Sherwin Siy, Vice President of Legal Affairs at Public Knowledge, discusses emerging issues in digital copyright policy. He addresses the Department of Commerce’s recent green paper on digital copyright, including the need to reform copyright laws in light of new technologies. This podcast also covers the DMCA, online streaming, piracy, cell phone unlocking, fair use recognition, digital ownership, and what we’ve learned about copyright policy from the SOPA debate.

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Related Links

• Sherwin Siy, Public Knowledge
• What the DMCA cell phone unlock ban means to you, Reardon
• Why The Library Of Congress Has A Lock On Your Phone, Henn

Patrick Ruffini, political strategist, author, and President of Engage, a digital agency in Washington, DC, discusses his latest book with coauthors David Segal and David Moon: Hacking Politics: How Geeks, Progressives, the Tea Party, Gamers, Anarchists, and Suits Teamed Up to Defeat SOPA and Save the Internet. Ruffini covers the history behind SOPA, its implications for Internet freedom, the “Internet blackout” in January of 2012, and how the threat of SOPA united activists, technology companies, and the broader Internet community.

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Related Links

• Patrick Ruffini, Engage
• Patrick Ruffini, Huffington Post
• Hacking Politics: How Geeks, Progressives, the Tea Party, Gamers, Anarchists and Suits Teamed Up to Defeat SOPA and Save the Internet, Goodreads

Joe Karaganis, vice president at The American Assembly at Columbia University, discusses the relationship between digital convergence and cultural production in the realm of online piracy.

Karaganis’s work at American Assembly arose from a frustration with the one-sided way in which industry research was framing the discourse around global copyright policy. He shares the results of Copy Culture in the US & Germany, a recent survey he helped conduct that distinguishes between attitudes towards piracy in the two countries. It found that nearly half of adults in the U.S. and Germany participate in a broad, informal “copy culture,” characterized by the copying, sharing, and downloading of music, movies, TV shows, and other digital media. And while citizens support laws against piracy, they don’t support outsized penalties.

Karaganis also discuses the new “six-strike” Copyright Alert System in the U.S., of which he is skeptical. He also talks about the politics of copyright reform and notes that there is a window of opportunity for the Republican Party to take up the issue before demography gives the advantage to the much younger Democratic Party. 

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Related Links

• “Copy Culture in the US and Germany”, The American Assembly
• Presenting ‘Copy Culture in the US and Germany’, Karagenis
• Copy Culture by Race and Ethnicity, Karagenis
• Unauthorized File Sharing: Is It Wrong?, Karagenis

Imagine a service that livestreams major broadcast television channels over the Internet for $4.99 a month — no cable or satellite subscription required. For an extra 99 cents a month, the service offers DVR functionality, making it possible to record, rewind, and pause live broadcast television on any broadband-equipped PC.

If this service sounds too good to be true, that’s because it is. But for a time, it was the business model of ivi. Cheaper than a cable/satellite/fiber subscription and more reliable than an over-the-air antenna, ivi earned positive reviews when it launched in September 2010.

Soon thereafter, however, a group of broadcast networks, affiliates, and content owners sued ivi in federal court for copyright infringement. The court agreed with the broadcasters and ordered ivi to cease operations pending the resolution of the lawsuit.

ivi appealed this ruling to the 2nd Circuit, which affirmed the trial court’s preliminary injunction earlier this month in an opinion (PDF) by Judge Denny Chin. The appeals court held as follows:

• The rights holders would likely prevail on their claim that ivi infringed on their performance rights, as ivi publicly performed their copyrighted programs without permission;
• ivi is not a “cable system” eligible for the Copyright Act’s compulsory license for broadcast retransmissions, as ivi distributes video over the Internet, rather than its own facilities;
• Allowing ivi to continue operating would likely cause irreparable harm to the rights holders, as ivi’s unauthorized distribution of copyrighted programs diminishes the works’ market value, and ivi would likely be unable to pay damages if it loses the lawsuit;
• ivi cannot be “legally harmed by the fact that it cannot continue streaming plaintiffs’ programming,” thus tipping the balance of hardships in plaintiffs’ favor;
• While the broad distribution of creative works advances the public interest, the works streamed by ivi are already widely accessible to the public.

As much as I enjoy a good statutory construction dispute, to me, the most interesting question here is whether ivi caused “irreparable harm” to rights holders.

