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Matt Yglesias today responded with a post of his own to a NYT article about sports channels and cable pricing by Brian Stelter that Yglesias believed had “bad analysis.” I’m here to defend Stelter a little bit because I think Yglesias was too harsh and that Yglesias erred in his own post about the nature of cable bundling. Yglesias’ posts on cable bundling are good, and especially valuable because his Slate and ThinkProgress audiences are not the most receptive to economic justifications for perceived unfair corporate pricing schemes. In part due to him I suspect, you rarely hear econ and business bloggers calling for a la carte pricing of cable channels.

And Yglesias is certainly right that you can’t really complain about the price of your cable package, which includes the few channels you watch plus the sports channels you don’t watch, because you obviously value the channels more than the price you pay per month, even if the sports are a “waste.” He falters when he says

So since those channels are worth $60 to you, even if unbundling happens your cable provider is going to find a way to charge you approximately $60 for them. Because at the end of the day, you’re paying your cable provider for access to the channels you do watch—not for access to the channels you don’t watch. The channels you don’t watch are just there. If the channels you do watch are worth $60 to you, then $60 is what you’ll pay for them.

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We spend a lot of time here defending the simple proposition that flexible free-market pricing is a good thing. You would think that in 2012 we wouldn’t need to do so, but there’s a growing movement afoot today by some academics, regulatory activists, and public policymakers to have government start asserting more authority over broadband pricing. In particular, they want Congress, the FCC, or state officials to investigate and possibly even regulate efforts by wireline and wireless broadband carriers to use usage-based pricing and data caps as a method of calibrating supply and demand. This was the focus of my last weekly Forbes column, “The Specter Of Broadband Price Controls.” In the piece I note that:

Data caps and usage-based pricing are forms of what economists refer to as price discrimination. Although viewed with suspicion by some policymakers and regulatory-minded academics and activists, price discrimination is widely recognized to improve consumer welfare. Price-differentiated and prioritized services are part of almost every industrial sector in our capitalist economy. Notable examples include airline and hotel reservations, prioritized shipping services, amusement park passes, and fuel and energy pricing. Economists agree that price discrimination represents a sensible way to calibrate supply and demand while ensuring the fixed costs of doing business get covered. Consumers benefit from such pricing experimentation by gaining more options while firms gain more certainty about investment and service decisions.

This is confirmed by an excellent new Mercatus Center working paper on “The Impact of Data Caps and Other Forms of Usage-Based Pricing for Broadband Access,” by Daniel A. Lyons, an assistant professor of law at Boston College Law School. Lyons explains why a return to price controls for communications would be monumentally misguided. Continue reading →

My most recent Forbes column is entitled, “We All Hate Advertising, But We Can’t Live Without It.” It’s my attempt to briefly (a) defend the role advertising has traditionally played in sustaining news, entertainment, and online service, and (b) discuss some possible alternatives to advertising that could be tapped if advertising starts failing us a media cross-subsidy.

What got me thinking about this issue again was the controversy over satellite video operator DISH Network offering its customers a new “Auto Hop” capability for its Hopper whole-home HD DVR system. Auto Hop will give viewers the ability to automatically skip over commercials for most recorded prime time programs shown on ABC, CBS, FOX and NBC when viewed the day after airing. It makes the viewing experience feel like the ultimate free lunch. Alas, something still must pay the bills. As innovative as that technology is, we can be certain that it will not make content consumption cost-free. We’ll just pay the price in some other way. The same is true for online services since it’s never been easier to use technology to block ads.

So, what is going to pay the bills for content as ad-skipping becomes increasingly automated and effortless? Stated differently, what are the other possible methods of picking up the tab for content creation? Here’s a rough taxonomy: Continue reading →

I wanted to follow up on Eli Dourado’s excellent previous post (“Real Talk on Net Neutrality“) to reiterate the importance of a few points he made and add some additional thoughts about the issues raised in that New York Times article on Net neutrality and forced access regulation that lots of people are talking about today.

What Eli’s post makes clear is that there are those of us who think about Net neutrality and infrastructure regulation in economic terms (a rapidly shrinking group, unfortunately) and those who think it about in quasi-religious terms. The problem with the latter ideology of neutrality uber alles, however, is that at some point it must confront real-world economics. This is Eli’s core point: Something must pay the bills. In this case, something must cover the significant fixed costs associated with broadband investments if you hope to sustain those networks. Unless you are ready to make the plunge and suggest that the government should cover those costs through massive infrastructure expenditures and even potential nationalization or municipalization of broadband networks — and some clearly would be — then you have to get serious about how those costs will be covered by private operators.

Thus, we come back to the importance of business model experimentation and pricing flexibility to this debate. I have been harping on this point for a long time now, going all the way back to this 2005 essay, “The Real Net Neutrality Debate: Pricing Flexibility Versus Pricing Regulation.” And there’s a litany of other things I’ve penned on the same point, many of which I have cited at the end of this essay.

Here are the core points I have tried to get across in those earlier essays: Continue reading →

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my new white paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.” [PDF] I first presented a draft of this paper last November at a Michigan State University conference on “The Governance of Social Media.” [Video of my panel here.]

