Ken Ferree, former chief of the FCC’s media bureau and PFF’s recently retired president (now Board member), has penned another devastatingly witty piece slamming the FCC’s recently announced inquiry into “the future of media and information needs of communities in a digital age” as something that,

should make the stomachs of civil libertarians everywhere queasy. Of course the Public Notice of the inquiry is dressed up in all of the usual public interest language. The Commission purports to be interested in protecting good journalism, promoting a diversity of information sources, and expanding the opportunities for a vibrant debate of public issues. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those representations, or of the FCC’s claim that it will consider First Amendment concerns first and foremost as the inquiry proceeds. The problem is that the very act of initiating such an inquiry will chill protected speech; government inquiry into what is and is not working in the area of news, information, and media is itself an affront to the First Amendment. And it is no answer that the Commission has embarked on this journey with beneficent motives, it has no power to derogate from the protections of the First Amendment in the name of what one group of bureaucrats may think are important government interests. Can there be any doubt but that any category of speakers that are even indirectly regulated by the FCC will be mindful of this new inquiry and will curb the nature of their conduct and communications in light of it? What great potential for mischief the FCC has spawned merely by initiating this little inquiry! Regulation by “raised eyebrow” has become a well-established tool for a number of federal agencies, including the FCC, but with this inquiry the Commission has taken the concept to a level heretofore unknown – this inquiry is regulation by penetrating leer.

The rest of the piece is well worth reading. But of course, the FCC will continue on their merry way anyway presuming neither their their complete lack of jurisdiction nor the First Amendment prevents them from “merely asking questions”—as with asked open-ended questions about things like cloud computing, online privacy (a slightly different matter) and online content controls that don’t come anywhere near the agency’s jurisdiction. Adam and I will be filing comments on the “Empowering Parents” inquiry questioning this “questioning.”

The Annenberg School at the University of Southern California recently released a paper by Geoffrey Cowan and David Westphal entitled, “Public Policy and Funding the News.” In it, Cowan and Westphal join the growing chorus of voices advocating a substantial role of government in propping up struggling media entities or investing in news production going forward.

I can’t say that I disagree with everything in the report, especially the contention that many traditional news-gathering institutions face serious challenges to their survival. But as I have noted here before, there are three big problems with recommendations to greatly expand the role of government in the media sector or journalistic profession as a solution:

1. While public media & subsidies may have a role, that role should be tightly limited and focused on filling specific niches or unfilled needs within certain communities. Public subsidies should not be viewed as a replacement for traditional private media sources. Moreover, public subsidies will not begin to make up the shortfall from traditional private funding source, unless we plan on having Congress spend hundreds of billions of dollars (like the radical regulatory advocates at Free Press advocates) to subsidize news.
2. If we do end up taking that path, it will raise profound fairness questions since it will leave taxpayers footing the bill for things they might not want or could find objectionable, even offensive. (Conservatives wouldn’t like funding Bill Moyers, and liberals wouldn’t be too keen on supporting Rush Limbaugh).
3. Any plan to have government step up its role in supporting journalism will raise profound questions about press independence and threaten core First Amendment values. Putting journalists on the public dole is a serious threat to the integrity of the profession.

My PFF colleague Ken Ferree echoes many of these concerns in an essay today about the Annenberg report. (“Another Naïve Proposal for Government Entanglement with the Fourth Estate.”) I think Ken’s concerns about the First Amendment issues at stake here are worth quoting extensively. Ken argues:

I question the underlying assumption that the government has any role — at all — in enhancing or protecting the news media. The authors of the report take that role for granted, but it strikes me as fundamentally inconsistent with the First Amendment freedoms. The framers of our founding document were well aware of the dangers of government entanglement with the press. At the time of the country’s founding, there were about three-dozen newspapers in all of the colonies. Those publications were, for the most part, highly commercial and extremely partisan. The founders did not, however, craft a basic law that would allow for regulation to increase “fairness” or enhance diversity of viewpoints, or to change the way the papers were packaged or sold. Instead they came up with the elegantly simple: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .” As Justice Black famously said, “no law means no law.” Congress and our elected officials may sincerely believe that a healthy media is essential to a democratic state, but the Constitution expressly carves the areas speech and press out of the sphere of appropriate government action. A truly free press must be truly free of the government’s tentacles.

