researcher, who noted that car hacking hasn’t become prevalent and that “Given the [monetary] motivation of most hackers, the chance of [automotive hacking] is very low.”

Security is a Dynamic, Evolving Process

Regardless, the notion that we can just clean this whole device security situation up with a single set of federal standards, as the Markey report suggests, is appealing but fanciful. “Security threats are constantly changing and can never be holistically accounted for through even the most sophisticated flowcharts,” observed my Mercatus Center colleagues Eli Dourado and Andrea Castillo in their recent white paper on “Why the Cybersecurity Framework Will Make Us Less Secure.” “By prioritizing a set of rigid, centrally designed standards, policymakers are neglecting potent threats that are not yet on their radar,” Dourado and Castillo note elsewhere.

We are at the beginning of a long process. There is no final destination when it comes to security; it’s a never-ending process of devising and refining policies to address vulnerabilities on the fly. The complex problem of cybersecurity readiness requires dynamic solutions that properly align incentives, improve communication and collaboration, and encourage good personal and organizational stewardship of connected systems. Implementing the brittle bureaucratic standards that Markey and others propose could have the tragic unintended consequence of rendering our devices even less secure.

Standards Are Developing Rapidly

Meanwhile, the auto industry has already come up with privacy standards that go above and beyond what most other digital innovators apply to their own products today. Here are the Auto Alliance’s “Consumer Privacy Protection Principles: Privacy Principles for Vehicle Technologies and Services,” which 23 major automobile manufacturers agreed to abide by. And, according to a press release yesterday, “automakers are currently working to establish an Information Sharing Analysis Center (or “Auto-ISAC”) for sharing vehicle cybersecurity information among industry stakeholders.”

Again, progress continues and standards are evolving. This needs to be a flexible, evolutionary process, instead of a static, top-down, one-size-fits-all bureaucratic political proceeding.

We can’t set down security and privacy standards in stone for fast-moving technologies like these for another reason, and one I am constantly stressing in my work on “Why Permissionless Innovation Matters.” If we spend all our time worrying about hypothetical worst-case scenarios — and basing our policy interventions on a parade of hypothetical horribles — then we run the risk that best-case scenarios will never come about.  As analysts at the Center for Data Innovation correctly argue, policymakers should only intervene to address specific, demonstrated harms. “Attempting to erect precautionary regulatory barriers for purely speculative concerns is not only unproductive, but it can discourage future beneficial applications of the Internet of Things.” And the same is true for connected cars.

Trade-Offs Matter

Technopanic indulgence isn’t always merely silly or annoying—it can be deadly.

“During the four deadliest wars the United States fought in the 20th century, 39 percent more Americans were dying in motor vehicles” than on the battlefield. So writes Washington Post reporter Matt McFarland in a powerful new post today. The ongoing toll associated with human error behind the wheel is falling but remains absolutely staggering, with almost 100 people losing their lives and almost 6,500 people injured every day.

We must never fail to appreciate the trade-offs at work when we are pondering precautionary regulation. Ryan Hagemann and I wrote about these issues in our recent Mercatus Center working paper, “Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars.” That paper, which has been accepted for publication in a forthcoming edition of the Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy, outlines the many benefits of autonomous or semi-autonomous systems and discusses the potential cost of delaying their widespread adoption.

When it comes to the various security, privacy, and ethical considerations related to intelligent vehicles, Hagemann and I argue that they “need to be evaluated against the backdrop of the current state of affairs, in which tens of thousands of people die each year in auto-related accidents due to human error.” We continue on later in the paper:

Autonomous vehicles are unlikely to create 100 percent safe, crash-free roadways, but if they significantly decrease the number of people killed or injured as a result of human error, then we can comfortably suggest that the implications of the technology, as a whole, are a boon to society. The ethical underpinnings of what makes for good software design and computer-generated responses are a difficult and philosophically robust space for discussion. Given the abstract nature of the intersection of ethics and robotics, a more detailed consideration and analysis of this space must be left for future research. Important work is currently being done on this subject. But those ethical considerations must not derail ongoing experimentation with intelligent-vehicle technology, which could save many lives and have many other benefits, as already noted. Only through ongoing experimentation and feedback mechanisms can we expect to see constant improvement in how autonomous vehicles respond in these situations to further minimize the potential for accidents and harms. (p. 42-3)

As I noted here in another recent essay, “anything we can do to reduce it significantly is something we need to be pursuing with great vigor, even while we continue to sort through some of those challenging ethical issues associated with automated systems and algorithms.”

No Mention of Alternative Solutions

Finally, it is troubling that neither the 60 Minutes segment nor the Markey report spend any time on alternative solutions to these problems. In my forthcoming law review article, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” I devote the second half of the 90-page paper to constructive solutions to the sort of complex challenges raised in the 60 Minutes segment and the Markey report.

Many of the solutions I discuss in that paper — such as education and awareness-building efforts, empowerment solutions, the development of new social norms, and so on – aren’t even touched on by the reports. That’s a real shame because those methods could go a long way toward helping to alleviate many of the issues the reports identify.

We need a better public dialogue than this about the future of connected cars and Internet of Things security. Political scare tactics and techno-panic journalism are not going to help make the world a safer place. In fact, by whipping up a panic and potentially discouraging innovation, reports such as these can actually serve to prevent critical, life-saving technologies that could change society for the better.

Additional Reading

• Making Sure the “Trolley Problem” Doesn’t Derail Life-Saving Innovation, January 15, 2015.
• Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change, June 30, 2014
• Law review article: “Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars,” September 17, 2014.
• Law review article: “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation.”
• Ongoing blog series: Moral Panics & Technopanics
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• Slide Presentation: Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology, September 12, 2014
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014)
• The Growing Conflict of Visions over the Internet of Things & Privacy, January 14, 2012
• Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things? IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013
• My Filing to the FTC in its ‘Internet of Things’ Proceeding, May 31, 2013

I suppose it was inevitable that the DRM wars would come to the world of drones. Reporting for the Wall Street Journal today, Jack Nicas notes that:

In response to the drone crash at the White House this week, the Chinese maker of the device that crashed said it is updating its drones to disable them from flying over much of Washington, D.C.SZ DJI Technology Co. of Shenzhen, China, plans to send a firmware update in the next week that, if downloaded, would prevent DJI drones from taking off within the restricted flight zone that covers much of the U.S. capital, company spokesman Michael Perry said.

Washington Post reporter Brian Fung explains what this means technologically:

The [DJI firmware] update will add a list of GPS coordinates to the drone’s computer telling it where it can and can’t go. Here’s how that system works generally: When a drone comes within five miles of an airport, Perry explained, an altitude restriction gets applied to the drone so that it doesn’t interfere with manned aircraft. Within 1.5 miles, the drone will be automatically grounded and won’t be able to fly at all, requiring the user to either pull away from the no-fly zone or personally retrieve the device from where it landed. The concept of triggering certain actions when reaching a specific geographic area is called “geofencing,” and it’s a common technology in smartphones. Since 2011, iPhone owners have been able to create reminders that alert them when they arrive at specific locations, such as the office.

This is complete overkill and it almost certainly will not work in practice. First, this is just DRM for drones, and just as DRM has failed in most other cases, it will fail here as well. If you sell somebody a drone that doesn’t work within a 15-mile radius of a major metropolitan area, they’ll be online minutes later looking for a hack to get it working properly. And you better believe they will find one.

Second, other companies or even non-commercial innovators will just use such an opportunity to promote their DRM-free drones, making the restrictions on other drones futile.

Perhaps, then, the government will push for all drone manufacturers to include DRM on their drones, but that’s even worse. The idea that the Washington, DC metro area should be a completely drone-free zone is hugely troubling. We might as well put up a big sign at the edge of town that says, “Innovators Not Welcome!”

And this isn’t just about commercial operators either. What would such a city-wide restriction mean for students interested in engineering or robotics in local schools? Or how about journalists who might want to use drones to help them report the news?

For these reasons, a flat ban on drones throughout this or any other city just shouldn’t fly.

Moreover, the logic behind this particular technopanic is particularly silly. It’s like saying that we should install some sort of kill switch in all automobile ignitions so that they will not start anywhere in the DC area on the off chance that one idiot might use their car to drive into the White House fence. We need clear and simple rules for drone use; not technically-unworkable and unenforceable bans on all private drone use in major metro areas.