In this paper, I note that to the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Internet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered “essential facilities” or “natural monopolies” and regulated as public utilities. The debate over “net neutrality” regulation has been animated by such concerns.

While that debate still rages, the rhetoric of public utilities and essential facilities is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about other layers of the Internet, such as the search layer. More recently, there have been rumblings within academic and public policy circles regarding whether social media platforms, especially social networking sites, might also possess public utility characteristics. Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of those sites’ structures and business practices.

Proponents of treating social media platforms as public utilities offer a variety of justifications for regulation. Amorphous “fairness” concerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational concerns are also frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation. Proponents of regulation also sometimes invoke “social utility” or “social commons” arguments in defense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear definition.

Social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities, however, and there are good reasons why policymakers should avoid a rush to regulate them as such. Continue reading →

Two data points in the news over the past 24 hours to consider:

  • A new report on “Smartphone Adoption & Usage” by the Pew Internet Project finds that “one third of American adults – 35% – own smartphones” and that of that group “some 87% of smartphone owners access the Internet or email on their handheld” and “25% of smartphone owners say that they mostly go online using their phone, rather than with a computer.”
  • According to the Wall Street Journal, the “Average iPhone Owner Will Download 83 Apps This Year.” That’s up from an average of 51 apps downloaded in 2010. (At first I was astonished when I read that, but then realized that I’ve probably downloaded an equal number of apps myself, albeit on an Android-based device.)

As I explain in my latest Forbes column, facts like these help us understand “How iPhones And Androids Ushered In A Smartphone Pricing Revolution.” That is, major wireless carriers are in the process of migrating from flat-rate, “all-you-can-eat” wireless data plans to usage-based plans. The reason is simple economics: data demand is exploding faster than data supply can keep up.

“It’s been four years since the introduction of the iPhone and rival devices that run Google’s Android software,” notes Cecilia Kang of The Washington Post. “In that time, the devices have turned much of America into an always-on, Internet-on-the-go society.” Indeed, but it’s not just the iPhone and Android smartphones. It’s all those tablets that have just come online over the past year, too. We are witnessing a tectonic shift in how humans consume media and information, and we are witnessing this revolution unfold over a very short time frame. Continue reading →

The FCC proposed new rules today aimed at combating wireless “bill shock,” a term that describes mobile subscribers getting hit with overage charges they didn’t anticipate. The proposed rules would require wireless providers to create a system for alerting customers when they are about to incur extra usage charges for voice, text, data, or roaming.

I can certainly see why some consumers may be frustrated with wireless pricing practices. But this frustration hardly constitutes evidence that the mobile marketplace is actually failing. Yes, mobile carriers sometimes make mistakes, and they probably need to do more to ensure their customers understand how overage charges work.

Competitive forces, however, are far better equipped than federal regulators to punish providers that engage in
genuinely harmful practices. And if the federal government must “do something” about bill shock, educating mobile subscribers about where to locate and track their usage information is a far better approach than prescriptive, burdensome federal regulation.

Hypocritically, even as the FCC tries to reign in bill shock, its own policies are harming consumers far more than any wireless industry practices. The FCC has again and again put off spectrum auctions that would enable mobile providers to offer better services at lower prices. As a result, consumers are suffering to the tune of billions of dollars each year. Economists Thomas Hazlett and Roberto Munoz published a study last year in which they concluded that U.S. wireless prices would decline by 8% if the FCC were to allocate an additional 60mhz of spectrum to mobile telephony.

If the FCC truly cares about wireless subscribers, rather than simply grandstanding against competitive (if imperfect) mobile carriers, the Commission’s top priority should be to aggressively free up the airwaves.

But analysts at the Competitive Enterprise Institute urged the FCC not to interfere with market disputes and to instead turn its focus to the real obstacle to the wireless marketplace – the FCC’s own anti-consumer approach to spectrum allocation. “Educating mobile subscribers about where to locate their up-to-date usage information – which all major wireless providers make available – is a far better solution to ‘bill shock’ than prescriptive federal regulation,” argued Ryan Radia, CEI Associate Director of Technology Studies. Radia pointed out that some consumers’ frustration with current wireless pricing practices is hardly evidence that the mobile marketplace is failing. “To be sure, mobile carriers make occasional mistakes, and they need to work harder to ensure their customers stay well-informed,” Radia said. “But competitive forces are far better equipped than federal regulators to punish providers that engage in genuinely harmful practices or fail to satisfy consumers’ evolving preferences.” In its efforts to address wireless bill disputes, the FCC purports to represent consumers’ interests; yet, Radia argued, the agency is harming consumers by delaying action to free up radio spectrum — the lifeblood of wireless communications. “Consumers are suffering to the tune of billions of dollars each year on account of the FCC’s failure to free up radio spectrum for mobile communications,” Radia said. “Economists Thomas Hazlett and Roberto Munoz recently published a study finding that U.S. wireless prices would decline by 8% if the FCC were to allocate an additional 60mhz of spectrum to mobile telephony.” “If the FCC genuinely cares about wireless subscribers, it should focus on aggressively freeing up the airwaves instead of comparatively trivial issues like bill shock.”