Writing on Techdirt, Mike Masnick is skeptical of the 2nd Circuit’s holding, criticizing its “purely faith-based claims … that a service like ivi creates irreparable harm to the TV networks.” He argues that even though ivi “disrupt[s] the ‘traditional’ way that [the broadcast television] industry’s business model works … that doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s automatically diminishing the value of the original.” Citing the VCR and DVR, two technologies that disrupted traditional methods of monetizing content, Mike concludes that “[t]here’s no reason to think” ivi wouldn’t “help [content owners’] business by increasing the value of shows by making them more easily watchable by people.”

Mike has a point. Perhaps many ivi subscribers previously didn’t watch much, if any, broadcast television. But thanks to ivi, some of these viewers may get hooked on hit network shows like American Idol, NCIS, or Person of Interest. Some ivi subscribers might even go on to buy seasons of their favorite shows on Blu-ray or DVD. If these assumptions hold true, ivi might actually increase the market value of the television programs it streams. So why aren’t rights holders applauding ivi — or emulating it — instead of trying to shut it down?

Perhaps it’s because the rights holders worry that ivi could attract a large audience of “cord cutters” who previously bought season passes to their favorite shows from Internet media stores such as iTunes or Amazon Instant Video. Rights holders might also worry that ivi could induce  cord cutting by inducing people to cancel their basic cable or satellite television service. Why pay a cable company $16.50 a month for local broadcast channels when you can get them from ivi for less than a third of the price of cable?

Broadcasters might worry about ivi undercutting their advertising revenues. Because television ad rates are largely based on viewership statistics — as determined by audience measurement companies like Nielsen — each person who unplugs his antenna or cancels his cable subscription for ivi is one fewer Nielsen viewer. (Although ivi is reportedly interested in cutting a deal with Nielsen to ensure its ratings reflect ivi’s audience, it appears no deal was in place when ivi launched.) From the broadcasters’ perspective, it doesn’t matter if lots of ivi subscribers actually watch television ads, as advertisers typically aren’t willing to pay for eyeballs they can’t measure.

Adding insult to injury, ivi streamed the local channels of two markets, Seattle and New York City, to subscribers worldwide. Because broadcast affiliates typically sell ad slots to local businesses, every person who uses ivi but doesn’t reside in Seattle or NYC amounts to one fewer set of eyeballs for a local affiliate.

So ivi could be helping rights holders, hurting them, or doing some of both. To determine ivi’s net impact on content owners’ bottom line, we need to know whether the first type of viewers discussed above (those who spend more on content because of ivi) makes more money for content owners than they lose on other viewers (those who substitute ivi viewing for media store purchases, over-the-air viewing, or pay-TV subscriptions). Unfortunately, we lack the data to answer these questions with confidence.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to assume that ivi subscribers who generate less revenue for content owners after signing up for ivi vastly outnumber those who generate more revenue.

Consider ivi’s natural subscriber base: people who already pay for network television content — via pay-TV, Internet media stores, or streaming services like Hulu Plus — or watch for free via authorized, ad-supported sources. For many of these viewers, ivi presents a compelling alternative to other sources of network television content.

But what about ivi’s potential to deliver networks a new, untapped audience? Well, at $60 per year, ivi won’t likely play well with casual viewers who aren’t even sure if network television is worth watching. These viewers far more likely to test the network TV waters by streaming recently-aired shows for free on Hulu or network websites.

ivi is also unlikely to attract many network television lovers who’d otherwise miss out on it because they lack the cash. That’s because most low-income television junkies already tune in — perhaps via free, over-the-air network television (which nearly all TV owners can already access with nothing more than a $20 antenna and $30 converter box). From the content owners’ perspective, each user who switches from an over-the-air antenna to an ivi subscription is basically a wash.

At best, ivi may attract some viewers who can’t afford or aren’t willing to pay for basic cable, and live too far away from an urban area to receive an over-the-air signal. But do these viewers outnumber the many TV junkies who want cheaper, more convenient access to network television content? I highly doubt it. And, had ivi tried to persuade the 2nd Circuit that its service actually benefits rights holders, I suspect the Court wouldn’t have bought the argument unless ivi could marshall data that probably doesn’t exist.

Business Models, Innovation, and Incentives

If ivi is such an attractive alternative to “legacy” business models, why don’t the broadcast networks simply follow ivi’s lead by offering a comparable service? It seems like a no-brainer; after all, networks and affiliates already have established relationships with advertisers, and enjoy immediate access to perfect digital copies of their content. A joint venture of the major networks, perhaps in collaboration with their affiliates, would surely dominate ivi (assuming both services were comparably priced).

What explains the broadcasters and rights holders’ reticence toward this business model? Perhaps they’re too stupid or lazy to see the green in front of them. Maybe they’re too attached to obsolete business models to monetize their content in a rational, profit-maximizing manner.

