Last week, it was my great honor to speak at the 2011 State of the Net 2011 event, where I participated in a panel discussion about the future of the online video marketplace.  In an earlier essay, I mentioned how some of the discussion that day revolved around the Comcast-NBCU merger, which had just been approved by the FCC, but with unprecedented strings being attached.  The heart of the panel discussion, however, was a debate about the future of online video and regulation of the video marketplace more generally. Also joining me on the panel were Susan Crawford of Cardozo Law School, William Lehr of MIT, Marvin Ammori of Nebraska Law School, and Richard Bennett of ITIF.

During my response time on the panel, which begins around 28:45 of the video, I made a couple of key points:

• We’re living in the golden age of video. In considering the state of the video marketplace, we need to put things in some historical context. We should appreciate just how far we’ve come from the “age of scarcity,” in which we only had access to a handful of VHF and UHF broadcast channels in most communities, compared to present day. Indeed, we are today blessed today to live in a world of information abundance. By the FCC’s last count, 565 cable or satellite channels exist today and those channels and programs are available over more platforms (cable, satellite, telco, online, mail, etc) than ever before.
• Deregulation (or light-touch) rules helped. Video distribution and program diversity thrived as the FCC gradually loosened the regulatory chains or forebore from regulating emerging video platforms or programs.  By contrast, in the highly-regulated past, innovation, competition, and diversity were stagnant.
• “Gatekeeper” control fears are bunk. Content continues to flow over multiple platforms in an unprecedented manner. That only makes sense since content creators and distributors have every incentive to get as much content pushed out on as many platforms as possible in order to make money! No one ever got rich in this space by locking up all their content. Moreover,  vertical integration of programming by MVPDs is at its lowest point in the past 20 years. The percentage of channels owned by video distributors has fallen from 50% in 1990 to around 15% today.
• Youngsters today don’t “watch TV” anymore. They watch YouTube, Hulu, Netflix, Apple TV, Google TV, Amazon, XBox Live, PlayStation, Roku, etc.  The video market is highly dynamic and subject to seemingly constant disruptive technological change.
• Level the playing field in favor of more freedom. To the extent there is a regulatory asymmetry at work between the old media marketplace and the online or Internet video world, and to the extent policymakers are looking to “level the regulatory playing field” between them, I argued we should level the playing field in favor of freedom.
• Clean up the old mess now. Therefore, the old rules need to go. Those rules would include must carry mandates and other carriage requirements / compulsory licensing rules, retransmission consent rules, “localism” and other program content mandates, set-tob box regs, advertising limitations, etc.
• Or, at least don’t extend old mess to new world. If lawmakers refuse to get rid of the old rules, however, we should erect a high and tight firewall between the old and new worlds and not muck up the new online video ecosystem with rules and regulations that would stifle the wonderful developments and diversity we are witnessing today.

See the entire State of the Net 2011 panel on YouTube here.

Yesterday I engaged in a lively luncheon debate about Net neutrality regulation with Ben Scott of Free Press at a Catholic University Law School event on “Implementing the National Broadband Plan.” To open the debate, I made a very quick 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation. I argued that the the objections to a Net neutrality regulatory regime can be grouped into 5 major categories: (1) Legal; (2) Economic; (3) Engineering; (4) Practical; and (5) Philosophical / Principled. Down below you will find my working notes to see how I then elaborated on each objection in a bit more detail. And then Ben and I engaged in some spirited banter for the next 45 minutes.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that the video of our debate is online just yet, but once it is I will post it here. However, the folks from NextGenWeb asked me to shoot a short 2 1/2 min video clip after the debate summarizing my remarks. If you can stand the sight of my big fat head in your browser for that long, here ya go:

The 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation

The objections to a Net neutrality regulatory regime can be grouped into 5 major categories: (1) Legal; (2) Economic; (3) Engineering; (4) Practical; and (5) Philosophical / Principled. Each objection will be briefly summarized below:

(1)   The Legal Case

• The FCC utterly lacks the authority to regulate in this way: The Commission’s current effort, which is tantamount to throwing stuff at wall to see what sticks, is troubling. They should go to Congress for authority.
• Importantly, Sec. 230 & 706 of the Telecom Act cannot be the hook: They were deregulatory in nature & aimed at keeping govt’s hands off the Net.
• Litigation nightmare : Regardless of how the FCC or Congress plows forward, we’re going to get tied up in the courts for years if we continue down the regulatory path. It will become “full employment” for telecom lawyers.

