politics – Technology Liberation Front https://techliberation.com Keeping politicians' hands off the Net & everything else related to technology Mon, 28 Nov 2022 01:18:49 +0000 en-US hourly 1 6772528 The End of Permissionless Innovation? https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/ https://techliberation.com/2021/01/10/the-end-of-permissionless-innovation/#comments Sun, 10 Jan 2021 21:24:12 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76823

Time magazine recently declared 2020 “The Worst Year Ever.” By historical standards that may be a bit of hyperbole. For America’s digital technology sector, however, that headline rings true. After a remarkable 25-year run that saw an explosion of innovation and the rapid ascent of a group of U.S. companies that became household names across the globe, politicians and pundits in 2020 declared the party over. “We now are on the cusp of a new era of tech policy, one in which the policy catches up with the technology,” says Darrell M. West of the Brookings Institution in a recent essay, “The End of Permissionless Innovation.” West cites the House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee’s October report on competition in digital markets—where it equates large tech firms with the “oil barons and railroad tycoons” of the Gilded Age—as the clearest sign that politicization of the internet and digital technology is accelerating. It is hardly the only indication that America is set to abandon permissionless innovation and revisit the era of heavy-handed regulation for information and communication technology (ICT) markets. Equally significant is the growing bipartisan crusade against Section 230, the provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that shields “interactive computer services” from liability for information posted or published on their systems by users. No single policy has been more important to the flourishing of online speech or commerce than Sec. 230 because, without it, online platforms would be overwhelmed by regulation and lawsuits. But now, long knives are coming out for the law, with plenty of politicians and academics calling for it to be gutted. Calls to reform or repeal Sec. 230 were once exclusively the province of left-leaning academics or policymakers, but this year it was conservatives in the White Houseon Capitol Hill and at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) who became the leading cheerleaders for scaling back or eliminating the law. President Trump railed against Sec. 230 repeatedly on Twitter, and most recently vetoed the annual National Defense Authorization Act in part because Congress did not include a repeal of the law in the measure. Meanwhile, conservative lawmakers in Congress such as Sens. Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz have used subpoenasangry letters and heated hearings to hammer digital tech executives about their content moderation practices. Allegations of anti-conservative bias have motivated many of these efforts. Even Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas questioned the law in a recent opinion. Other proposed regulatory interventions include calls for new national privacy laws, an “Algorithmic Accountability Act” to regulate artificial intelligence technologies, and a growing variety of industrial policy measures that would open the door to widespread meddling with various tech sectors. Some officials in the Trump administration even pushed for a nationalized 5G communications network in the name of competing with China. This growing “techlash” signals a bipartisan “Back to the Future” moment, with the possibility of the U.S. reviving a regulatory playbook that many believed had been discarded in history’s dustbin. Although plenty of politicians and pundits are taking victory laps and giving each other high-fives over the impending end of the permissionless innovation era, it is worth considering what America will be losing if we once again apply old top-down, permission slip-oriented policies to the technology sector.

Permissionless Innovation: The Basics

As an engineering principle, permissionless innovation represents the general freedom to tinker and develop new ideas and products in a relatively unconstrained fashion. As I noted in a recent book on the topic, permissionless innovation can also describe a governance disposition or regulatory default toward entrepreneurial activities. In this sense, permissionless innovation refers to the idea that experimentation with new technologies and innovations should generally be permitted by default and that prior restraints on creative activities should be avoided except in those cases where clear and immediate harm is evident. There is an obvious relationship between the narrow and broad definitions of permissionless innovation. When governments lean toward permissionless innovation as a policy default, it is likely to encourage freewheeling experimentation more generally. But permissionless innovation can sometimes occur in the wild, even when public policy instead tends toward its antithesis—the precautionary principle. As I noted in my latest book, tinkerers and innovators sometimes behave evasively and act to make permissionless innovation a reality even when public policy discourages it through precautionary restraints. To be clear, permissionless innovation as a policy default has not meant anarchy. Quite the opposite, in fact. In the United States, over the past 25 years, no major federal agencies that regulate technology or laws that do so were eliminated. Indeed, most agencies grew bigger. But in spite of this, entrepreneurs during this period got more green lights than red ones, and innovation was treated as innocent until proven guilty. This is how and why social media and the sharing economy developed and prospered here and not in other countries, where layers of permission slips prevented such innovations from ever getting off the drawing board. The question now is, how will the shift to end permissionless innovation as a policy default in the U.S. affect innovative activity here more generally? Economic historians Deirdre McCloskey and Joel Mokyr teach us that societal and political attitudes toward growth, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism have a powerful connection with the competitive standing of nations and the possibility of long-term prosperity. If America’s innovation culture sours on the idea of permissionless-ness and moves toward a precautionary principle-based model, creative minds will find it harder to experiment with bold new ideas that could help enrich the nation and improve the well-being of the citizenry—which is exactly why America discarded its old top-down regulatory model in the first place.

Why America Junked the Old Model

Perhaps the easiest way to put some rough bookends on the beginning and end of America’s permissionless innovation era is to date it to the birth and impending death of Sec. 230 itself. The enactment in 1996 of the Telecommunications Act was important, not only because it included Sec. 230, but also because the law created a sort of policy firewall between the old and new worlds of ICT regulation. The old ICT regime was rooted in a complex maze of federal, state and local regulatory permission slips. If you wanted to do anything truly innovative in the old days, you typically needed to get some regulator’s blessing first—sometimes multiple blessings. The exception was the print sector, which enjoyed robust First Amendment protection from the time of the nation’s founding. Newspapers, magazines and book publishers were left largely free of prior restraints regarding what they published or how they innovated. The electronic media of the 20th century were not so lucky. Telephony, radio, television, cable, satellite and other technologies were quickly encumbered with a crazy quilt of federal and state regulations. Those restraints include price controls, entry restrictions, speech restrictions and endless agency threats. ICT policy started turning the corner in the late 1980s after the old regulatory model failed to achieve its mission of more choice, higher quality and lower prices for media and communications. Almost everyone accepted that change was needed, and it came fast. The 1990s became a whirlwind of policy and technological change. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration decided to allow open commercialization of the internet, which, until then, had mostly been a plaything for government agencies and university researchers. But it was the enactment of the 1996 telecommunications law that sealed the deal. Not only did the new law largely avoid regulating the internet like analog-era ICT, but, more importantly, it included Sec. 230, which helped ensure that future regulators or overzealous tort lawyers would not undermine this wonderful new resource. A year later, the Clinton administration put a cherry on top with the release of its Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. This bold policy statement announced a clean break from the past, arguing that “the private sector should lead [and] the internet should develop as a market-driven arena, not a regulated industry.” Permissionless innovation had become the foundation of American tech policy.

The Results

Ideas have consequences, as they say, and that includes ramifications for domestic business formation and global competitiveness. While the U.S. was allowing the private sector to largely determine the shape of the internet, Europe was embarking on a very different policy path, one that would hobble its tech sector. America’s more flexible policy ecosystem proved to be fertile ground for digital startups. Consider the rise of “unicorns,” shorthand for companies valued at $1+ billion. “In terms of the global distribution of startup success,” notes the State of the Venture Capital Industry in 2019, “the number of private unicorns has grown from an initial list of 82 in 2015 to 356 in Q2 2019,” and fully half of them are U.S.-based. The United States is also home to the most innovative tech firms. Over the past decade, Strategy& (PricewaterhouseCooper’s strategy consulting business) has compiled a list of the world’s most innovative companies, based on R&D efforts and revenue. Each year that list is dominated by American tech companies. In 2013, 9 of the top 10 most innovative companies were based in the U.S., and most of them were involved in computing, software and digital technology. Global competition is intensifying, but in the most recent 2018 list, 15 of the top 25 companies are still U.S.-based giants, with Amazon, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Oracle and Cisco leading the way. Meanwhile, European digital tech companies cannot be found on any such list. While America’s tech companies are household names across the European continent, most people struggle to name a single digital innovator headquartered in the EU. Permissionless innovation crushed the precautionary principle in the trans-Atlantic policy wars. European policymakers have responded to the continent’s digital stagnation by doubling down on their aggressive regulatory efforts. The EU closed out 2020 with two comprehensive new measures (the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act), while the U.K. simultaneously pursued a new “online harms” law. Taken together, these proposals represent “the biggest potential expansion of global tech regulation in years,” according to The Wall Street Journal. The measures will greatly expand extraterritorial control over American tech companies. Having decimated their domestic technology base and driven away innovators and investors, EU officials are now resorting to plugging budget shortfalls with future antitrust fines on U.S.-based tech companies. It has essentially been a lost quarter century for Europe on the information technology front, and now American companies are expected to pay for it.

Republicans Revive ‘Regulation-By-Raised-Eyebrow’

In light of the failure of Europe’s precautionary principle-based policy paradigm, and considering the threat now posed by the growing importance of various Chinese tech companies, one might think U.S. policymakers would be celebrating the competitive advantages created by a quarter century of American tech dominance and contemplating how to apply this winning vision to other sectors of the economy. Alas, despite its amazing run, business and political leaders are now turning against permissionless innovation as America’s policy lodestar. What is most surprising is how this reversal is now being championed by conservative Republicans, who traditionally support deregulation. President Trump also called for tightening the screws on Big Tech. For example, in a May 2020 Executive Order on “Preventing Online Censorship,” he accused online platforms of “selective censorship that is harming our national discourse” and suggested that “these platforms function in many ways as a 21st century equivalent of the public square.” Trump and his supporters put Google, Facebook, Twitter and Amazon in their crosshairs, accusing them of discriminating against conservative viewpoints or values. The irony here is that no politician owes more to modern social media platforms than Donald Trump, who effectively used them to communicate his ideas directly to the American people. Moreover, conservative pundits now enjoy unparalleled opportunity to get their views out to the wider world thanks to all the digital soapboxes they now can stand on. YouTube and Twitter are chock-full of conservative punditry, and the daily list of top 10 search terms on Facebook is dominated consistently by conservative voices, where “the right wing has a massive advantage,” according to Politico. Nonetheless, conservatives insist they still don’t get a fair shake from the cornucopia of new communications platforms that earlier generations of conservatives could have only dreamed about having at their disposal. They think the deck is stacked against them by Silicon Valley liberals. This growing backlash culminated in a remarkable Senate Commerce Committee hearing on Oct. 28 in which congressional Republicans hounded tech CEOs and called for more favorable treatment of conservatives, and threatened social media companies with regulation if conservative content was taken down. Liberal lawmakers, by contrast, uniformly demanded the companies do more to remove content they felt was harmful or deceptive in some fashion. In many cases, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle were talking about the exact same content, putting the companies in the impossible position of having to devise a Goldilocks formula to get the content balance just right, even though it would be impossible to make both sides happy. In the broadcast era, this sort of political harassment was known as the “regulation-by-raised-eyebrow” approach, which allowed officials to get around First Amendment limitations on government content control. Congressional lawmakers and regulators at the FCC would set up show trial hearings and use political intimidation to gain programming concessions from licensed radio and television operators. These shakedown tactics didn’t always work, but they often resulted in forms of soft censorship, with media outlets editing content to make politicians happy. The same dynamic is at work today. Thus, when a firebrand politician like Sen. Josh Hawley suggests “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared,” or when Sohrab Ahmari, the conservative op-ed editor at the New York Postcalls for the nationalization of Twitter, they likely understand these extreme proposals won’t happen. But such jawboning represents an easy way to whip up your base while also indirectly putting intense pressure on companies to tweak their policies. Make us happy, or else! It is not always clear what that “or else” entails, but the accumulated threats probably have some effect on content decisions made by these firms. Whether all this means that Sec. 230 gets scrapped or not shouldn’t distract from the more pertinent fact: few on the political right are preaching the gospel of permissionless innovation anymore. Even tech companies and Silicon Valley-backed organizations now actively distance themselves from the term. Zachary Graves, head of policy at Lincoln Network, a tech advocacy organization, worries that permissionless innovation is little more than a “legitimizing facade for anarcho-capitalists, tech bros, and cynical corporate flacks.” He lines up with the growing cast of commentators on both the left and right who endorse a “Tech New Deal” without getting concrete about what that means in practice. What it likely means is a return to a well-worn regulatory playbook of the past that resulted in innovation stagnation and crony capitalism.

