I was honored to be asked by the editors at Reason magazine to be a part of their “Revolutionary Reading” roundup of “The 9 Most Transformative Books of the Last 45 Years.”  Reason is celebrating its 45th anniversary and running a wide variety of essays looking back at how liberty has fared over the past half-century. The magazine notes that “Statism has hardly gone away, but the movement to roll it back is stronger than ever.” For this particular feature, Reason’s editors “asked seven libertarians to recommend some of the books in different fields that made [the anti-statist] cultural and intellectual revolution possible.”

When Jesse Walker of Reason first contacted me about contributing my thoughts about which technology policy books made the biggest difference, I told him I knew exactly what my choices would be: Ithiel de Sola Pool’s Technologies of Freedom (1983) and Virginia Postrel’s The Future and Its Enemies (1998). Faithful readers of this blog know all too well how much I love these two books and how I am constantly reminding people of their intellectual importance all these years later. (See, for example, this and this.) All my thinking and writing about tech policy over the past two decades has been shaped by the bold vision and recommendations set forth by Pool and Postrel in these beautiful books.

As I note in my Reason write-up of the books:

The past 45 years have seen remarkable advances in information technology: the Internet, mobile communications, ubiquitous news and entertainment options, and much more. What made these and other innovations possible was a general openness to the unplanned, the unpredictable, and even the uncontrollable. In our willingness to embrace a world of uncertainty and incessant change, we found unparalleled technological abundance. No two books more eloquently captured and celebrated the information age than Ithiel de Sola Pool’s Technologies of Freedom and Virginia Postrel’s The Future and Its Enemies.

And I conclude by noting that “While plenty of tech pundits and academics cling to… stasist thinking today, Pool and Postrel’s books continue to provide beacons for a better world, free from the top-down, technocratic mentality and prescriptions of the past. At least thus far, permissionless innovation has largely trumped the precautionary principle in tech policy. Let’s hope the dynamist vision can hold the line for another 45 years.”

Head over to Reason to read the rest of my essay as well as all the other excellent books that contributors have recommended as part of the symposium.  There are some really great selections in there.

And if you care about the future of technological freedom and human liberty and progress more generally, please do read (or re-read) both Pool and Postrel’s books when you have a chance.  They changed my life and they will change yours, too.

Tom W. Bell, professor of law at Chapman University and author of the concluding essay in Copyright Unbalanced, a new book edited by Surprisingly Free’s own Jerry Brito, discusses the ways in which copyright has evolved over time and why reform is vital.

Bell differentiates copyright from other types of property, arguing that conflating the two terms causes great confusion amongst laypeople and, over time, corrodes the value placed in tangible property rights. According to Bell, copyright is a privilege created by statute that doesn’t exist in a state of nature and is not recognized by common law.

As a special type of economic good, copyright must be treated differently than tangible property rights, according to Bell, who outlines five proposals for copyright reform.

While Bell is not opposed to copyright, he argues that copyright enforcement has gone too far, and lawmakers should structure policies to lead us towards a world in which we conceivably do without it.

Download

Related Links

• Copyright Unbalanced: From Incentive to Excess, by Brito, et al
• Intellectual Privilege: A Libertarian View of Copyright, Bell
• Copyright Duration and the Mickey Mouse Curve, Tech Liberation Front

Earlier this year I read Scott Cleland’s new book, Search & Destroy: Why You Can’t Trust Google, Inc., after he was kind enough to send me an advance copy. I didn’t have time to review it at the time and just jotted down a few notes for use later. Because the year is winding down, I figured I should get my thoughts on it out now before I publish my end of year compendium of important tech policy books.

Cleland is President of Precursor LLC and a noted Beltway commentator on information policy issues, especially Net neutrality regulation, which he has vociferously railed against for many years. On a personal note, I’ve known Scott for many years and always enjoyed his analysis and wit, even when I disagree with the thrust of some of it.

And I’m sad to report that I disagree with most of it in Search & Destroy, a book that is nominally about Google but which is really a profoundly skeptical look at the modern information economy as we know it. Indeed, Cleland’s book might have been more appropriately titled, “Second Thoughts about Cyberspace.” In a sense, it represents an outline for an emerging “cyber-conservative” vision that aims to counter both “cyber-progressive” and “cyber-libertarian” schools of thinking.

After years of having Scott’s patented bullet-point mini-manifestos land in my mailbox, I think it’s only appropriate I write this review in the form of a bulleted list! So, here it goes..

The Central Irony of the Book

• The central irony of the book — and one that he never confronts — is that, in the name of dealing with what he regards as “Big Brother, Inc.,” Cleland thinks we must call in Big Government to deal with Google and the digital economy in general.
• Cleland has spent the last decade railing against the “cyber-collectivist” or “digital commons” movement (I’ll just call them “cyber-progressives”) and yet, ironically, in Search & Destroy, he has adopted their tone and tactics in vilifying Google, one of the great capitalist success stories of our time.
• In a sense, Cleland has unwittingly joined his cyber-conservatism with the cyber-progressivism he supposedly detests. His passionate belief in “security” and the Rule of Law quickly devolves into the Rule of Man (or regulators, that is) over a corporate entity that he fundamentally distrusts and loathes. But it also signals his acceptance of a much greater role for government in policing all of cyberspace.

On Privacy as Property & Privacy Regulation in General

• The book is loaded with over-the-top rhetoric and techno-panicky talk — not just about Google but about other issues, like online privacy more generally.
• Cleland has made the grave error of suggesting — again in line with the cyber-progressive movement he typically derides — that privacy should essentially be treated as property right and that extensive regulation is needed in the name of protecting privacy online.
• Importantly, in railing against various types of data collection or advertising practices, Cleland doesn’t seem to appreciate that his book is not just an indictment of Google but of the entire Information Economy as we know it. The data collection and online advertising practices he decries and believes should be regulated are the engines that run not just Google, but a large percentage of the business models for new and old companies alike. (I began wondering at points in the book how Cleland felt about analog era data collection companies like Experian, TransUnion, Equifax, etc.)
• Indeed, there are times while reading the book when I found Cleland’s views on privacy and information policy virtually indistinguishable from those of the radical Left, many of whom he cites favorably in the book! (ex: Frank Pasquale, Mark Rottenberg, GoogleWatch.)
• I know Cleland will cringe at the thought, but there are clear similarities between his book and Tim Wu’s book The Master Switch, with their common fears about “information empires” and “Big Brother, Inc.”  The difference is that Cleland singles out Google as the most problematic.
• Again, this is a dangerous game Cleland is playing since his indictment of Google could be applied to many other Digital Economy operators, just as Wu has done in The Master Switch by suggesting that action needs to be taken against not just Google but also Apple, AT&T, Verizon, Facebook, Amazon, and even Twitter who are all “information monopolists” in Wu’s view.