(2)    The Economic Case

• NN will likely create substantial disincentives to invest and innovate: At a time when we’re trying to build out broadband infrastructure the last thing we should be doing is disincentivizing network investment.
• NN could regress into old fashion rate or return / price control regime. In the history of network regulation, price and rate controls have always accompanied service regulations.
• Sharing is not competing: If this is all just greasing the skids for a new line-sharing or forced access regime, well, we’ve been there before and it didn’t end well. Creating networks built on paper is a worthless endeavor.
• Facilities-based competition, not infrastructure sharing is the path forward if we want truly robust & competitive networks and markets.
• Contestability counts: This is a contestable market. Threats of new entry at margins keep incumbents on their toes.

(3)   The Engineering Case

• We shouldn’t be freezing networks in stone: (Can you imagine if we would have frozen 1999 walled garden model in place?) The Net was “designed for change” (Richard Bennett) and it should be allowed to adapt to changing circumstances.
• Flexibility is crucial for fast-moving technologies & networks: In particular, we need to grant network managers the flexibility to deal with congestion, latency, malware & other unforeseen problems.
• Innovation at the core of networks is every bit as important as innovation at the edge: We don’t want stagnation at the core or networks, and the applications that ride on them, will suffer.

(4)   The Practical Case

• The FCC just isn’t very good at regulating fast-moving industries & technologies: And its track record is poor when it comes to incentivizing new things (remember Video Dialtone? Open Video System rules?)
• No such thing as a “simple rule” when it comes to Net neutrality or network regulation in general: Consider the paperwork burden generated by just three major “competition” rules the FCC issued in an attempt to implement the Telecom Act and define the “cost” of unbundled network elements (“UNEs”):

o   Local Competition Order (1996): 737 pages, 3,283 footnotes o   UNE Remand Order (1999): 262 pages, 1,040 footnotes o   UNE Triennial Review (2003): 576 pages; 2,447 footnotes o   That’s 1,575 pages and 6,770 footnotes worth of regulation in just three orders! o   This was all implemented following the passage of a bill (The Telecom Act) that was supposed to be deregulatory in character! And this doesn’t even begin to cover the tens of thousands of pages of legal filings, economic studies, consultant reports and other filings submitted to the FCC and state agencies by groups and individuals looking to have a say in the matter. That’s an enormous deadweight loss.

• The potential for industry capture grows in proportion to size of the regulatory regime: Alfred Kahn, author of the seminal Economics of Regulation said it best long ago: “Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.”
• Markets need not be perfect to be preferable to government regulation: That’s especially true in light of the inefficiencies associated with bureaucratic regulation.
• Community policing can help: Any deviations from “neutrality” will be policed by the watchful eyes of the digital world (and the press) and the white hot spotlight of public attention will scrutinize every carrier move (and already is). Plus, experts and technical bodies (ex: Net Neutrality squad) will be watching.

(5)   The Philosophical/Principled Case

• Whatever happened to “Hands Off the Net”? Do we believe in markets or not? And are we willing to let the experiment we started with the Telecom Act continue or not?
• NN is a declaration of surrender and a call to return to the era of public utility-style regulation. We should not give up so easily on the idea of facilities-based competition. Even just two major rivals per region is better than one regulated monopoly.
• The slippery slope of regulation is real: Neutrality mandates will gradually spread to other layers of the Net and cover content and applications. (FCC is already hinting at interest in regulating in the cloud and other Net services and content). Google and Apple’s necks will be on the neutrality chopping block next.
• There are some First Amendment concerns in play here, but not those raised by regulatory advocates (Net Neutrality is not the Internet’s First Amendment as the regulatory advocates claim; the First Amendment is the Internet First’s Amendment).