A More Political Future

Indeed, as was the case during past eras of permission slip-based policy, our new regulatory era will be a great boon to the largest tech companies. Many people advocate greater regulation in the name of promoting competition, choice, quality and lower prices. But merely because someone proclaims that they are looking to serve the public interest doesn’t mean the regulatory policies they implement will achieve those well-intentioned goals. The means to the end—new rules, regulations and bureaucracies—are messy, imprecise and often counterproductive. Fifty years ago, the Nobel prize-winning economist George Stigler taught us that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits.” In other words, new regulations often help to entrench existing players rather than fostering greater competition. Countless experts since then have documented the problem of regulatory capture in various contexts. If the past is prologue, we can expect many large tech firms to openly embrace regulation as they come to see it as a useful way of preserving market share and fending off pesky new rivals, most of whom will not be able to shoulder the compliance burdens and liability threats associated with permission slip-based regulatory regimes. True to form, in recent congressional hearings, Facebook head Mark Zuckerberg called on lawmakers to begin regulating social media markets. The company then rolled out a slick new website and advertising campaign inviting new rules on various matters. It is always easy for the king of the hill to call for more regulation when that hill is a mound of red tape of their own making—and which few others can ascend. It is a lesson we should have learned in the AT&T era, when a decidedly unnatural monopoly was formed through a partnership between company officials and the government.

Image Credit: Infrogmation/Wikimedia Commons

Many independent telephone companies existed across America before AT&T’s leaders cut sweetheart deals with policymakers that tilted the playing field in its favor and undermined competition. With rivals hobbled by entry restrictions and other rules, Ma Bell went on to enjoy more than a half century of stable market share and guaranteed rates of return. Consumers, by contrast, were expected to be content with plain-vanilla telephone services that barely changed. Some of us are old enough to remember when the biggest “innovation” in telephony involved the move from rotary-dial phones to the push-button Princess phone, which, we were thrilled to discover, came in multiple colors and had a longer cord. In a similar way, the impending close of the permissionless innovation era signals the twilight of technological creative destruction and its replacement by a new regime of political favor-seeking and logrolling, which could lead to innovation stagnation. The CEOs of the remaining large tech companies will be expected to make regular visits to the halls of Congress and regulatory agencies (and to all those fundraising parties, too) to get their marching orders, just as large telecom and broadcaster players did in the past. We will revert to the old historical trajectory, which saw communications and media companies securing marketplace advantages more through political machinations than marketplace merit.

Will Politics Really Catch Up?

While permissionless innovation may be falling out of favor with elites, America’s entrepreneurial spirit will be hard to snuff out, even when layers of red tape make it riskier to be creative. If for no other reason, permissionless innovation still has a fighting chance so long as Congress struggles to enact comprehensive technology measures. General legislative dysfunction and profound technological ignorance are two reasons that Congress has largely become a non-actor on tech policy in recent years. But the primary limitation on legislative meddling is the so-called pacing problem, which refers to the way technological innovation often outpaces the ability of laws and regulations to keep up. “I have said more than once that innovation moves at the speed of imagination and that government has traditionally moved at, well, the speed of government,” observed former Federal Aviation Administration head Michael Huerta in a 2016 speech.

DNA sequencing machine. Image Credit: Assembly/Getty Images

The same factors that drove the rise of the internet revolution—digitization, miniaturization, ubiquitous mobile connectivity and constantly increasing processing power—are spreading to many other sectors and challenging precautionary policies in the process. For example, just as “Moore’s Law” relentlessly powers the pace of change in ICT sectors, the “Carlson curve” now fuels genetic innovation. The curve refers to the fact that, over the past two decades, the cost of sequencing a human genome has plummeted from over $100 million to under $1,000, a rate nearly three times faster than Moore’s Law. Speed isn’t the only factor driving the pacing problem. Policymakers also struggle with metaphysical considerations about how to define the things they seek to regulate. It used to be easy to agree what a phone, television or medical tracking device was for regulatory purposes. But what do those terms really mean in the age of the smartphone, which incorporates all of them and much more? “‘Tech’ is a very diverse, widely-spread industry that touches on all sorts of different issues,” notes tech analyst Benedict Evans. “These issues generally need detailed analysis to understand, and they tend to change in months, not decades.” This makes regulating the industry significantly more challenging than it was in the past. It doesn’t mean the end of regulation—especially for sectors already encumbered by many layers of preexisting rules. But these new realities lead to a more interesting game of regulatory whack-a-mole: pushing down technological innovation in one way often means it simply pops up somewhere else. The continued rapid growth of what some call “the new technologies of freedom”—artificial intelligence, blockchain, the Internet of Things, etc.—should give us some reasons for optimism. It’s hard to put these genies back in their bottles now that they’re out. This is even more true thanks to the growth of innovation arbitrage—both globally and domestically. Creators and capital now move fluidly across borders in pursuit of more hospitable innovation and investment climates. Recently, some high-profile tech CEOs like Elon Musk and Joe Lonsdale have relocated from California to Texas, citing tax and regulatory burdens as key factors in their decisions. Oracle, America’s second-largest software company, also just announced it is moving its corporate headquarters from Silicon Valley to Austin, just over a week after Hewlett Packard Enterprise said it too is moving its headquarters from California to Texas—in this case, Houston. “Voting with your feet” might actually still mean something, especially when it is major tech companies and venture capitalists abandoning high-tax, over-regulated jurisdictions.

Advocacy Remains Essential

But we shouldn’t imagine that technological change is inevitable or fall into the trap of thinking of it as a sort of liberation theology that will magically free us from repressive government controls. Policy advocacy still matters. Innovation defenders will need to continue to push back against the most burdensome precautionary policies, while also promoting reforms that protect entrepreneurial endeavors. The courts offer us great hope. Groups like the Institute for Justice, the Goldwater Institute, the Pacific Legal Foundation and others continue to litigate successfully in defense of the freedom to innovate. While the best we can hope for in the legislative arena may be perpetual stalemate, these and other public interest law firms are netting major victories in courtrooms across America. Sometimes court victories force positive legislative changes, too. For example, in 2015, the Supreme Court handed down North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, which held that local government cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws when it delegates power to nongovernmental bodies, such as licensing boards. This decision made much-needed occupational licensing reform an agenda item across America. Many states introduced or adopted bipartisan legislation aimed at reforming or sunsetting occupational licensing rules that undermine entrepreneurship. Even more exciting are proposals that would protect citizens’ “right to earn a living.” This right would allow individuals to bring suit if they believe a regulatory scheme or decision has unnecessarily infringed upon their ability to earn a living within a legally permissible line of work. Meanwhile, there have been ongoing state efforts to advance “right to try” legislation that would expand medical treatment options for Americans tired of overly paternalistic health regulations. Perhaps, then, it is too early to close the book on the permissionless innovation era. While dark political clouds loom over America’s technological landscape, there are still reasons to believe the entrepreneurial spirit can prevail.
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Impressions from the DOJ Workshop about Section 230 https://techliberation.com/2020/02/26/impressions-from-the-doj-workshop-about-section-230/ https://techliberation.com/2020/02/26/impressions-from-the-doj-workshop-about-section-230/#comments Wed, 26 Feb 2020 18:54:26 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76670

Last week I attended the Section 230 cage match workshop at the DOJ. It was a packed house, likely because AG Bill Barr gave opening remarks. It was fortuitous timing for me: my article with Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation, was published 24 hours before the workshop by the Oklahoma Law Review.

These were my impressions of the event:

I thought it was pretty well balanced event and surprisingly civil for such a contentious topic. There were strong Section 230 defenders and strong Section 230 critics, and several who fell in between. There were a couple cheers after a few pointed statements from panelists, but the audience didn’t seem to fall on one side or the other. I’ll add that my friend and co-blogger Neil Chilson gave an impressive presentation about how Section 230 helped make the “long tail” of beneficial Internet-based communities possible.

AG Bob Barr gave the opening remarks, which are available online. A few things jumped out. He suggested that Section 230 had its place but Internet companies are not an infant industry anymore. In his view, the courts have expanded Section 230 beyond drafters’ intent, and the Reno decision “unbalanced” the protections, which were intended to protect minors. The gist of his statement was that the law needs to be “recalibrated.”

Each of these points were disputed by one or more panelists, but the message to the Internet industry was clear: the USDOJ is scrutinizing industry concentration and its relationship to illegal and antisocial online content.

The workshop signals that there is now a large, bipartisan coalition that would like to see Section 230 “recalibrated.” The problem for this coalition is that they don’t agree on what types of content providers should be liable for and they are often at cross-purposes. The problematic content ranges from sex trafficking, to stalkers, to opiate trafficking, to revenge porn, to unfair political ads. For conservatives, social media companies take down too much content, intentionally helping progressives. For progressives, social media companies leave up too much content, unwittingly helping conservatives.

I’ve yet to hear a convincing way to modify Section 230 that (a) satisfies this shaky coalition, (b) would be practical to comply with, and (c) would be constitutional.

Now, Section 230 critics are right: the law blurs the line between publisher and conduit. But this is not unique to Internet companies. The fact is, courts (and federal agencies) blurred the publisher-conduit dichotomy for fifty years for mass media distributors and common carriers as technology and social norms changed. Some cases that illustrate the phenomenon:

In Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, a 1991 federal district court decision, some Washington apple growers sued some local CBS affiliates for airing allegedly defamatory programming. The federal district court dismissed the case on the grounds that the affiliates are conduits of CBS programming. Critically, the court recognized that the CBS affiliates “had the power to” exercise editorial control over the broadcast and “in fact occasionally [did] censor programming . . . for one reason or another.” Still, case dismissed. The principle has been cited by other courts. Publishers can be conduits.

Conduits can also be publishers. In 1989, Congress passed a law requiring phone providers to restrict “dial-a-porn” services to minors. Dial-a-porn companies sued. In Information Providers Coalition v. FCC, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that regulated common carriers are “free under the Constitution to terminate service” to providers of indecent content. The Court relied on its decision a few years earlier in Carlin Communications noting that when a common carrier phone company is connecting thousands of subscribers simultaneously to the same content, the “phone company resembles less a common carrier than it does a small radio station.”

Many Section 230 reformers believe Section 230 mangled the common law would like to see the restoration of the publisher-conduit dichotomy. As our research shows, that dichotomy had already been blurred for decades. Until advocates and lawmakers acknowledge these legal trends and plan accordingly, the reformers risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Relevant research:
Brent Skorup & Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation (Oklahoma Law Review).

Brent Skorup & Joe Kane, The FCC and Quasi–Common Carriage: A Case Study of Agency Survival (Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology).

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Congress as a Non-Actor in Tech Policy https://techliberation.com/2020/02/04/congress-as-a-non-actor-in-tech-policy/ https://techliberation.com/2020/02/04/congress-as-a-non-actor-in-tech-policy/#comments Tue, 04 Feb 2020 19:28:42 +0000 https://techliberation.com/?p=76658

ImageCongress has become a less important player in the field of technology policy. Why did that happen, and what are the ramifications for technological governance efforts going forward?

I’ve spent almost 30 years covering technology policy. There was a time in my life when I spent almost all my time as a policy analyst preoccupied with developments in the federal legislative arena. I lived in the trenches of Capitol Hill and interacted with lawmakers and their staff morning, noon, and night.

In recent years, however, I have spent very little time focused on the Legislative Branch because it has effectively become a non-actor on technology policy. It is not that congressional lawmakers stopped caring about tech policy. Interest actually remains quite high—perhaps higher than ever before. Congress also continues to introduce lots of bills, host plenty of hearings, and issue mountains of press releases related to tech policy issues.

Nonetheless, all that interest and activity has not really translated into much important legislation. While it is hard to track tech-oriented legislative trends statistically because of the complication of defining “technology policy” over time, judged by substantive output, Congress has largely checked out of technological policymaking.