The False Link to Friedman & Hayek

• Cleland is wildly off-base in enlisting the words and Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek in support of his indictment of Google.
• Cleland imagines that Google’s “central planning” efforts are roughly equivalent to government central planning. That is horribly misguided and to enlist Friedman and Hayek’s words in defense of this thesis is a travesty.
• Friedman and Hayek’s critique of central planning was squarely focused on the State, not corporations. While it may be the case that elements of their critique could be applied to large private entities that attempt audacious tasks like “organizing the all the world’s information,” it does not follow that the State must take action to counter those business objectives, no matter how quixotic. This is where marketplace trial and error — not anticipatory regulation — is the better way to determine what is efficient and what consumers desire.
• To use a Hayekian term, Cleland is guilty of the “pretense of knowledge” problem by imagining he (or the government) has a more sensible vision for how these digital markets should look or operate. Only ongoing experimentation can tell us that.

On Solutions

• We can all agree that more transparency about privacy/data collection practices (for Google and others) is generally a good idea, but it’s clear that is not enough for Cleland.
• He wants to bring in the wrecking ball of antitrust, thinking that this is the way to better organize the markets that Google serves.
• Again, the irony is that he sees no conflict between this prescription and his general distaste for Big Government in other contexts.  As I noted in my 2009 review of Gary Reback’s tedious screed Free the Market, there are some conservatives who subscribe to the illogical belief that antitrust law is not a form of economic regulation. Sadly, Cleland is one of them. Instead, in his view, antitrust is about “the Rule of Law.” Except that, at root, antitrust is really just as much about the Rule of Men as tradition administrative agency regulation. And those men can make many mistakes, especially when they imagine they can magically concoct a supposedly better plan for fast-moving, high-tech sectors.

Where Cyber-Conservatives & Cyber-Libertarians Part Ways

• Part of what Cleland has done in this book is to further develop a theory of “cyber-conservativism.”
• We are beginning to see a serious schism develop between cyber-conservatives (like Scott) and cyber-libertarians (like myself and many others here at the TLF).
• Over the past decade, cyber-conservatives and cyber-libertarians have been allies on many important economic policy battles (ex: Net neutrality and Net taxes are two good examples).
• But the cyber-conservative desire to make everything subservient to “security and stability,” and their tendency to sometimes extend property right concepts well beyond their natural or practical application, is what leads to a strong break with cyber-libertarians, who value liberty, experimentation, dynamism, and limited government above all else.
• This tension is going to grow more acute in coming years as information control efforts become increasingly onerous and costly (especially on the copyright, privacy, and cyber-security fronts).
• Cyber-conservatives will need to ask themselves just how far they want the State to go to achieve “security and stability,” or to preserve and / or extend property rights into the sphere of intangible information flows.
• Cleland’s book suggests he is willing to make that leap in a fairly aggressive way to take down a company that many cyber-libertarians believe has been a great innovator and prime example of cyber-capitalism at its finest.
• Like some other conservatives, Cleland has also strongly endorsed sweeping copyright regulation that would fundamentally alter the Internet’s architecture in the name of protecting copyright.  Most cyber-libertarians could never accept such “by-any-means-necessary” approaches to copyright protection.
• But the most interesting fight in the short-term will be over privacy controls. Cleland’s book signals the desire of some conservatives to have government take a more active role in the name protecting (or even “property-tizing” personal information). Some conservative policymakers, like Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX), have long been in that same boat. It will be interesting to see how many more conservatives join them and then make alliances with cyber-progressives, who are gung-ho about expanding the power of the State in this regard.
• One thing is certain to me after reading Scott’s book: Any alliances we cyber-libertarians make with cyber-conservatives will be fleeting and fickle affairs, just as they often are when we broker peace treaties with cyber-progressives. I suppose I was naïve to ever have thought we could bring more of either group fully into our liberty-loving camp.  But what concerns me even more is that those other two camps may increasingly (sometimes unwittingly, of course) be joining forces to expand the reach of Big Government’s tentacles until the entire digital economy is smothered in innovation-stifling bureaucracy and red tape.
• “The natural progress of things is for liberty to yield and government to gain ground,” Thomas Jefferson taught us long ago. With conservatives increasingly joining progressives in calling for greater State control of cyberspace, it is now clear to me just how lonely we libertarians will be in calling for government to keep its hands off the Net.

__________

Related Reading:

• Cyber-Libertarianism: The Case for Real Internet Freedom (with Berin Szoka)
• What Cablegate Tells Us about Cyber-Conservatism (by Jerry Brito)
• What Privacy Conservatives & Moral Conservatives Share in Common
• SOPA & Selective Memory about a Technologically Incompetent Congress
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka — (Ver. 1.0 — Summer 2009)

We are attempting to articulate the core principles of cyber-libertarianism to provide the public and policymakers with a better understanding of this alternative vision for ordering the affairs of cyberspace. We invite comments and suggestions regarding how we should refine and build-out this outline. We hope this outline serves as the foundation of a book we eventually want to pen defending what we regard as “Real Internet Freedom.” [Note:  Here’s a printer-friendly version, which we also have embedded down below as a Scribd document.]

I. What is Cyber-Libertarianism?

Cyber-libertarianism refers to the belief that individuals—acting in whatever capacity they choose (as citizens, consumers, companies, or collectives)—should be at liberty to pursue their own tastes and interests online.

Generally speaking, the cyber-libertarian’s motto is “Live & Let Live” and “Hands Off the Internet!”  The cyber-libertarian aims to minimize the scope of state coercion in solving social and economic problems and looks instead to voluntary solutions and mutual consent-based arrangements.

Cyber-libertarians believe true “Internet freedom” is freedom from state action; not freedom for the State to reorder our affairs to supposedly make certain people or groups better off or to improve some amorphous “public interest”—an all-to convenient facade behind which unaccountable elites can impose their will on the rest of us.