Indeed, any attempt to socialize media in order to save it won’t likely work and in the process it will create a grave risk to private media, free speech, and vibrant democratic exchange.

Additional Reading:

• A “Public Option” for Media? The Free Press Plan to Put Journalists on the Public Dole
• The Dangers of Government-Subsidized News
• Public Option for Press Should Get the Red Pen
• Shall We Save Media by Socializing It?

There was a hearing today in the House Energy and Commerce Committee on “Reauthorization of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act,” which got into the sticky of issue of whether must carry mandates should be applied to satellite television (DBS) operators. My boss, Ken Ferree, president of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, testified in opposition to that notion. Here’s what he had to say about proposals that would require satellite operators to carry local broadcast TV stations from even the smallest markets:

Because Congress cannot repeal the laws of physics, there are only two ways in which a satellite company might comply with such a mandate: 1) it may add capacity (i.e., launch new satellites and build associated ground equipment), or 2) it may convert capacity currently used for other purposes to local television carriage in the most sparsely populated parts of the country. Neither approach makes economic sense. That is, these proposals, if they were to become law, would impose considerable costs on satellite operators while generating no appreciable revenue.

Building and launching new satellites in order to carry local television stations in the smallest markets would of course cost hundreds of millions of dollars, while the return on such an investment, without any doubt, would be negligible. On the other hand, satellite television operators make capacity decisions in order to maximize net revenue. If they are required to delete program services that are profitable to make room for those that are less so, they necessarily lose in the transaction. Indeed, if delivering local television signals in the smallest markets made sound business sense, the satellite companies would be doing so already and no legal mandate would be necessary. Moreover, and fatally for any such proposal, requiring DBS companies to provide local signals (effectively adopting a satellite must-carry requirement) would almost certainly be unconstitutional. Cable must-carry was upheld by the Supreme Court by a bare majority only because there was a voluminous record suggesting that weaker broadcast stations would fail absent a cable must-carry requirement, thus depriving over-the-air viewers of additional video programming choices. There is no similar record, nor any reason to believe that one might be assembled, suggesting that the same would hold true absent some enhanced satellite carriage rule. Carriage requirements impose significant burdens on the commercial and First Amendment rights of those bound by them. In the current environment, imposing enhanced carriage mandates on DBS operators would be unwarranted, economically indefensible, and unconstitutional.

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC’s December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap http://documents.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=8630011&access_key=key-2obr4z2ohtozi1gabbay&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

In late June, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) opened a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding “Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising” (MB Docket No. 08-90). Basically, it’s an inquiry into the product placement and embedded advertising practices on television. Some at the FCC want such practices regulated.

PFF filed comments in the matter today. Ken Ferree and I argue that that FCC regulation of such advertising practices would be unnecessary and unwise. “If the Notice demonstrates anything,” we argue, “it is that a majority of the current Commissioners live in a world wholly alien and unfamiliar to most Americans; indeed, a world long forgotten if it ever existed.” We continue:

The Notice alludes menacingly to new, “subtle and sophisticated means” of commercial messaging, to “sneaky commercials” (quoting a senescent order topped with nearly fifty-years of dust) and to “vindicat[ing]” the policy goals of the Communications Act – as if the FCC must exact vengeance on those who would try – horror of horrors – to sell goods and services to the American public. The melodramatic tone of the Notice is intended, of course, to set the stage for the Commission’s latest effort to micromanage the free marketplace of ideas, i.e., the media. Only by portraying “embedded” advertising as something new and nefarious can the Commission hope to justify a new portfolio of intrusive and burdensome speech regulations in the name of preserving the “public’s right to know who is paying to air commercials or other program matter on broadcast television and radio and cable.”

