The debate over the imposition of sales tax collection obligations on interstate vendors is heating up again at the federal level with the introduction of S. 1452, “The Main Street Fairness Act.” [pdf]  The measure would give congressional blessing to a multistate compact that would let states impose sales taxes on interstate commerce, something usually blocked by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced the bill in the Senate along with Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Jack Reed (D-RI).  The measure is being sponsored in the House of Representatives by John Conyers (D-MI) and Peter Welch (D-VT). At this time, there are no Republican co-sponsors even though Sen. Mike Enzi was rumored to be a considered co-sponsoring the measure before introduction.

Without any Republicans on board the effort, the measure may not advance very far in Congress. Nonetheless, to the extent the measure gets any traction, it is worth itemizing a few of the problems with this approach. My Mercatus Center colleague Veronique de Rugy and I have done some work on this issue together in the past and we are planning a short new paper on the topic. It will build on this lengthy Cato Institute paper we authored together in 2003, “The Internet Tax Solution: Tax Competition, Not Tax Collusion.” The key principle we set forth was this: “Congress must.. take an affirmative stand against efforts by state and local governments to create a collusive multistate tax compact to tax interstate sales.” “It would be wrong,” we argued, “for members of Congress to abdicate their responsibility to safeguard the national marketplace by giving the states carte blanche to tax interstate commercial activities through a tax compact. The guiding ethic of this debate must remain tax competition, not tax collusion.”

Proponents of simply extending current sales tax collection obligations to interstate sales will claim that the so-called “Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement” (SSTUA) they want Congress to bless has solved the compliance cost and complexity problem associated with taxing “remote” interstate sales. Yet, as I pointed out in my recent Forbes essay, “The Internet Taxman Cometh,” this 200-page “simplification” effort remains a Swiss cheese tax system, however, riddled with loopholes and complexities that could burden vendors, especially mom-and-pop operators. America’s estimated 7,400 local jurisdictions still have many different definitions and exemptions that complicate the sales tax code. For example, is a cookie a “candy,” (which is taxed in most jurisdictions) or a “baked good,” (which is typically tax-exempt)? Thus, forcing online vendors to collect local taxes would create significant burdens on interstate commerce.

This is not to say there aren’t some legitimate tax “fairness” arguments in play here. It really is unfair that “Main Street” vendors are burdened with significant tax collection responsibilities while others are not. But “fairness” cuts many ways. It’s also unfair and unconstitutional to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales taxes on behalf of a jurisdiction where they have no physical presence. After all, at least in theory, those who are taxed should expect to receive some benefit for it. Interstate vendors receive no benefit but bear all the cost.

To the extent we want to “level the playing field,” therefore, one approach is to cut or eliminate sales taxes on in-state vendors. Of course, that’s a tough pill for many states and localities to swallow. If they got their profligate spending habits under control, however, that might be easier.

Another alternative would be the creation of a national Internet sales tax that would avoid the complexity problem by imposing a single rate and set of definitions on all vendors. But that just opens the door to a new federal tax base, which would grow to be burdensome in other ways at a time when American consumers and companies are already over-taxed. I doubt the idea would get much traction in Congress, anyway.

Perhaps the best alternative would be to switch the sourcing methodology for state sales tax collection obligations from destination-based to “origin-based.”  Stated differently, the rule would be “you can tax your own exports, not the imports from other states.” Here’s how Veronique and I summarized an origin-based solution in our old Cato paper:

under an origin-based sourcing rule—also referred to as a “seller state,” “vendor-state,” or “source-based” rule by some scholars—all interstate sales through all channels (traditional stores or cyber-retailers) would be taxed at the point of sale (meaning the company’s “principal place of business”) instead of at the point of destination, if the state or locality chooses to impose a tax. All goods within a given state or locality would be taxed at the locally applicable rate no matter how they were purchased and no matter where they were consumed.  This option would take care of most of the problems posed by the destination-based methodology that is favored by most state and local policymakers today.