B.  Application in Social & Economic Contexts

The cyber-libertarian draws no distinction between social and economic freedom when applying this vision:

• Social Freedom: Individuals should be granted liberty of conscience, thought, opinion, speech, and expression in online environments.
• Economic Freedom: Individuals should be granted liberty of contract, innovation, and exchange in online environments.

Cyber-libertarians also argue that social and economic freedoms are inextricably intertwined:  It is not enough to support liberty of action in one sphere; foreclosing freedom in one sphere will eventually affect freedom in the other.

C.  How “Code Failures” Are to Be Addressed

The cyber-libertarian believes that “code failures” (the digital equivalent of so-called “market failures”) are better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions.   From a practical perspective, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those responses.  Stated differently, cyber-libertarians have a strong aversion to the politicization of technology issues and efforts to replace market processes with bureaucratic processes.

Importantly, the cyber-libertarian defines “markets” broadly to include monetary and non-monetary transactions as well as proprietary and non-proprietary modes of production.  To be clear, collaborative, non-proprietary technologies and efforts ( e.g., Wikipedia and open source software) are not at odds with cyber-libertarianism.  But the cyber-libertarian does reject the notion these models are the only acceptable model or that they should be imposed on us by law.  The proper policy position with regards to the “open vs. closed” or “proprietary vs. non-proprietary” debate should be one of techno-agnosticism.  Lawmakers and courts should not be tilting the balance in one direction or the other.

More generally speaking, instead of seeking to define or impose a single utopian vision, the cyber-libertarian seeks to enable what libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick called a “Utopia of Utopias:” a framework within which many different models of organizing commerce and community can flourish alongside, and in competition with, each other.

D.  General Relationship to “Internet Exceptionalism”

Internet exceptionalists are first cousins to cyber-libertarians:  They believe that the Internet has changed culture and history profoundly and is deserving of special care before governments intervene.  [See Section IV for an expanded discussion.]

II. The Intellectual Foundations of Cyber-Libertarianism

A.  Traditional Libertarian Philosophy

• Natural Rights philosophers –John Locke, Ayn Rand, The Founders
• Utilitarian philosophers – John Stuart Mill (On Liberty), Herbert Spencer
• “Austrian School” of Economics – Ludwig von Mises, F.A.  Hayek, Murray Rothbard
• Milton Friedman (Free to Choose)
• Robert Nozick – argument for a minimalist state; “utopia of utopias” notion
• Thomas Sowell – critique of “The Vision of the Anointed”
• Richard Epstein – vision of “Simple Rules for a Complex World

B.  Modern Cyber-Libertarian Theorists

• Ithiel de Sola Pool (Technologies of Freedom)
• Alvin Toffler (The Third Wave , Future Shock)
• George Gilder (Microcosm , Telecosm)
• Peter Huber (Law & Disorder in Cyberspace)
• Tom W.  Bell
• Technology Liberation Front bloggers

C.  Internet Exceptionalists[see Sec.  IV below]

• Nicholas Negroponte (Being Digital)
• John Perry Barlow (“Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”)
• David Post
• Eric Goldman
• H.  Brian Holland

III. The Contrast with Cyber-Collectivism

A.  Cyber-Collectivism Defined

Cyber-collectivism is the opposite of cyber-libertarianism.  Cyber-collectivism refers to the general belief that cyber-choices should be guided by the State or an elite class according to some amorphous “general will” or “public interest.”  The distant influence of Plato, Rousseau, and Marx can often been seen in the work of cyber-collectivists.

Cyber-collectivism comes in many flavors, however.  “Left”-leaning cyber-collectivists, for example, are more focused on social concerns than economic ones.  Some “Right”-leaning cyber-collectivists are focused on controlling the impact of the Internet on culture or security.  In other words, cyber-collectivism is not as philosophically coherent as cyber-libertarianism—which, though it comes in many flavors, shares a larger core of common agreement

B.  General Relationship to “Information Commons” Movement

There is a close relationship between the Leftist variant of cyber-collectivism and the “digital commons” or “information commons” movement, which generally refers to the belief that digital resources should be shared or perhaps commonly owned instead of held privately—both because cyber-collectivists think this is more equitable and because they generally think such arrangements will ultimately work better.

Cyber-collectivists are typically not Marxists; few of them call for state ownership of the information means of production.  Rather, cyber-collectivists might better be thought of a “cyber social Democrats” (in a European sense) or “Digital New Dealers” (in the American tradition).  They advocate a generous role for law and regulation in many online matters, but do not typically resort to full-blown nationalization.

C. Exponents of Cyber-Collectivism

Some notable cyber-collectivists or information commons adherents (and their key works):

• Lawrence Lessig (Code , Free Culture)
• Tim Wu (Who Controls the Internet?)
• Yochai Benkler (The Wealth of Networks)
• Jonathan Zittrain (The Future of the Internet & How to Stop It)
• David Bollier (Viral Spiral)
• Harvard Berkman Center*
• New America Foundation*
• Public Knowledge*

(*We are, of course, generalizing a bit here. Not everyone in these institutions is a cyber-collectivist and, again, there are many flavors of cyber-collectivism, just as there are many flavors of cyber-libertarianism. Individuals in some of these organizations diverge significantly in attitudes towards technological change and the proper scope of government influence throughout the high-tech sector.)

IV. Relationship Between Cyber-Libertarianism & Internet Exceptionalism

Some non-libertarians occasionally join ranks with cyber-libertarians out of a belief that the Internet is different and deserving of special consideration and care. This is commonly referred to as “Cyber-Exceptionalism” or “Internet Exceptionalism.” John Perry Barlow’s 1996 “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” was probably the earliest (and most extreme) articulation of “Internet Exceptionalism”:

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions. You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.

Similarly, in 1994, The Progress & Freedom Foundation brought together four leading technology visionaries (Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin Toffler) to pen A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age. In that manifesto, the authors argued:

Cyberspace is the land of knowledge, and the exploration of that land can be a civilization’s truest, highest calling. The opportunity is now before us to empower every person to pursue that calling in his or her own way. The challenge is as daunting as the opportunity is great. The Third Wave has profound implications for the nature and meaning of property, of the marketplace, of community and of individual freedom. As it emerges, it shapes new codes of behavior that move each organism and institution—family, neighborhood, church group, company, government, nation—inexorably beyond standardization and centralization, as well as beyond the materialist’s obsession with energy, money and control. Turning the economics of mass-production inside out, new information technologies are driving the financial costs of diversity—both product and personal—down toward zero, “demassifying” our institutions and our culture. Accelerating demassification creates the potential for vastly increased human freedom. It also spells the death of the central institutional paradigm of modern life, the bureaucratic organization. (Governments, including the American government, are the last great redoubt of bureaucratic power on the face of the planet, and for them the coming change will be profound and probably traumatic.)

