This morning, a group of organizations led by the Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), R Street, and the Sunlight Foundation released a public letter to House Speaker John Boehner and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi calling for enhanced congressional oversight of U.S. national security surveillance policies.

The letter—signed by over fifty organizations, ranging from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, and a handful of individuals, including Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg—expresses deep concerns about the expansive scope and limited accountability of intelligence activities and agencies, famously exposed by whistleblower Edward Snowden in 2013. The letter states:

Congress is responsible for authorizing, overseeing, and funding these programs. In recent years, however, the House of Representatives has not always effectively performed its duties. The time for modernization is now. When the House convenes for the 114th Congress in January and adopts rules, the House should update them to enhance opportunities for oversight by House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) members, members of other committees of jurisdiction, and all other representatives. The House should also consider establishing a select committee to review intelligence activities since 9/11. We urge the following reforms be included in the rules package.

The proposed modernization reforms include:

1) modernizing HPSCI membership to more accurately reflect House interests by allowing chairs and ranking members of other committees with intelligence jurisdiction to select a designee on HPSCI;

2) allowing each HPSCI Member to designate a staff member of his or her choosing to represent their interests on the committee, as is the practice in the Senate;

3) making all unclassified intelligence reports quickly available to the public;

4) improving HPSCI the speed and transparency of responsiveness to member requests for information; and

5) improving general HPSCI transparency by better informing members of relevant activities like upcoming closed hearings, legislative markups, and committee activities

The groups also urge reforms to empower all members of Congress to be informed of and involved with executive intelligence agencies’ activities. They are:

1) making all communications from the executive branch available to all Members unless the sender explicitly indicates otherwise;

2) reaffirming Members’ abilities to access, review, and publicly discuss materials already available to the public that are classified by the executive branch, as is the case with the Snowden leaks. Members should feel comfortable to discuss this kind of information without fear of reprimand;

3) providing Members with at least one staff member with access to classified information through a Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance;

4) allowing Members to speak with whistleblowers without fear of reprisal; and

5) improving training for Members and staff on how to handle classified information and conduct effective congressional oversight of classified matters.

Over at the CREW blog, Daniel Schuman provides some more context of the problems these groups seek to address:

Members of Congress rely on staff to do a lot of work, but most staff working on intelligence issues are not permitted to hold the necessary security clearances to do their jobs. Sometimes, the Intelligence Committee in the House intercepts mail from the executive branch addressed to all members of Congress. That same committee sits on unclassified reports, refusing to make them available to the public. Briefings provided by the intelligence community are announced for inconvenient times, do not provide enough detailed information, and members of Congress often are not allowed to take notes on what was said. The executive branch has 666,000 employees with top secret/SCI clearance and 541,000 contractors with top secret/SCI clearance, and yet often times members of Congress are not permitted to talk with one another about their briefings. Members of Congress are not allowed to publicly speak about—and staff may not read—classified information that has been published in the newspaper or on the internet. This makes no sense for the deliberative body that was designed as a check on executive power.

While these proposed reforms aim to improve congressional oversight through common-sense changes or clarifications in House procedure and committee structure, these still only address failures of intelligence oversight that we have gleaned from our current knowledge of the byzantine maze of surveillance agency activities so far. The picture painted by the little knowledge that have right now is not pretty. An associated white paper presenting the reforms in more detail notes:

The last decade-and-a-half has witnessed major intelligence community failures. From the inability to connect the dots on 9/11 to false claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, from the unlawful commission of torture to the inability to predict the Arab spring, from lying to Congress about the NSA to CIA surveillance of Senate staff, the intelligence community has a credibility gap. Moreover, with recent revelations about secret government activities, to the apparent surprise of many members of Congress, it is increasingly clear that Congress has not engaged in effective oversight of the intelligence community .