Specifically, an origin-based sourcing rule would have the following advantages:

• Minimize the burden on sellers by requiring sellers to know and abide by the tax rates and regulations within their principal place of business instead of the rates and definitions of thousands of different taxing jurisdiction.
• Ensure tax parity between Main Street vendors and interstate sellers.
• Do away with the need for a multistate collection arrangement such as the SSTUA by eliminating any need to trace interstate transactions to the final point of consumption.
• Remove nexus uncertainties and constitutional concerns, because only companies within a state or local government’s borders would be taxed.
• Largely remove any need for continued reliance on the use tax because all transactions would henceforth be sourced to the origin of sale and collected immediately by the vendor at that point.
• Respect buyers’ privacy rights by eliminating the need to collect any special or unique information about a buyer, and  by not using third-party tax collectors to gather information about buyers.
• Respect federalism principles and enhance jurisdictional tax competition  by permitting each state to determine its  own tax policies and encouraging healthy state-by-state tax rivalry.
• Preserve local jurisdictional tax authority where a harmonization proposal like the SSTUA plans would create a de facto national sales tax system and run roughshod over local governments.
• Because it is more politically / constitutionally feasible it may maximize the amount of tax collected for states by making compliance easier and incorporating activities that are currently untaxed.

Please see the old Cato paper for more details and answers to potential objections, but I hope it’s clear why an “origin-based” solution offers a sensible way to break the current logjam and achieve tax “fairness” in the process.

Some states officials will object to the vigorous tax competition spawned by an origin-based sourcing rule. But that’s a feature, not a bug! Tax competition is good for consumers and the continued vitality of American federalism. A multistate tax compact, by contrast, would encourage tax collusion and let states too easily raise rates on interstate sales.

Moreover, I think it bears repeating that state officials have been at this for 15 years and still not found a way to truly simplify their sales taxes and get around constitutional limitations on the taxation of interstate activity. An origin-based system, therefore, may offer them the only way for them to finally tax the Internet and interstate sales.  I’d prefer they scale back their taxing ways, of course, but to the extent they insist on pushing out the boundaries of their tax authority, an origin-based solution — not the “Main Street Tax Fairness Act” — is the only sensible, constitutional way for them to do so.

Northwestern Law Prof. James Speta has a new paper out that touches on many of the themes that Barbara Esbin, my colleague at The Progress & Freedom Foundation, has been covering in her excellent work explaining why the FCC doesn’t actually have have the vast, essentially unlimited authority over the Internet that it has asserted in its recent effort to enforce its non-binding 2005 net neutrality policy statement and its ongoing net neutrality rulemaking. (See her FCC comments on that issue here and Adam’s thoughts on this here.) Speta’s thesis also seems to parallel the approach taken under PFF’s 2005 Digital Age Communications Act (DACA), which emphasized focusing on on unfair practices and relying on a standard of consumer harm as in antitrust rather than trying to enshrine abstract principles like “neutrality” into law.

Anyway, here’s the abstract for Speta’s paper:

The Federal Communications Commission’s order directing Comcast to cease certain traffic management techniques in the name of network neutrality adopted a very strong theory of the FCC’s regulatory jurisdiction over the Internet. This article offers three responses: (1) Briefly reviewing the theory of the FCC’s “ancillary jurisdiction” and the theory offered in the Comcast order, the article concludes that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction cannot be as broad as the agency asserted – for the agency claimed the power to regulate any aspect of Internet service, including price and quality of service. Because “ancillary jurisdiction,” however broad, simply cannot be as broad as the FCC’s nearly plenary authority over common carriers (as the FCC itself had previously recognized), the Comcast order states an untenable theory of regulatory power. (2) Although a rigorous administrative law analysis would conclude that the FCC does not have any “ancillary jurisdiction,” that conclusion is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, both generally and by a specific dicta that the FCC has some ancillary authority over the Internet. The article concludes that the FCC’s ancillary authority can be reasonably interpreted and rationally cabined – giving the FCC jurisdiction over Internet carriage of Title II and Title III services, meaning, for example, that the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate Internet carriers’ treatment of “interconnected VOIP,” as in fact the FCC has done. (3) Finally, the article offers a structure for conferring on the FCC an appropriate degree of regulatory authority over the Internet, through appropriate legislation. Because current antitrust doctrine struggles with the sorts of issues that might arise in the Internet, the FCC should have authority to enjoin unfair competition practices, when committed by Internet carriers offering public services (and at the retail level). This authority would be broad enough to cover the practices alleged in the Comcast case, but only if the FCC were to follow the substantive requirements of an unfair competition analysis (as it did not).