As that last paragraph suggests, this “Magna Carta” for cyberspace contained some hints of cyber-libertarian thinking, but the general thrust of the document was more generally of the Internet Exceptionalist school of thought.

Internet Exceptionalists are sometime critiqued for sounding like techno-utopians, but it is a mistake to conflate the two. There are not always synonymous.

V. Cyber-Libertarianism’s Early Legal Foundations & Victories

• Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 is probably the best example of cyber-exceptionalism in practice. It grants broad immunity to online intermediaries for third party content except for criminal and IP law—breaking with traditional tort liability standards. Specifically, Sec. 230 rejected the “deputization of the middleman” model of liability.
• Overturning of the Communications Decency Act’s indecency & obscenity provisions in Reno v. ACLU decision
• Various court decisions blocking enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1999
• The encryption wars & the defeat of the “Clipper Chip”
• The Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998

VI. Applications: How Cyber-Libertarians Think about Various Policy Issues

• Free speech & online child safety: Favor parental empowerment and industry self-regulation over censorship. “Household standards” should trump “community standards.”
• Privacy policy & online advertising: Privacy is a subjective condition and efforts to regulate to “protect privacy” could have unintended consequences for freedom of speech and the growth of online content and commerce. User empowerment and industry self-regulation represent the superior way to address privacy concerns.
• Net neutrality / infrastructure regulation: “Open access” regulation is nothing more the infrastructure socialism. Network operators should be free to own, operate, and price their systems and services as they see fit, subject only to enforcement of their terms of service and other voluntary disclosures as contracts with their users. New entry and innovation are better alternative to regulating yesterday’s networks and technologies.
• Internet taxation: No special taxes should be imposed on online services or Internet access. To the extent the Net disrupts traditional tax bases that should be seen as an opportunity to reform those tax systems.
• Online gambling: People should be free to do what they want with their money and Internet gambling is likely impossible to shut down entirely anyway, given the nature of the Internet.
• Antitrust: “Market power” and “code failures” are best dealt with by spontaneous evolution of markets and new entry, not bureaucratic micro-management of old technologies or market structures. Regulation often creates, or tends to foster, most monopolies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool once noted, “The force that preserves most monopoly privilege is law… most would vanish in the absence of enforcement.”
• IP issues: Cyber-libertarians are deeply divided over IP issues (especially copyright) and this reflects a long-standing division within libertarian ranks on these issues more generally. Some believe IP rights are a natural extension of traditional property rights and/or a sensible way to incentivize scientific and artistic creativity. Others believe no one has a right to “property-tize” intangible creations or that copyright is simply industrial protectionism. And there are many views in between.

VII. Prospects for Cyber-Libertarianism

A. The Pessimistic View

• Government’s will quash online freedom and bring the Internet under their thumbs.
• Regulatory efforts are expanding at a breathtaking pace and will not slow anytime soon.

B. The Optimistic View

• “Technologies of Freedom” (tools and methods to avoid online regulation, censorship and control) will ultimately triumph.
• Technology is evolving faster than government’s ability to regulate it.

VIII. Related Reading on Cyber-Libertarianism & Internet Exceptionalism

• John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996).
• Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence , 87 U. Minn. L. Rev. 743 (2003).
• Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, & Alvin Toffler, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age (1994).
• Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, Santa Clara Magazine (Winter 2008).
• H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, Kansas L. Rev. (2007).
• Peter Huber, Law & Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm (1997).
• Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (1983).
• David Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace (2009).
• Adam Thierer, The Pragmatic Internet Optimist’s Creed, Technology Liberation Front Blog (Nov. 11, 2008).
• Technology Liberation Front Blog, About the Technology Liberation Front (August 2004, revised 2008).

Cyber-Libertarianism: The Case for Real Internet Freedom [Ver 1.0 – Thierer & Szoka] http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=18490847&access_key=key-14tt6eb4f2cdcil8wnf2&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty turns 150 this year. Published in 1859, this slender manifesto for human liberty went on to become a classic of modern philosophy and political science.  It remains a beautiful articulation of the core principles of human liberty and a just society.

Anyone familiar with the book recognizes the importance of the opening chapter and Mill’s “one very simple principle” for “the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion”:

That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

Mill went on to outline “the appropriate region of human liberty,” and divided it into:

1. “liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.”
2. “liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong”
3. “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others”

Bringing it altogether, he argued:

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

To this day, I do not believe there has been a more eloquent or concise summation of the central principles of libertarianism than those passages from Chapter 1 of the book. But what many fail to remember or appreciate is the equally powerful second chapter of Mill’s treatise, “On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion.” It was a bold defense of freedom of speech and expression that was many decades ahead of its time. And it still has lessons and warnings worth heeding in our modern Information Age.

Mill opened that chapter by noting that:

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the “liberty of the press” as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear.

Alas, Mill knew that we weren’t quite there yet in 1859. Efforts to suppress speech and expression were alive and well. And so he marshaled all his intellectual forces to construct a powerful critique of censorship in all its forms:

The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. … We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

Mill went on to show how, at root, censorship is based on arrogance and elitism:

Those who desire to suppress [an opinion], of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

More profoundly, Mill taught us that the right to freedom of thought and expression was a core right upon which almost all our other rights depended:

Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.

In other words, if you care about any other rights and wish to exercise them to their fullest, you must first have the right to express opinions and, importantly, have them subjected to the opinions of others. This is how truth is discovered.

[Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning.

And Mill taught us that it is essential we be vigilant in defending our rights of speech and expression because, sadly, “the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution,” he correctly noted.

Mill’s words are every bit as relevant in 2009 as they were 1859. While we enjoy significant speech and press freedoms here in the United States today, censorial threats persist.  Just a few years ago, the House of Representatives passed the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on all social networking sites in public schools and libraries.  DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a remarkably lopsided 410-15 vote, but luckily failed to get through the Senate. However, Congress did pass several other online censorship measures in the 1990s, including the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998, which luckily were both struck down by the courts.

Of course, we have it pretty good here in the States thanks the existence of the First Amendment to our Constitution. Most speech-restricting enactments get struck down today because they cannot withstand strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. But think about all those less fortunate in other countries who struggle on a regular basis to express themselves and learn the truth about the world and culture around them without interference from above.

Anyway, go give On Liberty another read if you haven’t done so in some time. It’s a timeless statement of the principles that should guide a just society. I’ll close with this apt warning from Mill about how history will remember those who fail to appreciate the importance of openness to new ideas:

And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity.

Update: A colleague of mine just brought to my attention this essay of “150 Years of On Liberty” by Jonathan M. Riley that appeared in this month’s edition of TPM: The Philosopher’s Magazine.

Just before the New Year, Mike Masnick reported:

It’s been well over five years since we first heard about a plan in Oregon to attach GPS devices to cars and tax drivers based on how much they drove and the idea hasn’t become any better in the intervening years… but apparently it’s still being pushed. Oregon’s governor is trying to move forward with the plan.  One of the reasons behind the bill has nothing to do with a more efficient way to tax drivers, but because the state is gaining less revenue from its gas tax since there are more fuel-efficient cars on the roads these days. Of course, rather than reward drivers for driving more fuel efficient cars, this sort of tax punishes them, and actually encourages the use of less fuel efficient vehicles. And, of course, that doesn’t even begin to get into the potential (and likely) privacy problems brought about by any system whereby the government has full access to a GPS system on your car.

This is a great example of the problems that often arise when trying to bring into the digital age areas of the economy monopolized or dominated by government.  There’s a clear (if imperfect) analogy here to Obama’s ambitious goal of digitizing health records:  both are great ideas that raise special privacy concerns because of the heavy involvement of government.  These privacy concerns are certainly not unwarranted:  I wouldn’t want the government to have access to my car’s location or my medical history at any given moment or a complete record of where I’ve driven or what doctors I’ve seen.  But just as relying on paper health records is clearly stupid (and dangerous), it would make a hell of a lot more sense for drivers to pay for road use depending on “where, when and how far they drove”—as in a small pilot project in the UK.

Today, state and Federal taxes on every gallon of gasoline are intended to serve two conflicting purposes—but do a poor job with both.  First, the taxes fund the cost of building and maintaining roads.  But the tax provides only a very rough proxy for how much driving Americans are doing, and says nothing about which roads are actually being used or when.  So government road planners have to guess at which roads need to be upgraded or where new roads are required.  Worse, the current system does nothing to encourage rational decisions on the part of drivers, who currently have no direct economic incentive (other than saving time) not to drive during rush hour or to use less-congested roads.

Second, the current tax system is what economists would call “Pigouvian“: it is intended to correct the negative externalities (air pollution) caused by driving.  But, again, taxing total gallons of gas consumed is a poor proxy for emissions.  As Cato’s Jerry Taylor points out (start podcast at 1:33), cars are already sufficiently computerized that if we really wanted to punish pollution through the tax system, we could directly tax emissions themselves by having each car keep track of unhealthy emissions and then uploading that data, say, at the car’s annual inspection.

So in a rational world, we’d abolish gasoline taxes entirely and institute user fees to fund the cost of roads & highways that reflect actual use.   If government insists on it, we could also tax emissions directly.  (We could make the whole transition revenue-neutral, lest this reform result in higher taxes/fees.)  Merely by reducing congestion, better economic incentives could significantly reduce air pollution.

If roads weren’t run by government monopolies, this kind of change would have happened a long time ago.  Although many people associate toll booths with road privatization, no private business would ever choose a technology as cumbersome (and costly) as toll booths if they had the option of using a system as seamless and invisible to the user as GPS-tracking or even existing transponder-based systems ( e.g.,  E-Z Pass, FasTrak).  Maybe there’s a more efficient or privacy-friendly option out there, or at least on the horizon.  I don’t know, but I suspect competing road operators would figure it out.

Some drivers might still be uncomfortable with the idea of a private company having access to their driving data, but that private company would have a strong incentive to compete for privacy-sensitive drivers by offering strong data protection policies (such as data anonymization and retention limits), which would of course be enforced under the FTC’s existing “unfair & deceptive trade practices.”

But because government has virtually monopolized the road system, we’re stuck with a terrible choice:

• Continue to use a “pricing” (tax) system from the 1950s when modern satellite and computer technology offers us clearly superior alternatives that could reduce congestion and pollution and perhaps even save lives; OR
• Risk putting the data created by those modern technologies directly into the government’s hands.

It’s a hard choice.  I don’t know what the right answer is—other than privatizing the roads, enforcing corporate privacy policies strictly under existing law, and increasing Fourth Amendment protections against government access to user data kept by companies.  Since road privatization is unlikely to happen in an era when we are (re)nationalizing core industries through bailouts, I suspect that we’ll end up having to choose either technology (with all its benefits)  or privacy, when we should be able to have both.

President Obama has talked about “investing” $50 billion in tax money over the next five years to subsidize the digitization of health records.  While one might hope that these records wouldn’t be directly accessible to government in the same way that driving records would be under the Oregon or UK projects, it’s by no means clear that this won’t be the case, given the Federal government’s dominant role in the health care sector.  If the Golden Rule (“He Who Has the Gold, Makes the Rules”) holds, increased government spending on health care across the board—whether in the name of e-Health or universal health—will surely lead to greater government control of the health care system.  That will probably mean greater access to e-health records.  If politicians can access FBI files of their opponents, they’ll probably abuse access to health care records, too.  No safeguards are ever perfect, of course, and invasions of privacy would happen if the data were kept by private companies, but at least those companies would be accountable in court, in the court of public opinion and in the marketplace if they allowed such violations by their employees or corporate partners, or simply failed to protect such a “honey pot” of data.

I’d like to see the most modern technology used across the board—whether it’s for roads or health care.  I just don’t want the real Big Brother—government—to have access to that information, a problem that is only going to increase as government’s role in our lives grows.

Adam Thierer noted in mid-December that the FCC was considering allowing the experimental use of cellphone jammers in prison.  The FCC just issued (PDF) a Special Temporary Authorization to allow the DC Department of Corrections to test a cell phone jamming technology.