[ Update 1/30: Washington Post reporter Matt McFarland was kind enough to call me and ask for comment on this matter. Here’s his excellent story on “The case for not banning drone flights in the Washington area,” which included my thoughts.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my latest working paper, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation.” The “Internet of Things” (IoT) generally refers to “smart” devices that are connected to both the Internet and other devices. Wearable technologies are IoT devices that are worn somewhere on the body and which gather data about us for various purposes. These technologies promise to usher in the next wave of Internet-enabled services and data-driven innovation. Basically, the Internet will be “baked in” to almost everything that consumers own and come into contact with.

Some critics are worried about the privacy and security implications of the Internet of Things and wearable technology, however, and are proposing regulation to address these concerns. In my new 93-page article, I explain why preemptive, top-down regulation would derail the many life-enriching innovations that could come from these new IoT technologies. Building on a recent book of mine, I argue that “permissionless innovation,” which allows new technology to flourish and develop in a relatively unabated fashion, is the superior approach to the Internet of Things.

As I note in the paper and my earlier book, if we spend all our time living in fear of the worst-case scenarios — and basing public policies on them — then best-case scenarios can never come about. As the old saying goes: nothing ventured, nothing gained. Precautionary principle-based regulation paralyzes progress and must be avoided.  We instead need to find constructive, “bottom-up” solutions to the privacy and security risks accompanying these new IoT technologies instead of top-down controls that would limit the development of life-enriching IoT innovations.

The better alternative is to deal with concerns creatively as they develop, using a balanced, layered approach  involving many different solutions, including: educational efforts, technological empowerment tools, social norms, public and watchdog pressure, industry best practices and self-regulation, transparency, torts and products liability law, and targeted enforcement of existing legal standards as needed.

Generally speaking, patience, humility, and forbearance by policymakers is crucial to allowing greater innovation and consumer choice in this arena. Importantly, policymakers should not forget that societal and individual adaptation will play a role here, just as it has during so many other turbulent technological transformations.

This article can be downloaded on my Mercatus Center page, on SSRN, or at Research Gate. I am hoping to find a law or policy journal interested in publishing this paper soon. If you with a journal and are interested, please contact me. [UPDATE 12/3/14: This paper has been accepted for publication in the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 21, Issue 6 (2015).]

Finally, if you are interested in this topic, you might want to flip through these slides I prepared for a presentation on this topic that I made at the Federal Communications Commission in September:

Evan Selinger, a super-sharp philosopher of technology up at the Rochester Institute of Technology, is always alerting me to interesting new essays and articles and this week he brought another important piece to my attention. It’s a short new article by Arturo Casadevall, Don Howard, and Michael J. Imperiale, entitled, “The Apocalypse as a Rhetorical Device in the Influenza Virus Gain-of-Function Debate.” The essay touches on something near and dear to my own heart: the misuse of rhetoric in debates over the risk trade-offs associated with new technology and inventions. Casadevall, Howard, and Imperiale seek to “focus on the rhetorical devices used in the debate [over infectious disease experiments] with the hope that an analysis of how the arguments are being framed can help the discussion.”

They note that “humans are notoriously poor at assessing future benefits and risks” and that this makes many people susceptible to rhetorical ploys based on the artificial inflation of risks. Their particular focus in this essay is the debate over so-called “gain-of-function” (GOF) experiments involving influenza virus, but what they have to say here about how rhetoric is being misused in that field is equally applicable to many other fields of science and the policy debates surrounding various issues. The last two paragraphs of their essay are masterful and deserve everyone’s attention:

Who has the upper hand in the GOF debate? The answer to this question will be apparent only when the history of this time is written. However, it is possible that in the near future, arguments about risk will trump arguments about benefits, because the risk of a GOF experiment unleashing a devastating epidemic plays on a well-founded human fear, while the potential benefits of the research are considerably harder to articulate. In debates about benefits and risks, arguments based on positing extreme risks, however unlikely, are powerful rhetorical devices because they play into human fears. While we all agree that the risk of a GOF experiment unleashing a deadly epidemic is not zero, such an event would be at the extreme end of the likely outcomes from GOF experimentation. Arguing against GOF on the basis of pandemic dangers is a powerful rhetorical device because anyone can understand it. The problem with the use of apocalyptic scenarios in risk-benefit analysis is that they invoke the possibility for infinite suffering, irrespective of the probability of such an event, and the prospect of infinite suffering can potentially overwhelm any good obtained from knowledge gained from such experiments. Repeatedly invoking the apocalypse can create a sophistry that we call the apocalyptic fallacy, which, when applied in a vacuum of evidence and theory, proposes consequences that are so dire, however low the probability, that this tactic can be employed to quash any new invention, technique, procedures, and/or policy. The apocalyptic fallacy is an effective rhetorical tool that is meaningless in the absence of objective numbers. We remind those who invoke the apocalypse that the DNA revolution went on to deliver a multitude of benefits without unleashing the fears of Asilomar and that the large hadron collider was turned on, the Higgs boson was discovered, the standard model in physics was validated, and we are still here. Hence, we caution individuals against overreliance on the apocalypse in the debates ahead, for rhetoric can win the day, but rhetoric never gave us a single medical advance.

This is spot-on and, again, has applicability in many other arenas. Indeed, it aligns quite nicely with what I had to say about the use and misuse of rhetoric in information technology debates in my recent law review article on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle” (Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2013). In that piece, I began by noting that:

Fear is an extremely powerful motivational force. In public policy debates, appeals to fear are often used in an attempt to sway opinion or bolster the case for action. Such appeals are used to convince citizens that  threats to individual or social well-being may be avoided only if specific steps are taken. Often these steps take the form of anticipatory regulation based on the precautionary principle. Such “fear appeal arguments” are frequently on display in the Internet policy arena and often take the form of a fullblown “moral panic” or “technopanic.”  These panics are intense public, political, and academic responses to the emergence or use of media or technologies, especially by the young.  In the extreme, they result in regulation or censorship. While cyberspace has its fair share of troubles and troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society than previous technologies did. That has not stopped some from suggesting there are reasons to be particularly fearful of the Internet and new digital technologies. There are various individual and institutional factors at work that perpetuate fear-based reasoning and tactics.

I continued on to document the structure of “fear appeal” arguments, and then outlined how those arguments can be deconstructed and refuted using sound analysis and real-world evidence. The logic pattern behind fear appeal arguments looks something like this (as documented by Douglas Walton, in his outstanding textbook, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation):

• Fearful Situation Premise: Here is a situation that is fearful to you.
• Conditional Premise: If you carry out A, then the negative consequences portrayed in this fearful situation will happen to you.
• Conclusion: You should not carry out A.

In the field of rhetoric and argumentation, this logic pattern is referred to as argumentum in terrorem or argumentum ad metum. A closely related variant of this argumentation scheme is known as argumentum ad baculum, or an argument based on a threat. Argumentum ad baculum literally means “argument to the stick,” and the logic pattern in this case looks like this (again, according to Walton’s book on the subject):

• Conditional Premise: If you do not bring about A, then consequence B will occur.
• Commitment Premise: I commit myself to seeing to it that B will come about.
• Conclusion: You should bring about A.

The problem is that these logic patterns and rhetorical devices are logical fallacies or are based on outright myths. Once you start carefully unpacking arguments based on this logic pattern and applying reasoned, evidenced-based analysis, you can quickly show why the premise is not valid.

Unfortunately, that doesn’t stop some people (including a great many policymakers) from utilizing such faulty logic or misguided rhetorical devices. Even worse, as I note in my paper, is that,

fear appeals are facilitated by the use of threat inflation. Specifically, threat inflation involves the use of fear-inducing rhetoric to inflate artificially the potential harm a new development or technology poses to certain classes of the population, especially children, or to society or the economy at large. These rhetorical flourishes are empirically false or at least greatly blown out of proportion relative to the risk in question.

I then go on for many pages in my paper to document the use of fear appeals and threat inflation in a variety of information technology debates. I show that in every case where such tactics are common, they are unjustified once the evidence is evaluated dispassionately.  Regrettably, those who employ fear tactics and use threat inflation often don’t care because they know exactly what they are doing: The use of apocalyptic rhetoric grabs attention and sometimes ends serious deliberation. It is often an intentional ploy to scare people into action (or perhaps just into silence), even if that result is not based on a reasoned, level-headed evaluation of all the facts on hand.

