regulatory capture – Technology Liberation Front https://techliberation.com Keeping politicians' hands off the Net & everything else related to technology Mon, 28 Nov 2022 01:18:49 +0000 en-US hourly 1 6772528 The End of Permissionless Innovation? https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/ https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/#comments Sun, 10 Jan 2021 21:24:12 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76823

Time magazine recently declared 2020 “The Worst Year Ever.” By historical standards that may be a bit of hyperbole. For America’s digital technology sector, however, that headline rings true. After a remarkable 25-year run that saw an explosion of innovation and the rapid ascent of a group of U.S. companies that became household names across the globe, politicians and pundits in 2020 declared the party over. “We now are on the cusp of a new era of tech policy, one in which the policy catches up with the technology,” says Darrell M. West of the Brookings Institution in a recent essay, “The End of Permissionless Innovation.” West cites the House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee’s October report on competition in digital markets—where it equates large tech firms with the “oil barons and railroad tycoons” of the Gilded Age—as the clearest sign that politicization of the internet and digital technology is accelerating. It is hardly the only indication that America is set to abandon permissionless innovation and revisit the era of heavy-handed regulation for information and communication technology (ICT) markets. Equally significant is the growing bipartisan crusade against Section 230, the provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that shields “interactive computer services” from liability for information posted or published on their systems by users. No single policy has been more important to the flourishing of online speech or commerce than Sec. 230 because, without it, online platforms would be overwhelmed by regulation and lawsuits. But now, long knives are coming out for the law, with plenty of politicians and academics calling for it to be gutted. Calls to reform or repeal Sec. 230 were once exclusively the province of left-leaning academics or policymakers, but this year it was conservatives in the White Houseon Capitol Hill and at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) who became the leading cheerleaders for scaling back or eliminating the law. President Trump railed against Sec. 230 repeatedly on Twitter, and most recently vetoed the annual National Defense Authorization Act in part because Congress did not include a repeal of the law in the measure. Meanwhile, conservative lawmakers in Congress such as Sens. Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz have used subpoenasangry letters and heated hearings to hammer digital tech executives about their content moderation practices. Allegations of anti-conservative bias have motivated many of these efforts. Even Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas questioned the law in a recent opinion. Other proposed regulatory interventions include calls for new national privacy laws, an “Algorithmic Accountability Act” to regulate artificial intelligence technologies, and a growing variety of industrial policy measures that would open the door to widespread meddling with various tech sectors. Some officials in the Trump administration even pushed for a nationalized 5G communications network in the name of competing with China. This growing “techlash” signals a bipartisan “Back to the Future” moment, with the possibility of the U.S. reviving a regulatory playbook that many believed had been discarded in history’s dustbin. Although plenty of politicians and pundits are taking victory laps and giving each other high-fives over the impending end of the permissionless innovation era, it is worth considering what America will be losing if we once again apply old top-down, permission slip-oriented policies to the technology sector.

Permissionless Innovation: The Basics

As an engineering principle, permissionless innovation represents the general freedom to tinker and develop new ideas and products in a relatively unconstrained fashion. As I noted in a recent book on the topic, permissionless innovation can also describe a governance disposition or regulatory default toward entrepreneurial activities. In this sense, permissionless innovation refers to the idea that experimentation with new technologies and innovations should generally be permitted by default and that prior restraints on creative activities should be avoided except in those cases where clear and immediate harm is evident. There is an obvious relationship between the narrow and broad definitions of permissionless innovation. When governments lean toward permissionless innovation as a policy default, it is likely to encourage freewheeling experimentation more generally. But permissionless innovation can sometimes occur in the wild, even when public policy instead tends toward its antithesis—the precautionary principle. As I noted in my latest book, tinkerers and innovators sometimes behave evasively and act to make permissionless innovation a reality even when public policy discourages it through precautionary restraints. To be clear, permissionless innovation as a policy default has not meant anarchy. Quite the opposite, in fact. In the United States, over the past 25 years, no major federal agencies that regulate technology or laws that do so were eliminated. Indeed, most agencies grew bigger. But in spite of this, entrepreneurs during this period got more green lights than red ones, and innovation was treated as innocent until proven guilty. This is how and why social media and the sharing economy developed and prospered here and not in other countries, where layers of permission slips prevented such innovations from ever getting off the drawing board. The question now is, how will the shift to end permissionless innovation as a policy default in the U.S. affect innovative activity here more generally? Economic historians Deirdre McCloskey and Joel Mokyr teach us that societal and political attitudes toward growth, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism have a powerful connection with the competitive standing of nations and the possibility of long-term prosperity. If America’s innovation culture sours on the idea of permissionless-ness and moves toward a precautionary principle-based model, creative minds will find it harder to experiment with bold new ideas that could help enrich the nation and improve the well-being of the citizenry—which is exactly why America discarded its old top-down regulatory model in the first place.

Why America Junked the Old Model

Perhaps the easiest way to put some rough bookends on the beginning and end of America’s permissionless innovation era is to date it to the birth and impending death of Sec. 230 itself. The enactment in 1996 of the Telecommunications Act was important, not only because it included Sec. 230, but also because the law created a sort of policy firewall between the old and new worlds of ICT regulation. The old ICT regime was rooted in a complex maze of federal, state and local regulatory permission slips. If you wanted to do anything truly innovative in the old days, you typically needed to get some regulator’s blessing first—sometimes multiple blessings. The exception was the print sector, which enjoyed robust First Amendment protection from the time of the nation’s founding. Newspapers, magazines and book publishers were left largely free of prior restraints regarding what they published or how they innovated. The electronic media of the 20th century were not so lucky. Telephony, radio, television, cable, satellite and other technologies were quickly encumbered with a crazy quilt of federal and state regulations. Those restraints include price controls, entry restrictions, speech restrictions and endless agency threats. ICT policy started turning the corner in the late 1980s after the old regulatory model failed to achieve its mission of more choice, higher quality and lower prices for media and communications. Almost everyone accepted that change was needed, and it came fast. The 1990s became a whirlwind of policy and technological change. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration decided to allow open commercialization of the internet, which, until then, had mostly been a plaything for government agencies and university researchers. But it was the enactment of the 1996 telecommunications law that sealed the deal. Not only did the new law largely avoid regulating the internet like analog-era ICT, but, more importantly, it included Sec. 230, which helped ensure that future regulators or overzealous tort lawyers would not undermine this wonderful new resource. A year later, the Clinton administration put a cherry on top with the release of its Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. This bold policy statement announced a clean break from the past, arguing that “the private sector should lead [and] the internet should develop as a market-driven arena, not a regulated industry.” Permissionless innovation had become the foundation of American tech policy.

The Results

Ideas have consequences, as they say, and that includes ramifications for domestic business formation and global competitiveness. While the U.S. was allowing the private sector to largely determine the shape of the internet, Europe was embarking on a very different policy path, one that would hobble its tech sector. America’s more flexible policy ecosystem proved to be fertile ground for digital startups. Consider the rise of “unicorns,” shorthand for companies valued at $1+ billion. “In terms of the global distribution of startup success,” notes the State of the Venture Capital Industry in 2019, “the number of private unicorns has grown from an initial list of 82 in 2015 to 356 in Q2 2019,” and fully half of them are U.S.-based. The United States is also home to the most innovative tech firms. Over the past decade, Strategy& (PricewaterhouseCooper’s strategy consulting business) has compiled a list of the world’s most innovative companies, based on R&D efforts and revenue. Each year that list is dominated by American tech companies. In 2013, 9 of the top 10 most innovative companies were based in the U.S., and most of them were involved in computing, software and digital technology. Global competition is intensifying, but in the most recent 2018 list, 15 of the top 25 companies are still U.S.-based giants, with Amazon, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Oracle and Cisco leading the way. Meanwhile, European digital tech companies cannot be found on any such list. While America’s tech companies are household names across the European continent, most people struggle to name a single digital innovator headquartered in the EU. Permissionless innovation crushed the precautionary principle in the trans-Atlantic policy wars. European policymakers have responded to the continent’s digital stagnation by doubling down on their aggressive regulatory efforts. The EU closed out 2020 with two comprehensive new measures (the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act), while the U.K. simultaneously pursued a new “online harms” law. Taken together, these proposals represent “the biggest potential expansion of global tech regulation in years,” according to The Wall Street Journal. The measures will greatly expand extraterritorial control over American tech companies. Having decimated their domestic technology base and driven away innovators and investors, EU officials are now resorting to plugging budget shortfalls with future antitrust fines on U.S.-based tech companies. It has essentially been a lost quarter century for Europe on the information technology front, and now American companies are expected to pay for it.

Republicans Revive ‘Regulation-By-Raised-Eyebrow’

In light of the failure of Europe’s precautionary principle-based policy paradigm, and considering the threat now posed by the growing importance of various Chinese tech companies, one might think U.S. policymakers would be celebrating the competitive advantages created by a quarter century of American tech dominance and contemplating how to apply this winning vision to other sectors of the economy. Alas, despite its amazing run, business and political leaders are now turning against permissionless innovation as America’s policy lodestar. What is most surprising is how this reversal is now being championed by conservative Republicans, who traditionally support deregulation. President Trump also called for tightening the screws on Big Tech. For example, in a May 2020 Executive Order on “Preventing Online Censorship,” he accused online platforms of “selective censorship that is harming our national discourse” and suggested that “these platforms function in many ways as a 21st century equivalent of the public square.” Trump and his supporters put Google, Facebook, Twitter and Amazon in their crosshairs, accusing them of discriminating against conservative viewpoints or values. The irony here is that no politician owes more to modern social media platforms than Donald Trump, who effectively used them to communicate his ideas directly to the American people. Moreover, conservative pundits now enjoy unparalleled opportunity to get their views out to the wider world thanks to all the digital soapboxes they now can stand on. YouTube and Twitter are chock-full of conservative punditry, and the daily list of top 10 search terms on Facebook is dominated consistently by conservative voices, where “the right wing has a massive advantage,” according to Politico. Nonetheless, conservatives insist they still don’t get a fair shake from the cornucopia of new communications platforms that earlier generations of conservatives could have only dreamed about having at their disposal. They think the deck is stacked against them by Silicon Valley liberals. This growing backlash culminated in a remarkable Senate Commerce Committee hearing on Oct. 28 in which congressional Republicans hounded tech CEOs and called for more favorable treatment of conservatives, and threatened social media companies with regulation if conservative content was taken down. Liberal lawmakers, by contrast, uniformly demanded the companies do more to remove content they felt was harmful or deceptive in some fashion. In many cases, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle were talking about the exact same content, putting the companies in the impossible position of having to devise a Goldilocks formula to get the content balance just right, even though it would be impossible to make both sides happy. In the broadcast era, this sort of political harassment was known as the “regulation-by-raised-eyebrow” approach, which allowed officials to get around First Amendment limitations on government content control. Congressional lawmakers and regulators at the FCC would set up show trial hearings and use political intimidation to gain programming concessions from licensed radio and television operators. These shakedown tactics didn’t always work, but they often resulted in forms of soft censorship, with media outlets editing content to make politicians happy. The same dynamic is at work today. Thus, when a firebrand politician like Sen. Josh Hawley suggests “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared,” or when Sohrab Ahmari, the conservative op-ed editor at the New York Postcalls for the nationalization of Twitter, they likely understand these extreme proposals won’t happen. But such jawboning represents an easy way to whip up your base while also indirectly putting intense pressure on companies to tweak their policies. Make us happy, or else! It is not always clear what that “or else” entails, but the accumulated threats probably have some effect on content decisions made by these firms. Whether all this means that Sec. 230 gets scrapped or not shouldn’t distract from the more pertinent fact: few on the political right are preaching the gospel of permissionless innovation anymore. Even tech companies and Silicon Valley-backed organizations now actively distance themselves from the term. Zachary Graves, head of policy at Lincoln Network, a tech advocacy organization, worries that permissionless innovation is little more than a “legitimizing facade for anarcho-capitalists, tech bros, and cynical corporate flacks.” He lines up with the growing cast of commentators on both the left and right who endorse a “Tech New Deal” without getting concrete about what that means in practice. What it likely means is a return to a well-worn regulatory playbook of the past that resulted in innovation stagnation and crony capitalism.