Think about digital privacy. How many years now have people been predicting a comprehensive “baseline” privacy bill would pass in each legislative session? It never happens. Perhaps it will this year, but if you would like to place a wager on it, I will take that bet.

Speaking of bets, for several years now, I have been wagering with friends that Congress will not pass federal legislation creating a national autonomous vehicles framework. Each session I win that bet. Keep in mind, a framework for driverless cars is far less controversial than privacy policy. Still, nothing substantive ever gets done in Congress.

Same goes for cybersecurity with lots of calls for big measures, but no final action. Folks are now also telling me to expect a big artificial intelligence bill one day soon. I sincerely doubt it. Again, I’ll bet on it if you’d like to lose some money!

Let me be clear, there may actually be some very good reasons why Congress should implement a national framework for privacy, driverless cars, and some AI policy issues. But all the wishful thinking in the world will not magically make it happen.

We need to entertain the possibility that Congress has largely checked out of the world of substantive tech policymaking and isn’t coming back. We may get a few big surprise measures here and there, as we did with clumsily-drafted FOSTA-SESTA. If anything, it is more likely that we instead see misguided legislative riders attached to non-germane measures during late night negotiations. But even haphazard efforts like those will be extremely rare. The days of Congress passing big bills like the Telecom Act of 1996 or the Cable Act of 1992 appear mostly over.

Why Congress Is No Longer the Major Player It Once Was

I think there are probably many obvious explanations for why Congress has checked out of tech policymaking, but let me try to boil it down to a couple of interrelated trends:

The “pacing problem” has intensified: The pacing problem refers to the inability of legal or regulatory regimes to keep adjust to the intensifying pace of technological change. There are just more emerging technologies than ever, and they are evolving faster than ever, too. “New technologies that used to have two-year cycle times now can become obsolete in six months, and the pace of change is not slowing,” says consulting firm Deloitte.

A growing multiplicity of technologies means more tech policy issues to cover. And those issues grow more complicated each year. As soon as lawmakers wrap their heads around one technology (if they do at all), another innovation pops up that complicates things further or crowds out their attention.

Technological convergence and blurring governance boundaries: Technology policymaking increasingly involves metaphysical questions about the underlying nature of things. For example, what is a “phone,” a “medical device,” or an “aerial vehicle”? These things used to be relatively easy to define and had well-understood meanings in federal statutes and regulations. But those concepts evolved rapidly in an age of widespread technological convergence and rapid-fire “combinatorial innovation,” with new technologies multiplying and building on top of one another in the symbiotic fashion. Basically, almost as soon as new tech laws or regulations are enacted, they are confronted with new marketplace realities and technological changes that call into question legal classifications or regulatory distinctions.

For example, today’s smartphones combine dozens of different functions that were previously quite distinct, including health tracking capabilities, mobile payment systems, and video distribution, all of which remain heavily regulated by an assortment of federal laws and agencies. But the convergence of all these capabilities in a single device that we can carry in our pockets creates massive governance challenges, not only for archaic legislative frameworks, but even for newer semantic distinctions that may seem current one moment only to be obliterated the next. These factors also make it harder to figure out who in Congress should be driving policy because technological convergence blurs previously distinct governance categories among legislative committees and the laws they have crafted.

Legislative dysfunctionalism: Policymaking processes move slowly by design. Constitutional constraints and other legal requirements demand it. But things move even slower today because of what Jonathan Rauch calls “demosclerosis,” or the “government’s progressive loss of the ability to adapt.” “[A]s layer is dropped upon layer,” he argued, “the accumulated mass becomes gradually less rational and less flexible.”

Inadequate resources are also part of the problem with Congress facing a complex, rapidly-evolving set of issues but devoting only limited resources to technical staff or studies to better understand these developments. This combined with the factors cited above has led to a never-ending “competency trap,” with lawmakers and their staffs seemingly always one step behind technological developments and societal demands or expectations.

Meanwhile, partisanship increases and the work load on many other fronts grows alongside it. There’s just a lot more on Congress’s plate than ever before. Plus, tech policy matters seemingly always take a back seat to tax, budget, entitlements, defense, and other issues.

Many people hope that boosting technology assessment efforts might help correct these problems. Perhaps better technical advice could help lawmakers ask less ignorant questions at tech-oriented congressional hearings, which have become showcases for the staggering lack of congressional understanding of modern technologies. But just adding new technology assessment capacity, such as in the form of a revived Office of Technology Assessment, won’t likely move the needle much in terms of actual legislative output. More serious structural reforms will be required.

Globalization: Many modern technologies “are truly global and call out for policy approaches that do not respect traditional national borders,” note former NITA officials Lawrence E. Strickling and Jonah Force Hill. Congress only has so much control over technologies that defy national boundaries, further complicating tech governance questions.

Yet, one would think that when America’s global competitive advantage was on the line, Congress would have greater reason to assert itself and craft frameworks to ensure US firms are not disadvantaged by a lack of policy clarity. That has not proven to be the case, however. Congressional lawmakers do plenty of huffing and puffing about the tech governance choices made by Europe, China, and other governments, but they then leave the field wide open to them (as well as lower levels of government) to craft policies that govern national markets throughout the United States.

Endless delegation: Speaking of passing the buck, Congress has been doing it for decades on tech policy by delegating massive and quite amorphous authority to technocratic administrative agencies. Over the past half century, scholars from various disciplines—economics, law, political science, history, and others—have explored the growth of what has been alternatively called the “interest group society,”  “receivership by regulation,”  “iron triangles,” and “client politics.” This literature identifies the way Congress has increasingly abdicated its constitutional role as lawmaker by shifting hard policy questions to regulatory agencies and then hoping that bureaucrats could figure out all the answers.

Delegation is even more common for the most technical policy matters, and that trend has only accelerated in recent years as the complexity increases and overwhelms lawmakers and their staff.

Ramifications for Tech Governance Going Forward

If Congress remains largely incapable of ever getting the ball over the goal line on important tech policy matters, what are some of the ramifications? There are many, but I will identify just a few of the most obvious ones:

  • More tech-oriented legislative activity will shift to the states: In fact, it already has. For each of the tech policy issues I identified earlier (privacy, driverless cars, cybersecurity, and even some AI-related issues like facial recognition), states are—for better or worse—picking up the slack. We should expect that trend to accelerate. This will create an increasingly confusing patchwork of policies that will potentially raise serious barriers to entry and innovation. Nonetheless, I can’t see this trend reversing anytime soon. Perhaps Congress will finally act on privacy or driverless cars legislation if for no other reason than to preempt a crazy-quilt of contradictory policies. Of course, that’s what people have been predicting for years, and it never happens.
  • “Soft law” becomes the dominate governance force for tech: Again, it already has. Soft law refers to informal, collaborative, and constantly evolving governance mechanisms that differ from hard law in that they lack the same degree of enforceability. Soft law can include things like multi-stakeholder processes, industry best practices and standards, agency workshops and guidance documents, and educational efforts. But that just scratches the surface of soft law mechanisms. For better or worse, soft law is becoming the dominant modus operandi for most modern technological governance. We can expect that trend to accelerate to fill the governance gap left by Congressional inaction. For example, we don’t have any formal “rules of the road” for driverless cars, but we do now have four iterations of Department of Transportation guidance on driverless cars. Version 4.0of the DoT guidance for automated vehicles was just released this month. Expect the “soft law-ization” of technological governance to expand considerably in coming years because it is really the only way for agencies to cope with the pacing problem and those metaphysical issues identified earlier. Because soft law is not boxed in by rigid preconceptions of what a particular technology or technological process is or entails, it is often better able to address new marketplace realities. Soft law can adapt as technologies do. With Congress out of the picture, it will have to.
  • The congressional tech policy death spiral accelerates. Some may think (or at least hope) that the situation described here can’t get any worse. To the contrary, it can get radically worse. With our politics increasingly infected with bitter partisanship and rancor, what are the chances that lawmakers can work together to craft comprehensive tech policy measures? I’d say the odds are approaching zero. The Cable Act, the Telecom Act (and Sec. 230), and the Internet Tax Freedom Act all enjoyed broad, bipartisan support when they passed in the 1990s. People reached across the aisle to get things done. It didn’t always work, and sometimes it resulted in misguided policies (like the Communications Decency Act’s provisions trying to censor internet “indecency”). But bipartisan lawmaking scenarios like those seem almost unthinkable now. To the extent many lawmakers even show up at tech-oriented congressional hearings anymore, it is mostly to score points in front of the cameras for Team Red or Team Blue back home. Serious legislative oversight and policymaking is dead; it’s mostly just show-trials and media circuses at this point.

Should I Care about Congress Anymore?

If you believe this miserable thesis is correct but continue to focus on the Legislative Branch for a living, you may be asking yourself: Am I wasting all my time here? Not necessarily. Congress is still actively interested in tech policy matters. For those who hope to limit that damage Congress might do by hastily passing ham-handed, crisis-driven policy measures, your efforts in the trenches will continue to be important in curbing the worst instincts of some lawmakers. In many instances, preserving a perpetual stalemate may go down as a tremendous victory.

For example, as the debate over Section 230 intensifies—with politicians of all stripes looking to gut the most important of all Internet freedom policies—it is vital that smart people work with lawmakers and their staff to beat back misguided and destructive measures. Hopefully this becomes another instance of legislative gridlock winning out! And I think it will.

More realistically, your role will not be to stop Congress from doing insanely destructive things, it will be to just stop them from saying those things. In fact, that seems to be what a lot of people who work with Congress already do today. When I chat with various inside-the-Beltway policy advocates and industry reps today, they usually acknowledge that the prospects for actual legislation on any given issue are quite slim. They will, of course, continue to try to work with lawmakers, their committees, and their staff to either advance or stop legislative measures. Yet, they all seem to accept the utter futility of it all.

Why do they persist? Most obviously, they want to at least preserve the legislative stalemate and not cede the ground to their enemies who might succeed in getting lawmakers to do something if only one side was communicating with Congress.

But the other thing these policy advocates are hoping to achieve is better messaging. Regulatory advocates want lawmakers to use the power of the bully pulpit to put pressure on various people or groups to change behavior, even in the absence of any legislative action. By contrast, many in industry want to make sure that their technologies are understood and not endlessly demonized. Bad press isn’t good for business, even if all the congressional threats never result in final legislation. Also, those defending innovation more generally will want to make sure that even if lawmakers aren’t making any actual laws, they still better understand and appreciate the importance of new technological capabilities for improving human welfare.

Those are all good reasons not to give up your legislative advocacy. For some of us, however, the personal cost-benefit analysis just doesn’t add up. Our focus has shifted to where the real action is at: federal administrative agencies, statehouses and state administrative agencies, the courts, and the growing world of multi-stakeholder governance and other soft law efforts. Congress has checked out, but technological governance lives on in many other forms and venues.

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Shane Greenstein on bias in Wikipedia articles https://techliberation.com/2014/03/11/greenstein/ https://techliberation.com/2014/03/11/greenstein/#respond Tue, 11 Mar 2014 10:00:07 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=74289

Shane Greenstein, Kellogg Chair in Information Technology at Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management, discusses his recent paper, Collective Intelligence and Neutral Point of View: The Case of Wikipedia , coauthored by Harvard assistant professor Feng Zhu. Greenstein and Zhu’s paper takes a look at whether Linus’ Law applies to Wikipedia articles. Do Wikipedia articles have a slant or bias? If so, how can we measure it? And, do articles become less biased over time, as more contributors become involved? Greenstein explains his findings.

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Adam Thierer on cronyism https://techliberation.com/2013/07/09/adam-thierer-on-cronyism/ https://techliberation.com/2013/07/09/adam-thierer-on-cronyism/#comments Tue, 09 Jul 2013 10:00:37 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=45126

Adam Thierer, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center discusses his recent working paper with coauthor Brent Skorup, A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector. Thierer takes a look at how cronyism has manifested itself in technology and media markets — whether it be in the form of regulatory favoritism or tax privileges. Which tech companies are the worst offenders? What are the consequences for consumers? And, how does cronyism affect entrepreneurship over the long term?