The lesson here is simple: The ends do not justify the means. No matter how passionately you feel about a particular policy issue — even those that you perhaps believe potentially involve life and death ramifications — it is wise to avoid the use of apocalyptic rhetoric. Generally speaking, the sky is not falling and when one insists that it is, they should be backing up their assertions with a substantial body of evidence. Otherwise, they are just using fear appeal arguments and apocalyptic rhetoric to unnecessarily scare people and end all serious debate over issues that are likely far more complex and nuanced than their rhetoric suggests.

[For all my essays on “technopanics,” moral panics, and threat inflation, see this compendium I have assembled.]

If there are two general principles that unify my recent work on technology policy and innovation issues, they would be as follows. To the maximum extent possible:

1. We should avoid preemptive and precautionary-based regulatory regimes for new innovation. Instead, our policy default should be innovation allowed (or “permissionless innovation”) and innovators should be considered “innocent until proven guilty” (unless, that is, a thorough benefit-cost analysis has been conducted that documents the clear need for immediate preemptive restraints).
2. We should avoid rigid, “top-down” technology-specific or sector-specific regulatory regimes and/or regulatory agencies and instead opt for a broader array of more flexible, “bottom-up” solutions (education, empowerment, social norms, self-regulation, public pressure, etc.) as well as reliance on existing legal systems and standards (torts, product liability, contracts, property rights, etc.).

I was very interested, therefore, to come across two new essays that make opposing arguments and proposals. The first is this recent Slate oped by John Frank Weaver, “We Need to Pass Legislation on Artificial Intelligence Early and Often.” The second is Ryan Calo’s new Brookings Institution white paper, “The Case for a Federal Robotics Commission.”

Weaver argues that new robot technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” In order to preemptively address concerns about new technologies such as driverless cars or commercial drones, “we need to legislate early and often,” Weaver says. Stated differently, Weaver is proposing “precautionary principle”-based regulation of these technologies. The precautionary principle generally refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.

Calo argues that we need “the establishment of a new federal agency to deal with the novel experiences and harms robotics enables” since there exists “distinct but related challenges that would benefit from being examined and treated together.” These issues, he says, “require special expertise to understand and may require investment and coordination to thrive.

I’ll address both Weaver and Calo’s proposals in turn.

Problems with Precautionary Regulation

Let’s begin with Weaver proposed approach to regulating robotics and autonomous systems.

What Weaver seems to ignore—and which I discuss at greater length in my latest book—is that “precautionary” policy-making typically results in technological stasis and lost opportunities for economic and social progress. As I noted in my book, if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon such fears—it means that best-case scenarios will never come about. Wisdom and progress are born from experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures. As the old adage goes, “nothing ventured, nothing gained.”

More concretely, the problem with “permissioning” innovation is that traditional regulatory policies and systems tend to be overly-rigid, bureaucratic, costly, and slow to adapt to new realities. Precautionary-based policies and regulatory systems focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. As a result, preemptive bans or highly restrictive regulatory prescriptions can limit innovations that yield new and better ways of doing things.

Weaver doesn’t bother addressing these issues. He instead advocates regulating “early and often” without stopping to think through the potential costs of doing so. Yet, all regulation has trade-offs and opportunity costs. Before we rush to adopt rules based on knee-jerk negative reactions to new technology, we should conduct comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of the proposals and think carefully about what alternative approaches exist to address whatever problems we have identified.

Incidentally, Weaver also does not acknowledge the contradiction inherent in his thinking when he says robotic technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” Well, if robotic technology is truly developing “faster than we can legislate it,” then “getting out ahead of it” would be seemingly impossible! Unless, that is, he envisions regulating robotic technologies so stringently as to effectively bring new innovation to a grinding halt (or banning altogether).

To be clear, my criticisms should not be read to suggest that zero regulation is the best option. There are plenty of thorny issues that deserve serious policy consideration and perhaps even some preemptive rules. But how potential harms are addressed matters deeply. We should exhaust all other potential nonregulatory remedies first — education, empowerment, transparency, etc. — before resorting to preemptive controls on new forms of innovation. In other words, ex post (or after the fact) solutions should generally trump ex ante (preemptive) controls.

I’ll say more on this point in the conclusion since my response addresses general failings in Ryan Calo’s Federal Robotics Commission proposal, to which we now turn.

Problems with a Federal Robotics Commission

Moving on to Calo, it is important to clarify what he is proposing because he is careful not to overstate his case in favor of a new agency for robotics. He elaborates as follows:

“The institution I have in mind would not “regulate” robotics in the sense of fashioning rules regarding their use, at least not in any initial incarnation. Rather, the agency would advise on issues at all levels—state and federal, domestic and foreign, civil and criminal—that touch upon the unique aspects of robotics and artificial intelligence and the novel human experiences these technologies generate. The alternative, I fear, is that we will continue to address robotics policy questions piecemeal, perhaps indefinitely, with increasingly poor outcomes and slow accrual of knowledge. Meanwhile, other nations that are investing more heavily in robotics and, specifically, in developing a legal and policy infrastructure for emerging technology, will leapfrog the U.S. in innovation for the first time since the creation of steam power.”

Here are some of my concerns with Calo’s proposed Federal Robotics Commission.

Will It Really Just Be an Advisory Body?

First, Calo claims he doesn’t want a formal regulatory agency, but something more akin to a super-advisory body. He does, however, sneak in that disclaimer that he doesn’t envision it to be regulatory “at least not in any initial incarnation.” Perhaps, then, he is suggesting that more formal regulatory controls would be in the cards down the road. It remains unclear.

Regardless, I think it is a bit disingenuous to propose the formation of a new governmental body like this and pretend that it will not someday very soon come to possess sweeping regulatory powers over these technologies. Now, you may well feel that that is a good thing. But I fear that Calo is playing a bit of game here by asking the reader to imagine his new creation would merely stick to an advisory role.

Regulatory creep is real. There just aren’t too many examples of agencies being created solely for their advisory expertise and then not also getting into the business of regulating the technology or topic that is included in that agency’s name. And in light of some of Calo’s past writing and advocacy, I can’t help but think he is actually hoping that the agency comes to take on a greater regulatory role over time. Regardless, I think we can bank on that happening and I that there are reasons to worry about it for reasons noted above and which I will elaborate on below.

Incidentally, if Calo is really more interested in furthering just this expert advisory capacity, there are plenty of other entities (including non-governmental bodies) that could play that role. How about the National Science Foundation, for example? Or how about a multi-stakeholder body consisting of many different experts and institutions? I could go on, but you get the point. A single point of action is also a single point of failure. I don’t want just one big robotics bureaucracy making policy or even advising. I’d prefer a more decentralized approach, and one that doesn’t carry a (potential) big regulatory club in its hand.

Public Choice / Regulatory Capture Problems

Second, Calo underestimates the public choice problems of creating a sector-specific or technology-specific agency just for robotics. To his credit, he does admit that, “agencies have their problems, of course. They can be inefficient and are subject to capture by those they regulate or other special interests.” He also notes he has criticized other agencies for various failings. But he does not say anything more on this point.

Let’s be clear. There exists a long and lamentable history of sector-specific regulators being “captured” by the entities they regulate. To read the ugly reality, see my compendium, “Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found.” That piece documents what leading academics of all political stripes have had to say about this problem over the past century. No one ever summarized the nature and gravity of this problem better than the great Alfred Kahn in his masterpiece, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (1971):

“When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. [. . . ] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.” (pgs. 12, 46)

The history of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is highly instructive in this regard and was documented in a 66-page law review article I penned with Brent Skorup entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector,” (Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Vol. 18, 2013). Again, it doesn’t make for pleasant reading. Time and time again, instead of serving the “public interest,” the FCC served private interests. The entire history of video marketplace regulation is one of the most sickening examples to consider since there have almost eight decades worth of case studies of the broadcast industry using regulation as a club to beat back new entry, competition, and innovation. [Skorup and I have another paper discussing that specific history and how to go about reversing it.] This history is important because, in the early days of the Commission, many proponents thought the FCC would be exactly the sort of “expert” independent agency that Calo envisions his Federal Robotics Commission would be. Needless to say, things did not turn out so well.