This technology sounds like an excellent solution to a serious problem:  The illicit use of cell phones inside correctional facilities by prisoners across the country.  In particular, the technology appears to be “directional,” meaning that unlike traditional jammers, which simply block signals within a certain radius around the jammer, this technology appears to be capable of blocking signals inside the confines of a particular room or building.  In fact, I’m sure millions of Americans would love to see such technologies implemented in cinemas, theatres, and other performing arts venues across the country.  I, for one, am tired of having the exquisite acoustic delicacies of Bach interrupted by annoying ring tones, such as  the (painfully) immortal “Who Let the Dogs Out?”

So Much for The Rule of Law

But there’s one important problem: The FCC isn’t waiving a rule here against cell phone jammer. unless I’m missing some subtle statutory quirk, they’re essentially “waiving” a statute—specifically 47 U.S.C. 333:

No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter or operated by the United States Government.

You don’t need to be an administrative lawyer to know that agencies can’t just ignore acts of Congress—no matter how good the policy reason for the waiver is. That’s a big part of what the “rule of law” means.  Period.  Do not pass ‘Go’.  Do not collect $3,101.09 (today’s equivalent of $200 in 1935, when Monopoly debuted).

Fortunately, as noted in the WSJ article Adam cited, at least one legislator realizes this and thinks it’s worth fixing:  U.S. Rep. Kevin Brady (R., Texas) told the Journal that his office is “drafting the necessary legislation to remove this outdated FCC roadblock.”  The FCC, of course, sped right past that particular roadblock.  But then, what should we expect from an agency that has, under its outgoing (and none-too-soon!) chairman Kevin Martin, simply disregarded statutory limits on its authority when it found Comcast in violation of the agency’s non-binding net neutrality principles this summer?  (My PFF colleague Barbara Esbin has eloquently condemned this violation of the rule of law in, “The Law is Whatever the Nobles Do: Undue Process at the FCC” (PDF).)

Now, when Congress considers this question, let us hope that they draw the right lesson from this episode:   Whatever the wisdom of outright bans on particular technologies, writing such bans into statutes is a really bad idea.  At least if such decisions were left up to regulatory agencies, they would have the flexibility to decide when to depart from a general ban.  Thus, the best approach would be to repeal the ban altogether.  The FCC probably already has the authority to ban jammers under Section 302a, which provides that:

The Commission may, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, make reasonable regulations:

(1) governing the interference potential of devices which in their operation are capable of emitting radio frequency energy by radiation, conduction, or other means in sufficient degree to cause harmful interference to radio communications…

A Legislative Solution

Now, if Rep. Brady wanted to establish an orderly procedure for replacing Section 333’s outright ban on cell phone jammers with a more reasonable, and flexible, rule, the bill repealing Section 333 might also simply give the FCC the authority to issue Special Temporary Authorizations like the one the FCC just issued to the DC Department of Corrections—but also require that the agency complete a rule-making proceeding within, say, a year to establish new regulations specifying precisely which jammers would be banned.  At a minimum, the new regulations could achieve legally what the FCC is trying to achieve illegally:   banning cell phone jammers except for use in correctional facilities and only subject to certain technical requirements intended to ensure that the jamming was sufficiently “directional” not to obstruct cell phone reception nearby such facilities.

But if such directional jamming is really possible, why not allow the use of jammers in performance venues?  Of course, some consumers might not actually prefer to suffer through a few stray ring-tones during a movie if it means being able to receive calls on vibrate or text messages or email in case of emergency.  But I’d rather leave that decision to private property owners and consumers.  These are not questions Congress should attempt to answer:  Those answers would necessarily be enshrined in statute, and therefore very difficult to change.  Instead, these decisions should be left up to the FCC and resolved through the normal rule-making process.  If the initial rule-making bans private uses of jammers, at least there would be an established procedure whereby the rule could be more easily changed in the future, as technology develops.

A Future Without a Jammer Ban

With all such technologies banned today, there is probably little incentive to develop better jamming technology that can be more carefully tailored.  But if at least some uses of jamming technology were allowed, there would be a market that could drive the development of better jamming technologies in the future.  So if the FCC’s concern were that today’s jammers caused unacceptable levels of unintentional interference to cell phone networks, that problem might yet be solved through technological innovation.

Lest anyone argue that once any use of jammers was allowed, the “cat” would be “out of the bag”—resulting in the disruption of cell phone networks by pranksters, criminals or even terrorists—let me simply suggest Googling “cell phone jammer.” It may not be legal, but Americans can already buy cell phone jammers.  The reality is that, without a global totalitarian state, or at least completely sealed borders (an impossibility), completely banning any technology is impossible.

Since today’s ban—and harsh penalties—seems to work well enough to protect cell networks from widespread disruption—or even occasional disruption sufficient to attract attention—it’s not unreasonable to think we might get by just fine if we kept those same penalties in place under a new rule that carefully circumscribed which private users would be allowed to use which technologies.  Perhaps then we might all be able to enjoy a movie, concert or other performance in peace—if we chose to.

The Alternative

Many people would probably prefer that solution over the alternative:  incorporating into cell phones the kind of  “digital manners policy” (DMP) technology recently patented by Microsoft that would allow a DMP transmitter to order all devices within range that have a DMP receiver to turn off their ring tones, etc.  There’s something to be said for Microsoft’s solution from a technical perspective:  The DMP could be set to allow me to continue to receive text messages, use the vibrate setting for calls, or use the wireless data network.  So a DMP transmitter would certainly be a less blunt instrument than a cell phone jammer.  But it wouldn’t be entirely effective unless every cell phone had a DMP chip, which means that the only way to “make the ringing stop!” would be to mandate the adoption of such technology by cell phone managers, banning the sale of non-compliant cell phones, and—if we really wanted to be thorough—sending out the cell-phone Gestapo to round up all the old, non-compliant cell phones out there.

I’m not suggesting any nefarious intent on Microsoft’s part.  Like Hamlet (” There is nothing either good or bad, but  thinking makes it so“), I don’t believe a technology can be inherently evil.  Indeed, even partial adoption of DMP technologies in cell phones would certainly help solve our “crisis of digital manners.”  But I’m more than a little uncomfortable with the idea of creating this kind of architecture of control, by which a third party (not me or the carrier) could manipulate the settings of my cell phone.  The potential for abuse of that technology seems even scarier than the potential for abuse of jammers.  Even if Microsoft limited the DMP chip’s interface with the cell phone to controlling, say, ring volume or vibrate settings, I’d have to wonder what a good hacker could do with that kind of technology.  So while I wouldn’t suggest banning DMPs either, I would hate to see DMP technologies become industry standard merely because the FCC refused to reconsider its decades-old outright ban on radio jammers.