But the rights holders could also be acting perfectly rationally. Maybe the $6 monthly fee ivi charges isn’t the profit-maximizing price at which to charge consumers for high definition, live, recordable, rewindable network television content. Perhaps the business strategy currently employed by broadcasters and creators — complex and confusing as it may be to most people — captures more income for the creation and distribution of television shows than alternative business models.

I don’t know whether content owners ought to shun or embrace ivi’s business model. Neither does Mike Masnick — or, for that matter, anyone. At best, armed with extensive economic data and market research, we’d still only be able to make an educated guess as to how content owners should structure their businesses. Modern consumers’ preferences are simply too opaque, divergent, and dynamic for any producer to systematically squeeze out every last drop of profits or surplus.

Even under uncertainty, however, decisions must still be made. In the market for creative works, their creators (and their assignees) are empowered by the Copyright Act with an exclusive, but limited, right to decide how to monetize their works. So it is that broadcasters and affiliates may dictate how television shows are distributed, and decide how much to charge for them, for a limited time and with certain exceptions.

This is why broadcasters may give their content away for free to anybody near a metropolitan area who has an antenna and converter box, while simultaneously preventing third parties like ivi from distributing the same exact content (whether free of charge or for a fee). At first, this may seem absurd, but consider how many websites freely distribute their content on the terms they see fit. That’s why I can read all the Techdirt articles I desire, but only on Techdirt’s website. If copyright protection excluded content distributed freely to the general public, creators of popular ad-supported content would soon find others reproducing their content with fewer ads. Between Hulu — with its several minutes of ads per episode — and a competing service offering the same content, but with nothing more than a few text ads, many viewers would prefer the latter option.

Of course, the Copyright Act is no guarantee that a particular business model will succeed, or that a content creator will make a profit. It simply vests in each rights holder the  power to decide among business models for monetizing their content.

Why let creators and their assignees make these decisions? Even if we believe that that public policy ought to “promote the Progress of … useful Arts” — an admittedly controversial belief that is beyond the scope of this essay — why give content creators exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform, transmit, and sell their expressive works? There are, after all, plenty of other ways government could encourage people to create movies, books, music, video games, and other socially valuable expressions.

For instance, we could award monetary prizes to creators of popular works, perhaps by measuring how often they’re viewed or experienced. We could create a federal Department of Creative Expression and hire 50,000 of the nation’s most talented writers, artists, and musicians to create books, movies, television shows, and songs all day. We could also give individuals and companies generous, refundable tax credits for income derived from expressive works.

But, for the most part, we don’t do these things. Of the many ways our government could foster the creation of expressive works, we chose copyrights — as have many other governments over the years.

So why copyright? Two reasons: knowledge and incentives.

In an ever-changing world, the best way to discover how to  monetize creative works is through trial-and-error. By empowering lots of individual creators and companies to experiment with different ways of distributing content, knowledge emerges through spontaneous order, as rights holders mimic their successful competitors while constantly trying to figure out an even smarter way to make money. Instead of relying on a centralized bureaucracy or a small group of lawmakers to decide how much to charge for creative works, the institution of copyright disperses such decisions, harnessing the wisdom of the crowd for a better outcome.

If decentralized decision-making works so well, why limit it to creators? Surely if  everybody could monetize creative works, we’d enjoy even more innovative distribution strategies. But this would push the value of creative works down to their marginal price, zero. While it’s still possible to make money by distributing free content, as Mike has explained as comprehensively as anyone, it’s not necessarily the best way for creators to make money. If it were, everybody would already be doing it!

Therefore, we give content creators and their assignees a limited, exclusive right — a temporary monopoly, as it’s often described — over their works. They get to decide not only what to create, but how to distribute it. Whether they reap vast rewards or lose their shirts depends solely on the decisions they make.

To be sure, our Copyright Act abounds with excesses and deficiencies, many of which we’ve discussed on these pages over the years. (For instance, it lacks a registration or renewal requirements, imposes draconian criminal penalties on noncommercial infringement, and confers copyrights on too broad a range of subject matter.) Despite these problems, however, the exclusive right to monetize expressive works — a right that ivi flagrantly violates — is at the core of copyright. If there’s one exclusive right that copyright laws  should  secure for content creators, it’s the right to sell complete copies of newly-produced creative works made for the purpose of private commercial gain.

If ivi doesn’t violate this right, I don’t know what does.

A new report says the opposite, though perhaps “legacy” entertainment companies are failing to keep up.