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Book Review: Brown & Marsden’s “Regulating Code” https://techliberation.com/2013/06/27/book-review-brown-marsdens-regulating-code/ https://techliberation.com/2013/06/27/book-review-brown-marsdens-regulating-code/#respond Thu, 27 Jun 2013 20:51:52 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=45035

Regulating Code book coverIan Brown and Christopher T. Marsden’s new book, Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age, will go down as one of the most important Internet policy books of 2013 for two reasons. First, their book offers an excellent overview of how Internet regulation has unfolded on five different fronts: privacy and data protection; copyright; content censorship; social networks and user-generated content issues; and net neutrality regulation. They craft detailed case studies that incorporate important insights about how countries across the globe are dealing with these issues. Second, the authors endorse a specific normative approach to Net governance that they argue is taking hold across these policy arenas. They call their preferred policy paradigm “prosumer law” and it envisions an active role for governments, which they think should pursue “smarter regulation” of code.

In terms of organization, Brown and Marsden’s book follows the same format found in Milton Mueller’s important 2010 book Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance; both books feature meaty case studies in the middle bookended by chapters that endorse a specific approach to Internet policymaking. (Incidentally, both books were published by MIT Press.) And, also like Mueller’s book, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code does a somewhat better job using case studies to explore the forces shaping Internet policy across the globe than it does making the normative case for their preferred approach to these issues.

Thus, for most readers, the primary benefit of reading either book will be to see how the respective authors develop rich portraits of the institutional political economy surrounding various Internet policy issues over the past 10 to 15 years. In fact, of all the books I have read and reviewed in recent years, I cannot think of two titles that have done a better job developing detailed case studies for such a diverse set of issues. For that reason alone, both texts are important resources for those studying ongoing Internet policy developments.

That’s not to say that both books don’t also make a solid case for their preferred policy paradigms, it’s just that the normative elements of the texts are over-shadowed by the excellent case studies. As a result, readers are left wanting more detail about what their respective policy paradigms would (or should) mean in practice. Regardless, in the remainder of this review, I’ll discuss Brown and Marsden’s normative approach to digital policy and contrast it with Mueller’s since they stand in stark contrast and help frame the policy battles to come on this front.

Governing Cyberspace: Mueller vs. Brown & Marsden

Mueller’s normative goal in Networks and States was to breathe new life into the old cyber-libertarian philosophy that was more prevalent during the Net’s founding era but which has lost favor in recent years. He made the case for a “cyberliberty” movement rooted in what he described as a “denationalized liberalism” vision of Net governance. He argued that “we need to find ways to translate classical liberal rights and freedoms into a governance framework suitable for the global Internet. There can be no cyberliberty without a political movement to define, defend, and institutionalize individual rights and freedoms on a transnational scale.”

I wholeheartedly endorsed that vision in my review of Mueller’s book, even if he was a bit short on the details of how to bring it about. But it is useful to keep Mueller’s paradigm in mind because it provides a nice contrast with the approach Brown and Marsden advocate, which is quite different.

Generally speaking, Brown and Marsden reject most forms of “Internet exceptionalism” and certainly reject the sort of “cyberliberty” ethos that Mueller and I embrace. They instead endorse a fairly broad role for governments in ordering the affairs of cyberspace. In their self-described “prosumer” paradigm, the State is generally viewed as benevolent actor, well-positioned to guide the course of code development toward supposedly more enlightened ends.

Consistent with the strong focus on European policymaking found throughout the book, the authors are quite enamored with the “co-regulatory” models that have become increasing prevalent across the continent. Like many other scholars and policy advocates today, they occasionally call for “multi-stakeholderism” as a solution but they do not necessarily mean the sort of truly voluntary, bottom-up multi-stakeholderism of the Net’s early days. Rather, they are usually thinking of multi-stakeholderism as what is essentially pluralistic politics; it’s the government setting the table, inviting the stakeholders to it, and then guiding (or at least “nudging”) policy along the way. “We are convinced that fudging with nudges needs to be reinforced with the reality of regulation and coregulation, in order to enable prosumers to maximize their potential on the broadband Internet,” they say. (p. 187)

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?

Thus, despite the new gloss, their “prosumer law” paradigm ends up sounding quite a bit like a rehash of traditional “public interest” law and common carrier regulation, albeit with a new appreciation of just how dynamics markets built on code can be. Indeed, Brown and Marsden repeatedly acknowledge how often law and regulation fails to keep pace with the rapid evolution of digital technology. “Code changes quickly, user adoption more slowly, legal contracting and judicial adaptation to new technologies slower yet, and regulation through legislation slowest of all,” they correctly note (p. xv). This reflects what Larry Downes refers to as the most fundamental “law of disruption” of the digital age: “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”

At the end of the day, however, that insight doesn’t seem to inform Brown and Marsden’s policy prescriptions all that much. Theirs is a world in which policy tinkering errors will apparently be corrected promptly and efficiently by still more policy tinkering, or “smarter regulation.” Moreover, like many other Internet policy scholars today, they don’t mind regulatory interventions that come early and often since they believe that will help regulators get out ahead of the technological curve and steer markets in preferred directions. “If regulators fail to address regulatory objects at first, then the regulatory object can grow until its technique overwhelms the regulator,” they say (p. 31).

This is the same mentality that is often on display in Tim Wu’s work, which I have been quite critical of here and elsewhere. For example, Wu has advocated informal “agency threats” and the use of “threat regimes” to accomplish policy goals that prove difficult to steer though the formal democratic rulemaking process. As part of his “defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts,” Wu stresses the importance of regulators taking control of fast-moving tech markets early in their life cycles. “Threat regimes,” Wu argues, “are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid change — under conditions of ‘high uncertainty.’ Highly informal regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology or business model, or a practice about which little is known,” Wu concludes.

This is essentially where most of the “co-regulation” schemes that Brown and Marsden favor would take us: Code regulators would take an active role in shaping the evolution of digital technologies and markets early in its life cycle. What are the preferred regulatory mechanisms? Like Wu and many other cyberlaw professors today, Brown and Marsden favor robust interconnection and interoperability mandates bolstered by antitrust actions as well. And, again, they aren’t willing to wait around and let the courts adjudicate these issues in an ex post fashion. “Essential facilities law is a very poor substitute for the active role of prosumer law that we advocate, especially in its Chicago school minimalist phase” (p. 185). In other words, we shouldn’t wait for someone to bring a case and litigate it through the courts when preemptive, proactive regulatory interventions can sagaciously steer us to a superior end.

More specifically, they propose that “competition authorities should impose ex ante interoperability requirements upon dominant social utilities… to minimize network barriers” (p. 190) and they model this on traditional regulatory schemes such as must-carry obligations, API interface disclosure requirements, and other interconnection mandates (such as those imposed on AOL/Time Warner a decade ago to alleviate fears about instant messaging dominance). They also note that “Effective, scalable state regulation often depends on the recruitment of intermediaries as enforcers” to help achieve various policy objectives (p. 170).

The Problem with Interoperability Über Alles

So, in essence, the Brown-Marsden Internet policy paradigm might be thought of as interoperability über alles. Interoperability and interconnection in pursuit of more “open” and “neutral” systems is generally considered an unalloyed good and most everything else is subservient to this objective.

This is a serious policy error and one that I address in great detail in my absurdly long review of John Palfrey and Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems. I’m not going to repeat all 6,500 words of that critique here when you can just click back and read it, but here’s the high level summary: There is no such thing as “optimal interoperability” that can be determined in an a priori fashion. Ongoing marketplace experimentation with technical standards, modes of information production and dissemination, and interoperable information systems, is almost always preferable to the artificial foreclosure of this dynamic process through state action. The former allows for better learning and coping mechanisms to develop while also incentivizing the spontaneous, natural evolution of the market and market responses. The latter (regulatory foreclosure of experimentation) limits that potential.

More importantly, when interoperability is treated as sacrosanct and forcibly imposed through top-down regulatory schemes, it will often have many unintended consequences and costs. It can even lock in existing market power and market structures by encouraging users and companies to flock to a single platform instead of trying to innovate around it. (Go back and take a look at how the “Kingsbury Commitment” — the interconnection deal from the early days of the U.S. telecom system — actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry instead of assisting independent operators.)

Citing Palfrey and Gasser, Brown and Marsden do note that “mandated interoperability is neither necessary in all cases nor necessarily desirable” (p. 32), but they don’t spend as much time as Palfrey and Gasser itemizing these trade-offs and the potential downsides of some interoperability mandates. But what frustrates me about both books is the almost quasi-religious reverence accorded to interoperability and open standards when such faith is simply not warranted after historical experience is taken into consideration.

Plenty of the best forms of digital innovation today are due to a lack of interoperability and openness. Proprietary systems have produced some of the most exciting devices (iPhone) and content (video games) of modern times. Then again, voluntary interoperable and “open” services and devices thrive, too. The key point here — and one that I develop in far greater detail in my book chapter, “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters” — is that the market for digital services is working marvelously and providing us with choices of many different flavors. Innovation continues to unfold rapidly in both directions along the “open” vs. “closed” continuum. (Here are 30 more essays I have written on this topic if you need more proof.)

Generally speaking, we should avoid mandatory interop and openness solutions. We should instead push those approaches and solutions in a truly voluntary, bottom-up fashion. And, more importantly, we should be pushing for outside-the-box solutions of the Schumpeterian (creative destruction / disruptive innovation) variety instead of surrendering so quickly on competition through forced sharing mandates.

The Case for Patience & Policy Restraint

But Brown and Marsden clearly do not subscribe to that sort of Schumpeterian thinking. They think most code markets tip and lock into monopoly in fairly short order and that only wise interventions can rectify that. For example, they claim that Facebook’s “monopoly is now durable,” which will certainly come as a big surprise to the millions of us who do not use it all. And the story of MySpace’s rapid rise and equally precipitous fall has little bearing on this story, they argue.

But, no matter how you define the “social networking market,” here are two facts about it: First, it is still very, very young. It’s only about a decade old. Second, in that short period of time, we have already witnessed the entire first generation of players fall by the wayside. While the second generation is currently dominated by Facebook, it is by no means alone. Again, millions like me don’t use it at all and get along just fine with other “social networking” technologies, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, and even older tech like email, SMS, and yes, phone calls! Accusations of “monopoly” in this space strain credulity in the extreme. I invite you to read my Mercatus working paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” for a more thorough debunking of this logic. (Note: The final version of that paper will be published in the CommLaw Conspectus shortly.)

Such facts should have a bearing on the debate about regulatory interventions. We continue to witness the power of Schumpeterian rivalry as new and existing players battle in a race for the prize of market power. Brown and Marsden fear that the race is already over in many sectors and that it is time to throw in the towel and get busy regulating. But when I look around at the information technology marketplace today, I am astonished just how radically different it looks from even just a few years ago, and not just in the social media market. I have written extensively about the smartphone marketplace, where innovation continues at a frantic pace. As I noted in my essay here on “Smartphones & Schumpeter,” it’s hard to remember now, but just 6 short years ago:

  • The iPhone and Android had not yet landed.
  • Most of the best-selling phones of 2007 were made by Nokia and Motorola.
  • Feature phones still dominated the market; smartphones were still a luxury (and a clunky luxury at that).
  • There were no app stores and what “apps” did exist were mostly proprietary and device or carrier-specific; and,
  • There was no 4G service.

It’s also easy to forget just how many market analysts and policy wonks were making absurd predictions at the time about how the telecom operators at the time had so much market power that they would crush new innovation without regulation. Instead, in very short order, the market was completely upended in a way that mobile providers never saw coming. There was a huge shift in relative market power flowing from the core of these markets to the fringes, especially to Apple, which wasn’t even a player in that space before the launch of the iPhone.

As I noted in concluding that piece last year, these facts should lead us to believe that this is a healthy, dynamic marketplace in action. Not even Schumpeter could have imagined creative destruction on this scale. (Just look as BlackBerry). But much the same could be said of many other sectors of the information economy.  While it is certainly true that many large players exist, we continue to see a healthy amount of churn in these markets and an astonishing amount of technological innovation.