Can the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) just do anything it wants? If it wants to bring the entire Internet under its thumb, or regulate any speech uttered over electronic media, can it just do so on a whim? The agency’s recent actions on the Net neutrality and free speech fronts seems to suggest that the agency thinks so.

I don’t need to rehash here what the FCC has been up to on the Net neutrality front.  Most everyone is familiar with how the agency has essentially been trying to invent its authority to regulate out of thin air.  If you want the whole ugly history of how this charade has unfolded over past few years, I encourage you to read these amazing comments filed today in the FCC’s net neutrality NPRM proceeding by my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin.  Barbara simply demolishes the FCC’s argument that it can do anything it wants under the guise of its “ancillary jurisdiction.” As Barbara argues in her comments, the FCC’s position “is akin to saying that the FCC can regulate if its actions are ancillary to its ancillary jurisdiction, and that is one ancillary too many.”  She notes that:

The proposed rules regulating the services and network management practices of broadband Internet providers must rest, if at all, on the Commission‘s implied or ancillary jurisdiction and the NPRM fails to provide a basis upon which the exercise of such jurisdiction can be considered lawful.

She shows how farcical it is for the FCC to concoct its supposed authority to regulate from provisions of the Communications Act that have nothing whatsoever to do with Net neutrality or even expanding regulation in general. Specifically, the agency’s reliance on sections 230(b) and 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is completely outlandish.  Anyone who knows a lick about telecom law and the nature of those two sections understands they were never intended to serve as the basis of an expansive new regulatory regime for the Internet. As Barbara puts it:

This exercise—searching for snippets and threads of regulatory authority over a communications medium as significant as the Internet in multiple, unrelated statutory provisions—should signal to the Commission that no credible source of authority to regulate Internet services exists.

All I have to say is, thank God for checks and balances. I believe the courts will put a stop to this nonsense, but it will take some time.  Until then, I suppose the FCC will continue to act like a rogue agency, hell-bent and tossing the constitution to the wind and concocting asinine theories about why they should be allowed to do anything they want. But there are signs that the courts are ready to start holding the FCC more accountable.

If you want some concrete proof, Exhibit A would be the recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals oral arguments in the Comcast v. FCC case, which involves the FCC’s assertion of Net neutrality authority from vague “principles” it laid down a few years back. The headline from Wired about the court arguments really says all you need to know: “Court to FCC: You Don’t Have Power to Enforce Net Neutrality.”  Indeed, by all accounts, things did not go well for the agency. “No decision has been made yet,” reports Tony Bradley of PC World, ” but, if Friday’s arguments… are any indication, it doesn’t appear that the FCC will prevail in exerting its authority over Comcast.”

Exhibit B would be the stunning oral arguments that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York heard this week in the remand hearing of the case Fox Television v. FCC. You have to watch this video of the arguments to appreciate just how fed up some judges are with this agency.  It is like nothing else I have ever seen.  Andy Schwartzman of Media Access Project described it as “a slaughter,” and an unnamed source told John Eggerton of Broadcasting & Cable, “To say that the justices were extremely skeptical of the FCC’s application of the indecency law from a constitutional perspective in this case is an understatement.”  I’ll say.  Watch it yourself to see.

Meanwhile, as I’ve been writing here lately, the FCC is busy trying to expand or invent new authority to regulate digital media and online safety issues in its “Child Safe Viewing Act” and “Empowering Parents and Protecting Children” proceedings. The agency also recently began looking at cloud computing, forcing me to wonder, “Is the FCC Becoming the Federal Cloud Commission?”  And then there was the Commission strong-arming of Apple about the iPhone app store process. Who knows where that authority came from.  Finally, just yesterday, the FCC launched a new inquiry into privacy issues — get this — as part of its National Broadband Plan! The agency is asking for public comment about “the use of personal information and privacy in an online, broadband world.” (Someone should probably call the Federal Trade Commission and let them know that that there is a new sheriff in town!) Again, no word where the FCC’s authority to do any of this comes from.  When it comes to statutory authority, it’s an ‘anything-goes’ world over at the FCC these days. They just make it up as they go along.