But the FCC isn’t the only guilty offender in this regard. Go read the history about how airlines so effectively cartelized their industry following World War II with the help of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Thankfully, President Jimmy Carter appointed Alfred Kahn to clean things up in the 1970s. Kahn, a life-long Democrat, came to realize that the problem of capture was so insidious and inescapable that abolition of the agency was the only realistic solution to make sure consumer welfare would improve. As a result, he and various other Democrats in the Carter Administration and in Congress worked together to sunset the agency and its hideously protectionist, anti-consumer policies. (Also, please read this amazing 1973 law review article on “Economic Regulation vs. Competition,” by Mark Green and Ralph Nader if you need even more proof of why this is a such a problem.)

In other words, the problem of regulatory capture is not something one can casually dismiss. The problem is still very real and deserves more consideration before we casually propose creating new agencies, even “advisory” agencies. At a minimum, when proposing new agencies, you need to get serious about what sort of institutional constraints you might consider putting in place to make sure that history does not repeat itself. Because if you don’t, various large, well-heeled, and politically-connected robotics companies could come to capture any new “Federal Robotics Commission” in very short order.

Can We Clean Up Old Messes Before Building More Bureaucracies?

Third, speaking of agencies, if it is the case that the alphabet soup collection of regulatory agencies we already have in place are not capable of handling “robotics policy” right now, can we talk about reforming them (or perhaps even getting rid of a few of them) first? Why must we just pile yet another sector-specific or technology-specific regulator on top of the many that already exist? That’s just a recipe for more red tape and potential regulatory capture. Unless you believe there is value in creating bureaucracy for the sake of creating bureaucracy, there is no excuse for not phasing out agencies that failed in their original mission, or whose mission is now obsolete, for whatever reason. This is a fundamental “good government” issue that politicians and academics of all stripes should agree on.

Calo indirectly addresses this point by noting that “we have agencies devoted to technologies already and it would be odd and anomalous to think we are done creating them.” Curiously, however, he spends no time talking about those agencies or asking whether they have done a good job. Again, the heart of Calo’s argument comes down the assertion that another specialized, technology-specific “expert” agency is needed because there are “novel” issues associated with robotics. Well, if it is true, as Calo suggests, that we have been down this path before (and we have), and if you believe our economy or society has been made better off for it, then you need to prove it. Because the objection to creating another regulatory bureaucracy is not simply based on distaste for Big Government; it comes down to the simple questions: (1) Do these things work; and (2) Is there a better alternative?

This is where Calo’s proposal falls short. There is no effort to prove that technocratic or “scientific” bureaucracies, on net, are worth their expense (to taxpayers) or cost (to society, innovation, etc.) when compared to alternatives. Of course, I suspect this is where Calo and I might part ways regarding what metrics we would use to gauge success. I’ll save that discussion for another day and shift to what I regard as the far more serious deficiency of Calo’s proposal.

Do We Become Global Innovation Leaders Through Bureaucratic Direction?

Fourth, and most importantly, Calo does not offer any evidence to prove his contention that we need a sector-specific or technology-specific agency for robotics in order to develop or maintain America’s competitive edge in this field. Moreover, he does not acknowledge how his proposal might have the exact opposite result. Let me spend some time on this point because this is what I find most problematic about his proposal.

In his latest Brookings essay and his earlier writing about robotics, Calo keeps suggesting that we need a specialized federal agency for robotics to avoid “poor outcomes” due to the lack of “a legal and policy infrastructure for emerging technology.” He even warns us that other countries who are looking into robotics policy and regulation more seriously “will leapfrog the U.S. in innovation for the first time since the creation of steam power.”

Well, on that point, I must ask: Did America need a Federal Steam Agency to become a leader in that field? Because unless I missed something in history class, steam power developed fairly rapidly in this country without any centralized bureaucratic direction. Or how about a more recent example: Did America need a Federal Computer Commission or Federal Internet Commission to obtain or maintain a global edge in computing, the Internet, or the Digital Economy?

To the contrary, we took the EXACT OPPOSITE approach. It’s not just that no new agencies were formed to guide the development of computing or the Internet in this country. It’s that our government made a clear policy choice to break with the past by rejecting top-down, command-and-control regulation by unelected bureaucrats in some shadowy Beltway agency.

Incidentally, it was Democrats who accomplished this. While many Republicans today love to crack wise-ass comments about Al Gore and the Internet while simultaneously imagining themselves to be the great defenders of Internet freedom, the reality is that we have the Clinton Administration and one its most liberal members—Ira Magaziner—to thank for the most blessedly “light-touch,” market-oriented innovation policy that the world has ever seen.

What did Magaziner and the Clinton Administration do? They crafted the amazing 1997 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a statement of the Administration’s principles and policy objectives toward the Internet and the emerging digital economy. It recommended reliance upon civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and ongoing marketplace experiments to solve information age problems. First, “the private sector should lead. The Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry,” the Framework recommended. “Even where collective action is necessary, governments should encourage industry self-regulation and private sector leadership where possible.” Second, “governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce” and “parties should be able to enter into legitimate agreements to buy and sell products and services across the Internet with minimal government involvement or intervention.”

I’ve argued elsewhere that the Clinton Administration’s Framework, “remains the most succinct articulation of a pro-freedom, innovation-oriented vision for cyberspace ever penned.” Of course, this followed the Administration’s earlier move to allow the full commercialization of the Internet, which was even more important. The policy disposition they established with these decisions resulted in an unambiguous green light for a rising generation of creative minds who were eager to explore this new frontier for commerce and communications. And to reiterate,they did it without any new bureaucracy.

If You Regulate “Robotics,” You End Up Regulating Computing & Networking

Incidentally, I do not see how we could create a new Federal Robotics Commission without it also becoming a de facto Federal Computing Commission. Robotics and the many technologies and industries it already includes — driverless cars, commercial drones, Internet of Things, etc. — is becoming a hot policy topic, and proposals for regulation are already flying. These robotic technologies are developing on top of the building blocks of the Information Revolution: microprocessors, wireless networks, sensors, “big data,” etc.

Thus, I share Cory Doctorow’s skepticism about how one could logically separate “robotics” from these other technologies and sectors for regulatory purposes:

I am skeptical that “robot law” can be effectively separated from software law in general. … For the life of me, I can’t figure out a legal principle that would apply to the robot that wouldn’t be useful for the computer (and vice versa).

In his Brookings paper, Calo responded to Doctorow’s concern as follows:

the difference between a computer and a robot has largely to do with the latter’s embodiment. Robots do not just sense, process, and relay data. Robots are organized to act upon the world physically, or at least directly. This turns out to have strong repercussions at law, and to pose unique challenges to law and to legal institutions that computers and the Internet did not.

I find this fairly unconvincing. Just because robotic technologies have a physical embodiment does not mean their impact on society is all that more profound than computing, the Internet, and digital technologies. Consider all the hand-wringing going on today in cybersecurity circles about how hacking, malware, or various other types of digital attacks could take down entire systems or economies. I’m not saying I buy all that “technopanic” talk (and here are about three dozens of my essays arguing the contrary), but the theoretical ramifications are nonetheless on par with dystopian scenarios about robotics.

The Alternative Approach

Of course, it certainly may be the case that some worst-case scenarios are worth worrying about in both cases—for robotics and computing, that is. Still, is a Federal Robotics Commission or a Federal Computing Commission really the sensible way to address those issues?

To the contrary, this is why we have a Legislative Branch! So many of the problems of our modern era of dysfunctional government are rooted in an unwise delegation of authority to administrative agencies. Far too often, congressional lawmakers delegate broad, ambiguous authority to agencies instead of facing up to the hard issues themselves. This results in waste, bloat, inefficiencies, and an endless passing of the buck.

There may very well be some serious issues raised by robotics and AI that we cannot ignore, and which may even require a little preemptive, precautionary policy. And the same goes for general computing and the Internet. But that is not a good reason to just create new bureaucracies in the hope that some set of mythical technocratic philosopher kings will ride in to save the day with their supposed greater “expertise” about these matters. Either you believe in democracy or you don’t. Running around calling for agencies and unelected bureaucrats to make all the hard choices means that “the people” have even less of a say in these matters.