Public Choice Insights: What History Tells Us

One would hope these realities would have a greater bearing on the policy prescriptions suggested by analysts like Brown and Marsden, but they don’t seem to. Instead, the attitude on display here is that governments can, generally speaking, act wisely and nudge efficiently to correct short-term market hiccups and set us on a better course. But there are strong reasons to question that presumption.

Specifically, what I found most regrettable about Brown and Marsden’s book was the way — like all too many books in this field these days — the authors briefly introduce “public choice” insights and concerns only to summarily dismiss them as unfounded or overblown. (See my review of Brett Frischmann’s book, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources for a more extended discussion of this problem as it pertains to discussions about not just infrastructure regulation by the regulation of all complex industries and technologies.)

Brown and Marsden make it clear that their intentions are pure and that their methods would incorporate the lessons of the past, but they aren’t very interested in dwelling on the long, lamentable history of regulatory failures and capture in the communications and media policy sectors. They do note the dangers of a growing “security-industrial complex” and argue that “commercial actors dominate technical actors in policy debates.” They also say that the “potential for capture by regulated interests, especially large corporate lobbies, is an essential insight” that informs their approach. The problem is that it really doesn’t. They largely ignore those insights and instead imply that, to the extent this is a problem at all, we can build a better breed of bureaucrats going forward who will craft “smarter regulation” that is immune from such pressures. Or, they claim that “multi-stakeholderism” — again, the new, more activist and government-influenced conception of it — can overcome these public choice problems.

A better understanding of power politics that is informed by the wisdom of the ages would instead counsel that minimizing the scope of politicization of technology markets is the better remedy. Capture and cronyism in communications and media markets has always grown in direct proportion to the overall scope of law governing those sectors. (I invite you to read all the troubling examples of this that Brent Skorup and I have documented in our new 72-page working paper, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” Warning: It makes for miserable reading but proves beyond any doubt that there is something to public choice concerns.)

To be clear, it’s not that I believe that “market failures” or “code failures” never occur, rather, as I noted in this debate with Larry Lessig, it’s that such problems are typically “better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).” It’s not just that traditional regulatory remedies cannot keep pace with code markets, it’s that those attempting to craft the remedies do not possess the requisite knowledge needed to know how to steer us down a superior path. (See my essay, “Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset,” for more on that point.)

Regardless, at a minimum, I expect scholars to take seriously the very real public choice problems at work in this arena. You cannot talk about the history of these sectors without acknowledging the horrifically anti-consumer policies that were often put in place at the request of one industry or another to shield themselves from disruptive innovation. No amount of wishful thinking about “prosumer” policies will change these grim political realities. Only by minimizing chances to politicize technology markets and decisions can we overcome these problems.

Conclusion

For those of us who prefer to focus on freeing code, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code is another reminder that liberty is increasingly a loser in Internet policy circles these days. Milton Mueller’s dream of decentralized, denationalized liberalism seems more and more unlikely as armies of policymakers, regulators, special interests, regulatory advocates, academics, and others all line up and plead for their pet interest or cause to be satisfied through pure power politics. No matter what you call it — fudging, nudging, coregulation, smart regulation, multistakeholderism, prosumer law, or whatever else, — there is no escaping the fact that we are witnessing the complete politicization of almost every facet of code creation and digital decisionmaking today.

Despite my deep reservations about a more politicized cyberspace, Brown and Marsden’s book is an important text because it is one of the most sophisticated articulations and defenses of it to date. Their book also helps us better understand the rapidly developing institutional political economy of Internet regulation in both broad and narrow policy contexts. Thus, it is worth your time and attention even if, like me, you are disheartened to be reading yet another Net policy book that ultimately endorses mandates over of markets as the primary modus operandi of the information age.


Additional Resources about the book:

Other books you should read alongside “Regulating Code” (links are for my reviews of each):

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Avoiding Silicon Valley’s ‘Suicidal Impulse’: Strategies to Reduce Tech Cronyism https://techliberation.com/2013/01/29/avoiding-silicon-valleys-suicidal-impulse-strategies-to-reduce-tech-cronyism/ https://techliberation.com/2013/01/29/avoiding-silicon-valleys-suicidal-impulse-strategies-to-reduce-tech-cronyism/#comments Tue, 29 Jan 2013 20:40:24 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=43574

In an important essay this week entitled “Silicon Valley’s ‘Suicide Impulse’,” Wall Street Journal columnist L. Gordon Crovitz warns that “Silicon Valley has long prided itself on avoiding the lumbering relationship between big government and most industries, but somehow it has become one of the top lobbyists in Washington.” Crovitz is worried that Internet and technology companies are falling prey to what Milton Friedman labeled “The Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse”: the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors using regulation or the threat thereof. “Rather than lobby government to go after one another,” Crovitz argues, “Silicon Valley lobbyists should unite to go after overreaching government. Instead of the ‘suicide impulse’ of lobbying for more regulation, Silicon Valley should seek deregulation and a long-overdue freedom to return to its entrepreneurial roots.”

Crovitz’s essay touches upon a dangerous trend I have written about here and elsewhere in the past: the increasing politicization of the Internet and information technology sectors and the gradual rise of rent-seeking (i.e., favor-seeking) over time. I’ve written about this problem in essays like:

These essays have documented how tech companies are increasingly vying for the attention of legislators and regulators in Washington, statehouses, and international capitals across the globe.

Why should we care about the increasing politicization of the information technology sector? In a forthcoming Mercatus Center working paper entitled, “A History of Cronyism & Capture in the Information Technology Sector,” Brent Skorup and I explain how “time and resources spent focusing on influencing politicians and capturing regulators represent time and resources that could better be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. This can negatively impact consumer welfare in two ways: Not only are consumers denied more and better products and services, but they also may pay higher prices or higher taxes extracted by the corporate-government agreement.”

We document how rent-seeking and cronyism have had a corrupting influence on older information sectors and technologies, especially broadcasting and communications. We develop lengthy case studies from each sector to illustrate the costs that rent-seeking imposes on consumers, competitors, and ongoing innovation.

It’s a miserable history but one that is essential to recount if we hope to avoid it for newer sectors and technologies. That’s why Brent and I devote the closing section of our paper to a list of “Strategies to Limit Cronyism” in the Internet world before things get as bad as they have in the communications and media sectors. We argue that it is essential that we use a combination of institutional safeguards and market/social norms if we hope to head-off incessant rent-seeking and avoid the ‘suicidal impulse’ problem that Milton Friedman and Gordon Crovtiz identified.

Generally speaking, we must begin by acknowledging that, as economist David Henderson correctly notes, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.” Special interest rent-seeking and the chronic cronyism problems of modern America are fundamentally tied up with the constantly expanding horizons of government power. As Mancur Olson taught us in his 1965 book, The Logic of Collective Action, when benefits are concentrated and costs are dispersed (across all taxpayers or ratepayers, for example), we can expect groups to form to take advantage of those benefits. Those groups have a powerful motivation to create, preserve, and perpetuate government programs that favor their narrow interests at the expense of others, while those bearing the true costs of those policies or programs do not have the same incentive (or resources) to lobby government to reduce or end those burdens.

This leads to what economist Gordon Tullock called the “transitional gains trap”: once a policy or program is put in place to favor a certain interest, most of their gains come upfront and are factored into future earnings. Those benefiting from the policies would face large transitional losses if reform is undertaken, even if these policies impose large deadweight costs on society as a whole. This “trap” can frustrate beneficial reform efforts because the interest benefiting from the cronyist policies and programs will fight to the death to preserve them, no matter how costly or inefficient they may be for society as a whole.

There are several steps we can take if we hope to overcome the collective action problem in the tech sector and avoid Tullock’s transitional gains trap.

First, we must limit the scope of technology regulation whenever possible, and where existing rules open the door to cronyism, streamline or eliminate as many of them as possible. When policymakers deregulated other sectors in past—airlines, railroads, trucking, etc.—it helped eliminate the legal levers that industry could capture or influence. Consequently, deregulation forced companies to spend more time satisfying consumers as opposed to lawmakers and regulators.

Second, whenever possible we should rely on auctions and property rights to ensure that resources are being allocated according to market demand instead of political influence. The ugly history of spectrum cronyism is rooted in the misguided reliance upon the so-called “public interest” theory of regulation, which claimed that supposedly enlightened and benevolent regulators would steer resources and markets in more pro-consumer directions. The reality was just the opposite: the “public interest” became synonymous with the private interest of regulated entities, who largely “gamed” the system for their own ends. It was only when policymakers finally embraced the logic of auctions to allocate spectrum that America began to see cronyism dissipate in this sector. Auctions ensured faster allocation and more efficient distribution and development of this important resource. While full-blown spectrum property rights have not yet taken hold, the gradual movement in that direction helps minimize cronyism opportunities.

Third, the use of vouchers can help limit corporate gaming of social programs that are deemed essential. For example, America’s universal service program, which subsidizes phone and now broadband service, is a permanent fixture of communications policy. Unfortunately, cronyism is a permanent fixture of the system as well. Because the universal service system delivers assistance to end-users indirectly through favored local providers, it limits the potential for new entry and undermines competition. A means-tested voucher could have targeted assistance to those who needed it without creating an inefficient, unsustainable hidden tax or undermining competition.

Fourth, sunsetting provisions for new and existing laws and regulations can greatly limit cronyism opportunities. All new technology proposals should include a provision sunsetting the law or regulation within a few years of enactment and existing technology laws and regulations should be reopened and reassessed on a regular timetable as well to ensure they are not being abused. (Here’s a Forbes column I wrote last year with details about how to do so.)

Fifth, we need serious limits on congressional delegations of power to regulatory bodies and executive branch agencies. Too often, lawmakers “pass the buck” on to agencies and expect them to figure out how to interpret and administer arcane technology policy statutes. The result is abuse both by over-zealous regulators and interests looking to game the system. Congress should be more accountable and, at a minimum, must make their regulatory intent and standards clearer before delegating authority.

Finally, we need to encourage better norms inside the tech industry itself and encourage them to hold themselves to a higher standard. We should ask them to promise not to exploit government power that would discourage innovation or crush competition. Better yet, we should ask them to consider “strategic disengagement” with Washington and politics in general. Yes, I understand that sounds like a pipe dream since where power exists interests will likely look to exploit it. And, again, that’s the best reason for serious deregulation and strong limits on government power to begin with. But social pressure and market norms can also help in the absence of more sweeping reforms. Some firms already adopt the right approach. For example, Apple and Sony have largely shunned political engagement and instead focused on satisfying their customers in the marketplace. While their hands aren’t entirely clean, we should encourage more tech innovators to follow their general lead of not sending small armies of lobbyists to Washington and state capitals.

In the end, there is no silver-bullet solution that can forever cure cronyism. It would be foolish to pretend that we’ll be able to significantly curtail the scope of government powers in the short-term. Nonetheless, there are many sensible institutional reforms and marketplace norms that can help us keep cronyism in check before it begins running rampant in this important sector of our economy.

(Brent and I have just sent our paper on this topic off for peer review from some academic experts in this field, but we welcome thoughts from others about strategies to limit and reduce cronyism in this arena. We hope to publish this paper in a law review or poly sci journal later this Summer or Fall.)

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The Troubling Growth of High-Tech Regulation, Lobbying, and Rent-Seeking https://techliberation.com/2012/12/02/the-troubling-growth-of-high-tech-regulation-lobbying-and-rent-seeking/ https://techliberation.com/2012/12/02/the-troubling-growth-of-high-tech-regulation-lobbying-and-rent-seeking/#comments Sun, 02 Dec 2012 19:36:09 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=42970

I caught this tidbit today in a Washington Post article about Julius Genachowski’s tenure as Federal Communications Commission chairman:

He wound up presiding over a crucial period in which the powerful companies of Silicon Valley turned into Washington power players. Lobbying the FCC has become a major economic franchise. Each day, hundreds of dark-suited lawyers crowd the antiseptic, midcentury-modern agency building.