Simply put, the FCC is out of control and I sincerely hope the courts rope it back in soon. If the agency wants the authority to regulate in any of these areas, it should go to Congress and ask for it.  That’s how things are suppose to work in a constitutional republic.  Until then, FCC officials should stop behaving as if they are above the law.

Hmmm… What am I missing? I cannot lay my finger on a single line in the Communications Act of 1934, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, or any statute in between that gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the authority to regulate cloud computing.  And yet, like any good stickler for jurisdictional authority, my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin keeps bringing to my attention little FCC chirps here and there which suggest that the agency is slowly positioning itself to become the Federal Cloud Commission. For example, back in September, Barbara brought to my attention this passage in the Commission’s recent Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry, (paragraph 60, pg. 21):

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

In my earlier essay about this, I noted that these questions should serve as a wake-up call for Google and other cloud-based providers who think that “neutrality” mandates will end at the infrastructure layer of the Net.  As Berin Szoka and I argued in our paper on “high-tech mutually assured destruction,” regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract.  And I’m even less optimistic about the FCC limiting its regulatory aspirations after the latest thing Barbara Esbin brought to my attention.

Today, as part of the Commission’s ongoing effort to develop a National Broadband Plan, the FCC released a request for information “on data portability and its relationship to broadband.”  (NBP Public Notice #21) “The Commission seeks tailored comment on broadband and portability of data and their relation to cloud computing, transparency, identity, and privacy,” the notice says.  Here was the second item on the list of things the Commission said it was investigating:

Cloud computing. When considering the portability of data, we also consider the processes through which data are moved. In this context, we seek comment on how to identify and understand cloud computing as a model for technology provisioning.

1. The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines cloud computing as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” Does this definition accurately capture the concept of cloud computing?
2. What types of cloud computing exist (e.g., public, hybrid, and internal) and what are the legal and regulatory implications of their use?
3. Can present broadband network configurations handle a large-scale shift in bandwidth usage that a rapid adoption of cloud computing might cause?
4. How does cloud computing affect the reliability, scalability, security, and sustainability of information and data?
5. To what extent can the federal government leverage cloud solutions to improve intra-agency processes, intergovernmental coordination, and civic participation?
6. What impact do developments in cloud computing have with respect to broadband deployment, adoption, and use?
7. How can various parties leverage cloud computing to obtain economic or social efficiencies? Is it possible to quantify the efficiencies gained?
8. To what extent are consumers protected by industry self-regulation (e.g., the Cloud Computing Manifesto), and to what extent might additional protections be needed?
9. What specific privacy concerns are there with user data and cloud computing?
10. What precautions should government agencies take to prevent disclosure of personal information when providing data?
11. Is the use of cloud computing a net positive to the environment? Are there specific studies that quantify the environmental impact of cloud computing?

I suppose some might claim there’s nothing wrong with the FCC looking into these issues, and that the agency’s interest in cloud computing is entirely benign.  But when it read all these questions about cloud computing in recent FCC notices, I can’t help but thinking about the potential for regulatory creep.  Eventually, when a regulatory agency asks enough questions — especially the sort of questions bolded above — it leads to more agency oversight.  And more agency oversight typically leads to some sort of agency regulation.

Or perhaps I’m just being paranoid.

Regardless, at a minimum, would someone at least tell me where the FCC gets the authority to even ask these questions?  Or do we live in such a Bold New World of progressive government that little encumbrances like statutory authority can be thrown to the wind?   Years from now, some might look back and ask the question that Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase asked 50 years ago about the FCC and spectrum regulation:  “How did the commission come to acquire this power?”  But I’d like to know the answer to that question right now regarding the FCC’s growing interest in cloud computing.

On Friday, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a new Notice of Inquiry entitled, “Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving Media Landscape” (MB Docket No. 09-194).  The purpose of this investigation is to:

seek information on the extent to which children are using electronic media today, the benefits and risks these technologies bring for children, and the ways in which parents, teachers, and children can help reap the benefits while minimizing the risks. (p. 2)… Our goal with this NOI is to gather data and recommend-ations from experts, industry, and parents that will enable us to identify actions that all stakeholders can take to enable parents and children to navigate this promising electronic media landscape safely and successfully. (p. 3)

This Notice builds on the FCC’s August 31st Report to Congress (“Implementation of the Child Safe Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming”) that was required pursuant to the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of that bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB Docket No. 09-26) was to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.” [I filed 150+ pages worth of comments in that proceeding, and here’s my analysis of why the bill and the FCC’s proceedings are worth monitoring. In previous posts here, I also listed all the major filings and reply comments that were submitted to the FCC in the matter.]

