It seems Microsoft is facing much the same problem Pepsi faced in the 70s, when it created the Pepsi challenge (a blind taste test between Coke and Pepsi):
A stark sign of the challenge Yusuf Mehdi faces as a point man for Microsoft in the company’s battle with Google comes from the company’s own research into the habits of consumers online.
During regular “blind taste tests,” in which Microsoft asks randomly-selected consumers to score the quality of results from various Internet search engines, the quality of Microsoft’s search results have so improved that people can’t tell the difference between Microsoft and Google search results, says Mr. Mehdi, senior vice president of Microsoft’s online audience business group. But when Microsoft slaps the Google brand name on the results from Microsoft’s own search engine during another portion of its tests, users invariably score them highest.
“Just by putting the name up, people think it’s more relevant,” he says.
… Microsoft still faces the problem of the strong association in consumers’ minds between Google and Internet search. In theory, it’s far easier for a consumer to switch Internet search engines than it is for them to switch other forms of software. But Mr. Mehdi–a veteran of the Web browser wars of the late 90s in which Microsoft managed to overtake the pioneer in the category, Netscape Communications–says in reality it’s very hard to convince consumers to change their search behavior.
So, Microsoft faces an uphill battle. Happily for the Internet marketplace, it seems they’re embracing the challenge cheerily by attempting to kill two birds with one stone: launching an innovative new semantic search engine capable of answering users’ questions more directly while also creating a fresh new brand for what Microsoft acknowledges is a “confusing jumble of brand names for its search efforts.” I, for one am looking forward to Microsoft’s forthcoming search engine, dubbed “Kumo.”
But I think there’s a bigger lesson here: Google’s most valuable asset is its brand. Continue reading →
Jerry Yang’s departure as Yahoo! CEO opens the door to a renewed bid by Microsoft to buy Yahoo!’s search business (or Yahoo! itself). Such a merger could produce a significantly stronger challenger to Google in the search market. With this possibility in mind, the WSJ just ran a fascinating history of the “paid search” 
business—the placement of “contextually targeted” ads next to search engine results based on the search terms that produced those results.
In a nutshell, Microsoft failed to see (back in 1998-2003) the enormous potential of paid search—just as small start-ups (such as Google) were starting to develop the technology and business model that today account for a $12+ billion/year industry, which is
twice the size of the display ad market and which supports a great deal of the online content and services we have all come to take for granted online. Microsoft first put its toe in the water of paid search with a small-scale partnership with Goto.com in 1999-2000. But this partnership failed because of internal resistance from the managers of Microsoft’s display-ad program. In 2000, Google launched Adwords and thus began its transformation from start-up into economic colossus. By 2002, Microsoft realized that it needed to catchup fast, and approached Goto.com (by then renamed Overture) about a takeover. But Microsoft ultimately chose in 2003 not to buy the startup because Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer “balked at Overture’s valuation of $1 billion to $2 billion, arguing that Microsoft could create the same service for less.”
Microsoft, meanwhile, spent the next 18 months deploying hundreds of programmers to build a search engine and a search-ad service, which it code-named Moonshot. The company launched its search engine in late 2004 and its search-ad system in May 2006.
But Microsoft’s ad system came too late:
Advertisers applauded Moonshot for its technical innovation. But Microsoft had trouble coaxing people to migrate to its search engine from Google; advertisers were unwilling to spend large sums on MSN’s search ads. By building a new system instead of buying Overture, Mr. Mehdi says, “we really delayed our time to market.”
What’s most fascinating about the piece is that it seems to suggest that Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly
innovative companies fail. The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete. Continue reading →
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