Claims that Google has abandoned its stance on network neutrality have been thoroughly debunked, as Cord and Adam note below. Over at Broadband Reports, Karl Bode explains that Google is seeking edge-caching agreements, not preferential treatment. Edge-caching involves Google housing its content on servers located inside consumer ISP networks, cutting bandwidth costs by allowing users to access Google content located just a few hops away.

Even though edge-caching doesn’t violate network neutrality as defined by Google, it’s still one of the many advantages that big players have over new entrants. Edge-caching isn’t a “fast track,” as the WSJ imprecisely terms it, but rather a short track—functionally, there’s a lot of similarity between the two. As Richard Bennett has explained time and time again, being close to end users is quite advantageous even without preferential treatment, as it eliminates the need to push vast amounts of data across the congestion-prone core of the public Internet.

We’ve heard about how edge-caching enables content providers and ISPs to cut their bandwidth bills and make more efficient use of finite network resources. Both of these are true, but there’s more—edge caching makes it much less likely that users will experience long load times or buffering hiccups while watching streaming video online. That high-def YouTube clip might take a few extra seconds to buffer if it has to make its way through congested central network exchanges—not so, however, if that video is housed just a few hops away, within your ISP’s network.

Of course, as Larry Lessig points out, there’s nothing stopping anybody from negotiating edge-caching arrangements with ISPs directly or with content delivery networks like Akamai. Like many network enhancing-technologies, though, edge caching costs money. But what’s wrong with that? A blog post over at NYTimes.com quips that Google has a “Treat All Rich Companies the Same” vision of net neutrality. The post goes on to point out that:

The reality today is that rich companies already get first class service, and most network neutrality proposals aren’t going to change that. Big sites buy faster Internet connections and get better service from their providers. Moreover, those with money can buy services content delivery networks like Akamai, or in the case of the superrich, they can set up their own networks, as Google is trying to do.

Neutrality supporters’ refrain—that the Internet must remain open to all, free from any arrangements that grant a leg up to established players at the expense of the little guy—would seem to go against edge-caching. This apparent disconnect between how net neutrality regulation is argued and how it’s actually defined is quite revealing, as ArsTechnica points out.

Wayne Crews argues on OpenMarket that arrangements such as those sought by Google benefit the Internet by making it a more valuable network than it would otherwise be:

Special deals like Google’s, as well as future proprietary services that use Internet technology, but may or may not ride the same pipes as the “capital-I” Internet, increase the Net’s overall functionality. Policy should not discourage the possible emergence of such a “Splinternet” by catering to the old-school model of infrastructure socialism and sleepy-headed “openness.”

And as Cord correctly states, efficient agreements that harness the Internet’s power to deliver rich content and give us greater access to information should welcomed, not shunned.

[Hat tip to Richard Bennett for the recommendation here..] I haven’t had a chance to read through the entire thing yet, but this new study by Nemertes Research seems worthy of attention: “Internet Interrupted: Why Architectural Limitations Will Fracture the ‘Net.” From the exec sum:

In 2007, Nemertes Research conducted the first-ever study to independently model Internet and IP infrastructure (which we call “capacity”) and current and projected traffic (which we call “demand”) with the goal of evaluating how each changes over time. In that study, we concluded that if current trends were to continue, demand would outstrip capacity before 2012. Specifically, access bandwidth limitations will throttle back innovation, as users become increasingly frustrated with their ability to run sophisticated applications over primitive access infrastructure. This year, we revisit our original study, update the data and our model, and extend the study to look beyond physical bandwidth issues to assess the impact of potential logical constraints. Our conclusion? The situation is worse than originally thought! We continue to project that capacity in the core, and connectivity and fiber layers will outpace all conceivable demand for the near future. However, demand will exceed access line capacity within the next two to four years. Even factoring in the potential impact of a global economic recession on both demand (users purchasing fewer Internet-attached devices and services) and capacity (providers slowing their investment in infrastructure) changes the impact by as little as a year (either delaying or accelerating, depending on which is assumed to have the greater effect).

This is a subject that my colleague Bret Swanson has written a great deal about, so I’m sure he’ll be commenting on this study at some point.  Even if you don’t agree with the conclusion Nemertes reaches, as Richard Bennett notes, the report is well worth reading just the background information on public and private peering, content delivery networks, and overlay networks.

Tim Lee has been taking some heat here from Richard Bennett and Steve Schultze about various aspects of his new Net neutrality paper. I haven’t had much time this week to jump into these debates, but I did want to mention one important portion of Tim’s paper that is being overlooked. Specifically, I like the way Tim took head-on some of the silly free speech arguments being put forth as a rationale for net neutrality regulation. As Tim notes in the introduction of the paper:

Concerns that network owners will undermine free speech online are particularly misguided. Network owners have neither the technology nor the manpower to effectively filter online content based on the viewpoints being expressed, nor do profit-making businesses have any real incentive to do so. Should a network owner be foolish enough to attempt large-scale censorship of its customers, it would not only fail to suppress the disfavored speech, but the network would actually increase the visibility of the content as the effort at censorship attracted additional coverage of the material being censored.

I think that’s exactly right and, later in his paper (between pgs 22-3), Tim nicely elaborates about the “Herculean task” associated with any attempt by a broadband provider to “manipulate human communication.” Not only is it true, as Tim argues, that “no widescale manipulation would go unnoticed for very long,” but he is also correct in noting that the public and press backlash would be enormous.

Again, I agree wholeheartedly with all these sentiments, but I think Tim missed another important angle here when discussing the unfounded fears about corporate censorship and the misguided attempts to use free speech as a justification for imposing net neutrality regulations.

In his paper, Tim is essentially making an argument about the practicality of broadband providers acting as speech regulators — and he demolishes that assertion. But Tim fails to make an argument about the principle of the matter that is at stake here. Namely, some net neutrality supporters are attempting to convert the First Amendment into an affirmative grant of state power to regulate private entities, something it was clearly never intended to do.

Indeed, when Net neutrality supporters like the “Save the Internet Coalition” make statements like “Network neutrality is the Internet’s First Amendment,” I sometimes wonder if they are reading the same Constitution that I am. After all, the language of the First Amendment could not be more clear when it says, “Congress shall make no law…” It doesn’t contain any caveats or footnotes. And the First Amendment most certainly was not intended as a tool for government to control the editorial discretion of private individuals or institutions. It was about restricting the power of the government to curtail speech and expression.

Beginning in the 1960’s, however, a handful of liberal legal theories began concocting a new theory of the First Amendment that eventually came to be known as the “media access” school of thought. George Washington University law professor Jerome A. Barron’s 1967 Harvard Law Review article, “Access to the Press — a New First Amendment Right,” as well as the work of Yale University law professor Owen Fiss, gave rise to this new intellectual movement. Its goal, in essence, was to convert the First Amendment into a club to beat demands out of private media providers. Basically, these theorists wanted to expand “Fairness Doctrine”-like right-of-reply notions to newspapers, and simultaneously grant the government more leeway to use the First Amendment to alter media structures and outputs. As Fiss argued in a 1986 law review article, under the “media access” approach, a proper reading of the First Amendment requires “a change in our attitude about the state” such that we learn “to recognize the state not only as an enemy, but also as a friend of speech… [that should act] to enhance the quality of public debate.” (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 71, 1986, p. 1416).

Other left-leaning intellectuals and activists groups would come to integrate that logic into their work and public policy proposals. Now you know, for example, where the Media Access Project gets their name! But many other regulatory-minded groups — like Free Press, MoveOn.org, New America Foundation, and others — trace much of their intellectual heritage back to Barron, Fiss, and the other media access theorists. [Read my lengthy debunking of media access theory here.]