Moreover, there are many other methods of dealing with robotics and the potential problems robotics might create than through the creation of new bureaucracy. The common law already handles many of the problems that both Calo and Weaver are worried about. To the extent robotic systems are involved in accidents that harm individuals or their property, product liability law will kick in.

On this point, I strongly recommend another new Brookings publication. John Villasenor’s outstanding April white paper, “Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for Legislation,” correctly argues that,

“when confronted with new, often complex, questions involving products liability, courts have generally gotten things right. … Products liability law has been highly adaptive to the many new technologies that have emerged in recent decades, and it will be quite capable of adapting to emerging autonomous vehicle technologies as the need arises.”

Thus, instead of trying to micro-manage the development of robotic technologies in an attempt to plan for every hypothetical risk scenario, policymakers should be patient while the common law evolves and liability norms adjust. Traditionally, the common law has dealt with products liability and accident compensation in an evolutionary way through a variety of mechanisms, including strict liability, negligence, design defects law, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and so on. There is no reason to think the common law will not adapt to new technological realities, including robotic technologies. (I address these and other “bottom-up” solutions in my new book.)

In the meantime, let’s exercise some humility and restraint here and avoid heavy-handed precautionary regulatory regimes or the creation of new technocratic bureaucracies. And let’s not forget that many solutions to the problems created by new robotic technologies will develop spontaneously and organically over time as individuals and institutions learn to cope and “muddle through,” as they have many times before.

Additional Reading

• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change, June 30, 2014
• New Paper: “Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars,” September 17, 2014
• Slide Presentation: Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology, September 12, 2014
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014)
• The Growing Conflict of Visions over the Internet of Things & Privacy, January 14, 2012
• Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things? IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013
• My Filing to the FTC in its ‘Internet of Things’ Proceeding, May 31, 2013

On Thursday, it was my great pleasure to present a draft of my forthcoming paper, “The Internet of Things & Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy & Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” at a conference that took place at the Federal Communications Commission on “Regulating the Evolving Broadband Ecosystem.” The 3-day event was co-sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the University of Nebraska College of Law.

The 65-page working paper I presented is still going through final peer review and copyediting, but I posted a very rough first draft on SSRN for conference participants. I expect the paper to be released as a Mercatus Center working paper in October and then I hope to find a home for it in a law review. I will post the final version once it is released. [UPDATE:The final version of this working paper was released on November 19, 2014.]

In the meantime, however, I thought I would post the 46 slides I presented at the conference, which offer an overview of the nature of the Internet of Things and wearable technology, the potential economic opportunities that exist in this space, and the various privacy and security challenges that could hold this technological revolution back. I also outlined some constructive solutions to those concerns. I plan to be very active on these issues in coming months.

Additional Reading

• “The Growing Conflict of Visions over the Internet of Things & Privacy,” January 14, 2012
• “Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things?” IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013
• My Filing to the FTC in its ‘Internet of Things’ Proceeding, May 31, 2013
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014)

I’ve spent a lot of time here through the years trying to identify the factors that fuel moral panics and “technopanics.” (Here’s a compendium of the dozens of essays I’ve written here on this topic.) I brought all this thinking together in a big law review article (“Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle”) and then also in my new booklet, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom.”

One factor I identify as contributing to panics is the fact that “bad news sells.” As I noted in the book, “Many media outlets and sensationalist authors sometimes use fear-based tactics to gain influence or sell books. Fear mongering and prophecies of doom are always effective media tactics; alarmism helps break through all the noise and get heard.”

In line with that, I want to highly recommend you check out this excellent new oped by John Stossel of Fox Business Network on “Good News vs. ‘Pessimism Porn‘.”  Stossel correctly notes that “the media win by selling pessimism porn.” He says:

Are you worried about the future? It’s hard not to be. If you watch the news, you mostly see violence, disasters, danger. Some in my business call it “fear porn” or “pessimism porn.” People like the stuff; it makes them feel alive and informed. Of course, it’s our job to tell you about problems. If a plane crashes — or disappears — that’s news. The fact that millions of planes arrive safely is a miracle, but it’s not news. So we soak in disasters — and warnings about the next one: bird flu, global warming, potential terrorism. I won Emmys hyping risks but stopped winning them when I wised up and started reporting on the overhyping of risks. My colleagues didn’t like that as much.

He continues on to note how, even though all the data clearly proves that humanity’s lot is improving, the press relentlessly push the “pessimism porn.” He argues that “time and again, humanity survived doomsday. Not just survived, we flourish.” But that doesn’t stop the doomsayers from predicting that the sky is always set to fall. In particular, the press knows they can easily gin up more readers and viewers by amping up the fear-mongering and featuring loonies who will be all too happy to play the roles of pessimism porn stars. Of course, plenty of academics, activists, non-profit organizations and even companies are all too eager to contribute to this gloom-and-doom game since they benefit from the exposure or money it generates.

The problem with all this, of course, is that it perpetuates societal fears and distrust. It also sometimes leads to misguided policies based on hypothetical worst-case thinking. As I argue in my new book, which Stossel was kind enough to cite in his essay, if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—it means that best-case scenarios will never come about.

Facts, not fear, should guide our thinking about the future.

______________________

Related Reading:

• Journalists, Technopanics & the Risk Response Continuum (July 15, 2012)
• How & Why the Press Sometimes “Sells Digital Fear” (April 8, 2012)
• danah boyd’s “Culture of Fear” Talk (March 26, 2012)
• Prophecies of Doom & the Politics of Fear in Cybersecurity Debates (Aug. 8., 2011)
• Cybersecurity Threat Inflation Watch: Blood-Sucking Weapons! (March 22, 2012)

In a recent essay here “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” I made the argument that “We cannot possibly plan for all the ‘bad butterfly-effects’ that might occur, and attempts to do so will result in significant sacrifices in terms of social and economic liberty.” It was a response to a problem I see at work in many tech policy debates today: With increasing regularity, scholars, activists, and policymakers are conjuring up a seemingly endless parade of horribles that will befall humanity unless “steps are taken” to preemptive head-off all the hypothetical harms they can imagine. (This week’s latest examples involve the two hottest technopanic topics du jour: the Internet of Things and commercial delivery drones. Fear and loathing, and plenty of “threat inflation,” are on vivid display.)

I’ve written about this phenomenon at even greater length in my recent law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” as well as in two lengthy blog posts asking the questions, “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” and “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” The key point I try to get across in those essays is that letting such “precautionary principle” thinking guide policy poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity. If public policy is guided at every turn by the precautionary mindset then innovation becomes impossible because of fear of the unknown; hypothetical worst-case scenarios trump all other considerations. Social learning and economic opportunities become far less likely under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

Indeed, if we live in constant fear of the future and become paralyzed by every boogeyman scenario that our creative little heads can conjure up, then we’re bound to end up looking as silly as this classic 2005 parody from The Onion, “Everything That Can Go Wrong Listed.” It joked that “A worldwide consortium of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers is nearing the completion of the ambitious, decade-long project of cataloging everything that can go wrong.” The goal of the project was to create a “catalog of every possible unfortunate scenario” such that, “every hazardous possibility will be known to man.” Here was the hilarious fake snippet of the imaginary page 55,623 of the project:

I loved the story’s concluding quote from obviously fake Popular Science writer Brian Dyce, who said:

“Within a decade, laypeople might be able to log onto the Internet or go to their public library and consult volumes listing the myriad things that could go wrong,” Dyce said. “It could prove a very valuable research tool or preventative stopgap. For example, if you’re shopping for a car, you can prepare yourself by boning up on the 98,627 bad things that could happen during the purchasing process. This project could have deep repercussions on the way people make decisions, and also the amount of time they spend locked in their bedrooms.”

So, in the spirit of keeping people locked in their bedrooms, cowering in fear of hypothetical horribles, I have started a list of things we must all live in fear of and plan for! (I actually pulled most of these from articles and essays in my Evernote files that I tagged with the words “fear,” “panic.” and “dread.” I have collected more things than I can count.)  Anyway, please feel free to add your own suggestions down below in the comments.