While the FCC’s new Notice outlines several positive impacts that media use may have for children, it then goes on to itemize a variety of concerns about media exposure:

While we recognize that electronic media technologies offer these potential benefits to children, we also explore the risks of harm that media use presents. As discussed below, these risks include (i) exposure to exploitative advertising; (ii) exposure to inappropriate content (such as offensive language, sexual content, violence, or hate speech); (iii) impact on health (for example, childhood obesity, tobacco use, sexual behavior, or drug and alcohol use); (iv) impact on behavior (in particular, exposure to violence leading to aggressive behavior); (v) harassment and bullying; (vi) sexual predation; (vii) fraud and scams; (viii) failure to distinguish between who can and who cannot be trusted when sharing information; and (ix) compromised privacy. We seek comment on these risks, whether parents, teachers, and children are aware of them, and what can be done to protect children from them.

It’s not really clear to me where the FCC finds the jurisdictional authority to investigate some of these things (hate speech? bullying?), but let’s not worry about that here. The question a lot of folks — especially those with strong First Amendment leanings — will be asking is: Where is the FCC heading with this in terms of new speech controls or content regulation?

In my earlier work on the “Child Safe Viewing Act,” I worried that the bill and resulting FCC investigation might be the beginning of “convergence-era content regulation.” I was pleasantly surprised, however, with the FCC’s final Report to Congress about the Child Safe Viewing Act, which did a very nice job highlighting the amazing diversity of parental control tools and methods on the market today.  That being said, the proceeding noted that “no single parental control technology available today works across all media platforms” and might have left the impression in minds of some critics that it was somehow possible to create a “universal” parental control or rating mechanism to deal with content across platforms.

Not only is it highly unlikely that such a silver-bullet solution is possible, but it’s unclear that it is even desirable.  I spent some time addressing this issue in my big filing to the FCC earlier this year.  If you jump to pg. 98 of my filing, you will find a section on “The Perils of Mandatory Controls, Restrictive Defaults or ‘Universal’ Ratings.” In it I argue:

the search for technological silver?bullet solutions and “universal” ratings or controls represents a quixotic, Holy Grail?like quest. Simply stated, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. There are no simple solutions or quick fixes to concerns about objectionable media content or online child safety. Only a “layered” approach—involving many tools, methods, and strategies—can get the job done right. And technological blocking controls are probably the least important part of that mix. Education and mentoring are far more important. Moreover…  any move to force “universal,” top?down solutions could destroy future innovation in this space. [There are] unforeseen downsides to mandating controls and defaults as well as efforts to create universal rating or labeling schemes.

Again, to be clear, the FCC’s final report to Congress did not recommend any such thing, and the agency is to be commended for that.  But, at the end of the Child Safe Viewing Act report to Congress, the agency also noted that another Notice of Inquiry would dig a little deeper into possible solutions, and now here it is.  But it still remains unclear where the FCC might take this in terms of concrete steps. I was pleased to see a strong focus on the importance of education and media literacy in the agency’s latest notice, so that’s very good news. But there’s also plenty of hand-wringing about the supposed negative impacts of media throughout the report, which leads one to believe that the agency isn’t going to just settle for education-based solutions.

Importantly, there’s also a lot of talk about the supposed dangers of advertising to children in the new Notice:

Exposure to excessive and exploitative advertisements is a significant risk children face from electronic media. Advertisements of particular concern for children include: (i) those that promote products specifically to children; (ii) those that promote unhealthy food, thereby contributing to childhood obesity, and (iii) those that contain inappropriate content, such as offensive language, sexual content, and

This is actually one area where the FCC does have a little jurisdictional authority under the Children’s Television Act of 1990. But I don’t see how the agency can read that statute, which was intended for broadcast television, too broadly.  Regardless, if I had to bet on one thing we are certain to see come out of this proceeding, I’d say some expanded advertising restrictions are in the works.  But, again, the agency’s limited jurisdiction makes it hard for me to understand where they plan to go with this or how it would pass muster in the courts once challenged.