Can anyone think this is a good thing? To be clear, I don’t think Genachowski is solely responsible for Silicon Valley innovators getting more aggressive in Washington or for tech lobbying becoming “a major economic franchise” at the FCC. There’s plenty of blame to go around in that regard. Regardless, every legislative and regulatory action that opens the door to greater regulation of the information economy also opens the door a bit wider to unproductive rent-seeking and cronyist activities. Moreover, every minute and every dollar spent focusing on making legislators and regulators happy is another minute and dollar that could have better been spent making consumers happy in the marketplace. It’s a pure deadweight loss to society.

And there has been a remarkable expansion in such tech lobbying activity over the past decade, as the following charts illustrate. The first shows the dramatic growth of lobbying by computer and Internet companies relative to other sectors and the second shows lobbying spending by specific computer and Internet companies. [Click to enlarge.]

Sadly, this situation isn’t going to improve any time soon. As I noted in a 2010 Cato essay (“The Sad State of Tech Politics“) and other essays here (see them below), lobbying by information technology companies is absolutely exploding. Google and Facebook set quarterly records of their own recently, but it’s not just the big dogs like them. Everyone is beefing up. As the politics of the parasitic Belwway economy increasingly replace the cut-throat rivalry of the market economy, consumers and innovation will suffer.

These firms aren’t coming to Washington because they are just dying to be here. They first come here out of necessity: they are looking to cover their asses. The more Washington seeks to regulate, the more these firms come to believe that they have to be here to make themselves heard. And I can’t blame them. But very quickly they come to realize that all this regulatory activity can present opportunities as well as threats. Regulation is often used as a club to beat back new innovations and rivals. Here’s the sad history of that. Worse yet, lobbying activity eventually takes on a life of its own.  As political scientist Lee Drutman points out in his dissertation on the business of lobbying, “lobbying creates its own demand… (and) has a self-reinforcing dynamic. Once companies come to Washington, they stick around, and usually expand. And with each passing year, more companies come to Washington”:

once they hire lobbyists and set up lobbying offices and become active in trade associations, they start to see the benefits of political participation. Lobbyists are there to point out new potential opportunities and new threats, and to make the case that being engaged politically is good for the bottom line. Companies get involved in more issues and more ongoing battles. And once they’ve paid the start-up costs of learning about Washington and building relationships, the cost-benefit equation of being politically engaged shifts even more in favor of staying and doing more.

In other words, there’s a sort of “Say’s Law” of lobbying at work: supply creates its own demand. That certainly seems to be true for the high-technology companies and sectors mentioned above. They are falling over themselves in a mad rush to see who can beef-up their lobbying operations faster. They are doing this even though there isn’t always a compelling case for them to be doing so. But it doesn’t make a difference. Lobbying has taken on a life of its own. It is rationalized by tech leaders telling themselves that ‘we either do this or we get screwed,’ all the while being egged on to do so by a professional class of inside-the-Betlway lobbyists, consultants, PR people, trade associations, and reporters who all insist that it’s just the way business is done nowadays — and who all make their money by encouraging the grow of the parasite economy.

Pathetic.

Additional (Miserable) Reading:

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Matt Hindman on politics and the internet https://techliberation.com/2012/11/13/matt-hindman/ https://techliberation.com/2012/11/13/matt-hindman/#respond Tue, 13 Nov 2012 11:00:20 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=42789

In the wake of the election, Matt Hindman, author of The Myth of Digital Democracy, analyzes the effect of the internet on electoral politics. 

According to Hindman, the internet had a large—but indirect—effect on the 2012 elections. Particularly important was microtargeting to identify supporters and get out the vote, says Hindman. Data and measurements—two things that the GOP was once ahead in, but which they have ceded to the Democrats in the past 8 years—played a key role in determining the winner of the presidential election, according to Hindman. 

Hindman also takes a critical look at the blogosphere, comparing it to the traditional media that some argue it is superseding, and he delineates the respective roles played by Facebook and Twitter within the electoral framework.

Download

Related Links

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The Internet, Politics, Lobbying & the “Big Spend” https://techliberation.com/2012/01/24/the-internet-politics-lobbying-the-big-spend/ https://techliberation.com/2012/01/24/the-internet-politics-lobbying-the-big-spend/#comments Tue, 24 Jan 2012 20:47:38 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=39940

In the wake of last week’s big SOPA showdown, a lot of people are talking about the expanded presence and power of the Internet, online operators, and digital Netizens in Washington policy debates. I certainly don’t mean to diminish the importance of this particular episode. It certainly is historic, regardless of how you feel about the specifics of SOPA. What does concern me, however, is the way this episode is prompting questions about how much more “engagement” Internet companies need to consider inside the Beltway. For example, today’s Wall Street Journal features an article on “The Web’s Growing Muscle” and notes:

The Internet industry has found a rare sweet spot in Washington. With Google in the lead, the companies have begun building a strong traditional lobbying force in Washington. And, to complement that inside game, websites’ millions of users have become a powerful outside weight on Congress. What’s more, in a rare Washington double play, the concerns of Internet companies have found a sympathetic ear both in the Democratic White House and among Republican presidential candidates who otherwise can’t agree with Barack Obama on anything.

The piece concludes with a quote from an anonymous media executive saying “People are looking at what Google spent on lobbying and wondering, ‘Can we match that?’ It has to be a big spend.”

I cannot possibly think of anything more demoralizing than that. The idea that web companies should spend more of their time in Washington showering politicians with cash instead of out there in the real world innovating and making consumers happy is extremely troubling. I wrote about this growing trend in my 2010 Cato essay on “The Sad State of Cyber-Politics.” I built that essay around an old manifesto by Cypress Semiconductor CEO T. J. Rodgers on “Why Silicon Valley Should Not Normalize Relations with Washington, D.C.”  Rodgers had argued that “The political scene in Washington is antithetical to the core values that drive our success in the international marketplace and risks converting entrepreneurs into statist businessmen,” and that “The collectivist notion that drives policymaking in Washington is the irrevocable enemy of high-technology capitalism and the wealth creation process.”

But no one was listening then and they certainly aren’t listening now. We find ourselves in the midst a mad rush to see who can open a bigger, fancier office in Washington and have glitzier parties to make the political class happy. As I noted in the Cato essay:

There’s enormous pressure on the high-tech sector to actually become more entrenched in coming years, at least to remain “competitive” with other companies who have planted a flag inside the Beltway. Recently, for example, Reid Hoffman, founder of LinkedIn, a social networking site for professionals, worried that policymakers tend to ignore high-tech startups. “We don’t have an entrepreneurship lobby,” he said, “because entrepreneurs are off doing it.” As if that was a bad thing! In particular, he fretted about startups not getting their share of recent stimulus funding and argued that “It’s much easier when you’re embedded in the political infrastructure to respond to immediate things” such as nabbing stimulus dollars, he said.

Am I being naive about all this? Don’t these new tech companies have to have armies of lobbyists pressing the flesh and greasing the palms here in DC in order to compete against other entrenched competitors who are doing to same thing?  Perhaps, but there’s always been self-fulfilling circularity to the argument that you have to be here in order to “be a player” or “have a seat at the table.” The end result of that thinking is always the same: more lobbying, more logrolling, more of “the big spend.” And then we end up with one giant cesspool of protected markets, protracted legal nightmares, bloated bureaucracies, and widespread regulatory capture. Welcome to the wonderful world of crony capitalism! And your tech sector superstars are now falling all over themselves to make sure they have that proverbial “seat at the table” so they can feast at this Big Government supper.

It makes me sick to my stomach to even think about it. So, I’ll continue right on being a naive dope and conclude this piece the same way I concluded my old Cato essay on the sad state of cyber-politics:

For that small remnant of believers in real Internet Freedom — freedom from incessant government techno-meddling — we will never stop hoping that disputes among high-tech companies might be settled in the marketplace instead of within regulatory agencies and congressional committee rooms. And we must continue our push to discourage high-tech companies from an excessive “normalization” of relations with the parasitic culture that dominates Washington by reminding them, as Rodgers noted in 2000, “that free minds and free markets are the moral foundation that has made our success possible. We must never allow those freedoms to be diminished for any reason.”

Just let me dream, people.

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Kinsley on Cyber-Politics & “How Microsoft Learned the ABCs of D.C.” https://techliberation.com/2011/04/05/kinsley-on-cyber-politics-how-microsoft-learned-the-abcs-of-d-c/ https://techliberation.com/2011/04/05/kinsley-on-cyber-politics-how-microsoft-learned-the-abcs-of-d-c/#respond Tue, 05 Apr 2011 14:19:51 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=36135

Jack Shafer brought to my attention this terrific new Politico column by Michael Kinsley entitled, “How Microsoft Learned ABCs of D.C.”  In the editorial, Kinsley touches on some of the same themes I addressed in my recent piece here “On Facebook ‘Normalizing Relations’ with Washington” as well as in my Cato Institute essay from last year on”The Sad State of Cyber-Politics.”  Kinsley notes how Microsoft was originally bashed by many for not getting into the D.C. lobbying game early enough:

there even was a feeling that, in refusing to play the Washington game, Microsoft was being downright unpatriotic. Look, buddy, there is an American way of doing things, and that American way includes hiring lobbyists, paying lawyers vast sums by the hour, throwing lavish parties for politicians, aides, journalists and so on. So get with the program.
But after doing exactly that, Kinsley notes, the company got blasted for for being too aggressive in D.C.!
So that’s what Microsoft did. It moved its “government affairs” office out of distant Chevy Chase and into the downtown K Street corridor. It bulked up on lawyers and hired the best-connected lobbyists. Soon, Microsoft was coming under criticism for being heavy-handed in its attempts to buy influence.
“But the sad thing is that it seems to have worked. Microsoft is no longer Public Enemy No. 1,” Kinsley notes, and he continues on to reiterate a point I made in my last two essays: Google is the Great Satan now! 
Best of all, the finger of blame has moved on — to Google, which now gets the blame for everything. It is an evil monopoly that uses its monopoly power to extend that monopoly into new areas. It must be stopped before all of its competitors are wiped out. And so on. This is all very familiar to anyone who worked at Microsoft in the late 1990s and (it must be admitted) very enjoyable. Microsoft last week piled on, bringing charges against Google before the European Union (which had given Microsoft an especially hard time), accusing it of a variety of nefarious practices, including some the EU had formerly accused Microsoft of.
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Noonan on How the Internet Improves Political Rhetoric & Knowledge https://techliberation.com/2011/02/26/noonan-on-how-the-internet-improves-political-rhetoric-knowledge/ https://techliberation.com/2011/02/26/noonan-on-how-the-internet-improves-political-rhetoric-knowledge/#respond Sat, 26 Feb 2011 15:40:32 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=35336

Loyal readers know of my generally bullish, optimistic outlook regarding the Internet’s impact on society, economy, and even politics. On that last front, columnist Peggy Noonan has a nice piece in today’s Wall Street Journal entitled, “The Internet Helps Us Get Serious.” Serious about politics and political rhetoric, she means. Speaking about how politicians are addressing the current fiscal crisis in the U.S., Noonan argues:

One way to change minds about the current crisis is through information. We all know this, and we all know about the marvelous changes in technology that allow for the spreading of messages that are not necessarily popular with gatekeepers and establishments. But there’s something new happening in the realm of political communication that must be noted. Speeches are back. They have been rescued and restored as a political force by the Internet.

She then makes the point that I always stress when debating Net pessimists: You have to measure progress against the yardstick of the past and ask yourself if we really better off in a world of information scarcity. Noonan does that beautifully when she notes:

In the past quarter-century or so, the speech as a vehicle of sustained political argument was killed by television and radio. Rhetoric was reduced to the TV producer’s 10-second soundbite, the correspondent’s eight-second insert. The makers of speeches (even the ones capable of sustained argument) saw what was happening and promptly gave up. Why give your brain and soul to a serious, substantive statement when it will all be reduced to a snip of sound? They turned their speeches into soundbite after soundbite, applause line after applause line, and a great political tradition was traduced. But the Internet is changing all that. It is restoring rhetoric as a force. When Gov. Mitch Daniels made his big speech—a serious, substantive one—two weeks ago, Drudge had the transcript and video up in a few hours. Gov. Chris Christie’s big speech was quickly on the net in its entirety. All the CPAC speeches were up. TED conference speeches are all over the net, as are people making speeches at town-hall meetings. I get links to full speeches every day in my inbox and you probably do too.