• Without beefed-up cybersecurity regulations, we’ll face an “electronic Pearl Harbor.”
• Without pervasive NSA & law enforcement snooping, we face “the next 9/11.”
• An unfiltered Internet experience will lead the next generation to become nymphomaniacs and sex-starved freaks.
• Social networking sites are a “predators’ playground” where sex perverts prey on children.
• Twitter and texting will lead to the end of reading and/or long-form writing.
• Personalized digital services will lead to an online echo-chamber (“filter bubbles”) and potentially even the death of deliberative democracy.
• Robots are going to take all our jobs and then turn us into their slaves.
• 3D printing will destroy manufacturing jobs and innovation.
• Strong crypto will just let the bad guys hide their secrets and nefarious plots from us.
• Bitcoin will just lead to every teenager buying illegal drugs online.
• Hackers will hijack my car’s electronic systems and force it to drive off a bridge with me inside.
• Hackers are just going to remotely hack all those new medical devices I might use and give me a heart attack or aneurism.
• Hackers are just going to remotely hack my home and all its “smart devices” and then shut down all my stuff or spy on me.
• Geolocation technology is only going to empower perverts and stalkers to harass women.
• Targeted online ads just brainwash us into buying things we don’t need and will lead to massive discrimination.
• Big Data and the “quantified self” movement are just going to lead to massive social and economic discrimination.
• Violent video games are teaching our kids to be killers and will lead to a massive spike in murders and violent crime.
• Facebook is a “monopoly” and “public utility” from which there is no escape if you want to have an online existence.
• Google Glass will mean everybody will just take pictures of me naked in the gym locker room.
• Wearable technology will lead to a massive peer-to-peer Panopticon.
• Commercial drones are going to fall from the sky and kill us (if they don’t zap us with lasers or death rays first).

Hey, it could all happen, right?!  Therefore, as The Onion proposed, we must “catalog every possible unfortunate scenario” such that “every hazardous possibility will be known to man” and then plan, plan, PLAN, P-L-A-N accordingly!

Alternatively, we could realize that, again and again, humans have shown the remarkable ability to gradually adapt to new technologies and assimilate them into their lives through trial-and-error experimentation, the evolution of norms, and the development of coping mechanisms. It’s called resiliency. It happens. We live, we learn, we move on.

Washington Post columnist Robert J. Samuelson published an astonishing essay today entitled, “Beware the Internet and the Danger of Cyberattacks.” In the print edition of today’s Post, the essay actually carries a different title: “Is the Internet Worth It?” Samuelson’s answer is clear: It isn’t. He begins his breathless attack on the Internet by proclaiming:

If I could, I would repeal the Internet. It is the technological marvel of the age, but it is not — as most people imagine — a symbol of progress. Just the opposite. We would be better off without it. I grant its astonishing capabilities: the instant access to vast amounts of information, the pleasures of YouTube and iTunes, the convenience of GPS and much more. But the Internet’s benefits are relatively modest compared with previous transformative technologies, and it brings with it a terrifying danger: cyberwar.

And then, after walking through a couple of worst-case hypothetical scenarios, he concludes the piece by saying:

the Internet’s social impact is shallow. Imagine life without it. Would the loss of e-mail, Facebook or Wikipedia inflict fundamental change? Now imagine life without some earlier breakthroughs: electricity, cars, antibiotics. Life would be radically different. The Internet’s virtues are overstated, its vices understated. It’s a mixed blessing — and the mix may be moving against us.

What I found most troubling about this is that Samuelson has serious intellectual chops and usually sweats the details in his analysis of other issues. He understands economic and social trade-offs and usually does a nice job weighing the facts on the ground instead of engaging in the sort of shallow navel-gazing and anecdotal reasoning that many other weekly newspaper columnist engage in on a regular basis.

But that’s not what he does here. His essay comes across as a poorly researched, angry-old-man-shouting-at-the-sky sort of rant. There’s no serious cost-benefit analysis at work here; just the banal assertion that a new technology has created new vulnerabilities.  Really, that’s the extent of the logic at work here. Samuelson could have just as well substituted the automobile, airplanes, or any other modern technology for the Internet and drawn the same conclusion: It opens the door to new vulnerabilities (especially national security vulnerabilities) and, therefore, we would be better off without it in our lives.

Samuelson does admit that “Life would be radically different… without some earlier breakthroughs: electricity, cars, antibiotics,” so it is obvious he thinks their benefits outweigh their costs. But I could just as well say that new technologies such as cars and planes bring death and destruction, both in the theater of war and in everyday life. So, one might conclude of modern transportation technology that the “virtues are overstated, its vices understated. It’s a mixed blessing — and the mix may be moving against us,” just as Samuelson concludes of the Net.  Of course, such an assertion would be absurd without reference to the many benefits that accrue to us from these technologies. I don’t think I need to cite them all here. But Samuelson is certainly a sharp enough guy that he would engage in such a cost-benefit analysis if someone made such an assertion about other technologies.

When it comes to the Internet, however, all he can say about benefits is that “the instant access to vast amounts of information, the pleasures of YouTube and iTunes, the convenience of GPS and much more.” (GPS? Really? Strictly speaking, that’s not an Internet technology, Bob. But perhaps you have something against satellite technology, too! Looking forward to your column, “Is Satellite Communication Worth It?”)

Of course the first benefit of the Internet that Samuelson cites — “instant access to vast amounts of information” — is nothing to sneeze at! The fact that he so casually dismisses that benefit is rather troubling. For the vast majority of civilization, humans have lived in a what we might think of as a state of extreme information poverty. Today, by contrast, we are blessed to live in amazing times. An entire planet of ubiquitous, instantly accessible media and information is now at our fingertips. We are able to share culture and engage with others — both socially and commercially — in ways that were unthinkable and impossible even just a few decades ago.

It’s hard to quantify the benefits associated with these facts, but I would think most of us would agree they are enormous. But it’s hardly the only sort of benefit that comes from the Internet and modern digital communications technologies. The fact that Samuelson can’t think of anything more is either a serious failure of imagination or, more troubling, an intentional effort to minimize and ignore those benefits in order to prey on people’s worst fears.

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about “technopanics” and the role that journalists sometimes play in hyping them. See, for example, my essay last summer, “Journalists, Technopanics & the Risk Response Continuum,” which is based on my Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” As I explain in that article, the model for what Samuelson has done in his essay is actually a very old logical fallacy: a so-called “appeal to fear.” Here’s how I explain it in my law review article:

Rhetoricians employ several closely related types of “appeals to fear.” Douglas Walton, author of Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation, outlines the argumentation scheme for “fear appeal arguments” as follows:

• Fearful Situational Premise: Here is a situation that is fearful to you.
• Conditional Premise: If you carry out A, then the negative consequences portrayed in the fearful situation will happen to you.
• Conclusion: You should not carry out A.

This logic pattern here is referred to as argumentum in terrorem or argumentum ad metum. A closely related variant of this argumentation scheme is known as argumentum ad baculum, or an argument based on a threat. Argumentum ad baculum literally means “argument to the stick,” an appeal to force. Walton outlines the argumentum ad baculum argumentation scheme as follows:

• Conditional Premise: If you do not bring about A, then consequence B will occur.
• Commitment Premise: I commit myself to seeing to it that B comes about.
• Conclusion: You should bring about A.

As will be shown, these argumentation devices are at work in many information technology policy debates today even though they are logical fallacies or based on outright myths. They tend to lead to unnecessary calls for anticipatory regulation of information or information technology.

I continue on in that article to provide several examples of how ” argumentum in cyber-terrorem ” logic is at work in several digital policy arenas today, especially as it pertains to cybersecurity and cyberwar fears. My Mercatus Center colleagues Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins have warned of the dangers of “threat inflation” in cybersecurity policy in their important paper, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy.” The rhetoric of cybersecurity debates illustrates how threat inflation is a crucial part of “argumentum in cyber-terrorem ” logic. Frequent allusions are made in cybersecurity debates to the potential for a “Digital Pearl Harbor,”  a “cyber cold war,”  a “cyber Katrina,”  or even a “cyber 9/11.”  These analogies are made even though these historical incidents resulted in death and destruction of a sort not comparable to attacks on digital networks. Others refer to “cyber bombs” even though no one can be “bombed” with binary code. A rush to judgment often follows inflated threats.

