It seems Microsoft is facing much the same problem Pepsi faced in the 70s, when it created the Pepsi challenge (a blind taste test between Coke and Pepsi):

A stark sign of the challenge Yusuf Mehdi faces as a point man for Microsoft in the company’s battle with Google comes from the company’s own research into the habits of consumers online. During regular “blind taste tests,” in which Microsoft asks randomly-selected consumers to score the quality of results from various Internet search engines, the quality of Microsoft’s search results have so improved that people can’t tell the difference between Microsoft and Google search results, says Mr. Mehdi, senior vice president of Microsoft’s online audience business group. But when Microsoft slaps the Google brand name on the results from Microsoft’s own search engine during another portion of its tests, users invariably score them highest. “Just by putting the name up, people think it’s more relevant,” he says. … Microsoft still faces the problem of the strong association in consumers’ minds between Google and Internet search. In theory, it’s far easier for a consumer to switch Internet search engines than it is for them to switch other forms of software. But Mr. Mehdi–a veteran of the Web browser wars of the late 90s in which Microsoft managed to overtake the pioneer in the category, Netscape Communications–says in reality it’s very hard to convince consumers to change their search behavior.

So, Microsoft faces an uphill battle.  Happily for the Internet marketplace, it seems they’re embracing the challenge cheerily by attempting to kill two birds with one stone:  launching an innovative new semantic search engine capable of answering users’ questions more directly while also creating a fresh new brand for what Microsoft acknowledges is a “confusing jumble of brand names for its search efforts.”  I, for one am looking forward to Microsoft’s forthcoming search engine, dubbed “Kumo.”

But I think there’s a bigger lesson here:  Google’s most valuable asset is its brand. Sure, much of the strength of its brand may lie in the intangible irrationalities of human psychology:  Microsoft’s search engine will probably have to be significantly better than Google’s before the software giant can begin regrowing its 8% share of the search market.  However unfair this might seem to Microsoft, consider how Google reached this height of brand power:  by offering consumers a number of terrific products (for free!) and by carefully cultivating a reputation not just of coolness (think Google Lunar X-Prize) but of “Don’t be evil“-ness.  Many ridicule that motto and attack Google for trying to take over the world, as we’ve detailed in our ongoing Googlephobia series.  But consider what Google stands to loose by offending consumers:  the brand power that makes consumers keep coming back to its search engine.  Google’s reputation as helpful, cool and “non-evil” is perhaps just as valuable as Coke’s secret formula.  So why would Google risk throwing that away by offending real sensitivities about, say, its privacy practices?

Some might fear that the equation of the term “google” with “Search” could permanently entrench Google in a position of dominance in the search market (think “Kleenex” in the market for facial tissue).  Such worriers might be surprised to learn that Google actively discourages the “genericization” of the term “Google”—the use of “google” as a synonym for all search, just as Kleenex is commonly used for tissue paper, Xerox for copying and Coke for soda.  The reason?  Under trademark law, a company can lose its unique rights to its trademark if that term becomes sufficiently generic—a catastrophe for a corporation commonly referred to as “genericide.”  Thus, Google is actively working to check the very phenomenon that gives its products special appeal.

It’s by no means a perfect solution.  Microsoft, Yahoo! and others will still have to work extra-hard to overcome Google’s brand appeal.  But there is a certain elegance to the fact that existing laws provide some competitive check on the marketplace without the need for government regulation or an antitrust lawsuit.

Jerry Yang’s departure as Yahoo! CEO opens the door to a renewed bid by Microsoft to buy Yahoo!’s search business (or Yahoo! itself).  Such a merger could produce a significantly stronger challenger to Google in the search market.  With this possibility in mind, the WSJ just ran a fascinating history of the “paid search” business—the placement of “contextually targeted” ads next to search engine results based on the search terms that produced those results.

In a nutshell, Microsoft failed to see (back in 1998-2003) the enormous potential of paid search—just as small start-ups (such as Google) were starting to develop the technology and business model that today account for a $12+ billion/year industry, which is  twice the size of the display ad market and which supports a great deal of the online content and services we have all come to take for granted online.  Microsoft first put its toe in the water of paid search with a small-scale partnership with Goto.com in 1999-2000.  But this partnership failed because of internal resistance from the managers of Microsoft’s display-ad program.  In 2000, Google launched Adwords and thus began its transformation from start-up into economic colossus.  By 2002, Microsoft realized that it needed to catchup fast, and approached Goto.com (by then renamed Overture) about a takeover.  But Microsoft ultimately chose in 2003 not to buy the startup because  Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer “balked at Overture’s valuation of $1 billion to $2 billion, arguing that Microsoft could create the same service for less.” 

Microsoft, meanwhile, spent the next 18 months deploying hundreds of programmers to build a search engine and a search-ad service, which it code-named Moonshot. The company launched its search engine in late 2004 and its search-ad system in May 2006.

But Microsoft’s ad system came too late:

Advertisers applauded Moonshot for its technical innovation. But Microsoft had trouble coaxing people to migrate to its search engine from Google; advertisers were unwilling to spend large sums on MSN’s search ads. By building a new system instead of buying Overture, Mr. Mehdi says, “we really delayed our time to market.”

What’s most fascinating about the piece is that it seems to suggest that Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail.  The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete.  This dynamic was described brilliantly in Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s classic 1997 book The Innovator’s Dilemma:  When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail.  (Read chapter one here and Tim Lee’s recent discussion of the book here.)  

Whatever one thinks about the debate over whether antitrust intervention is necessary to restrain Google’s growth, I’m sure we’d all applaud the evolution of increased competition in the paid search market through market forces.  Let’s hope that Microsoft—as well as Yahoo!—have carefully studied the vast literature produced by business schools in the wake of Christensen’s book about how big companies can avoid the Innovator’s Dilemma by promoting—and capitalizing on—radical innovation from within.  Indeed, this seems to be precisely what has guided Google’s own strategy as it has grown from “disruptive innovator” to become the very sort of behemoth that cannot easily escape the Dilemma, even if corporate managers are fully aware of the problem on a theoretical level.  If Google can do it, Microsoft should be able to, too.  But let’s also not discount the possibility that, no matter how hard Google’s management might try to retain the innovative culture of a start-up, the giant  can’t do that well enough to prevent its own apparent market dominance from being disrupted by new upstart innovators in search and advertising technologies.  

The head of Google Research talked about some of these possibilities in July 2007 and the Google has recently covered other possibilities.  Here are my own bets—for what little they’re worth—as to what such “disruptors” might be:

• Semantic search and social search – whichever search engine masters these tools will likely dominate the market for search, and thus search advertising.
• Micro-payments to search users for using a search engine and discounts for clicking on ads – something Microsoft has pioneered with its Cashback system but which is probably still only in its infancy.
• Behavioral targeting that can make display ads competitive with search ads by making display ads as relevant to consumers as search ads (or even more so), rather than simply trying to target display ads based on the context of a page—which limits the economic value of the ad “display inventory” that websites try to fill with ads, especially for smaller websites in the Internet’s “long tail” whose subject matter might have little relevance to the keywords for products or services that are more highly valued by advertisers.  
• Technologies that allow contextual targeting of ads in or around videos based on the contents of the video (and associated discussion by viewers in comments). Even the imperfect ability to automatically create transcripts of a video, and then search for keywords, could hugely increased the value of advertising associated with video content.

I suspect we’d all be at least a little surprised if we could see what search engines—and online advertising—really looked like in, say, 2019.  But I won’t be terribly surprised if Google—for all its ingenuity—ends up making some of the same mistakes Microsoft made with Search 1.0 ( c. 1998-2005).