To get a fuller picture of the extent of the problem, the letter proposes that the House adopt a special committee to conduct a distinct, broad-based review of the activities of the intelligence community after 9/11. Similar committees have been assembled in the past to address previous shortcomings:

The last time so many revelations of government misdeeds came to light in news reports, Congress reacted by forming two special committees to investigate intelligence community activities. The reports by the Church and Pike Committees led to wholesale reforms of the intelligence community , including improving congressional oversight mechanisms. The magnitude of current revelations and intelligence community failures leads to this conclusion: the House (and Senate) must establish a distinct, broad-based review of the activities of the intelligence community since 9/11. The House should establish a committee modeled after the Church or Pike Committees, provide it adequate staffing and financial support, and give it a broad mandate to review intelligence community activities, engage in public reporting wherever possible, and issue recommendations for reform.

The Church and Pike Committees of the 1970’s were products of a decade of explosive revelations of government surveillance run amok. The white paper cites a 1974 New York Times exclusive report by Seymour Hersh that revealed the CIA had been operationalized to inspect the mail, telephone communications, and residences of tens of thousands of uncharged private citizens since the 1950’s. Earlier that year, allegations that the U.S. Army had been performing illegal surveillance of American citizens were verified and repudiated by Senator Sam Ervin’s Military Surveillance Investigations. In 1975, a bombshell NSA investigation published by the Times reported that the then largely-unknown intelligence unit “eavesdrops on virtually all cable, Telex, and other nontelephone communications leaving and entering the United States” and “uses computers to sort out and obtain intelligence from the contents” in the now-infamous Project Shamrock. The revealed executive abuses of the Nixon administration provided the cherry on top of a growing distrust and anger with surreptitious U.S. surveillance practices.

Today is another era of outrageous whitstleblower reports and rapidly dwindling trust in U.S. surveillance bodies. A mere 24 percent of Americans reported that they trust the government to “do the right thing” most of the time in 2013 Rasmussen poll. (A miniscule 4 percent of your fellow Pollyanna patriots trust Uncle Sam all of the time.) Meanwhile, technological advances have allowed U.S. intelligence agencies a greater degree of potential (and, as Snowden revealed, actual) surveillance than every before. This gap in trust and power simply cannot continue indefinitely.

While not without their problems, the Church and Pike committees are noteworthy milestones in reclaiming congressional accountability over executive intelligence agencies run amok. Creating a new committee to comprehensively assess current surveillance agency activities, warts and all, and recommend accountability measures to address the unknown excesses that likely lurk in the shadows is one step in the right direction toward taming back the tentacles of unlawful government surveillance.

But if there’s one thing we’ve learned from the fruits of the 1970’s committees—namely, the Foreign Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978—it’s that what once served as a hindrance to government abuses may one day become a party to it. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) established by FISA that was intended to provide critical oversight of federal spying programs is today limited by the inadequate tools available to verify whether or not surveillance programs are lawful.

Imposing accountability on agencies whose missions are devoted to secrecy is a tough nut to crack. Our history struggling with this challenge suggests that these proposed reforms are good preliminary actions. But watching the watchers will continue to be an omnipresent duty.

I’ve been working closely with PFF’s new Adjunct Fellow Michael Palage on ICANN issues.  Here is his latest note , from the PFF blog.

ICANN recently proclaimed that the “Joint Project Agreement” (one of two contractual arrangements that ICANN has with the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) governing ICANN’s operations) will come to an end in September 2009. ICANN’s insistence on this point first became clear back in October 2008 at ICANN’s Washington, D.C. public forum on Improving Institutional Confidence when Peter Dengate Thrush, Chair of ICANN’s Board declared:

the Joint Project Agreement will conclude in September 2009. This is a legal fact, the date of expiry of the agreement. It’s not that anyone’s declared it or cancelled it; it was set up to expire in September 2009.

ICANN’s recently published 2008 Annual Report stuck to this theme:

“As we approach the conclusion of the Joint Project Agreement between the United States Department of Commerce and ICANN in September 2009…” – His Excellency Dr. Tarek Kamel, Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Arab Republic of Egypt

“Concluding the JPA in September 2009 is the next logical step in transition of the DNS to private sector management.” – ICANN Staff

“This consultation’s aim was for the community to discuss possible changes to ICANN in the lead-up to the completion of the JPA in September 2009.” – ICANN Staff

ICANN’s effort to make the termination of the JPA seem inevitable is concerning on two fronts. First, ICANN fails to mention that the current JPA appears to be merely an extension/revision of the original 1998 Memorandum of Understand (MoU) with DoC, which was set to expire in September 2000. Thus, because the JPA does not appear to be a free-standing agreement, but merely a continuation of MOU-as Bret Fausset argues in his excellent analysis of the relationship between the MoU and the JPA (also discussed by Milton Mueller). Therefore, it would be more correct to talk about whether the “MoU/JPA”-meaning the entire agreement as modified by the most current JPA-will expire or be extended.

Although previous MoUs with the USG have been extended, ICANN seems to be playing a game of chicken with the USG-hinting that it will not extend the current MoU/JPA if ICANN believes that it has completed its mission. Since it seems possible that ICANN really might walk away from the MoU/JPA without global stakeholder consensus that it has fully completed its obligations under the MoU/JPA, it is critical that we think about the consequences of such a unilateral move by ICANN. ICANN would likely argue that the bilateral contracts it has in place with registry operators-from which ICANN has carefully removed most references to the USG in recent years-provide a sufficient legal basis for ICANN to continue its current operations without direct USG oversight.

Some stakeholders have expressed concern about the idea of ICANN not being directly held accountable to any government entity, but ICANN appears to have attempted to preemptively address this concern, when it acknowledged in its 2008 Annual report that “[t]he California attorney general is the legal overseer of California nonprofit public benefit corporations such as ICANN.”

With the future stability and security of the Internet hanging in the balance, a neutral third party ought to analyze the current existing relationship between the USG and ICANN- before ICANN decides in September 2009 whether to renew the MoU/JPA or walk away. The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the ideal candidate for such a task, given its well-established reputation for independent analysis and prior experience studying these matters-especially its detailed 2000 analysis of the early stages of DoC’s relationship with ICANN.

In conducting a new study, GAO ought to consider the following issues:

• Since the original 2000 GAO report on ICANN, ICANN’s annual budget has skyrocketed to more than $60 million. That budget is set to grow significantly once ICANN begins accepting applications for new gTLDs on a large scale: Using ICANN’s own projections of new gTLD applicants and the minimum fees that will be assessed suggests that ICANN’s budget will soon exceed $100 million. As ICANN’s budget grows, one must ask: Are these fees-paid by largely gTLD registrants, registrars, and registries-consistent with the GAO’s conclusion in its 2000 report that ICANN is limited to recovering only actual costs (because “ICANN is a project partner with the Department under the memorandum of understanding, and it is the Department’s policy to allow project partners to recover only actual project costs”)?

• If ICANN walked away from the MoU/JPA without the USG formally acknowledging that ICANN had successful fulfilled its obligations under the agreement, would ICANN be able to rely upon its existing contracts with registry operators to continue collecting fees?

• In its 2000 report, the GAO asked whether the DoC “had the authority to transfer control of the authoritative root server to ICANN.” The GAO did not definitively answer this question, but concluded that it was “uncertain whether transferring control would involve the transfer of government property to a private entity” thus giving rise to implications involving the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.), which requires statutory authority for the disposal of government property.

• GAO investigated, but did not resolve, whether or not an act of Congress would thus be required to transfer control of the root server to ICANN. But GAO did not undertake the same analysis as to whether the contractual rights associated with the top-level domains themselves constituted “government property” requiring Congressional action for any to transfer to ICANN. This may have been because U.S. courts had, at that time, held that domain names were not “property” in general, but simply a contractual right to a service provided by the registration authority. But potentially changed with the Ninth Circuit’s 2003 decision in Kremen v. Network Solutions concerning sex.com. Thus, if the GAO concludes that ICANN’s gTLD contracts with registry operators involve property rights and that statutory authority would be required for the DoC to transfer these rights to ICANN, it is difficult to see how ICANN would be able to enforce these rights if ICANN ended its relationship with the USG as a project partner by walking away from the MoU/JPA-regardless of ICANN’s success in removing references to the USG in these contracts.

These are just some of the initial questions the GAO needs to answer well before September 2009, independent of whether the USG and ICANN decide to extend the MoU/JPA. The stakes are just too high for these questions to remain unanswered.