And that’s exactly what Samuelson has done in his essay. He’s rushed to an illogical, sweeping conclusion — namely, that we would be better off just bottling up the Net, or “repealing” it (whatever that means) — and he hasn’t even bothered considering the costs of such action. Worse yet, even though he admits that, “I don’t know the odds of this technological Armageddon. I doubt anyone does. The fears may be wildly exaggerated,” that doesn’t stop him from suggesting that we should live in fear of worst case hypothetical scenarios and take radical steps based upon them.

Again, it is certainly true that the Internet creates new vulnerabilities, including national security vulnerabilities, but that simply cannot be the end of the story. Those vulnerabilities need to be carefully evaluated and measured and, before we rush to panicked conclusions and advocate sweeping policy solutions, the corresponding benefits of the Internet must be taken into consideration.

Instead, Samuelson has engaged in the worst sort of fear-based, factually-challenged reasoning in his essay. It’s a model for how not to think or write about Internet policy. A more thoughtful analysis would acknowledge that the Internet is more than just “a symbol of progress;” it constitutes real progress and an improvement of the human condition.  And while it’s all too easy for newspaper columnists to suggest “we would be better off without it” and that it should be “repealed,” there are all too many government goons out there who would like to do just that since the Net has empowered the masses and given them a voice like no other technology in history.

Shame on Robert Samuelson for dismissing these realities — and the Internet’s many benefits — so lightly.

[ Note: See all my essays on “technopanics” here.]

In mid-April, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requested comments regarding “the consumer privacy and security issues posed by the growing connectivity of consumer devices, such as cars, appliances, and medical devices” or the so-called “Internet of Things.” This is in anticipation of a November 21 public workshop that the FTC will be hosting on the same issue.

These issues are finally starting to catch the attention of the public and policymakers alike with the rise of wearable computing, remote home automation and monitoring technologies, smart grids, autonomous vehicles and intelligent traffic systems, and so on. The Internet of Things represents the next great wave of Internet innovation, but it also represents the next great battleground in the field of Internet policy.

I filed comments with the FTC today in this proceeding and made a few simple points about why they should proceed cautiously here. A summary of my filing follows.

Avoiding a Precautionary Principle for the Internet of Things

First, while it is unclear where the FTC is heading with this proceeding—or for that matter, whether this even a formal proceeding at all—the danger exists that it represents the beginning of a regulatory regime for a new set of information technologies that are still in their infancy. Fearing hypothetical worst-case scenarios about the misuse of some IoT technologies, some policy activists and policymakers could seek to curb or control their development.

Policymakers should avoid acting on those impulses. Simply put, the Internet of Things—like the Internet itself—should not be subjected to a precautionary principle, which would impose preemptive, prophylactic restrictions on this rapidly evolving sector to guard against every theoretical harm that could develop. Preemptive restrictions on the development of the Internet of Things could retard technological innovation and limit the benefits that flow to consumers.

In other words, to the maximum extent possible, the default position toward new forms of technological innovation such as the Internet of Things should be innovation allowed, or what Paul Ohm, who recently joined the FTC as a Senior Policy Advisor, refers to as an “anti-Precautionary Principle.” This policy norm is better captured in the well-known Internet ideal of “permissionless innovation,” or the general freedom to experiment and learn through trial-and-error experimentation. As I noted in a recent essay here:

Wisdom is born of experience, including experiences involving risk and the possibility of mistakes and accidents. Patience and openness to permissionless innovation represent the wise disposition toward new technologies not only because it provides breathing space for future entrepreneurialism, but also because it provides an opportunity to observe both the evolution of societal attitudes toward new technologies and how citizens adapt to them.

Adaptation Is Not Just Possible but Likely

Which leads to the next major point I make in my filing: Humans adapt! The more I study the history of various technological innovations the more I find the same story unfolding: again and again society has found ways to adapt to new technological changes by employing a variety of coping mechanisms or new social norms. In fact, we see a common cycle of initial resistance, gradual adaptation, and then eventual assimilation of new technologies into society. (I previously outlined this cycle in my law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.”)

I offer several specific examples of this process in action—from the rise of the telephone and the camera to RFID and Gmail. I argue that these examples should give us hope that we will also find ways of adapting to the challenges presented by the rise of the Internet of Things.

Norms Evolve and “Regulate”

Third, my filing discusses how societal norms evolve in response to new technologies and even come to “regulate” acceptable use of those technologies. Law tends to regulate in sweeping ways and then get locked in. Social norms and technological etiquette, by contrast, flexibly evolve in unique ways over time.

Some of these norms or social constraints are more “top-down” and formal in nature in that they are imposed by establishments or organizations in the form of restrictions on technologies. In other cases, these norms or social constraints are purely bottom-up and group-driven. I offer examples of both types of norms in my filing.

Other Remedies Exist or Will Develop as Needed

Finally, I argue in my filing that policymakers should exercise restraint and humility in the face of uncertain change and address harms that develop—if they do at all—after careful benefit-cost analysis of various remedies. I note that many federal and state laws already exist that could address perceived harms associated with these technologies.

And let’s be clear: some misuses and harms will develop, just as they have for every other information technology ever invented. But, to reiterate, we have generally not preemptive applied precautionary regulation to each and every new information technology based on the potential threat of some misuses developing. Instead, we have allowed experimentation and innovation to take place largely unimpeded and then relied on a combination of education, user empowerment, various social norms and coping mechanisms, and then targeted laws as needed after serious harms were demonstrated. That same approach should govern the Internet of Things.

If we succumb to the opposite impulse and apply a “Mother May I?” permissioned approach to the Internet of Things—with innovation only being allowed after regulators deem those technologies “safe” or “acceptable”—then we risk derailing the next great wave of Internet-based innovation. The implications for America’s consumers and our global competitiveness could not be more profound. The result will be fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

Hopefully the FTC is not going down that path with this proceeding or its forthcoming workshop on the Internet of Things. But stay tuned. This set of issues is expanding rapidly and promises to produce heated privacy, security, and safety debates for many years to come.

Please read my filing for more details. I’ve also embedded it below.

Comments of Adam Thierer Mercatus Center in FTC Internet of Things Proceeding (June 2013)

I’m excited to announce that the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology has just published the final version of my 78-page paper on, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” My thanks to the excellent team at the Journal, who made the final product a much better paper than the one I turned into them! I poured my heart and soul into this article and hope others find it useful. It’s the culmination of all my work on technopanics and threat inflation in information policy debates, much of which I originally developed here in various essays through the years. In coming weeks, I hope to elaborate on themes I develop in the paper in a couple of posts here.

The paper can be found on the Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. website or on SSRN. I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader. Here’s the executive summary:

Fear is an extremely powerful motivational force. In public policy debates, appeals to fear are often used in an attempt to sway opinion or bolster the case for action. Such appeals are used to convince citizens that  threats to individual or social well-being may be avoided only if specific steps are taken. Often these steps take the form of anticipatory regulation based on the precautionary principle. Such “fear appeal arguments” are frequently on display in the Internet policy arena and often take the form of a fullblown “moral panic” or “technopanic.”  These panics are intense public, political, and academic responses to the emergence oruse of media or technologies, especially by the young.  In the extreme, they result in regulation or censorship. While cyberspace has its fair share of troubles and troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society than previous technologies did. That has not stopped some from suggesting there are reasons to be particularly fearful of the Internet and new digital technologies. There are various individual and institutional factors at work that perpetuate fear-based reasoning and tactics.

This paper will consider the structure of fear appeal arguments in technology policy debates, and then outline how those arguments can be deconstructed  and refuted in both cultural and economic contexts. Several examples of fear appeal arguments will be offered with a particular focus on online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. The various factors contributing to “fear cycles” in these policy areas will be documented. To the extent that these concerns are valid, they are best addressed by ongoing societal learning, experimentation, resiliency, and coping strategies rather than by regulation. If steps must be taken to address these concerns, education- and empowerment-based solutions represent superior approaches to dealing with them compared to a precautionary principle approach, which would limit beneficial learning opportunities and retard technological progress.

Technopanics and Threat Inflation [Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center]

[Based on forthcoming article in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14 Issue 1, Winter 2013, http://mjlst.umn.edu]

I hope everyone caught these recent articles by two of my favorite journalists, Kashmir Hill (“Do We Overestimate The Internet’s Danger For Kids?”) and Larry Magid (“Putting Techno-Panics into Perspective.”) In these and other essays, Hill and Magid do a nice job discussing how society responds to new Internet risks while also explaining how those risks are often blown out of proportion to begin with.