Rep. Brady, our nation turns its lonely eyes (and even more annoyed ears) to you.

My Romanian space lawyer (and improbably-named) friend Virgiliu Pop has made the front page of Space.com today in a great interview with leading space journalist Leonard David about his new book Who Owns the Moon?: Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership.  Virgil slams the “Common Heritage of Mankind” socialism behind the 1979 Moon Treaty, which was killed in the U.S. Senate by the free-market space movement, which later gave birth to the Space Frontier Foundation (which I chair).

Virgil once famously claimed ownership of the sun to demonstrate the absurdity of serious assertions made by a number of charlatans to ownership of lunar territory (Dennis Hope) or the entire Eros asteroid (Greg Nemitz).  Virgil’s point was “to show how ridiculous a property rights system in outer space would be if it were to be based solely on claim unsubstantiated by any actual possession.”

I’m looking forward to reading Virgil’s book–and to writing a proper review.  For now, I’ll just say that I think Virgil and I see eye-to-eye on three key premises (something of a rarity among space lawyers on the ultra-contentious issue of property rights):

1. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits nations from appropriating territory in space and also prohibits individuals from asserting any territorial claims (generally accepted) except to a narrowly-limited area under actual use (not accepted by all space lawyers).
2. The Outer Space Treaty, properly understood, does not bar claims to ownership of movable objects such as extracted resources or even (if they can be moved in a meaningful way) entire asteroids or comets.
3. Securing such property rights is essential to the economic development of space.

Here are a few choice excerpts from Virgil’s new book on the big picture of property rights in space:

Outer space needs to be spared the painful experience of the former Eastern Block. Despite the noble ideals of equity and care for the have-nots, the CHM paradigm has more faults than merits. A refutation of the Common Heritage principle does not mean, however, that the developing world will, or should, be left behind in the space era. China, India and Brazil are living proofs that a developing country can, through its own effort, join the spacefaring club. Instead of freeloading on the efforts of the older spacefarers, the have-nots should pool their meagre financial resources into a common space agency or into regional ones, and proceed at exploiting the riches of outer space for themselves. The rallying cry of Marxism – “Proletarians of all countries, unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains” should evolve into “Countries of the world unite – you have nothing to lose but the chains of gravity”. The skies are open. “

…

The frontier paradigm has proven its worth on our planet, and it most likely will do so in the extraterrestrial realms. Homesteading is likely to transform the lunar desert in the same manner as it transformed the 19th Century United States. Space is indeed a new frontier calling for individualism rather than collectivism, and its challenges need to be addressed with a legal regime favourable to property rights. Such a regime is seen by many authors as not only useful, but also as the only means of opening the extraterrestrial realms to settlement, given the reluctance of most industrialists to invest money in an endeavour without having the security that they will enjoy the benefits. It may also occur that a minority of investors, with a bigger tolerance to risk, would adopt an anarcho-capitalist approach and “cross the Alleghenies” without backing from a sovereign State.

Given the abundance of extraterrestrial resources, it would be nonsensical to forbid their private appropriation. Securing property rights would be a small price to pay, and more beneficial to humankind, compared to the alternative of keeping the extraterrestrial realms undeveloped. The practical arguments against the Frontier paradigm may have merit, but the issues raised can be tackled. The ideological arguments, nonetheless, are emotional rather than rational.

Whereas the frontier paradigm is outlawed in the current incarnation of the international law of outer space, law is a dynamic phenomenon and it may evolve towards a regime supportive of property rights in outer space. A shift from the res publica approach may be in the cards, given the official support of the Aldridge commission for property rights. Until this shift happens, the non-appropriation principle remains nonetheless the lex lata in the extraterrestrial realms.

As TLF readers may know, I took over in July as Chairman of the Board of the Space Frontier Foundation.  As I explained in my recent interview on The Space Show, SFF has been the leading citizens’ advocacy group for space commercialization since 1988.  Dedicated to promoting Princeton physicist Gerard O’Neill‘s vision of space settlement, as described in his 1976 masterpiece The High Frontier, the Foundation has always argued that “space is a place, not a program.”

We sent out the following press release on October 28, calling for a major transformation of the U.S. government’s space program by which the U.S. government would buy commercial transportation to the International Space Station.  We’ll have more to say about this in the coming weeks.

Space Frontier Foundation Finds Funding Source for COTS-D

The Space Frontier Foundation today called upon Presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain to invest the $2 billion in new funds they have promised to NASA for reducing the “Gap” in U.S. human spaceflight (after the Space Shuttle is retired in 2010) to spur innovation and competition in America.

Foundation Chairman Berin Szoka said “It’s time that our national leaders give American entrepreneurs a shot at closing this gap. Let’s take the two billion dollars in the candidates’ plans and fund up to five winners of COTS-D.”

The NASA Authorization Act of 2008, recently signed into law by the President, directs NASA to “issue a notice of intent [by mid-April 2009] … to enter into a funded, competitively awarded Space Act Agreement with two or more commercial entities’ for transporting humans to the ISS”-the “Capability D” of NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program (or COTS-D for short). But that directive is not yet funded.

Szoka continued, “Let’s have an American competition in space – to create good jobs, fuel innovation, and close the gap more quickly. With private funds matching government’s investment, we can dramatically leverage the $2 billion to produce breakthroughs in a new American industry – commercial orbital human spaceflight.”

By investing in several different approaches, the government will win no matter who wins this new race, and also benefit from the resulting price competition.

Many American companies, including Boeing, PlanetSpace, SpaceDev, SpaceX, and t/Space have each previously submitted credible COTS-D proposals to NASA. Each of these firms has reached the semi-finals of one of the previous NASA COTS competitions. Increasing funding for COTS by $2 billion would allow NASA to fund all five of these promising companies’ proposals with COTS agreements, and in so doing, build redundancy into the human spaceflight capability available to NASA and other customers.

“It’s popular in Washington to use ‘The Gap’ to cynically justify continued funding of an expensive jobs program,” concluded the Foundation’s co-founder, Bob Werb. “We’re using ‘The Gap’ to advocate a policy that will bridge a gap that matters much more: the chasm between a dying government Human spaceflight monopoly and an emerging, free and competitive marketplace that can open the space frontier to everyone.”