Today I appeared on CNBC’s “Power Lunch” to debate Net neutrality issues and the specific role of pricing in this debate. Specifically, the producers wanted to know whether websites should be allowed to pay a higher fee to allow consumers faster access to their sites or should it be equal for every website.  The show was partially a response to the rumors that the may be some sort of deal pending between Verizon and Google about prioritized services. On the program, I was up against Craig Aaron of Free Press.  During the discussion I made several points, many of which first appeared in my 2005 essay on “The Real Net Neutrality Debate: Pricing Flexibility Versus Pricing Regulation.” Here are the key points I tried to get across:

  • In a free-market economy, companies should be able to freely set prices for goods and services without fear of government price controls.
  • This isn’t about consumers paying more for basic Internet access or having their connections “slowed down”?  This is about whether the government will allow some broadband services to be differentiated or specialized for unique needs, such as online gaming, live event telecasts, secure telepresence conferences, telemedicine, etc.
  • Differentiated and prioritized services and pricing are part of almost every industrial sector in a capitalistic economy. (ex: airlines, package shipping, hotels, amusement parks, grades of gasoline, etc.)  Why should it be any different for broadband?
  • It’s always important to remember that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Something has to pay for Internet access. It doesn’t just fall like manna from heaven.  Differentiated services may help in this regard by allowing carriers to price more intensive or specialized users and uses to ensure that carriers don’t have to hit everyone – including average household users – with the same bill for service.  Why should the government make that illegal through Net neutrality regulation?
  • Heavy-handing tech mandates – especially Internet price controls – could have a profoundly deleterious impact on investment, innovation, and competition. After all, there can be no innovation or investment without a company first turning a profit.   We don’t want to return to the era of rotary-dial regulated monopoly, in which our choices were few and our services were standardized and rudimentary.  We should let our current experiment with facilities-based, head-to-head competition continue.

http://plus.cnbc.com/rssvideosearch/action/player/id/1559985749/code/cnbcplayershare

Interesting piece here from Slate’s Farhad Manjoo on why AT&T should dump unlimited data plans and end what he calls the “iPhone all-you-can-eat buffet.”  He notes that: “The typical smartphone customer consumes about 40 to 80 megabytes of wireless capacity a month. The typical iPhone customer uses 400 MB a month. AT&T’s network is getting crushed by that demand.” Because “some iPhone owners are hogging the network” and causing “a slowed-down wireless network,” Manjoo recommends a congestion pricing model as a method of balancing supply and demand:

How would my plan work? I propose charging $10 a month for each 100 MB you upload or download on your phone, with a maximum of $40 per month. In other words, people who use 400 MB or more per month will pay $40 for their plan, or $10 more than they pay now. Everybody else will pay their current rate—or less, as little as $10 a month. To summarize: If you don’t use your iPhone very much, your current monthly rates will go down; if you use it a lot, your rates will increase. (Of course, only your usage of AT&T’s cellular network would count toward your plan; what you do on Wi-Fi wouldn’t matter.) To understand the advantages of tiered pricing, let’s look at AT&T’s current strategy of spending billions to build more network space. Why won’t this work? For the same reason building more roads doesn’t reduce traffic—more capacity increases the attractiveness of driving, which brings a lot more cars to the road, which leads to more gridlock.

Congestion pricing and metering is something I’ve written quite a bit about here in the context of wireline broadband (1, 2, 3), but Manjoo is equally correct that it could be applied for wireless data plans.  It has the added value of taking pressure off lawmakers to impose Net neutrality regulation since pricing of the pipe becomes an effective substitute for most other forms of network management. In other words, price, don’t block bandwidth-hogging customers and applications.  The problem, Manjoo explains: Continue reading →

In a past life — that is, from roughly 1994-2004 — I spent an enormous amount of time countering the proponents of “open access” regulation for communications and high-tech networks.  My work in that field culminated in the publication of a 2003 book with my old Cato colleague Wayne Crews entitled, What’s Yours is Mine: Open Access & the Rise of Infrastructure Socialism. We aimed to counter the efforts of bureaucrats and central planners to command technology companies and industry sectors to share networks, facilities, or specific technologies with rivals in the name of “competition.”  Simply stated, sharing is not competing, and competition in the creation of networks is just as important as competition in the goods, services, and information that move across those networks.  Moreover, there are property right considerations that come into play when governments seek to commandeer networks or take over network management decisions.

But let’s just stick to the economic issue here regarding the incentives created by the network-sharing mentality of the “forced access” movement and the fiction associated with the belief that network sharing can create competition.  My old PFF colleague Randy May, who currently serves as President of the Free State Foundation, continues to cover developments in this field far closer than I do, and has always done much better work on the subject than me.  Recently, Randy addressed some new fictions put forth by the radical Leftist activity group, the (Un-)Free Press who are, once again, spinning a revisionist history of telecom and media policy.  Specifically, Free Press has recently suggested that in the late 1990s we lived in a veritable communications nirvana, with thousands of Internet Service Providers and/or “competitive exchange carriers” hotly “competing” for our business.  Here’s how Randy May addresses this:

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