Anyway, stay tuned. Comments in the matter are due to the FCC by late December.  Meanwhile, one wonders how long it will be before Sen. Rockefeller and others up on Capitol Hill start to engage more on content-related issues.  They’ve been fairly silent so far this year.  In light of Sen. Rockefeller’s past efforts on this front, it seems likely he’ll eventually engage in this debate — and likely in a very pro-regulatory fashion.

I used to have a (semi-crazy) uncle who typically began conversations with lame jokes or bad riddles. This sounds like one he might have used had he lived long enough: What do Thomas Jefferson, a moose, and cyberspace have in common?

The answer to that question can be found in a new book, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace, by David G. Post, a Professor of Law at Temple University. Post, who teaches IP and cyberspace law at Temple, is widely regarded as one of the intellectual fathers of the “Internet exceptionalist” school of thinking about cyberlaw.  Basically, Post sees this place we call “cyberspace” as something truly new, unique, and potentially worthy of some special consideration, or even somewhat different ground rules than we apply in meatspace. More on that in a bit.

[ Full disclosure: Post’s work was quite influential on my own thinking during the late 1990s, so much so that when I joined the Cato Institute in 2000, one of the first things I did was invite David to become an adjunct scholar with Cato. He graciously accepted and remains a Cato adjunct scholar today. Incidentally, Cato is hosting a book forum for him on February 4th that I encourage you to attend or watch online. Anyway, it’s always difficult to be perfectly objective when you know and admire someone, but I will try to do so here.]

Post’s book is essentially an extended love letter — to both cyberspace and Jefferson. Problem is, as Post even admits at the end, it’s tough to know which subject this book is suppose to teach us more about. The book loses focus at times — especially in the first 100 pages — as Post meanders between historical tidbits of Jefferson’s life and thinking and what it all means for cyberspace. But the early focus is on TJ.  Thus, those who pick up the book expecting to be immediately immersed in cyber-policy discussions may be a bit disappointed at first.  As a fellow Jefferson fanatic, however, I found all this history terrifically entertaining, whether it was the story of Jefferson’s Plow and his other agricultural inventions and insights, TJ’s unique interest in science (including cryptography), or that big moose of his.

OK, so what’s the deal with the moose? When TJ was serving as a minister to France in in the late 1780s, at considerable expense to himself, he had the complete skeleton, skin and horns of a massive American moose shipped to the lobby of his Paris hotel. Basically, Jefferson wanted to make a bold statement to his French hosts about this New World he came from and wake them up to the fact that some very exciting things were happening over there that they should be paying attention to. That’s one hell of way to make a statement!

Questions about Frontiers, Both Old and New

Now you see the connection to Post’s investigation into the state of cyberspace. Like Jefferson, Post is very excited about a new frontier and he wants to alert people to it. Importantly, however, Post isn’t at all ashamed to admit when he doesn’t understand why some things are the way they are in this new world.  And so Post begins asking questions — lots and lots of questions — to guide our investigation.

Thus, in much the same way that Jefferson penned Notes on the State of Virginia as guidebook for newcomers to the strange new world of his time, David Post has penned this slender volume as a guidebook to our modern cyber-frontier. If you’re looking for a book with concrete positions on all of cyberspace’s pressing policy problems, this book is not it. Instead, it is meant to help us frame the issues and questions properly and consider how this new frontier is unfolding in the early years of its existence. As Post puts it:

We are at the very beginning of what will become a centuries-long conversation about these questions, and my goal here was not to put anything to rest but to put everything in play, not to conclude any part of that conversation but to help you get started. We need, more than answers to today’s questions about law and policy on the network, new ways of thinking about the questions themselves, new vocabularies, new visions of the possible, new ways of identifying and organizing what we know and what we don’t know about the new place. (p. 209)

Post does a very nice job of giving us “new ways of thinking about questions” in his book. These questions generally fall into two categories.  First, Post wants to know why cyberspace works the way it does, or more profoundly, why it works at all. How did this little experiment with networking protocols turn into the most revolutionary global communications and information distribution system of modern times?  Second, Post wants to know “Who makes the rules ‘there’… and what should they be? What does the law look like there? How does it get made, and by whom? Who governs? By what means, and by what right?” (p. 4)

What Jefferson (and Hamilton) Can Teach Us

Post brings Jefferson into the story in the hope that TJ’s profound thinking on the issues of his time might help us getter a better handle on the cyber-controversies of our own time. After all, Jefferson was a man who spent much of his life thinking about uncharted subjects and frontiers. And law, of course!