A More Political Future

Indeed, as was the case during past eras of permission slip-based policy, our new regulatory era will be a great boon to the largest tech companies. Many people advocate greater regulation in the name of promoting competition, choice, quality and lower prices. But merely because someone proclaims that they are looking to serve the public interest doesn’t mean the regulatory policies they implement will achieve those well-intentioned goals. The means to the end—new rules, regulations and bureaucracies—are messy, imprecise and often counterproductive. Fifty years ago, the Nobel prize-winning economist George Stigler taught us that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits.” In other words, new regulations often help to entrench existing players rather than fostering greater competition. Countless experts since then have documented the problem of regulatory capture in various contexts. If the past is prologue, we can expect many large tech firms to openly embrace regulation as they come to see it as a useful way of preserving market share and fending off pesky new rivals, most of whom will not be able to shoulder the compliance burdens and liability threats associated with permission slip-based regulatory regimes. True to form, in recent congressional hearings, Facebook head Mark Zuckerberg called on lawmakers to begin regulating social media markets. The company then rolled out a slick new website and advertising campaign inviting new rules on various matters. It is always easy for the king of the hill to call for more regulation when that hill is a mound of red tape of their own making—and which few others can ascend. It is a lesson we should have learned in the AT&T era, when a decidedly unnatural monopoly was formed through a partnership between company officials and the government.

Image Credit: Infrogmation/Wikimedia Commons

Many independent telephone companies existed across America before AT&T’s leaders cut sweetheart deals with policymakers that tilted the playing field in its favor and undermined competition. With rivals hobbled by entry restrictions and other rules, Ma Bell went on to enjoy more than a half century of stable market share and guaranteed rates of return. Consumers, by contrast, were expected to be content with plain-vanilla telephone services that barely changed. Some of us are old enough to remember when the biggest “innovation” in telephony involved the move from rotary-dial phones to the push-button Princess phone, which, we were thrilled to discover, came in multiple colors and had a longer cord. In a similar way, the impending close of the permissionless innovation era signals the twilight of technological creative destruction and its replacement by a new regime of political favor-seeking and logrolling, which could lead to innovation stagnation. The CEOs of the remaining large tech companies will be expected to make regular visits to the halls of Congress and regulatory agencies (and to all those fundraising parties, too) to get their marching orders, just as large telecom and broadcaster players did in the past. We will revert to the old historical trajectory, which saw communications and media companies securing marketplace advantages more through political machinations than marketplace merit.

Will Politics Really Catch Up?

While permissionless innovation may be falling out of favor with elites, America’s entrepreneurial spirit will be hard to snuff out, even when layers of red tape make it riskier to be creative. If for no other reason, permissionless innovation still has a fighting chance so long as Congress struggles to enact comprehensive technology measures. General legislative dysfunction and profound technological ignorance are two reasons that Congress has largely become a non-actor on tech policy in recent years. But the primary limitation on legislative meddling is the so-called pacing problem, which refers to the way technological innovation often outpaces the ability of laws and regulations to keep up. “I have said more than once that innovation moves at the speed of imagination and that government has traditionally moved at, well, the speed of government,” observed former Federal Aviation Administration head Michael Huerta in a 2016 speech.

DNA sequencing machine. Image Credit: Assembly/Getty Images

The same factors that drove the rise of the internet revolution—digitization, miniaturization, ubiquitous mobile connectivity and constantly increasing processing power—are spreading to many other sectors and challenging precautionary policies in the process. For example, just as “Moore’s Law” relentlessly powers the pace of change in ICT sectors, the “Carlson curve” now fuels genetic innovation. The curve refers to the fact that, over the past two decades, the cost of sequencing a human genome has plummeted from over $100 million to under $1,000, a rate nearly three times faster than Moore’s Law. Speed isn’t the only factor driving the pacing problem. Policymakers also struggle with metaphysical considerations about how to define the things they seek to regulate. It used to be easy to agree what a phone, television or medical tracking device was for regulatory purposes. But what do those terms really mean in the age of the smartphone, which incorporates all of them and much more? “‘Tech’ is a very diverse, widely-spread industry that touches on all sorts of different issues,” notes tech analyst Benedict Evans. “These issues generally need detailed analysis to understand, and they tend to change in months, not decades.” This makes regulating the industry significantly more challenging than it was in the past. It doesn’t mean the end of regulation—especially for sectors already encumbered by many layers of preexisting rules. But these new realities lead to a more interesting game of regulatory whack-a-mole: pushing down technological innovation in one way often means it simply pops up somewhere else. The continued rapid growth of what some call “the new technologies of freedom”—artificial intelligence, blockchain, the Internet of Things, etc.—should give us some reasons for optimism. It’s hard to put these genies back in their bottles now that they’re out. This is even more true thanks to the growth of innovation arbitrage—both globally and domestically. Creators and capital now move fluidly across borders in pursuit of more hospitable innovation and investment climates. Recently, some high-profile tech CEOs like Elon Musk and Joe Lonsdale have relocated from California to Texas, citing tax and regulatory burdens as key factors in their decisions. Oracle, America’s second-largest software company, also just announced it is moving its corporate headquarters from Silicon Valley to Austin, just over a week after Hewlett Packard Enterprise said it too is moving its headquarters from California to Texas—in this case, Houston. “Voting with your feet” might actually still mean something, especially when it is major tech companies and venture capitalists abandoning high-tax, over-regulated jurisdictions.

Advocacy Remains Essential

But we shouldn’t imagine that technological change is inevitable or fall into the trap of thinking of it as a sort of liberation theology that will magically free us from repressive government controls. Policy advocacy still matters. Innovation defenders will need to continue to push back against the most burdensome precautionary policies, while also promoting reforms that protect entrepreneurial endeavors. The courts offer us great hope. Groups like the Institute for Justice, the Goldwater Institute, the Pacific Legal Foundation and others continue to litigate successfully in defense of the freedom to innovate. While the best we can hope for in the legislative arena may be perpetual stalemate, these and other public interest law firms are netting major victories in courtrooms across America. Sometimes court victories force positive legislative changes, too. For example, in 2015, the Supreme Court handed down North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, which held that local government cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws when it delegates power to nongovernmental bodies, such as licensing boards. This decision made much-needed occupational licensing reform an agenda item across America. Many states introduced or adopted bipartisan legislation aimed at reforming or sunsetting occupational licensing rules that undermine entrepreneurship. Even more exciting are proposals that would protect citizens’ “right to earn a living.” This right would allow individuals to bring suit if they believe a regulatory scheme or decision has unnecessarily infringed upon their ability to earn a living within a legally permissible line of work. Meanwhile, there have been ongoing state efforts to advance “right to try” legislation that would expand medical treatment options for Americans tired of overly paternalistic health regulations. Perhaps, then, it is too early to close the book on the permissionless innovation era. While dark political clouds loom over America’s technological landscape, there are still reasons to believe the entrepreneurial spirit can prevail.
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Video: Launch Event for “Evasive Entrepreneurs” Book https://techliberation.com/2020/04/29/video-launch-event-for-evasive-entrepreneurs-book/ https://techliberation.com/2020/04/29/video-launch-event-for-evasive-entrepreneurs-book/#respond Wed, 29 Apr 2020 15:22:06 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76706

Here’s yesterday’s full launch event video for the release of my new book, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance: How Innovation Improves Economies and Governments. My thanks to Matthew Feeney, Director of the Project on Emerging Technologies at the Cato Institute, for hosting the discussion and sorting through audience questions. The video is below and some of the topics we discussed are listed down below:

* innovation culture
* charter cities, innovation hubs & competitive federalism
* the pacing problem
* technological determinism
* innovation arbitrage
* existential risk
* the Precautionary Principle vs. Permissionless Innovation
* responsible innovation
* drones, facial recognition & surveillance tech
* why privacy & cybersecurity bills never pass
* regulatory accumulation
* applying Moore’s Law to government
* technological civil disobedience
* 3D printing
* biohacking & the “Right to Try” movement
* technologies of resistance
* “born free” technologies vs. “born in captivity” tech
* regulatory capture
* agency threats & “regulation by raised eyebrow”
* soft law vs. hard law
* autonomous systems & “killer robots”!
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Book Review: Calestous Juma’s “Innovation and Its Enemies” https://techliberation.com/2016/07/29/book-review-calestous-jumas-innovation-and-its-enemies/ https://techliberation.com/2016/07/29/book-review-calestous-jumas-innovation-and-its-enemies/#comments Fri, 29 Jul 2016 15:32:42 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76052

Juma book cover

“The quickest way to find out who your enemies are is to try doing something new.” Thus begins Innovation and Its Enemies, an ambitious new book by Calestous Juma that will go down as one of the decade’s most important works on innovation policy.

Juma, who is affiliated with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has written a book that is rich in history and insights about the social and economic forces and factors that have, again and again, lead various groups and individuals to oppose technological change. Juma’s extensive research documents how “technological controversies often arise from tensions between the need to innovate and the pressure to maintain continuity, social order, and stability” (p. 5) and how this tension is “one of today’s biggest policy challenges.” (p. 8)

What Juma does better than any other technology policy scholar to date is that he identifies how these tensions develop out of deep-seated psychological biases that eventually come to affect attitudes about innovations among individuals, groups, corporations, and governments. “Public perceptions about the benefits and risks of new technologies cannot be fully understood without paying attention to intuitive aspects of human psychology,” he correctly observes. (p. 24)

Opposition to Change: It’s All in Your Head

Juma documents, for example, how “status quo bias,” loss aversion, and other psychological tendencies tend to encourage resistance to technological change. [Note: I discussed these and other “root-cause” explanations of opposition to technological change in Chapter 2 of my book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, as well as in my 2012 law review article on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.”]  Juma notes, for example, that “society is most likely to oppose a new technology if it perceives that the risks are likely to occur in the short run and the benefits will only accrue in the long run.” (p. 5) Moreover, “much of the concern is driven by perception of loss, not necessarily by concrete evidence of loss.” (p. 11)

Juma’s approach to innovation policy studies is strongly influenced by the path-breaking work of Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who long ago documented how entrepreneurial activity and the “perennial gales of creative destruction” were the prime forces that spurred innovation and propelled society forward. But Schumpeter was also one of the first scholars to realize that psychological fears about such turbulent change was what ultimately lead to much of the short-term opposition to new technologies that, in due time, we eventually come to see as life-enriching or even life-essential innovations.  Juma uses Schumpeter’s insight as the launching point for his exploration and he successfully verifies it using meticulously-detailed case studies.

Case Study-Driven Analysis

Juma
Short-term opposition to change is particularly acute among incumbent industries and interest groups, who often feel they have the most to lose. In this regard, Innovation and Its Enemies contains some spectacular histories of how special interests have resisted new technologies and developments throughout the centuries. Those case studies include: coffee and coffeehouses, the printing press, margarine, farm machinery, electricity, mechanical refrigeration, recorded music, transgenic crops, and genetically engineered salmon. These case studies are remarkably detailed histories that offer engaging and enlightening accounts of “the tensions between innovation and incumbency.”

My favorite case study in the book discusses how the dairy industry fought the creation and spread of margarine (excuse the pun!). I had no idea how ugly that situation got, but Juma provides all the gory details in what I consider one of the very best crony capitalist case studies ever penned.

In particular, in a subsection of that chapter entitled “The Laws against Margarine,” he provides a litany of examples of how effective the dairy industry was in convincing lawmakers to enact ridiculous anti-consumer regulations to stop margarine, even though the product offered the public a much-needed, and much more affordable, substitute for traditional butter. At one point, the daily industry successfully lobbied five states to adopt rules mandating that any imitation butter product had to be dyed pink! Other states enacted labelling laws that required butter substitutes to come in ominous-looking black packaging. Again, all this was done at the request of the incumbent dairy industry and the National Dairy Council, which would resort to almost any sort of deceptive tactic to keep a cheaper competing product out of the hands of consumers.

And so it goes in chapter after chapter of Juma’s book. The amount of detail in each of these unique case studies is absolutely stunning, but they nonetheless remain highly readable accounts of sectoral protectionism, special interest rent-seeking, and regulatory capture. In this way, Juma is plowing some familiar ground already covered by other economic historians and political scientists, such as Joel Mokyr and Mancur Olson, both of whom are mentioned in the book, as well as a long line of public choice scholars who are, somewhat surprisingly, not discussed in the text. Nonetheless, Juma’s approach is still fresh, unique, and highly informative. In fact, I don’t think I’ve ever seen so many distinct and highly detailed case studies assembled in one place by a single scholar.  What Juma has done here is truly impressive.

Related Innovation Policy Paradigms

Beyond Schumpeter’s clear influence, Juma’s approach to studying innovation policy also shares a great deal in common with two other unmentioned innovation policy scholars, Virginia Postrel and Robert D. Atkinson.

Postrel’s 1998 book, The Future and Its Enemies, contrasted the conflicting worldviews of “dynamism” and “stasis” and showed how the tensions between these two visions would affect the course of human affairs. She made the case for embracing dynamism — “a world of constant creation, discovery, and competition” — over the “regulated, engineered world” of the stasis mentality. Similarly, in his 2004 book, The Past and Future of America’s Economy, Atkinson documented how “American history is rife with resistance to change,” and in recounting some of the heated battles over previous technological revolutions he showed how two camps were always evident: “preservationists” and “modernizers.”

When Juma repeatedly recounts the fight between “innovation and incumbency” in his case studies, he is essentially describing the same paradigmatic divide that Postrel and Atkinson highlight in their works when they discuss “dynamist” vs. “stasis” tensions and the “modernizers” vs. “preservationists” battles that we have seen throughout history. [Note: In my 2014 essay on, “Thinking about Innovation Policy Debates: 4 Related Paradigms,” I discussed Postrel and Atkinson’s books and other approaches to understanding tech policy divisions and then related them to the paradigms I contrast in my work: the so-called “precautionary principle” vs. “permissionless Innovation” mindsets.]

Finally, Juma’s book could also be compared to another freshly released book, The Politics of Innovation, by Mark Zachary Taylor. Taylor’s book is also essential reading on this lamentable history of industrial protectionism and the resulting political opposition to change we have seen over time. [Note: Brent Skorup and provided many other high-tech cronyist case studies like these in our 2013 law review article, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.”]

To counter the prevalence of special interest influence and poor policymaking more generally, Juma stresses the need for evidence-based analysis and a corresponding rejection of fear-mongering and deceptive tactics by public officials and activist groups. He’s particularly concerned with “the use of demonization and false analogies to amplify the perception of risks associated with a new product.”

Accordingly, he would like to see improved educational and risk communication efforts aimed at better informing the public about risk trade-offs and the many potential future benefits of emerging technologies. “Learning how to communicate to the general public is an important aspect of reducing distrust [in new technologies],” Juma argues. (p. 312)

On the Pacing Problem

But Juma never really adequately squares that recommendation with another point he makes throughout the text about how “the pace of technological innovation is discernibly fast,” (p. 5) and how it is accelerating in an exponential fashion. “The implications of exponential growth will continue to elude political leaders if they persist in operating with linear worldviews.” (p. 14) But if it is indeed the case that things are moving that fast, then are we not potentially doomed to live in never-ending cycles of technopanics and misinformation campaigns about new technologies no matter how much education we try to do?

Regardless, Juma’s argument about the speed of modern technological change is quite valid and shared by many other scholars. He is essentially making the same case that Larry Downes did in his excellent 2009 book, The Laws of Disruption: Harnessing the New Forces That Govern Life and Business in the Digital Age. Downes argued that lawmaking in the information age is inexorably governed by the “law of disruption” or the fact that “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”  This law, Downes said, is “a simple but unavoidable principle of modern life,” and it will have profound implications for the way businesses, government, and culture evolve going forward.  “As the gap between the old world and the new gets wider,” he argued, “conflicts between social, economic, political, and legal systems” will intensify and “nothing can stop the chaos that will follow.”

Again, Juma makes that same point repeatedly throughout the chapters of his book. This is also a restatement of the so-called “pacing problem,” as it is called in the field of the philosophy of technology. I discussed the pacing problem at length in my recent review of Wendell Wallach’s important new book, A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control. Wallach nicely defined the pacing problem as “the gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.” “There has always been a pacing problem,” he noted but, like Juma, Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to “govern” using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms.

New Approaches to Technological Governance Needed

Both Wallach in A Dangerous Master and Juma in Innovation and Its Enemies struggle with how to solve this problem. Wallach advocates “soft law” mechanisms or even informal “Governance Coordinating Committees,” which would oversee the development of new technology policies and advise existing governmental institutions. Juma is somewhat ambiguous regarding potential solutions, but he does stress the general need for a flexible approach to policy, as he notes on pg. 252:

It is important to make clear distinctions between hazards and risks. It is necessary to find a legal framework for addressing hazards. But such a framework should not take the form of rigid laws whose adoption needs to be guided by evidence of harm. More flexible standards that allow continuous assessment of emerging safety issues related to a new product are another way to address hazards. This approach would allow for evidence-based regulation.

Beyond that Juma wants to see “entrepreneurialism exercised in the public arena” (p. 282) and calls for “decisive leaders to champion the application of new technologies.” (p. 283) He argues such leadership is needed to ensure that life-enriching technologies are not derailed by opponents of change.

On the other hand, Juma sees a broader role for policymakers in helping to counter some of the potential side effects associated with many emerging technologies. He highlights three primary areas of concern. First, he suggests political leaders might need to find ways “to help balance the benefits and risks of automation” due to the rapid rise of robotics and artificial intelligence. Second, he notes that synthetic biology and gene-editing will give rise to many thorny issues that require policymakers to balance “potentially extraordinary benefits and the risk of catastrophic consequences.” (p. 284)  Finally, he points out that medicine and healthcare are set to be radically transformed by emerging technologies, but they are also threatened by archaic policies and practices in many countries.

In each case, Juma hopes that “decisive,” “adaptive” and “flexible” leaders will steer a sensible policy course with an eye toward limiting “the spread of political unrest and resentment toward technological innovation.” (p. 284)  That’s a noble goal, but Juma remains a bit vague on the steps needed to accomplish that balancing act without tipping public policy in favor a full-blown precautionary principle-based regime for new technologies. Juma clearly wants to avoid that result, but it remains unclear how or where he would draw clear lines in the sand to prevent it from occurring while at the same time achieving “decisive leadership” aimed at balancing potential risks and benefits.

Similarly, his repeated calls in the closing chapter for “inclusive innovation” efforts and strategies sounds sensible in theory, but Juma speaks in abstract generalities about what the term means and doesn’t provide a clear vision for how that would translate into concrete actions that would not end up giving vested interests a veto over new forms of technological innovation that they disfavor.

[CARTOON] Consider Every Risk Except

Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained

Generally speaking, however, Juma wants this balance struck in favor of greater openness to change and an ongoing freedom to experiment with new technological capabilities. As he notes in his concluding chapter:

The biggest risk that society faces by adopting approaches that suppress innovation is that they amplify the activities of those who want to preserve the status quo by silencing those arguing for a more open future. […] Keeping the future open and experimenting in an inclusive and transparent way is more rewarding that imposing the dictum of old patterns. (pgs. 289, 316)

In that regard, the thing I liked most about Innovation and Its Enemies is the way throughout the text that Juma stressed the symbiotic relationship between risk-taking and progress. One of the ways he does so is by kicking off every chapter with a fun quote on that theme from some notable figure. He includes gems like these:

  • “Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome.” – Samuel Johnson
  • “Only those will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go.” – T.S. Eliot
  • “If you risk nothing, then you risk everything.” – Geena Davis
  • “Test fast, fail fast, adjust fast.” – Tom Peters

Of course, I was bound to enjoy his repeated discussion of this theme because that was the central thesis of my latest book, in which I made the argument that, “if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon such fears—then many best-case scenarios will never come about.” Or more simply, as the old saying goes: “nothing ventured, nothing gained.”

CARTOON - Protesting Against New Technology - the Early Days

On Pastoral Myths

I also liked the way that Juma used his case studies to remind us how “the topics may have changed, but the tactics have not.” (p. 143) For example, much of the fear-mongering and deceptive tactics we have seen through the years are based on “pastoral ideals,” i.e., appeals to nature, farm life, old traditions, of just the proverbial “good old days,” whenever those supposedly were! “Demonizing innovation is often associated with campaigns to romanticize past products and practices,” Juma notes. “Opponents of innovation hark back to traditions as if traditions themselves were not inventions at some point in the past.” (p. 309)  So very true!

That was especially the case in battles over new farming methods and technologies, when opponents of change were frequently “championing a moral cause to preserve a way of life,” as Juma discusses in several chapters. (p. 129) New products or methods of production were repeatedly but wrongly characterized as dangerous simply because they were not supposedly “natural” or “traditional” enough in character.

Of course, if all farming and other work was to remain frozen in some past “natural” state, we’d all still be hunters and gathers struggling to find the next meal to put in our bellies. Or, if we were all still on the farms of the “good old days,” then we’d still be stuck using an ox and plow in the name of preserving the “traditional” ways of doing things.

Humanity has made amazing strides—including being able to feed more people more easily and cheaply than ever before—precisely because we broke with those old, “natural” traditions. Alas, many vested interests and even quite a few academics today still employ these same pastoral appeals and myths to oppose new forms of technological change. Juma’s case studies powerfully illustrate why that dynamic continues to be a driving force in innovation policy debates and how it has delayed the diffusion of many important new goods and services throughout history. When the opponents of change rest their case on pastoral myths and nostalgic arguments about the good old days we should remind them that the good old days weren’t really that great after all.

Conclusion

In closing, Innovation and Its Enemies earns my highest recommendation. Even though 2016 is only half done as I write this, Professor Juma’s book is probably already a shoo-in as my choice for best innovation policy book of the year. And I am certain that it will also go down as one of the decade’s most important innovation policy books. Buy the book now and read every word of it. It is well worth your time.


 

Additional material related to Juma’s book:

Other Related Books

In addition to the books that I already mentioned throughout this review, readers who find Juma’s book and the issues he discusses in it of interest should also consider reading these other books on innovation policy, technological governance, and regulatory capture.  Although many of them are more squarely focused on the information technology sector or other emerging technology fields, they all relate to the general subject matter and approach found throughout Juma’s book. [NOTE: Links, where provided, are to my reviews of these books.]

 

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New Filing & Working Paper on the Regulation of the Sharing Economy https://techliberation.com/2015/05/26/new-filing-working-paper-on-the-regulation-of-the-sharing-economy/ https://techliberation.com/2015/05/26/new-filing-working-paper-on-the-regulation-of-the-sharing-economy/#comments Tue, 26 May 2015 17:41:04 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=75562

Along with colleagues at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, I am releasing two major new reports today dealing with the regulation of the sharing economy. The first report is a 20-page filing to the Federal Trade Commission that we are submitting to the agency for its upcoming June 9th workshop on “The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators.” We have been invited to participate in that event and I will be speaking on the fourth panel of the workshop. The filing I am submitting today for that workshop was co-authored with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman and Matt Mitchell.

The second report we are releasing today is a new 47-page working paper entitled, “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the ‘Lemons Problem.'” This study was co-authored with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman, Anne Hobson, and Chris Kuiper.

I will summarize each report briefly here.

In our new filing to the FTC, we address the five questions the Commission set forth in its workshop annoucement. Those five questions are as follows:

  • How can state and local regulators meet legitimate regulatory goals (such as protecting consumers, and promoting public health and safety) in connection with their oversight of sharing economy platforms and business models, without also restraining competition or hindering innovation?
  • How have sharing economy platforms affected competition, innovation, consumer choice, and platform participants in the sectors in which they operate? How might they in the future?
  • What consumer protection issues—including privacy and data security, online reviews and disclosures, and claims about earnings and costs—do these platforms raise, and who is responsible for addressing these issues?
  • What particular concerns or issues do sharing economy transactions raise regarding the protection of platform participants? What responsibility does a sharing economy platform bear for consumer injury arising from transactions undertaken through the platform?
  • How effective are reputation systems and other trust mechanisms, such as the vetting of sellers, insurance coverage, or complaint procedures, in encouraging consumers and suppliers to do business on sharing economy platforms?

We provide detailed answers to each of these questions as well as one additional major question that was not posed by the Commission in its workshop notice but which is, no doubt, on the minds of many at the agency and outside it: What should the FTC do about state and local barriers to entry and innovation that might be thwarting the growth of the sharing economy? (I blogged about that issue here a couple of weeks ago and our filing includes that discussion.)

Please take a look at our filing for detailed answers to each of these questions. (Incidentally, our filing is an extension of an earlier working paper that Koopman, Mitchell, and I released late last year on “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change.”) But, to briefly highlight the thrust of our argument, here’s a passage from our new filing:

As the debate surrounding the sharing economy moves forward, policymakers must keep in mind that merely because regulations were once justified on the grounds of consumer protection does not mean they accomplished those goals or that they are still needed today. Even well-intentioned policies must be judged against real-world evidence. Unfortunately, the evidence shows that many traditional consumer protection regulations hurt consumers; in the words of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, they are often “cumbersome, and some are just plain protectionist.” Markets, competition, reputational systems, and ongoing innovation often solve problems better than regulation when they are given a chance to do so. There are two reasons for this. First, market imperfections create powerful profit opportunities for entrepreneurs who are able to find ways to correct them. Second, regulatory solutions too often undermine competition and lock in inefficient business models.

We continue on to explain exactly why that is the case, while also offering some constructive solutions to other issues that are on the minds of regulators.

Meanwhile, the new working paper we are releasing today provides much greater detail on the fifth of the five questions the FTC posed in its workshop notice regarding reputation systems and other trust mechanisms. Here is the abstract from the paper:

This paper argues that the sharing economy—through the use of the Internet and real time reputational feedback mechanisms—is providing a solution to the lemons problem that many regulators have spent decades attempting to overcome. Section I provides an overview of the sharing economy and traces its rapid growth. Section II revisits the lemons theory as well as the various regulatory solutions proposed to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. Section III discusses the relationship between reputation and trust and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commercial interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymmetries were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses how the evolution of both the Internet and information systems (especially the reputational feedback mechanisms of the sharing economy) addresses the lemons problem. Section V explains how these new realities affect public policy and concludes that asymmetric information is not a legitimate rationale for policy intervention in light of technological changes. We also argue that continued use of this rationale to regulate in the name of consumer protection might, in fact, make consumers worse off. This has ramifications for the current debate over regulation of the sharing economy.

We believe that our research makes it clear “how the sharing economy relies upon—and has helped spur the growth of—sophisticated reputational feedback mechanisms that facilitate online trust and commerce, overcoming many of the information asymmetries that seemed intractable… just a generation ago. In combination with online review services and other information-sharing technologies enabled by the Internet,” we conclude, “these reputational tools can help create more effective, and largely self-regulating, markets that provide more information to more individuals than ever before.”

We look forward to continuing engagement with officials at the FTC and other policymakers at the federal, state, and even international level on these issues. We hope our research will help legislators and regulators find sensible ways to adjust policy for the sharing economy so as not to derail the sort of “permissionless innovation” that has thus far powered this exciting sector and produced the many pro-consumer benefits flowing from it. Check out our filing and new paper for more details.

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Regulatory Capture: FAA and Commercial Drones Edition https://techliberation.com/2015/01/16/regulatory-capture-faa-and-commercial-drones-edition/ https://techliberation.com/2015/01/16/regulatory-capture-faa-and-commercial-drones-edition/#comments Fri, 16 Jan 2015 14:02:54 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=75279

FAA sealRegular readers know that I can get a little feisty when it comes to the topic of “regulatory capture,” which occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies (regulatory agencies, in particular) to further their own ends. As I noted in my big compendium, “Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found“:

While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory policies or developments, it does provide an explanation for the actions of political actors with dismaying regularity.  Because regulatory capture theory conflicts mightily with romanticized notions of “independent” regulatory agencies or “scientific” bureaucracy, it often evokes a visceral reaction and a fair bit of denialism.

Indeed, the more I highlight the problem of regulatory capture and offer concrete examples of it in practice, the more push-back I get from true believers in the idea of “independent” agencies. Even if I can get them to admit that history offers countless examples of capture in action, and that a huge number of scholars of all persuasions have documented this problem, they will continue to persist that, WE CAN DO BETTER! and that it is just a matter of having THE RIGHT PEOPLE! who will TRY HARDER!

Well, maybe. But I am a realist and a believer in historical evidence. And the evidence shows, again and again, that when Congress (a) delegates broad, ambiguous authority to regulatory agencies, (b) exercises very limited oversight over that agency, and then, worse yet, (c) allows that agency’s budget to grow without any meaningful constraint, then the situation is ripe for abuse. Specifically, where unchecked power exists, interests will look to exploit it for their own ends.

In any event, all I can do is to continue to document the problem of regulatory capture in action and try to bring it to the attention of pundits and policymakers in the hope that we can start the push for real agency oversight and reform. Today’s case in point comes from a field I have been covering here a lot over the past year: commercial drone innovation.

Yesterday, via his Twitter account, Wall Street Journal reporter Christopher Mims brought this doozy of an example of regulatory capture to my attention, which involves Federal Aviation Administration officials going to bat for the pilots who frequently lobby the agency and want commercial drone innovations constrained. Here’s how Jack Nicas begins the WSJ piece that Mims brought to my attention:

In an unfolding battle over U.S. skies, it’s man versus drone. Aerial surveyors, photographers and moviemaking pilots are increasingly losing business to robots that often can do their jobs faster, cheaper and better. That competition, paired with concerns about midair collisions with drones, has made commercial pilots some of the fiercest opponents to unmanned aircraft. And now these aviators are fighting back, lobbying regulators for strict rules for the devices and reporting unauthorized drone users to authorities. Jim Williams, head of the Federal Aviation Administration’s unmanned-aircraft office, said many FAA investigations into commercial-drone flights begin with tips from manned-aircraft pilots who compete with those drones. “They’ll let us know that, ’Hey, I’m losing all my business to these guys. They’re not approved. Go investigate,’” Mr. Williams said at a drone conference last year. “We will investigate those.”

Well, that pretty much says it all. If you’re losing business because an innovative new technology or pesky new entrant has the audacity to come onto your turf and compete, well then, just come on down to your friendly neighborhood regulator and get yourself a double serving of tasty industry protectionism!

And so the myth of “agency independence” continues, and perhaps it will never die. It reminds me of a line from those rock-and-roll sages in Guns N’ Roses: ” I’ve worked too hard for my illusions just to throw them all away!”

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The Internet, Politics, Lobbying & the “Big Spend” https://techliberation.com/2012/01/24/the-internet-politics-lobbying-the-big-spend/ https://techliberation.com/2012/01/24/the-internet-politics-lobbying-the-big-spend/#comments Tue, 24 Jan 2012 20:47:38 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=39940

In the wake of last week’s big SOPA showdown, a lot of people are talking about the expanded presence and power of the Internet, online operators, and digital Netizens in Washington policy debates. I certainly don’t mean to diminish the importance of this particular episode. It certainly is historic, regardless of how you feel about the specifics of SOPA. What does concern me, however, is the way this episode is prompting questions about how much more “engagement” Internet companies need to consider inside the Beltway. For example, today’s Wall Street Journal features an article on “The Web’s Growing Muscle” and notes:

The Internet industry has found a rare sweet spot in Washington. With Google in the lead, the companies have begun building a strong traditional lobbying force in Washington. And, to complement that inside game, websites’ millions of users have become a powerful outside weight on Congress. What’s more, in a rare Washington double play, the concerns of Internet companies have found a sympathetic ear both in the Democratic White House and among Republican presidential candidates who otherwise can’t agree with Barack Obama on anything.

The piece concludes with a quote from an anonymous media executive saying “People are looking at what Google spent on lobbying and wondering, ‘Can we match that?’ It has to be a big spend.”

I cannot possibly think of anything more demoralizing than that. The idea that web companies should spend more of their time in Washington showering politicians with cash instead of out there in the real world innovating and making consumers happy is extremely troubling. I wrote about this growing trend in my 2010 Cato essay on “The Sad State of Cyber-Politics.” I built that essay around an old manifesto by Cypress Semiconductor CEO T. J. Rodgers on “Why Silicon Valley Should Not Normalize Relations with Washington, D.C.”  Rodgers had argued that “The political scene in Washington is antithetical to the core values that drive our success in the international marketplace and risks converting entrepreneurs into statist businessmen,” and that “The collectivist notion that drives policymaking in Washington is the irrevocable enemy of high-technology capitalism and the wealth creation process.”

But no one was listening then and they certainly aren’t listening now. We find ourselves in the midst a mad rush to see who can open a bigger, fancier office in Washington and have glitzier parties to make the political class happy. As I noted in the Cato essay:

There’s enormous pressure on the high-tech sector to actually become more entrenched in coming years, at least to remain “competitive” with other companies who have planted a flag inside the Beltway. Recently, for example, Reid Hoffman, founder of LinkedIn, a social networking site for professionals, worried that policymakers tend to ignore high-tech startups. “We don’t have an entrepreneurship lobby,” he said, “because entrepreneurs are off doing it.” As if that was a bad thing! In particular, he fretted about startups not getting their share of recent stimulus funding and argued that “It’s much easier when you’re embedded in the political infrastructure to respond to immediate things” such as nabbing stimulus dollars, he said.

Am I being naive about all this? Don’t these new tech companies have to have armies of lobbyists pressing the flesh and greasing the palms here in DC in order to compete against other entrenched competitors who are doing to same thing?  Perhaps, but there’s always been self-fulfilling circularity to the argument that you have to be here in order to “be a player” or “have a seat at the table.” The end result of that thinking is always the same: more lobbying, more logrolling, more of “the big spend.” And then we end up with one giant cesspool of protected markets, protracted legal nightmares, bloated bureaucracies, and widespread regulatory capture. Welcome to the wonderful world of crony capitalism! And your tech sector superstars are now falling all over themselves to make sure they have that proverbial “seat at the table” so they can feast at this Big Government supper.

It makes me sick to my stomach to even think about it. So, I’ll continue right on being a naive dope and conclude this piece the same way I concluded my old Cato essay on the sad state of cyber-politics:

For that small remnant of believers in real Internet Freedom — freedom from incessant government techno-meddling — we will never stop hoping that disputes among high-tech companies might be settled in the marketplace instead of within regulatory agencies and congressional committee rooms. And we must continue our push to discourage high-tech companies from an excessive “normalization” of relations with the parasitic culture that dominates Washington by reminding them, as Rodgers noted in 2000, “that free minds and free markets are the moral foundation that has made our success possible. We must never allow those freedoms to be diminished for any reason.”

Just let me dream, people.

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Remembering What Regulatory Capture Looked Like: The Airline Experience https://techliberation.com/2011/04/11/remembering-what-regulatory-capture-looked-like-the-airline-experience/ https://techliberation.com/2011/04/11/remembering-what-regulatory-capture-looked-like-the-airline-experience/#respond Tue, 12 Apr 2011 02:51:23 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=36203

This week, my colleague Jerry Brito asked me to guest lecture to his George Mason University law school class on regulatory process. He asked me to talk about one of my favorite topics: the sad, sordid history of regulatory capture. Regular readers will recall the compendium I posted here a few months ago [and that I continue to update] of selected passages from books and papers penned by various economists and political scientists who have studied this issue.

Again, it doesn’t make for pretty reading, but the lesson that history teaches is vital: No matter how noble the “public interest” goals of regulatory advocates or their specific proposals, the only thing that really counts is what regulation means in practice.  Regrettably, all too often, regulation is “captured” by various interests and used to their advantage, or at least to the disadvantage of potential competitors, new entrants, and innovation.

While I was gathering some materials for the case study portion of my lecture — which incorporates the history of telecommunications monopolization, broadcast industry regulatory shenanigans, and transportation / airlines fiascos — I figured I had to post a passage from one of my favorite books on regulation of all-time: Thomas K. McCraw’s brilliant Pulitzer Prize-winning 1984 book, Prophets of Regulation. In his chapter on the late great Alfred Kahn, the father of airline deregulation, McCraw recounts the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) from its creation in the 1940s up until the time of Kahn’s ascendency to CAB chairman in the Carter Administration (and then the CAB’s eventual deregulation and abolition). Here’s the key passage from that history:

“Clearly, in passing the Civil Aeronautics Act [of 1938], Congress intended to bring stability to airlines. What is not clear is whether the legislature intended to cartelize the industry. Yet this did happen. During the forty years between passage of the act of 1938 and the appointment of [Alfred] Kahn to the CAB chairmanship, the overall effect of board policies tended to freeze the industry more or less in its configuration of 1938. One policy, for example, forbade price competition. Instead the CAB ordinarily required that all carriers flying a certain route charge the same rates for the same class of customer. […] A second policy had to do with the CAB’s stance toward the entry of new companies into the business. Charged by Congress with the duty of ascertaining whether or not ‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity’ mandated that new carriers should receive a certificate to operate, the board often ruled simply that no applicant met these tests. In fact, over the entire history of the CAB, no new trunkline carrier had been permitted to join the sixteen that existed in 1938. And those sixteen, later reduced to ten by a series of mergers, still dominated the industry in the 1970s. All these companies… developed into large companies under the protective wing of the CAB. None wanted deregulation.” (p. 263)

To reiterate: Zero new competitors were allowed. Zero price competition was allowed. And very little service innovation was permitted. It was a comfy little protected cartel from start to finish. It’s no wonder that “none wanted deregulation”!  Folks, if that isn’t the very definition of regulatory capture, I don’t know what is.

This is what makes Fred Kahn’s achievement all the more monumental.  Beyond his obvious mastery of the subject and rigorous documentation of regulatory failure in action, it was Fred’s sheer force of will and amazing spirit that provided the spark to get the deregulation of this mess moving forward. Against all odds — and with the help of some fellow liberal Democrats like Ted Kennedy, Ralph Nader, and Stephen Breyer — Fred did it.

And consumers owe him a huge debt of gratitude for it. Prices plummeted following the CAB’s abolition and countless new industry faces have come and gone since deregulation. Things haven’t been perfect by any stretch of the imagination, but can you imagine how much worse off we would have been absent Fred Kahn’s bold move to break the regulatory capture logjam and “free the skies” for competition?

Something to think about next time someone tells you that regulation is always in consumer’s best interests.

[P.S. – I posted a short obit here late last December remembering Fred Kahn upon his passing. I hope you read it if you haven’t already.  I still wish I could hear Fred speak just one more time. What a joy and inspiration that man was. I always treasured my moments with him. I still have the final email he sent me from early 2010 sitting in my inbox. I just can’t bring myself to delete it for some reason. He had passed along a nice note about a paper I had recently written. I practically cried when I read his note. One of my intellectual heroes had not only read something I penned but he had actually liked it! And he was 92 when he sent it to me.  Blows my mind.]

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Toles Cartoon on Regulatory Capture https://techliberation.com/2011/01/20/toles-cartoon-on-regulatory-capture/ https://techliberation.com/2011/01/20/toles-cartoon-on-regulatory-capture/#respond Thu, 20 Jan 2011 14:51:46 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=34571

Washington Post cartoonist Tom Toles is certainly no fan of free markets, but his contribution to today’s paper offers us this humorous take on the dangers of regulatory capture, a subject we’ve spent much time documenting here on the TLF.

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Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found https://techliberation.com/2010/12/19/regulatory-capture-what-the-experts-have-found/ https://techliberation.com/2010/12/19/regulatory-capture-what-the-experts-have-found/#comments Mon, 20 Dec 2010 00:58:22 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=33727

[Note: This post is updated regularly as I discover relevant old or new material.]

“Regulatory capture” occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies — regulatory agencies, in particular — to further their own ends.  Capture theory is closely related to the “rent-seeking” and “political failure” theories developed by the public choice school of economics.  Another term for regulatory capture is “client politics,” which according to James Q. Wilson, “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (and industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).”  (James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 1989, at 76).

While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory policies or developments, it does provide an explanation for the actions of political actors with dismaying regularity.  Because regulatory capture theory conflicts mightily with romanticized notions of “independent” regulatory agencies or “scientific” bureaucracy, it often evokes a visceral reaction and a fair bit of denialism.  (See, for example, the reaction of New Republic’s Jonathan Chait to Will Wilkinson’s recent Economist column about the prevalence of corporatism in our modern political system.)  Yet, countless studies have shown that regulatory capture has been at work in various arenas: transportation and telecommunications; energy and environmental policy; farming and financial services; and many others.

I thought it might be useful to build a compendium of quotes from various economists and political scientists who have studied the regulatory process throughout history and identified regulatory capture or client politics as a major problem.  I would greatly appreciate having others suggest additional quotes and studies to add to this list since I plan to update it frequently and eventually work all of this into a future paper or book. [ Note: I have updated this compendium over a dozen times since the original post, so please check back for updates.]

The following list is chronological and begins, surprisingly, with the thoughts of progressive hero Woodrow Wilson…

Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (1913) at 201-202:

“If the government is to tell big business men how to run their business, then don’t you see that big business men have to get closer to the government even than they are now? Don’t you see that they must capture the government, in order not to be restrained too much by it? Must capture the government? They have already captured it. Are you going to invite those inside to stay? They don’t have to get there. They are there.”

A. C. PigouEconomics of Welfare, (1920), Ch. 20, Para. #4

“It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any public authority will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by private interest. A loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organised for votes, may easily outweigh the whole.”

Anthony Downs, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” 65 Journal of Political Economy 2 (1957), 135-150, at 136:

“…even if social welfare could be defined, and methods of maximizing it could be agreed upon, what reason is there to believe that the men who run the government would be motivated to maximize it? To state that “they should do so does not mean that they will.”

Ronald Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission” 2 Journal of Law and Economics (1959), 1-40, at 37. In commenting on the fact that many lawmakers bemoaned “the extent to which pressure is brought to bear on the [FCC] by politicians and businessmen,” Coase said “that this should be happening is hardly surprising.”  He continued on:

“When rights, worth millions of dollars, are awarded to one businessman and denied to others, it is no wonder if some applicants become overanxious and attempt to use whatever influence they have (political and otherwise), particularly as they can never be sure what pressure the other applicants may be exerting.”

Milton Friedman, Capitalism & Freedom (1962) at 140:

“the pressure on the legislature to license an occupation rarely comes from the members of the public . . . On the contrary, the pressure invariably comes from the occupation itself.”

Harold Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?,” 11(1) Journal of Law and Economics (Apr., 1968), at 61.

“…in utility industries, regulation has often been sought because of the inconvenience of competition.”

Richard Posner, “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,” 21(3) Stanford Law Review 548 (Feb., 1969):

“Because regulatory commissions are of necessity intimately involved in the affairs of a particular industry, the regulators and their staffs are exposed to strong interest group pressures.  Their susceptibility to pressures that may distort economically sound judgments is enhanced by the tradition of regarding regulatory commissions as ‘arms of the legislature,’ where interest-group pressures naturally play a vitally important role.”

George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” 2(1) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, (1971), 3-21 at 3:

“…as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits.”

George Stigler, “Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?” in The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (1975), at 183:

“Regulation and competition are rhetorical friends and deadly enemies: over the doorway of every regulatory agency save two should be carved: ‘Competition Not Admitted.’ The Federal Trade Commission’s doorway should announce , “Competition Admitted in Rear,” and that of the Antitrust Division, ‘Monopoly Only by Appointment.’”

Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (2nd Ed., 1969, 1979) at 280:

“a considerable proportion of federal regulation, regardless of its own claim to consumer protection, has the systematic effect of constituting and maintaining a sector of the economy or the society. These are the policies of receivership by regulation.”

Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (1971):

“When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition.” (p. 12) “Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.” (p. 46)

Mark Green and Ralph Nader, “Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man,” Yale Law Journal 82, no. 5 (April 1973), 876

“a kind of regular personnel interchange between agency and industry blurs what should be a sharp line between regulator and regulatee, and can compromise independent regulatory judgment. In short, the regulated industries are often in clear control of the regulatory process.”

Richard B. McKenzie and Gordon Tullock, Modern Political Economy: An Introduction to Economics (1978) at 220:

“although regulation is begun with the good intentions of those who promote and pass the laws, somewhere along the line regulators may become pawns of the regulated firms.”

Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (1980) at 193:

“Every act of intervention establishes positions of power.  How that power will be used and for what purposes depends far more on the people who are in the best position to get control of that power and what their purposes are than on the aims and objectives of the initial sponsors of the intervention.”

Barry M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), at 38:

“Much relatively recent research has argued that regulation was often sought by industries for their own protection, rather than being imposed in some ‘public interest.’ Although the distinction is not always made clear in this recent literature, we may add that regulation which is not directly sought at the outset is generally ‘captured’ later on so it behaves with consistency to the industry’s major interests, or at least has been observed to behave in this manner.”

Barry Weingast, “Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation: The Foundation of Agency-Clientele Relationships,”44 Law and Contemporary Problems, (1981) pp. 147-77, at 151:

“Often, agencies are the vehicle for this endeavor. Agency heads and commission members, anxious to further their careers and goals (including large budgets) as well as completing their own of power and prestige pet projects and policy initiatives, depend upon service to interest their success groups and key committee members for their success.”

George Gilder, Wealth & Poverty (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 283:

“One reason for government resistance to change is that the process of creative destruction can attack not only an existing industry, but also the regulatory apparatus that subsists on it; and it is much more difficult to retrench a bureaucracy than it is to bankrupt a company. A regulatory apparatus is a parasite that can grow larger than its host industry and become in turn a host itself, with the industry reduced to parasitism, dependent on the subsidies and protections of the very government body that initially sapped its strength.”

Bruce Yandle,”Bootleggers and Baptists — The Education of a Regulatory Economist,” Regulation, Vol. 3, No. 3, (May/June 1983) p. 13:

“what do industry and labor want from the regulators? They want protection from competition, from technological change, and from losses that threaten profits and jobs. A carefully constructed regulation can accomplish all kinds of anticompetitive goals of this sort, while giving the citizenry the impression that the only goal is to serve the public interest.”

Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 263 [recounting the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board up until the time of Alfred Kahn ascendency to chairman and its eventual deregulation and abolition.]

“Clearly, in passing the Civil Aeronautics Act [of 1938], Congress intended to bring stability to airlines. What is not clear is whether the legislature intended to cartelize the industry. Yet this did happen. During the forty years between passage of the act of 1938 and the appointment of [Alfred] Kahn to the CAB chairmanship, the overall effect of board policies tended to freeze the industry more or less in its configuration of 1938. One policy, for example, forbade price competition. Instead the CAB ordinarily required that all carriers flying a certain route charge the same rates for the same class of customer. […] A second policy had to do with the CAB’s stance toward the entry of new companies into the business. Charged by Congress with the duty of ascertaining whether or not ‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity’ mandated that new carriers should receive a certificate to operate, the board often ruled simply that no applicant met these tests. In fact, over the entire history of the CAB, no new trunkline carrier had been permitted to join the sixteen that existed in 1938. And those sixteen, later reduced to ten by a series of mergers, still dominated the industry in the 1970s. All these companies… developed into large companies under the protective wing of the CAB. None wanted deregulation.”

Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (1987) p. 8:

“The government’s regulatory agencies have created or sustained private monopoly power more often than they have precluded or reduced it.  This result was exactly what  many interested parties desired from government regulation, though they would have been impolitic to have said so in public.”

Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society (1989) p. 151:

“The ties between interest groups and [regulatory] agencies can become too close. A persistent criticism by political scientists is that agencies that regulate businesses are overly sympathetic to the industries they are responsible for regulating.  Critics charge that regulators often come from the businesses they regulate and thus naturally see things from an industry point of view.  Even if regulators weren’t previously involved in the industry, they have been seen as eager to please powerful clientele groups rather than have them complain to the White House or to the agency’s overseeing committees in Congress.”

Jonathan Emord, “The Electronic Press and the Industry Capture Movement,” Chapter 11 from: Freedom Technology and the First Amendment (1991), p. 146 (discussing the early history of radio licensing):

“The minutes of the First National Radio Conference in 1922 reveal that even at this early date, industry leader clamored for government limits on the number of licenses issued; they sought protection against entry by new licenses. For its part, the government desired control over the industry’s structure and programming content. Certain members of Congress, joined by [Secretary of Commerce Herbert] Hoover, agreed with broadcast industry leaders that the system of broadcasting in the United States would be brought within the federal government’s control. The classic rent/content control quid pro quo soon developed: in exchange for regulatory controls on industry structure and programming content, industry leaders would be granted restrictions on market entry that they wanted. These restrictions would ensure monopoly rents for licensees and would provide the government with assurance that the broadcast industry would not oppose regulatory controls.”

David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 13:

“Agency heads are usually not apolitical and, indeed, concentrated interests often prevail more easily in an agency than they can in Congress. Effective participation in agency lawmaking usually requires expensive legal representation as well as close connections to members of Congress who will pressure the agency on one’s behalf. The agency itself is often closely linked with the industry it regulates. Not only large corporations, but also labor unions, cause-based groups, and other cohesive minority interests sometimes can use delegation to triumph over the interests of the larger part of the general public, which lacks the organization, finances, and know-how to participate as effectively in the administrative process.”

Douglass North, “Economic Performance through Time,” 84 American Economic Review 3, (1994), 359-363, at p. 360:

“Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules.”

P.A. McNutt, The Economics of Public Choice (1996), p. 105-6:

“The more successful the interest group becomes the greater the probability that it will be in a position to impact on the policy making process of successive governments. … Aspiring monopolists will retain lobbyists to assure a favourable outcome and devote resources to the acquisition of the monopoly right.  A government will more than likely grant monopoly privileges to various groups of politically influential people.  Cartels and anti-competitive behaviour will be maintained and politicians will react to the demands of the more vociferous and well organised interest groups.”

Andrew Odlyzko, “Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet,” July 27, 2003, p. 12:

“It is now widely accepted that the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was not a pure triumph of the populist movement and its allies in the anti-railroad camp. The railway industry largely decided that regulation was in its best interests and acquiesced in and even encouraged government involvement. This is often portrayed as the insidious capture of the regulators by the industry they regulate. There is certainly much evidence to support this view.”

Lawrence Lessig,”Reboot the FCC,” Newsweek, December 23, 2008

“Economic growth requires innovation. Trouble is, Washington is practically designed to resist it. Built into the DNA of the most important agencies created to protect innovation, is an almost irresistible urge to protect the most powerful instead. The FCC is a perfect example. … With so much in its reach, the FCC has become the target of enormous campaigns for influence. Its commissioners are meant to be “expert” and “independent,” but they’ve never really been expert, and are now openly embracing the political role they play. Commissioners issue press releases touting their own personal policies. And lobbyists spend years getting close to members of this junior varsity Congress.”

Thomas Frank, Obama and Regulatory Capture,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2009:

“There are powerful institutions that don’t like being regulated. Regulation sometimes cuts into their profits and interferes with their business. So they have used the political process to sabotage, redirect, defund, undo or hijack the regulatory state since the regulatory state was first invented. The first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was set up to regulate railroad freight rates in the 1880s. Soon thereafter, Richard Olney, a prominent railroad lawyer, came to Washington to serve as Grover Cleveland’s attorney general. Olney’s former boss asked him if he would help kill off the hated ICC. Olney’s reply, handed down at the very dawn of Big Government, should be regarded as an urtext of the regulatory state: ‘The Commission… is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. … The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.'”

Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (2010), p. 308:

“Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace…. Government’s tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity … [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive.”

David J. Farber & Gerald R. Faulhaber, “Net Neutrality: No One Will Be Satisfied, Everyone Will Complain,” The Atlantic, December 21, 2010:

“When the FCC asserts regulatory jurisdiction over an area of telecommunications, the dynamic of the industry changes. No longer are customer needs and desires at the forefront of firms’ competitive strategies; rather firms take their competitive battles to the FCC, hoping for a favorable ruling that will translate into a marketplace advantage. Customer needs take second place; regulatory “rent-seeking” becomes the rule of the day, and a previously innovative and vibrant industry becomes a creature of government rule-making.”

Holman Jenkins, “Let’s Restart the Green Revolution,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2011, (regarding how misguided agricultural & environmental policies are hurting consumers):

“When some hear the word ‘regulation,’ they imagine government rushing to the defense of consumers. In the real world, government serves up regulation to those who ask for it, which usually means organized interests seeking to block a competitive threat. This insight, by the way, originated with the left, with historians who went back and reconstructed how railroads in the U.S. concocted federal regulation to protect themselves from price competition. We should also notice that an astonishingly large part of the world has experienced an astonishing degree of stagnation for an astonishingly long time for exactly such reasons.”

Bruce Schneier, Liars & Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012), p. 204.

“There’s one competing interest that’s unique to enforcing institutions, and that’s the interest of the group the institution is supposed to watch over. If a government agency exists only because of the industry, then it is in its self-preservation interest to keep that industry flourishing. And unless there’s some other career path, pretty much everyone with the expertise necessary to become a regulator will be either a former or future employee of the industry with the obvious implicit and explicit conflicts. As a result, there is a tendency for institutions delegated with regulating a particular industry to start advocating the commercial and special interests of that industry. This is known as regulatory capture, and there are many examples both in the U.S. and in other countries.”

Bruce Owen, “Communication Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative Capture” (Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, January 19, 2012), SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 11-006, p. 2. Owen argues that it is the legislative branch, not the regulatory agencies themselves, where regulatory capture takes root:

“It is rather legislative oversight and budget committees and their chairs that are (willingly) captured by special interests in the first instance. One could equally say that legislators capture the special interests, seeking campaign funding The behavior of regulatory agencies simply reflect the preferences of their congressional masters. Regulators generally seek to please their committees, not to defy them.”

Mark Zachary TaylorThe Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 213:

“political resistance to technological change can obstruct or warp otherwise ‘good’ S&T [science and technology] policy. Time and again, the losing interest groups created by scientific progress or technological change have been able to convince politicians to block, slow, or alter government support for scientific and technological progress. They support taxes, regulations, subsidies, procurement policies, spending, and so forth that obstruct progress in new S&T, and favor the status quo S&T. The losers and their political representatives have interfered with markets, public institutions and policies, and even the scientific debate itself–whatever they can to protect their interests.”

Additional readings:

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Thoughts on Wu’s Master Switch, Part 6 (His Audacious Information Industrial Policy) https://techliberation.com/2010/11/02/thoughts-on-wu%e2%80%99s-master-switch-part-6-his-audacious-information-industrial-policy/ https://techliberation.com/2010/11/02/thoughts-on-wu%e2%80%99s-master-switch-part-6-his-audacious-information-industrial-policy/#comments Tue, 02 Nov 2010 14:44:56 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=32764

I’m going to close out my series of essays about Tim Wu’s new book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, by discussing his proposed solutions.  In the first five essays in the series, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] I’ve critiqued Wu’s look at information history as well as his use of terms like “market failure,” “laissez-faire” and “open” vs. “closed.”  I argued there’s a great deal of over-simplification, even outright distortion, in his use of those terms throughout the book.

Anyway, let’s run through the basics of the book once more before getting to Wu’s proposed solutions.  By my reading of The Master Switch, Wu’s argument essentially goes something like this:

  • Information industries go through cycles. After a period of “openness” and competition, they tend to drift toward “closed,” corporate-controlled, anti-consumer models and outcomes.
  • The resulting “monopolists” then block much innovation, competition, and free speech.
  • Consequently, “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible.”
  • Moreover, information industries are more important than all others (“information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries”) and even traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.” (p. 303).
  • Thus, special rules should apply to information-related sectors of our economy.

Again, I’ve challenged some of these assertions in my previous essays, specifically, Wu’s incomplete history of cycles and the fact that he greatly underplays the role of governments in “locking-in” sub-optimal market structures or, worse yet, creating those structures through misguided public policies or regulatory capture.  Wu discusses some of those factors in his book, but he tends to regard them as secondary to the inquiry, whereas I believe they are crucial to understanding how most “closed” or anti-competitive scenarios develop or endure. Instead, Wu simplistically suggests that “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible,” even though no such state of affairs has ever existed within communications or media industries. They have been subjected to varying levels of indirect influence or direct control almost since their inception.

Regardless, what does Tim Wu want done about the problems he has (mis-)diagnosed?

What Wu Wants: A “Constitutional” Approach to Private Regulation

Broadly speaking, Wu wants to counter what he regards as “the danger of private power,” “the Lockean sanctification of private property,” and the fact that “American economic life [has] been built mostly on freewheeling capitalism.” (p. 300)  More specifically, he wants to end the “cycle” he describes of markets moving from supposedly open to closed.

To do so, he proposes what he calls a “constitutional” approach to private marketplace regulation.  In reality, it would be a massive, unprecedented, and highly destructive information sector industrial policy that would substitute the Rule of Man for the Rule of Law.  But let’s hear how Wu describes it:

What I propose is not a regulatory approach but rather a constitutional approach to the information economy. By that I mean a regime whose goal is to constrain and divide all power that derives from the control of information. Specifically, what we need is something I would call a Separations Principle for the information economy. A Separations Principle would mean the creation of a salutary distance between each of the major functions or layers in the information economy. It would mean that those who develop information, those who control the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another. At the same time, Separations Principle stipulates one other necessity: that the government also keep its distance and not intervene in the market to favor any technology, network monopoly, or integration of the major functions of an information industry.”  (p. 302, emphasis in original)

Wu calls this a “constitutional approach” because he models it on the separations of power found in the U.S. Constitution, such as the separation of church and State, as well as the separation of powers between branches of government.  Wu makes a few additional assertions:

  • “[T]he Separations Principle accepts in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be sacrificed, even in ways that may seem painful or costly.” (p. 305)
  • But Wu believes that pain or cost is worth it because of the “corrupting effect of vertically integrated power.” (p. 305)
  • “You cannot serve two masters, and the objectives of creating information are often at odds with those of disseminating it,” he says. (p. 305)
  • Specifically, he claims the Separations Principle would better protect free speech and entrepreneurial freedom. On the former: “It is a recognition that the disposition of firms and industries is, if anything, more critical than the actions of the state in controlling who gets heard.” On the latter: “The Separations Principle protects entrepreneurial freedom by preventing stagnation and repression of business innovation, especially with the help of the state.” (p. 306)

There’s a lot to unpack here including Wu’s stunning claim that his Separations Principle doesn’t represent a regulatory regime, as well as his rather incredible belief that government meddling and machinations could be kept in check under this regime.

First, however, Wu deserves credit for coming clean about just how radical his proposal is.

Constitutional Limits on Governments vs. Private Actors

Wu admits that “It would be quite radical today even to contemplate imposing on the economy the kind of safeguards that the Constitution places on the political system.” (p. 301)  A few pages later he notes that “The Separations Principle… requires a certain breadth and ambition in its application.” (p. 308)

I’m glad Wu was willing to at least acknowledge the radicalness of his proposal.  But, as he is prone to do throughout the book, he raises an important potential objection only to quickly walk away from it.  In this case, however, it’s completely understandable why Wu wouldn’t want to continue this inquiry: His proposal really is “quite radical” since it is completely at odds with America’s constitutional heritage of individual liberty and limited government.

Let’s go back to Civics 101.  We require that governments live under certain constraints and the Rule of Law because we recognize that governments possess the unique ability to fine, punish, and imprison citizens.  Moreover, escape from government’s tentacles is difficult, if not impossible. A constitutional system is required, therefore, to limit government’s role over our lives and the economy.

By contrast, we do not impose similar constraints on individuals — or on individuals when they work collaboratively in organizations or corporations — primarily because we believe there should be a presumption of liberty in most human affairs.  Freedom is the default position.  We value freedom because it allows humans to exercise their free will and live a life of their own choosing — and that includes the freedom to pursue happiness by making money in a business venture.  Our nation’s founders saw the wisdom in this even before we had a grand historical clash between communism and capitalist systems.  From that experience, however, we now have undisputed proof that social and economic freedoms are closely linked, and that when humans are free, they prosper.  The other reason we default to freedom for private individuals and organizations is because the possibility of “escape” exists from undesirable social or economic situations.

Wu doesn’t bother slowing down to appreciate these distinctions. He gives occasional lip service to the dangers of excessive government power:

Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace…. Government’s tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity … [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive. (p. 308)

Quite right. Yet, as I pointed out in this earlier essay, there’s seemingly never any serious lesson to be drawn from that conclusion.  Wu just marches right along in his narrative and ignores that “disgrace” and its relationship to “the cycle.”

The crucial point here is that Wu doesn’t fully appreciate the qualitative difference between State power and corporate power.  Instead — consistent with many “media access” theorists who came before him — he largely equates those forms of power or even makes private power out to be the more significant threat to personal liberties and freedom of speech.  Again, we hear statements like “the disposition of firms and industries is, if anything, more critical than the actions of the state in controlling who gets heard.”

The problem with this is that (a) history shows it’s simply not true and (b) the corrective remedies such a theory counsels would require a massive enhancement of State power to counter the supposed threats of private power, which (c) would create an even bigger threat to human liberty since only the State can fine, imprison, and truly foreclose speech.

So, I’ll stick with traditional “constitutionalism,” thank you very much!  Tim Wu’s “constitutionalism,” by contrast, is the Rule of Man, not the Rule of Law.  Specifically, it would be the rule of a handful of unelected men (and women) down at the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, or whatever other regulatory bureaucracies Wu would empower under this approach.   And, as we’ll see next, that approach is truly audacious in its scope.

Practical Considerations: An Unprecedented Information Control Regime

OK, let’s forget about all that philosophical and legalistic mumbo-jumbo.  After all, most people these days don’t really give a hoot about constitutional limitations or the first principles associated with our nation’s founding. Let us instead explore the Bold New World of information regulation that Wu wants imposed on the high-tech economy and consider its complexity and costs.  Wu is a bit short on details about how policymakers should go about constructing a “Separations” regime, or how it will work in practice, but he does suggest that Net neutrality regulation and expanded antitrust oversight are at least two of the core elements. But he says that will not be enough.

Despite the fact that Wu admits the FCC “has on occasion let itself become the enemy of the good, effectively a tool of repression,” Wu seems to suggest the agency will continue to have “day-to-day authority over the information industries.” (p. 309) Of course, the FCC’s role is currently limited mostly to older sectors of the information economy, but Wu seems to suggest that role should be expanded considerably.  Yet, FCC oversight isn’t enough either, Wu says.  He argues that “what is needed is not only an FCC institutionally committed to a Separations Principle but also a structural arrangement to guard against such deviations, including congressional oversight as well as attention and corrections from other branches of government.”

Here the “breadth and ambition in its application” associated with Wu’s Separations Principal becomes more apparent. We are talking about layers upon layers of regulation. More importantly, the key attribute of Wu’s Separations Principle is that it is preemptive and prophylactic in character.  He explicitly rejects the idea that marketplace experimentation should be allowed and that ex post administrative proceedings or antitrust enforcement will be good enough. “[T]here is the problem of taking an after-the-fact approach to a commodity so vital to our basic liberties,” he argues. (p. 204) Thus, Wu’s approach represent a return to the sort of anticipatory, “Mother, May I” regulatory regime America was supposed to be turning away from following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

What’s most bizarre about Wu’s call for such a preemptive “Separations” approach is his insistence that it is not a regulatory approach.  It’s hard to know whether this is an astonishing bit of hubris or just plain naiveté.  I hate to suggest it, but I think Wu is perfectly aware of just how regulatory his system would be in practice; he just doesn’t want to admit it.  After all, for there to be “separations” of various segments of the information sector, someone would need to determine who and what belongs in which bucket.  Wu suggests we’ll need at least three buckets. To repeat, he says his Separations Principle “would mean that those who develop information, those who control the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another.”  Let’s put some labels on these buckets:

  • Bucket #1: Information Creators
  • Bucket #2: Information Distributors
  • Bucket #3: Information Hardware Makers

These would essentially become three of the new “titles” (or regulatory sections) of a forthcoming “Information Economy Separations Act.” (I’m assuming Wu understands it would take an act of Congress to implement this sweeping regime, although he never makes that clear.  Or perhaps he would just prefer the FCC “reclassify” the entire information economy by regulatory fiat? Who knows.  Again, he never really sweats the details on this important point.)

Regardless, the problem with these conceptually neat classifications is that don’t conform to our fast-paced, highly dynamic Information Age economy.  There is a fluidity of innovation and market activity that Wu utterly fails to appreciate.  I suppose it’d be easy to throw a couple of players into these buckets and tell them to stay put.  We could tell T-Mobile, for example, that they could be a wireless information distributor and absolutely nothing else; we could tell Discovery Networks, they could be a content creator and absolutely nothing else; and we could tell Intel, you can be a chip maker and absolutely nothing else.

But not every existing information sector actor or technology is so neatly compartmentalized. Moreover, Wu’s framework also begs the question: Would firms that currently have integrated operations and investments in multiple fields be forced to divest control of various operations to come in line with Wu’s Separations Principle?   Here are a few scenarios to consider (and with each example, ask yourself the question: What’s the harm here to would justify the sort of “separations” regime Wu proposes?):

  • Cox Enterprises has a wide variety of content and distribution properties including: broadband services, cable TV channels and distribution systems, newspapers, radio stations, advertising and direct mail divisions, and AutoTrader.com.  How many pieces does the firm need to be split into to comply with Wu’s new “Separations” regime?
  • Should an ISP be allowed to develop or offer (or directly integrate into their service) free anti-virus software and parental control technologies since that’s not part of the underlying distribution service? Nearly every major ISP does so already today.
  • Even though the experiment was ultimately a failure, should Google have been allowed to break out of the search market and give the handheld device business a shot with the Nexus One?  Likewise, should Google be allowed to continue its experiment with local fiber or wi-fi networks even though it is so clearly outside their traditional line of business?  Finally, should the FCC have disallowed Google’s bid in the 700 MHz spectrum auction back in 2008 since it would have meant the firm was formally entering the information distribution business?
  • Which bucket is Microsoft in as a traditional OS and software provider?  Regardless, was it a mistake to allow them to jump into the video game console marketplace with the Xbox many years ago?   Should MS have been forbidden from creating the Zune since it too was a digital device outside of Microsoft’s core field?  Should MS be allowed to have a content division that develops games or other content for its operating systems even though they might be considered two separate information markets?
  • Sony produces movie and video game content but also develops hardware (video game consoles, televisions, music players, phones, etc.) on which that content can be played. Should that be illegal? Would they have to divest some of these divisions once Wu’s system went into effect?
  • Apple is the ultimate example of an information hardware manufacturer that has not only diversified its hardware offerings from PCs to iPods, iPhones and iPads, but also become a (if not the) leading information distributor for digital music, movies, television shows, podcasts, books and audiobooks through iTunes.  The company’s Apps store also makes it a key distributor of software.  What bucket is it in?
  • Should Amazon be allowed to be both the biggest online marketplace as well as the manufacturer of a device (the Kindle) that offers access to that store?

I could go on and on, but here’s the crucial point: Creating firewalls between the buckets Wu proposes would be a nightmare and would entail incessant regulatory interventions to make sure the walls weren’t breached.  As suggested above, the very act of regulatory line-drawing would be mind-bogglingly complex.  More importantly, each new information sector innovation would suddenly be subjected to a regulatory classification proceeding.

Wu is essentially saying there are few integrative efficiencies or other economic benefits associated with cross-sector deals or cross-platform technological developments.  Again, he dismisses the notion with one line: “[T]he Separations Principle accepts in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be sacrificed, even in ways that may seem painful or costly.” (p. 305)  Well, that’s nice… except that this regulatory system would upend the U.S. information economy as we know it!  His Separations Principle is an unprecedented regulatory wrecking ball that would do untold destruction to the American economy in the name of creating a system of information apartheid. Wu also completely ignores the litigation nightmare that would ensue once the government started forcing the divestiture of various lines of business.  After all, many companies would likely have valid “takings” claims here under the Fifth Amendment.

But even if we could get beyond all that, we’d have to consider how this regime would work going forward.  Let’s consider a hypothetical example.  Virtual reality is an emerging field of our information economy that promises to experience rapid growth in coming years.  A number of companies are currently developing content and devices that will help bring a veritable Star Trek holodeck experience to our living rooms sometime very soon.  The market is still in a great deal of flux and it remains unclear which technologies will prevail or which developers and device makers will prosper.  One thing we know for certain, however: it’s a hugely complex and expensive undertaking.  VR technologies aren’t like creating a YouTube video of your cat playing a piano. There are significant costs associated with developing VR content and devices. Distributing VR bits over networks will, no doubt, be quite complicated as well.  Now, imagine two scenarios (which, for all I know, may already be playing out in the marketplace today):

  • Scenario 1: A partnership is announced between some cutting-edge VR companies that have different core competencies in this field.  One of the companies is developing holographic imaging devices to project immersive environments directly into your living room or workspace.  Another of the partners is developing games that would take advantage of those new holographic imaging innovations.  And a third partner in the deal is developing software that will help manage the real-time, high-bandwidth flow of VR bits across broadband lines.  Under Wu’s Separations Principle, would this deal be illegal?
  • Scenario 2: All of the activities discussed above are being handled by a single, integrated firm.  Is that illegal under Wu’s Separations Principle?

Now, it would be easy to dismiss this scenario with a casual wave of the hand and a ‘we’ll-figure-it-out-later’ attitude.  But consider the fact that deals and developments like this are happening every single minute of the day our modern information economy.  One wonders how regulators would even be expected to keep track of it all.  And they would have to keep track of it all because, again, Wu’s Separations Principle is preemptive and prophylactic in character.  His regulatory regime is going to have to come to grips with that fact that innovation happens. Markets evolve. People want to experiment and do bold new things. They tinker. They develop. They pitch. They deal. And so on.  As that dynamic process unfolds every day across the high-tech economy, Wu’s Separations Principle will be put to the test and necessitate a regulatory proceeding of some sort to determine what is permitted and what is verboten.  Meanwhile, the very uncertainty associated with Wu’s regime would delay and discourage investment in the field and formation of the partnership/venture necessary to successfully bring VR to market

Astonishingly, however, Wu argues that “a Separations regime would take much of the guesswork and impressionism, and indeed the influence trafficking, out of the oversight of information industries.” (p. 307) That’s a doozy of a claim.  To the extent his Separations Principle eliminates “guesswork” and creates more regulatory certainty, it would only do so by creating rigid artificial barriers to market entry and innovation across the information economy.  That’s “certainty” that we can live without.

Conclusion

Over on Amazon.com, I was interested to see Tim Wu post a glowing review of Kevin Kelly’s important new book, What Technology Wants (which I will be reviewing here next).  Kelly’s book argues that we should think of technology, or what he calls “the Technium,” as a “force” or even a living “organism” that has a “vital spirit” and which “has its own wants” and “a noticeable measure of autonomy.”  I think Kelly goes a bit far, but to the extent one buys into the notion that technology is like an organism, Tim Wu’s Information Industrial Policy would kill that organism.  Or, it would at least severely stunt its continued growth and evolution.

Because his information industry policy is every bit as “radical” as he suggests and would require, as he also admits, “a certain breadth and ambition in its application,” it is essential we reject this innovation-killing regulatory regime.  The health of the high-tech economy, the global competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector, and the long-term welfare of consumers depends upon it.

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Thoughts on Tim Wu’s Master Switch, Part 4 (on Regulatory Capture) https://techliberation.com/2010/10/29/thoughts-on-tim-wu%e2%80%99s-master-switch-part-4-on-regulatory-capture/ https://techliberation.com/2010/10/29/thoughts-on-tim-wu%e2%80%99s-master-switch-part-4-on-regulatory-capture/#comments Fri, 29 Oct 2010 13:45:39 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=32709

After posting the first three installments of my ongoing look at Tim Wu’s important new book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, [see parts 1, 2, & 3], I’ve heard back from some readers as well as Prof. Wu himself that I may be going a bit hard on him, or that I am under-appreciating some of his valid critiques.  In particular, Wu and others have claimed I’ve ignored or downplayed his admission that the problem of regulatory capture is a prime culprit of “the cycle” he addresses in his book.  So, let me address that point here today.

I have acknowledged that Prof. Wu’s book includes some occasional references to the problem of regulatory capture or bureaucratic bungling throughout the history of communications and media policy.  In a comment to my previous post, Wu itemizes a couple of those instances, most of which I’d already cited before. But here’s probably the best passage from the book on this point:

Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace…. Government’s tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity … [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive. (p. 308)

I agree.  And, as I also noted in my previous essay, I very much appreciated this footnote in chapter 3 of Wu’s book: “The technical term for such a system is ‘corporatism’: in its extreme manifestation it is called ‘fascism.”  Wu is absolutely right.  I applaud him for labeling this system what it really is.

But here’s what’s so damn peculiar about Wu and his book when it comes to the problem of regulatory capture and bureaucratic mismanagement: as soon as he raises it, he immediately walks away from itThere’s seemingly never any serious lesson drawn from it. Indeed, sometimes within a line or two of raising such concerns, Wu seem to dismiss them entirely and propose giving the State far more power to play games within the information sector. If Wu really believed in what he said about the dangers of regulatory capture, he wouldn’t also be so eager to empower the State to do even more meddling in these sectors. Indeed, as we’ll see in the next installment of this series, Wu goes on in his book to propose a truly audacious regulatory regime for America’s information sectors. It is a breathtaking information industrial policy.

Thus, after reading Wu’s book, one is forced to conclude that he is asking us to accept this rather silly syllogism:

  • Premise #1: Information industries are prone to “cycles” that generally advance from “open” to “closed” and from competition to monopoly.
  • Premise #2: Regulatory capture and bureaucratic mismanagement are major culprits.
  • Conclusion: Therefore, the solution to the problem is to empower the State to take more, or better, steps to correct for this “market failure.”

That logic just doesn’t add up.  But that’s exactly what Wu asks us to accept in The Master Switch.

Regrettably, therefore, one is forced to conclude that Wu either has a complete disregard for public choice theory, or, worse yet, he is the victim of the stunning naive belief that his new vision or his new team of benevolent-minded, technocratic philosopher kings can save the day and will be immune to the problems of corporatism, regulatory capture, and bureaucratic mismanagement. Excuse me, but I’ve heard that one before, and I’m still not buying it.

Moreover, if one understands that the history of information sectors is indeed littered with examples of regulatory capture and bureaucratic bungling, one cannot also then conclude, as Wu does in his book, that a “purely economic laissez-faire approach” to information industries must be rejected.  By definition, a “purely economic laissez-faire approach” does not exist in markets characterized by regulatory capture and bureaucratic mismanagement.  And you won’t ever get less regulatory capture and bureaucratic mismanagement by increasing the scope of government control over a market!

You can’t have it both ways, Professor Wu.


[Jump to Part 5 in the series.]

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Ends, Means, and One Man’s War on Advertising https://techliberation.com/2009/03/24/ends-means-and-one-mans-war-on-advertising/ https://techliberation.com/2009/03/24/ends-means-and-one-mans-war-on-advertising/#comments Tue, 24 Mar 2009 15:02:18 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=17580

Chris Soghoian has responded to my recent post lauding his Targeted Advertising Cookie Opt-Out (or “TACO” – documented and downloadable here). We’re agreed in the main on user empowerment. The interesting stuff is on the margin: He disagrees with me that blocking third party cookies as I do (and he does too) is a satisfactory approach to suppressing tracking by advertisers.

There are a couple of points worth making about the discussion.

The first has to do with our slightly differing objectives. Chris is deeply focused on advertisers and his dislike of being tracked by advertisers. Though it is not absolute, I have a preference against tracking by anyone other than sites that I know, like, and trust. I’m no more worried about advertisers than any entity that would track my surfing – and there are many.

Again, TLF readers, I ask you to try setting your browser to query you before setting cookies. It’s a real insight into the dozens of entities getting a look at you as you surf, including a bunch of social networks and news sites.

If “advertisers” are what you seek to harness, that seems like a group that can be captured through some kind of centralized control mechanism. (I don’t think it actually is.) But if your goal is privacy as against all comers, you don’t attempt to centrally plan or decide who is good and who is bad. Responsibility rests with the end user.

Let the goal be “advertisers,” though. And I ask: Those social networks and news aggregators – are they “advertisers”? If you’re going to require a subset of Web communicators to obey opt-out cookies, you have to be able to define that subset – a problem Chris doesn’t seem to have thought about yet.

Lots of different publishers, sites, and networks have data that is entirely fungible with the tracking data advertisers collect. What do you get if you push down on the “officially advertisers” part of the balloon? Workarounds.

But I’ve backed into the second point – the means to these ends. Chris soft-pedals how he would get at tracking, but as far as I can tell it’s a law that says “advertisers” have to obey opt-out cookies.

Unlike all of the previous anti-advertising technologies, the opt-out mechanism provides users with a way to positively affirm that they do not wish to be tracked and targeted. This opt-out cookie is something that advertisers cannot ignore.

Is it by magic that they “cannot ignore” opt-out cookies? No, it’s by law.

With the right law in place, Chris appears to believe, “[t]he Federal Trade Commission and Congress would likely take an interest” when advertisers tried to skirt opt-out cookies, using other technologies to glean information about Web surfers’ interests.

His hope is to end the “arms race” in which users have to constantly chase the shifting tactics advertisers use to track them. It’s a fair point: There is a constant, rolling change in how the Web is used by publishers, advertisers, and consumers to interact and trade the data each produces.

That is an “arms race” only if you’ve adopted the rigid, war-like stance that tracking by advertisers is inherently wrong. It’s not. Berin and Adam, who have done a lot more work than me on this lately, have done a good write-up of the subtleties. What Chris calls an “arms race” is better thought of as a constantly unfolding negotiation among all parties about the terms of the content-for-advertising bargain.

I believe, as a person who dislikes third-party cookies, that offering them to my computer in the hopes of gleaning some information is not wrong. Some people think it’s horribly wrong. Most people are indifferent.

Who’s right? Everyone and nobody. There doesn’t have to be one answer.

But should the terms of use for the Web be written by a vociferous minority (i.e. Chris) that can’t persuade the public to refuse tracking using the tools available to them? Perhaps the demand for control comes because the public won’t be persuaded.

Now that would be wrong – regulating cookies to force “protection” on a public that could seek it for itself, but won’t. That would deprive “advertisers” – we still don’t know who they are – of freedom and communications channels, it would deny publishers revenues, and it would deny consumers content they want and enjoy.

But let’s talk about arms races. Chris seeks exit from the so-called arms race on the technical and user side in favor of an arms race in the legislative and regulatory world. The law he imagines – so perfect as it resides there in his head – would have to be passed by Congress and implemented by a regulatory agency like the Federal Trade Commission.

Each of these regulatory bodies is under constant, well, “siege” by phalanxes of lobbyists, paid to advocate the views of their clients, including ” advertisers.” There is no realistic hope that Chris’ opt-out cookie law would make it through that in the form he wants. Defining what one means by “advertisers” is a gruesome task, with likely First Amendment problems. Instead of the clean bill Chris imagines, it would be perverted (from Chris’ perspective) by lobbying and special-interest influence. Remember when Congress passed a law alleging it would prevent spam?

Chris would transfer the arms race we’re in now – where consumers are in control, if apathetic – to a field where consumers are not in control and very apathetic, believing that they are protected by the government. This is the approach preferred by victims of the fatal conceit, who think that they can design society better than society can design itself. (Berin has done a terrific job of lambasting the Center for Democracy and Technology for its similarly conceited, blindly pro-regulatory armchair quarterbacking on the online advertising issue.)

Plenty of people dream about regulation that works, of course. The SEC’s failure to protect investors in the Madoff case provides one more example among many where law and regulation failed utterly to protect consumers – and by its existence encouraged their irresponsibility.

It is damaging folly to try protecting consumers from the tracking advertisers do when consumers can just as well protect themselves.

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Tim Wu on Obama, McCain, and “a Chicken in Every Pot” https://techliberation.com/2008/09/10/tim-wu-on-obama-mccain-and-a-chicken-in-every-pot/ https://techliberation.com/2008/09/10/tim-wu-on-obama-mccain-and-a-chicken-in-every-pot/#comments Wed, 10 Sep 2008 19:03:56 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=12582

Writing at Slate, Tim Wu tries to make Obama out to be the real Big Government candidate on media policy, who will deliver “if not a chicken in every pot, a fiber-optic cable in every home.” By contrast, Wu implies that McCain is just another pro-big business lackey who doesn’t understand “that the media and information industries are special—that like the transportation, energy, or financial industries, they are deeply entwined with the public interest.” Wu goes on to say:

Ultimately, most of the difference in Obama’s and McCain’s media policies boils down to questions about whether the media is special and a dispute over how much to trust the private sector. Camp McCain would tend to leave the private sector alone, with faith that it will deliver to most Americans what they want and deserve. The Obama camp would probably administer a more frequent kick in the pants, in the belief that good behavior just isn’t always natural.

First, as a factual matter, Wu is just wrong about McCain being some sort of a radical hands-off, pro-market liberalizer on media policy issues. Oh, if only that were true! But for those of us who have been in DC covering telecom and media policy for many years, it is widely understood there is no nailing down John McCain on any tech, telecom or media policy issue. He’s been all over the board. While he has sponsored or supported some deregulatory initiatives on the telecom front in the past, he’s also been a supporter of other regulatory causes. His battles with broadcasters and cable, for example, are well-known. Most recently, McCain has been leading the effort to impose a la carte mandates on cable and satellite operators. And if you’re all about Big Government credentials, then don’t forget McCain-Feingold, a law that made it a felony for corporations, nonprofit advocacy groups, and labor unions to run ads that criticize–or even name or show–members of Congress within 60 days of a federal election. And then there was the far more troubling McCain-Feingold II. Although it did not pass, McCain’s measure would have required broadcasters to run 12 hours of “candidate-centered and issue-centered programming” in the six weeks prior to primary and general elections—without giving broadcasters any control over those 12 hours (half of which would have had to run during prime time). The bill would have created a voucher system for the purchase of airtime for political advertisements, financed by an annual spectrum-use fee on all broadcast license holders. In sum, the legislation would have forced broadcast stations to pay a tax to the federal government that would in turn finance a pool of funds that politicians could turn around and spend to run ads on those very stations!

This sounds like the sort of Big Government Media Agenda that should make Tim Wu happy, but he doesn’t mention any of it in his essay.

But let me address the more fundamental, and quite mistaken, premise that underlies Wu’s essay — namely, that increased government activism in the media and broadband marketplace will somehow lead us to techno-nirvana. When Wu states that “the difference in Obama’s and McCain’s media policies boils down to questions about whether the media is special and a dispute over how much to trust the private sector,” he conveniently ignores the flip-side of that statement. That is, shouldn’t the real question here be: “How much do we trust the public sector”? Wu apparently assumes that “public interest” regulation will be all wine and roses. Enlightened, benevolent lawmakers and regulators who understand that media is “special” will concoct just the right mix of regulatory policies that will be pro-consumer, pro-democracy, and pro-free speech.

Sorry, but I’m not buying it. One would need to ignore 100 years worth of experience to believe such fanciful notions, and Wu seemingly does. Somehow, all will be different now. Regulators won’t be captured by special interests. Command-and-control regulation will suddenly become far more efficient and not deter innovation. And policymakers will resist the urge to censor speech.

Do you believe that story? If you’ve read your economic history, you’re probably just as skeptical as I am. It is revisionist history to say that the era of regulated monopoly and “public interest” media regulation was some sort of pro-consumer, pro-innovation, pro-free speech paradise. In reality, a “chicken in every pot” means a regulator on every cyber-corner. And I just don’t understand how someone as smart as Tim Wu thinks the entire process won’t once again come to be captured by the very interests he hopes to “kick in the pants.” They will be wearing the pants before it is over!

I invite Tim Wu and all his activist-minded friends on the Left to take another look at the definitive 2-volume Economics of Regulation by a more enlightened and experienced Democrat, Professor Alfred E. Kahn. In that masterwork, they will find the following words of wisdom (and caution):

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.
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