The Federal Circuit significantly limited the patentability of software and business methods today.  Mike Masnick at TechDirt summarizes the holding of the case as follows:

the court has said that there’s a two-pronged test to determine whether a software of business method process patent is valid: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. In other words, pure software or business method patents that are neither tied to a specific machine nor change something into a different state are not patentable.

I’m sure several of my TLF colleagues will have a great deal to say about this.   Tim Lee has already written about this on Ars Technica:

The Bilski decision, then, is a clear signal that the pendulum has begun to swing back toward tighter limits on software and business patents. However, it remains to be seen how far the court will go in this direction. Bilski was a relatively easy case. The applicant made little effort to hide the fact that he was seeking to patent a mental process, something the Supreme Court has clearly said is not allowed. Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of this patent doesn’t tell us how it will rule when confronted with software or business method patents that are tied more directly to a physical machine or a transformation of matter. And indeed, the Federal Circuit reiterated that some software and business method patents are valid, so we are unlikely to return to the near-prohibition on such patents that prevailed until the early 1980s.

Thoughts?

Debates about online privacy often seem to assume relatively homogeneous privacy preferences among Internet users.  But the reality is that users vary widely, with many people demonstrating that they just don’t care who sees what they do, post or say online.   Attitudes vary from application to application, of course, but that’s precisely the point:  While many reflexively talk about the “importance of privacy” as if a monolith of users held a single opinion, no clear consensus exists for all users, all applications and all situations.  

If a picture is worth a thousand words, this picture makes the point brilliantly—showing:

locations where [Flickr] users are more likely to post their photos as “public,” which is the default setting, in green. Places where Flickr users are more likely to put privacy controls on their photos show up in red.

Of course, geography is just one dimension across which users may vary in their attitudes about privacy, but the map makes the basic point about variation very well.  Seeing what users actually do in real life says a lot more about their preferences than merely polling them about what they think they care about in the abstract—as my colleagues Solveig Singleton and Jim Harper argued brilliantly in their 2001 paper With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us (SSRN).

Google has just announced that it is now accepting applications from undergraduate, graduate and professional students for its summer 2009 Google Policy Fellowship.  Three think tanks employing TLFers are among the host organizations participating in the program: The Progress & Freedom Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute. 

Applications are due by December 12, 2008.  The program will run for ten weeks during the summer of 2009 (June-August). Apply today!

The Progress & Freedom Foundation has just launched the new Center for Internet Freedom.  CIF offers an alternative to the proliferation of advocacy groups calling for government intervention online by offering timely analyses and critiques of proposals that diminish the vital role of free markets, free speech and property rights.  We aim to drive the Internet policy debate in new directions by emphasizing a layered approach of technological innovation, user education, user self-help, industry self-regulation, and the enforcement of existing laws consistent with the First Amendment.  Such an approach is a less restrictive—and generally more effective—alternative to increased regulation.  

Here are some of the issues I’ll be working on as CIF’s Director in conjunction with my esteemed colleagues Adam Thierer, Adam Marcus, and adjunct fellows: 

• Defending online advertising as the lifeblood of online content & services, especially in the “Long Tail”;
• Emphasizing market solutions to problems of privacy protection, especially regarding the use of cookies and packet inspection data;
• Protecting online speech and expression both in the U.S. and abroad;
• Defending Section 230 immunity for Internet intermediaries;
• Opposing online taxation and legal barriers to e-commerce and digital payments, especially at the state and local levels; and
• Ensuring that Internet governance remains transparent and accountable without hampering the evolution of the Internet.

Congress has very wisely cancelled the National Reconnaissance Office’s proposed Broad Area Space-Based Imagery Collection (BASIC) satellite system. The proposal to build two new imaging satellites at a cost to taxpayers of $1.7 billion would have represented a major break from what is possibly the U.S. government’s most successful effort to promote space commercialization to date: buying the imagery it needs from commercial providers, who can also sell imagery to other buyers.

Five years ago, the idea that Internet users could pull up a satellite image of just about any location on the planet at a whim would have seemed ludicrous. Yet that’s precisely what websites like Google Maps and Microsoft’s Live Search offer today—for free! Desktop applications like Microsoft’s Virtual Earth and Google Earth offer even more advanced geospatial tools—again, for free. But of course this library of incredibly rich imagery didn’t just “fall out of the sky,” as they say. It was collected by a handful of expensive commercial remote sensing satellites whose construction was made possible by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency‘s (Wikipedia) extraordinarily successful “Nextview” program implemented under the Commercial Remote Sensing Policy of 2003.  Rather than having the Federal government build its own satellites—and pay for the entire cost of the satatellites—the NGA very wisely chose to buy imagery from commercial providers in two ~$500 million, 4-year contracts with U.S. satellite imagery companies:  DigitalGlobe in 2003 and OrbImage (now GeoEye) in 2004.  

These long-term purchase agreements essentially made the U.S. Government the “anchor tenant” in a new class of remote sensing satellites, providing the initial funding for both companies to build and operate their satellites. But because the companies sell roughly half of imagery to foreign governments and commercial buyers like Google and Microsoft, these deals have saved U.S taxpayers money for the purchase of imagery for a wide variety of needs, ranging from agricultural monitoring to military intelligence. At the same time, the Nextview contracts have given birth to a vibrant geospatial industry whose immediate benefits should be obvious to anyone who’s ever pulled up a satellite map online and whose macroeconomic impact is potentially enormous. 

So why mess with success?  If the U.S. Government thinks it needs more satellite imagery, why not simply award another long-term purchase agreement to a commercial provider? Besides reducing the burden on the taxpayers, continuing the NextView approach would support the construction of a new generation of commercial satellites like GeoEye-1, which was launched just last month, and DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-1, launched last year.  Rather than rolling back NextView in favor of building its own systems, the U.S. Government should be looking for other space services it can buy on a commercial basis as a way of building industries rather than programs, ranging from sending crew & cargo to the International Space Station to communications and navigation services for NASA’s planned Return to the Moon.

Rather than giving up on the NextView approach in the area where it has already produced spectacular results, the U.S. government should be looking for other areas in which to apply the NextView model by buying space services from commercial providers.

Full disclosure: I was proud to handle FCC matters for GeoEye while practicing law at Latham & Watkins LLP. I currently have no greater personal interest in their success than should any American who wants to see the private sector succeed where the government has failed in opening up the space frontier to all mankind.