Using this approach to help us explore cyberspace and cyberlaw works quite well in many cases. It works particularly well when Post brings TJ’s leading intellectual nemesis into the drama — Alexander Hamilton.  “Their feud the longest-running in American political history,” Post correctly notes, “for they stood on opposite shores of the great intellectual divide, a divide that encapsulates something fundamental in the way we think about society and government.” (p. 107). Jefferson desired liberty above all else; Hamilton stressed order and authority. Whereas Jefferson trusted decentralization and wanted diffuse communities making political decisions, Hamilton looked to a strong central authority to guide the nation.

Many modern cyberspace disputes, Post suggests, can be viewed through this same Jeffersonian vs. Hamiltonian philosophical dichotomy. Post continues:

Cyberspace is not the American West of 1787, of course. But like the American West of 1787, cyberspace is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian kind of place. Jeffersonians always predominate in new places, because new places attract people who find new places attractive and retell people who do not. […] Hamiltonians, though, inevitably make their way to Jeffersonian places (certainly once gold is discovered there!), claims of order and authority and power assert themselves, and struggles over the shape of the place begin in earnest. And like the West of 1787, cyberspace poses some hard questions, and could use some new ideas, about governance, and law, and order, and scale. The engineers have bequeathed to us a remarkable instrument, one that has managed to solve prodigious technical problems associated with communication on a global scale. The problem is the one that Jefferson and his contemporaries faced: How do you build “republican” institutions — institutions that respect the equal worth of all individuals and their right to participate in the formation of the rules under which they live — that scale? (p. 116-117)

Will Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian thinking prevail as this process unfolds? That remains to be seen, and although Post clearly falls in the Jeffersonian camp on these issues, he doesn’t really place odds on the outcome. Moreover, I would have liked to see Post offer a more full-throated defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism and Interent exceptionalism, or at least better explain to the reader how the debate between exceptionalism and unexceptionalism — or Jeffersonianism vs. Hamiltonianism — has progressed since the mid-1990s.

I think it’s clear that the cyber-Hamiltonians (i.e., the Internet unexceptionalists) are in the midst of a major “Empire Strikes Back” moment today as cyberspace is coming under increasing political pressure from many corners, and calls for more centralized authority abound — whether we are talking about domain name regulation, net neutrality mandates, speech controls, or whatever else. I just wish Post would have spent more time developing a “Return of the Jedi” defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism in this book.

Central Planning vs. Self-Governing Communities

Incidentally, Post has put forward such a defense elsewhere. Along with my former Cato colleague Wayne Crews, I co-edited a beefy book on Net governance issues back in 2003 entitled Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction. It contained some truly wonderful essays and they are all still quite relevant today. Jonathan Zittrain’s essay on “Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law” remains one of the best primers on the subject you can find. But the exchange about Internet governance between David Post and Jack Goldsmith in that book is really a classic Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian debate about cyberlaw. [You can read their chapters at the link above.]

In Jefferson’s Moose, Post comes closest to developing a fuller theory of Internet exceptionalism in his excellent chapter “Governing Cyberspace III: Law.” In that chapter, he takes the unexceptionalists to task for their troubling logic, which “leads inexorably to the conclusion that (just about) everything you do on the Web may be subject to (just about) everybody’s law.” (p. 167). Indeed, the unexceptionalist vision is quite a miserable one when you get right down to it; one that treats this new frontier as a plaything in an endless power struggle between competing political bodies. Meanwhile, as Post points out, the rule of law loses its meaning and becomes less about the consent of the governed and more like a game of “Jurisdictional Whack-a-Mole,” with countless “sovereigns” asserting authority and trying to beat cyberspace and digital denizens into submission in one way or another.