Both Hill and Magid are rarities among technology journalists in that they spend more time debunking fears rather than inflating them. Whether its online safety, cybersecurity, or digital privacy, we all too often see journalists distorting or ignoring how humans find constructive ways to cope with technological change. Why do journalists fail to make that point? I suppose it is because bad news sells–even when there isn’t much to substantiate it.

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about “moral panics” and “technopanics” in recent years (here’s a compendium of roughly two dozen essays I’ve penned on the topic) and earlier this year I brought all my work together in an 80-page paper entitled, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.”

In that paper, I identified several reasons why pessimistic, fear-mongering attitudes often dominate discussions about the Internet and information technology. I began by noting that the biggest problem is that for a variety of reasons, humans are poor judges of risks to themselves or those close to them. But I identified other explanations for why human beings are predisposed toward pessimism and are risk-averse, including:

• Generational Differences
• Hyper-Nostalgia, Pessimistic Bias, and Soft Ludditism
• Bad News Sells: The Role of the Media, Advocates, and the Listener
• The Role of Special Interests and Industry Infighting
• Elitist Attitudes among Academics and Intellectuals
• The Role of “Third-Person-Effect Hypothesis”

You can read my paper for fuller descriptions of each point. But let me return to my primary concern here regarding the role that the media plays in the process. It seems logical why journalists inflate fears: In an increasingly crowded and cacophonous modern media environment, there’s a strong incentive for them to use fear to grab attention. But why are we, the public, such eager listeners and so willing to lap up bad news, even when it is overhyped, exaggerated, or misreported?

“Negativity bias” certainly must be part of the answer. Michael Shermer, author of The Believing Brain, notes that psychologists have identified “negativity bias” as “the tendency to pay closer attention and give more weight to negative events, beliefs, and information than to positive.” Negativity bias, which is closely related to the phenomenon of “pessimistic bias,” is frequently on display in debates over online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity.

But even with negativity bias at work, what I still cannot explain is why so many of these inflated fears exists when we have centuries of experience and empirical results that prove humans are able to again and again adapt to technological change. We are highly resilient, adaptable mammals. We learn to cope.

In my paper, I try to develop a model for how humans deal with new technological risks. I identify four general groups of responses and place them along a “risk response continuum”:

1. Prohibition: Prohibition attempts to eliminate potential risk through suppression of technology, product or service bans, information controls, or outright censorship.
2. Anticipatory Regulation: Anticipatory regulation controls potential risk through preemptive, precautionary safeguards, including administrative regulation, government ownership or licensing controls, or restrictive defaults. Anticipatory regulation can lead to prohibition, although that tends to be rare, at least in the United States.
3. Resiliency: Resiliency addresses risk through education, awareness building, transparency and labeling, and empowerment steps and tools.
4. Adaptation: Adaptation involves learning to live with risk through trial-and-error experimentation, experience, coping mechanisms, and social norms. Adaptation strategies often begin with, or evolve out of, resiliency-based efforts.

For reasons I outline in the paper, I believe that it almost always makes more sense to use bottom-up resiliency and adaptation solutions instead of top-down anticipatory regulation or prohibition strategies. And, more often than not, that’s what we eventually opt for as a society, at least when it comes to information technology. Sure, you can find plenty of examples of knee-jerk prohibition and regulatory strategies being proposed initially as a response to an emerging technology. In the long-run, however–and sometimes even in the short-run–we usually migrate down the risk response continuum and settle into resiliency and adaptation solutions. Sometimes we adopt those approaches because we come to understand they are more sensible or less costly. Other times we get there only after several failed experiments with prohibition and regulation strategies.

I know I am being a bit too black and white here. Sometimes we utilize hybrid approaches–a bit of anticipatory regulation with a bit of resiliency, for example. We use such an approach for both privacy and security matters, for example. But I have argued in my work that the sheer velocity of change in the information age makes it less and less likely that anticipatory regulation strategies–and certainly prohibition strategies–will work in the long-haul. In fact, they often break down very rapidly, making it all the more essential that we begin thinking seriously about resiliency strategies as soon as we are confronted with new technological risks. Adaptation isn’t usually the correct strategy right out of the gates, however. Just saying “learn to to live with it” or “get over it” won’t work as a short-term strategy, even if that’s exactly what will happen over the long-term. But resiliency strategies often help us get to adaption strategies and solutions more quickly.

Anyway, back to journalists and fear. It strikes me that sharp journalists like Hill and Magid just seem to get everything I’m saying here and they weave these insights into all their reporting. By why do so few others? Again, I suppose it is because the incentives are screwy here and make it so that even those reporters who know better will sometimes use fear-based tactics to sell copy. But I am still surprised by how often even respected mainstream media establishments play this game.

In any event, those others reporters need to learn to give humans a bit more credit and acknowledge that (a) we often learn to cope with technological risks quite rapidly and (b) sometimes those risks are greatly inflated to begin with.

Yesterday on TechCrunch, Josh Constine posted an interesting essay about how some in the press were “Selling Digital Fear” on the privacy front. His specific target was The Wall Street Journal, which has been running an ongoing investigation of online privacy issues with a particular focus on online apps. Much of the reporting in their “What They Know” series has been valuable in that it has helped shine light on some data collection practices and privacy concerns that deserve more scrutiny. But as Constine notes, sometimes the articles in the WSJ series lack sufficient context, fail to discuss trade-offs, or do not identify any concrete harm or risk to users. In other words, some of it is just simple fear-mongering. Constine argues:

Reality has yet to stop media outlets from yelling about privacy, and because the WSJ writers were on assignment, they wrote the “Selling You On Facebook” hit piece despite thin findings. These kind of articles can make mainstream users so worried about the worst-case scenario of what could happen to their data, they don’t see the value they get in exchange for it. “Selling You On Facebook” does bring up the important topic of how apps can utilize personal data granted to them by their users, but it overstates the risks. Yes, the business models of Facebook and the apps on its platform depend on your personal information, but so do the services they provide. That means each user needs to decide what information to grant to who, and Facebook has spent years making the terms of this value exchange as clear as possible.

“While sensationalizing the dangers of online privacy sure drives page views and ad revenue,” Constine also noted, “it also impedes innovation and harms the business of honest software developers.” These trade-offs are important because, to the extent policymakers get more interested in pursing privacy regulations based on these fears, they could force higher prices or less innovation upon us with very little benefit in exchange.

Of course, the press generating hypothetical fears or greatly inflating dangers is nothing new. We have seen it happen many times in the past and it can be seen at work in many other fields today (online child safety is a good example). In my recent 80-page paper on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” I discussed how and why the press and other players inflate threats and sell fear. Here’s a passage from my paper:

“The most obvious reason that doomsday fears get disproportionate public attention is that bad news is newsworthy, and frightening forecasts cause people to sit up and take notice,” Julian Simon astutely observed in 1996.[1] That is equally true today.[2] Many media outlets and sensationalist authors sometimes use fear-based rhetorical devices to gain influence or sell books. “Opportunists will take advantage of this fear for personal and institutional gain,” notes University of Colorado Law School professor Paul Ohm.[3] Fear mongering and prophecies of doom have always been with us, since they represent easy ways to attract attention and get heard. “Pessimism has always been big box office,” notes [Matt] Ridley.[4] This is even more true in the midst of the modern information age cacophony. Breaking through all the noise is hard when competition for our eyes and ears is so intense. It should not be surprising, therefore, that sensationalism and alarmism are used as media differentiation tactics. This is particularly true as it relates to kids and online safety.[5] “Unbalanced headlines and confusion have contributed to the climate of anxiety that surrounds public discourse on children’s use of new technology,” argues Professor Sonia Livingstone of the London School Economics. “Panic and fear often drown out evidence.”[6] Sadly, most of us are eager listeners and lap up bad news, even when it is overhyped, exaggerated, or misreported. [Michael] Shermer notes that psychologists have identified this phenomenon as “negativity bias,” or “the tendency to pay closer attention and give more weight to negative events, beliefs, and information than to positive.”[7] Negativity bias, which is closely related to the phenomenon of “pessimistic bias” …  is frequently on display in debates over online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity.