Christopher Wolf, director of the law firm Hogan Lovells’ Privacy and Information Management group, addresses his new book with co-author Abraham Foxman, Viral Hate: Containing Its Spread on the Internet. To what extent do hateful or mean-spirited Internet users hide behind anonymity? How do we balance the protection of the First Amendment online while addressing the spread of hate speech? Wolf discusses how to define hate speech on the Internet; whether online hate speech leads to real-world violence; how news sites like the Huffington Post and New York Times have dealt with anonymity; lessons we should impart on the next generation of Internet users to discourage hate speech; and cases where anonymity has proved particularly beneficial or valuable.

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Related Links

• Viral Hate: Containing its Spread on the Internet, Amazon
• About Christopher Wolf, Future of Privacy
• Christopher Wolf Biography, Huffington Post

I’m pleased to announce the release of my latest law review article, “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates.” It appears in the new edition of the George Mason University Law Review. (Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 2013)

This is the second of two complimentary law review articles I am releasing this year dealing with privacy policy. The first, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” was published in Vol. 36 of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy this Spring. (FYI: Both articles focus on privacy claims made against private actors — namely, efforts to limit private data collection — and not on privacy rights against governments.)

My new article on benefit-cost analysis in privacy debates makes a seemingly contradictory argument: benefit-cost analysis (“BCA”) is extremely challenging in online child safety and digital privacy debates, yet it remains essential that analysts and policymakers attempt to conduct such reviews. While we will never be able to perfectly determine either the benefits or costs of online safety or privacy controls, the very act of conducting a regulatory impact analysis (“RIA”) will help us to better understand the trade-offs associated with various regulatory proposals.

However, precisely because those benefits and costs remain so remarkably subjective and contentious, I argue that we should look to employ less-restrictive solutions — education and awareness efforts, empowerment tools, alternative enforcement mechanisms, etc. — before resorting to potentially costly and cumbersome legal and regulatory regimes that could disrupt the digital economy and the efficient provision of services that consumers desire. This model has worked fairly effectively in the online safety context and can be applied to digital privacy concerns as well.

The article is organized as follows. Part I examines the use of BCA by federal agencies to assess the utility of government regulations. Part II considers how BCA can be applied to online privacy regulation and the challenges federal officials face when determining the potential benefits of regulation. Part III then elaborates on the cost considerations and other trade-offs that regulators face when evaluating the impact of privacy-related regulations. Part IV discusses alternative measures that can be taken by government regulators when attempting to address online safety and privacy concerns. This article concludes that policymakers must consider BCA when proposing new rules but also recognize the utility of alternative remedies such as education and awareness campaigns, to address consumer concerns about online safety and privacy.

I’ve embedded the full article down below in a Scribd reader, but you can also download it from my SSRN page and my Mercatus author page.

A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates by Adam Thierer

I’m excited to announce the release of my latest law review article, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” which appears in the next edition (vol. 36) of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. This is the first of two complimentary law review articles that I will be releasing this year dealing with privacy policy. The second, which will be published later this summer by the George Mason University Law Review, is entitled, “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates.” (FYI: Both articles focus on privacy claims made against private actors — namely, efforts to limit private data collection — and not on privacy rights against governments.)

The new Harvard Journal article is divided into three major sections. Part I focuses on some of normative challenges we face when discussing privacy and argues that there may never be a widely accepted, coherent legal standard for privacy rights or harms here in the United States. It also explores the tensions between expanded privacy regulation and online free speech. Part II turns to the many enforcement challenges that are often ignored when privacy policies are being proposed or formulated and argues that legislative and regulatory efforts aimed at protecting privacy must now be seen as an increasingly intractable information control problem. Most of the problems policymakers and average individuals face when it comes to controlling the flow of private information online are similar to the challenges they face when trying to control the free flow of digitalized bits in other information policy contexts, such as online safety, cybersecurity, and digital copyright.

If the effectiveness of law and regulation is limited by the normative considerations discussed in Part I and the practical enforcement complications discussed in Part II, what alternatives remain to assist privacy-sensitive individuals? I address that question in Part III of the paper and argue that the approach America has adopted to deal with concerns about objectionable online speech and child safety offers a path forward on the privacy front as well. A so-called “3-E” solution that combines consumer education, user empowerment, and selective enforcement of existing targeted laws and other legal standards (torts, anti-fraud laws, contract law, and so on), has helped society achieve a reasonable balance in terms of addressing online safety while also safeguarding other important values, especially freedom of expression.  That does not mean perfect online safety exists, not only because the term means very different things to different people, but because it would be impossible to achieve in the first instance as a result of information control complications. But the “3-E” approach has the advantage of enhancing online safety without sweeping regulations being imposed that could undermine the many benefits information networks and online services offer individuals and society.  This same framework can guide online privacy decisions—both at the individual household level and the public policy level.

I’ve embedded the full article down below in a Scribd reader, but you can also download it from my SSRN page and it should be available on the HJLPP website shortly. [Update 4/16: It is now live on the site.] In coming weeks, I hope to do some blogging that builds on the themes and arguments I develop in this article.

The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing

My Romanian space lawyer (and improbably-named) friend Virgiliu Pop has made the front page of Space.com today in a great interview with leading space journalist Leonard David about his new book Who Owns the Moon?: Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership.  Virgil slams the “Common Heritage of Mankind” socialism behind the 1979 Moon Treaty, which was killed in the U.S. Senate by the free-market space movement, which later gave birth to the Space Frontier Foundation (which I chair).

Virgil once famously claimed ownership of the sun to demonstrate the absurdity of serious assertions made by a number of charlatans to ownership of lunar territory (Dennis Hope) or the entire Eros asteroid (Greg Nemitz).  Virgil’s point was “to show how ridiculous a property rights system in outer space would be if it were to be based solely on claim unsubstantiated by any actual possession.”

I’m looking forward to reading Virgil’s book–and to writing a proper review.  For now, I’ll just say that I think Virgil and I see eye-to-eye on three key premises (something of a rarity among space lawyers on the ultra-contentious issue of property rights):

1. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits nations from appropriating territory in space and also prohibits individuals from asserting any territorial claims (generally accepted) except to a narrowly-limited area under actual use (not accepted by all space lawyers).
2. The Outer Space Treaty, properly understood, does not bar claims to ownership of movable objects such as extracted resources or even (if they can be moved in a meaningful way) entire asteroids or comets.
3. Securing such property rights is essential to the economic development of space.

Here are a few choice excerpts from Virgil’s new book on the big picture of property rights in space:

Outer space needs to be spared the painful experience of the former Eastern Block. Despite the noble ideals of equity and care for the have-nots, the CHM paradigm has more faults than merits. A refutation of the Common Heritage principle does not mean, however, that the developing world will, or should, be left behind in the space era. China, India and Brazil are living proofs that a developing country can, through its own effort, join the spacefaring club. Instead of freeloading on the efforts of the older spacefarers, the have-nots should pool their meagre financial resources into a common space agency or into regional ones, and proceed at exploiting the riches of outer space for themselves. The rallying cry of Marxism – “Proletarians of all countries, unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains” should evolve into “Countries of the world unite – you have nothing to lose but the chains of gravity”. The skies are open. “

…

The frontier paradigm has proven its worth on our planet, and it most likely will do so in the extraterrestrial realms. Homesteading is likely to transform the lunar desert in the same manner as it transformed the 19th Century United States. Space is indeed a new frontier calling for individualism rather than collectivism, and its challenges need to be addressed with a legal regime favourable to property rights. Such a regime is seen by many authors as not only useful, but also as the only means of opening the extraterrestrial realms to settlement, given the reluctance of most industrialists to invest money in an endeavour without having the security that they will enjoy the benefits. It may also occur that a minority of investors, with a bigger tolerance to risk, would adopt an anarcho-capitalist approach and “cross the Alleghenies” without backing from a sovereign State.

Given the abundance of extraterrestrial resources, it would be nonsensical to forbid their private appropriation. Securing property rights would be a small price to pay, and more beneficial to humankind, compared to the alternative of keeping the extraterrestrial realms undeveloped. The practical arguments against the Frontier paradigm may have merit, but the issues raised can be tackled. The ideological arguments, nonetheless, are emotional rather than rational.

Whereas the frontier paradigm is outlawed in the current incarnation of the international law of outer space, law is a dynamic phenomenon and it may evolve towards a regime supportive of property rights in outer space. A shift from the res publica approach may be in the cards, given the official support of the Aldridge commission for property rights. Until this shift happens, the non-appropriation principle remains nonetheless the lex lata in the extraterrestrial realms.