And Noonan debunks the argument skeptics like Cass Sunstein and others have made about the atomization of the audience or fracturing of the public’s attention:

People in politics think it’s all Facebook and Twitter now, but it’s not. Not everything is fractured and in pieces, some things are becoming more whole. People hunger for serious, fleshed-out ideas about what is happening in our country. … A funny thing about politicians is that they’re all obsessed with “messaging” and “breaking through” and “getting people to listen.” They’re convinced that some special kind of cleverness is needed, that some magical communications formula exists and can be harnessed if only discovered. They should settle down, survey the technological field and get serious. They should give pertinent, truthful, sophisticated and sober-minded speeches. Everyone will listen. They’ll be all over the interwebs.

Amen, sister.

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Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found https://techliberation.com/2010/12/19/regulatory-capture-what-the-experts-have-found/ https://techliberation.com/2010/12/19/regulatory-capture-what-the-experts-have-found/#comments Mon, 20 Dec 2010 00:58:22 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=33727

[Note: This post is updated regularly as I discover relevant old or new material.]

“Regulatory capture” occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies — regulatory agencies, in particular — to further their own ends.  Capture theory is closely related to the “rent-seeking” and “political failure” theories developed by the public choice school of economics.  Another term for regulatory capture is “client politics,” which according to James Q. Wilson, “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (and industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).”  (James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 1989, at 76).

While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory policies or developments, it does provide an explanation for the actions of political actors with dismaying regularity.  Because regulatory capture theory conflicts mightily with romanticized notions of “independent” regulatory agencies or “scientific” bureaucracy, it often evokes a visceral reaction and a fair bit of denialism.  (See, for example, the reaction of New Republic’s Jonathan Chait to Will Wilkinson’s recent Economist column about the prevalence of corporatism in our modern political system.)  Yet, countless studies have shown that regulatory capture has been at work in various arenas: transportation and telecommunications; energy and environmental policy; farming and financial services; and many others.

I thought it might be useful to build a compendium of quotes from various economists and political scientists who have studied the regulatory process throughout history and identified regulatory capture or client politics as a major problem.  I would greatly appreciate having others suggest additional quotes and studies to add to this list since I plan to update it frequently and eventually work all of this into a future paper or book. [ Note: I have updated this compendium over a dozen times since the original post, so please check back for updates.]

The following list is chronological and begins, surprisingly, with the thoughts of progressive hero Woodrow Wilson…

Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (1913) at 201-202:

“If the government is to tell big business men how to run their business, then don’t you see that big business men have to get closer to the government even than they are now? Don’t you see that they must capture the government, in order not to be restrained too much by it? Must capture the government? They have already captured it. Are you going to invite those inside to stay? They don’t have to get there. They are there.”

A. C. PigouEconomics of Welfare, (1920), Ch. 20, Para. #4

“It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any public authority will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by private interest. A loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organised for votes, may easily outweigh the whole.”

Anthony Downs, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” 65 Journal of Political Economy 2 (1957), 135-150, at 136:

“…even if social welfare could be defined, and methods of maximizing it could be agreed upon, what reason is there to believe that the men who run the government would be motivated to maximize it? To state that “they should do so does not mean that they will.”

Ronald Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission” 2 Journal of Law and Economics (1959), 1-40, at 37. In commenting on the fact that many lawmakers bemoaned “the extent to which pressure is brought to bear on the [FCC] by politicians and businessmen,” Coase said “that this should be happening is hardly surprising.”  He continued on:

“When rights, worth millions of dollars, are awarded to one businessman and denied to others, it is no wonder if some applicants become overanxious and attempt to use whatever influence they have (political and otherwise), particularly as they can never be sure what pressure the other applicants may be exerting.”

Milton Friedman, Capitalism & Freedom (1962) at 140:

“the pressure on the legislature to license an occupation rarely comes from the members of the public . . . On the contrary, the pressure invariably comes from the occupation itself.”

Harold Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?,” 11(1) Journal of Law and Economics (Apr., 1968), at 61.

“…in utility industries, regulation has often been sought because of the inconvenience of competition.”

Richard Posner, “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,” 21(3) Stanford Law Review 548 (Feb., 1969):

“Because regulatory commissions are of necessity intimately involved in the affairs of a particular industry, the regulators and their staffs are exposed to strong interest group pressures.  Their susceptibility to pressures that may distort economically sound judgments is enhanced by the tradition of regarding regulatory commissions as ‘arms of the legislature,’ where interest-group pressures naturally play a vitally important role.”

George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” 2(1) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, (1971), 3-21 at 3:

“…as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits.”

George Stigler, “Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?” in The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (1975), at 183:

“Regulation and competition are rhetorical friends and deadly enemies: over the doorway of every regulatory agency save two should be carved: ‘Competition Not Admitted.’ The Federal Trade Commission’s doorway should announce , “Competition Admitted in Rear,” and that of the Antitrust Division, ‘Monopoly Only by Appointment.’”

Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (2nd Ed., 1969, 1979) at 280:

“a considerable proportion of federal regulation, regardless of its own claim to consumer protection, has the systematic effect of constituting and maintaining a sector of the economy or the society. These are the policies of receivership by regulation.”

Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (1971):

“When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition.” (p. 12) “Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.” (p. 46)

Mark Green and Ralph Nader, “Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man,” Yale Law Journal 82, no. 5 (April 1973), 876

“a kind of regular personnel interchange between agency and industry blurs what should be a sharp line between regulator and regulatee, and can compromise independent regulatory judgment. In short, the regulated industries are often in clear control of the regulatory process.”

Richard B. McKenzie and Gordon Tullock, Modern Political Economy: An Introduction to Economics (1978) at 220:

“although regulation is begun with the good intentions of those who promote and pass the laws, somewhere along the line regulators may become pawns of the regulated firms.”

Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (1980) at 193:

“Every act of intervention establishes positions of power.  How that power will be used and for what purposes depends far more on the people who are in the best position to get control of that power and what their purposes are than on the aims and objectives of the initial sponsors of the intervention.”

Barry M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), at 38:

“Much relatively recent research has argued that regulation was often sought by industries for their own protection, rather than being imposed in some ‘public interest.’ Although the distinction is not always made clear in this recent literature, we may add that regulation which is not directly sought at the outset is generally ‘captured’ later on so it behaves with consistency to the industry’s major interests, or at least has been observed to behave in this manner.”

Barry Weingast, “Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation: The Foundation of Agency-Clientele Relationships,”44 Law and Contemporary Problems, (1981) pp. 147-77, at 151:

“Often, agencies are the vehicle for this endeavor. Agency heads and commission members, anxious to further their careers and goals (including large budgets) as well as completing their own of power and prestige pet projects and policy initiatives, depend upon service to interest their success groups and key committee members for their success.”

George Gilder, Wealth & Poverty (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 283:

“One reason for government resistance to change is that the process of creative destruction can attack not only an existing industry, but also the regulatory apparatus that subsists on it; and it is much more difficult to retrench a bureaucracy than it is to bankrupt a company. A regulatory apparatus is a parasite that can grow larger than its host industry and become in turn a host itself, with the industry reduced to parasitism, dependent on the subsidies and protections of the very government body that initially sapped its strength.”

Bruce Yandle,”Bootleggers and Baptists — The Education of a Regulatory Economist,” Regulation, Vol. 3, No. 3, (May/June 1983) p. 13:

“what do industry and labor want from the regulators? They want protection from competition, from technological change, and from losses that threaten profits and jobs. A carefully constructed regulation can accomplish all kinds of anticompetitive goals of this sort, while giving the citizenry the impression that the only goal is to serve the public interest.”

Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 263 [recounting the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board up until the time of Alfred Kahn ascendency to chairman and its eventual deregulation and abolition.]

“Clearly, in passing the Civil Aeronautics Act [of 1938], Congress intended to bring stability to airlines. What is not clear is whether the legislature intended to cartelize the industry. Yet this did happen. During the forty years between passage of the act of 1938 and the appointment of [Alfred] Kahn to the CAB chairmanship, the overall effect of board policies tended to freeze the industry more or less in its configuration of 1938. One policy, for example, forbade price competition. Instead the CAB ordinarily required that all carriers flying a certain route charge the same rates for the same class of customer. […] A second policy had to do with the CAB’s stance toward the entry of new companies into the business. Charged by Congress with the duty of ascertaining whether or not ‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity’ mandated that new carriers should receive a certificate to operate, the board often ruled simply that no applicant met these tests. In fact, over the entire history of the CAB, no new trunkline carrier had been permitted to join the sixteen that existed in 1938. And those sixteen, later reduced to ten by a series of mergers, still dominated the industry in the 1970s. All these companies… developed into large companies under the protective wing of the CAB. None wanted deregulation.”

Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (1987) p. 8:

“The government’s regulatory agencies have created or sustained private monopoly power more often than they have precluded or reduced it.  This result was exactly what  many interested parties desired from government regulation, though they would have been impolitic to have said so in public.”

Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society (1989) p. 151:

“The ties between interest groups and [regulatory] agencies can become too close. A persistent criticism by political scientists is that agencies that regulate businesses are overly sympathetic to the industries they are responsible for regulating.  Critics charge that regulators often come from the businesses they regulate and thus naturally see things from an industry point of view.  Even if regulators weren’t previously involved in the industry, they have been seen as eager to please powerful clientele groups rather than have them complain to the White House or to the agency’s overseeing committees in Congress.”

Jonathan Emord, “The Electronic Press and the Industry Capture Movement,” Chapter 11 from: Freedom Technology and the First Amendment (1991), p. 146 (discussing the early history of radio licensing):

“The minutes of the First National Radio Conference in 1922 reveal that even at this early date, industry leader clamored for government limits on the number of licenses issued; they sought protection against entry by new licenses. For its part, the government desired control over the industry’s structure and programming content. Certain members of Congress, joined by [Secretary of Commerce Herbert] Hoover, agreed with broadcast industry leaders that the system of broadcasting in the United States would be brought within the federal government’s control. The classic rent/content control quid pro quo soon developed: in exchange for regulatory controls on industry structure and programming content, industry leaders would be granted restrictions on market entry that they wanted. These restrictions would ensure monopoly rents for licensees and would provide the government with assurance that the broadcast industry would not oppose regulatory controls.”

David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 13:

“Agency heads are usually not apolitical and, indeed, concentrated interests often prevail more easily in an agency than they can in Congress. Effective participation in agency lawmaking usually requires expensive legal representation as well as close connections to members of Congress who will pressure the agency on one’s behalf. The agency itself is often closely linked with the industry it regulates. Not only large corporations, but also labor unions, cause-based groups, and other cohesive minority interests sometimes can use delegation to triumph over the interests of the larger part of the general public, which lacks the organization, finances, and know-how to participate as effectively in the administrative process.”

Douglass North, “Economic Performance through Time,” 84 American Economic Review 3, (1994), 359-363, at p. 360:

“Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules.”

P.A. McNutt, The Economics of Public Choice (1996), p. 105-6:

“The more successful the interest group becomes the greater the probability that it will be in a position to impact on the policy making process of successive governments. … Aspiring monopolists will retain lobbyists to assure a favourable outcome and devote resources to the acquisition of the monopoly right.  A government will more than likely grant monopoly privileges to various groups of politically influential people.  Cartels and anti-competitive behaviour will be maintained and politicians will react to the demands of the more vociferous and well organised interest groups.”

Andrew Odlyzko, “Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet,” July 27, 2003, p. 12:

“It is now widely accepted that the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was not a pure triumph of the populist movement and its allies in the anti-railroad camp. The railway industry largely decided that regulation was in its best interests and acquiesced in and even encouraged government involvement. This is often portrayed as the insidious capture of the regulators by the industry they regulate. There is certainly much evidence to support this view.”

Lawrence Lessig,”Reboot the FCC,” Newsweek, December 23, 2008

“Economic growth requires innovation. Trouble is, Washington is practically designed to resist it. Built into the DNA of the most important agencies created to protect innovation, is an almost irresistible urge to protect the most powerful instead. The FCC is a perfect example. … With so much in its reach, the FCC has become the target of enormous campaigns for influence. Its commissioners are meant to be “expert” and “independent,” but they’ve never really been expert, and are now openly embracing the political role they play. Commissioners issue press releases touting their own personal policies. And lobbyists spend years getting close to members of this junior varsity Congress.”

Thomas Frank, Obama and Regulatory Capture,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2009:

“There are powerful institutions that don’t like being regulated. Regulation sometimes cuts into their profits and interferes with their business. So they have used the political process to sabotage, redirect, defund, undo or hijack the regulatory state since the regulatory state was first invented. The first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was set up to regulate railroad freight rates in the 1880s. Soon thereafter, Richard Olney, a prominent railroad lawyer, came to Washington to serve as Grover Cleveland’s attorney general. Olney’s former boss asked him if he would help kill off the hated ICC. Olney’s reply, handed down at the very dawn of Big Government, should be regarded as an urtext of the regulatory state: ‘The Commission… is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. … The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.'”

Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (2010), p. 308:

“Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace…. Government’s tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity … [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive.”

David J. Farber & Gerald R. Faulhaber, “Net Neutrality: No One Will Be Satisfied, Everyone Will Complain,” The Atlantic, December 21, 2010:

“When the FCC asserts regulatory jurisdiction over an area of telecommunications, the dynamic of the industry changes. No longer are customer needs and desires at the forefront of firms’ competitive strategies; rather firms take their competitive battles to the FCC, hoping for a favorable ruling that will translate into a marketplace advantage. Customer needs take second place; regulatory “rent-seeking” becomes the rule of the day, and a previously innovative and vibrant industry becomes a creature of government rule-making.”

Holman Jenkins, “Let’s Restart the Green Revolution,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2011, (regarding how misguided agricultural & environmental policies are hurting consumers):

“When some hear the word ‘regulation,’ they imagine government rushing to the defense of consumers. In the real world, government serves up regulation to those who ask for it, which usually means organized interests seeking to block a competitive threat. This insight, by the way, originated with the left, with historians who went back and reconstructed how railroads in the U.S. concocted federal regulation to protect themselves from price competition. We should also notice that an astonishingly large part of the world has experienced an astonishing degree of stagnation for an astonishingly long time for exactly such reasons.”

Bruce Schneier, Liars & Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012), p. 204.

“There’s one competing interest that’s unique to enforcing institutions, and that’s the interest of the group the institution is supposed to watch over. If a government agency exists only because of the industry, then it is in its self-preservation interest to keep that industry flourishing. And unless there’s some other career path, pretty much everyone with the expertise necessary to become a regulator will be either a former or future employee of the industry with the obvious implicit and explicit conflicts. As a result, there is a tendency for institutions delegated with regulating a particular industry to start advocating the commercial and special interests of that industry. This is known as regulatory capture, and there are many examples both in the U.S. and in other countries.”

Bruce Owen, “Communication Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative Capture” (Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, January 19, 2012), SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 11-006, p. 2. Owen argues that it is the legislative branch, not the regulatory agencies themselves, where regulatory capture takes root:

“It is rather legislative oversight and budget committees and their chairs that are (willingly) captured by special interests in the first instance. One could equally say that legislators capture the special interests, seeking campaign funding The behavior of regulatory agencies simply reflect the preferences of their congressional masters. Regulators generally seek to please their committees, not to defy them.”

Mark Zachary TaylorThe Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 213:

“political resistance to technological change can obstruct or warp otherwise ‘good’ S&T [science and technology] policy. Time and again, the losing interest groups created by scientific progress or technological change have been able to convince politicians to block, slow, or alter government support for scientific and technological progress. They support taxes, regulations, subsidies, procurement policies, spending, and so forth that obstruct progress in new S&T, and favor the status quo S&T. The losers and their political representatives have interfered with markets, public institutions and policies, and even the scientific debate itself–whatever they can to protect their interests.”

Additional readings:

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event notice: ITIF Release of “Who’s Who in Internet Politics” (10/5) https://techliberation.com/2010/09/27/event-notice-itif-release-of-whos-who-in-internet-politics-105/ https://techliberation.com/2010/09/27/event-notice-itif-release-of-whos-who-in-internet-politics-105/#respond Tue, 28 Sep 2010 01:31:13 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=31947

I encourage tech policy wonks in Washington to attend next week’s (Oct. 5th) Information Technology and Innovation Foundation event on “A Guide to the Internet Political Landscape,” which will feature the release of Rob Atkinson’s new report, “Who’s Who in Internet Politics: A Taxonomy of Information Technology Policy Perspectives .”  The report identifies nine distinct groupings shaping Internet policy and how these groups view key Internet policy issues, including net neutrality, copyright, and privacy.

Rob is one of my very favorite people in Washington and I always look forward to everything he does–even when I disagree with him!  I remember a great debate we had a decade ago when he invited me to critique his paper on “The Failure of Cyber-Libertarianism: The Case for a National E-Commerce Strategy.”  And at the end of the debate he conceded that I was correct and he immediately converted to the libertarian movement.  No, not really!  But it was a hell of a fun time.

I hope for a repeat for some of that fun as Rob was kind enough to ask me to comment on his new “Who’s Who in Internet Politics” paper as next week’s event along with Morgan Reed of the Association for Competitive Technology.  Rob asked me to peer review an early draft of the study and I can assure you it will make a splash.  Come on over to ITIF next Tuesday, October 5th at 9:30am to hear us discuss it.  You can RSVP here.  Location is 1101 K Street NW, Suite 610.

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Joe Biden is No Friend of Tech, So Tech Should Give to Joe Biden https://techliberation.com/2010/06/30/joe-biden-is-no-friend-of-tech-so-tech-should-give-to-joe-biden/ https://techliberation.com/2010/06/30/joe-biden-is-no-friend-of-tech-so-tech-should-give-to-joe-biden/#comments Wed, 30 Jun 2010 16:13:24 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=29962

Politics and extortion share a similar logic: Give to the one who can hurt you the most.

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A Modest Proposal to Improve the State of the Union Speech https://techliberation.com/2010/01/27/a-modest-proposal-to-improve-the-state-of-the-union-speech/ https://techliberation.com/2010/01/27/a-modest-proposal-to-improve-the-state-of-the-union-speech/#comments Thu, 28 Jan 2010 04:53:25 +0000 http://surprisinglyfree.com/?p=896

Just finished watching President Barack Obama’s State of the Union speech and Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell’s response.

For some reason, this reminds me of the annual honors ceremony at my daughter’s school.  Why?  Because at my daughter’s school, when they award a plethora of awards to students in each grade, they ask the audience to hold our applause to the end.  Why? Because  applause prolongs the ceremony interminably.

Sound familiar? Members of Congress imitate Jack-in-the-Boxes springing up and down at appropriate applause lines. Democrats sprang up at appropriate applause lines relevant to the president’s agenda. Republicans sprang up too, when the president praised small business or said said he wanted more nuclear power plants.  President Obama expected applause from Republicans when he listed his tax cuts, but he was disappointed and then joked about it. If you watched the speech on TV, some members of Congress seemed to be applauding with a look on their faces that said they didn’t quite know why they were applauding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally stood up and applauded when Obama praised veterans. Vice President Joe Biden has perfected the “sage” look, though sometimes he looked grumpy enough to be mistaken for a Republican!  

Republicans have finally cottoned to this phenomenon. Instead of presenting a solo speaker in a sterile environment, they presented Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell with an audience in the Virginia State Capitol. Like the president, the governor was interrupted by applause from legislators and others in the audence. Rhetorically, I thought it added an extra “oopmh” to the governor’s speech — both because it showed he has folks who agree with him and because he highlighted the state perspective. Given the rules of the political game, it was a smart choice. 

But that doesn’t mean a change in the rules wouldn’t make everyone better off. It’s friggin’ 11:50 at night, and I’m wiped out from a day of simultaneously working at home to get something written and running multiple scans on the home computer to get rid of the friggin’ Security 2010 virus, or Trojan, or whatever that thing  is.  I would have appreciated shorter speeches that simply told me what each party wanted to accomplish.

So here’s my suggestion. For the State of the Union Speech and the opposition party’s response, they should make the same request made at my daughter’s school awards ceremony: “Please hold your applause until the end.”

Now … anybody got any interesting technological solutions that would accomplish this goal?

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The Most Important Number for Technology Policy in 2009 https://techliberation.com/2009/01/08/the-most-important-number-for-technology-policy-in-2009/ https://techliberation.com/2009/01/08/the-most-important-number-for-technology-policy-in-2009/#comments Thu, 08 Jan 2009 20:59:16 +0000 http://techliberation.com/?p=15254

Is $1,200,000,000,000.00.  That’s the expected 2009 Federal budget deficit.  Since the current Federal debt is estimated at a “mere” $10.6 trillion, this means that we’re expected to add nearly 9% in a single year to a debt accumulated over 233 years (since 1774).  This number also amounts to more than 8% of the U.S. economy. 

So what does this have to do with technology policy?  To start with, this figure comes from Congressional Budget Office estimates, which “don’t account for the huge economic stimulus bill Obama is expected to propose soon to try to jolt the economy.”  So, while the Obama team has talked about big “public works” and “infrastructure” spending (which used to be called, variously, “make-work,” “pork barrel” and “corporate welfare”), there’s sure to be huge pressure not to waste more taxpayer money on top of this staggering figure.  Whatever blame Bush deserves, Obama probably doesn’t want to go down in history as the man who finally caused the U.S. government to default on its unmanageable debt burden.

One certainly could make an argument that the kind of technology-related “infrastructure” stimulus Obama has talked about (e.g., broadband subsidies) would be less of a waste of money than, say, simply building more bridges (as Japan did in the 1990s, its “lost decade”) or other reflexively Keynesian responses.  But even so, I suspect that the total amount of funding made available for such projects won’t be anywhere near enough to satisfy the technology policy Left.  

This could result in increased pressure on the Administration to increase regulation of the technology sector in order to implement tech-leftist ideas about “protecting” users’ privacy, promoting media diversity or “fairness”, mandating net “neutrality,” “opening up” spectrum, etc.  Such  proposals might seem attractive precisely because they generally wouldn’t require increased Federal expenditures other than the cost of hiring more bureaucrats (which means more government employee union jobs anyway—hardly a bad thing for Democrats)—while the economic consequences of such proposals for companies and consumers will probably surely be trivialized.  For example, if the advocates of government control at the so-called “Free Press” can’t get universal broadband, they’ll probably press that much harder to cripple online advertising and traffic management by ISPs, just to name two popular bogeymen.obamas-new-new-deal

One might think that a sharp economic decline would cause policy-makers to think twice before undermining the business models that have supported IT innovation and real infrastructure investment.  But one has only to look at the policies of FDR’s first two terms to see how even an amiable, soft-spoken president elected on a mantra of change and “uniting” the nation in a time of crisis could consistently choose to place “Reform” (i.e., increased regulation) over “Recovery” (i.e., the health of the economy)—with devastating economic consequences.

Even if Obama isn’t a fanatic about the ideals of the technology policy Left, it remains to be seen whether he will be able to resist the ideological agenda of Congressional Democrats on technology policy.  I suppose the first indication we’ll have as to whether the Administration will chart a more reasonable course will be whom he appoints to head the FTC and FCC and as CTO.  Since the first two appointments are to independent agencies, Obama will have to choose someone who appreciates how much damage the “Reform” agenda could do—lest he find, as Bush has with the phony-free-marketeer Kevin Martin, that his Chairmen are fair more radical regulators than he is.  Obama’s appointment of Cass Sunstein as head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is hardly encouraging, for the reasons Adam has noted.

We may also find that the Administration has better things to do than worry about Internet, communications or media policy—and is therefore all too willing to defer to their appointees (as Bush did with Martin).  If that happens, all Obama’s lofty talk of non-partisanship won’t make any difference if his appointees start taking their marching orders from the hardcore advocates of “Reform.”

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