By any measure, it appears that we are living in a true Renaissance era for content. More money is being spent overall. Households are spending more on entertainment. And a lot more works are being created.

Good news! Check out: “The Sky is Rising.”

In the ongoing copyright debates, areas of common ground are seemingly few and far between. It’s easy to forget that not all approaches to combating copyright infringement are mired in controversy. One belief that unites many stakeholders across the spectrum is that more efforts are needed to educate Internet users about copyright. The Internet has spawned legions of amateur content creators, but not all of the content that’s being created is original. Indeed, a great deal of online copyright infringement owes to widespread ignorance of copyright law and its penalties.

For its part, Google yesterday unveiled “Copyright School” for YouTube users. As Justin Green explains on the official YouTube blog, users whose accounts have been suspended for allegedly uploading infringing content will be required to watch this video and then correctly answer questions about it before their account will be reinstated:

Of course, boiling down the basics of copyright into a four and a half minute video is not an easy task, to put it mildly. (The authoritative treatment of copyright law, Nimmer on Copyright, fills an 11-volume treatise.) Copyright geeks and fans of “remix culture” will appreciate that Google’s video touches on fair use and includes links to in-depth resources for users to learn more about copyright. It will be interesting to see how Google’s effort influences the behavior of YouTube users and the incidence of repeat infringement.

Update: EFF’s Corynne McSherry has an essay up on the Deeplinks blog arguing that YouTube’s Copyright School video omits several important facts about copyright. She raises several very good points, but the unfortunate reality of copyright law is that uploading content that’s not substantially original — even in cases that might constitute fair use — is legally risky, particularly for those who aren’t familiar with copyright law. While I’d love to see YouTube create a follow-up video that explains fair use doctrine in an accessible manner, Google’s decision to urge YouTube uploaders to err on the side of caution is quite reasonable in light of the severity of the statutory penalties for copyright infringement.

Should ISPs be barred under net neutrality from discriminating against illegal content? Not according to the FCC’s draft net neutrality rule, which defines efforts by ISPs to curb the “transfer of unlawful content” as reasonable network management. This exemption is meant to ensure providers have the freedom to filter or block unlawful content like malicious traffic, obscene files, and copyright-infringing data.

EFF and Public Knowledge (PK), both strong advocates of net neutrality, are not happy about the copyright infringement exemption. The groups have urged the FCC to reconsider what they describe as the “copyright loophole,” arguing that copyright filters amount to “poorly designed fishing nets.”

EFF’s and PK’s concerns about copyright filtering aren’t unreasonable. While filtering technology has come a long way over the last few years, it remains a fairly crude instrument for curbing piracy and suffers from false positives. That’s because it’s remarkably difficult to accurately distinguish between unauthorized copyrighted works and similar non-infringing files. And because filters generally flag unauthorized copies on an automated basis without human intervention, even when filters get it right, they often disrupt legal, non-infringing uses of copyrighted material like fair use.

Despite copyright filtering technology’s imperfections, however, outlawing it is the wrong approach. At its core, ISP copyright filtering represents a purely private, voluntary method of dealing with the great intellectual property challenge. This is exactly the sort of approach advocates of limited government should embrace. As Adam and Wayne argued back in 2001:

To lessen the reliance on traditional copyright protections, policymakers should ensure that government regulations don’t stand in the way of private efforts to protect intellectual property.

That’s exactly right. As digital technology evolves, effectively enforcing intellectual property privileges will grow increasingly difficult for content creators. The traditional model for financing content creation — direct payments from consumers to producers — will remain viable only if there’s an economic incentive for consumers to fork over money in exchange for content. Voluntary filtering arrangements between network providers and content owners may prove valuable to this end because they discourage the unauthorized transfer of copyrighted files.

The best part about copyright filtering? It doesn’t necessitate the exercise of the state’s coercive power. In this way, it has the potential to help us move gradually toward a regime of intellectual property protection that’s reliant on the force of the market rather than the force of government.

Of course, there’s no guarantee that attempts to filter copyrighted content at the ISP level will turn out to be effective. That’s because end-to-end encryption, which enjoys growing popularity among savvy users, renders traffic impossible to digitally “fingerprint.” It amounts to a near-perfect foil to deep-packet filtering technologies. There are alternative methods of identifying infringing files — IP address blacklisting, for instance — but such methods tend to be notoriously imprecise and as such are unlikely to be met with acceptance by consumers.

As with all kinds of unsavory ISP behavior, in the long run, overly blunt copyright filtering is simply not a sustainable business practice. Users tend to expect the Internet will “just work,” and attempts by providers to interfere with access to content are invariably met with swift resistance. Consider the recent 4chan blockages by AT&T and Verizon, both of which lasted for mere hours but immediately sparked outrage that reverberated throughout the tech world.

To be sure, some providers may experiment with ineffective, overly aggressive copyright filters. But this sort of experimentation, while painful for those involved, is crucial if providers are to learn the valuable lessons that will signal to the market how to properly balance consumer interests with content creators’ interests. And since ISP competition is on the rise, as Obama’s Department of Justice recently explained, even in relatively uncompetitive markets like Rochester, New York it’s only a matter of time before some 4G LTE carrier deploys residential-grade broadband and shakes things up.

As I’ve argued before, the best way government can serve consumers in DRM disputes is by steering clear of them entirely. Markets may not be perfect, but they tend to efficiently balance competing concerns in a way government regulators simply cannot. In the same way, network-level copyright filtering should succeed or fail based on its own merits and how it impacts consumer welfare, not on how well it meets the invariably vague criteria of the FCC. If net neutrality rules are enshrined into law — and for the record, I hope they aren’t — regulating ISP efforts to curb illegal content should be off the table.

The Isle of Man may soon implement a “blanket license” whereby Manx broadband users could download as much music as they like in exchange for paying a “fee” (also known as a “tax,” since this would be non-optional) to their ISP that would supposedly be as low as $1.38/month.  The Manx proposal sounds a lot like how SoundExchange administers a blanket license in the U.S. for web-casting of copyrighted music:

the money collected by the Internet providers would be sent to a special agency that would distribute the proceeds to the copyright owners, including the record labels and music publishers. They would receive payments based on how often their music was downloaded or streamed over the Internet, as they now do in many countries when it is performed live or on the radio.

As Adam Thierer has noted,  Larry Lessig has endorsed at least a voluntary version of this idea, but Adam has raised a number of tough questions:

How do we determine who should get paid what under a blanket licensing system for the Net? What formula shall we use to determine why one artists gets more than another? After all, counting downloads won’t be simple, and it can be gamed. Lessig says that “there are plenty of ways that we might tag and trace particular uses of copyrighted material.” (p. 272)  Really? If that was the case today, then we would have a fully functioning copyright clearance and compensation system in place already. But “tagging and tracing” is easier said than done. The fact is, the same complexities we face trying to enforce such tagging and tracing systems under the present copyright system would be present in any compulsory licensing system…. There are many thorny questions about the fairness of imposing a blanket fee on all online users even if they don’t listen to any music, or those who would be offended at the prospect of being forced to pay for certain types of music (think of grandmas paying for gangsta rap). On the opposite end of the equation, there’s the question of fairness to artists who may not want to surrender the rights to their musical creations at government-set terms and rates. Finally, what about other types of media creators and distributors? If we’re going to have a blanket fee for online music, why not movies, television content, video games, and everything else?

For further reading, check out “What’s Wrong with ISP Music Licensing” by copyright gurus Chris Castle and Amy Mitchell and this 2004 Cato study by Robert Merges.  Not being a copyright expert, I don’t really have anything more to add on this issue.  But I look forward to hearing what our readers—and my co-bloggers—think.

Sean Sands makes the argument that it is in a very powerfully worded editorial today over at The Escapist entitled “Sink the Pirates“:

PC developers are being forced to make more dramatic decisions in the face of overwhelming piracy, an issue that Cevat Yerli, CEO of Crysis developer Crytek, recently enumerated at one legitimate copy to every twenty pirated. […] Yes, I think Cevat is inflating his 20 to 1 statistic, but he’s probably not nearly as far off as you or I might think. Looking at arguably one of the largest P2P torrent sharing sites on the web (no, I’m not going to link to it), and the number of Games torrents currently available, the evidence is absolutely damning. Despite PCs’ relative weakness in the marketplace, clearly in the backseat by orders of magnitude in relation to the next gen and handheld systems, it represents 50% of all torrents. Let me stress that – the number of illegal PC downloads are, at any given moment, equal to or greater than the illegal downloads for every other system combined. […] Here’s the bottom line: Yes, piracy is destroying PC gaming. That is an immutable truth, evidenced by the exodus of PC developers defecting en masse to make games for consoles. End of story.

I’m not prepared to offer an opinion one way or the other, but I have noticed the slowdown in the PC gaming market recently and wondered about why many developers were moving over the more secure gaming consoles. That doesn’t necessarily prove that piracy was the primary factor, but it certainly could be part of the explanation.

What do you think?