Because Post believes that the unexceptionalists are wrong in their assertion that the Internet is merely the “functional equivalent of mail, or telephone, or smoke signals,” he offers — but does not fully develop — an alternative framework based on Jefferson’s vision for how to settle the Western frontier: Give settlers maximum flexibility to create free, independent, self-governing communities. In Jefferson’s words, “an empire of liberty.. built not on conquest, but on principles of compact and equality.” And this empire of liberty would be, in Post’s words, “held together by consensual bonds and adherence to republican principles, not coercive power, an ever-expanding union of self-governing commonwealths joined together as peers.”

Now that is a beautiful vision for cyberspace!  And, in many ways, it partially explains why cyberspace has been such a special place — at least so far in its early history. But as more and more Hamiltonians assert the need for greater “order,” all that could change. Again, I wish Post would have put some more meat on the bones of his beautiful cyber-Jeffersonian framework to counter the increasing calls we hear for more cyber-Hamiltonianism.  Specifically, Post needs to better address the accusation made by the Digital Age Hamiltonians that Internet exceptionalism is little more than cyber-anarchism. In reality, Internet exceptionalism is essentially something akin to decentralized federalism for the Internet; a federalism that the Founders — or at least Jefferson — would have likely strongly supported.  As I wrote here recently, I like to think of Internet exceptionalism as a variation on Robert Nozick’s “utopia of utopias” vision of an ideal society: “a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others.” (Nozick, 1974)

Post begins a sketch of that Nozickian vision for cyberspace in Jefferson’s Moose, but he doesn’t really finish painting his masterpiece. To be fair, however, Post did make it clear right from the start of the book that it was going to be about asking the right questions, not necessarily providing all the answers.

Two Big Issues, Both Then and Now

Incidentally, using Jefferson as a guide to understanding modern cyberlaw controversies also works well when it comes to “the two issues [that] have been featured in virtually all of the Internet’s Big Cases” — free speech and intellectual property. As Post reminds us, Jefferson had a bit to say about those issues during his own lifetime.

“Jefferson was America’s first, and probably its greatest, First Amendment absolutist”  Post says, (p. 188), because Jefferson viewed free speech as part of a greater “interconnected whole”:

republican self-government, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and freedom of speech. You couldn’t have any without the others; they were inextricably bound together into a single system, and they would stand, or fall, together. (p. 189-190)

Consequently:

To a Jeffersonian, then, free speech questions are always simultaneously (a) of supreme importance and (b) pretty easy. The answer to free speech questions is always (or almost always) simple:  The more protection for, and the fewer the restrictions on, speech, the better. (p. 194)

And Jefferson held true to that principle throughout his life, most notably with his strenuous opposition to the horrendous Sedition Act of 1798.

But intellectual property is a far thornier issue — for both Jefferson and modern cyberlaw. Jefferson was a great inventor himself and keenly interested in the topic. But he also saw IP rights in a different light than speech rights.  Post explains Jefferson’s position:

Unlike free speech rights, intellectual property… cannot, in nature, be a subject of property; they do derive from the “social law,” from the laws of England, or Virginia, or whatever; they’re not antecedent to the law, but entirely dependent on it. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have intellectual property rights. It only means that we get to decide (and we have to decide) whether to have them or not, and how much of them to have. (p. 198) […] Intellectual property law in a Jeffersonian world, then, is always a matter of degree, of finding that balance, of drawing the line… Protection for intellectual property shouldn’t be too weak (or it won’t give creators enough of an incentive to create) or too strong (or it will choke off future creativity), but just right. We’ll never get it exactly right, but it is what we are always aiming for — in a Jeffersonian world, at least. (p. 201)

Of course, finding that “balance” is easier said than done and efforts to strike it engender even more controversy today in the digital world than they did during Jefferson’s time.

Conclusion

David Post has given us an enlightening map to help us navigate the new frontier of cyberspace and cyberlaw. I’m confident Jefferson’s Moose will be on my next end-of-year list of important tech policy books. And I hope my handful of small nitpicks here about the lack of details or answers regarding Post’s beautiful Jeffersonian vision for cyberspace will inspire him to pen yet another book on the subject! We need more friends of true cyber-freedom like David Post.

P.S. David Post is also the co-author of an outstanding treatise on cyberlaw with Patricia L. Bellia and Paul Schiff Berman: Cyberlaw: Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age. The text sits on top of my desk at all times, never far from reach when I need to a quick refresher on some arcane aspect of early Internet jurisprudence. A highly recommended resource.