Here we see how the seeds of misguided intellectual thinking sometimes spring into wild gardens in which the weeds slowly take over everything in sight. This twisted conception of the First Amendment is so thoroughly ingrained in leftist media policy thinking today that even an abundant medium like the Internet is not exempt from potential regulations based on it. And that’s how we get to the point we are at today in the net neutrality regulatory debate, with many policymakers and activists groups painting private broadband operators as the supposed real Big Brother problem that the First Amendment must address.

Consider, for example, the comments Sen. Hillary Clinton made in 2006 regarding why she supports net neutrality regulation: “Each day on the Internet views are discussed and debated in an open forum without fear of censorship or reprisal.” As I noted at the time, when I read her statement I practically fell off my chair. It’s not just that Sen. Clinton is asking us to believe in some asinine conspiracy theory about how broadband companies are supposedly out to censor our thoughts or engage in reprisals. (”Reprisals”? For what?) No, what really blew my mind here was the fact that Sen. Clinton had the chutzpah to declare that the private sector was somehow the real threat to online speech. After all, as I inventoried in that old essay, Sen. Clinton has led several notable efforts over the past decade to expand government regulation of television, video games, and even the Internet.

And yet she and many other Net neutrality advocates insist that it is the private sector, not the government, that is the real threat to our free speech rights. Again, Tim Lee is correct to point out in his paper that, practically speaking, these advocates of Net neutrality regulation have little to fear in this regard. It is almost impossible to believe that any Internet operator could limit speech or expression in the ways these regulatory advocates fear. Unlike the government, which possesses the coercive power to completely foreclose all speech under threat of fine or imprisonment, the private sector lacks the ability to use force to bottle up speech or speakers. And even if private operators tried it, there would be hell for them to pay with the press, industry watchdogs, and their even subscribers. More importantly, there’s just no good business angle to censorship; they make more money by delivering more bits, not fewer. Finally, any attempt by one actor to stifle something becomes a prime incentive for another to offer it.  So, Tim is right on all those grounds.

But the principle of the matter is important, and we can’t let regulatory advocates get away with their effort convert the First Amendment into something it isn’t. As Jonathan Emord, author of the brilliant Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment, argued back in 1991, “In short, the [media] access advocates have transformed the marketplace of ideas from a laissez-faire model to a state-control model.” The real danger of this twisted conception of the First Amendment, he noted, is that, “It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private, unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.”

That philosophy and regulatory approach is completely at odds with a proper understanding of the First Amendment, and yet that is exactly what many Net neutrality regulatory advocates are asking us to accept today.  The state — not the private sector — remains the true threat to our liberties. And, most horrifyingly of all, empowering the state to use the First Amendment to regulate private actors will almost certainly backfire and result in more, not less, regulation of speech online.

Richard Bennett and Matt Sherman explain why it’s a bad idea. (And here are a few of my old rants on the issue.)

Bennett:

If we’ve learned anything at all about from the history of Internet-as-utility, it’s that this strained analogy only applies in cases where there is no existing infrastructure, and probably ends best when a publicly-financed project is sold (or at least leased) to a private company for upgrades and management. We should be suspicious of projects aimed at providing Wi-Fi mesh because they’re slow as molasses on a winter’s day. I don’t see any examples of long-term success in the publicly-owned and operated networking space. And I also don’t see any examples of publicly-owned and operated Internet service providers doing any of the heavy lifting in the maintenance of the Internet protocols, a never-ending process that’s vital to the continuing growth of the Internet.

Sherman:

Pursuing a public utility model while also desiring competition are fundamentally contradictory goals. Utilities are designed not to compete. Do you, or does anyone you know, have a choice of providers for water, sewage or electricity? My second question would be: is there anyone in the technology world who sees public utilities as a model for innovation? A 1.5 megabit connection (T1) was an unimaginable luxury when I started in tech in the mid-90’s. It was for well-funded companies only. Today, it is a low-end consumer connection and costs around 80% less. Has your sewage service followed a similar trajectory? A public utility is designed to be “good enough” and little more. There is no need, and little room, for differentiation or progress. Your electricity service is essentially unchanged from 20 years ago, and will look the same 10 years from now. Broadband, on the other hand, requires constant innovation if we are to move forward — and it has been delivering it, even if we desire more.