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New Paper on “A History of Cronyism & Capture in the Information Technology Sector”

by on July 2, 2013 · 1 comment

WP coverThe Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives. Continue reading →

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Google’s Lobby Shop Creates Need for Itself

by on July 14, 2010 · 1 comment

“Live by the sword, die by the sword.”

“Play with fire and you might get burned.”

Those are lines that sprung to my mind as I read this FT article noting how Google’s support for ‘net neutrality regulation has transmogrified into a push for “search neutrality.” Such regulation would be aimed directly at Google’s heart throat nuts business model.

(I was the first to discuss “search neutrality” here on TLF. Ignore Adam’s comment.)

But sloganeering is cheap. Let’s take a minute to try and understand why things like this happen to companies like Google.

First, I think, most executives—certainly executives in tech companies—don’t understand Washington at all. They have a gauzy impression that good people work for the betterment of public policy here.

Actually, that’s true. Just about everyone is good. And everyone is working for the betterment of public policy as they see it. The thing is, everybody sees the betterment of public policy as turning it to their own interests. Washington, D.C. is a war of all against all—each trying to grab the most stuff—using politics instead of clubs, knives, and guns.

Next, I think it’s important to recognize the incentives of the people who advise tech executives. They are people with families and mortgages. They want to have and keep a job. So what do they do? They encourage involvement in public policy. The public policy advisor who says “steer clear of Washington” may be giving better advice, but his consulting contract is small and its term is short.

The government relations/lobbying shop in a company like Google is part of a larger business, yes, but it is a small bureaucracy within the business. It doesn’t produce anything subject to competitive pricing, so (accounting practices notwithstanding) there is little way to measure its value. The fallback measure is activity—the more things happening, the more ‘valuable’ the lobbying shop. (Surprise me, Google, so famous for measurement, testing, and rigor in product development. Have you got a way to measure the true value produced by your lobbying shop, law department, accounting group, etc.?)

You see how the dynamics quickly get perverse. A public policy advisor or lobbyist makes him- or herself ‘valuable’ by getting the client into trouble.

Google is not in trouble. The FT story is premature, and it’s overstatement to say that Google has been “hoisted by its own petard.”

But imagine a controlled experiment in which another Google in a parallel universe didn’t draw attention to itself in Washington, D.C., didn’t push for conditions in the 700 MHz spectrum auction, didn’t advocate for ‘net neutrality regulation, and so on. That Google might not have created—or might have delayed—the need for a permanent lobbying/government relations cost center.

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Lessig on Building a Better Bureaucrat

by on December 24, 2008 · 24 comments

Before commenting on Lawrence Lessig’s latest call to abolish the Federal Communications Commission (he issued a similar call for the FCC’s abolition earlier this year, which I commented on here), let’s recall what Tim Lee posted yesterday about “Real Regulators“:

Too many advocates of regulation seem to have never considered the possibility that the FCC bureaucrats in charge of making these decisions at any point in time might be lazy, incompetent, technically confused, or biased in favor of industry incumbents. That’s often what “real regulators” are like, and it’s important that when policy makers are crafting regulatory scheme, they assume that some of the people administering the law will have these kinds of flaws, rather than imagining that the rules they write will be applied by infallible philosopher-kings.

Ironically, Prof. Lessig — who typically defends many forms of high-tech regulation like Net neutrality and online content labeling — is essentially agreeing with Tim’s critique of bureaucracy. But Lessig seems to ignore the underlying logic of Tim’s critique and instead imagines that we need only reinvent bureaucracy in order to save it. But I’m getting ahead of myself. First, let’s hear what Lessig proposes.

In a Newsweek column this week entitled “Reboot the FCC,” Lessig argues that the FCC is beyond saving because, instead of protecting innovation, the agency has succumb to an “almost irresistible urge to protect the most powerful instead.” Consequently, he continues:

The solution here is not tinkering. You can’t fix DNA. You have to bury it. President Obama should get Congress to shut down the FCC and similar vestigial regulators, which put stability and special interests above the public good. In their place, Congress should create something we could call the Innovation Environment Protection Agency (iEPA), charged with a simple founding mission: “minimal intervention to maximize innovation.” The iEPA’s core purpose would be to protect innovation from its two historical enemies–excessive government favors, and excessive private monopoly power.

As was the case with his earlier call to “blow up the FCC,” I am tickled to hear Lessig call for shutting down an agency that many of us have been fighting against for the last few decades. (Here’s a 1995 blueprint for abolishing the FCC that I contributed to, and here’s PFF’s recent “DACA” project to comprehensively reform and downsize the agency.)

But is Lessig really calling for the same sort of sweeping regulatory reform and downsizing that others have been calling for? And has he identified the real source of the problem that he hopes to correct?  I don’t think so. There are 3 basic problems with the argument Lessig is putting forward in his essay. I will address each in turn.

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