And, as we make clear in the filing, we don’t buy the argument that the public are nothing more than mindless sheep:

Motivating the effort to expand the FCC’s regulation of private speech is a view that the Commission must protect the public from “stealth advertising” and “secret” advertisements that “prey upon unsuspecting minds.” One would think that before such loaded and sinister characterizations were used, the Commission might demand some evidence that the public is both 1) unaware of the commercial nature of product placements or other embedded advertisements and 2) that some positive harm flows directly from any such lack of awareness. In fact, however, there can be little doubt but that viewers and listeners understand that when “American Idol” judges drink from Coca Cola cups, promotional consideration was exchanged; when a radio host talks about the great dinner he ate at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, the restaurant is a sponsor of the show; when contestants on “The Biggest Loser” are taught how to make desserts with “Jell-O” gelatin, the association is not serendipitous. When brand names are used in program material, the public generally understands that some form of commercial sponsorship is involved. Indeed, it is hard even to imagine that the American public could be as ignorant or naïve as a majority of the Commission appears to believe they are.

Indeed, we argued, “With respect to embedded commercial material, the Internet has spawned a variety of instantaneous feedback mechanisms allowing average Americans to serve as media watchdogs, policing product placement and taking steps to point out when placements have become excessive, or even silly.” For example, product placement and brand promotion in movies and television is now closely monitored by a wide variety of websites, such as BrandSpotters.com and BrandChannel.com. Also see the “Product Placement” entry at Wikipedia. Thus:

the “harm” posited by the Notice is an imaginative fiction – a fiction driven entirely by the paternalistic view that an enlightened few, who happen to be ensconced on the 8th floor of a federal building in Southwest D.C., see the truth while the public at large is made up of mindless sheep being duped at every turn by advertisers. In fact, of course, those who hold this view are themselves victims of the so-called “third-person effect”: “People tend to think that other people are fooled by what they themselves understand perfectly.” [quoting W. Phillips Davison, 1983] A rich literature exists on the myriad ways in which the third-person effect has predicated calls for speech controls and media regulation.

But what’s the harm, a skeptic might ask, in a little more FCC regulation here? It’s three-fold: (1) It’s another blow to First Amendment rights. (2) It unfairly singles out the already over-regulated broadcast media sector relative to its many unregulated competitors. (3) It could have a detrimental economic impact on the health of that struggling sector, which relies entirely on advertising to maintain its “free” content offerings. As we go on to conclude in our filing:

Ironically, the “remedies” suggested in the Notice not only are unnecessary, overbroad, and over-burdensome given the absolute paucity of evidence that embedded advertisements pose any kind of risk or harm to the public, they would in fact have a deleterious effect on the health of free media in America. As a result of the rapid introduction and growth of new media outlets, traditional media operators, and particularly free broadcast media, are struggling to remain relevant and profitable. An era of media abundance for consumers is an era of hyper-competition for suppliers; traditional media operators and their business models are under enormous strain. Yet the burdensome disclosure regulations posited in the Notice are targeted directly at traditional media platforms, while new media outlets over which the FCC has little or no authority would remain free to sell advertising in whatever form they choose. Not only would such an approach be inequitable, it would sap the very lifeblood of free, traditional media – commercial advertising. At a time when VCRs, DVD players, digital video recorders, video on demand, video on the Internet are making stand-alone commercial spots obsolete, embedded advertisements and product sponsorship may become the only methods of continued support for free, over-the-air broadcasting. Further, enhanced government regulation of speech on traditional platforms will only serve to accelerate the migration of program content to new, unregulated platforms. In this case, therefore, the proposed remedies are worse than the purported disease. In the name of protecting consumers from “hidden” advertisements, the FCC is contemplating rules that likely would destroy the financial health and well-being of the free broadcast medium and unfairly handicap cable services vis-à-vis new media platforms. Indeed, because of the steady progress of media technology, the very rationale for FCC content regulation of broadcast and cable programming has become superannuated. Advertisers and consumers have moved on and are adapting to the 21st Century media marketplace — the Commission should, too.

Our filing can be downloaded from the PFF webpage here and I have embedded the filing below in a Scribd reader if you care to take a quick look: