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Microsoft is making a major push to integrate social networking tools like Facebook and Twitter into its Bing search engine: users will soon be able to “Ping” search results they like to their friends directly from Bing. Back in January, in “Google, the Innovator’s Dilemma and the Future of Search & Web Ads,” I talked about the implications of this history of search from the WSJ):

Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail.  The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete.  This dynamic was described brilliantly in Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s classic 1997 book The Innovator’s Dilemma:  When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail… Let’s hope that Microsoft—as well as Yahoo!—have carefully studied the vast literature produced by business schools in the wake of Christensen’s book about how big companies can avoid the Innovator’s Dilemma by promoting—and capitalizing on—radical innovation from within.  Indeed, this seems to be precisely what has guided Google’s own strategy as it has grown from “disruptive innovator” to become the very sort of behemoth that cannot easily escape the Dilemma, even if corporate managers are fully aware of the problem on a theoretical level.  If Google can do it, Microsoft should be able to, too.  But let’s also not discount the possibility that, no matter how hard Google’s management might try to retain the innovative culture of a start-up, the giant  can’t do that well enough to prevent its own apparent market dominance from being disrupted by new upstart innovators in search and advertising technologies.

My prediction seems to be coming true: Microsoft, with less to lose and without a huge installed user base to worry about annoying by violating Google’s “Prime Directive” of elegant simplicity, may have an easier time introducing “disruptive” innovations to search than Google. Of course, it’s unlikely that any one feature will prove the “killer app” that suddenly causes Bing’s market share to explode—and Google’s to plummet—but a steady stream of such nifty features could convince many users to switch to Bing.

At 29, I’m old enough to remember when Microsoft seemed as cool as Google does today. Hell, I remember being thrilled as a sophomore in high school by Bill Gates’ 1995 book The Road Ahead and the accompanying CD-ROM (which included, as I recall, a tour of Gates’s ultra-futuristic home).  If Microsoft can “get its mojo back,” the company could truly become a web services provider to rival Google.  We’d all benefit from having more choices in search engines, advertising platforms and related tools. And, driving each other to “build a better mousetrap,” the two companies could lead us down the “Road Ahead” from Search 2.0 to Search 3.0 and beyond. So here’s to hoping that Redmond can solve the “Innovator’s Dilemma” with tools like Google’s “20 percent” time that free engineers to innovate!

Jerry Yang’s departure as Yahoo! CEO opens the door to a renewed bid by Microsoft to buy Yahoo!’s search business (or Yahoo! itself).  Such a merger could produce a significantly stronger challenger to Google in the search market.  With this possibility in mind, the WSJ just ran a fascinating history of the “paid search” The search marketbusiness—the placement of “contextually targeted” ads next to search engine results based on the search terms that produced those results.

In a nutshell, Microsoft failed to see (back in 1998-2003) the enormous potential of paid search—just as small start-ups (such as Google) were starting to develop the technology and business model that today account for a $12+ billion/year industry, which is  twice the size of the display ad market and which supports a great deal of the online content and services we have all come to take for granted online.  Microsoft first put its toe in the water of paid search with a small-scale partnership with Goto.com in 1999-2000.  But this partnership failed because of internal resistance from the managers of Microsoft’s display-ad program.  In 2000, Google launched Adwords and thus began its transformation from start-up into economic colossus.  By 2002, Microsoft realized that it needed to catchup fast, and approached Goto.com (by then renamed Overture) about a takeover.  But Microsoft ultimately chose in 2003 not to buy the startup because  Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer “balked at Overture’s valuation of $1 billion to $2 billion, arguing that Microsoft could create the same service for less.” 

Microsoft, meanwhile, spent the next 18 months deploying hundreds of programmers to build a search engine and a search-ad service, which it code-named Moonshot. The company launched its search engine in late 2004 and its search-ad system in May 2006.

But Microsoft’s ad system came too late:

Advertisers applauded Moonshot for its technical innovation. But Microsoft had trouble coaxing people to migrate to its search engine from Google; advertisers were unwilling to spend large sums on MSN’s search ads. By building a new system instead of buying Overture, Mr. Mehdi says, “we really delayed our time to market.”

What’s most fascinating about the piece is that it seems to suggest that Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail.  The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete.   Continue reading →